ByDesign

A technical publication of ASSE’s

Engineering Practice Specialty

Volume 13 • Number 3

Do Fall Protection
PAGE 12
PTD
PROCESS
Proven

Systems Need
D Solutions

to Be Load
PAGE 18
FALL
HAZARDS
Identifying

Tested?
D Risks

PAGE 21
RISK
ASSESSMENT
Fall
D Prevention

PAGE 22
HUMAN
FACTORS
Inherently
D Safe Design
By Kevin Wilcox

W
hile the answer to the a substitute for sound engineering
question, “Has this practice. For a complete
fall protection system Many people believe that load Table of Contents,
been load tested?” is a testing of fall protection systems is see page 3
simple yes or no, the Load testing can
be a powerful
required by law, ANSI standards or
answer to the underlying question, by both. The only requirement for
©ISTOCKPHOTO.COM/SOFIAWORLD

tool for fall

“Should this fall protection system
be load tested, and if so, how?” is
not nearly as simple. Load testing
of fall protection systems should
be conducted as part of a complete
design program. Load testing is not
protection system load testing related to fall protection
designers, but the
method is often
is found in the ANSI/ASSE Z359
misunderstood. and A10 families of standards. The
standards contain provisions for load
testing of manufactured fall protec-
tion equipment, such as harnesses,
continued on page 8
1
ByDesign www.asse.org 2014
 Membership
ByDesign
Welcome Engineering Practice Specialty

Officers
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information.
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 c o n t e n t s
Volume 13 • Number 3

PAGE  1 Do Fall Protection Systems D

Need to Be Load Tested? PAGE  12
By Kevin Wilcox Proven Solutions
Load testing benefits include determining structural capacity for
From Prevention
existing systems, as well as cost savings in design and construc- Through Design
tion of new fall protection systems.
By Dave Walline

PAGE  4 Electrician Electrocuted Causal data from fatal and serious injury
events suggest the decisions arising from
Troubleshooting Envelope the prevention through design process
play a central role in avoidance of cata-
Manufacturing Machine strophic events.
An overview of an incident in which an electrician was electrocut-
ed while troubleshooting a medium open-end envelope machine.

D PAGE  18
Do Not Be
Fooled by Falls
By Thomas Kramer
Properly identifying and evaluating fall
hazards can help one more intelligently
prioritize projects—with risk and other
factors considered.

PAGE  22 How Do Human

Factors Influence D PAGE  21
Inherently Safe Design? Fall Hazard
By Don Enslow Risk Assessment
A critical component of incident management is a sound incident & Ranking
investigation system that includes employee involvement and rec-
ognizes incident investigation techniques that focus on root-cause By Bethany Harvey
processes and on all contributing factors, including human factors. Safety professionals must seek to iden-
tify all risks rather than focus on a few
PAGE  26 T argeted M etrics categories of risk.

forManaging Fatalities
& Serious Injuries
By Scott Stricoff

While many organizations have some awareness of exposures,

near misses and minor injuries that have high potential, few pos-
sess the consistent reporting, measurement and tracking visibility
needed to address these precursors in sustainable ways.

CONNECTION KEY
Click on these icons for immediate access or bonus information

V Video W Website P PDF L Hot Link Ad Ad Link D Direct Link

3
ByDesign www.asse.org 2014
 Electrical Hazards

Electrician Electrocuted
Troubleshooting Envelope
Manufacturing Machine
Massachusetts FACE Investigation: 12-MA-007-01

O
n April 4, 2012, a 53-year-old male electrician tagout, hazard communication and powered industrial
(victim) was electrocuted while troubleshoot- trucks.
ing a medium open-end envelope machine. The During the site visit, it was reported that since the
machine’s blower was not working, and the incident, the company had started to develop a safety
victim was working to repair it. The victim was reach- and health program and was holding weekly planning
ing into the machine to access wiring for the blower meetings of management and key production staff to
contained in an electrical junction box when he was develop a safety committee.
electrocuted.
Victim
Employer The victim had been employed by the company as an
The employer is a manufacturer electrician for approximately 7 years at the time of the
The victim had and printer of envelopes and sta- incident. He held a valid master electrician license. The
tionery and has been in business victim’s normal work schedule was first shift, Monday
been working extra for 24 years. The company has through Friday. For 2 months before the incident, he
hours to direct approximately 82 employees, about
60 of whom work in the manufac-
had been working extended hours in support of the com-
pany’s relocation. It was reported that the victim had
the project and turing department while 20 work worked about 12 hours the day before the incident and
disconnecting and in sales and office positions. Three
employees made up the mainte-
was on site at 5:00 a.m. or 6:00 a.m. on the day of the
incident.
reconnecting any nance department in which the vic-
tim worked. Employees worked 5
electrical compo- days per week,
nents affected by Monday through
Friday. There
the facility’s move. were two work
shifts each day.
Saturday was
a designated maintenance day for
the machines, a downtime when
machine setters could come in to
adjust the machines.

Written Safety
Programs & Training
The victim was the company’s
main safety and health representa-
tive/trainer. At the time of the inci-
dent, the company did not have a
comprehensive safety and health pro-
gram. New hires were provided with
an orientation that included training
on multiple safety and health topics, Photo 1: A medium open-end envelope machine viewed from the front end.
including machine guarding, lockout/

4
ByDesign www.asse.org 2014
 STANDARD
ANSI/ASSE
Z244.1-2003
W (R2008)

Investigation
At the time of the incident, the
company had been moving its
entire facility to the newly reno-
vated factory building where the
incident occurred. Reportedly, the
victim was playing a large role in
this move, overseeing the break-
ing down, moving and setting up/
reassembling of approximately
15 manufacturing machines. The
move had started 1 month prior to
the incident with the machinery
being moved in stages so that pro-
duction could continue with limit-
Photo 2: The envelope machine’s blower motor.
ed downtime. A few machines had
been split into two or three pieces
and moved by a rigging contractor
Incident Location into the new facility. The victim
The company was in the process of moving into a had been working extra hours to direct the project and
building built around 1900 and historically operated disconnecting and reconnecting any electrical compo-
as a fabric mill. The building had been recently reno- nents affected by the move. The company contracted an
vated to accommodate the envelope company. The additional electrician to help with this process.
entire building was more than 300,000 sq ft, and the The machine involved in the incident was one of
company was to occupy about half of that space. The the machines that had been split into two pieces for
machinery was set up on the ground floor, which was a the move. Splitting this particular machine required
large open space. removing plates, which bridged the machine frame at
approximately the midpoint of the machine’s length,
Equipment and disconnecting all wiring/conduit and other compo-
The machine involved in the incident was a medium nents, which crossed this midpoint (Photo 3, p.6). The
open-end envelope machine (Photo 1) that the company machine had been moved, reassembled, tested and run-
had owned for about 14 years. It was estimated that the ning the evening before the incident.
machine was manufactured more
than 30 years ago and perhaps as
early as the 1960s. The machine was Figure 1
configured to punch and install an
address window on presized sheets Envelope Machine’s Blower Motor
of paper, fold and glue the envelope Power Supply Shown From Above With
into shape and put on a strip of self-
sealing glue with removable strip to Approximate Pathway of Conduit
seal the envelope.
The machine was equipped with
a blower motor (Photo 2) that pro-
vided airflow to different sections
of the machine through a series of
hoses. The blower’s main function
was to create negative air pressure
on the underside of the transfer belts
to keep the paper flat and in position
as it passed from one process to the
next. The blower motor was powered
by 480 V through a three-phase for-
mat, (three powered lines and a neu-
tral line), which ran through conduit
and many junction boxes from the
main fuse panel (Figure 1).

5
ByDesign www.asse.org 2014
 The day of the incident, the machine setter/
operator had been scheduled to resume work
as the machine was ready to use. While mak-
ing adjustments, the machine operator noticed
he could not hear the blower motor running and
reported the issue. The victim discovered dur-
ing his initial troubleshooting that the blower
may have been running at a reduced power, and
perhaps one of the electrical lines had shorted or
disconnected after being set up at the new facil-
ity. The victim then continued to further trouble-
shoot the motor wiring, replacing some fuses in
the main panel and apparently locating a short in
the blower’s wiring.
At the time of the incident, the victim was
accessing a junction box located near the break
in the machine at floor level (Photo 4). It was
unclear if the victim was voltage testing to
ensure that the junction box was de-energized
or if he was continuing to troubleshoot. While
accessing this junction box, he came in contact
with an energized component and was electro-
cuted. It is suspected the current traveled from
one hand, through his torso and out his other
hand or perhaps another part of his body touch-
ing the machine. The machine operator noticed
the victim looked like he was straining while
reaching into the machine and walked over to
offer assistance. He realized the victim was being
electrocuted and pulled on the victim’s sleeve to
move him away from the machine. The machine
operator then yelled for help and another
coworker called emergency medical services.
The local fire department was at the site to
inspect the fire alarm panel as part of
the move into the renovated facility.
A coworker informed fire department
personnel of the incident, and they
started to care for the victim. Local
police, additional fire department
personnel and state police arrived at
the incident location. The victim was
transported by ambulance to a local
hospital where he was pronounced
dead.
Face Program
T he NIOSH Fatality Assessment and Control
Evaluation (FACE) program is a research program
designed to identify and study fatal occupational
injuries. The FACE program’s goal is to prevent occu­
pational fatalities across the U.S. by identifying and
investigating high-risk work situations and then
formulating and disseminating prevention strate­
gies to those who can intervene in the workplace.
Investigations conducted through the FACE program
allow the identification of factors that contribute to
these fatal injuries. This information is used to devel­
op comprehensive recommendations for preventing
similar deaths.
Participating states voluntarily notify NIOSH of
traumatic occupational fatalities resulting from spe­
cific causes of death, including confined spaces, elec­
trocutions, machine-related, falls from elevation and
logging. FACE is targeting investigations of deaths
associated with machinery, falls, energy production,
deaths of youths under 18 years of age not covered
by child labor hazardous orders and deaths of for­
eign-born workers.
Nine state health or labor departments have
cooperative agreements with NIOSH for conducting
surveillance and on-site investigations and for recom­
mending prevention activities at the state level using
the FACE model.
For more information, contact Nancy Romano at
ndr4@cdc.gov or (304) 285-5889.

Cause of Death
The medical examiner listed the
cause of death as electrocution.

Recommendations
Recommendation 1: Employers
should ensure that electrical circuits
and equipment are de-energized and
that lockout/tagout standard operat-
ing procedures are implemented and Photo 3: The bridge plates at the envelope machine’s split point.
enforced prior to beginning work.

6
ByDesign www.asse.org 2014
 Recommendation 2: Employers
should provide and ensure that
employees use appropriate PPE and
tools for troubleshooting live circuits.
Recommendation 3: Employers
should develop, implement and
enforce an injury and illness preven-
tion program that addresses hazard
recognition and avoidance of unsafe
conditions.
Recommendation 4: Employers
should ensure that work is scheduled
to allow for sufficient rest periods
between work shifts.
Recommendation 5: Machine
manufacturers should implement
the prevention through design
concept to ensure the safety and
health of machine users, including Photos 4-5: The envelope machine’s junction box (view from left and right of bridge plate) where
machine operators and maintenance the worker contacted live wire.
workers. •

Z359 Fall Protection Code

Now Available on Flash Drive
V
ersion 3.0 of the ANSI/ASSE
Z359 Fall Protection Code is
now available on a flash drive,
allowing SH&E professionals world-
wide to have instant and portable
access to what is considered the
definitive resource for fall protection.
Initially released in 2007, the code
is a series of coordinated standards
and reference documents that estab-
lish the requirements for an effective
and comprehensive fall protection
management system. Version 3.0
includes the following standards:
ANSI/ASSE Z359.0-2012,
Definitions & Nomenclature Used
for Fall Protection & Fall Arrest
ANSI/ASSE Z359.1-2007,
Safety Requirements for Personal
Fall Arrest Systems, Subsystems &
Components
ANSI/ASSE Z359.2-2007,
Minimum Requirements for a
Comprehensive Managed Fall
Protection Program
ANSI/ASSE Z359.3-2007, Safety ANSI/ASSE Z359.1-1992
Requirements for Positioning & (R1999)—Historical Document,
Travel Restraint Systems Safety Requirements for Personal
ANSI/ASSE Z359.4-2013, Safety Fall Arrest Systems, Subsystems &
Requirements for Assisted-Rescue & Components
Self-Rescue Systems, Subsystems & ANSI/ASSE
Components A10.32-2012,
ANSI/ASSE Z359.6- Fall Protection
2009, Specifications & Design Systems for
Requirements for Active Fall Construction
Protection Systems & Demolition
ANSI/ASSE Z359.7-2011, Operations
Qualification & Verification Testing ANSI/
of Fall Protection Products ASSE Z490.1-
ANSI/ASSE Z359.12-2009, 2009, Criteria
Connecting Components for Personal for Accepted
Fall Arrest Systems Practices in
ANSI/ASSE Z359.13-2013, Safety, Health &
Personal Energy Absorbers & Environmental
Energy-Absorbing Lanyards Training
ANSI/ASSE Z359.14-2012, Click here for more information
Safety Requirements for Self- on the code or click here to pur-
Retracting Devices for Personal Fall chase it. •
Arrest & Rescue Systems

7
ByDesign www.asse.org 2014
 cover story

Do Fall Protection Systems testing program can confirm the adequacy of the struc-
Need to Be Load Tested? tural capacity and can yield the necessary documentation
continued from page 1 for their recertification. Likewise, load testing will expose
any system deficiencies, mitigating the unknown hazard
lanyards and other PPE, but they do not discuss load that may cause a failure. After all, a false sense of secu-
testing of anchorages or anchorage connectors. rity might increase the risk of a fall.
Load testing can be a powerful tool for fall protection
system designers, but the method is often misunderstood. Confirm Existing Systems
Load testing is not given extensive or specific treatment In some cases, load testing may be the only feasible
in the codes and standards, so interpretation and soundway to determine structural capacity. Because fall protec-
engineering judgment are necessary to determine appro- tion systems are often installed on structures long after
priate applications of this testing method. their initial construction, a variety of structural (and non-
Load testing benefits include determining structural
structural) materials can serve as the substrate through
capacity for existing systems, as well as cost savings in
which the fall protection loads must ultimately travel and
design and construction of new fall protection systems.be resisted. For the designer, this means that the structure
Load testing can also help prevent incidents and injuries
to which the fall protection system is attached may not be
on systems that are in use but have insufficient docu- readily assessed by analytical means.
mentation to demonstrate their structural capacity. As with any construction project, installation of fall
protection may vary widely in quality between projects
Regulations & Standards and contractors. Load testing is often a valuable alterna-
Existing fall protection regulations and standards offer tive to structural analysis in locations where information
only limited provisions regarding load testing. In fact, needed to perform a conventional analysis is not avail-
OSHA does not address the subject at all. The ANSI/ able or when the structure cannot be assessed by conven-
ASSE standards contain provisions for load testing of tional analytical methods. In some cases, fall protection
manufactured fall protection equipment, such as harness- systems are installed without proper oversight or docu-
es, lanyards and other PPE, but they mentation. In the author’s experience, load testing has
do not discuss load testing of anchor- been conducted to verify that the installation was per-
Load testing is ages or anchorage connectors. Many formed in accordance with proper construction methods
manufacturers of subsystems, such
often a valuable as horizontal lifelines, require that (e.g., a visual inspection of adhesive anchors installed
into concrete cannot be relied on to evaluate the strength
alternative to the installers test the equipment to
verify that it was properly installed,
of those anchors).
structural analysis but this requirement rarely (if ever) System Redesign or Reconfiguration
extends to testing the anchorage to Load testing may also be a useful tool in the recon-
in locations where the building structure. figuration or redesign of existing fall protection systems
information needed Although the building code does for new applications and new loadings. Reuse of part
not prescribe fall protection loads, or all of an existing system as part of a new fall protec-
to perform a con- the International Building Code tion design may be a cost-effective alternative to new
contains a full section
ventional analysis tions for in-situ load testing of of regula- construction. Because of the evolving nature of fall
protection regulations and standards, loadings and usage
is not available or building structures, written in the needs may change over a system’s lifespan. Load test-
when the structure context of building code loading
conditions. Concerning window
ing is a means of establishing structural adequacy for
components of an existing system that cannot be readily
cannot be assessed cleaning, the ANSI/IWCA I-14.1 analyzed for new loading conditions. Note that load test-
standard addresses load testing of ing should not be considered a replacement for proper
by conventional window cleaning anchorages, but its analysis. However, load testing is often useful in verify-
analytical methods. treatment of the topic is somewhat
incomplete and ambiguous. More
ing assumptions that must be made to proceed with engi-
neering analysis.
specifically, the standard does not
require load testing of anchors. It merely gives guid- Commissioning & Certification
ance in the event that a professional engineer deems Many proprietary systems, such as horizontal life-
load testing necessary. lines, need to be certified or commissioned by the
In short, load testing of fall protection system anchor- installer or the designer prior to use. Manufacturers often
ages is not required. require load testing as part of the certification process for
their systems. This may also be true for systems requir-
Why Load Test Fall Protection Systems? ing recertification.
Although it is not required, a designer may choose to
load test fall protection systems for many reasons. A load
8
ByDesign www.asse.org 2014
 Load Testing Program
Load testing of fall protection needs to be more
than simply pulling on anchorages and giving them
approval. A complete program includes an investigation
phase with an approved group of carefully selected and
designed load tests that address the specific components
in question for the systems being tested. Testing requires
deliberate planning of test logistics and complete docu-
mentation of the entire process. This documentation pro-
vides a vital record of work for future use.
Pretesting Investigation
Designers should investigate the fall protection
systems and their supporting structures before testing.
Performing this due diligence will limit the inherent
risks associated with load testing of an existing struc-
ture. Without sufficient knowledge of the structure, it
is not possible to reliably predict how it may behave
when subjected to a concentrated test load. Furthermore,
pretesting investigation aids in the selection of system
components that will actually require a load test. In addi-
tion, the investigation informs the designer’s decision
about the type of test that will most effectively test those
components.
For example, load testing is only useful if it provides
information about how an anchorage will perform when
loaded in the same direction as a force that a fall will
generate. One would not conclude that an anchor in a
roof could withstand a 200-lb pullout load just because a
©ISTOCKPHOTO.COM/FRANKY DE MEYER
200-lb person could stand on it.
Office Investigation
Several tasks should be performed in the office
before the load testing begins. Designers should review
any available documentation regarding installation of
the existing fall protection systems to assess whether
certain system components will require testing and
ByDesign www.asse.org 2014
to understand the overall quality of the installation.
Designers should review structural drawings and per-
form calculations to identify building structures eligible
for testing and to set safe limits for testing loads. At
times, load testing may be ruled out by analysis for
some structures that cannot handle the concentrated
loads necessary to test certain system components. This
in-house work lays the groundwork for effective test
design and meaningful results.
Potential Pitfalls & Disadvantages
While load testing can be a valuable tool in the evalu-
ation and design of fall protection systems, it has some
drawbacks that should be considered before proposing a
load testing program.
Research & Development
Any load testing program, even if similar to past proj-
ects, will need to be somewhat customized to the current
project’s specific needs. This may include significant
amounts of research, investigation and test development.
The costs associated with the program development
effort should be estimated at the outset so that the owner
can decide whether the value added by the testing is
worth the cost of bringing it to fruition.
Risk of Accidental Damage/Liability
Despite a designer’s best efforts, risks will remain
during a load testing operation. While contracts and
agreements with the client, testing agency and other
concerned parties can limit the test designer’s liability,
a lawsuit is always a possibility if collateral damage
occurs. In most cases, the benefits will outweigh the
risks, but those risks should always be kept in mind
when pursuing load testing as means to a fall protection
solution.
9
 Unfavorable Results
Although load testing is designed to identify deficien-
cies in fall protection systems, too many unfavorable
results eliminate the economic benefits of load testing.
While discovering inadequate systems can help avoid
incidents, failed systems must be rejected, removed,
redesigned and replaced. Load testing then becomes an
expensive extra step in the redesign and renovation of
fall protection systems. If it is predicted that a group of
systems will experience a high rate of failure during load
testing, or if high failure rates are experienced in a suf-
ficient sample of tests early in a program, the designer
and client should consider abandoning load testing in
favor of pursuing new design and installation. However,
this situation is not likely to be revealed until substantial
amounts of time and money have been invested in the
development of a load testing program and the genera-
tion of a sufficient body of data.
Practical Considerations
The types of load tests employed in a fall protection
testing program will vary between projects. The tests
used will correspond to the specific system components
identified for testing and will also vary based on the
makeup of the building structure as well as the types of
fall protection systems installed.
Selection of a test type in a given application depends
on what the test needs to prove and what component of
the fall protection system needs to be tested. The design-
er should consider the following questions when select-
ing the tests used in the load testing program:
•What am I trying to test?
•How can it be isolated from the other system compo-
nents?
•Can a single test prove the capacity of multiple com-
ponents?
•Is a physical test required or will an inspection suffice?
Although the planning and theory behind a load test-
ing program are critical to achieving successful results,
those results will only be valuable if the tests are well
executed and well documented. Design professionals
possess the greatest amount of responsibility for ensuring
that the testing is a success and should, therefore, main-
tain an appropriate level of control over practical aspects
of the testing, particularly if a third party is physically
performing the tests. Laying the groundwork for proper
field methodologies and documentation of test results
will ensure that testing is delivered with the highest
value possible. •
Kevin Wilcox is principal at LJB Inc.

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 Join your fellow safety
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Conference. Experience
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 PTD Process
Proven Solutions From
Prevention Through Design
C
ausal data from fatal and
serious injury events sug-
gest the decisions arising
from the prevention through
design (PTD) process play
a central role in avoidance of cata-
strophic (life-ending or life-altering)
events. Numerous studies and
research reveal 20% to 50% of all
mishaps reported indicate a design
gap finding. From the author’s first-
hand experience and study, fatal and
serious events are at the high end of
this percentage range.
The central question is, What is
holding back organizations from
addressing design-related events
head-on? The author believes a criti-
cal organizational and cultural blind
spot exists. Through benchmarking
with other SH&E professionals, he
has found that most injury/illness
data management systems used by
organizations do not ask for, capture read ANSI/ASSE Z590.3-2011,
or highlight design-related causal
factors. This data gap has caused
latent, design-related conditions
to go uncontrolled and undetected
in most organizations. As a direct
result, both existing and new designs
continue to be operated or procured
with inherent uncontrolled hazards
and risks that can potentially cause four main stages of occupational
serious mishaps.
©ISTOCKPHOTO.COM/DAVINCIDIG
To avoid such design-related inci-
dents, the author strongly suggests
that SH&E professionals personally
dive deep into their own organiza-
tions’ injury/loss experience if they
have not done so already. By criti-
ByDesign www.asse.org 2014
By Dave Walline, CSP
cally examining previous incidents, preoperational stage. SH&E profes-
startling answers can be uncovered. sionals must shift and even depart
The author has gained new from traditional safety roles and
insight from his own experiences by daily job duties, such as compliance
drilling deeper into causal data from
program writing, training, inspec-
past mishaps. Other SH&E profes- tions and claims management, and
sionals can also discover compel- must transition into risk avoidance
ling information that can be used toand risk mitigation activities related
generate a stronger focus on PTD in to organizational planning, design,
their organizations. specifications, safety procurement
One key outcome of the author’s specifications, design safety reviews,
work has been the development of a proven solution development and
design safety checklist centered on risk assessment.
fatal and serious mishap prevention Based on the author’s informal
controls related to past events. This
research and discussion with many
design-focused checklist has been a global SH&E professionals over the
game changer for designing out fatalpast 5 years, the SH&E community
and serious mishap-related risks. roughly spends its time as follows:
1) preoperational, 10% (avoidance
PTD Skill-Building and elimination focus);
To enhance their skill level and 2) operational, 70% (compliance
efforts around PTD, SH&E pro- and retrofit focus);
fessionals should first obtain and 3) postincident, 20% (claims
management, litigation, regulatory
Prevention Through Design: issues);
Guidelines for Addressing 4) postoperational, <1% (decom-
Occupational Hazards and missioning, demolition).
Risks in Design and Redesign Today’s best organizations seek
Processes. out innovative and creative SH&E
Section 1.3 of the standard, professionals, but the SH&E job
which is focused on application, description of tomorrow will likely
states the PTD standard applies to look much different. Progressive
employers will look for SH&E pro-
risk management: fessionals who possess these key core
1) preoperational; competencies (working in the preop-
2) operational; erational risk management stage):
3) postincident; 1) PTD;
4) postoperational. 2) risk assessment;
The author believes for PTD to 3) management of change;
come to the forefront of business deci- 4) fatal and serious injury pre-
sion making, the SH&E community vention;
must begin to spend more time in the
12
 5) operational risk management
system;
6) contractor risk management;
7) safety specifications for pro-
curement;
8) human error and human per-
formance.
These core competencies are
highlighted in ANSI/AIHA/ASSE
Z10-2012, Occupational Health
and Safety Management
Systems, another document SH&E
professionals should obtain, read,
fully understand and adopt.
SH&E professionals who possess
these core competencies will bring
the required leadership and creativ-
ity to their organizations and facili-
ties by identifying, establishing and
driving proven solutions into new
designs and processes. The author
believes future SH&E professionals
should establish a career target (both
time and skill set) to work 70% in
the preoperational stage of risk man-
agement. In this stage, the business
world sees the SH&E professional
as a leader, valued business partner
and risk mitigation advisor. Personal
recognition and reward come with
this new role.
According to the author’s obser-
vations, SH&E professionals spend
most of their time in a firefighting
and/or compliance mode while mak-
ing these common mistakes:
1) Assume their business lead-
ers know what they should be doing
next in SH&E (such as PTD).
2) Believe nothing can be done
in PTD without a corporate edict or
standard.
3) Think that PTD is to be left
only to engineers and designers.
4) Fear that they will not per-
fectly implement PTD when start-
ing out.
5) Wait for others to engage them
in the PTD process.
Safe Design Myths & Bad
Design Hurt Organizations
Five common myths must be
dispelled and overcome to move an
organization forward:
1) The design meets minimum
compliance; therefore, it is safe.
2) PTD is cost-prohibitive. High-
level controls are too costly.
3) PTD will slow down the proj-
ect. We do not have time for design
reviews and risk assessment.
4) The current/old design is safe
enough. We have always done it this
way. Our injury experience does not
prove otherwise.
5) Low-level controls on the haz-
ard-control hierarchy greatly reduce
severity of harm.
Bad designs can negatively influ-
ence an entire organization in the fol-
lowing ways:
1) serious mishaps;
2) low employee morale;
3) elevated risk levels;
4) human performance barriers;
5) product quality issues;
6) losses impacting profitability;
7) poor operating efficiency;
8) equipment and process reliabil-
ity issues;
9) litigation;
10) poor public image;
11) higher labor costs;
12) compliance gaps;
13) waste and scrap;
14) business interruption;
15) customer expectations not
being fulfilled.
Proven Solutions:
PTD Culture Revolution
Risk avoidance and hazard
elimination are proven solutions for in Z590.3, this
designing out causal factors. These
solutions directly remove high-
potential risk factors often faced by acceptable risk in design through
exposed groups, such as operations risk avoidance. Avoidance has the
and maintenance personnel, con-
struction workers and the public.
PTD decision makers and stake-
holders are responsible for risk
control, and these entities include
business owners, customers, capital
project delivery teams, construction
managers, design/build firms, engi-
neers, designers, machine builders/
fabricators, operations and mainte-
nance personnel and SH&E profes-
sionals. Proven solutions provide a
visible means to remove traditional
cultural barriers in the form of false sionals tend to work in the reactive
beliefs from design-for-safety efforts. or costly retrofit world and never
13
ByDesign www.asse.org 2014
Proven solutions are myth-busters
that address causal factors surround-
ing catastrophic events and have
these key attributes:
1) risk avoidance;
2) hazard elimination;
3) severity reduction;
4) high level of control (control
effectiveness);
5) remove barriers to safe work;
6) reduce burden costs (e.g., cost-
ly retrofitting, claims, compliance
programs);
7) address both normal and abnor-
mal conditions;
8) widely accepted by users;
9) positive impact on operating
efficiency and maintenance;
10) easily incorporated into engi-
neered designs and procurement
specifications.
Such solutions should be incor-
porated into a project at the earliest
stage of the design process as perfor-
mance objectives and design criteria
and can be used
to provide a
tangible view of Proven solutions
what achieving
acceptable risk offer the rare
looks like. opportunity to
Proven solu-
tions originate design out or to
from the hierar-
chy of controls. avoid entire hazard/
As presented exposure categories.
approach is
the preferred method of achieving
greatest net positive impact on safe
design because it prevents hazards
from entering the workplace though
design. When avoidance strategies
are used, no hazards need to be elim-
inated or controlled.
A good risk avoidance statement
begins with a “no” statement. Each
no statement bears a proven solu-
tion. Taking this approach may seem
strange to many SH&E professionals
because avoiding risk can rarely be
accomplished. Most SH&E profes-

live in the risk avoidance mindset or
workspace.
During the conceptual design
stage, risk avoidance and hazard
elimination allow SH&E profes-
sionals to work and participate with
design and project teams. Proven
solutions offer the rare opportunity to and mixing systems.
design out or to avoid entire hazard/
exposure categories.
Proven solutions create and shape
the bond between the SH&E com-
munity and engineering and design
communities by allowing engineers
and designers to do what they do
best—incorporate risk control mea-
sures into their designs and redesigns ment, maintenance and emergencies.
with confidence.
From 2009 to 2011, the author
worked on a large capital project in
China, a multimillion-dollar manu-
facturing facility. He worked with
the design/build firm to incorporate
proven solutions into the plant design new facility found their new work
by placing each of the performance
objectives into a no statement. The
result of this effort came with a no-
exposure outcome. Examples of no
statements included:
1) No portable ladders.
2) No powered forklift trucks
used in the manufacturing space.
3) No elevated work.
4) No energized electrical work.
ByDesign www.asse.org 2014
5) No manual handling/lifting of
manufactured products exceeding 45
lb by production employees.
6) No elevated or remote energy
isolation points used for lockout/
tagout/try tasks.
7) No open chemical processing
8) No unsecured trailers while
loading.
9) No open electrical panels to
perform diagnostics or thermography.
10) No fall hazards during build-
ing construction.
11) No congested or restricted
workspace regarding people, equip-
12) No direct interface between
employees and powered machinery
and equipment (during either normal
or abnormal conditions).
Upon completion of this project, impact severity of harm is during
many of the 350 employees at this
environment to be world-class and
worker-friendly.
Sustainable, proven solutions are likelihood, not severity.
now used on all projects based on
the no statements the author estab-
lished for the China project. For
example:
1) Typical portable ladder tasks Requirements and Risk
are designed out by
a) relocating work at ground
level;
14
b) work made accessible by
fixed stairways/platforms;
c) establishing a proper access-
way for work-lifts.
2) An automated guided
vehicle system eliminates forklift
operations.
3) Electrical energy isolation,
arc-preventive switchgear/motor
control centers and diagnostic
ports are used.
4) Piping system isolation
valves are used at ground level, as
are gauges and filters.
5) A trailer restraint system and
dock door barrier guards are used.
6) Automated product convey-
ance and lifting systems are used.
7) Fully-enclosed chemical pro-
cess and mixing systems are used.
8) Fall prevention, includ-
ing perimeter guarding, skylight
guarding and aerial lifts, is used
100% of the time during construc-
tion.
9) Employees wear less PPE, not
more.
10) Devices are enabled under
the exclusive control of maintenance
workers for approved troubleshoot-
ing tasks.
11) All hazardous energy isolation
points are at floor level within 3 m
of need.
12) Employees are removed from
directly interfacing with powered
machinery and equipment using
barrier guarding and automated jam-
clearing systems.
PTD Influence on Exposure
& Human Performance
The only opportunity SH&E
professionals and designers have to
the avoidance and elimination stage.
In some cases, substitution can also
affect the severity of harm. Other
levels of control can only impact
The author highly recom-
mends that SH&E professionals
©ISTOCKPHOTO.COM/NADLA
obtain and read ANSI B11.0-2010,
Safety of Machinery: General
Assessment. Table 3 in this stan-
dard, the hazard control hierarchy,
outlines the influence each level of
control has on risk factors, such as
severity and likelihood. The table
indicates that the greatest influence
on eliminating or reducing severity
of harm is at the elimination or sub-
stitution level.
Based on the author’s experi-
ence, many SH&E professionals,
engineers and others hold a false
belief that low-level controls have a
great impact on severity when they
do not. Guarding and engineering
controls are excellent risk control
measures, but their primary purpose
is to reduce likelihood, not severity.
That is why control effectiveness and
control maintainability are so impor-
tant for sustainable protection. To
prevent fatal and serious loss events,
the focus on design must begin with
avoidance and elimination because
these highest-control levels relate
directly to severity reduction.
Proven solutions also support
safe behaviors and eliminate many
common human error factors. SH&E
leaders begin to understand the
affect of PTD in their organizations
when they overhear project man-
agers, business leaders and others
make these statements:
1) “Design the work so it is easy
to do it safely and difficult to do it
wrong.”
2) “Severe injuries will have a
greater impact on the organization
than will stopping production to
improve safety.”
3) “Someone who wants to do
well never underestimates a bad
outcome.”
4) “Administrative and PPE con-
trols will never replace appropriate
safeguarding.”
5) “We could be world-class
if this process were not so poorly
designed to begin with.”
Proven solutions can significantly
enhance human performance through
avoidance and elimination of the fol-
lowing human error influencers:
1) high ambient noise;
2) poor ergonomics (e.g., layout,
job setup, workspace);
3) PPE loading and barrier to job
completion;
4) working in high ambient tem-
peratures or poor lighting;
5) responding to routine process
upsets and abnormal conditions;
6) performing complex work;
7) physically demanding work
that leads to fatigue;
8) use of hand tools that draw a
worker close to the hazard.
The only
opportunity SH&E
professionals and
designers have to
impact severity of
harm is during the
avoidance and
elimination stage.
Proven Solutions
Reduce Burden Costs
A key PTD selling point often
overlooked by the SH&E commu-
nity and during design reviews is the
long-term burden costs the organiza-
tion will incur when hazards are not
eliminated in the design or redesign
phase. The SH&E community can
identify and communicate burden
costs when low-level controls are
selected over one-time, high-level
controls designed to avoid or elimi-
nate hazards and risks.
Most SH&E professionals spend
the majority of their time in the
operational and postincident phase
due to:
1) burdensome oversight of reg-
ulatory-driven programs and claims
management;
2) almost daily efforts to find
scarce resources for retrofitting
15
ByDesign www.asse.org 2014
uncontrolled hazards associated with
design gaps.
Of special significance is the
fact that burden costs, which can be
extreme, must be maintained during
the facility’s life expectancy.
One example of how burden cost
can add up over time is using por-
table ladders in a typical manufactur-
ing setting. Based on the author’s
experience, the burden cost for a
new 500,000-sq-ft facility that has
a planned lifespan of 50 years with
intent to use portable ladders can run
as much as $9.3 million.
As an alternative, proven solu-
tions to design out the 17 defined
routine ladder tasks (for 175 ladder
users) in the concept stage would
require a one-time capital investment
of $500,000. This is a noteworthy
net positive capital investment and
can prevent the facility from ever
having a serious portable ladder-
related mishap.
Any capital project always has
two monetary spends. The first spend
(pay now) is the cost of the new
design, and the second spend (pay
later) is the long-term burden costs.
Long-term burden costs often far
exceed the cost of an original design
solution that would have eliminated
the entire hazard category.
The most commonly seen burden
costs linked to a facility’s life expec-
tancy are injury claim costs, com-
pliance maintenance costs, retrofit
costs, business interruption, operat-
ing inefficiencies, resource manage-
ment and manpower costs.
Many organizations continue to
report falls from portable and fixed
ladders, which are reflected in past
and current data reported by OSHA
and the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Often, falls from ladders can become
life-ending or life-altering. Portable
ladders also continue to appear on
OSHA’s top 10 violations list.
When looking at portable ladder
use, the ladder and its user are both
considered lower-level controls. A
safe ladder and safe ladder user do
not mean low severity, which is why
ladder-related fatalities continue to
be a commonly reported mishap. In
fact, portable ladder use is a high-
risk task. Our focus must shift from
ladder compliance programs to lad-
der avoidance through design.
The author uncovered a signifi-
cant risk factor when performing an
in-depth review of previously unseen
causal factors related to poor design.
The key risk factor discovered was
the impact a congested or restricted
access workspace has on worker
safety. As most organizations and
businesses attempt to cut project
costs, a common approach is to
reduce floor space or the facility’s
footprint. This approach generally
results in less workspace and/or
restricted access to equipment for
maintenance activities. It forces the
facility’s operations management to
purchase portable ladders because no
workspace or access was provided
for alternative safer designs, such as
stairways, personal lifts and hoisting
equipment.
Business Value &
Benefits Gained from PTD
A second key selling point for
PTD is the benefits derived from
safe project delivery. Safe designs
offer organizations many benefits.
For example, the new plant built in
China incorporated many proven
ByDesign www.asse.org 2014
solutions into its design and saw
these additional benefits:
1) Project came in $10 million
under budget.
2) Reduced energy consumption.
3) Zero waste to landfill and
overall net positive impact on the
environment.
4) Plant sold out of its product
line and achieved full production
capacity ahead of plan.
5) High worker morale.
6) Operating efficiency targets
achieved well ahead of plan.
7) Fifty innovative proven solu-
tions incorporated into design (many
hazard categories avoided or elimi-
nated).
8) Plant design and all job tasks
achieved an acceptable risk rating.
9) No reported serious mishaps or
near-miss events since plant startup
in 2011.
10) CEO and business leadership-
level recognition given to the design
team and project champion.
The China project team is proud
of the new facility, the project team-
work displayed and the outcome
achieved. Proven solutions that avoid
risk and eliminate hazards in design
must be our legacy, not programs
and firefighting. Knowing that 350
employees of a new facility can go
16
home to their families at the end of
each workday injury- and illness-free
is the true reward.
As SH&E professionals, walking
into a new facility or operation dur-
ing a ribbon-cutting event with the
customer and other leaders and pro-
fessionals reinforces the long-term
impact our efforts have on those who
will be working with the new design
for years to come. SH&E profession-
als can showcase their overall value
to organizations by designing to
acceptable risk through sustainable
high-level controls.
Building a Proven
Solutions Library
PTD is a culmination of proven
solutions (safe designs) to avoid
risk and to eliminate hazards in
new designs/redesigns. When the
SH&E community works in partner-
ship with engineers and designers
over the next decade to incorporate
proven solutions into designs, the net
positive results will be the prevention
of life-ending and life-altering mis-
haps globally. Establishing proven
solutions is critical work that places
SH&E professionals in the preopera-
tional stage of risk management.
Many resources are available to
help SH&E professionals develop a
proven solutions library.
These include:
1) internal organiza-
tional data analysis related
to design;
2) NIOSH;
3) ASSE’s Body of
Knowledge;
4) ANSI/ASSE
Z590.3-2011;
5) ASSE Risk
Assessment Institute;
6) Design for
Construction Safety;
7) Construction
Industry Institute;
©ISTOCKPHOTO.COM/ARTYFREE
8) ASSE’s PTD
Symposium;
9) OSHA;
10) lessons learned
from completed design
projects;
 11) engineering and design com-
munity;
12) vendors and suppliers;
13) hourly workers;
14) benchmarking;
15. Safety in Design.
PTD Action Steps
for SH&E Professionals
The SH&E community should
take these actions to drive a cultural
revolution around PTD. The rewards
and benefits will be many, but the
most noteworthy outcome will be the
prevention of life-ending and life-
altering mishaps. SH&E profession-
als should follow these steps:
1) Create a design safety checklist
from organizational incident data
linked to design gaps.
2) Establish a personal goal
to spend more time in the preop-
erational stage of occupational risk
management.
3) Develop a critical skill set
around PTD and risk assessment.
4) Apply a high level of control
decision making in the design pro-
cess with special focus on severity
reduction.
5) Develop and use a proven solu-
tions library that achieves risk avoid-
ance or hazard elimination in design.
6) Identify and share long-term
burden costs related to poor design
decision making with leaders and
design teams.
7) Work to dispel common PTD
myths.
8) Eliminate barriers to safe work
through design.
9) Capture and communicate the
benefits of safe design.
10) Make your legacy one that
leaves a lasting net positive impact
on the organization.
Conclusion
Incorporating proven solutions
into design is critical to the preven-
tion of life-ending and life-altering
mishaps. Proven solutions have
global application and bring demon-
strated value on many fronts when
such an approach is adapted as part
of an organization’s PTD culture and
process.
The pace of injury/illness preven-
tion improvement during one’s life-
time is directly linked to the speed
of change led and driven by the
SH&E profession. Risk assessment
and PTD must be at the forefront of
these efforts. The SH&E community
has the responsibility, creativity and
power to support injury-free lives
around the world. •
References
ANSI. (2010). Safety of machin-
ery: General requirements and risk
assessment (B11.0). Houston, TX:
B11 Standards Inc.
ANSI/ASSE. (2011). Prevention
through design: Guidelines for
addressing occupational hazards and
risks in design and redesign process-
es (Z590.3). Des Plaines, IL: ASSE.
ANSI/ASSE/AIHA. (2012).
Occupational health and safety man-
agement systems (Z10). Des Plaines,
IL: ASSE.
David Walline, CSP, is a global safety
leader for Owens Corning in Toledo, OH.
Walline is a 35-year professional member
of ASSE. Prevention through design (PTD),
fatal and serious injury prevention and risk
assessment have been his primary career
focus. He has developed and implemented
global risk assessment, PTD processes and
training programs within organizations
and also influenced the design and risk
mitigation levels of projects worldwide.
In June 2012, Walline received the CSP
Award of Excellence from the Board of
Certified Safety Professionals. He was a
contributor to and served on the review
committee for ANSI/ASSE Z590.3-2011,
Prevention Through Design: Guidelines
for Addressing Occupational Hazards and
Risks in Design and Redesign Processes.
He is chair of ASSE’s Risk Assessment
Committee, which manages ASSE’s Risk
Assessment Institute. He also served on
the planning committee for and presented
at ASSE’s PTD Virtual Symposium in
February 2013.
Reprinted with permission from the pro-
ceedings of ASSE’s 2013 Fatality & Severe
Loss Prevention Symposium.

Safety 2014 Chapter Night Out

A re you attending Safety 2014 in Orlando, FL? Don’t

miss the Chapter Night Out on Tuesday, June 10 (7
p.m. to 11 p.m.) at WonderWorks. Sponsored by ASSE’s
Central Florida Chapter, the event is a great way to meet
other ASSE members and enjoy an entertaining evening as
you explore exhibits throughout the upside down build­
ing that houses the indoor amusement park for the mind.
The registration fee (adult $75; child, ages 4 to 12, $49.50)
includes dinner buffet, dessert, unlimited soft drinks and
©WONDERWORKS

the entire facility reserved exclusively for ASSE.

17
ByDesign www.asse.org 2014
 Fall Hazards By Thomas Kramer, P.E., CSP
Do Not Be Fooled by Falls
F
all hazards present two conflicting realities: sig-
nificant fall incidents do not happen often, but
when they do occur, they are catastrophic and
costly. Just like most people did not think black
swans existed, most organizations do not think
they will ever have a fall fatality at their facility. In this
way, fall fatalities can be viewed as black swan events.
A black swan event is defined as one that meets the fol-
lowing criteria:
•Rarity: Low probability of occurring.
•Extreme impact: Consequences are significant or
catastrophic.
•Retrospective predictability: In looking back, they
can be easily explained or predicted.
The rarity of incidents can lull both management and
workers into a false sense of security. But, managing the
major risks presented by falls is a smart and ethical busi-
ness investment—in addition to a legal requirement.
Although regulatory agencies and standards commit-
tees highlight the value of fall hazard surveys or risk
assessments as a critical step in a successful fall protec-
tion program, many organizations around the world do
not address fall hazards or do so haphazardly. Many still
devote money, time and resources toward the first fall
hazard brought to their attention, while ignoring high-
risk items.
To avoid a black swan fall fatality, fall hazard risk
must be systematically managed. Properly identifying and
evaluating fall hazards can help one more intelligently
prioritize projects—with risk and other factors considered.
A clear picture of the hazards can help one best decide
how to address them based on level of risk, priorities and
budget—not on a first-come, first-served basis.
Identifying Risk
A fall protection pro-
gram’s ultimate goal is to
create a safer environment
for workers. However, until
all hazards are identified, it is
difficult to develop an effec-
tive strategy to reduce risk.
Fall hazards can be clas-
sified into three main cat-
egories:
1) Means of access. This
is the manner of moving
from one level to another.
Examples include noncom-
pliant ramps, runways and
18
ByDesign www.asse.org 2014
walkways; fixed stairs; fixed or portable ladders; and
personnel lifts.
2) Locations. These are specific areas of immediate
exposure to a fall hazard. Examples include unprotected
sides, leading edges, elevated walkways, excavations,
floor and wall openings, elevated conveyors, scaffolding,
lights, overhead mechanical and electrical runs, roofs,
pipe racks and tanks.
3) Tasks. These are actions that workers perform that
expose them to a potential fall hazard, such as removing
a guardrail when hoisting material up to a mezzanine.
These hazards typically fall within three general catego-
ries: construction, production and maintenance.
When identifying risk, it is also important to consider
hidden hazards or hazards that are not always easy to
recognize. Examples of hidden hazards include:
•guardrail size, height, spacing and strength require-
ments;
•roof edges;
•swing gates on ladders;
•access ladders or stairs between levels;
•smoke/heat relief vents;
•skylights;
•paint booths;
•false ceilings;
•newly installed fall protection systems that may
prove inadequate.
Identification Methods
It is infeasible to identify every hazard within a large
facility or complex, but it is important to identify as
many hazards as possible so that the fall hazards can be
thoroughly evaluated. The four main methods of identi-
fication are:
1) suggestion programs;
2) use of statistics;
3) facility walkthrough;
4) wall-to-wall facility survey.
Suggestion Programs
Suggestion programs are the most cost-effective
method used to identify fall hazards. They identify areas
of particular interest through worker participation. These
interest areas typically contain job tasks that workers feel
uncomfortable performing because they know they are at
risk of a fall.
This method also allows a large group of workers to
©ISTOCKPHOTO.COM/ZOG
participate in the process. Although not trained in the
identification of fall hazards, many workers know which
frequently accessed areas are hazardous. An organiza-
tion’s employees are often a wealth of information about
continuous improvement.
 A downside of the suggestion program method is that
it is the least comprehensive. The method will identify
some, but definitely not all, fall hazards. Often, it takes
the skills of an experienced competent person in fall pro-
tection to identify hazards that the suggestion program
method misses.
Statistics
A thorough review of statistics can help identify
specific fall hazard exposures. The statistics are based
on incidents that have resulted in citations, injuries and
fatalities. Organizations can learn from these statistics
and can apply them to similar situations.
For example, statistics show that roof fall hazards
account for approximately 20% of all fall fatalities.
Therefore, one action item may be to identify roof fall
hazard exposures. While this is beneficial, using the sta-
tistics method leaves out other hazards that do not fall
into high-profile categories.
Bureau of Labor Statistics provides much information
relative to surfaces on which fall hazards occur. Also,
NIOSH collects information and creates reports on cer-
tain occupational fatalities so the public can better under-
stand how the incident occurred, learn from the mistake
and share with others. NIOSH publishes these FACE
reports on its website.
Facility Walkthrough
The facility walkthrough method is more facility-spe-
cific than the suggestion or statistics methods. However,
Table 1 Typical Risk Assessment Code Chart
ByDesign www.asse.org 2014
this method is still not a complete comprehensive fall
hazard survey.
During a facility walkthrough, a competent or quali-
fied person is brought in to serve as an objective set of
eyes. The objective is to identify typical hazards—not
every hazard. This individual also prioritizes typical
hazards from a risk standpoint and estimates abatement
methods and costs. This method allows the organization
to estimate the order of the magnitude cost for a facility.
Remember that because only typical hazards are iden-
tified, the number of hazards and the cost for abatement
are only an estimate of the order of the magnitude.
Wall-to-Wall Facility Survey
The wall-to-wall, or in some cases, an inside-the-
fence facility survey is the most comprehensive method
to identify hazards.
This method requires competent or qualified persons
with significant industry and fall hazard survey experi-
ence. Again, the competent or qualified persons’ goal is
to objectively identify as many hazards as possible.
Due to the vast amount of information collected, this
method requires an experienced team and preplanning so
that data can be collected and managed efficiently. Once
data are collected, identified hazards must be ranked and
prioritized before an abatement plan can be implemented
to address the hazards.
With the goal of identifying as many hazards as possi-
ble, this method goes beyond a typical survey. The wall-
to-wall facility survey is therefore the method of choice.
19
 Once fall hazards Risk Assessment & Ranking
A wall-to-wall facility survey
and the potential or risk assessment focuses on the
highest risk. The more efficiently
risks associated risk is reduced, the better. So, rather
with them are than devoting resources to the most
obvious hazards, organizations can
identified, evaluated use the risk assessment process to
and ranked, systematically identify, evaluate and
control fall hazards. By directing
leadership can use the budget to the highest-risk items,
organizations can then achieve maxi-
the information to mum risk reduction for the invest-
create a validated ment made.
During a comprehensive fall
budget, schedule hazard risk assessment, detailed data
are gathered on fall hazards. The
and abatement data are analyzed to determine the
strategy. probability and severity each hazard
presents. In terms of probability,
various factors must be considered:
frequency of task, exposure time, number of workers
exposed and likelihood of falls based on external influ-
ences. Severity is measured by determining fall distance
and likely obstructions impacted during a fall.
Many times, risk assessments are conducted using a
simple risk matrix (Table 1, p. 19). However, especially
for locations with hundreds or thousands of hazards,
the information gained from such an assessment is not
granular enough to be effective in long-term planning.
Often, dozens of hazards will fall into one category, giv-
ing the program manager no indication of which hazards
to abate first.
When conducting a more granular risk assessment,
the resulting data are organized into a prioritized list of
hazards. This list can be organized by location, main-
tenance task and type of solution proposed—or in any
other way that helps the organization manage abate-
ments. Once fall hazards and the potential risks associ-
ated with them are identified, evaluated and ranked,
leadership can use the information to create a validated
budget, schedule and abatement strategy.
Since organizations may not be able to address every
hazard, the prioritized list provides guidance on what,
when and how to abate hazards. This risk assessment
method transforms an overwhelming list of hazards into a
manageable plan with a beginning and end point. Program
managers can use this information to report metrics on the
amount of risk reduced for a given investment.
Conclusion
Falls are a misunderstood safety issue. The reality
is that falls can and do cause fatalities and catastrophic
losses. Conducting a risk assessment specific to falls
can significantly reduce risk to the workforce and orga-
nization. •
Thomas Kramer, P.E., CSP, is principal at LJB Inc. in
Miamisburg, OH. A safety consultant and structural engineer with
18 years’ experience, Kramer specializes in the assessment and
design of fall protection systems. He is a member of the ANSI/
ASSE Z359 Accredited Standards Committee for Fall Protection
and chairs two subcommittees that develop standards for the
design of active fall protection systems (Z359.6 and Z359.17).
He also serves as president of the International Society for Fall
Protection. Kramer holds bachelor’s and master’s degrees in
Civil Engineering, as well as an M.B.A. He frequently speaks on
fall protection at international, national and regional conferences.
Reprinted with permission from the proceedings of ASSE’s
2013 Fatality & Severe Loss Prevention Symposium.

Manufacturing Practice Specialty

The Manufacturing Practice Specialty (MPS) began as a branch of the Management
Practice Specialty in 2006 and became a practice specialty in 2008. MPS’s goal is to provide a forum
for industry-specific issues in manufacturing facilities, such as metalworking, timber and lumber
working, food processing, chemical, rubber, plastics and printing/publishing locations.
In addition to publishing its triannual technical publication Safely Made, MPS helps develop
technical sessions for ASSE’s annual Professional Development Conference, regularly sponsors
webinars on timely manufacturing-related topics, holds conference calls and much more.
Click here to join MPS today or click here to follow MPS on LinkedIn.

20
ByDesign www.asse.org 2014
 Risk Assessment By Bethany Harvey

Fall Hazard
Risk Assessment
& Ranking
I
n September 2013, LJB Inc. ards is necessary for remembering
presented Understanding Risk what the hazards are, where they are
Assessment & Ranking, a webinar located and how quickly they need
on how best to identify fall hazards to be mitigated. He suggests using a
and prioritize preventive actions. risk matrix (Figure 1) to help deter-
Speaker Thom Kramer, P.E., CSP, mine which hazards require immedi-
the managing principal at LJB Inc. ate attention. Such a matrix measures
and chair of ASSE’s Professional the severity of the potential incident
Development Conference planning against the probability that workers
committee, explained that to abate will be exposed to the hazard and
fall hazards, safety professionals can be used for assigning a numeri- funds available for risk reduction
need to both evaluate their current cal ranking to every hazard. For strategies. Kramer stresses the need
methods of risk assessment and iden- example, a hazard to which workers to identify all risks before mitigating
tify the top ten risks found in their have probable exposure would result according to a budget because com-
facilities. in a total temporary disability (TTD) panies run the risk of spending all of
According to Kramer, many and would receive a ranking of 2, their available funds on the first risk
fall hazards go undetected because meaning that it requires immediate they find, which may not be the most
workers may believe that a lack of attention but is not as urgent as a critical hazard to address. •
incidents indicates that no risks are hazard that receives a ranking of 1.
present. He warns that some safety Simple risk matrixes have some Bethany Harvey is a communications
and design assistant for ASSE and part of
initiatives, such as use of PPE and limitations in their accuracy, so it the editorial staff for Professional Safety.
safer equipment, may lead workers is important to also calculate the She holds a B.A. in Interdisciplinary
to take more risks because they per- maximum risk reduction possible in Communications Mass Media from
ceive their workplace as being safer respect to the hazards identified and Elmhurst College.
than it really is.
To effectively assess risks,
safety professionals must seek to
identify all risks rather than focus
on a few categories of risk. For
Figure 1 Simple Risk Matrix
example, while hazards associated
with edge distance and slippery
conditions are most often taken
into consideration, some person-
nel may overlook more unusual
hazards, such as a loose bolt
holding a ladder in place on a
structure.
Once all hazards have been
identified, lists of those hazards
©ISTOCKPHOTO.COM/IBLIST

must be kept for use in pri-

oritizing concerns and in alert-
ing workers to risks they may
encounter. Kramer says that just
like a grocery list, a list of haz-
21
ByDesign www.asse.org 2014
 Human factors By Don Enslow, CSP

How Do Human
Factors Influence
Inherently Safe Design?
T
he Engineering Practice Specialty is reinforcing Various causes and influences related to human fac-
the concepts discussed in ANSI/ASSE Z590.3- tors are inherent to minor and major incidents, and they
2011, Prevention Through Design (PTD): surface in almost every incident and near-miss. How
Guidelines for Addressing Occupational many times have we documented incident causation fac-
Hazards and Risks in Design and Redesign tors to include operator inattention, misunderstanding
Processes, through various forums available within or violation of a procedure, inadequate design specific
ASSE to increase visibility and focus on PTD. to operating conditions and operator response, fatigue,
This article attempts to raise some questions regard- ergonomics and the operator’s capability to respond?
ing the relationship between what is referred to as These causal factors represent only a fraction of contrib-
inherently safe design (ISD) and the unpredictability of uting causes specific to human factors in incidents.
human behavior. By definition, inherently safe implies
that the anticipation and quantifiable predictability of Case Study
human response to workplace environments is integral In the U.S., the highest percentage of accidental loss
to ISD. Theoretically, that is the basis and intent for ISDof life is attributed to the operation of a motor vehicle,
principles. ISD provides concepts to assist engineers and and a major contributor to these incidents is driver
safety professionals in establishing and implementing inattention. For motor vehicle incidents, human factor
design processes in anticipation of human error. influences are relatively obvious; however, for some
industrial incidents, they may not be as obvious.
Challenges Early in his career, the author investigated an explo-
In a perfect world with an unlimited budget and 100% sion and total loss of a hot oil heater on an offshore plat-
predictability in workplace scenarios/environments, form. The platform and associated process facilities were
ISD’s goal would be the norm rather than the excep- recently constructed, and the platform was preparing for
tion. History, education and technology have provided start-up and introduction of crude oil for phase separa-
a sound foundation for improving designs to accom- tion into oil, gas and water. The separated oil and gas
modate potential failures and human exposure to injuries were then to be introduced into pipelines for delivery to
or fatalities. Four challenges that prohibit the execution onshore facilities and marketing. The water was recycled
and integration of ISD into management systems and back into the reservoir.
processes are perceived cost, lack of management accep- To facilitate separation, crude oil from the reservoir
tance, limited competency and understanding of the con- needed to be heated. The expected volume of crude oil
cepts, and perceived time/schedule constraints. was estimated to be 50,000 barrels per day for this plat-
Inherent to all four of these challenges is human form, and the size and capacity of the hot oil heater (the
factors or “the scientific discipline concerned with the design included two heaters for platform operation at
understanding of interactions between humans and other 100% capacity) was relatively large to ensure the appro-
elements of a system and the profession that applies the- priate design for that volume of fluid.
ory, principles, data and methods to design to optimize As the steps for platform start-up were initiated, it
human well-being and overall system performance” was necessary to ignite the pilot flames for the hot oil
(International Ergonomic Association, 2000). heaters. The pilots were maintained by ignited gas, and
©ISTOCKPHOTO.COM/ABLUECUP

The unpredictability and multitude of influences that their operating controls ensured the appropriate ignitable
affect human behavior and, ultimately, human factors, concentration of natural gas and oxygen prior to igni-
can seem overwhelming. It is important to recognize the tion. The operator responsible for the hot oil heaters was
potential risk and exposure to a workplace that does not unable to initiate ignition of the pilots, and start-up was
integrate human factors into management systems and delayed. The design of this heater was relatively new,
design/process controls. and it was determined that it was necessary to consult
with an expert who needed to be summoned immedi-

22
ByDesign www.asse.org 2014
ately and delivered to the platform via helicopter. This survival. Delaying start-up meant substantial financial
created a 2-day delay in the logistics of organizing this and reputational risk. The platform’s geographical loca-
visit. Anxiety and tension within the operation were tion was susceptible to dramatic changes in weather and
heightened, and the expectation for immediate results sea conditions that could delay start-up significantly if
from this expert was the critical path for start-up and identified personnel were unable to travel to the platform
product delivery. to evaluate the issue. The expert’s technical competence,
Upon arrival of the heater expert and an evaluation experience and resume were good relative to his knowl-
of the pilot ignition controls, it was determined that the edge of control systems and this particular model of hot
flame safety controls for the pilot system were inhibiting oil heater. This individual also understood his assign-
the ignition system’s ability to work. The recommenda- ment to be to provide an immediate fix to the problem.
tion was to defeat the pilot flame safety system and, The critical need was apparent, and if he could provide
when it was thought to be appropriate (based on opera- a quick solution, he would be a hero. Existing manage-
tor observation), manually initiate the igniter. Under the ment systems and deviation processes from established
expert’s observation, the recommended steps were fol- design control systems were not in place to prohibit
lowed, which ignited a gas volume behavior that exceeded rational lim-
that exploded and blew the back of its and increased risk.
the heater vessel several hundred In reflecting on this incident, the
feet into the sea. Although the explo-
To better integrate author can recall many situations he
sion’s magnitude was significant, no human factors into had been involved with or partici-
one was injured. pated in as an investigator in which
At the time of the investigation, the inherently safe human factors influenced a system or
the root cause was determined to design process, process that was designed to elimi-
be design failure of pilot ignition nate potentially catastrophic events.
control system. It was not inherently there must be The most effective ISD is one that
obvious to the responsible parties,
nor was it inherent to the incident
recognition of how will not allow a system to operate
under at-risk operating parameters
investigation process at the time, to human behavior can after discovering that someone has
consider human factors as contribut- bypassed that control to allow the
ing factors to the incident. Looking influence all aspects system to continue operating.
back at that incident more than 35 of the operation
years later, it is apparent that human Suggestions
factors were indeed a major contrib- throughout the To better integrate human factors
uting factor. into the ISD process, it is important
Human factors influenced the
facility’s lifecycle. to recognize how human behav-
management systems, decisions ior can influence all aspects of the
and behaviors that resulted in the operation throughout the facility’s
undesired outcome. Human factors were also involved in life cycle. A best practice is to initiate a process within
decisions and acceptance during operation design for the management systems to continually evaluate safety
hot oil heaters. From design to construction to start-up, systems including engineering and behavior-based pro-
human factors played an influencing role in this incident. cesses. Management support is integral to this process’s
How many times can incidents be attributed to human effectiveness, and it is important to base measurement
factors? How does ISD play a role in the reduction of and performance on key metrics. The term management
potential risk of human factor failures? systems is an all-encompassing platitude that can lose
The four challenges identified earlier in this article perspective in the day-to-day priorities of a workplace.
were apparent in the hot oil heater incident. Perceived Management systems can also overwhelm an organiza-
cost was a critical factor in the decision-making process to tion when attempting to integrate assurance processes
defeat the pilot ignition controls. At the time of the inci- from early design all the way through to final production.
dent, oil prices were significantly lower than today and According to the late Trevor Kletz, a chemical process
the world economy was struggling. The start-up of this safety expert, “Some people have forgotten the limita-
platform was paramount to corporate financial well-being. tions of management systems. All that a system can
To the credit of the responsible platform operator, opera- do is harness the knowledge and experience of people.
tions were shut down and start-up was delayed until a Knowledge and experience without a system will achieve
second opinion was obtained. However, criteria for inde- less than their full potential. Without knowledge and
pendent review focused on start-up, not on safe start-up. experience, even the best system will achieve nothing.”
At the time of this incident, corporate culture and Experience has proven that integration of sound man-
expectations within management were based on financial agement systems that reinforce recognition of human

23
ByDesign www.asse.org 2014

factors, as well as an appreciation for their influence in
sustained safe operations, will provide economic suc-
cess. The fundamentals are fairly simple; the sustained
implementation and reinforcement of these practices and
principles can be challenging. As always, it begins at the
top. Management must establish the basis for safe opera-
tions and focus on continuous improvement. Managers
must also have systems in place to measure performance
and to correct deviations when required. A key to the
successful endorsement of top management relies on
their understanding and appreciation of these concepts.
If the corporate standard is driven by key management
©NIKOLAI OKHITIN/ISTOCKPHOTO.COM/THINKSTOCK; ©FUSE/ISTOCKPHOTO.COM/THINKSTOCK
systems and principles, managers will absorb and proac-
tively reinforce the standard.
What do good management systems look like? It
is difficult to provide a one-size-fits-all template with
the variety of processes and business applications that
abound in the work environment; however, some funda-
mental components must be universally addressed.
There must be a corporate code of operations that
reinforces established safety standards and systems. The
established standards and systems, at a minimum, must
meet regulatory requirements and must integrate lessons
learned specific to internal operations. Within that code
of operations, ISD must be integrated into all design
applications, whether for new facility start-up or facility
renovation, including maintenance turnarounds.
An additional component for success is employee
involvement. Employees must be competent to provide
the service for which they are hired but also must engage
24
ByDesign www.asse.org 2014
and embrace the established corporate standards. It is
imperative that they participate in design reviews, hazard
analyses, prejob safety assessments and development
of standard operating procedures as well as understand
management of change principles and standards.
If the fundamentals of management and employee
participation exist within an operation, performance must
be continually measured and performance measurement
standards that provide assurance for sustained operation
must be integrated. Critical components of performance
metrics must include measures and critical components
to provide assurance that management systems function
properly and that potential hazards are recognized and
addressed. Employee recognition for promptly address-
ing risks is fundamental to sustaining this effort.
Metrics also include continued monitoring of near-
miss events and incidents. A critical component of
incident management is a sound incident investigation
system that includes employee involvement and recog-
nizes incident investigation techniques that focus on root
cause processes and on all contributing factors, including
human factors. If the investigation process uses a root
cause identification process, human factors should be
integral to this system. As a result of the investigation
and findings, it is imperative that management reinforces
the corrective actions and addresses any fundamental
system errors that must be changed or calibrated. These
fundamental errors may include proposed changes in the
design process and evaluation of process safety controls
that were thought to be inherently safe. •
Don Enslow, CSP, is the process safety management team lead
at BP Exploration Alaska. He has more than 35 years’ experience
as a safety professional in the oil exploration and production and
nuclear power industries. He is a principal member of the NFPA
Technical Committee on Gaseous Fire Extinguishing Systems
(GFE-AAA), NFPA 12, NFPA 12A and NFPA 2001.
FY 2013 ly
ent
Most FrequHA
Cited OS
Standards
leased a list
OSHA has re uently cited
freq
of its most .
stand ard s for FY 2013 .
r a summa ry
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 SaFety Management By Scott Stricoff
Targeted Metrics for Managing
Fatalities & Serious Injuries
F
or decades, the safety com-
the basic relationships the paradigm
munity has adopted conven-
espouses. Over the past several
tional wisdom, which holds
years, many organizations have
that a reduction in the inci-
experienced a consistent decline in
dence of minor injuries will
their occupational injury rates while
bring about a proportional reduction
concurrently experiencing level or
in the incidence of serious injuries
even increasing numbers of fatalities
and fatalities (SIFs). This thinking
and serious injuries.
emanates from H.W. Heinrich’s This pattern has been seen at the
Safety Triangle, a visual construct of
site, organizational and national lev-
Heinrich’s Law, which has informed
els and raises important implications
this paradigm (Figure 1) suggesting
and questions about how SIF preven-
that organizations should address
tion is approached and the validity of
minor injuries (and near-misses) as
this long-held model.
Fundamentally, the traditional
a means of reducing serious injuries
and fatalities. model claims two basic relationships:
1) Descriptive. An inverse
Despite the longevity and perva-
relationship exists between the fre-
siveness of this paradigm, the real-
quency of an injury and the severity
ity that has played out in numerous
of an injury.
organizations contradicts many of
2) Predictive.
Reductions in less
serious injuries will
Figure 1 produce proportionate
The Traditional Paradigm reductions in more
serious injuries.
In examining these
issues, a comprehen-
sive set of data from
seven large organiza-
tions was studied.
The findings of this
study showed that
while the Heinrich
triangle is indeed
accurate descriptively
(there is a higher
incidence of minor
injuries than serious
injuries), it is not
accurate predictively
(reducing minor
injuries at the base of
the triangle does not
produce proportional
reductions throughout
the rest of the tri-
26
ByDesign www.asse.org 2014
angle). The study further found that a
subset of total injuries and exposures
is disproportionately responsible for
serious injuries and fatalities.
Pitfalls of Inadequate
Performance Measurement
To assess the comprehensive
effectiveness of their safety manage-
ment capability, many organizations
have relied primarily on lagging
indicators, such as recordable injury
rates. The attractiveness of metrics,
such as these, is understandable.
They are relatively easy to collect,
classify and understand, and in many
cases, governing bodies mandate the
reporting of these metrics. However,
this disproportionate focus and over-
reliance can mask many serious
safety issues that lie below the sur-
face of awareness generated by these
indicators.
Over the past several years,
numerous catastrophic workplace
incidents have occurred (e.g., BP
Texas City, Qinghe Special Steel
Corp., Upper Big Branch Mine and
Deepwater Horizon) that clearly
illustrate this problem. In virtually
every case, the catastrophic incident
was preceded by extended peri-
ods of low, very low or improving
recordable injury rates. Prior to these
incidents, asking the executives of
these organizations, “How are you
doing in safety?” would have likely
generated a response of “We are
doing great. Our injury rates have
never been lower.” But clearly, seri-
ous safety issues persisted outside of
their view.
To manage SIFs more effectively,
it is important for organizations to
measure more than just the incident
frequency and severity. They must
effectively measure their exposure to
the types of incidents that can pro-
duce SIFs. This marks a critical shift
in focus from lagging indicators to
leading indicators for a more proac-
tive approach to preventing SIFs.
More specifically, this approach
requires establishing methods of
classifying exposures and incidents
to create a new metric—potential
SIFs. By tracking potential SIFs in
addition to the traditional measures
discussed, an organization can gen-
erate a much clearer picture of its
progress. Further, sound evaluation
of the exposures that contribute to
potential SIFs allows for tailored
mitigation programs that focus
squarely on those areas of concern.
Measuring &
Classifying Potential
All exposures are not equal when
it comes to their potential to gener-
ate SIF events. Data analyzed in the
aforementioned study that examined
the validity of Heinrich’s Triangle
found that only 21% of the injuries
classified as minor had the potential
to produce an SIF outcome. That is
not to say that the other 79% of inju-
ries are not important but rather that
these incidents require a different
prevention strategy.
To further illustrate this point,
consider the following two incidents,
both of which produce an identical
injury:
Incident 1: A worker steps off the
bottom step of an outside stairwell
onto the ground’s gravel surface. In
carrying out this action, he loses trac-
tion and sprains his ankle.
Incident 2: A worker steps up
from the top step of an outside stair-
well onto a roof’s gravel surface.
As he shifts his weight to the foot in
contact with the gravel surface, he
loses traction and sprains his ankle.
In this case, the most obvious
variable that influences potential is
where the event occurred. Because
the second incident occurred at
significant height, the worker could
have fallen down the stairs or even
off of the roof surface if proper con-
trols were not in place. Because the
first incident essentially occurred on
the ground, an extended fall would
not be a possible outcome.
Although these two incidents pro-
duced the same injury outcome, the
second incident has a higher poten-
tial to produce an SIF event, whereas
the first incident is not likely to pro-
duce anything significantly beyond
the relatively minor injury that
occurred. Yet in many organizations,
these incidents would be identically
classified because of the misplaced
focus on outcome and lack of atten-
tion to potential.
To manage SIFs
more effectively,
it is important for
organizations to
measure more than
just the frequency
and severity of
accidents.
By evaluating and tracking mea-
sures such as the quantity, frequency
and percentage of injury and near-
miss events occurring inside the
organization that have the potential
for SIFs, a better sense is gained of
the likelihood that a serious, fatal or
catastrophic event will occur.
Importance of Precursors
Precursor events are defined as
high-risk situations in which man-
agement controls are absent, inef-
fective or not complied with and
which will result in a serious injury
or fatality if allowed to continue.
Precursors can be identified through
proper evaluation of incidents like
the ones discussed by studying data
on exposure and via careful analysis
of injury reports, near-misses, safety
observations and audit findings.
Creating an SIF precursor metric
requires having a method for iden-
27
ByDesign www.asse.org 2014
tifying those incidents that are SIF
precursors. Three general methods
have been employed:
•Outcome-based. Using the result
as a basis for classification. Although
easy to implement, this does not
identify SIF precursors accurately, as
the previous discussion illustrates.
•Judgment-based. Using profes-
sional judgment to assess whether
the event could have resulted in an
SIF. With this approach, it is virtu-
ally impossible to achieve consistent
classification as different raters will
assess potential differently based on
their personal judgment about prob-
ability and outcome.
•Event-based. Using character-
istics of the event to identify those
with SIF potential. This approach
risks missing some SIF precursors
but can capture most with consistent
screening that can be done at the
local level.
When using the event-based
approach, particular activities more
naturally lend themselves to produc-
ing higher proportions of precursor
events. Examples of these activities
include:
•operation of mobile equipment
and interaction with pedestrians;
•entering confined spaces;
•performing jobs that require
lockout/tagout;
•operations that entail suspended
loads;
•working at height.
Beginning with a generic SIF
classification decision tree, an orga-
nization can perform a one-time
customization. A small group applies
the generic decision tree to the
organization’s incident experience
(injuries, near-misses and process
safety events). After identifying most
events that are defined by the generic
tool as SIF precursors and nonprec-
ursors, a group of unclassified events
will remain. The small group then
conducts a one-time judgment-based
assessment of the unclassified events
and from those selected as precur-
sors modifies the generic decision
tree to create a tree customized to
the organization’s exposures. That
 customized decision tree can then be
used throughout the organization to
drive event-based classification of all
incidents, providing a SIF precursor
metric.
Conclusion
While many organizations have
some awareness of exposures, near-
misses and minor injuries that have
high potential, few possess the con-
sistent reporting, measurement and
tracking visibility needed to address
these precursors in sustainable ways.
A reliable, effective system to cap-
ture, report and address precursors
minimizes the elevation of trivial
©ISTOCKPHOTO.COM/KENISHIROTIE
The system to address precursors
also dispels beliefs that an SIF is just
a fluke or unpreventable event. With
sound precursor data, leaders who
think about and address serious inju-
have said, “We do not know where
ries and fatalities. Further, it suggests
to start” or “We do not know where
that a new metric must be developed
these events are stemming from,”
for SIF precursors. What gets mea-
will be empowered with information
sured gets managed, so developing
that answers these commonplace
and implementing an SIF precursor
concerns by showing them a subset
metric is a key step toward under-
of events on which they need to
standing how to better focus various
focus.
safety interventions toward reducing
In addition, the system low-
the frequency of the most serious
ers serious injury rates. Having a
events. •
sharpened focus on events with SIF
potential means that resources, which Scott Stricoff is president of Behavioral
Science Technology Inc. in Ojai, CA.

previously had been largely wasted

events. While all incidents should
be reported and accompanied by
some level of investigation, the SIF
potential of events must be carefully
considered to inform the depth and
scope of investigations.
in addressing trivial events, can
instead be allocated to reduce expo- Reprinted with permission from the
sures to SIFs.
proceedings of ASSE’s 2011 Prove
It! Measuring Safety Performance
The information outlined in this Symposium.
article suggests that significant flaws
exist in the way many organizations

ASSE Elections: Vote Today!

V oting in the 2014 ASSE Election is underway,
and this process is important. In the coming
years, the Society will address several critical stra­
and platform statements posted at www.asse
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Kim McDowell with any questions.
tegic issues concerning the path forward for both
ASSE and the safety profession. These issues affect
not only your practice specialty, but your liveli­
hood. By staying informed and voting, you play an
important role in deciding who will lead ASSE. It
is a critical responsibility of membership, and ASSE
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encourages you to:

•Get to know the candidates at www.asse
.org/elections.
•Cast your vote by March 31.
Ballots have been sent via e-mail to all mem­
bers except those who elected to receive a mailed
ballot. Voting instructions and additional informa­
tion about candidates, along with interviews, bios

28
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ASSE Practice Specialties
GET THE MOST FROM Academics
PRACTICE SPECIALTIES
Manufacturing

YOUR MEMBERSHIP Construction

Consultants
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Engineering Public Sector

• Network with industry professionals via LinkedIn Environmental Risk Management/

Ergonomics Insurance
• Engage in conference calls and meetings Fire Protection Training &
Healthcare Communications
• Receive triannual electronic technical publications Industrial Hygiene Transportation

• Access interviews with top industry professionals International Utilities

Management
• Earn COCs through multiple publication opportunities
BRANCHES

• Tap into advisory committee guidance and advice Agricultural Human Resources
Health & Wellness Military
• Explore volunteer and leadership opportunities
• Receive discounts on group-sponsored webinars
COMMON INTEREST GROUPS

• Request group sponsorship on conference speaking proposals Blacks in Safety Women in Safety
Engineering Engineering
• Participate in mentoring services Safety Professionals Young Professionals
& the Latino in SH&E
Workforce

Learn more about the benefits you receive as an Engineering Practice Specialty
member at www.asse.org/ps. Similar benefits are available through
all of ASSE’s industry and interest groups.

Networking Mentoring Industry Guidance Publications Leadership

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