Journal of Anxiety Disorders 21 (2007) 201–210

Pseudo-PTSD
Gerald M. Rosen a,*, Steven Taylor b
a
University of Washington, United States
b
University of British Columbia, Canada

Abstract
Pseudo-posttraumatic stress disorder (pseudo-PTSD) refers to cases in which a patient’s presentation is
but a simulation of the actual clinical syndrome. The problem of pseudo-PTSD has been neglected by many
clinicians and researchers, who often rely on the assumption that a patient’s reported symptoms can be
accepted as valid. The purpose of this article is to (a) consider the diverse causes of pseudo-PTSD, (b)
emphasize the importance of the DSM-IV’s guideline to rule out malingering, and (c) discuss the
implications that pseudo-PTSD has for research and clinical practice.
# 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD); Factitious; Malingering; Litigation; Personal injury; Compensation-
seeking; Veterans

Pseudo or false presentations of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) can arise from diverse
causes (Lacoursiere, 1993; Pankratz, 1998). Yet, when the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association [APA],
1994) addressed the issue of pseudo-PTSD, it only concerned itself with the concept of
malingering. Malingering was defined as ‘‘the intentional production of false or grossly
exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by external incentives such as
avoiding military duty, avoiding work, obtaining financial compensation, evading criminal
prosecution, or obtaining drugs’’ (APA, 1994, p. 739). With regard to PTSD, the DSM-IV
provided this cautionary guideline, ‘‘Malingering should be ruled out in those situations in which
financial remuneration, benefit eligibility, and forensic determinations play a role’’ (p. 467).
The DSM-IV’s guideline to rule out malingering was noteworthy in several respects. First, it
directed special attention toward PTSD even though malingering is an issue that can just as well
apply to other disorders (e.g., major depression) when issues of compensation are involved.
Second, while providing the dictum to rule out malingering, the DSM-IV failed to instruct

* Corresponding author at: 117 East Louisa Street, PMB-229, Seattle, WA 98102, United States.
E-mail address: grosen@u.washington.edu (G.M. Rosen).

0887-6185/$ – see front matter # 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2006.09.011
202 G.M. Rosen, S. Taylor / Journal of Anxiety Disorders 21 (2007) 201–210

clinicians and researchers on how they might accomplish the task, if indeed the task is feasible.
And third, as previously noted, the DSM-IV’s guideline on malingering ignored other reasons
that pseudo-PTSD might occur. In this paper we address these issues and discuss why pseudo-
PTSD warrants more attention in research, clinical, and forensic settings.

1. DSM-IV’s guideline to rule out malingering

1.1. Why a guideline specific to PTSD?

There are several reasons why DSM-IV provides a specific guideline to rule out malingering
in the differential diagnosis of PTSD. PTSD was a diagnostic construct that arose by committee
decision, largely in response to the interests and mental health needs of Vietnam veterans (Scott,
1990; Shephard, 2001; Yehuda & McFarlane, 1995; Young, 1995). The PTSD diagnosis provided
a specific etiology (Meehl, 1977), and so it was particularly beneficial for Vietnam veterans and
other groups who might have disability claims. Unlike most other diagnoses, a core assumption
underlying PTSD concerned the linkage of a specific class of events (Criterion A) to a specific set
of clinical symptoms (Criteria B–D). Slovenko (1994) observed that this feature made PTSD ‘‘a
favored diagnosis in cases of emotional distress because it is incident specific’’ (p. 441). Trimble
(1985) suggested that PTSD ‘‘would give a great deal of leverage to those seeking compensation
and the counting off of symptoms in checklist fashion will become routine practice in many a
lawyer’s office’’ (p. 13). Lees-Haley (1986) wryly commented, ‘‘If mental disorders were listed
on the New York exchange, PTSD would be a growth stock to watch’’ (p. 17).
Additional considerations played a role in the DSM-IV’s provision of a cautionary guideline
for PTSD on the issue of malingering. There had been a long history preceding the DSM that
considered the problem of malingered posttraumatic disorders (e.g., Lewis & Bombaugh, 1896;
Hamilton, 1904; Page, 1891). Issues of disability compensation also influenced policy toward
psychological casualties among soldiers in past wars (Jones & Wessely, 2005; Shephard, 2001).
In addition to historical considerations, there were contemporary publications in which (a)
commentators observed that the symptom criteria were subjective, easily coached, and easily
simulated (Eldridge, 1991; Sparr & Atkinson, 1986); (b) case reports documented the reality of
feigned PTSD (e.g., Lynn & Belza, 1984; Sparr & Pankratz, 1983); and (c) commentators noted
the diverse motives that contributed to people adopting a victim narrative (Hamilton, 1985;
Lacoursiere, 1993). In light of these various influences, it was not surprising when the DSM-IV
included a cautionary guideline specific to PTSD. The only surprise was that it took three editions
to finally recognize the issue: no mention of malingering was made in the PTSD sections of the
DSM-III (APA, 1980) or the DSM-III-R (APA, 1987)

1.2. Have mental health professionals heeded the guideline?

Despite the DSM-IV’s cautionary guideline to rule out malingering, researchers have mostly
ignored the issue. See most every peer reviewed publication on PTSD (1980–2006) to
demonstrate this point. Very few studies report that they ruled out malingering, and fewer still
describe the methods that were used. This holds true even when litigation or compensation claims
apply. To illustrate, Rosen (2004b) observed that Eid, Johnsen, and Thayer (2001) cited two
studies as if they demonstrated high rates of PTSD, when in fact both publications (Raphael &
Meldrum, 1993; Rosen, 1995) reported on subjects who were involved in litigation. No mention
was made by Eid et al. of this important confound. Publications from the Albany Motor Vehicle
 G.M. Rosen, S. Taylor / Journal of Anxiety Disorders 21 (2007) 201–210 203

Accident Project (e.g., Blanchard & Hickling, 2003; Blanchard et al., 1996) and a series of papers
on survivors of the sinking of the Jupiter (e.g. Yule et al., 2000), included many subjects who
were involved in litigation. Yet, no effort to rule out malingering was reported in these
publications. Rosen (2006) provided a detailed critique of a paper by Daly and Johnston (2002)
that reported a 67% rate of PTSD among litigating survivors of a 3 hour hostage situation at a bar
in Northern Island. Although all referrals had been made by plaintiffs’ counsel for the purpose of
forensic assessments, no effort was made to rule out malingering. Instead, Daly and Johnston
(2002) simply observed that the victims appeared to have been ‘‘genuine, honest people’’ (p.
463).
Another example illustrates how researchers and peer review journals have failed to make
meaningful attempts to rule out malingering. Murphy and Keating (1995) reported on their
evaluation of 27 plaintiffs involved in a class action suit, all of whom had been referred by their
counsel. What was the process of assessment used in this study? Murphy and Keating explained
that all plaintiffs had been exposed to a sudden and unpredictable torrent of debris and water that
swept down a hill in a predawn rainstorm, resulting in neither death nor severe physical injuries.
Nonetheless, all plaintiffs were ‘‘exposed,’’ and a class action suit was filed on their behalf.
Clinical interviews were conducted using a written protocol that prompted the plaintiffs’ self-
reports concerning their emotional status and their current level of functioning. Symptom
checklists also were used including the SCL-90-R (Derogatis, 1994) and the Impact of Event
Scale (Horowitz, Winler, & Alvarez, 1979). Murphy and Keating noted that medical records were
available, but, ‘‘The case attorneys had access to litigants’ medical records, [and] requested that
the assessment team submit their report based on data we collected’’ (p. 476). In other words, no
attempt was made to look at additional sources of information beyond the plaintiffs’ self-reported
problems. Perhaps such attempts were felt to be unnecessary. Murphy and Keating reported, ‘‘We
had the opportunity to observe litigants and ask them questions that would be difficult to ‘fake’’’
(p. 480). Based on their findings, Murphy and Keating judged the severity of each case and
provided rankings to further a determination of how any group award might be divided. They
drew the following conclusion:
The process [of assessment] was effective—the case was settled out of court in favor of the
litigants. Individual litigants were satisfied with monetary awards received (p. 473).
Murphy and Keating’s belief that answers to certain types of questions are difficult to fake, is
similar in its optimism to the observation that litigants appear to be trustworthy and sincere (e.g.,
Blanchard & Hickling, 2003; Daly & Johnston, 2002). As we shall see, there is no particular type
of question that reveals feigned presentations of a disorder, nor can clinicians reliably judge a
person’s honesty by their aura.

1.3. Is the DSM-IV’s guideline a feasible goal?

It should be pointed out the Murphy and Keating publication in 1995 could mean that the
assessments were conducted prior to the 1994 introduction of the DSM-IV’s guideline.
Nevertheless, the report serves as a striking example of what not to do. Even in years prior to
1994, it was appreciated that forensic experts should not rely solely on an individual’s self-report
(Shapiro, 1984), disorders could be easily feigned on symptom checklists (Lees-Haley, 1989,
1990), and mental health professionals were not accurate in judging truthfulness (Ekman &
O’Sullivan, 1991; Shapiro, 1984). A decade before the Murphy and Keating publication,
Raifman (1983) observed:
204 G.M. Rosen, S. Taylor / Journal of Anxiety Disorders 21 (2007) 201–210

A good poker player probably knows better than a mental health professional whether or
not a person is lying. A psychiatrist is a doctor, not a lie-detector (p. 129).
Publications over the past 10 years have reinforced these past concerns, demonstrating that (a)
individuals involved in civilian personal injury suits can malinger PTSD symptoms (Rosen,
1995), (b) individuals who seek treatment in VA PTSD clinics can over report their symptoms, a
pattern accentuated among those who seek VA disability compensation (Frueh, Hamner, Cahill,
Gold, & Hamlin, 2000; Frueh et al., 2003), (c) individuals also can misreport the occurrence of
traumatic events (Burkett & Whitley, 1998; Sheridan & Blaauw, 2004), and (d) trained clinicians
have no particular ability to detect actors who feign PTSD (Hickling, Blanchard, Mundy, &
Galovski, 2002; Rosen & Phillips, 2004).
At the same time, publications have observed how difficult it can be for clinicians and
researchers to fulfill the DSM-IV’s dictum to rule out malingering. There is no single or
preferred measure to detect malingering among PTSD patients or claimants (Guriel & Fremouw,
2003), and all instruments have their limitations (Frueh, Elhai, & Kaloupek, 2004). Further,
there is the concern that clinicians must be cautious to protect the therapeutic relationship,
which might be damaged if the veracity of a patient’s report was somehow questioned (Rosen,
2004a; Taylor, Frueh, & Asmundson, 2007). Reflecting on this situation, M. Miller (personal
communication, June 2003) suggested that the DSM-IV should have worded its guideline
more realistically, perhaps stating, ‘‘Although necessary, it is often impossible to rule out
malingering.’’
Several authors have begun to discuss issues of assessment and how malingering might best be
addressed (e.g., Frueh et al., 2004; Rosen, 2004a; Taylor et al., 2007). Still, without a frank
confession or convincing findings from videotaped surveillance, the detection of malingering is a
probabilistic concern; one in which the probability that symptoms are feigned increases with the
amount of convergent information in support of the hypothesis. Examples of methods that may
contribute useful data include the PTSD malingering indices from the MMPI-2 (Butcher,
Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 1989; Elhai, Ruggiero, Frueh, Beckham, & Gold,
2002), interview methods such as the Miller Forensic Assessment Screening Test (Miller, 2001),
the Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology (Smith, 1997; Smith & Burger, 1997),
the Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms (Rogers, Kropp, Bagby, & Dickens, 1992), the
Morel Emotional Numbing Test (Morel, 1998), and symptom validity testing (Rosen & Powel,
2003). These methods may enhance the odds of detecting malingered PTSD and they can be
employed in forensic assessments. Unfortunately, little is known about their feasibility or
accuracy in everyday clinical practice, or in their use for screening people participating in
research.

1.4. Recommendations for DSM-V and peer review journals

Despite the daunting nature of the task to detect malingered PTSD, it is more precipitous to
ignore the matter. As observed by McNally (2003) and Summerfield (1999), feigned cases of
PTSD can compromise the integrity of the PTSD database, with the result that tainted findings
may be misperceived as sound data. Clinicians and forensic experts are urged to use all available
tools in a manner that is informed by current literature. Researchers should only publish in
quality peer-reviewed journals if the issue of malingering has been addressed. Rosen (2004b)
recommended that journal editors should require a clear disclosure statement from authors that
specified the extent to which subjects were involved in litigation, disability applications, or other
 G.M. Rosen, S. Taylor / Journal of Anxiety Disorders 21 (2007) 201–210 205

situations involving compensation claims. When feasible, comparisons on measures of interest

should be made between subjects unaffected and possibly affected by compensation concerns.
Editors of journals that contribute to the PTSD scientific literature are encouraged to consult
with each other for the purpose of drafting a set of requirements that provide minimal standards
for assessing and reporting on the status of research subjects. An example of this type of
enterprise is provided by the CONSORT (Consolidated Standards of Reporting Trials)
guidelines, a document that has provided standards for those reporting clinical trials in medicine
(Begg et al., 1996; Rennie, 1996). As observed by Rosen (2006), ‘‘Until researchers and journal
editors heed the DSM, the PTSD data base remains at risk’’ (p. 534).

2. Factitious PTSD

Diverse motives can lead people to take on a victim role and present with the symptoms of
PTSD (Lacoursiere, 1993). Not every case of pseudo-PTSD is malingered. In support of this
point are numerous cases reported in the literature in which people feign symptoms of PTSD to
assume the sick role (e.g., Fear, 1996; Lynn & Belza, 1984; Neal & Rose, 1995; Newmark,
Adityanjee, & Kay, 1999; Sparr & Pankratz, 1983). To illustrate, Fear (1996) described a case in
which a young male claimed to have been involved in a fishing disaster and feigned PTSD
symptoms primarily to gain admission to hospital.
Factitious PTSD may be associated with bizarre claims of satanic ritual abuse, UFO
abductions, or memories of past-life abuse recovered during age regression therapies. Baumeister
and Sommer (1997) conducted a review of cases involving some of these purported forms of
abuse. They concluded that some people seem to adopt a patient role to transcend and transform
their identities and to cultivate relationships with powerful, and often desirable others.
Another mechanism to account for at least a subset of patients presenting with PTSD-like
symptoms after recovered memories of sexual abuse or bizarre events (e.g., space alien
abductions) has been proposed by McNally and Clancy (2005a,b). Here it is proposed that
episodes of sleep paralysis, accompanied by hallucinations upon awakening and an inability to
move, may lead the person to misinterpret their experience. This raises the fascinating question of
whether a presentation of posttraumatic reactions after what may be a falsely perceived event can
be construed as PTSD. Such events do not appear to meet the first condition of Criterion A
(experiencing, witnessing, or being confronted with an event involving actual or threatened death
or serious injury), although they certainly could fulfill the second and subjective component that
defines a traumatic stressor (a person’s response is characterized by intense fear, helplessness, or
horror). Perhaps with the ever expanding definition of Criterion A and resulting concerns with
conceptual bracket creep (McNally, 2003; Rosen, 2005), such distinctions will no longer matter.
In that case, PTSD will be considered a clinical syndrome that can result from any event, real or
imagined, as long as it is traumatic in the eye of the beholder. Logically, that position would do
away with Criteria A entirely, a position that was considered by the DSM-IV subcommittee
(Kilpatrick et al., 1998) and continues to be recommended by some (Maier, 2006).

3. Is PTSD itself a pseudo disorder?

Most psychiatric disorders are hypothetical constructs devised to help clinicians and
researchers better understand and treat psychopathology. In this regard, PTSD is no different
from other psychiatric disorders. What distinguishes PTSD from other disorders is the construct’s
underlying core assumptions or ‘‘inner logic’’ (Young, 2004). As previously discussed, one of the
206 G.M. Rosen, S. Taylor / Journal of Anxiety Disorders 21 (2007) 201–210

distinctive assumptions underlying PTSD is the assumption of specific etiology (Meehl, 1977);
PTSD is conceptualized as a unique clinical syndrome that can arise only after a defined
traumatic event (Criterion A in the DSM).
If the field of traumatology were to do away with Criterion A, would PTSD stand on the merits
of its symptom criteria? There are reasons to think not. First, PTSD does not represent a discrete
disorder with a distinctive etiology. Research using a statistical method called latent class
analysis (LCA) suggests that there may be three distinct classes or groups of individuals; no
PTSD, partial PTSD, and full PTSD (Breslau, Reboussin, Anthony, & Storr, 2005). However,
‘‘LCA provides no formal test of whether the resulting classes differ in severity or qualitatively’’
(Breslau et al., 2005, p. 1350). Research using taxometric statistical methods, which are designed
to distinguish dimensional from categorical methods, suggests that posttraumatic stress
symptoms fall on a continuum of severity, ranging from everyday symptoms of stress (e.g.,
tension, headaches, irritability) to symptoms characteristic of what we currently call PTSD
(Ruscio, Ruscio, & Keane, 2002). Consistent with this, behavioral genetic (twin studies)
indicates that PTSD symptoms arise, in part, from additive genetic factors; that is, genes that
quantitatively contribute to the risk for developing PTSD symptoms (Stein, Jang, Taylor, Vernon,
& Livesley, 2002).
Other behavioral genetic studies raise the possibility that PTSD, like other anxiety and mood
disorders, arises from a combination of non-specific genetic and environmental factors
(influencing many disorders) along with comparatively smaller contributions from disorder-
specific factors (Hettema, Prescott, Myers, Neale, & Kendler, 2005). That traumatic events are
likely to be non-specifically linked to psychopathology is indicated, for example, by research
showing that childhood sexual abuse is associated with an increased risk for all kinds of
disorders, including PTSD, panic disorder, major depression, and bulimia nervosa (for reviews,
see Taylor (2000, 2006)). Also, non-criterion A events can give rise to the PTSD clinical
syndrome (e.g., Gold, Marx, Soler-Baillor, & Sloan, 2005; Mol et al., 2005), a further
demonstration that core assumptions are fatally flawed.
Posttraumatic stress symptoms also overlap with other diagnostic constructs that may just as
well account for the symptom criteria of PTSD (e.g., depression, panic disorder, specific phobia;
Young, 1995). In fact, the overlap of symptoms for the combination of major depression and
specific phobia is absolutely complete with PTSD to fulfill criteria for the latter diagnosis.
Consider as just one example that Symptom criteria C-4 for PTSD is defined as ‘‘markedly
diminished interest or participation in significant activities,’’ while symptom 2-A for major
depression is defined as ‘‘markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or almost all activities
most of the day, nearly everyday.’’ McHugh (1999) extended these considerations to a discussion
of unusual or delayed forms of PTSD:
More likely, the culprit will be a separate and complicating condition like major
depression, with its cardinal symptoms of misery, despair, and self-recrimination. In this
condition, memories of past losses, defeats, or traumas are reawakened, giving content and
justification to diminished attitudes about oneself. But such memories should hardly
be confused with the cause of the depression itself, which can and should be treated for
what it is.
The possibility that PTSD is itself a pseudo-diagnosis is apart from concerns regarding
malingered and factitious presentations of the hypothesized disorder. Nevertheless, any
discussion of pseudo-PTSD would be incomplete without considering this long-standing (March,
1990), yet unresolved issue.
 G.M. Rosen, S. Taylor / Journal of Anxiety Disorders 21 (2007) 201–210 207

4. Discussion

Regardless of whether PTSD represents a distinct disorder, it has served at least one useful
function; to promote research and advance our understanding of how individuals react to severely
adverse events. Unfortunately, the utility of the PTSD construct is undermined to the extent that
pseudo presentations of the disorder are prevalent and go undetected. Some authorities may feel
these issues are trivial, noting that the base rate of malingering is low. Here the argument goes
that because malingering rarely occurs there is no need to detect it (e.g., D.G. Kilpatrick, personal
communication, 23 March 2005). In actuality, the true base rate of malingering is not known,
with estimates ranging as high as 50% (Resnick, 2003). Even less is known about base rates for
factitious presentations of PTSD. A recent study found that among veterans claiming Vietnam
combat-related PTSD, military records did not corroborate reports of combat exposure in almost
40% of cases (Frueh et al., 2005). Findings such as these reinforce the position that pseudo-PTSD
should not be ignored.

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