As noted, Confucius did not employ an abstract concept of self, for the

very reason that morality in his day was explicitly understood in terms of
social rituals and roles. The closest Coniucius came to an "abstract" conceyt
is jen, but even this concept--though mysterious-is not truly abstract. /en
is not a theoretical property of a conceptually isolated ego or self; it is an
"outer-directed" orientation exyressd in the specific intcracl.ions one has
with others. Confucius conceived of morality in just this way: as living a life
of ii and jcn. Although his philosophy was not concerned with the pursuit of
Morat Truth (a purrnit the West has bem carrying out for millennia), CoIdu-
cius provided a profound account of morality that focused instead on what I
have been calling "harmonious human interactionm-an event that occurs in
a specific human context as people conscientiously carry out their various
roles and responsibilities. The point is tliis: The roles that make us who we
are cannot be abstracted f r o m k h o we are. What defines the "self" is pre-
cisely &at defines us as persons-namely, tbe various roles and relation-
ships that link us to others, This is also what it means to live a '%uman7' life
for Confucius: living a "moral" life of ii and jen.

Confucian Ethics, Aristotelian Ethics, and the Problem of

Ethical Indetcvmindcy
Notwithstanding this difference between Confucian philosophy and West-
ern ethics, specifically, that the former lacks theoretical abstraction,z"here
are severat key similarities between Confucian ethics and Aristotdian elhics
that this section will examine. With respect to the absence of theory, though,
PEI was not a problem of pursuing Moral Truth for Confucius. There was a
sure element olpracticdl indclerminacy in Confucius$ aypmxch t o ethics
nonetheless, as we can see in his treatment of jen. In particular, when Confu-
cius was questioned about whecher a living person was jen or not, he either
said he did not know or simply declined to answer,
Confucius spoke of jen in a very paradoxical way because of the indeter-
minacy that emerges from his moral teachings. I account for this in much the
same way as 1 account for thepamdox ofethics endemic to Westcm ethics-
o r to any rationally acceptable ethical system, for that matter--since all ethi-
cal systems must contend with PEI in one form or another. The paradox in
Cunf~lcianethics can be explained as follows: Thc moral person-or the per-
son who is jen---must follow a tao, or path, that entails theptlrsuit ofien. For
even strictly practical aims can embody a kind of "ideal," and the case of jen
presents as much uf an "ideal" as any theoretical moral standard, including
the various versions of Moral Truth that we have embraced in the West.
Why! Because, from a reasonable point of view, none can finally and com-
pletely be reached.