1.) [G.R. No. 127240.

March 27, 2000]

ONG CHIA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. marie
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato[2] admitting petitioner Ong Chia to Philippines citizenship.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the port of Manila on
board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his own
business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be
admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner, after
stating his qualifications as required in 2, and lack of the disqualifications enumerated in 3 of the law, stated -
17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the provisions of Letter of Instruction No.270
with the Special Committee on Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, docketed as SCN Case
No.031776, but the same was not acted upon owing to the fact that the said Special Committee on Naturalization
was not reconstituted after the February, 1986 revolution such that processing of petitions for naturalization by
administrative process was suspended;
During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to corroborate his testimony.
So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony of petitioner that, upon being asked by the court whether
the State intended to present any witness against him, he remarked: novero
Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is rather surprising, in the sense that he
seems to be well-versed with the major portion of the history of the Philippines, so, on our part, we are convinced,
Your Honor Please, that petitioner really deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. And for this
reason, we do not wish to present any evidence to counteract or refute the testimony of the witnesses for the
petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself.[3]
Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The
State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed contending that petitioner: (1) failed to state all the names by
which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his former places of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, 7; (3) failed to
conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of 2; (4) has no known
lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of 2; and (5)
failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence. [4]
Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by petitioner with the Special
Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767,[5] in which petitioner stated that in addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he had
likewise been known since childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong." As petitioner, however, failed to state this other name in his 1989
petition for naturalization, it was contended that his petition must fail. [6] The state also annexed income tax returns[7] allegedly filed
by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net income could hardly support himself and his family. To prove that petitioner
failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines, the State contended that,
although petitioner claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married twice, once before a judge in 1953, and then again in
church in 1977, petitioner actually lived with his wife without the benefit of marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977. It
was alleged that petitioner failed to present his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any. The State also annexed a copy of
petitioner's 1977 marriage contract[8] and a Joint-Affidavit[9] executed by petitioner and his wife. These documents show that when
petitioner married Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage license had been required in accordance with Art.76 of the
Civil Code because petitioner and Ramona Villaruel had been living together as husband and wife since 1953 without the benefit of
marriage. This, according to the State, belies his claim that when he started living with his wife in 1953, they had already been
married.ella
The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, [10] petitioner resided at "J.M. Basa
Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said address in his petition.
On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already noted, reversed the trial court and
denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that due to the importance of naturalization cases, the State is not
precluded from raising questions not presented in the lower court and brought up for the first time on appeal. [11] The appellate court
held:
As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioner Ong Chia failed to state in this present
petition for naturalization his other name, "LORETO CHIA ONG," which name appeared in his previous application
under Letter of Instruction No.270. Names and pseudonyms must be stated in the petition for naturalization and
failure to include the same militates against a decision in his favor...This is a mandatory requirement to allow those
persons who know (petitioner) by those other names to come forward and inform the authorities of any legal
objection which might adversely affect his application for citizenship.
1
 Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for naturalization that he formerly resided in "J.M. Basa St.,
Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo." Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law requires the applicant to state in his
petition "his present and former places of residence." This requirement is mandatory and failure of the petitioner
to comply with it is fatal to the petition. As explained by the Court, the reason for the provision is to give the
public, as well as the investigating agencies of the government, upon the publication of the petition, an
opportunity to be informed thereof and voice their objections against the petitioner. By failing to comply with this
provision, the petitioner is depriving the public and said agencies of such opportunity, thus defeating the purpose
of the law
Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner when he lived-in with his wife for
several years, and sired four children out of wedlock. It has been the consistent ruling that the "applicant's 8-year
cohabitation with his wife without the benefit of clergy and begetting by her three children out of wedlock is a
conduct far from being proper and irreproachable as required by the Revised Naturalization Law", and therefore
disqualifies him from becoming a citizen of the Philippines by naturalizationnigel
Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in 1961 of P5,000.00, exclusive of bonuses, commissions and
allowances, is not lucrative income. His failure to file an income tax return "because he is not liable for income tax
yet" confirms that his income is low. . ."It is not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his
ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an
appreciable margin of his income over expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of
unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid one's becoming the object of charity or public
charge." ...Now that they are in their old age, petitioner Ong Chia and his wife are living on the allowance given to
them by their children. The monthly pension given by the elder children of the applicant cannot be added to his
income to make it lucrative because like bonuses, commissions and allowances, said pensions are contingent,
speculative and precarious
Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT IN NATURALIZATION CASES, THE
APPELLATE COURT CAN DENY AN APPLCATION FOR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE BASIS OF DOCUMENTS NOT
PRESENTED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND NOT FORMING PART OF THE RECORDS OF THE CASE.
II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN KNOWN BY SOME OTHER NAME NOT
STATED IN HIS PETITION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PETITIONER STATED IN HIS PETITION AND ITS
ANNEXES HIS PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES OF RESIDENCE.
IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO CONDUCT HIMSELF IN A PROPER
AND IRREPROACHABLE MANNER IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD. brando
Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which had merely been
annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having
been presented and formally offered as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value," [12] so it was
argued, because under Rule 132, 34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered.
The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143[13] of the Rules of Court which provides that -
These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency
proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient. (Emphasis added)
Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being invoked by petitioner is clearly
not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by
analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the
documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of
action considering that decision in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata.[14] Consequently, a final
favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of
the same documents.
Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its documentary evidence before
the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to
[15]
procedural due process. We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has
not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. [16] Petitioner cannot claim that
he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could
have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals, thus: nigella
The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN Case No. 031767) which was supposedly filed by
Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not been established. In fact, the case number of the alleged petition for naturalization
2
 is 031767 while the case number of the petition actually filed by the appellee is 031776. Thus, said document is
totally unreliable and should not be considered by the Honorable Court in resolving the instant appeal. [17]
Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be accounted for as a typographical
error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No. 031767," a copy of which was annexed to the petition, is the correct case
number is confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet[18] of the Special Committee on Naturalization which was also docketed as "SCN Case
No. 031767." Other than this, petitioner offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the documents presented by the State.
Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents - namely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767, petitioner's marriage contract,
the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and petitioner's income tax returns - are all public documents. As such, they have
been executed under oath. They are thus reliable. Since petitioner failed to make satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that
may cast doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the appellate court did not err in relying upon them.
One last point. The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this case, but to settle all the issues raised, we shall
briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's failure to include the address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance with 7, C.A.
No. 473. This address appears on petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a document which forms part of the records as
Annex A of his 1989 petition for naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address in his petition, but argues
that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully published,[19] with the petition and the other annexes,
such publication constitutes substantial compliance with 7. [20] This is allegedly because the publication effectively satisfied the
objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give investigating agencies of the government the opportunity to check
on the background of the applicant and prevent suppression of information regarding any possible misbehavior on his part in any
community where he may have lived at one time or another. [21] It is settled, however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly
enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. [22] As noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, 7 clearly
provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present and former places of residence. [23] This
provision and the rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance"
with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition ought to be denied. marinella
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

3
 2.) [G.R. No. 129296. September 25, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ABE VALDEZ y DELA CRUZ, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For automatic review is the decision[1] promulgated on February 18, 1997, by the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 3105. It found appellant Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating
Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of death by lethal injection.
In an Information dated September 26, 1996, appellant was charged as follows:"That on or about September 25, 1996, at Sitio
Bulan, Barangay Sawmill, Municipality of Villaverde, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who was caught in flagrante delicto and without authority of law, did then and there
wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously plant, cultivate and culture seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp
weighing 2.194 kilos, from which dangerous drugs maybe (sic) manufactured or derived, to the damage and prejudice of the
government of the Republic of the Philippines.
"That the property where the said seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants were planted, cultivated and cultured shall be confiscated
and escheated in favor of the government.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."[2]
On November 15, 1996, appellant was arraigned and, with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the
merits then ensued.
The first witness for the prosecution was SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a member of the police force of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. He
testified that at around 10:15 a.m. of September 24, 1996, he received a tip from an unnamed informer about the presence of a
marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by appellant at Sitio Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. [3] The prohibited plants were
allegedly planted close to appellant's hut. Police Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya then
formed a reaction team from his operatives to verify the report. The team was composed of SPO3 Marcelo M. Tipay, SPO2 Noel V.
Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut. Inspector Parungao gave them specific
[4]
instructions to "uproot said marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of same.
At approximately 5:00 o'clock A.M. the following day, said police team, accompanied by their informer, left for the site where
the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. After a three-hour, uphill trek from the nearest barangay road, the police
operatives arrived at the place pinpointed by their informant. The police found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then,
proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in
two rows, approximately 25 meters from appellant's hut. [5]PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and,
according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his.[6] The police uprooted the seven marijuana plants, which weighed 2.194
kilograms.[7] The police took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants. [8] Appellant was then arrested. One of the
plants, weighing 1.090 kilograms, was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for
analysis.[9] Inspector Prevy Fabros Luwis, the Crime Laboratory forensic analyst, testified that upon microscopic examination of said
plant, she found cystolitic hairs containing calcium carbonate, a positive indication for marijuana. [10] She next conducted a chemical
examination, the results of which confirmed her initial impressions. She found as follows:
"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED: Exh "A" - 1.090 grams of uprooted suspected marijuana plant placed inside a white sack with markings.
xxx
"FINDINGS: Qualitative examination conducted on the above stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the test for Marijuana, a
prohibited drug."[11]
The prosecution also presented a certification from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources that the land
cultivated by appellant, on which the growing marijuana plants were found, was Lot 3224 of Timberland Block B, which formed part
of the Integrated Social Forestry Area in Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. [12] This lot was part of the public domain. Appellant was
acknowledged in the certification as the occupant of the lot, but no Certificate of Stewardship had yet been issued in his favor.[13]
As its sole witness, the defense presented appellant. He testified that at around 10:00 o'clock A.M., September 25, 1996, he
was weeding his vegetable farm in Sitio Bulan when he was called by a person whose identity he does not know. He was asked to go
with the latter to "see something."[14] This unknown person then brought appellant to the place where the marijuana plants were
found, approximately 100 meters away from his nipa hut.[15] Five armed policemen were present and they made him stand in front
of the hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing there. When he denied any knowledge
thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit ownership of the plants. [16]Appellant was so nervous and afraid that
[17]
he admitted owning the marijuana.
The police then took a photo of him standing in front of one of the marijuana plants. He was then made to uproot five of the
cannabis plants, and bring them to his hut, where another photo was taken of him standing next to a bundle of uprooted marijuana
plants.[18] The police team then brought him to the police station at Villaverde. On the way, a certain Kiko Pascua, a barangay peace
officer of Barangay Sawmill, accompanied the police officers. Pascua, who bore a grudge against him, because of his refusal to
participate in the former's illegal logging activities, threatened him to admit owning the marijuana, otherwise he would "be put in a
4
bad situation."[19] At the police headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana plants seized by the
police.[20]
On cross-examination, appellant declared that there were ten other houses around the vicinity of his kaingin, the nearest
house being 100 meters away.[21] The latter house belonged to one Carlito (Lito) Pascua, an uncle of the barangay peace officer who
had a grudge against him. The spot where the marijuana plants were found was located between his house and Carlito Pascua's. [22]
The prosecution presented SPO3 Tipay as its rebuttal witness. His testimony was offered to rebut appellant's claim that the
marijuana plants were not planted in the lot he was cultivating. [23] Tipay presented a sketch he made,[24] which showed the location
of marijuana plants in relation to the old and new nipa huts of appellant, as well as the closest neighbor.According to Tipay, the
marijuana plot was located 40 meters away from the old hut of Valdez and 250 meters distant from the hut of Carlito
Pascua.[25] Tipay admitted on cross-examination that no surveyor accompanied him when he made the measurements. [26] He further
stated that his basis for claiming that appellant was the owner or planter of the seized plants was the information given him by the
police informer and the proximity of appellant's hut to the location of said plants.[27]
Finding appellant's defense insipid, the trial court held appellant liable as charged for cultivation and ownership of marijuana
plants as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of cultivating marijuana plants punishable under section 9 of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, accused is hereby sentenced to death by lethal injection. Costs against the accused.
"SO ORDERED."[28]
Appellant assigns the following errors for our consideration:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE SEVEN (7) MARIJUANA PLANTS DESPITE THEIR
INADMISSIBILITY BEING PRODUCTS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 9, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425 DESPITE
THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE CORPUSDELICTI AND THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH UPON APPELLANT DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE THAT THE LAND WHERE THE MARIJUANA PLANTS WERE PLANTED IS A PUBLIC LAND ON THE
ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED APPELLANT PLANTED THE SUBJECT MARIJUANA. [29]
Simply stated, the issues are:
(1) Was the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case lawful?
(2) Were the seized plants admissible in evidence against the accused?
(3) Has the prosecution proved appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
(4) Is the sentence of death by lethal injection correct?
The first and second issues will be jointly discussed because they are interrelated.
Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show that the law enforcers had more than ample time
to secure a search warrant. Second, that the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not remove appellant from the
mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. He relies on the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio,
392 US 1, 20 L. Ed 2d 898, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), to the effect that the protection against unreasonable government intrusion
protects people, not places.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the records clearly show that there was no search made by the
police team, in the first place. The OSG points out that the marijuana plants in question were grown in an unfenced lot and as each
grew about five (5) feet tall, they were visible from afar, and were, in fact, immediately spotted by the police officers when they
reached the site. The seized marijuana plants were, thus, in plain view of the police officers. The instant case must, therefore, be
treated as a warrantless lawful search under the "plain view" doctrine.
The court a quo upheld the validity of the search and confiscation made by the police team on the finding that:
"...It seems there was no need for any search warrant. The policemen went to the plantation site merely to make a
verification. When they found the said plants, it was too much to expect them to apply for a search warrant. In view of the
remoteness of the plantation site (they had to walk for six hours back and forth) and the dangers lurking in the area if they stayed
overnight, they had a valid reason to confiscate the said plants upon discovery without any search warrant. Moreover, the evidence
shows that the lot was not legally occupied by the accused and there was no fence which evinced the occupant's desire to keep
[30]
trespassers out. There was, therefore, no privacy to protect, hence, no search warrant was required."
[31]
The Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried on the strength of a judicial
warrant. Otherwise, the search and seizure is deemed "unreasonable." Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable
search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded. [32]Such evidence
shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. [33]

5
 In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of the existence of probable
cause. From the declarations of the police officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least one (1) day to obtain a warrant to
search appellant's farm. Their informant had revealed his name to them. The place where the cannabis plants were planted was
pinpointed. From the information in their possession, they could have convinced a judge that there was probable cause to justify the
issuance of a warrant. But they did not. Instead, they uprooted the plants and apprehended the accused on the excuse that the trip
was a good six hours and inconvenient to them. We need not underscore that the protection against illegal search and seizure is
constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed without warrants. [34] The mantle of protection
extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers, regardless
of the praiseworthiness of their intentions.
We find no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's contention that we apply the "plain view" doctrine. For the doctrine to
apply, the following elements must be present:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of
their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; and
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.[35]
In the instant case, recall that PO2 Balut testified that they first located the marijuana plants before appellant was arrested
[36]
without a warrant. Hence, there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of appellant's premises. Note further
that the police team was dispatched to appellant's kaingin precisely to search for and uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of
evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently
comes across an incriminating object.[37] Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent. We also note the
testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they could spot the illegal
plants.[38] Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a "further search" was needed. In sum, the
marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to
apply.
Nor can we sustain the trial court's conclusion that just because the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot, appellant
could not invoke the protection afforded by the Charter against unreasonable searches by agents of the State. The right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of one's person, which includes his residence, his papers, and other
possessions.[39] The guarantee refers to "the right of personal security"[40] of the individual. As appellant correctly points out, what is
sought to be protected against the State's unlawful intrusion are persons, not places. [41] To conclude otherwise would not only mean
swimming against the stream, it would also lead to the absurd logic that for a person to be immune against unreasonable searches
and seizures, he must be in his home or office, within a fenced yard or a private place. The Bill of Rights belongs as much to the
person in the street as to the individual in the sanctuary of his bedroom.
We therefore hold, with respect to the first issue, that the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an illegal search
and seizure. As to the second issue, which involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants as evidence for the prosecution, we find
that said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant.They are fruits of the
proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of the court a quo to have admitted and relied upon the
seized marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant.
We now proceed to the third issue, which revolves around the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to prove appellant's
guilt. Having declared the seized marijuana plants inadmissible in evidence against appellant, we must now address the question of
whether the remaining evidence for the prosecution suffices to convict appellant?
In convicting appellant, the trial court likewise relied on the testimony of the police officers to the effect that appellant
admitted ownership of the marijuana when he was asked who planted them. It made the following observation:
"It may be true that the admission to the police by the accused that he planted the marijuana plants was made in the absence of any
independent and competent counsel. But the accused was not, at the time of police verification; under custodial investigation. His
admission is, therefore, admissible in evidence and not violative of the constitutional fiat that admission given during custodial
investigation is not admissible if given without any counsel."[42]
Appellant now argues that his admission of ownership of the marijuana plants in question cannot be used against him for being
violative of his right to counsel during the police investigation. Hence, it was error for the trial court to have relied upon said
admission of ownership. He submits that the investigation conducted by the police officers was not a general inquiry, but was meant
to elicit information on the ownership of the marijuana plants. Appellant theorizes that since the investigation had narrowed down
to him, competent and independent counsel should have assisted him, when the police sought information from him regarding the
ownership of the prohibited plants. Appellant claims the presumption of regularity of duty of officers cannot be made to apply to his
purported voluntarily confession of ownership of the marijuana plants. Nor can it override his constitutional right to counsel during
investigation.
The Office of the Solicitor General believes otherwise. The OSG avers that appellant was not yet under custodial
investigation when he admitted to the police that he owned the marijuana plants. His right to competent and independent counsel,
6
accordingly, had not yet attached. Moreover, appellants failure to impute any false motive for the police officers to falsely accuse
him indicates that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties by police officers was not sufficiently rebutted.
The Constitution plainly declares that any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right: (1)
to remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed of such
rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. [43] An investigation begins when it is no longer
a general inquiry but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or
exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. [44] The moment the police try to elicit admissions or
confessions or even plain information from a person suspected of having committed an offense, he should at that juncture be
assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right in writing and in the presence of counsel. [45]
In the instant case we find that, from the start, a tipster had furnished the police appellant's name as well as the location of
appellant's farm, where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. While the police operation was supposedly meant to
merely "verify" said information, the police chief had likewise issued instructions to arrest appellant as a suspected marijuana
cultivator. Thus, at the time the police talked to appellant in his farm, the latter was already under investigation as a suspect. The
questioning by the police was no longer a general inquiry.[46]
Under cross-examination, PO2 Balut stated, he "did not yet admit that he is the cultivator of that marijuana so we just asked
him and I think there is no need to inform (him of) his constitutional rights because we are just asking him..." [47] In trying to elicit
information from appellant, the police was already investigating appellant as a suspect. At this point, he was already under custodial
investigation and had a right to counsel even if he had not yet been arrested. Custodial investigation is "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way."[48] As a suspect, two armed policemen interrogated appellant. Behind his inquisitors were a barangay peace officer and three
other armed policemen.[49] All had been dispatched to arrest him.[50] From these circumstances, we may infer that appellant had
already been deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way, even before the actual arrest. Note that even before he was
arrested, the police made him incriminatingly pose for photos in front of the marijuana plants.
Moreover, we find appellant's extrajudicial confession flawed with respect to its admissibility. For a confession to be
admissible, it must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent
[51]
and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing. The records show that the admission by appellant
was verbal. It was also uncounselled. A verbal admission allegedly made by an accused during the investigation, without the
assistance of counsel at the time of his arrest and even before his formal investigation is not only inadmissible for being violative of
the right to counsel during criminal investigations, it is also hearsay. [52] Even if the confession or admission were "gospel truth", if it
was made without assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver of such assistance, the confession is inadmissible in evidence,
regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. [53]
It is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be convicted of a crime, the prosecution must establish
by proof beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that the accused is the author thereof. [54] The evidence arrayed
against the accused, however, must not only stand the test of reason,[55] it must likewise be credible and competent. [56] Competent
evidence is "generally admissible" evidence.[57] Admissible evidence, in turn, is evidence "of such a character that the court or judge
is bound to receive it, that is, allow it to be introduced at trial." [58]
In the instant case, the trial court relied on two pieces of probative matter to convict appellant of the offense charged. These
were the seized marijuana plants, and appellant's purportedly voluntary confession of ownership of said marijuana plants to the
police. Other than these proofs, there was no other evidence presented to link appellant with the offense charged. As earlier
discussed, it was error on the trial court's part to have admitted both of these proofs against the accused and to have relied upon
said proofs to convict him. For said evidence is doubly tainted.
First, as earlier pointed out, the seized marijuana plants were obtained in violation of appellant's constitutional rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The search and seizure were void ab initio for having been conducted without the requisite
judicial warrant. The prosecution's very own evidence clearly establishes that the police had sufficient time to obtain a
warrant. There was no showing of such urgency or necessity for the warrantless search or the immediate seizure of the marijuana
plants subject of this case. To reiterate, said marijuana plants cannot be utilized to prove appellant's guilt without running afoul of
the constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and the inadmissibility of evidence procured pursuant to an unlawful search
and seizure.
Second, the confession of ownership of the marijuana plants, which appellant allegedly made to the police during investigation,
is not only hearsay but also violative of the Bill of Rights.The purported confession was made without the assistance of competent
and independent counsel, as mandated by the Charter. Thus, said confession cannot be used to convict appellant without running
afoul of the Constitution's requirement that a suspect in a criminal investigation must have the services of competent and
independent counsel during such investigation.
In sum, both the object evidence and the testimonial evidence as to appellant's voluntary confession of ownership of the
prohibited plants relied upon to prove appellant's guilt failed to meet the test of Constitutional competence.
The Constitution decrees that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved..."[59] To justify the conviction of the accused, the prosecution must adduce that quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome
7
the constitutional presumption of innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on its evidence and cannot draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the accused. [60] Absent the required degree of proof of an accused's guilt, he is entitled to an
acquittal.[61] In this case, the seized marijuana plants linking appellant to the crime charged are miserably tainted with constitutional
infirmities, which render these inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." [62] Nor can the confession obtained during the
uncounselled investigation be used against appellant, "it being inadmissible in evidence against him. [63] Without these proffered but
proscribed materials, we find that the prosecution's remaining evidence did not even approximate the quantum of evidence
necessary to warrant appellant's conviction. Hence, the presumption of innocence in his favor stands. Perforce, his acquittal is in
order.
In acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that he is lily-white, or pure as driven snow. Rather, we are declaring his
innocence because the prosecution's evidence failed to show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. For that is what the basic law
requires. Where the evidence is insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, then his "acquittal
must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law."[64]
WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated on February 18, 1997, by the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya,
Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 3105, finding Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 9 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and imposing upon him the death penalty, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for insufficiency of
evidence. Appellant is ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED immediately from confinement unless held for another lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.

8
 3.) [G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996.]
CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private respondents clinic without the
latters knowledge and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of
her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondents secretary, forcibly opened
the drawers and cabinet in her husbands clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin
and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs. The documents and
papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which
petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner. The case
was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo
Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiffs Complaint or those further
described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to immediately
return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorneys fees;
and to pay the costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and
her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from using or submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in
question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that
they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial court declared the
documents and papers to be properties of private respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and
enjoined her from using them in evidence. In appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial courts decision,
petitioners only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled that the documents and papers (marked as
Annexes A-i to J-7 of respondents comment in that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioners
attorney, Alfonso Felix, Jr., did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct. For this reason it is contended that the Court of
Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private respondents complaint.
Petitioners contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among other things, private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr.
committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint against
Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note of the following defense of Atty. Felix, Jr. which it found to be impressed with merit:2
On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he maintains that:
xxx xxx xxx
4. When respondent refiled Cecilias case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional Trial Court, there was admittedly an order of
the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the documents Annex A-I to J-7. On September 6, 1983, however
having appealed the said order to this Court on a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid date which
order temporarily set aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the enforceability of this Courts order, respondents request for
petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be looked upon as malpractice. Notably,
petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and authenticity of the questioned annexes. At that point in time, would it have been
malpractice for respondent to use petitioners admission as evidence against him in the legal separation case pending in the Regional
Trial Court of Makati? Respondent submits it is- not malpractice.
Significantly, petitioners admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself under oath. Such verified admission
constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in evidence against him. Petitioner became bound by his admission. For Cecilia to
avail herself of her husbands admission and use the same in her action for legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a declaration that his use of the
documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martins admission as to their genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a
violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no means does the decision in that case establish the admissibility of the
documents and papers in question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used the documents and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial
court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed
by petitioner against the trial courts order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the further use of the documents
and papers became effective again.

9
 Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy
of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable3is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law.4 Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.5
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and
in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity
or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife
may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. 6 Neither may be
examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to
share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

10
 4.) [G.R. Nos. 140538-39. June 14, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. GODOFREDO B. ADOR and DIOSDADO B. ADOR III, appellants.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
The quiescence of the fading day was shattered by bursts of gunfire, startling the otherwise tranquil but sanguine folks of
Pacol, Naga City. As the fusillade of shots ceased and the wisp of smoke cleared, frolicking promenaders stumbled upon Ompong
Chavez who was gasping his last, clutching his intestines which had spewed out from his bloodied stomach. He did not in fact reach
the hospital alive. A breath away, Abe Cuya lay lifeless on the pavement. He died on the spot. For the twinned deaths, the Adors, six
(6) of them, were haled to court.
In two (2) separate informations,[1] Diosdado Sr.,[2] Diosdado Jr., Diosdado III, Godofredo, Rosalino and Allan, all surnamed
Ador, were charged with the murder of Absalon Abe S. Cuya III and Rodolfo Ompong S. Chavez. The Informations in Crim. Cases
Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816 identically read:
That on or about March 10, 1997, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and the aid
of armed men, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot ABSALON ABE CUYA III (RODOLFO OMPO CHAVEZ y SAN
ANDRES[3] for Crim. Case No. 97-6816) with firearms, inflicting upon him multiple and mortal gunshot wounds which caused his
death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
With the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation and nighttime.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
However, only four (4) of the six (6) Adors, namely, Diosdado Sr., Godofredo, Rosalino and Allan, were taken into custody. The
two (2), Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado III, remained at large.Trial thus proceeded only against Diosdado Sr., Godofredo, Rosalino and
Allan who all pleaded not guilty. Diosdado Sr. is the father of Diosdado Jr., Diosdado III and Godofredo, while Rosalino is the father
of Allan. Diosdado Sr. and Rosalino are brothers.[4]
In its effort to secure the conviction of the accused, the prosecution presented a total of sixteen (16) witnesses: Mercy Beria,
Larry Cado, Medico-Legal Officer of Naga City Dr. Joel S. Jurado, Police Inspector Ma. Julieta Razonable, SPO1 Benjamin Barbosa,
SPO3 Augusto Basagre, Major Ernesto Idian, Inspector Reynaldo F. Fulgar, SPO1 Noli Reyes Sol, SPO3 Eduardo C. Bathan, Inspector
Vicente C. Lauta, Ernani Castillo, PO3 Augusto I. Nepomuceno, Absalon Cuya Sr., Efren Chavez and Pablo Calsis.
From the evidence of the prosecution, it appears that on March 10, 1997, at around seven-thirty in the evening, while Mercy
Beria, Larry Cado and some eleven (11) others were leisurely walking along Kilometer 11 on their way to Zone 1, Kilometer 10,
Pacol, Naga City, to attend a wedding anniversary, they heard several gunshots. Shortly after, they met a certain Pablito Umali who
told them that Ompong Chavez had been shot. They ran to Chavez straight off and saw him already lying on the ground, about 1
meters away from a lighted electric post, holding on to his intestines which were starting to come out. Beria shook Chavez and asked
him what had happened. Chavez replied tinambangan kami na Ador (We were ambushed by the Adors) and requested that he be
brought to the hospital as he was dying. About eight (8) meters from where Chavez was, in a dark spot, lay Abe Cuya, dead. [5]
Upon learning of the shooting incident through their radio communication, SPO1 Benjamin Barbosa, together with PO2
Alexander Diaz, immediately proceeded to the crime scene to conduct an investigation. SPO3 Eduardo Bathan and SPO1 Wilfredo
Fernandez, among others, were already there. [6] SPO1 Barbosa collected some pieces of evidence, took some pictures and made
some sketches.[7] SPO1 Fernandez on the other hand interviewed one Cresenciana Mendoza in her house which was nearby, and
when he heard people shout that Chavez was still alive, he brought Chavez to the hospital but the latter expired on the way. [8]
That same evening, upon being informed that the Adors had a long-standing grudge against the Cuyas, SPO1 Barbosa sought
the help of then Barangay Captain Josue Perez to accompany him to the residence of the Adors. They arrived at the Adors at
around ten oclock that evening and spoke with their patriarch, Diosdado Ador Sr. SPO1 Barbosa looked for the other male members
of the Ador family but was told by Diosdado Sr. that they were already asleep. Diosdado Sr. nevertheless promised to present them
the following day.[9]
The following morning, March 11, 1997, Barangay Captain Perez accompanied the Adors, namely, Diosdado Sr., Diosdado III,
Godofredo, Rosalino, Allan and Reynaldo, to SPO1 Barbosa at the PNP Central Police Headquarters. The Adors were informed of
their constitutional rights to remain silent and to choose their own counsel. They were then brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at
the Provincial Headquarters and subjected to paraffin tests. [10] On the way to the crime laboratory, Godofredo told his police escort
that he had been entrusted with a handgun which he kept in his residence. [11] The information was relayed to Major Ernesto Idian,
then Deputy Chief of Police of Naga City, who ordered PO3 Augusto I. Nepomuceno to accompany him in recovering the gun
because Godofredo said that he would turn in the gun only to PO3 Nepomuceno. Thus, Major Idian, PO3 Nepomuceno and some
others accompanied Godofredo to the latters residence.
Upon reaching the Ador residence, Godofredo, together with PO3 Nepomuceno, went to their backyard, retrieved the gun
from under a fallen coconut trunk and turned it in to the latter.Godofredo allegedly told the police that he fired the said gun outside
their house on the night of March 10 after he heard several gunshots. [12] PO3 Nepomuceno identified the gun as a caliber .38 paltik
handgun which had no serial number.[13] PO3 Nepomuceno then turned over the handgun to Major Idian[14] who likewise identified
it as a .38 caliber revolver. Major Idian returned the handgun to PO3 Nepomuceno for ballistic and paraffin
11
examination.[15] Thereafter, PO3 Nepomuceno placed his initials on the gun and put it in his private locker while preparing the
documents for the examinations and the possible filing of a case for Illegal Possession of Firearm. [16]
Also, on the same day, March 11, 1997, Dr. Joel S. Jurado, Medico-Legal Officer of Naga City, conducted an autopsy on the
bodies of Chavez and Cuya. Based on the autopsy reports, Dr. Jurado testified that Cuya sustained five (5) gunshot wounds and died
from cardio-pulmonary arrest, massive intra-thoracic, intra-abdominal, intra-cranial hemorrhage secondary to multiple gunshot
wounds penetrating the heart, brain, lungs and digestive tract. [17] Chavez on the other hand had three (3) gunshot wounds and died
from traumatic shock and massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage secondary to multiple gunshot wounds penetrating the right kidney
and the internal abdominal organs.[18] Dr. Jurado further testified that that he recovered a slug from Cuyas head three (3) days after
he conducted the autopsy - after Cuyas relatives called his attention to a protruding mass in Cuyas head. Thus, he had Cuyas cadaver
sent back to the funeral parlor, opened it and was able to extract a deformed .38 caliber slug which he thereafter submitted to the
City Prosecutors Office.[19]
Police Inspector Reynaldo Fulgar, Chief of the Firearm Identification Section of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Camp Ola, Legaspi
City, testified that based on the ballistic examination he conducted on the bullets submitted to his office, the .38 caliber slug
recovered from Cuyas head matched the three (3) .38 caliber test bullets which were test-fired from the suspected firearm
surrendered by Godofredo. He however averred that the .38 caliber bullets were actually fired from a .357 Smith and Wesson
Magnum homemade revolver without serial number, and not from a .38 caliber revolver. [20]
The paraffin casts taken from the Adors were also transmitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory Services for examination and
yielded the presence of gunpowder nitrates, thus
(1) Diosdado A. Ador both hands, positive;
(2) Diosdado B. Ador III right hand, positive; left hand, negative;
(3) Godofredo B. Ador right hand, positive; left hand, negative;
(4) Rosalino A. Ador both hands, positive;
(5) Reynaldo T. Ador both hands, negative;[21]
(6) Allan T. Ador both hands, positive. [22]
Absalon Cuya Sr., father of deceased Cuya III, said that the killing of his son was driven by the long-standing feud between the
Adors and his family. He said that Diosdado Jr. had earlier accused his other son Liberato of frustrated homicide for allegedly
stabbing him (Diosdado Jr.).[23] Then, Adelina, a daughter of Diosdado Sr., filed a case for abduction with multiple rape against him,
Absalon III, Rayne and Josephine, all surnamed Cuya, after the romantic relationship between Adelina and his deceased son Absalon
III turned sour.[24] He also presented official receipts of the funeral and burial expenses which amounted to P10,230.00.[25]
Efren Chavez, brother of deceased Chavez, likewise spoke of the animosity between the Chavez and the Ador families. He
produced a certification from the PNP Naga City Police Station that on February 17, 1997, a blotter was entered in the Daily Record
of Events showing that deceased Chavez reported a certain Ricardo Ador who while under the influence of liquor caused him
physical injury.[26] The witness likewise presented an official receipt showing that the family spent P3,500.00 for the funeral of the
deceased Chavez.[27] After presenting Chavez, the prosecution rested its case.
On April 7, 1998, the four (4) accused filed a demurrer to evidence for utter lack of evidence. [28] On May 13, 1998, the trial
court dismissed the cases against Diosdado Sr., Rosalino and Allan but denied the demurrer to evidence against Godofredo
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the demurrer to evidence to be justified for the accused Diosdado A. Ador, Allan T. Ador and Rosalino
Ador, hence, the same is hereby granted insofar as these accused are concerned. Said accused therefore, namely: Diosdado A. Ador,
Allan T. Ador and Rosalino Ador are ACQUITTED in Crim. Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816. The bailbonds posted for their provisional
liberty are hereby cancelled.
Trial of the case insofar as Godofredo B. Ador is concerned shall proceed.
SO ORDERED.[29]
Thus, trial proceeded against Godofredo.
For his defense, Godofredo denied any participation in the killings of Cuya and Chavez. He said that on March 10, 1997, at
around seven oclock in the evening, he heard several gunshots while he was having dinner with his wife and four (4) children in their
house in Pacol, Naga City. Since his wife advised him not to go out anymore, he slept after dinner. The following day, while he was
gathering pili nuts, his long-time friend Dominador Bautista arrived and asked him to go down from the tree. Bautista wanted to
borrow money and on his way to see him, found a gun by the footpath. Bautista gave the gun to him. It was his first time to hold a
gun. He tried it out and fired three (3) times. After firing the gun, he removed the empty shells from its chambers and threw them
away. He then wrapped the gun with plastic and hid it under a coconut trunk. Bautista left when he told him that he had no
money. He then continued to gather pili nuts until Major Idian and three (3) other policemen came.
Godofredos father told him that they were being suspected of killing Chavez and Cuya the night before. Thus, they went to the
provincial headquarters, were subjected to paraffin testing and made to sign a blank bond paper. After that, they went back to the
central police station. At the central police station, Godofredo narrated to a certain Calabia that that morning, his friend Bautista
found a gun along the road and gave it to him. He hid the gun under a coconut trunk. Calabia relayed the information to Major Idian
who directed PO3 Nepomuceno to go with Godofredo to get the gun. Godofredo led PO3 Nepomuceno to where he hid the gun,

12
retrieved it and handed it to the latter. They then returned to the police headquarters where he was jailed. He asserted that the gun
presented in court is different from the gun he surrendered to the police. [30]
Bautista corroborated Godofredos story. He testified that he found the gun which Godofredo yielded to PO3 Nepomuceno. He
said that he was on his way to see Godofredo to borrow money when he chanced upon the handgun on the pathway. He gave the
gun to Godofredo and the latter tested it by pulling its trigger. After firing the gun, Godofredo removed the empty shells and threw
them. Godofredo then wrapped the gun with plastic and hid it under a fallen coconut trunk. [31]
Meanwhile, Diosdado Jr. was arrested on October 9, 1998, at Barangay Doa, Orani, Bataan, and committed to the Naga City Jail
on November 17, 1998, while Diosdado III surrendered to the court and was committed to the same city jail on November 22,
1998. On November 23, 1998, both Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado III were arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty.Hence, trial against
them commenced and proceeded jointly with the case of the remaining accused, Godofredo.
The prosecution presented Pablo Calsis[32] as a witness against Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado III. Calsis testified that on March 10,
1997, at around 7:30 in the evening, he dropped by the house of Cresenciana Mendoza whom he fondly called Lola Kising at
Kilometer 10, Pacol, Naga City, before going home from work. After asking permission from her to go home and while about to
urinate outside her house, he heard several gunshots. He ducked by a sineguelas tree at a nearby flower plantation. As he was about
to stand up, he saw Disodado Jr., Diosdado III, Godofredo and another unidentified man run away. Godofredo was carrying a short
firearm while Diosdado Jr. had a long firearm. [33] He saw Chavez and Cuya lying on the road. Chavez was about five (5) meters away
from where he stood while Cuya was ten (10) meters away. The place was illuminated by a bright light from an electric post. There
were no other people around. Calsis ran away for fear that he might be identified by the assailants. He heard Chavez mumbling but
shirked nevertheless.[34]
Calsis narrated to Absalon Cuya Sr. what he saw only after about one (1) year and nine (9) months. Fear struck him.[35] He
maintained that he knew the assailants because he and his wife lived in the house of Lola Kising after they got married. [36] Immense
fear prevented him from attending to Chavez, even while he heard him murmuring, and from informing the families of the victims of
the incident that very same night. He was about to tell the Chavez family the following morning but was counseled by his Lola
Bading, the sister of his Lola Kising, against getting involved in the case. [37] Calsis and his family left their residence in Pacol one (1)
month after the incident because he was afraid the assailants might have identified him. [38] Even Lola Kising left her residence two
[39]
(2) months after the incident. It was only after he learned from Absalon Cuya Sr. that the trial court dismissed the cases for lack of
evidence insofar as some of the original accused were concerned that he took pity on the respective families of the victims who have
failed to get justice for the death of their loved ones. [40]
In defense, Diosdado Jr. testified that on March 10, 1997, he was in Marikina City working as a warehouseman and timekeeper
of the Consuelo Builders Corporation. He was there the whole time from February 15, 1997, until March 24, 1997.[41] Pablo Aspe, a
co-worker of Diosdado Jr., corroborated the latters testimony. He said that on February 15, 1997, he and Diosdado Jr. left
Pacol, Naga City, together to work in Consuelo Construction in Marikina City. They were with each other in Marikina City the whole
time from February 15, 1997, until he (Aspe) went home to Naga City on March 22, 1997. While in Marikina City, they resided and
slept together in their barracks at the construction site. [42]
Diosdado III also took the witness stand. On March 10, 1997, at around seven oclock in the evening, he was at their house at
Zone 1, Pacol, Naga City, watching television with his parents and cousins Reynaldo and Allan when they heard gunshots. They
ignored the gunshots, continued watching television and slept at eight oclock. The following day, at around six oclock in the
morning, while he was fetching water, four (4) policemen arrived at their house and talked to his father. Thereafter, his father called
him, his brother Godofredo, uncle Rosalino and cousins Allan and Reynaldo. The policemen then requested all of them to go to the
PNP Central Police Headquarters for investigation regarding the killings of Chavez and Cuya. Upon reaching the police headquarters,
they were interviewed by the media and afterwards brought to the provincial headquarters where they were subjected to paraffin
tests. They were then brought back to the Central Police Headquarters and later allowed to go back home to Pacol.
Then, sometime in October, 1997, his father was arrested by the police. Diosdado III was at their residence when his father was
picked up. Only his father was taken by the police. He continued to reside in their house until April, 1998, when he transferred to
Sagurong, San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay, to work as a fisherman. On November 21, 1998, he received a letter from his father telling him
to come home. Thus, he went home the following day. On November 23, 1998, he surrendered to the court.[43]
The defense also presented Barangay Captain Josue Perez and an uncle of Diosdado Jr. and Disodado III, Jaime Bobiles. Perez
testified that he was the barangay captain of Pacol from 1982 until May, 1997. In 1996, Cresenciana Mendoza left their barangay
permanently to live with her children in Manila because she was sickly and alone in her house. He said that Mendoza never came
back. He does not know any Pablo Calsis and the latter could not have talked to Mendoza on March 10, 1997, because at that
time, Mendoza was not there and her house was already abandoned. [44] Similarly, Bobiles confirmed the testimony that Diosdado III
worked as a fisherman in Tabaco and stayed in his residence from May 1, 1998, until November 1998 when Diosdado III received a
letter from his father and had to go home. [45]
In rebuttal however, prosecution witness SPO1 Fernandez asserted that he interviewed Cresenciana Mendoza that fateful night
of March 10, 1997.[46] After the rebuttal witness was presented, the cases were finally submitted for decision. [47]
On August 2, 1999, the trial court held that a chain of circumstances x x x lead to a sound and logical conclusion that indeed the
accused (Diosdado III and Godofredo) committed the offense charged[48] and as such rendered judgment
13
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds the accused Godofredo B. Ador and Diosdado B. Ador III GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, defined and penalized under the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act 7659 in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816, hereby sentences the said accused Godofredo B. Ador
and Diosdado B. Ador III to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA in Criminal Case No. 97-6815; RECLUSION PERPETUA in
Criminal Case No. 97-6816, to pay the heirs of Absalon Abe Cuya III P25,000 each by way of actual damages and P50,000 in each
criminal case by way of indemnity. To pay the heirs of Rodolfo Ompong Chavez the sum of P50,000 in each criminal case by way of
indemnity, such accessory penalties as provided for by law and to pay the cost. For insufficiency of the prosecution to prove the guilt
of the accused Diosdado B. Ador, Jr. beyond reasonable doubt, he is hereby ACQUITTED in Crim. Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816.
The Jail Warden of the Naga City District Jail is hereby ordered to forthwith release from its custody the accused Diosdado B. Ador,
Jr., unless his further detention is warranted by any other legal cause or causes.
SO ORDERED.[49]

Hence, this joint appeal interposed by Disodado III and Godofredo. They maintain that the trial court gravely erred in convicting
them of murder based on circumstantial evidence. The testimony of prosecution witness Pablo Calsis that he saw them running
away from the scene of the crime was concocted. The handgun turned in by Godofredo was not the same gun presented by the
prosecution during the trial. The unusual discovery of a slug from the head of the deceased - three (3) days after the autopsy was
conducted and after the cadaver was turned over to the family of the victim - was quite doubtful. Even the supposed dying
declaration of the victim specifically pointed to neither Diosdado III nor Godofredo. And, the trial court erred in admitting in
evidence those taken against them in violation of their constitutional rights to counsel during custodial investigation. [50]
The rules of evidence allow the courts to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. [51] It may be the
basis of a conviction so long as the combination of all the circumstances proven produces a logical conclusion which suffices to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. [52] All the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent
with the theory that all the accused are guilty of the offense charged, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that
they are innocent and with every other possible, rational hypothesis except that of guilt. [53] The evidence must exclude each and
every hypothesis which may be consistent with their innocence. [54] Also, it should be acted on and weighed with great
[55]
caution. Circumstantial evidence which has not been adequately established, much less corroborated, cannot by itself be the basis
of conviction.[56]
Thus, for circumstantial evidence to suffice, (1) there should be more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.[57] Like an ornate tapestry created out of interwoven fibers which cannot be plucked out and assayed a strand at a
time apart from the others, the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. [58] The test to determine whether or
not the circumstantial evidence on record are sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of the circumstances proved must
be consistent with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence. [59] Accordingly, we have set guidelines in
appreciating circumstantial evidence:(1) it should be acted upon with caution; (2) all the essential facts must be consistent with the
hypothesis of guilt; (3) the facts must exclude every theory but that of guilt; and (4) the facts must establish such a certainty of guilt
of the accused as to convince the judgment beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is the one who committed the offense. [60]
Measured against the guidelines set, we cannot uphold the conviction of the accused based on the circumstantial evidence
presented.
The first circumstance which the prosecution sought to prove is that the accused were supposedly seen fleeing from the locus
criminis, armed with their respective weapons. Thus, the trial court, gleaning from the evidence presented, found that [w]hen about
to stand, Calsis saw Godofredo B. Ador, Diosdado B. Ador, Jr. and Diosdado B. Ador III, and a person going to the direction of the
house of the Adors which is about 500 meters away.[61] In fact, prosecution witness Calsis allegedly even saw Diosdado Jr. carrying a
long firearm but x x x could not determine what kind of gun it was.[62] However, the trial court acquitted Diosdado Jr. But only rightly
so. For, Calsis had difficulty in identifying the Adors notwithstanding his assertion that he knew and saw them personally. We defer
to his direct examination
ATTY. TERBIO (Private Prosecutor):
Q. You said you recognized the persons running, could you tell us their names?
PABLO CALSIS:
A. Yes sir.
Q. Name them?
A. Godofredo Ador, Jr., Sadang III.
Q. How about the others?
A. I could not tell his name but if I see him I could identify him.
Q. The 4 persons whom you saw that night, if they are present in court, please point them out?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Point particularly Godofredo Ador, Jr.?
A. (Witness pointed or tapped the shoulder of a person inside the courtroom who answered by the name Diosdado Ador, Jr.)
Q. How about this Sadang III?

14
 A. (Witness tapped the shoulder of a man who answered by the name of Diosdado Ador III.)
Q. Likewise, point to the third person?
A. (Witness pointed to a man)
COURT:
Delete that portion from the record, he is not on trial.
ATTY TERBIO:
Q. You said you saw 4 persons, is the fourth one inside the courtroom?
A. None sir.
Q. But if you saw that person, will you be able to recognize him?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Why do you know these persons whom you just tapped the shoulder?
xxxxxxxxx
A. I know these persons having lived in the house of Lola Kising.
Q. How far?
A. Around 100 meters.
Q. On the said date and time and place, you said you saw them running, how far were you from them?
A. Around 10 meters. (Emphases supplied)[63]

The testimony of Calsis, if at all, could hardly be used against Diosdado III whom he miserably failed to positively identify during
trial. In fact, the acquittal of Diosdado Jr. by the trial court renders the entire testimony of Calsis in serious doubt. Calsis was
presented to positively identify the assailants who were supposedly personally known to him and were just ten (10) meters away
from him. It puzzles us no end why he cannot even identify the Adors in open court.
Thus, despite Calsis assertion that Diosdado Jr. was one of the assailants, the trial court doubted him and gave credence to the
alibi of Diosdado Jr. that the latter was in Nangka, Marikina, when the killings took place. The trial court favored the unbiased
testimony of Aspe who said that Diosdado Jr. worked as a timekeeper and warehouseman with him at the Consuelo Construction at
Nangka, Marikina, from February 15, 1997, until March 22, 1997, and went home to Pacol only on May 27, 1997. This ruling is
strengthened by the fact that on the morning following the killings, all the male members of the Ador family were brought to the
police headquarters for paraffin examination and Diosdado Jr. was not among them. [64] We thus respect the finding of the trial court
that indeed Diosdado Jr. was not at the scene of the crime absent any indication that the lower court overlooked some facts or
circumstances which if considered would alter the outcome of the case. [65]
While it is true that the courts are not bound to accept or reject an entire testimony, and may believe one part and disbelieve
another,[66] our Constitution and the law mandate that all doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused. Calsis committed an
obvious blunder in identifying the supposed assailants which this Court cannot simply let go. On the contrary, it creates reasonable
doubt in our minds if Calcis really saw the persons he allegedly saw or if he was even where he said he was that evening. For, it is
elementary that the positive identification of the accused is crucial in establishing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. That is wanting
in the instant case.
What is more, Calsis asseverations, at the outset, could no longer be used against Godofredo since both the prosecution and
the defense have already rested and the case against Godofredo was already submitted for decision when Calsis was
presented.[67] Neither can they still be used against Diosdado Jr. who was already acquitted by the trial court.
Both Diosdado III and Godofredo denied the charges hurled against them. But, while it is true that alibi and denial are the
weakest of the defenses as they can easily be fabricated,[68]absent such clear and positive identification, the doctrine that the
defense of denial cannot prevail over positive identification of the accused must yield to the constitutional presumption of
[69] [70]
innocence. Hence, while denial is concededly fragile and unstable, the conviction of the accused cannot be based thereon. The
rule in criminal law is firmly entrenched that verdicts of conviction must be predicated on the strength of the evidence for the
prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[71]
The second circumstance is the handgun turned in by Godofredo. But this was bungled by the prosecution. Major Idian, Deputy
Chief of Police of the Naga City Police Station, to whom the handgun was turned over after Godofredo surrendered it, identified it as
a caliber .38 revolver, thus

ATTY TERBIO (Private Prosecutor):

Q. What kind of firearm was it?
MAJOR IDIAN:
A. Revolver handgun, caliber .38 with 6 rounds ammunition.
Q. What is the caliber?
[72]
A. .38 caliber.
Similarly, PO3 Nepomuceno who then had been with the PNP for eight (8) years already and to whom Godofredo turned in the handgun, likewise identified it
as a caliber .38, thus
ATTY TERBIO (Private Prosecutor):
Q. What is the caliber of that gun?
PO3 NEPOMUCENO:
A. .38 caliber.[73]

15
 However, Insp. Fulgar, Chief of the Firearm Identification Section of the PNP Crime Laboratory, testified that [t]he indorsement
coming from the City Prosecutors Office x x x alleged that the .38 caliber live bullet was fired from a .38 caliber revolver. But our
office found out that the firearm was not a .38 caliber revolver but a .357 caliber revolver. [74]
Could it be that the handgun was replaced before it was turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory? While the prosecution
traced the trail of police officers who at every stage held the gun supposedly recovered from Godofredo, it never clarified this
discrepancy which is quite glaring to ignore. It is difficult to believe that a Deputy Chief of Police and a police officer of eight (8) years
will both mistake a .357 caliber for a .38 caliber handgun. Likewise, a Chief of the Firearm Identification Section of the PNP Crime
Laboratory cannot be presumed not to know the difference between the two (2) handguns. Suffice it to say that the prosecution
failed to clear up the variance and for this Court to suggest an explanation would be to venture into the realm of pure speculation,
conjecture and guesswork. Thus, faced with the obvious disparity in the suspected firearm used in the crime and that which was
turned over by Godofredo, his declaration that the handgun presented in court was different from the gun he gave to the police
deserves serious, if not sole consideration.
Consequently, even the third circumstance, the .38 caliber slug supposedly recovered from the head of the victim three (3)
days after the autopsy was conducted loses evidentiary value as its source is now highly questionable. It has become uncertain
whether the deformed slug was fired from the .38 caliber revolver turned in by Godofredo or from a .357 caliber handgun as
attested to by the Chief of the Firearm Identification Section of the PNP Crime Laboratory.
Neither can this Court rely on the dying declaration of the dying Chavez nor on the results of the paraffin tests to convict either
Diosdado III or Godofredo or both. To refute these, we need not go far and beyond the 13 May 1998 Order of the trial court partially
granting the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused
The only direct evidence introduced by the prosecution is the testimony of Mercy Beria, that she heard Rodolfo Ompong Chavez say
tinambangan kami na Ador (We were ambushed by the Adors). Sad to say, no specific name was ever mentioned by the
witness. Neither was she able to tell how many (persons) Adors were involved. This testimony if it will be given credence may
inculpate any person with the family name Ador as assailant. The prosecution therefore was not able to establish with moral
certainty as to who of the Adors were perpetrators of the offense x x x x Paraffin tests are not conclusive evidence that indeed a
person has fired a gun.
The fact that the accused-appellants tested positive of gunpowder nitrates does not conclusively show that they fired the murder
weapon, or a gun for that matter, for such forensic evidence should be taken only as an indication of possibility or even of
probability, but not of infallibility, since nitrates are also admittedly found in substances other than gunpowder. (People v.
Abellarosa, G.R. No. 121195, 27 November 1996; People v. de Guzman, 250 SCRA 118; People v. Nitcha, 240 SCRA 283) [75]
Thus, while a dying declaration may be admissible in evidence, it must identify with certainty the assailant. Otherwise, it loses
its significance. Also, while a paraffin test could establish the presence or absence of nitrates on the hand, it cannot establish that
the source of the nitrates was the discharge of firearms a person who tests positive may have handled one or more substances with
the same positive reaction for nitrates such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, tobacco and leguminous
plants.[76] In People v. Melchor,[77] this Court acquitted the accused despite the presence of gunpowder nitrates on his hands
[S]cientific experts concur in the view that the result of a paraffin test is not conclusive. While it can establish the presence of
nitrates or nitrites on the hand, it does not always indubitably show that said nitrates or nitrites were caused by the discharge of
firearm. The person tested may have handled one or more of a number of substances which give the same positive reaction for
nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, pharmaceuticals and leguminous plants such as peas, beans and alfalfa. A person
who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since these substances are present in the products of
combustion of tobacco. The presence of nitrates or nitrites, therefore, should be taken only as an indication of a possibility but not
of infallibility that the person tested has fired a gun.
In fine, the admissions made by Godofredo to Major Idian and PO3 Nepomuceno including the gun in question cannot be
considered in evidence against him without violating his constitutional right to counsel. Godofredo was already under custodial
investigation when he made his admissions and surrendered the gun to the police authorities. The police had already begun to focus
on the Adors and were carrying out a process of interrogations that was lending itself to eliciting incriminating statements and
evidence: the police went to the Ador residence that same evening upon being informed that the Adors had a long-standing grudge
against the Cuyas; the following day, all the male members of the Ador family were told to go to the police station; the police was
also informed of the dying declaration of deceased Chavez pointing to the Adors as the assailants; the Adors were all subjected to
paraffin examination; and, there were no other suspects as the police was not considering any other person or group of persons. The
investigation thus was no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime as the Adors were already being held as suspects for the
killings of Cuya and Chavez.
Consequently, the rights of a person under custodial investigation, including the right to counsel, have already attached to the
Adors, and pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 12(1) and (3), 1987 Constitution, any waiver of these rights should be in writing and undertaken
with the assistance of counsel. Admissions under custodial investigation made without the assistance of counsel are barred as
evidence.[78] The records are bare of any indication that the accused have waived their right to counsel, hence, any of their
admissions are inadmissible in evidence against them. As we have held, a suspects confession, whether verbal or non-verbal, when
taken without the assistance of counsel without a valid waiver of such assistance regardless of the absence of such coercion, or the
16
fact that it had been voluntarily given, is inadmissible in evidence, even if such confession were gospel truth. [79] Thus, in Aballe v.
People,[80] the death weapon, a four-inch kitchen knife, which was found after the accused brought the police to his house and
pointed to them the pot where he had concealed it, was barred from admission as it was discovered as a consequence of an
uncounseled extrajudicial confession.
With hardly any substantial evidence left, the prosecution likewise played up the feud between the Adors on one hand and the
Chavezes and the Cuyas on the other hand, and suggested that the Adors had an axe to grind against the Chavezes and the
Cuyas. For sure, motive is not sufficient to support a conviction if there is no other reliable evidence from which it may reasonably
be adduced that the accused was the malefactor. [81] Motive alone cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt sufficient
to overthrow the presumption of innocence.[82]
All told, contrary to the pronouncements of the trial court, we cannot rest easy in convicting the two (2) accused based on
circumstantial evidence. For, the pieces of the said circumstantial evidence presented do not inexorably lead to the conclusion that
they are guilty.[83] The prosecution witness failed to identify the accused in court. A cloud of doubt continues to hover over the gun
used and the slug recovered. The dying declaration and paraffin examination remain unreliable. Godofredos uncounseled
admissions including the gun he turned in are barred as evidence. And, the supposed motive of the accused is simply
insufficient. Plainly, the facts from which the inference that the accused committed the crime were not proven.Accordingly, the guilt
of the accused cannot be established, more so to a moral certainty. It is when evidence is purely circumstantial that the prosecution
is much more obligated to rely on the strength of its own case and not on the weakness of the defense, and that conviction must
[84]
rest on nothing less than moral certainty.
Consequently, the case of the prosecution has been reduced to nothing but mere suspicions and speculations. It is hornbook
doctrine that suspicions and speculations can never be the basis of conviction in a criminal case. [85] Courts must ensure that the
conviction of the accused rests firmly on sufficient and competent evidence, and not the results of passion and prejudice. [86] If the
alleged inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two (2) or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused, and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence is not adequate to support conviction. [87] The
court must acquit the accused because the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is therefore insufficient to
support a judgment of conviction.[88] Conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of the guilt of the accused. [89] The
overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt
as to his guilt.[90] It is thus apropos to repeat the doctrine that an accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous
with guilt the prosecution must overthrow the presumption of innocence with proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
prosecution has failed to discharge its burden. Accordingly, we have to acquit.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Br. 25, in Crim. Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816
dated August 2, 1999, finding accused-appellants Godofredo B. Ador and Diosdado B. Ador III guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
(2) counts of murder and imposing on them the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-
appellants Godofredo B. Ador and Diosdado B. Ador III are ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and their IMMEDIATE RELEASE is hereby
ORDERED unless they are being held for some other legal cause.
SO ORDERED.

17
 5.) G.R. No. 110662 August 4, 1994
TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO F. ZAMORA, Presiding Judge, Br. 94, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City and RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ, respondents.
Oscar A. Inocentes & Associates Law Office for petitioner.
Efren A. Santos for private respondent.

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks to reverse the decision * of respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 28545 entitled "Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez versus Hon. Romeo F. Zamora, Presiding Judge, Br. 94, Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City and Rafael S. Ortanez".
The relevant facts of the case are as follows:
On 2 May 1990, private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for
annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or
psychological incapacity of the petitioner. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-90-5360 and raffled to Branch 94, RTC of
Quezon City presided over by respondent Judge Romeo F. Zamora.
Private respondent, after presenting his evidence, orally formally offered in evidence Exhibits "A" to "M".
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between
petitioner and unidentified persons.
Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent's oral offer of evidence on 9 June 1992; on the same
day, the trial court admitted all of private respondent's offered evidence.
A motion for reconsideration from petitioner was denied on 23 June 1992.
A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals assailing the admission in evidence of the
aforementioned cassette tapes.
On 10 June 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment which is the subject of the present petition, which in part reads:
It is much too obvious that the petition will have to fail, for two basic reasons:
(1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for
certain purposes, depending on how they are presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the
interest of truth and fairness and the even handed administration of justice.
(2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced
during trial. The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is erroneous,
the ruling should be questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the merits and not through the special civil
action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it exists, cannot be anymore than an error of law,
properly correctible by appeal and not by certiorari. Otherwise, we will have the sorry spectacle of a case being
subject of a counterproductive "ping-pong" to and from the appellate court as often as a trial court is perceived to
have made an error in any of its rulings with respect to evidentiary matters in the course of trial. This we cannot
sanction.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari being devoid of merit, is hereby DISMISSED. 1
From this adverse judgment, petitioner filed the present petition for review, stating:
Grounds for Allowance of the Petition
10. The decision of respondent [Court of Appeals] has no basis in law nor previous decision of the Supreme Court.
10.1 In affirming the questioned order of respondent judge, the Court of Appeals has decided a
question of substance not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court as the question of
admissibility in evidence of tape recordings has not, thus far, been addressed and decided
squarely by the Supreme Court.
11. In affirming the questioned order of respondent judge, the Court of Appeals has likewise rendered a decision in
a way not in accord with law and with applicable decisions of the Supreme Court.
11.1 Although the questioned order is interlocutory in nature, the same can still be [the] subject
of a petition for certiorari. 2
The main issue to be resolved is whether or not the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was properly
availed of by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals.
The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper
remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the
interlocutory order.
However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford
adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress. 3

18
 In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the evidence offered by private respondent,
including tape recordings of telephone conversations of petitioner with unidentified persons. These tape recordings were made and
obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone. 4
Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of
Communication, and for other purposes" expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. The relevant provisions of
Rep. Act No. 4200 are as follows:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however
otherwise described. . . .
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or meaning of
the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or secured by any person in
violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-
judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions of the law in admitting
in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the
recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
Additionally, it should be mentioned that the above-mentioned Republic Act in Section 2 thereof imposes a penalty of imprisonment
of not less than six (6) months and up to six (6) years for violation of said Act. 5
We need not address the other arguments raised by the parties, involving the applicability of American jurisprudence, having arrived
at the conclusion that the subject cassette tapes are inadmissible in evidence under Philippine law.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 28545 is hereby SET ASIDE. The subject cassette tapes
are declared inadmissible in evidence.

SO ORDERED.

19
 6.) [G.R. No. 149889. December 2, 2003]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RUEL BACONGUIS y INSON, appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
On automatic review is the Decision of July 11, 2001 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch
18, convicting Ruel Baconguis y Inson (appellant) of murder and sentencing him to death.
To the charge of murder allegedly committed as follows,
That on or about June 23, 2000 at 2:04 early in the morning at Phase 3, Block 21, Lot 9, Villa Trinitas Subd., Bugo, Cagayan de Oro
City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with treachery and with intent to kill, attacked
one Roberto C. Mercado with the use of an undetermined caliber of a gun thereby inflicting mortal wounds which is the cause of his
immediate death.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to RA 7659, as amended. [1]
appellant pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on July 27, 2000.[2]
Culled from the evidence for the prosecution is its following version of the case:
On June 23, 2000, at around 2:40 a.m., while Lydia Mercado-Lledo was sleeping in her 3-bedroom one storey house, she was
awakened by the sound of a gunshot. She immediately looked out of her bedroom window and saw to her right a tall man some five
meters away from her[3] leave her house and jump over the 21/2 - 3 meters high bamboo fence.[4] Before the man who was wearing
[5]
khaki short pants and a white T-shirt jumped, he turned his face to the left, thus enabling her to see his slim face and tall nose.
Lydia soon heard someone moaning. She thus repaired to the sala where she found her younger brother, taxi-driver 24-year
old Roberto Mercado (the victim), sprawled and bleeding on the floor. He was brought to the hospital but he died on the way due to
severe hemorrhage resulting from a gunshot wound at the left chest. Aside from the chest, the victim also suffered gunshot wounds
on his left forearm.[6]
The investigating officers found that the description of the man seen leaving Lydias house matched that of herein appellant
Ruel Baconguis who was a suspect in several cases of theft and robbery.
In the afternoon of the incident, the police arrested appellant in the house of his in-laws at Purok 2-B, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro
[7]
City. At about noon of the following day or on June 24, 2000, appellant was paraffin-tested and was found positive for gunpowder
nitrates on both hands.[8]
Lydia was accordingly informed by her other brother, policeman Adolfo Mercado, that the suspect had been arrested. In the
early afternoon of June 24, 2000, she was brought to the cell of the police station where appellant was detained and was informed
that the lone detainee therein was the suspect.[9] On seeing appellant, she declared that he was the man she saw leaving her house
and jumping over the fence.[10]
The defense, on the other hand, denied the accusation.
Proffering alibi, appellant claimed that on the night of June 22, 2000, he took a walk along Limketkai with his common-law-wife
Liezel Sacala, child, mother-in-law and sister-in-law after which they returned to the house of his in-laws; and at the time of the
incident, he was fast asleep.[11]
Liezel corroborated appellants claim, adding that on the night of the incident she woke up twice to give milk to their 2-year old
baby, and appellant never left the house following their return from the walk. [12]
Crediting Lydias positive identification of appellant as the man she saw leaving her house and jumping over the fence and the
results of the paraffin test, the trial court convicted appellant by the decision on review, [13] the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused RUEL BACONGUIS y INSON GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER punishable
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7659, and after taking into account the presence of one generic
aggravating circumstance of dwelling, without any mitigating, the said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of
DEATH by lethal injection. He is further directed to indemnify the heirs the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS as damages for the
death of the victim, another FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS as exemplary damages, actual expenses in the amount of THIRTY FOUR
THOUSAND PESOS, plus to pay the costs. Pursuant to section 22 of R.A. 7659 and section 10 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, let the
entire record of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review.
SO ORDERED.[14]

In his brief, appellant proffers the following assignment of errors:

I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONIES OF THE ACCUSED AND DEFENSE WITNESSES AND
IN RELYING HEAVILY ON THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
III.

20
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE FACT THAT THE ACCUSED WAS NOT ASSISTED BY A LAWYER DURING
THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION IN VIOLATION OF HIS BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT.
IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE PRESENCE OF THE GENERIC AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
DWELLING DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS NOT ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION. (Underscoring supplied)
Appellant questions his arrest as bereft of a valid warrant. Having, however, submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court
when he entered his plea[15] and actively participated in the trial of the case, any infirmity in his arrest was deemed cured. [16]
Appellant likewise questions his subjection to custodial interrogation without the assistance of counsel. There was, however,
nothing inculpatory or exculpatory obtained from him by the police during his custodial investigation.
While it cannot be denied that accused-appellant was deprived of his right to be informed of his rights to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel, he has not shown that, as a result of his custodial interrogation, the police obtained any
statement from himwhether inculpatory or exculpatorywhich was used in evidence against him. The records do not show that he
had given one or that, in finding him guilty, the trial court relied on such statement x x x x In other words, no uncounseled statement
was obtained from accused-appellant which should have been excluded as evidence against him. [17]
It bears noting that the evidence relied upon by the prosecution is circumstantial.
It is settled that for circumstantial evidence to suffice to convict, the following requisites must be met: 1) there is more than
one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all circumstances is such
[18]
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The first circumstance which the prosecution sought to prove is that appellant was seen leaving the house where the victim lay
bleeding of gunshot wounds not long after a gunshot was heard.
Prosecution witness Lydia identified appellant, then alone in the detention cell, and in open court as the person she saw
leaving the house.
The value of the in-court identification made by Lydia, however, is largely dependent upon the out-of-court identification she
made while appellant was in the custody of the police. In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,[19] this Court held that corruption of out-of-court
identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the case.
In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of
circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the
crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and,
(6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.[20] (Underscoring supplied)
The totality of circumstances test has been fashioned to assure fairness as well as compliance with constitutional requirements
of due process in regard to out-of-court identification.[21]
Applying the above-said test, there are nagging doubts if Lydia had a good opportunity to view the man she saw leaving her
house. For by her claim, after hearing a gunshot, she stood up and opened the 3-panel jalousied and grilled bedroom window upon
which she saw a tall, slim man who was about 5 meters away at the right side of the window; [22] and the man turned his face to the
left, glancing at the terrace[23] which terrace she could not see from where she was, but which was lighted by an 18-watt [n]ot quite
dim but more yellow bulb attached to the road (sic).[24]
If Lydia could not see the terrace[25] which was five meters away from where she was, how could the suspect, who was by her
account also five meters away from the terrace, glance at the terrace by merely turning his whole face to the left, given the logical
location of the terrace to be obliquely behind (to his right) him.
If before appellant jumped he was, by Lydias claim, about three meters away from the light bulb attached to the road which
light illuminated the terrace, how could Lydia have clearly seen the face of the man turning his face to the left?
As for the circumstances surrounding the identification process, they were clearly tainted by improper suggestion. While there
is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification, as even without it there could still be proper identification
as long as the police did not suggest the identification to the witness, [26] the police in the case at bar did even more than suggest to
Lydia.
Thus, by Lydias own account, the following transpired after she arrived at the cell where appellant was detained.
Pros. Nolasco: On June 24, that is the following day, where were you?
A : I was in our house.
Q : In the afternoon or morning?
A : In the morning, Adolfo Mercado went to my house and informed me that they already arrested a suspect last June 23.
Q : And what did you do with that information?
A : At 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, June 24, I went together with my brother to Puerto Police Station.
Q : What did you do?
A : They let me see the suspect.
Q : Were you able to see the suspect?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : What was your reaction upon seeing the suspect?
A : I was so mad because the person whom I saw at that time was the same person.[27]
21
 xxx
Atty. Azis [defense counsel]: You said that at about 8:00 o'clock of the same morning there were operative[s] from the Puerto Police Station and you said
they investigated you about the incident?
A : Yes, ma'am.
Q : Who among the police officer[s]?
A : PO3 [Eddie] Akut, PO3 Ruben and PO3 Achas.
Q : You only described to them what you saw, the description of the suspect?
A : Yes, maam.
Q : About his being slim built?
A : Yes, ma'am.
Q : You could not determine whether he is a fair skin[ned] or dark person?
A : I could not determine.
Q : In fact you could not determine whether there is mark on his face?
A : Yes, ma'am.
Q : You said that on June 24, 2000 you were informed that there was already a suspect arrested by the police?
A : Yes, ma'am.
Q : But you were not or you did not accompany the police officer where that suspect was arrested?
A : No, ma'am.
Q : So it was not you who pointed to the suspect in order for him to be arrested?
A : No maam.
Q : And when you went to the Puerto Police Station they introduced to you the suspect?
A : Yes ma'am.
Q : When did you first know his name?
A : From my brother.
Q : When?
A : When he went to the house on June 24 in the morning.
Q : Where did you see the suspect inside the police station?
A : He was still inside the cell when they let me see.
Q : In other words, when you saw him he was inside the cell?
A : Yes, ma'am.
Q : But he was alone at the time?
A : Yes, ma'am.
Q : And the police officer pointed to you that that is Ruel Baconguis?
A : Yes, ma'am.
Q : And after pointing to you they told you that he was the suspect?
A : Yes, ma'am.
Q : And because of that, you were convinced that he was the one?
A : I was convinced because his face is the same person whom I saw [jump] over the fence.[28] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A show up, such as what was undertaken by the police in the identification of appellant by Lydia, has been held to be an
underhanded mode of identification for "being pointedly suggestive, generating confidence where there was none, activating visual
[29]
imagination, and, all told, subverting their reliability as an eyewitness. Lydia knew that she was going to identify a suspect, whose
name had priorly been furnished by her brother-policeman, when she went to the police station. And the police pointed appellant to
her, and told her that he was the suspect, while he was behind bars, alone.[30]
The unusual, coarse and highly singular method of identification, which revolts against accepted principles of scientific crime
detection, alienates the esteem of every just man, and commands neither respect nor acceptance.[31]
[32]
In People v. Acosta, this Court rejected the identification by a witness of the accused while the latter was alone in his
detention cell. There, this Court held that the identification of the suspect, which was tainted by the suggestiveness of having the
witness identify him while he was incarcerated with no one else with him with whom he might be compared by the witness, was less
[33]
than objective to thus impair the trustworthiness of their identification.
Under the circumstances attendant to the identification of appellant, this Court is not prepared to hold that the prosecution
had established that appellant was the man seen leaving the house-scene of the crime soon after a gunshot was heard.
As for the positive paraffin findings on appellant, it is well settled that nitrates are also found in substances other than
gunpowder.[34] Thus, in a number of cases,32 the Court acquitted the accused despite the finding of gunpowder nitrates on his hand,
noting that:
[S]cientific experts concur in the view that the result of a paraffin test is not conclusive. While it can establish the presence of
nitrates or nitrites on the hand, it does not always indubitably show that said nitrates or nitrites were caused by the discharge of
firearm. The person tested may have handled one or more of a number of substances which give the same positive reaction for
nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person
who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since these substances are present in the products of
combustion of tobacco. The presence of nitrates, therefore, should be taken only as an indication of a possibility but not of
infallibility that the person tested has fired a gun.33

22
 In fact, prosecution witness Police Superintendent Liza Madeja Sabong, who conducted the paraffin test on appellant, testified
that a person who fires a gun can transfer gunpowder from his hands to someone standing very near him even if the second person
did not fire a gun himself.34
But even assuming arguendo that appellants being positive for gunpowder may be credited as circumstantial evidence
indicating his culpability, that is only one circumstance, and since no other circumstance was established by the prosecution, the first
requirement for circumstantial evidence to warrant conviction of appellant has not been met.
The prosecution having failed to discharge its burden of proving the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt, he must be
acquitted.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Cagayan de Oro City finding appellant RUEL
BACONGUIS y INSON guilty of murder is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and appellant is ACQUITTED thereof. He is
ordered IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from confinement unless he is being held for some other legal cause.
The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to forthwith implement this Decision immediately and to inform this Court within five days
from receipt hereof of the date appellant shall have actually been released from confinement.
SO ORDERED.

23
 7.) G.R. No. 150224 May 19, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On automatic review is a Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar
alias "Kawit" to Death for the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Kathylyn
D. Uba, civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00, exemplary damages in the
amount of P50,000.00, actual damages in the amount of P186,410.00, or total damages amounting to P511,410.00, and costs of
litigation.1
Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide under the following Information:
That on or about the afternoon of June 30, 1998 at Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, in order to have carnal knowledge of a certain KATHYLYN D. UBA, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, and with use of a bladed weapon stab the latter inflicting upon her fatal injuries resulting in the
death of the victim, and on the occasion or by reason thereof, accused, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and by means of
force and violence had carnal knowledge of said Kathlyn D. Uba against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The facts are:
On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin, seventeen year old Kathylyn Uba, were on the ground
floor of the house of their grandmother, Isabel Dawang, in Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga. They were talking about the letter
sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar, to her husband, appellant Joel Yatar, through Kathylyn’s friend, Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn
handed the letter to appellant earlier that morning. 3
At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel Dawang, left for their farm in Nagbitayan some two
kilometers away. Before Judilyn and her husband departed, Kathylyn told Judilyn that she intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in the
event she would not be able to leave, she would just stay home and wash her clothes or go to the house of their aunt, Anita Wania.
Kathylyn was left alone in the house.4
Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the house of Isabel. They saw appellant at the back
of the house. They went inside the house through the back door of the kitchen to have a drink of water. Anita asked appellant what
he was doing there, and he replied that he was getting lumber to bring to the house of his mother. 5
At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw appellant descend the ladder from the second floor of
the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the back of the house.6 She later noticed appellant, who was wearing a white shirt with
collar and black pants, pacing back and forth at the back of the house. She did not find this unusual as appellant and his wife used to
live in the house of Isabel Dawang.7
At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her house. This time, he was wearing a black shirt without collar
and blue pants. Appellant told her that he would not be getting the lumber he had stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She noticed
that appellant’s eyes were "reddish and sharp." Appellant asked her where her husband was as he had something important to tell
him. Judilyn’s husband then arrived and appellant immediately left and went towards the back of the house of Isabel. 8
In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in her house were off. She called out for her
granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground floor was open. She noticed that the water container she asked Kathylyn to fill
up earlier that day was still empty. She went up the ladder to the second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She
found that the door was tied with a rope, so she went down to get a knife. While she groped in the dark, she felt a lifeless body that
was cold and rigid.9
Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out that it was the naked body of her granddaughter, Kathylyn. She
called for help. Judilyn and her husband arrived. Isabel was given a flashlight by Judilyn. She focused the beam and saw Kathylyn
sprawled on the floor naked, with her intestines protruding out of her stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived to offer
assistance. A daughter of Isabel, Cion, called the police. 10
At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a dead woman was found in Isabel Dawang’s house. Together
with fellow police officers, Faniswa went to the house and found the naked body of Kathylyn Uba with multiple stab wounds.
The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going down the ladder of the house of Isabel Dawang
at approximately 12:30 p.m.
The police discovered the victim’s panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals beside her naked cadaver at the scene of the
crime, and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with blood within 50 meters from the house of Isabel.
11
When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of Kathylyns’s death, however, he was placed under
police custody.
On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve himself. Police Officer Cesar Abagan accompanied him to the
toilet around seven to ten meters away from the police station. They suddenly heard someone shout in the Ilocano dialect,
"Nagtaray!" (He’s running away!). Police Officer Orlando Manuel exited through the gate of the Police Station and saw appellant

24
running away. Appellant was approximately 70 meters away from the station when Police Officer Abagan recaptured him. 12 He was
charged with Rape with Homicide. When he was arraigned on July 21, 1998, appellant pleaded "not guilty."
After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, and was accordingly, sentenced to Death.
Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In his Brief, appellant assigns the
following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION
NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR DOUBTFULNESS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE SERIOUS CRIME CHARGED DUE
TO REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellant’s contentions are unmeritorious.
The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved against appellant. This Court will not interfere
with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. 13 Well-
entrenched is the rule that the findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal unless
cogent reasons are presented necessitating a reexamination if not the disturbance of the same; the reason being that the former is
in a better and unique position of hearing first hand the witnesses and observing their deportment, conduct and attitude.14 Absent
any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would
affect the result of the case, the trial judge’s assessment of credibility deserves the appellate court’s highest respect.15 Where there
is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their testimonies are entitled to full
faith and credit.16
The weight of the prosecution’s evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule which provides that an accused can be
convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove
17
beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.
Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11) wounds, six (6) stab and five (5) incised, were found on the victim’s
abdomen and back, causing a portion of her small intestines to spill out of her body. 18 Rigor mortis of the vicitm’s body was
complete when Dr. Bartolo examined the victim at 9:00 a.m. on July 1, 1998. According to him, the time of death may be
approximated from between nine (9) to twelve (12) hours prior to the completion of rigor mortis.19 In other words, the estimated
time of death was sometime between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on June 30, 1998. This was within the timeframe within which the
lone presence of appellant lurking in the house of Isabel Dawang was testified to by witnesses.
It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report by the attending physician, Dr. Pej Evan C. Bartolo, indicates that no
hymenal lacerations, contusions or hematoma were noted on the victim,20 Dr. Bartolo discovered the presence of semen in the
vaginal canal of the victim. During his testimony, Dr. Bartolo stated that the introduction of semen into the vaginal canal could only
be done through sexual intercourse with the victim. 21 In addition, it is apparent from the pictures submitted by the prosecution that
the sexual violation of the victim was manifested by a bruise and some swelling in her right forearm indicating resistance to the
appellant’s assault on her virtue.22
Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm specimen from the vagina of the victim
was identical the semen to be that of appellant’s gene type.
DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms. 23 A person’s DNA is the same in each cell and it does
not change throughout a person’s lifetime; the DNA in a person’s blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the
root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. 24 Most importantly, because of polymorphisms
in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins. 25
DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate
a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has been left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a
fertile source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in effecting a more accurate account of the
crime committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper
administration of justice in every case.
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from suspicion in the same principle as
fingerprints are used.26 Incidents involving sexual assault would leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or
saliva which can be left on the victim’s body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could
also be transferred to the victim’s body during the assault. 27Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving that there was physical
contact between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with
known samples to place the suspect at the scene of the crime. 28
The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests in this case, used the Polymerase chain reaction
(PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA sequence can
25
be copied exponentially within hours. Thus, getting sufficient DNA for analysis has become much easier since it became possible to
reliably amplify small samples using the PCR method.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples were
collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.29
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or
identification techniques.30 Based on Dr. de Ungria’s testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant
are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. 31 The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the
following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken from the
victim’s vaginal canal.32 Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the
appellant in open court during the course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so
we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive
jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,33 it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it
was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial,
including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-
existence.34 Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis,
and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of
human genetics and molecular biology.
Independently of the physical evidence of appellant’s semen found in the victim’s vaginal canal, the trial court appreciated the
following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife
were living in the house of Isabel Dawang together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellant’s wife left the house
because of their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his estranged wife in the early
morning on June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the
kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant
going down the ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a
black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in
a dirty white shirt coming down the ladder of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead; (8) The door leading to
the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood with
her intestines protruding from her body on the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra, underwear
and shoes scattered along the periphery; (10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victim’s vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J");
(11) The stained or dirty white shirt found in the crime scene was found to be positive with blood; (12) DNA of slide, Exhibit "J" and
"H", compared with the DNA profile of the appellant are identical; and (13) Appellant escaped two days after he was detained but
was subsequently apprehended, such flight being indicative of guilt. 35
Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable
conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether there is sufficient
circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.36
In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken from him as well as the DNA tests
were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III
of the Constitution.
This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. 37 The right
against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does
not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
We ruled in People v. Rondero38 that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and
submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against
him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused
under duress.
Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial
compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde,39 where immediately after the incident, the police authorities took pictures of the
accused without the presence of counsel, we ruled that there was no violation of the right against self-incrimination. The accused
may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his involvement in an offense of which he is accused.
It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which was conducted in open court on March
30, 2000, in the presence of counsel.
26
Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are unconstitutional on the ground that
resort thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-post facto law.
This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of DNA typing involves the admissibility,
relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a
question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented.
Appellant’s twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The forensic DNA evidence and bloodied shirt, notwithstanding the
eyewitness accounts of his presence at Isabel Dawang’s house during the time when the crime was committed, undeniably link him
to the June 30, 1998 incident. Appellant did not demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence an impossibility to be in two places
at the same time, especially in this case where the two places are located in the same barangay. 40 He lives within a one hundred
(100) meter radius from the scene of the crime, and requires a mere five minute walk to reach one house from the other. This fact
severely weakens his alibi.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the court a quo committed reversible error in convicting him of the
crime charged. He alleges that he should be acquitted on reasonable doubt.
Appellant’s assertion cannot be sustained.
Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never on mere conjectures or suppositions. The
legal relevancy of evidence denotes "something more than a minimum of probative value," suggesting that such evidentiary
relevance must contain a "plus value."41 This may be necessary to preclude the trial court from being satisfied by matters of slight
value, capable of being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence without "plus value" may be logically relevant but
not legally sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the trial court to balance the probative value of such evidence against the likely
harm that would result from its admission.
The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence from which the court can properly find or infer
that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty of guilt in order to
sustain a conviction. Moral certainty is that degree of certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason
and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond reasonable doubt. 42 This requires that
the circumstances, taken together, should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory
43
conclusion that the accused, and no one else, committed the offense charged. In view of the totality of evidence appreciated thus
far, we rule that the present case passes the test of moral certainty.
However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, motive is
essential for conviction when there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit.44
Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first cousin of the victim, testified that she last saw the victim alive in the morning of
June 30, 1998 at the house of Isabel Dawang.45 She witnessed the appellant running down the stairs of Isabel’s house and
proceeding to the back of the same house.46 She also testified that a few days before the victim was raped and killed, the latter
revealed to her that "Joel Yatar attempted to rape her after she came from the school."47 The victim told Judilyn about the incident
or attempt of the appellant to rape her five days before her naked and violated body was found dead in her grandmother’s house on
June 25, 1998.48 In addition, Judilyn also testified that when her auntie Luz Dawang Yatar, wife of appellant, separated from her
husband, "this Joel Yatar threatened to kill our family."49 According to Judilyn, who was personally present during an argument
between her aunt and the appellant, the exact words uttered by appellant to his wife in the Ilocano dialect was, "If you leave me, I
will kill all your family and your relatives x x x."50 These statements were not contradicted by appellant.
Thus, appellant’s motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was evident in the instant case. It is a rule in criminal law that motive,
being a state of mind, is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused before or immediately
after the commission of the offense, deeds or words that may express it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may
be inferred.51
Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of rape with
homicide. Appellant sexually assaulted Kathylyn Uba, and by reason or on the occasion thereof, in order to conceal his lustful deed,
permanently sealed the victim’s lips by stabbing her repeatedly, thereby causing her untimely demise.
The following are the elements constitutive of rape with homicide: (1) the appellant had carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal
knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on the occasion of such carnal
knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, appellant killed the woman. 52However, in rape committed by close kin, such as
the victim’s father, step-father, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation
be employed.53 Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation.54 The fact that the victim’s hymen is
intact does not negate a finding that rape was committed as mere entry by the penis into the lips of the female genital organ, even
55
without rupture or laceration of the hymen, suffices for conviction of rape. The strength and dilatability of the hymen are
invariable; it may be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during intercourse. Absence of hymenal lacerations does not disprove
sexual abuse especially when the victim is of tender age. 56
In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the victim’s aunt. He is seven years older than the victim Kathylyn Uba. Before he and
his wife separated, appellant lived in the house of his mother-in-law, together with the victim and his wife. After the separation,

27
appellant moved to the house of his parents, approximately one hundred (100) meters from his mother-in-law’s house. Being a
relative by affinity within the third civil degree, he is deemed in legal contemplation to have moral ascendancy over the victim.
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of death is imposed when by reason or on the occasion of the rape,
homicide is committed. Although three (3) Justices of this Court maintain their position that R.A. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as
it prescribes the death penalty, they nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is not unconstitutional, and that
the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
As to damages, civil indemnity ex delicto of P100,000.00,57 actual damages incurred by the family of the victim that have been
proved at the trial amounting to P93,190.00,58 and moral damages of P75,000.0059 should be awarded in the light of prevailing law
and jurisprudence. Exemplary damages cannot be awarded as part of the civil liability since the crime was not committed with one
or more aggravating circumstances.60
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 35-98,
sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that he be ORDERED to pay the family of the victim Kathylyn Uba civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of
P100,000.00, P93,190.00 in actual damages and P75,000.00 in moral damages. The award of exemplary damages is DELETED.
Upon the finality of this Decision and in accordance with Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 25 of Rep. Act No.
7659, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the President of the Philippines for the possible exercise of the
pardoning power.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

28
 8.) G.R. No. 109144 August 19, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MORENO L. TUMIMPAD, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Miguel M. Lingating for accused-appellant.

KAPUNAN, J.:
Accused-appellant Constable Moreno L. Tumimpad and co-accused Constable Ruel C. Prieto were charged with the crime of rape
committed against a 15-year old Mongoloid child in a complaint dated on May 24, 1991, signed by her mother, Mrs. Pastora L.
Salcedo, which reads:
That during the period between the last week of March 1989 and the first week of April 1989, in Barangay Lower
Lamac, Oroquieta City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have (sic) carnal knowledge with Sandra Salcedo, complainant's
daughter, a woman who is a mongoloid and so weak of mind and in intellect as to be capable of giving rational and
legal consent. 1
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged and due trial ensued.
The facts as established by evidence are as follows:
Sandra Salcedo at the time of the incident was a 15-year old Mongoloid and daughter of Lt. Col. Teofisto Salcedo and
Pastora Salcedo. She had a mind of a five-year old child, who still needed to be fed and dressed up. Her vocabulary was limited and
most of the time she expressed herself by motions.
Col. Teofisto Salcedo was then Provincial Commander of Misamis Occidental. Four security men were assigned to him, two
of whom were accused Constable Ruel Prieto and accused-appellant Moreno Tumimpad.
The Salcedo family, composed of Col. Salcedo, his wife Pastora, his son Alexander and wife and daughter Sandra, lived in a two-
storey officers' quarters inside Camp Lucas Naranjo, Provincial Headquarters, in Oroquieta City. The upper storey of the house was
occupied by Col. Salcedo, his wife and Sandra while the lower storey had two (2) rooms, one of which was occupied by the four
security men and the other by Alexander Salcedo and his wife.
It was on August 7, 1989, when Sandra complained of constipation. Mrs. Salcedo then brought her to a doctor in Oroquieta
City for a checkup. Medication was given to Sandra but her condition did not improve. Sandra became irritable and moody. She felt
sick and unhappy.
The following day, August 8, 1989, Sandra saw Moreno Tumimpad coming out from the kitchen and told her mother,
"Mama, patayin mo 'yan, bastos." 2
Mrs. Pastora Salcedo, worried of her daughter's condition, brought her to Regina Hospital. Sandra was able to relieve
herself the following day but still remained moody and irritable. She refused to take a bath in spite of scoldings from her mother.
She did not want to eat and whenever she did, she would vomit.
Sandra was brought to a doctor in Oroquieta City for a second checkup. Dr. Conol, the examining physician, ordered a
urinalysis. Jose C. Lim, a Medical Technologist, conducted the urinalysis. The result revealed that Sandra was pregnant. 3 Mrs.
Pastora Salcedo could not believe that her daughter was pregnant and so she brought Sandra to Madonna and Child Hospital in
Cagayan de Oro City. Dr. Kho, and OB-GYNE Specialist, examined Sandra and subjected her to a pelvic ultra-sound examination. The
results were positive. The fetus' gestational age was equivalent to 17.1 weeks. 4 Another ultra-sound examination at the United
Doctors Medical Center (UDMC) at Quezon City on September 11, 1989 confirmed that she was indeed pregnant. 5
On January 11, 1990, Sandra gave birth to a baby boy who was named Jacob Salcedo. Hence, the filing of the complaint 6 by Mrs.
Pastora Salcedo.
During the investigation conducted by the CIS, about thirty (30) pictures of different persons were laid on the table and
Sandra was asked to pick up the pictures of her assailants. Sandra singled out the pictures of Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel
Prieto. 7 Later, Sandra was brought out of the investigation room to a police line-up of ten people, including Moreno Tumimpad and
Ruel Prieto. She was again asked to point to her assailants. Without hesitation, Sandra fingered Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto.8
Mrs. Pastora Salcedo testified that she requested her two daughters-in-law, Joy Salcedo and Celsa Salcedo, to ask Sandra the
identity of the persons who sexually molested her. 9
Joy confirmed in her testimony that she asked Sandra who sexually molested her. Sandra revealed that Moreno Tumimpad
and Ruel Prieto were the ones who raped her. Sandra demonstrated how she was raped. First, her thighs were touched, then she
was hugged and her panty was taken off. A push and pull movement followed. 10Celsa testified that she was present when the victim
demonstrated how she was sexually abused by the two accused, including the way her nipples were touched saying "dito hawak,"
and holding her breasts to emphasize. She likewise went through the motion of removing her panty, uttering at the same time
"hubad panty."
Sandra identified in open court accused Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto as the persons who raped her and said she
wished them dead, as they did something bad to her. 11 She once again demonstrated how she was sexually abused. She held her
two thighs with her two hands next to her sexual organ saying, "panty" and then placed her hand on her breast and gestured as if
she were sucking. She also touched her private organ and made a push and pull movement. 12
29
 During the trial, the accused moved that a blood test, both "Major Blood Grouping Test" and "Pheno Blood Typing" be
conducted on the offended party, her child Jacob and the two accused. The result of the test conducted by the Makati Medical
Center showed that Jacob Salcedo has a type "O" blood, Sandra Salcedo type "B", accused Ruel Prieto type "A" and accused-
appellant type "O".
Both accused anchored their defense on mere denial contending that it was impossible for them to have committed the
crime of rape.
After trial on the merits, the trial court convicted Moreno Tumimpad of the crime charged but acquitted the other accused, Ruel
Prieto, on reasonable doubt, stating that he "has a different type of blood with (sic) the child Jacob Salcedo as his type of blood is
"A", while that of child Jacob Salcedo is type "O".

The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused, PO1 Moreno Tumimpad, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Rape, as charged in the information, and pursuant to the provisions of Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, there being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attendant in the
commission of the crime, said accused Moreno Tumimpad is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA; to indemnify the offended girl, Sandra Salcedo, in the amount of P20,000.00; and to suffer the other
accessory penalties provided for by laws; and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
On reasonable doubt, accused Ruel Prieto is hereby declared ACQUITTED from the charge.
SO ORDERED. 13

Accused-appellant assigns the following as errors of the lower court:

1. The lower court erred in not appreciating the impossibility of committing the offense charged without detection.
2. The lower court erred in convicting the accused-appellant base on major blood grouping test known as ABO and
RHS test, not a paternal test known as chromosomes or HLA test.
The appeal is devoid of merit.
Accused-appellant argues that it was impossible for him to have committed the crime of rape because most of the time he
and his co-accused Ruel Prieto were together with Col. Salcedo on inspection tours while the victim was always in the company of
her mother. He further contends that it was likewise impossible for Sandra, if she had really been molested, not to have shouted out
of pain, she being a virgin. As if adding insult to injury, accused-appellant suggests that it was Sandra's brother, Cristopher Salcedo,
allegedly a drug user, who could have raped her.
We are not convinced.
It is true that the accused usually went with Col. Salcedo during inspection tours but sometimes they were left behind and
would play pingpong or card games with Sandra at the ground floor of the house. While Sandra was always with her mother, there
were times when she was left alone in the house with the accused. 14
Mrs. Pastora Salcedo testified:
Q How many security men remain if you can recall when your husband reported for work?
A Two (2).
Q Who were these security men who remained?
A Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto.
Q How about the 2 other security men Tanggan and Colaljo?
A My husband sent (sic) them for an errand and sometime they used to go with my husband to the office.
Q Every time when your husband is out what they do while they were (sic) at the headquarter?
A I saw them sleeping and sometime they were playing at the porch with my daughter Sandra playing pingpong and
sometime they were listening music.
Q Where did they play usually take place?
A Living room. 15
xxx xxx xxx
Q By the say, (sic) Mrs. Salcedo, you said a while ago when you were at the headquarters you were able to do your choirs,
(sic) doing laundry jobs in the second storey of your house. Do you know where is your daughter Sandra at that time?
A Yes, she spent her time at the second floor.
Q What part of the ground floor she used (sic) to stay?
A Because she is found (sic) of music she stay in the living room.
Q Did she has (sic) any playmates?
A Moreno and Prieto.
Q Have you seen actually the 2 accused playing with your daughter?
A Yes, playing pingpong and playing cards. 16

The victim more than once positively identified accused-appellant Moreno Tumimpad as one of the perpetrators of the
crime. First, during the investigation conducted by the CIS, Sandra singled out accused-appellant and his co-accused from among the
thirty (30) pictures of different persons shown to her. Second, at the police lineup of several persons, likewise conducted by the CIS,

30
Sandra once again unerringly pointed accused-appellant and his co-accused as the ones who raped her. Third, in open court, Sandra
without hesitation, pointed to accused- appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.
The following is the victim's own testimony:
PROS. RAMOS:
Will you please demonstrate before this Honorable Court what Moreno and Ruel did to you?
RECORD:
The witness when she stood up held both her thighs (sic) with her two hand (sic) down to her sexual organ saying a word
"panty" and she placed her hand on her breast and did something as if sucking and held her private part (sic) and did a
push and pull movement and she cried.
Q When you said that there was a push and pull movement of the body and when this was being done did you feel pain?
A Yes pain.
Q What part of your body is painful?
RECORD:
The witness touching her private parts.
Q Did you also see blood on your sexual organ?
A Yes.
Q Where did you see these blood?
RECORD:
The witness touching her private parts.
Q When this push and pull movement was being made, did you see a man's organ?
A Yes sir.
Q Where did you see this male organ?
A Witness touching her private part.
Q Who did this to you, who removed your panty?
A Moreno and Ruel.
Q Did you see Moreno taking off his pants?
A Yes.
Q Did you see his sex organ?
A The witness touching her private parts.
Q How about this Ruel, did you see if he taken (sic) off his pants?
A Yes.
Q Did you see his sex organ?
A Yes, witness again touching her private part.
Q Both of them?
A Yes.
Q Where did Moreno and Ruel removed (sic) your panty?
A Moreno.
Q In your house?
A Yes.
Q What part of your house did Moreno and Ruel remove your panty?
A Downstairs Moreno and Ruel remove panty.
Q What part of the ground floor, was it outside or inside the room?
A In the room.
Q When (sic) Moreno and Ruel are inside the courtroom now, can you point to them?
A Yes.
Q Will you please point to them?
PROS. RAMOS:
May we request the accused to stand up your honor?
RECORD:
Both accused stood up from where they were sitting inside the courtroom.
PROS. RAMOS:
Who is that person (prosecutor Ramos point to accused Moreno Tumimpad)?
A Moreno.
RECORD:
The witness pointing to a certain person who is standing and when asked what is his name, he readily answered that he is
Moreno Tumimpad.
PROS. RAMOS:
Who is that person standing besides Moreno?
A Joel.
PROS. RAMOS:
If your honor please, she could not pronounced (sic) well the word Ruel but the way she called this name is Joel which
refers to the same person who is one of the accused in this case. 17
Melinda Joy Salcedo, the victim's sister-in-law, testified that Sandra demonstrated to her how she was ravished by the two accused,
thus:
Q Now, will you please tell us what did Sandra Salcedo told (sic) you as to how she was abused?
A By what she had stated there were also actions that she made.
Q Will you please demonstrate to this Honorable Court how did Sandra Salcedo was abused as narrated or demonstrated
to you by Sandra Salcedo?
A According to her she was held in her thigh and then she was hugged and then the panty was taken off and making a
push and pull movement (witness demonstration by holding her thigh)?
31
 Q Now, after Sandra Salcedo told you and demonstrated to you how she was abused. What else did Sandra Salcedo tell
you if she had told you any more matter?
A She did not say anything more.
Q Now, when Sandra Salcedo refused to talk or say anything else. What happened next?
A Then it was Celsa who asked her.
Q Where were you when Celsa asked Sandra Salcedo?
A I was just beside her.
Q You said that after Sandra Salcedo refused to talk, Celsa did the questioning, did you hear the question being asked by
Celsa to Sandra Salcedo?
A Yes.
Q And what was the question being asked by Celsa to Sandra Salcedo?
A Celsa asked Sandra Salcedo as to what other things that these two had done to her?
Q And what if any did Sandra Salcedo tell you as to what was done to her?
A By way of talking and action.
Q And what was the answer of Sandra Salcedo?
A He (sic) answered it by action and talking.
Q And what was the answer of Sandra Salcedo as related by her to Celsa through words and action?
RECORD:
The witness demonstrated by holding his (sic) nipple going down to her thigh.
Q What else had transpired next?
A No more.
Q Now, whenever Sandra Salcedo mentioned the names of accused Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto, have you
observed whose names was usually mentioned first by Sandra Salcedo?
A She mentioned first the name of Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel.
Q And what happened after that?
A I informed my mother-in-law of what Sandra Salcedo had told us.
Q When did you tell your mother-in- law about what Sandra Salcedo told you and Celsa?
A That very evening sir. 18

Accused-appellant simplistically and quite erroneously argues that his conviction was based on the medical finding that he
and the victim have the same blood type "O".
Accused-appellants' culpability was established mainly by testimonial evidence given by the victim herself and her relatives.
The blood test was adduced as evidence only to show that the alleged father or any one of many others of the same blood type may
have been the father of the child. As held by this Court in Janice Marie Jao vs. Court of Appeals 19:
Paternity — Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples of the mother, the child, and the
alleged father, it can be established conclusively that the man is not the father of a particular child. But group
blood testing cannot show only a possibility that he is. Statutes in many states, and courts in others, have
recognized the value and the limitations of such tests. Some of the decisions have recognized the conclusive
presumption of non-paternity where the results of the test, made in the prescribed manner, show the impossibility
of the alleged paternity. This is one of the few cases in which the judgment of the Court may scientifically be
completely accurate, and intolerable results avoided, such as have occurred where the finding is allowed to turn
on oral testimony conflicting with the results of the test. The findings of such blood tests are not admissible to
prove the fact of paternity as they show only a possibility that the alleged father or any one of many others with
the same blood type may have been the father of the child.

WHEREFORE, accused-appellant's guilt of the crime of rape having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, the decision
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

32
 9.) G.R. No. 97525. April 7, 1993.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.JOEL SARTAGODA y BOCANEGRA, JIMMY BASCUÑA y LAZARTE, VICENTE STA.
ANA y GUTIERREZ and JOHN DOE, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ernesto M. Maiquez for accused-appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINGERPRINTS; ABSENCE THEREOF DOES NOT ELIMINATE POSSIBILITY THAT ACCUSED COULD HAVE
BEEN AT SCENE OF THE CRIME. — Although We agree with their opinion that a positive finding of matching fingerprints has great
significance, We cannot sustain their theory that from the negative findings in the fingerprint examination conducted in the course
of the investigation in the instant case, it must be concluded that they could not have been at the scene of the crime. Negative
findings do not at all times lead to a valid conclusion for there may be logical explanations for the absence of identifiable latent
prints other than their not being present at the scene of the crime. Only latent fingerprints found on smooth surface are useful for
purposes of comparison in a crime laboratory because prints left on rough surfaces result in dotted lines or broken lines instead of
complete and continuous lines. Such kind of specimen cannot be relied upon in a fingerprint examination. The latent fingerprints are
actually oily substance adhering to the surfaces of objects that come in contact with the fingers. By their very nature, oily substances
easily spread such that when the fingers slide against the surface they touch, no identifiable latent print is left, only smudges
instead. Not all police investigators are aware of the nature of latent fingerprints so as to be guided accordingly in deciding which
objects to submit for fingerprint lifting and examination. Noting the interplay of many circumstances involved in the successful lifting
and identification of proper latent fingerprints in a particular crime scene, the absence of one does not immediately eliminate the
possibility that the accused-appellants could have been at the scene of the crime. They may be there yet they had not left any
identifiable latent fingerprint. Besides, in the case at bar, only ten latent fingerprints are involved. The findings in this particular
fingerprint examination are not sufficient to case even just a reasonable doubt in their finding of guilt for the crime charged.

2. ID.; ID.; IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED; POLICE LINE-UP NOT REQUIRED BY LAW FOR PROPER IDENTIFICATION; FACE AND
BODY MOVEMENT OF ASSAILANT CREATE LASTING IMPRESSION ON VICTIM. — Whether or not there was a previous police line-up,
the fact is that they were positively identified at the trial. There is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper
identification. The complainant's recognition of the accused-appellants as her attackers cannot be doubted for she had during the
carnal acts ample opportunity to see the faces of the men who ravaged her. It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal
violence to strive to see the looks and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most
often the face of the assailant and body movement thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot easily be erased from their
memory.

3. ID.; ID.; NON-FLIGHT NOT PROOF OF INNOCENCE; CASE AT BAR. — They claim that the fact that Vicente Sta. Ana and Jimmy
Bascuña did not flee, even when they had all the opportunities to do so, prove their innocence. When they were allowed to go home
after Vilma failed to identify them during the first confrontation at the police station, they stayed home and did not flee until they
were again required to appear at the police station for the second time. The accused-appellants in effect posit that if flight is an
indication of guilt, non-flight or the decision not to flee, having the opportunity to do so, is a sign of innocence. We do not agree.
Although it is settled that unexplained flight indicates guilt, it does not necessarily follow that absence thereof proves innocence,
specially so when there is overwhelming evidence to establish their guilt.

4. ID.; APPEAL; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF TRIAL JUDGE ENTITLED TO HIGHEST RESPECT; EXCEPTION. — this Court finds no reversible
error having been committed by the trial court in convicting the three accused-appellants for the crime of robbery with multiple
rape under Article 294 par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. We affirm its findings of fact which are firmly grounded on the evidence
presented at the trial. We reiterate our ruling thus: "There is need to stress anew that this Court has long been committed to the
principle that the determination by a trial judge who could weigh and appraise the testimony as to the facts fully proved is entitled
to the highest respect, unless it could be shown that he ignored or disregarded circumstances of weight or influence sufficient to call
for a different finding."

5. CRIMINAL LAW; CIVIL LIABILITY OF PERSONS GUILTY OF CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY; INDEMNITY TO VICTIM FOR MULTIPLE RAPE
ATTENDED BY CONSPIRACY; ACCUSED SOLIDARILY LIABLE THEREFOR. — With regard to the indemnity to Vilma de Belen for multiple
rape, there having been evidence of conspiracy, the act of one being the act of all, each must be liable for all the three rapes
committed, they must be held solidarily liable for said indemnity which the trial court fixed at P30,000.00 for each offender or a total
of P90,000.00.

6. ID.; ID.; IN MULTIPLE RAPE ACCUSED NOT REQUIRED TO RECOGNIZE OFFSPRING. — This Court cannot uphold the trial court's
ruling ordering each of the accused to "recognize the offspring if there by any." In multiple rape, not one maybe required to

33
recognized the offspring of the offended woman. In a case where three persons, one after another, raped a woman, neither of the
accuse was ordered to recognize the offspring simply because it was impossible to determine the paternity thereof.

DECISION
CAMPOS, JR., J p:
The Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 36, Calamba, Laguna convicted all three accused-appellants in its
decision ** dated November 7, 1990, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the court hereby finds the accused Joel Sartagoda y Bocanegra, Jimmy Bascoña (sic) y Lazarte and Vicente
Sta. Ana y Gutierrez all guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals of the crime of Robbery With Rape, defined and penalized in
Article 294, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code; there being two aggravating circumstances without any mitigating circumstance
to offset the same, hereby sentences each of the said accused to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with the accessories
provided for by the law.
Each of the three accused is ordered to indemnify the offended party Vilma de Belen the sum of P30,000.00, and each of
them shall recognize the offspring if there be any.
The said accused are likewise ordered to return the personal properties stolen or pay its equivalent amount of P17,490.00 to Rogelio
de Belen, the lawful owner thereof.
SO ORDERED." 1

The facts of the case may be summarized as follows:

It was the evening of July 2, 1988 while Rogelio de Belen, his two daughters and his sister Vilma de Belen were sleeping in their
house at Calamba, Laguna, when appellant broke in and woke him up, poking a knife at him. They tied up his hands and made him
lie flat on his stomach and asked for the key to his cabinet. Fearing for his life and that of his companions, he reluctantly told them
where the key was kept.
Just on the other room was Vilma, who heard whispers (kaluskos) but simply played possum. When the three saw her on
the bed, they approached her. One covered her mouth as another poked a knife at her neck. They threatened to kill her if she should
make an outcry.
They raised her blouse and removed her underwear. They tied both her hands so that she could offer no resistance. She
was at such a pitiful state when the accused Jimmy Bascuña went on top of her, kissing her on different parts of her body, while
Vicente Sta. Ana held her legs apart. Jimmy finally inserted his sex organ inside her and satisfied his bestial desire. After Jimmy was
over, Vicente took his turn and then Joel. After the three of them had successfully deflowered Vilma, they left, carrying with them
the money and other personal belongings of the de Belen family.
After the three men left, Rogelio, with his hands and feet still tied up, tried to get up from the bed and switched the lights
on and called to his neighbors for help. Vilma, meanwhile, had lost consciousness due to shock.
Meanwhile, Petra Lamire, his sister-in-law who lives right next to his house responded to his cry for help. She went to their house
and untied Rogelio. She saw Vilma with her upper body naked and sobbing so she covered Vilma with a blanket. Soon after, his other
sister-in-law also arrived. They reported the incident to the Barangay Captain.
They had Vilma examined by Dr. Danilo A. Ramirez at Dr. Jose Rizal Memorial Hospital at about 10:00 that same morning.
He conducted external and internal examinations. His external examination showed no physical injuries except that he noted several
abrasions at the genital area. His internal examination showed fresh lacerations of the hymen at 9:00 and 4:00 positions. The vagina
admitted two fingers with ease.
In the present appeal the lone assigned error is:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING (THAT) THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION UTTERLY FAILED TO PROVE THE
GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT HENCE, THEIR ACQUITTAL IS INEVITABLE.
This appeal has no merit.

The accused-appellants fault the trial court of ignoring the fingerprint examination report submitted by the Crime
Laboratory of the PC/INP Camp Crame which stated that none of the specimen latent fingerprints were found to be positive. It is
their contention that since their fingerprints were not found in the objects found in the scene of the crime they cannot be held guilty
of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
Although We agree with their opinion that a positive finding of matching fingerprints has great significance, We cannot
sustain their theory that from the negative findings in the fingerprint examination conducted in the course of the investigation in the
instant case, it must be concluded that they could not have been at the scene of the crime. Negative findings do not at all times lead
to a valid conclusion for there may be logical explanations for the absence of identifiable latent prints other than their not being
present at the scene of the crime.
Only latent fingerprints found on smooth surface are useful for purposes of comparison in a crime laboratory because
prints left on rough surfaces result in dotted lines or broken lines instead of complete and continuous lines. Such kind of specimen
cannot be relied upon in a fingerprint examination. The latent fingerprints are actually oily substances adhering to the surfaces of
34
objects that come in contact with the fingers. By their very nature, oily substances easily spread such that when the fingers slide
against the surface they touch, no identifiable latent print is left, only smudges instead. Not all police investigators are aware of the
nature of latent fingerprints so as to be guided accordingly in deciding which objects to submit for fingerprint lifting and
examination. Noting the interplay of many circumstances involved in the successful lifting and identification of proper latent
fingerprints in a particular crime scene, the absence of one does not immediately eliminate the possibility that the accused-
appellants could have been at the scene of the crime. They may be there yet they had not left any identifiable latent fingerprint.
Besides, in the case at bar, only ten latent fingerprints are involved. The findings in this particular fingerprint examination are not
sufficient to cast even just a reasonable doubt in their finding of guilt for the crime charged.
The accused-appellants likewise contend that the police line-up had been irregularly conducted revealing suggestibility to
their prejudice. They accused Pat. Reyes of coaching complainant Vilma de Belen when she identified her three assailants. They
claim that it was Pat. Reyes' fault that "they were not allowed to select their positions at the line-up; that they were not placed in
line under a numeral against a wall marked to indicate their respective height in feet and inches; that there was no record made of
their descriptions and physical characteristics; that the witness/victim was not out of view of the three (3) accused lined-up for
identification purposes." 2
We find these claims of irregularities of little if not, of no significance at all when considered in the light of the natural
desire in the victim to seek retribution not simply from anybody who may be put before her but from the very same offenders who
actually did violence against her. It would be most illogical for an outraged victim to direct her anger against anyone other than her
three offenders. We cannot accept the accused-appellants' claim that it was on Pat. Reyes' suggestion that the victim pointed to the
accused-appellants as her assailants. No amount of coaching will be sufficient to counter the natural outrage of a rape victim against
her abuser when said abuser is presented before her in a police line-up. The outrage displayed by the rape victim was a spontaneous
reaction. She identified her assailants because of no other reason except to let people know who hurt her.
Whether or not there was a previous police line-up, the fact is that they were positively identified at the trial. There is no
law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification. 3 The complainant's recognition of the accused-appellants as her
attackers cannot be doubted for she had during the carnal acts ample opportunity to see the faces of the men who ravaged her. It is
the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see the looks and faces of their assailants and observe the
manner in which the crime was committed. Most often the face of the assailant and body movements thereof, create a lasting
impression which cannot easily be erased from their memory. 4
The accused-appellants further claim that "the Medical Findings of Dr. Danilo Ramirez concludes that the alleged victim of
rape, Vilma de Belen must have had sexual experienced (sic) five (5) to six (6) days before the alleged incident happened on July 2,
1988 at about 3 to 4 o'clock in the morning". 5 There is no truth to this claim. In fact, there was no categorical or positive assertion
on the part of Dr. Ramirez that the sexual intercourse with Vilma was committed on the very date when the alleged "robbery with
rape" took place on July 2, 1988.
This is a clear distortion of the testimony of Dr. Ramirez who on cross-examination testified as follows:
"ATTY. MAIQUEZ:
Q You cannot also determine when was the first and when was the last intercourse as per your examination?
FISCAL
Objection, witness is incompetent.
COURT
Witness may answer.
A The findings suggest that because of hymenal laceration the injuries was (sic) recent not more than one week, sir.
Q When you say it is not more than one week, could it be 6 or 5 days?
A Possible, sir.
Q When you say it is possible that the victim could have experienced sexual intercourse 6 to 5 days that was indicated in your examination marked as Exh. A, can you
determine as per your finding?
A Well, yes, sir, I placed fresh hymenal laceration because laceration will determine whether it is fresh or old because of the characteristice (sic) of the laceration, sir.
Q At the time you examined the patient in your medical opinion it could have been 5 or 6 days had elapsed?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. MAIQUEZ:
That will be all." 6
The trial court, in the exercise of its discretion to seek clarification in witness' testimony proceeded as follows:
"COURT:
Q Doctor, in your findings you noted that there was an abrasion?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q Is that more than one abrasion?
A I found 3 mm., your Honor.
WITNESS (continuing):
— and on the lower opening of the vagina on the right side, that is the only place, sir.
COURT:
Q Aside from that injury or rater (sic) that portion there is no other injury which you found?
A None, your Honor.
Q Because laceration stated in your medicolegal certificate that there was fresh hymenal laceration noted at 9 and 4 o'clock on the face of the clock?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q Do we gather it right when you stated in your medicolegal certificate fresh it is not yet healed?
35
A Yes, your Honor.
Q From that finding of yours regarding the existence of fresh hymenal laceration you said that it least one or 2 days had elapsed before you have conducted the
physical examination?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q In other words from one to 5 days?
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
Q But it is possible that it could be more than one or two days?.
WITNESS:
A Yes, your Honor." 7

It is evident that Dr. Ramirez never categorically concluded that the sexual intercourse causing the fresh hymenal
lacerations took place five to six days before the date of her examination. The accused-appellants' claim that the sexual intercourse
took place on June 26 or 27, 1988 is conjectural and without factual basis.
The claim of the accused-appellants that the prosecution failed to present rebuttal evidence to refute the averments of Joel
Sartagoda that they tried in vain to persuade him to admit the charge against him and to implicate his two (2) co-accused did not
deserve the attention of the trial court nor does it deserve Ours, being per se unacceptable and unbelievable in the light of human
experience.
Finally, they claim that the fact that Vicente Sta. Ana and Jimmy Bascuña did not flee, even when they had all the
opportunities to do so, prove their innocence. When they were allowed to go home after Vilma failed to identify them during the
first confrontation at the police station, they stayed home and did not flee until they were again required to appear at the police
station for the second time. The accused-appellants in effect posit that if flight is an indication of guilt, non-flight or the decision not
to flee, having the opportunity to do so, is a sign of innocence.
We do not agree. Although it is settled that unexplained flight indicates guilt, it does, not necessarily follow that absence
thereof proves innocence, specially so when there is overwhelming evidence to establish their guilt.
This Court finds no reversible error having been committed by the trial court in convicting the three accused-appellants for the crime
of robbery with multiple rape under Article 294 par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. We affirm its findings of fact which are firmly
grounded on the evidence presented at the trial. We reiterate our ruling thus:
"There is need to stress anew that this Court has long been committed to the principle that the determination by a trial
judge who could weigh and appraise the testimony as to the facts duly proved is entitled to the highest respect, unless it could be
shown that he ignored or disregarded circumstances of weight or influence sufficient to call for a different finding." 8
We are for the affirmance of the conviction of the three accused-appellants. With regard to the indemnity to Vilma de Belen for
multiple rape, there having been evidence of conspiracy, the act of one being the act of all, each must be liable for all the three
rapes committed, they must be held solidarily liable 9 for said indemnity which the trial court fixed at P30,000.00 for each offender
or a total of P90,000.00. 10
However, this Court cannot uphold the trial court's ruling ordering each of the accused to "recognize the offspring if there
be any". In multiple rape, not one maybe required to recognized the offspring of the offended woman. In a case 11 where three
persons, one after another, raped a woman, neither of the accused was ordered to recognize the offspring simply because it was
impossible to determine the paternity thereof.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellants
are held jointly and severally liable to indemnify Vilma de Belen for multiple rape in the amount of P90,000.00, and that none of the
accused is required to recognize the offspring.
SO ORDERED.

36
 10.) [G.R. No. 132676. April 4, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JAIME CARPO, OSCAR IBAO, WARLITO IBAO and ROCHE IBAO, accused-
appellants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The accused might as well have borrowed the famous line of Shakespeare How this world is given to lying![1] - when they
impute error to the trial court for relying on the testimony of a single witness in convicting them of multiple murder complexed with
attempted murder for the death of Florentino Dulay, Norwela Dulay and Nissan Dulay, and the wounding of Noemi Dulay. [2]
The challenged testimony of witness Ruben Meriales follows:[3] On 25 August 1996 at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening while
he was watching television with his family his dogs barked. His mother who was apprehensive that their cow might be stolen
prodded him to check the disturbance. To allay her fears he stood up, took his flashlight and trudged the unpaved path towards his
cow that was tied to a mango tree. Then the noise grew louder thus arousing his suspicion that something was really wrong. After
transferring his cow nearer to his house, he went inside the kitchen, stood atop the concrete washbasin, hid himself behind the
bamboo slats and peeped outside to observe. The darkness helped conceal him from outside view while the light from the two (2)
bulbs positioned at about three (3) meters from where he stood filtered through the slats and illumined the surroundings. There was
also moon in the sky.
A few minutes later, he saw barangay captain Jaime Carpo together with Warlito Ibao suspiciously stooping near his barn. He
knew Jaime and Warlito very well. Jaime was his uncle and Warlito lived in his neighborhood. Warlito's son Roche was also there; he
was standing by the mango tree. They were all looking in the direction of Florentino Dulay's house which was about a meter to the
south from where he was. He also saw Oscar Ibao, another son of Warlito, striding towards Dulay's hut. As soon as he reached the
hut Oscar lifted the sawali mat near the wall and hurled something inside. Oscar then scurried off towards the nearby creek with
Roche following him. Seconds later, a loud explosion shook the entire neighborhood and Teresita Dulay's screams broke into the
night.
Ruben Meriales, rushed outside. He ran towards Florentino's hut but was deterred by darkness. He returned home to take his
flashlight and raced back to lend aid to Teresita. Inside the hut he was stunned by the terrifying gore that greeted him - a bloodied
Florentino cradled in the arms of his weeping widow, Norwela and Nissan lying side by side on a cot both doused in blood, and a
motionless Norma whose head was oozing with blood.
Realizing the exigency of the situation, he left the crime scene to borrow the jeepney of Brgy. Kagawad Edgardo Marquez for
the hapless victims. The neighbors milling around at once gave up hope on Florentino so that only Norwela, Nissan and Noemi were
loaded in the jeepney and rushed to the Eastern Pangasinan District Hospital. On their way, Norwela who had injuries on her chest
and lower appendage died. Nissan who was five (5) years old and the youngest of the victims died later due to "shock from pains"
caused by the shrapnel wounds in her left shoulder, abdomen and lower extremities.[4]Noemi luckily survived. Her attending
physician, Dr. Emiliano Subido, testified that Noemi was semi-conscious and vomiting although ambulatory at the time he examined
her. But due to the seriousness of her wounds and the hospital's lack of facilities she was taken to another hospital in Dagupan
City.[5]
In the course of their investigation, the policemen questioned the people who might have witnessed the carnage. Fearful
however that the culprits would return, Ruben Meriales refused to give any statement but intimated to Police Officer Guillermo Osio
that he would go to the police station after the burial.
On 4 September 1996, or a week later, Ruben kept his promise and went to the police station where he gave his statement to
Police Officer Osio. He named Jaime Carpo, Warlito lbao, Oscar lbao and Roche Ibao as the perpetrators of the crime. He further said
that Florentino was killed because he was about to testify against Roche Ibao for the murder of his brother Delfin Meriales. [6]
On 3 October 1996, solely on the basis of Ruben's testimony, a criminal complaint for the murder of Florentino Dulay and his
two (2) daughters Norwela, and Nissan as well as the frustrated murder of his daughter Noemi was filed against Jaime Carpo,
Warlito Ibao, Oscar Ibao and Roche Ibao. Warrants for their immediate arrest were issued by the municipal circuit trial court.
On 25 October 1996 Jaime Carpo was taken into custody by the police, while Roche Ibao eluded arrest until 9 December 1996
when he was apprehended by police officers in La Union. With Roche's arrest, Oscar and Warlito realized the futility of hiding and
surrendered themselves to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in La Union.
At the trial, the prosecution presented Ruben, Noemi, Dr. Rosalina O. Victorio, Dr. Emiliano Subido and Police Officers Virgilio
dela Cruz, Jovencio Tapac and Guillermo Osio as witnesses.
Police Officer Osio testified that on the night of 25 August 1996 after receiving a report of an explosion in Brgy. Baligayan, he
together with Police Officers Julius Aurora, Ricardo Lugares and Jovencio Tapac immediately responded. They were able to gather
several grenade shrapnels and a grenade shifting lever from the crime scene. He spoke with the weeping Teresita Dulay who told
him that she suspected the accused of having perpetrated the assault. He likewise conferred with Ruben Meriales who named the
same set of suspects and who promised to give his statement to the police after the funeral.
After speaking with Teresita and Ruben, he summoned his colleagues to go with him to Warlito Ibao's house which was just
across the road. Warlitos house was dark and its front door was locked. He called out but there was no answer. They then
proceeded to Oscar's house which was also padlocked and unoccupied. He went to Roche's house and peeped inside before they
37
left.[7] Against their positive identification by Ruben, the four (4) accused interposed alibi claiming that they were somewhere else
when the Dulay hut was blasted. They likewise assailed Ruben's testimony for being a fabrication and insisted that he lied to get
back at them because Roche was a suspect in the killing of his brother Delfin Meriales. Jaime and his wife Veronica Carpo were one
in testifying that in the evening of 25 August 1995 Jaime was at home in Brgy. Libsong, a hundred and fifty (150) meters away from
the house of the Dulays in Brgy. Baligayan. When he heard the loud explosion, he summoned his tanods to check whether the blast
happened within their barangay. When he learned that the explosion occurred in the adjoining Brgy. Baligayan, he went home to
sleep. Brgy. Baligayan is separated from his barangay by a creek and could be reached in ten (10) minutes. However, on the night of
the incident, the creek was neck deep such that one had to make a detour through a mountainous route for about thirty (30)
minutes to reach Brgy. Baligayan.[8]
Jaime testified that Ruben implicated him because the latter was angry at him. Ruben's grudge supposedly started when Jaime
sided with the Ibaos in the murder case instituted by the Merialeses against Roche for the death of Delfin Meriales. As a matter of
fact on 10 December 1996 while he was incarcerated at the Balungao District Jail, Ruben supposedly visited him asking his
forgiveness for having named him as one of the perpetrators of the crime. Ruben subsequently pleaded with him to reveal the
names of those responsible but when he claimed ignorance, Ruben left in a huff.
Warlito, Oscar and Roche Ibao testified that on the night of the explosion their family was having a farewell party for the
family's only girl Maribel Ibao who was leaving for Hongkong. They heard the blast but they did not bother to check. They denied
having heard the police officers call for them an hour after the explosion. Roche further asserted that he did not have a house
in Brgy. Baligayan as reported because he lived with his parents-in-law in Brgy. Libsong. However, on the night of the blast, he slept
at his parents' house as all of his siblings and their families were there. He only learned of the bloodbath the following morning
when they went home to his in-laws. His wife Jovelyn corroborated his testimony in the same manner that Remedios supported the
story of her husband Warlito.[9]
In convicting Jaime Carpo, Warlito Ibao, Oscar Ibao and Roche Ibao of the multiple murder of Florentino, Norwela and Nissan
Dulay and the attempted murder of Noemi Dulay the trial Court gave full credit to the testimony of Ruben.[10] It accepted his
straightforward testimony and ruled that "at no instance throughout the twin testimonies of Meriales did the Court notice a twitch
of falsehood on his lips."[11] Accordingly, in accordance with Sec. 6, RA 7659, and Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code the trial court
imposed upon all of the accused the supreme penalty of death and ordered them to solidarily indemnify the heirs of the deceased as
well as Noemi Dulay in the amount of P600,000.00. [12]
Forthwith, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic review. After the filing of briefs, the accused filed an Addendum to
Appellant's Brief urging that the favorable results of their lie detector tests with the NBI be admitted into the records.[13]
A lie detector test is based on the theory that an individual will undergo physiological changes, capable of being monitored by
sensors attached to his body, when he is not telling the truth. The Court does not put credit and faith on the result of a lie detector
test inasmuch as it has not been accepted by the scientific community as an accurate means of ascertaining truth or deception.[14]
The explosion by means of a hand grenade on the night of 25 August 1996 resulting in the death of Florentino, Norwela and
Nissan Dulay and in the wounding of Noemi Dulay is an admitted fact. The identity of the perpetrators, as tenaciously questioned by
the accused, depends upon the credibility of Ruben Meriales.
In this appeal, accused-appellants challenge the veracity of the testimony of Ruben Meriales primarily on two (2)
grounds: first, Ruben's testimony in court is different from and is contradictory to his affidavit of 4 October 1996; and second, Ruben
is not a disinterested witness because he has a grudge against the Ibaos. Consistent with giving due deference to the observations of
the trial court on credibility of witnesses, we agree with the court a quo when it believed Ruben Meriales more than the defense
witnesses.[15] Indeed, the trial court is best equipped to make an assessment of witnesses, and its factual findings are generally not
disturbed on appeal unless it has overlooked, misunderstood or disregarded important facts, [16] which is not true in the present case.
The twin arguments therefore raised by accused-appellants against the testimony of Ruben Meriales are devoid of merit. A
scrutiny of the records reveals that his testimony is not inconsistent with his affidavit of 4 October 1996 inasmuch as the former
merely supplied the details of the event which the latter failed to disclose. But assuming that there was any inconsistency, it is
settled that whenever an affidavit contradicts a testimony given in court the latter commands greater respect. [17] Such inconsistency
is unimportant and would not even discredit a fallible witness.[18] The mere fact that Ruben admitted harboring resentment against
the Ibaos for the murder of his brother Delfin does not confirm that he fabricated his story. His frankness in admitting his
resentment against the Ibaos should even be considered in his favor. [19] There is likewise nothing unnatural in Ruben's attitude of
concealing himself behind the kitchen wall instead of warning the Dulays of the looming danger to their lives. It is a well-known fact
that persons react differently to different situations - there may be some who will respond violently to an impending danger while
there may be others who will simply assume a cravenly demeanor. In this case, Ruben was ruled by his fear rather than by his
reason, but for this alone, his credibility should not be doubted.
Apropos Jaime's imputation that Ruben had admitted to him while in jail that he lied in his testimony, we find this accusation
farcical as nothing was ever offered in support thereof. The lone corroborative testimony, which was that of Roche, does not inspire
belief since Roche himself admitted overhearing the conversation while Jaime together with other prisoners was constructing a hut
outside of his cell at about three (3) meters away. As correctly hinted by the prosecution, the noise generated by the construction
made it unlikely for Roche to hear conversations three (3) meters away. [20]
38
 The defense proffered by the accused is alibi. But this is futile. By his own admission, Jaime was only a hundred and fifty (150)
meters away from the scene of the crime. In fact, it would only take him thirty (30) minutes, at the most, to be at the place of the
Dulays.
More so for the Ibaos who acknowledged that they were having a party just a stone's throw away from the crime scene at the
time of the explosion. Curiously though, if they were indeed reveling inside their house on that fateful night, then we cannot
comprehend why they did not go out to investigate after hearing the blast. Besides, it was rather strange for the Ibaos not to have
joined their neighbors who had instantaneously milled outside to view the mayhem. Their conduct indeed betrayed them.
Further, the immediate flight and tarriance of the Ibaos to La Union until Roche's arrest cannot but demonstrate their guilt and
desire to evade prosecution.[21]
The trial court also correctly ruled that accused-appellants conspired in perpetrating the offense charged. From the detailed
account of Ruben, Jaime and Warlito positioned themselves near the hay barn while Roche casually stood by the mango tree. As
observed by the trial court, the presence of Jaime, Warlito and Roche inescapably gave encouragement and a sense of security to
Oscar, the group's preceptor.Surely, the latter was emboldened to commit the crime knowing that his co-conspirators were not far
behind.
Under the doctrine enunciated in People v. Tayo,[22] the crime committed may otherwise be more approriately denominated as
murder qualified by explosion rather than by treachery. However, since it was treachery that is alleged in the Information and
appreciated by the trial court, the explosion of the grenade which resulted in the death of Florentino, Norwela and Nissan, and the
[23]
wounding of Noemi can only be multiple murder complexed with attempted murder. The crime committed against Noemi Dulay
was correctly denominated by the trial court as attempted murder considering that none of her injuries was fatal. Her attending
physician even made conflicting statements in the assessment of her wounds, to wit: although he said that Noemi could have died
from the shrapnel wound in her head, he specifically ruled out the possibility of "intercerebral hemorrhage" [24] and despite the
seriousness of the possible complications of her injuries she would suffer from physical incapacity for only ten (10) to fourteen (14)
days.
As none of her wounds was severe as to cause her death, accused-appellants not having performed all the acts of execution
that would have brought it about, the crime is only attempted murder. [25]
Since the three (3) murders and attempted murder were produced by a single act, namely, the explosion caused by the hurling
of a grenade into the bedroom of the Dulays, the case comes under Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code on complex crimes. Article 48
provides that the penalty for the more serious crime, which in the present case is reclusion perpetua to death, should be applied in
its maximum period.As the crime was complexed, the death penalty was properly imposed by the trial court.
At this point, we take exception to the court a quo's award of damages in the "negotiated amount of P600,00.00." It appears
that under the auspices of the trial court counsel for the defense entered into an oral compromise with the public prosecutor, which
was subsequently ratified by the private complainant, limiting the amount of civil liability to P600,000.00. We note the discourse
between the court and the counsel for both parties regarding the award.
PROS. CORPUZ: x x x x (W)e would like to enter into stipulation the civil aspect of the case.
COURT: Are the accused confident that they could be acquitted in this case? Atty Sanglay?
ATTY. SANGLAY: I think so, your Honor.
COURT: What about Atty. Rafael?
ATTY. RAFAEL: We are confident, your Honor.
COURT: All right. So you can easily stipulate. First of all, how much do you want Fiscal?
PROS. CORPUZ: P1,282,740.00, your Honor x x x x
COURT: x x x x Agree gentlemen of the defense?
ATTY. SANGLAY: P600,000.00, your Honor.
COURT: Do you agree Fiscal?
PROS. CORPUZ: Yes, your Honor.
COURT: All right so P600,000.00 is the agreed liquidated amount in case of conviction without necessarily having to interpret this stipulation as admission of guilt
on the part of any of the accused. All right so we will dispense with the testimony on the civil aspect x x x x
COURT: x x x x Are you the private complainant in this case?
TERESITA DULAY: Yes, sir.
COURT: If the accused get convicted and I will hold them severally liable for you of damages in the liquidated sum of P600,000.00 as agreed upon by the counsel,
will you be satisfied? x x x x
TERESITA: Yes, sir.
COURT: So let that be of record. Will you sign the note so that there will be evidence.
(At this juncture private complainant Teresita Dulay affixed her signature at the bottom right margin of the stenographic notes
page 2 hereof).[26]

Article 1878 of the Civil Code and Sec. 23 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court set forth the attorney's power to
compromise. Under Art. 1878 of the Civil Code, a special power of attorney is necessary "to compromise, to submit questions to
arbitration, to renounce the right to appeal from a judgment, to waive objections to the venue of an action or to abandon a
prescription already acquired." On the other hand, Sec. 23, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides, "(a)ttorneys have authority to
bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeal, and in all matters of

39
ordinary judicial procedure, but they cannot, without special authority, compromise their clients' litigation or receive anything in
discharge of their clients' claims but the full amount in cash."
The requirements under both provisions are met when there is a clear mandate expressly given, by the principal to his lawyer
specifically authorizing the performance of an act. [27] It has not escaped our attention that in the present case counsel for both
parties had no special power of attorney from their clients to enter into a compromise. However, insofar as Teresita was concerned,
she was apprised of the agreement and in fact had signed her name as instructed by the court, thereby tacitly ratifying the same. As
for accused-appellants, the aforecited dialogue between the court and counsel does not show that they were ever consulted
regarding the proposed settlement. In the absence of a special power of attorney given by accused-appellants to their counsel, the
latter can neither bind nor compromise his clients' civil liability. Consequently, since Atty. Sanglay and Atty. Rafael had no specific
power to compromise the civil liability of all accused-appellants, its approval by the trial court which did not take the precautionary
measures to ensure the protection of the right of accused-appellants not to be deprived of their property without due process of
law, could not legalize it. For being violative of existing law and jurisprudence, the settlement should not be given force and effect.
In light of the foregoing, the award of damages must be set aside and a new one entered with all the circumstances of the case
in mind. For the death of Florentino, Norwela and Nissan Dulay, civil indemnity at P50,000.00 each or a total amount of P50,000.00
is awarded to their heirs. This is in addition to the award of moral damages at an aggregate amount of P150,000.00 for their
emotional and mental anguish. With respect to Noemi, an indemnity of P30,000.00 would be just and proper. All taken, an award of
P330,000.00 is granted.
Four (4) members of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, is
unconstitutional; nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the Court, by a majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that the
death penalty should be accordingly imposed.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the trial court finding accused-appellants JAIME CARPO, OSCAR IBAO, WARLITO IBAO and
ROCHE IBAO GUILTY of the complex crime of multiple murder with attempted murder and sentencing them to the supreme penalty
of death is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that they are ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Florentino, Norwela and
Nissan, all surnamed Dulay, P50,000.00 as death indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages for each death or an aggregate
amount of P300,00.00. In addition, accused-appellants are ordered to pay Noemi Dulay P30,000.00 as indemnity for her attempted
murder. Costs against accused- appellants.
In accordance with Sec. 25 of RA 7659, amending Art. 83 of The Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this Decision, let the
records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of executive clemency or pardoning
power.
SO ORDERED.

40