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Executive Department safeguard the constitutional right to life, liberty and security of aggrieved individuals.

—An amparo
proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal liability of individuals or entities
involved. Neither does it partake of a civil or administrative suit. Rather, it is a remedial measure
1. [Boac vs. Cadapan, 649 SCRA 618(2011)] designed to direct specified courses of action to government agencies to safeguard the constitutional
Presidential Immunity; Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual right to life, liberty and security of aggrieved individuals. Thus Razon Jr. v. Tagitis, 606 SCRA 598
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the (2009), enlightens: [An amparo proceeding] does nor determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability
Constitution or law—it will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, for the disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least
if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such.—The Court finds the appellate accountability, for the enforced disappearance…for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies
court’s dismissal of the petitions against then President Arroyo well-taken, owing to her immunity to address the disappearance… (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
from suit at the time the habeas corpus and amparo petitions were filed. Settled is the doctrine that
“Responsibility” and “Accountability,” Explained.—Tagitis defines what constitutes “responsibility”
the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or
and “accountability,” viz.: x x x. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established
criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the
by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations
disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file
while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment,
the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts.
hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and
Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to
functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and
those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their
anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties
complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating
imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. x x x
to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have
Parenthetically, the petitions are bereft of any allegation that then President Arroyo permitted,
failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
condoned or performed any wrongdoing against the three missing persons.
disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal
Writs of Amparo; Command Responsibility; The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security
finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed combats; Command responsibility is are restored. (emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
properly a form of criminal complicity, and thus a substantive rule that points to criminal or
While the concept of command responsibility does not apply in amparo cases to determine criminal
administrative liability.—Rubrico v. Macapagal Arroyo, 613 SCRA 233 (2010), expounded on the
liability, it may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those accountable individuals
concept of command responsibility as follows: The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine
that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue—in
finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas,
such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the
“command responsibility,” in its simplest terms, means the “responsibility of commanders for crimes
superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.—Rubrico
committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in
categorically denies the application of command responsibility in amparo cases to determine criminal
international wars or domestic conflict.” In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of
liability. The Court maintains its adherence to this pronouncement as far as amparo cases are
criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility,
concerned. Rubrico, however, recognizes a preliminary yet limited application of command
foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities
responsibility in amparo cases to instances of determining the responsible or accountable individuals
committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then
or entities that are duty-bound to abate any transgression on the life, liberty or security of the
formulated, command responsibility is “an omission mode of individual criminal liability,” whereby
aggrieved party. If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it
the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or
should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and
punish the perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (citations omitted; emphasis in the
has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court
original; underscoring supplied) It bears stressing that command responsibility is properly a form of
to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered
criminal complicity, and thus a substantive rule that points to criminal or administrative liability.
by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to fix
An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal liability of criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to
individuals or entities involved, and neither does it partake of a civil or administrative suit—rather, it administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if there be any.
is a remedial measure designed to direct specified courses of action to government agencies to (emphasis and underscoring supplied) In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied
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in amparo cases in order to identify those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or
implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo court domestic conflict.” In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity.
does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the
best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party. present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his
subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command
responsibility is “an omission mode of individual criminal liability,” whereby the superior is made
2. [Rubrico vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 613 SCRA 233(2010)] responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the
Separation of Powers; Presidential Immunity; The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered).
under our system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution.—
Petitioners first take issue on the President’s purported lack of immunity from suit during her term of While there are several pending bills on command responsibility, there is still no Philippine law that
office. The 1987 Constitution, so they claim, has removed such immunity heretofore enjoyed by the provides for criminal liability under that doctrine; It would be inappropriateto apply to amparo
chief executive under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. Petitioners are mistaken. The presidential proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility as a form of criminal complicity through
immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit not expressly omission, for individual respondents’ criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of
reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986 amparo—the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if
Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may have been committed.—While
S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued there are several pending bills on command responsibility, there is still no Philippine law that
during his or her tenure. The Court subsequently made it abundantly clear in David v. Macapagal- provides for criminal liability under that doctrine. It may plausibly be contended that command
Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 (2006), a case likewise resolved under the umbrella of the 1987 Constitution, responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings,
that indeed the President enjoys immunity during her incumbency, and why this must be so: Settled enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that
is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary
in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be
degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA
court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents’
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not
duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an
branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important infraction of an administrative rule may have been committed.
duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.

Writs of Amparo; Doctrine of Command Responsibility; Legal Research; Hague Conventions of 1907;
Command responsibility, as a concept defined, developed, and applied under international law, has
little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings; The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine 3. [Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141(1998)]
finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed combats; The Hague Conventions of Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Administrative Order No. 308; As a Senator, petitioner is
1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of Administrative
holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss Order No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power.—As is usual in constitutional litigation,
in his duty of control over them.—While in a qualified sense tenable, the dismissal by the CA of the respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of the petitioner and the
case as against Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon is incorrect if viewed against the backdrop of the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal
stated rationale underpinning the assailed decision vis-à-vis the two generals, i.e., command interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.
responsibility. The Court assumes the latter stance owing to the fact that command responsibility, as These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of
a concept defined, developed, and applied under international law, has little, if at all, bearing in our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the
amparo proceedings. The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. As taxpayer and member
development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, “command responsibility,” of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the
in its simplest terms, means the “responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.
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the system of separation of powers that inheres in our democratic republican government. Under
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of officers. The
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
determined by proper governmental organs.—Administrative power is concerned with the work of consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group refers to
President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all other
agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations. officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. Under the same
Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by
Administrative Order No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The present case involves
administrative order.—Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject the interpretation of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution with respect to the appointment
that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. x x x An administrative order is an of this fourth group of officers. The President appoints the first group of officers with the consent of
ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the second and third groups of officers
government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the third group of
the law and carrying out the legislative policy. officers if the law is silent on who is the appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a
department, agency, commission, or board to appoint is declared unconstitutional. Thus, if Section
Argument that Administrative Order No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the Administrative
6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is found unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the trustees of the CCP
Code of 1987 rejected.—We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy
Board because the trustees fall under the third group of officers.
of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general law and “incorporates in a unified
document the major structural, functional and procedural principles of governance” and “embodies Power of Appointment; Constitutional Law; The express language of the Constitution and the clear
changes in administrative structures and procedures designed to serve the people.” intent of its framers point to only one conclusion—the officers whom the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards may appoint must be of lower rank than those vested by law with
Administrative Order No. 308 cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation
the power to appoint.—The framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly intended that Congress could by
because facially it violates the right to privacy.—Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be
law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the heads of departments, agencies,
the subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because
commissions, or boards. The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission explain this intent
facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the “right to be let alone.”
beyond any doubt. The framers of the 1987 Constitution changed the qualifying word “inferior” to
the less disparaging phrase “lower in rank” purely for style. However, the clear intent remained that
these inferior or lower in rank officers are the subordinates of the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards who are vested by law with the power to appoint. The express language of
4. [Rufino vs. Endriga, 496 SCRA 13(2006)] the Constitution and the clear intent of its framers point to only one conclusion—the officers whom
Presidency; Power of Appointment; Separation of Powers; Usurpation of this fundamentally the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards may appoint must be of lower rank than
Executive power of appointment by the Legislative and Judicial branches violates the system of those vested by law with the power to appoint.
separation of powers that inheres in our democratic republican government; Under Section 16,
Same; Congress may vest the authority to appoint only in the heads of departments, agencies,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of officers—the first group
commissions, or boards.—Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution authorizes Congress to vest
refers to the heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
“in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards” the power to appoint lower-ranked
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
officers. Section 16 provides: The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower
appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, the second group refers to those
in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions,
whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, and the third group refers to all other
or boards. (Emphasis supplied) In a department in the Executive branch, the head is the Secretary.
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law; Under the same
The law may not authorize the Undersecretary, acting as such Undersecretary, to appoint lower-
Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by
ranked officers in the Executive department. In an agency, the power is vested in the head of the
law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.—The power to appoint is
agency for it would be preposterous to vest it in the agency itself. In a commission, the head is the
the prerogative of the President, except in those instances when the Constitution provides otherwise.
chairperson of the commission. In a board, the head is also the chairperson of the board. In the last
Usurpation of this fundamentally Executive power by the Legislative and Judicial branches violates
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three situations, the law may not also authorize officers other than the heads of the agency, Same; Power of Appointment; Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allows heads of
commission, or board to appoint lowerranked officers. departments, agencies, commissions, or boards to appoint only “officers lower in rank” than such
“heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards”—this excludes a situation where the
Same; Presidency; The President’s power to appoint which is a self-executing power vested by the appointing officer appoints an officer equal in rank as him; Insofar as it authorizes the trustees of the
Constitution itself and thus not subject to legislative limitations or conditions.—The grant of the CCP Board to elect their co-trustees, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is unconstitutional.—Section 6(b)
power to appoint to the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards is a matter of legislative grace. and (c) of PD 15 is thus irreconcilably inconsistent with Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Congress has the discretion to grant to, or withhold from, the heads of agencies, commissions, or Constitution. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees of the CCP Board to fill
boards the power to appoint lower-ranked officers. If it so grants, Congress may impose certain vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing them to elect their fellow trustees. On the other hand, Section
conditions for the exercise of such legislative delegation, like requiring the recommendation of 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allows heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
subordinate officers or the concurrence of the other members of the commission or board. This is in boards to appoint only “officers lower in rank” than such “heads of departments, agencies,
contrast to the President’s power to appoint which is a self-executing power vested by the commissions, or boards.” This excludes a situation where the appointing officer appoints an officer
Constitution itself and thus not subject to legislative limitations or conditions. The power to appoint equal in rank as him. Thus, insofar as it authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to elect their co-
conferred directly by the Constitution on the Supreme Court en banc and on the Constitutional trustees, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is unconstitutional because it violates Section 16, Article VII of
Commissions is also self-executing and not subject to legislative limitations or conditions. the 1987 Constitution.

Words and Phrases; The word “heads” refers to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards and Power of Appointment; Words and Phrases; It does not matter that Section 6(b) of PD 15 empowers
not to their members.—The Constitution authorizes Congress to vest the power to appoint the remaining trustees to “elect” and not “appoint” their fellow trustees for the effect is the same,
lowerranked officers specifically in the “heads” of the specified offices, and in no other person. The which is to fill vacancies in the CCP Board.—It does not matter that Section 6(b) of PD 15 empowers
word “heads” refers to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards and not to their members, for the remaining trustees to “elect” and not “appoint” their fellow trustees for the effect is the same,
several reasons. which is to fill vacancies in the CCP Board. A statute cannot circumvent the constitutional limitations
on the power to appoint by filling vacancies in a public office through election by the co-workers in
Power of Appointment; The Supreme Court en banc is the appointing power.—The 1987 Constitution that office. Such manner of filling vacancies in a public office has no constitutional basis.
speaks of vesting the power to appoint “in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards.” This is consistent with Section 5(6), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution The creation of an independent appointing power inherently conflicts with the President’s power to
which states that the “Supreme Court shall x x x [a]ppoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary appoint.—Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP trustees the independent appointing power of
in accordance with the Civil Service Law,” making the Supreme Court en banc the appointing power. their fellow trustees. The creation of an independent appointing power inherently conflicts with the
In sharp contrast, when the 1987 Constitution speaks of the power to appoint lower-ranked officers President’s power to appoint. This inherent conflict has spawned recurring controversies in the
in the Executive branch, it vests the power “in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or appointment of CCP trustees every time a new President assumes office. In the present case, the
boards.” incumbent President appointed the Endriga group as trustees, while the remaining CCP trustees
elected the same Endriga group to the same positions. This has been the modus vivendi in filling
Constitutional Law; Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP); The Chairman of the Cultural Center of vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing the President to appoint and the CCP Board to elect the
the Philippines (CCP) board is the “head” of the CCP who may be vested by law, under Section 16, trustees. In effect, there are two appointing powers over the same set of officers in the Executive
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, with the power to appoint lower-ranked officers of the CCP; The branch. Each appointing power insists on exercising its own power, even if the two powers are
CCP, being governed by a board, is not an agency but a board for purposes of Section 16, Article VII of irreconcilable. The Court must put an end to this recurring anomaly.
the 1987 Constitution.—The Chairman of the CCP Board is the “head” of the CCP who may be vested
by law, under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, with the power to appoint lower-ranked Presidency; Power of Control; The presidential power of control over the Executive branch of
officers of the CCP. Under PD 15, the CCP is a public corporation governed by a Board of Trustees. government extends to all executive employees from the Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk,
Section 6 of PD 15, as amended, states: Board of Trustees.—The governing powers and authority of a constitutional power that is self-executing and which does not require any implementing law;
the corporation shall be vested in, and exercised by, a Board of eleven (11) Trustees who shall serve Congress cannot limit or curtail the President’s power of control over the Executive branch.—There is
without compensation. The CCP, being governed by a board, is not an agency but a board for another constitutional impediment to the implementation of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15. Under our
purposes of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. system of government, all Executive departments, bureaus, and offices are under the control of the
President of the Philippines. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: The President

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shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the Power of Control; The Legislature cannot validly enact a law that puts a government office in the
laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied) The presidential power of control over the Executive Excutive branch outside the control of the President in the guise of insulating that office from politics
branch of government extends to all executive employees from the Department Secretary to the or making it independent.—The Legislature cannot validly enact a law that puts a government office
lowliest clerk. This constitutional power of the President is self-executing and does not require any in the Executive branch outside the control of the President in the guise of insulating that office from
implementing law. Congress cannot limit or curtail the President’s power of control over the politics or making it independent. If the office is part of the Executive branch, it must remain subject
Executive branch. to the control of the President. Otherwise, the Legislature can deprive the President of his
constitutional power of control over “all the executive x x x offices.” If the Legislature can do this with
Same; Same; Every government office, entity, or agency must fall under the Executive, Legislative, or the Executive branch, then the Legislature can also deal a similar blow to the Judicial branch by
Judicial branches, or must belong to one of the independent constitutional bodies, or must be a enacting a law putting decisions of certain lower courts beyond the review power of the Supreme
quasi-judicial body or local government unit; Since the CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Court. This will destroy the system of checks and balances finely structured in the 1987 Constitution
Judicial branches of government, and neither is it also one of the independent constitutional bodies, among the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches. Of course, the President’s power of control
nor a quasi-judicial body or a local government unit, the CCP must fall under the Executive branch; does not extend to quasi-judicial bodies whose proceedings and decisions are judicial in nature and
Since the President exercises control over “all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices,” the subject to judicial review, even as such quasi-judicial bodies may be under the administrative
President necessarily exercises control over the CCP which is an office in the Executive branch.— supervision of the President. It also does not extend to local government units, which are merely
Every government office, entity, or agency must fall under the Executive, Legislative, or Judicial under the general supervision of the President.
branches, or must belong to one of the independent constitutional bodies, or must be a quasi-judicial
body or local government unit. Otherwise, such government office, entity, or agency has no legal and Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP); Presidential Decree No. 15; Presidency; Power of Control;
constitutional basis for its existence. The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP a self-perpetuating entity, virtually outside the control of
of government. The CCP is also not one of the independent constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a the President—such a public office or board cannot legally exist under the 1987 Constitution.—
quasi- judicial body nor a local government unit. Thus, the CCP must fall under the Executive branch. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the
Unde the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency “not placed by law or order creating them Board, runs afoul with the President’s power of control under Section 17, Article VII of the 1987
under any specific department” falls “under the Office of the President.” Since the President Constitution. The intent of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is to insulate the CCP from political influence
exercises control over “all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices,” the President necessarily and pressure, specifically from the President. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP a self-
exercises control over the CCP which is an office in the Executive branch. In mandating that the perpetuating entity, virtually outside the control of the President. Such a public office or board
President “shall have control of all executive x x x offices,” Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 cannot legally exist under the 1987 Constitution.
Constitution does not exempt any executive office—one performing executive functions outside of
the independent constitutional bodies—from the President’s power of control. There is no dispute Same; Power of Control; Section 3 of PD 15 stating that the CCP “shall enjoy autonomy of policy and
that the CCP performs executive, and not legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions. operation” may give the CCP Board a free hand in initiating and formulating policies and undertaking
activities, but ultimately these policies and activities are all subject to the President’s power of
Same; Same; There can be no instance under the Constitution where an officer of the Executive control.—Section 3 of PD 15, as amended, states that the CCP “shall enjoy autonomy of policy and
branch is outside the control of the President—any office in the Executive branch that is not under operation x x x.” This provision does not free the CCP from the President’s control, for if it does, then
the control of the President is a lost command whose existence is without any legal or constitutional it would be unconstitutional. This provision may give the CCP Board a free hand in initiating and
basis.—The President’s power of control applies to the acts or decisions of all officers in the Executive formulating policies and undertaking activities, but ultimately these policies and activities are all
branch. This is true whether such officers are appointed by the President or by heads of departments, subject to the President’s power of control.
agencies, commissions, or boards. The power of control means the power to revise or reverse the
acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of discretion. In short, the President Same; Same; Constitutional Law; By stating that the “President shall have control of all the executive
sits at the apex of the Executive branch, and exercises “control of all the executive departments, x x x offices,” the 1987 Constitution empowers the President not only to influence but even to control
bureaus, and offices.” There can be no instance under the Constitution where an officer of the all offices in the Executive branch, including the CCP—control is far greater than, and subsumes,
Executive branch is outside the control of the President. The Executive branch is unitary since there is influence.—The CCP is part of the Executive branch. No law can cut off the President’s control over
only one President vested with executive power exercising control over the entire Executive branch. the CCP in the guise of insulating the CCP from the President’s influence. By stating that the
Any office in the Executive branch that is not under the control of the President is a lost command “President shall have control of all the executive x x x offices,” the 1987 Constitution empowers the
whose existence is without any legal or constitutional basis.
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President not only to influence but even to control all offices in the Executive branch, including the the issue of the Chief Justice’s appointment. The Decision proposed to reverse Valenzuela but only
CCP. Control is far greater than, and subsumes, influence. secured the support of five (5) votes, while my Separate Opinion in support of Valenzuela had four (4)
votes. Thus, on the whole, the Decision did not prevail in reversing Valenzuela, as it only had five (5)
votes in a field of participating Members of the Court. Valenzuela should therefore remain, as of the
5. [De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), 618 SCRA 639(2010)] filing of this Opinion, as a valid precedent.
Constitutional Law; Presidency; Power to Appoint; Appointments; View that because of the
temporary nature of the circumstance causing the impossibility of performance, the outgoing Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial and Bar Council; View that the Supreme Court cannot dictate on
President is released from non-fulfillment of the obligation to appoint, and the duty devolved upon the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) the results of its assigned task, i.e., who to recommend or what
the new President.—In view of the temporary nature of the circumstance causing the impossibility of standards to use to determine who to recommend—it cannot even direct the JBC on how and when
performance, the outgoing President is released from non-fulfillment of the obligation to appoint, to do its duty, but it can, under its power of supervision, direct the JBC to “take such action or step as
and the duty devolves upon the new President. The delay in the fulfillment of the obligation becomes prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.”—The Court cannot dictate on the JBC the
excusable, since the law cannot exact compliance with what is impossible. The 90-day period within results of its assigned task, i.e., who to recommend or what standards to use to determine who to
which to appoint a member of the Court is thus suspended and the period could only start or resume recommend. It cannot even direct the JBC on how and when to do its duty, but it can, under its power
to run when the temporary obstacle disappears (i.e., after the period of the appointments ban; when of supervision, direct the JBC to “take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform
there is already a quorum in the JBC; or when there is already at least three applicants). their duties,” if the duties are not being performed because of JBC’s fault or inaction, or because of
extraneous factors affecting performance. Note in this regard that, constitutionally, the Court can
Same; Same; Same; View that to require the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) to submit to the President also assign the JBC other functions and duties—a power that suggests authority beyond what is
a shortlist of nominees on or before the occurrence of vacancy in the Supreme Court leads to purely supervisory.
preposterous results.—To require the JBC to submit to the President a shortlist of nominees on or
before the occurrence of vacancy in the Court leads to preposterous results. It bears reiterating that Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the process of preparing and submitting a list of
the requirement is absurd when, inter alia, the vacancy is occasioned by the death of a member of nominees is an arduous and time-consuming task that cannot be done overnight.—I hasten to add
the Court, in which case the JBC could never anticipate the death of a Justice, and could never submit that the JBC’s constitutional task is not as simple as some people think it to be. The process of
a list to the President on or before the occurrence of vacancy. preparing and submitting a list of nominees is an arduous and time-consuming task that cannot be
done overnight. It is a six-step process lined with standards requiring the JBC to attract the best
BRION, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: available candidates, to examine and investigate them, to exhibit transparency in all its actions while
ensuring that these actions conform to constitutional and statutory standards (such as the election
Constitutional Law; Presidency; Power to Appoint; Appointments; View that the election ban on appointments), to submit the required list of nominees on time, and to ensure as well that all
appointment ban under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution should not apply to the these acts are politically neutral.
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court whose period for appointment is separately provided
for under Article VIII, Section 4(1).—The election appointment ban under Article VII, Section 15 of the Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) list for the Supreme
Constitution should not apply to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court whose period Court has to be submitted on or before the vacancy occurs given the 90-day deadline that the
for appointment is separately provided for under Article VIII, Section 4(1). appointing President is given in making the appointment.—On the time element, the JBC list for the
Supreme Court has to be submitted on or before the vacancy occurs given the 90-day deadline that
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that Valenzuela ruling is still good law; no reason exists to touch the the appointing President is given in making the appointment. The list will be submitted, not to the
ruling as its main focus—the application of the election ban on the appointment of lower court President as an outgoing President, nor to the election winner as an in President, but to the President
judges under Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution—is not even an issue in the present case and of the Philippines whoever he or she may be. If the incumbent President does not act on the JBC list
was discussed only because the petitions incorrectly cited the ruling as authority on the issue of the within the time left in her term, the same list shall be available to the new President for him to act
Chief Justice’s appointment.—I diverged fully from the Decision on the question of whether we upon. In all these, the Supreme Court bears the burden of overseeing that the JBC’s duty is done,
should maintain or reverse our ruling in Valenzuela. I maintained that it is still good law; no reason unerringly and with utmost dispatch; the Court cannot undertake this supervision in a manner
exists to touch the ruling as its main focus—the application of the election ban on the appointment of consistent with the Constitution’s expectation from the JBC unless it adopts a pro-active stance
lower court judges under Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution—is not even an issue in the within the limits of its supervisory authority.
present case and was discussed only because the petitions incorrectly cited the ruling as authority on

6
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the ponencia’s ruling is out of place in the present case, power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from
since at issue here is the appointment of the Chief Justice during the period of the election ban, not Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk and has been held by us, in the landmark case of Mondano vs.
the appointment of lower court judges that Valenzuela resolved.—The ponencia’s ruling reversing Silvosa, to mean “the power of [the President] to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
Valenzuela, in my view, is out of place in the present case, since at issue here is the appointment of subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
the Chief Justice during the period of the election ban, not the appointment of lower court judges former with that of the latter.” It is said to be at the very “heart of the meaning of Chief Executive.”
that Valenzuela resolved. To be perfectly clear, the conflict in the constitutional provisions is not
confined to Article VII, Section 15 and Article VIII, Section 4(1) with respect to the appointment of Same; Same; The “Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency” equally accepted as a corollary rule to the
Members of the Supreme Court; even before the Valenzuela ruling, the conflict already existed control powers of the President.—Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of
between Article VII, Section 15 and Article VIII, Section 9—the provision on the appointment of the the President, is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency.” As the President cannot be expected to
justices and judges of courts lower than the Supreme Court. After this Court’s ruling in Valenzuela, no exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them
amount of hairsplitting can result in the conclusion that Article VII, Section 15 applied the election to his Cabinet members.
ban over the whole Judiciary, including the Supreme Court, as the facts and the fallo of Valenzuela
plainly spoke of the objectionable appointment of two Regional Trial Court judges. To reiterate, Same; Same; Same; The President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members
Valenzuela only resolved the conflict between Article VII, Section 15 and appointments to the of the Cabinet who in turn and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their
Judiciary under Article VIII, Section 9. respective jurisdiction in the executive department.—Thus, and in short, “the President’s power of
control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his
In any case, let me repeat what I stressed in my Separate Opinion about Valenzuela which rests on authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive
the reasoning that the evils Section 15 seeks to remedy—vote buying, midnight appointments and department.”
partisan reasons to influence the elections—exist, thus justifying an election appointment ban. In
particular, the “midnight appointment” justification, while fully applicable to the more numerous Same; National Police Commission; There is no usurpation of the power of control of the NAPOLCOM
vacancies at the lower echelons of the Judiciary (with an alleged current lower court vacancy level of under Section 51.—We agree, and so hold, with the view of the Solicitor General that “there is no
537 or a 24.5% vacancy rate), should not apply to the Supreme Court which has only a total of 15 usurpation of the power of control of the NAPOLCOM under Section 51 because under this very same
positions that are not even vacated at the same time. The most number of vacancies for any one year provision, it is clear that the local executives are only acting as representatives of the NAPOLCOM.
occurred only last year (2009) when seven (7) positions were vacated by retirement, but this vacancy XXX As such deputies, they are answerable to the NAPOLCOM for their actions in the exercise of their
rate is not expected to be replicated at any time within the next decade. Thus “midnight functions under that section. Thus, unless countermanded by the NAPOLCOM, their acts are valid and
appointments” to the extent that they were understood in Aytona36 will not occur in the vacancies of binding as acts of the NAPOLCOM.”
this Court as nominations to its vacancies are all processed through the JBC under the public’s close
Same; Same; Same; The grant of disciplinary powers over PNP Members to the People’s Law
scrutiny. As already discussed above, the institutional integrity of the Court is hardly an issue. If at all,
Enforcement Boards and city and municipal mayors is also not in derogation of the Commission’s
only objections personal to the individual Members of the Court or against the individual applicants
power of control over the PNP.—The grant of disciplinary powers over PNP members to the “People’s
can be made, but these are matters addressed in the first place by the JBC before nominees are
Law Enforcement Boards” (or the PLEB) and city and municipal mayors is also not in derogation of the
submitted. There, too, are specific reasons, likewise discussed above, explaining why the election ban
Commission’s power of control over the PNP.
should not apply to the Supreme Court. These exempting reasons, of course, have yet to be shown to
apply to the lower courts. Thus, on the whole, the reasons justifying the election ban in Valenzuela Same; Same; The police force not being integrated with the military is not a part of the Armed Forces
still obtain in so far as the lower courts are concerned, and have yet to be proven otherwise in a of the Philippines.—It thus becomes all too apparent then that the provision herein assailed precisely
properly filed case. Until then, Valenzuela, except to the extent that it mentioned Section 4(1), should gives muscle to and enforces the proposition that the national police force does not fall under the
remain an authoritative ruling of this Court. Commander-in-Chief powers of the President. This is necessarily so since the police force, not being
integrated with the military, is not a part of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. As a civilian agency
of the government, it properly comes within, and is subject to, the exercise by the President of the
6. [Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290(1992)] power of executive control.
Administrative Law; The presidential power of control was held to mean the power of the President
to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of Same; Same; Same; The President, as Commander-in-Chief is not a member of the Armed Forces.—
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.—This presidential Consequently, Section 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers. It simply
7
provides for the transition period or process during which the national police would gradually assume justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to
the civilian function of safeguarding the internal security of the State. Under this instance, the ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads: Section 17. The President shall have
President, to repeat, abdicates nothing of his war powers. It would bear to here state, in reiteration control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
of the preponderant view, that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied). As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation
Forces. He remains a civilian whose duties under the Commander-in-Chief provision “represent only a of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The
part of the organic duties imposed upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature.” His President’s power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws—in
position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency—is inherent in the President’s
principle that “civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.” powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to
create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does
not mean that he is bereft of such authority.
7. See #4
Same; Same; Same; Residual Powers; The powers of the President are not limited to those specific
powers under the Constitution—one of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to
8. [Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, 637 SCRA 78(2010)] this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees, a power which flows
Same; Same; Same; Same; Power of Control; The power of control is entirely different from the from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed.—The
power to create public offices—the former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above, the
from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.—In powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the
the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the President’s power of control. Control is recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the
essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and
the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. determine if laws have been faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of Health v. Camposano, 457
Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former SCRA 438 (2005), the authority of the President to issue Administrative Order No. 298, creating an
is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, investigative committee to look into the administrative charges filed against the employees of the
or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws. Department of Health for the anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; The Court declines to recognize Presidential Decree (P.D.) Same; Same; Same; The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry
No. 1416 as a justification for the President to create a public office—P.D. No. 1416, as amended by into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in
P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio upon the convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.—It
in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.—The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an
No. 1416 as a justification for the President to create a public office. Said decree is already stale, inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and
anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the national government including the power land. And if history is to be revisited, this was also the objective of the investigative bodies created in
to create offices and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree, the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission and the
embodied in its last “Whereas” clause: WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of Zenarosa Commission. There being no changes in the government structure, the Court is not inclined
government will necessitate flexibility in the organization of the national government. Clearly, as it to declare such executive power as non-existent just because the direction of the political winds have
was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency during the interim, P.D. No. 1416, changed.
as amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio upon the convening of the First Congress, as
expressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. Same; Same; Appropriations; There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power to
appropriate funds where there is only allotment or allocations of existing funds already
Same; Same; Faithful Execution Clause; The creation of the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) finds appropriated.—On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to
justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.—While the power to create a truth commission cannot appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated.
pass muster on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to

8
appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a
of the commission because, in the words of the Solicitor General, “whatever funds the Congress has judgment.”
provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission.”
Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing
rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding.

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; No quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the Philippine Truth 9. [Dadole vs. Commission on Audit, 393 SCRA 262(2002)]
Commission (PTC) as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it; Quasi-judicial powers Constitutional Law; Local Governments; Local Autonomy; Power of Supervision vs. Power of Control;
involve the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply The supervisory power of the President is different from the power of control exercised by
and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and administering Congress.—In Pimentel vs. Aguirre, we defined the supervisory power of the President and
the same law.—Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate distinguished it from the power of control exercised by Congress. Thus: This provision (Section 4 of
reports of graft and corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution) has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. In
quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who Mondano v. Silvosa, the Court contrasted the President’s power of supervision over local government
come before it. It has been said that “Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to hear and determine officials with that of his power of control over executive officials of the national government. It was
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the emphasized that the two terms—supervision and control—differed in meaning and extent. The Court
standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.” In simpler terms, distinguished them as follows: “x x x In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the
judicial discretion is involved in the exercise of these quasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail
vested in the judiciary and must be clearly authorized by the legislature in the case of administrative or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
agencies. perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to
Same; Same; Same; “Power to Investigate,” and “Power to Adjudicate,” Distinguished.—The substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.” In Taule v. Santos,we further stated that
distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by the the Chief Executive wielded no more authority than that of checking whether local governments or
Court in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights, 204 SCRA 483 (1991). Thus: “Investigate,” commonly their officials were performing their duties as provided by the fundamental law and by statutes. He
understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The cannot interfere with local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority.
dictionary definition of “investigate” is “to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: “to “Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior
search or inquire into: x x to subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an official inquiry.” The body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body,” we said. In a more recent case,
purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere Drilon v. Lim, the difference between control and supervision was further delineated. Officers in
included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the control lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an act. If these rules are not
facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry. The legal meaning followed, they may, in their discretion, order the act undone or redone by their subordinates or even
of “investigate” is essentially the same: “(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. decide to do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising
To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by officials merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules,
careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;” “to inquire; to make an nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may
investigation,” “investigation” being in turn described as “(a)n administrative function, the exercise of order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own
which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the
otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters.” rules are followed. Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the
“Adjudicate,” commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, President. The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such,
determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as “to settle finally (the rights and they are subject to the power of control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be
duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. In contrast, the
judicially: x x act as judge.” And “adjudge” means “to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or heads of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the
quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x.” In the legal sense, electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the
“adjudicate” means: “To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous President’s supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their
with adjudge in its strictest sense;” and “adjudge” means: “To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or
9
legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority or must be possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to
power given them by the Constitution and the law. direct military operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to
delegate the actual command of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his.
As Commander-in-Chief, he is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces
placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual.

10. [Kulayan vs. Tan, 675 SCRA 482(2012)] Same; Philippine National Police; Regarding the country’s police force, Section 6, Article XVI of the
Presidency; There is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic— Constitution states that: the State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be
this means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police
to the President and no one else.—As early as Villena v. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451 (1939), it commission; A local chief executive, such as the provincial governor, exercises operational
has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is the supervision over the police, and may exercise control only in day-to-day operations.—In addition to
President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of being the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the President also acts as the leader of the
executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else. As emphasized by Justice Jose P. country’s police forces, under the mandate of Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, which
Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena: With reference to the Executive Department of the government, provides that, “The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.” During the deliberations of the
searchlight, and that is the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article Constitutional Commission on the framing of this provision, Fr. Bernas defended the retention of the
VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the word “control,” employing the same rationale of singularity of the office of the president, as the only
principle that “The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines.” This means that Executive under the presidential form of government. Regarding the country’s police force, Section 6,
the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other. Article XVI of the Constitution states that: “The State shall establish and maintain one police force,
Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a
provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction
calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof. shall be provided by law.” A local chief executive, such as the provincial governor, exercises
operational supervision over the police, and may exercise control only in day-to-day operations
Same; Calling-Out Powers; By constitutional fiat, the calling-out powers, which is of lesser gravity
than the power to declare martial law, is bestowed upon the President alone.—The power to declare Same; Calling-Out Powers; Respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call
a state of martial law is subject to the Supreme Court’s authority to review the factual basis thereof. upon the armed forces at his own bidding; the calling-out powers contemplated under the
By constitutional fiat, the calling-out powers, which is of lesser gravity than the power to declare Constitution is exclusive to the President.—Respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the
martial law, is bestowed upon the President alone. As noted in Villena, “(t)here are certain power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation,
constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the
by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers
powers by any other person. Such, for instance, is his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official,
and proclaim martial law x x x.484 even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of
Section 465 of the Local Government Code.
Same; While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution mandates that
civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military, making the civilian president the nation’s Same; A kidnapping incident cannot be considered as a calamity or a disaster.—Respondents cannot
supreme military leader; The Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed of rely on paragraph 1, subparagraph (vii) of Article 465 above, as the said provision expressly refers to
military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military calamities and disasters, whether man-made or natural. The governor, as local chief executive of the
operations and to determine military strategy.—Indeed, while the President is still a civilian, Article II, province, is certainly empowered to enact and implement emergency measures during these
Section 3 of the Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the occurrences. But the kidnapping incident in the case at bar cannot be considered as a calamity or a
military, making the civilian president the nation’s supreme military leader. The net effect of Article II, disaster. Respondents cannot find any legal mooring under this provision to justify their actions.
Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal
and administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution does not require that the President

10
11. AKBAYAN vs. Aquino profile cases, in which case not only would this be contrary to long-standing practice. It would also be
highly prejudicial to law enforcement efforts in general.
The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction. In
discussing valid limitations on the right to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that Also illustrative is the privilege accorded to presidential communications, which are
“information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive presumed privileged without distinguishing between those which involve matters of national security
agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest.” Even earlier, and those which do not, the rationale for the privilege being that
the same privilege was upheld in People’s Movement for Press Freedom (PMPF) v. Manglapuswherein
the Court discussed the reasons for the privilege in more precise terms. x xx [a] frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from
the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the
Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential,
may not be kept perpetually confidential – since there should be “ample opportunity for discussion Legislative and Judicial power. x xx (Emphasis supplied)
before [a treaty] is approved” – the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue
to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese In the same way that the privilege for judicial deliberations does not depend on the nature
representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that “historic confidentiality” would of the case deliberated upon, so presidential communications are privileged whether they involve
govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only matters of national security.
with Japan but with other foreign governments in futurenegotiations.
It bears emphasis, however, that the privilege accorded to presidential communications is
A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should now be open to public scrutiny not absolute, one significant qualification being that “the Executive cannot, any more than the other
would discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during branches of government, invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and
negotiations.While, on first impression, it appears wise to deter Philippine representatives from employees from investigations by the proper governmental institutions into possible criminal
entering into compromises, it bears noting that treaty negotiations, or any negotiation for that wrongdoing.” This qualification applies whether the privilege is being invoked in the context of a
matter, normally involve a process of quid pro quo, and oftentimes negotiators have to be willing to judicial trial or a congressional investigation conducted in aid of legislation.
grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an
area of greater national interest Closely related to the “presidential communications” privilege is the deliberative process privilege
recognized in the United States. As discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck &
Indeed, by hampering the ability of our representatives to compromise, we may be jeopardizing Co, deliberative process covers documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and
higher national goals for the sake of securing less critical ones. deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are
formulated. Notably, the privileged status of such documents rests, not on the need to protect
Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA national security but, on the “obvious realization that officials will not communicate candidly among
negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news,” the objective of the
presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermitaholds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does not privilege being to enhance the quality of agency decisions.
mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in
which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the deliberative process
of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status. and presidential communications privilege. It may be readily perceived that the rationale for the
confidential character of diplomatic negotiations, deliberative process, and presidential
While there certainly are privileges grounded on the necessity of safeguarding national security such communications is similar, if not identical.
as those involving military secrets, not all are founded thereon. One example is the “informer’s
privilege,” or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of a person or persons who The decision of the U.S. District Court, District of Columbia in Fulbright &Jaworski v.
furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. The Department of the Treasury enlightens on the close relation between diplomatic negotiations and
suspect involved need not be so notorious as to be a threat to national security for this privilege to deliberative process privileges. The plaintiffs in that case sought access to notes taken by a member
apply in any given instance. Otherwise, the privilege would be inapplicable in all but the most high- of the U.S. negotiating team during the U.S.-French taxtreaty negotiations. Among the points noted
11
therein were the issues to be discussed, positions which the French and U.S. teams took on some The Court’s statement in Senate v. Ermita that “presidential refusals to furnish information
points, the draft language agreed on, and articles which needed to be amended. Upholding the may be actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds of considerations [state secrets privilege,
confidentiality of those notes, Judge Green ruled, thus: informer’s privilege, and a generic privilege for internal deliberations], and may be asserted, with
differing degrees of success, in the context of either judicial or legislative investigations,”1[41]
Negotiations between two countries to draft a treaty represent a true implies that a privilege, once recognized, may be invoked under different procedural settings. That
example of a deliberative process. Much give-and-take must occur for the this principle holds true particularly with respect to diplomatic negotiations may be inferred from
countries to reach an accord. A description of the negotiations at any one point PMPF v. Manglapus itself, where the Court held that it is the President alone who negotiates treaties,
would not provide an onlooker a summary of the discussions which could later be and not even the Senate or the House of Representatives, unless asked, may intrude upon that
relied on as law. It would not be “working law” as the points discussed and process.
positions agreed on would be subject to change at any date until the treaty was
signed by the President and ratified by the Senate. Clearly, the privilege for diplomatic negotiations may be invoked not only against citizens’
demands for information, but also in the context of legislative investigations.
The policies behind the deliberative process privilegesupport non-
disclosure.Much harm could accrue to the negotiations process if these notes
were revealed. Exposure of the pre-agreement positions of the French negotiators 12. Araullo v. Aquino
might well offend foreign governments and would lead to less candor by the U. S.
in recording the events of the negotiations process. As several months pass in
between negotiations, this lack of record could hinder readily the U. S. negotiating c) The Philippine Budget Cycle66
team. Further disclosure would reveal prematurely adopted policies. If these
policies should be changed, public confusion would result easily. Four phases comprise the Philippine budget process, specifically: (1) Budget Preparation; (2) Budget
Legislation; (3) Budget Execution; and (4) Accountability. Each phase is distinctly separate from the
Finally, releasing these snapshot views of the negotiations would be others but they overlap in the implementation of the budget during the budget year.
comparable to releasing drafts of the treaty, particularly when the notes state the
tentative provisions and language agreed on. As drafts of regulations typically are c.1.Budget Preparation67
protected by the deliberative process privilege, Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Internal
Revenue Service, C.A. No. 80-705 (D.C.Cir., May 21, 1982), drafts of treaties should
The budget preparation phase is commenced through the issuance of a Budget Call by the DBM. The
be accorded the same protection. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Budget Call contains budget parameters earlier set by the Development Budget Coordination
Committee (DBCC) as well as policy guidelines and procedures to aid government agencies in the
preparation and submission of their budget proposals. The Budget Call is of two kinds, namely: (1) a
Clearly, the privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations follows as a logical consequence
National Budget Call, which is addressed to all agencies, including state universities and colleges; and
from the privileged character of the deliberative process.
(2) a Corporate Budget Call, which is addressed to all government-owned and -controlled
corporations (GOCCs) and government financial institutions (GFIs).
While indeed the petitioners in PMPF v. Manglapus consisted only of members of the mass media, it
would be incorrect to claim that the doctrine laid down therein has no bearing on a controversy such
Following the issuance of the Budget Call, the various departments and agencies submit their
as the present, where the demand for information has come from members of Congress, not only
respective Agency Budget Proposals to the DBM. To boost citizen participation, the current
from private citizens.
administration has tasked the various departments and agencies to partner with civil society
organizations and other citizen-stakeholders in the preparation of the Agency Budget Proposals,
The privileged character accorded to diplomatic negotiations does not ipso facto lose all
which proposals are then presented before a technical panel of the DBM in scheduled budget
force and effect simply because the same privilege is now being claimed under different
hearings wherein the various departments and agencies are given the opportunity to defend their
circumstances. The probability of the claim succeeding in the new context might differ, but to say
budget proposals. DBM bureaus thereafter review the Agency Budget Proposals and come up with
that the privilege, as such, has no validity at all in that context is another matter altogether.
1[41 ] Supra note 20 at 46 (e mpha sis supplied ).

12
recommendations for the Executive Review Board, comprised by the DBM Secretary and the DBM’s c.3. Budget Execution93
senior officials. The discussions of the Executive Review Board cover the prioritization of programs
and their corresponding support vis-à-vis the priority agenda of the National Government, and their With the GAA now in full force and effect, the next step is the implementation of the budget. The
implementation. Budget Execution Phase is primarily the function of the DBM, which is tasked to perform the
following procedures, namely: (1) to issue the programs and guidelines for the release of funds; (2) to
The DBM next consolidates the recommended agency budgets into the National Expenditure Program prepare an Allotment and Cash Release Program; (3) to release allotments; and (4) to issue
(NEP)and a Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF). The NEP provides the details of disbursement authorities.
spending for each department and agency by program, activity or project (PAP), and is submitted in
the form of a proposed GAA Actual disbursement or spending of government funds terminates the Budget Execution Phase and is
usually accomplished through the Modified Disbursement Scheme under which disbursements
Public or government expenditures are generally classified into two categories, specifically: (1) capital chargeable against the National Treasury are coursed through the government servicing banks.
expenditures or outlays; and (2) current operating expenditures. Capital expenditures are the
expenses whose usefulness lasts for more than one year, and which add to the assets of the c.4. Accountability98
Government, including investments in the capital of government-owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries.69 Current operating expenditures are the purchases of goods and services in
current consumption the benefit of which does not extend beyond the fiscal year.70 The two 13. [Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. vs. Republic, 612 SCRA 255(2010)]
components of current expenditures are those for personal services (PS), and those for maintenance Political Law; Presidency; The current administration, or any administration for that matter, cannot
and other operating expenses(MOOE). be detached from the government. In the final analysis, the seat of executive powers is located in the
sitting President who heads the government and/or the “administration.” Under the government
Public expenditures are also broadly grouped according to their functions into: (1) economic established under the Constitution, it is the executive branch, either pursuant to the residual power
development expenditures (i.e., expenditures on agriculture and natural resources, transportation of the President or by force of her enumerated powers under the laws, that has control over all
and communications, commerce and industry, and other economic development efforts);71 (2) social matters pertaining to the disposition of government property or, in this case, sequestered assets
services or social development expenditures (i.e., government outlay on education, public health and under the administration of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).—The current
medicare, labor and welfare and others);72 (3) general government or general public services administration, or any administration for that matter, cannot be detached from the government. In
expenditures (i.e., expenditures for the general government, legislative services, the administration the final analysis, the seat of executive powers is located in the sitting President who heads the
of justice, and for pensions and gratuities);73 (4) national defense expenditures (i.e., sub-divided into government and/or the “administration.” Under the government established under the Constitution,
national security expenditures and expenditures for the maintenance of peace and order); 74 and (5) it is the executive branch, either pursuant to the residual power of the President or by force of her
public debt.75 enumerated powers under the laws, that has control over all matters pertaining to the disposition of
government property or, in this case, sequestered assets under the administration of the PCGG.
c.2. Budget Legislation86 Surely, such control is neither legislative nor judicial. As the Court aptly held in Springer v.
Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928), resolving the issue as to which between
The Budget Legislation Phase covers the period commencing from the time Congress receives the the Governor-General, as head of the executive branch, and the Legislature may vote the shares of
President’s Budget, which is inclusive of the NEPand the BESF, up to the President’s approval of the stock held by the government.
GAA. This phase is also known as the Budget Authorization Phase, and involves the significant
participation of the Legislative through its deliberations.
14. [Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, 549 SCRA
77(2008)]
Initially, the President’s Budget is assigned to the House of Representatives’ Appropriations
Executive Privilege; For the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim of privilege,
Committee on First Reading. The Appropriations Committee and its various Sub-Committees schedule
lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter.—We now proceed to the
and conduct budget hearings to examine the PAPs of the departments and agencies. Thereafter, the
issue—whether the claim is properly invoked by the President. Jurisprudence teaches that for the
House of Representatives drafts the General Appropriations Bill (GAB). 87
claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the

13
department which has control over the matter.” A formal and proper claim of executive privilege existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may
requires a “precise and certain reason” for preserving their confidentiality. The Letter dated have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement. It serves as the formal judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose
claim of privilege. There, he expressly states that “this Office is constrained to invoke the settled an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case
doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in
accordingly.” Obviously, he is referring to the Office of the President. That is more than enough limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.
compliance. In Senate v. Ermita, a less categorical letter was even adjudged to be sufficient.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim 1. [Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 656(1997)]
with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to Constitutional Law; Judicial Power; Judicial power is defined under the 1987 Constitution as the duty
protect.—With regard to the existence of “precise and certain reason,” we find the grounds relied of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
upon by Executive Secretary Ermita specific enough so as not “to leave respondent Committees in the enforceable.—Judicial power is defined under the 1987 Constitution as the duty of courts to settle
dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged.” The case of Senate v. Ermita actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. Such power
only requires that an allegation be made “whether the information demanded involves military or includes the determination of whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.” The particular ground must only be specified. or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. Under this
The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive.” The following statement of grounds definition, a court is without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority
satisfies the requirement: The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is not empowered to
information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the President. It may, however, look into the
People’s Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion.
to the President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations,
without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect. At any rate, as held further in Same; Same; Legislative Power; When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it
Senate v. Ermita, 481 SCRA 1 (2006), the Congress must not require the executive to state the does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under
privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a coordinate and co-equal department. the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument sources and guarantees to them.—Judicial review of the acts of other departments is not
an assertion of superiority over them or a derogation of their functions. In the words of Justice Laurel
15. see # 11 in Angara vs. Electoral Commission: “x x x [W]hen the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
Judicial department authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument sources and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is
termed ‘judicial supremacy’ which properly is the power of the judicial review under the Constitution.
1. [Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, 696 SCRA 496(2013)] x x x.”
Same; Operative Facts Doctrine; Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the
declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized.―It would not be amiss to point out, Same; Same; Same; It is not the purpose of this Court to decrease or limit the discretion of the
however, that as a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no Secretary of Justice to review the decisions of the government prosecutors under him.—It is not the
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. purpose of this Court to decrease or limit the discretion of the secretary of justice to review the
This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the decisions of the government prosecutors under him. In Crespo, the secretary was merely advised to
declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential in the restrict such review to exceptionally meritorious cases. Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court,
interest of fair play. To reiterate the doctrine enunciated in Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil which recognizes such power, does not, however, allow the trial court to automatically dismiss the
Corporation: The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a case or grant the withdrawal of the information upon the resolution of the secretary of justice. This is
matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the precisely the import of Crespo, Marcelo, Martinez vs. Court of Appeals and the recent case of
14
Roberts, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, which all required the trial court to make its own evaluation of the and rules and regulations issued by the executive department that are accorded the same status as
merits of the case, because granting the motion to dismiss or to withdraw the information is that of a statute or those which are quasi-legislative in nature.
equivalent to effecting a disposition of the case itself.
Same; Same; The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity; It is applied only in the absence of
statutory law and never in contravention of said law.—The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity.
2. As a complement of legal jurisdiction, equity “seeks to reach and complete justice where courts of
law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special
circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do so. Equity regards the spirit and not the letter, the
3. [Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, 660 SCRA 525(2011)] intent and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by
Constitutional Law; Words and Phrases; “Operative Fact” Doctrine; The operative fact doctrine does different courts.” Remarkably, it is applied only in the absence of statutory law and never in
not only apply to laws subsequently declared unconstitutional or unlawful as it also applies to contravention of said law.
executive acts subsequently declared as invalid.—Contrary to the stance of respondents, the
operative fact doctrine does not only apply to laws subsequently declared unconstitutional or
unlawful, as it also applies to executive acts subsequently declared as invalid. As We have discussed 4. [Belgica vs. Ochoa, Jr., 710 SCRA 1(2013)]
in Our July 5, 2011 Decision: That the operative fact doctrine squarely applies to executive acts––in Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Actual Case or Controversy; No question involving the
this case, the approval by PARC of the HLI proposal for stock distribution––is well-settled in our constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court
jurisprudence. In Chavez v. National Housing Authority, We held: Petitioner postulates that the unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an
“operative fact” doctrine is inapplicable to the present case because it is an equitable doctrine which actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act
could not be used to countenance an inequitable result that is contrary to its proper office. On the must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of
other hand, the petitioner Solicitor General argues that the existence of the various agreements constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must
implementing the SMDRP is an operative fact that can no longer be disturbed or simply ignored, be the very lis mota of the case.―The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question
citing Rieta v. People of the Philippines. The argument of the Solicitor General is meritorious. The involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by
“operative fact” doctrine is embodied in De Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, wherein it is stated that a the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there
legislative or executive act, prior to its being declared as unconstitutional by the courts, is valid and must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person
must be complied with. challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
Same; Same; The term “executive act” is broad enough to encompass decisions of administrative constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Of these requisites, case law states that the
bodies and agencies under the executive department which are subsequently revoked by the agency first two are the most important and, therefore, shall be discussed forthwith.
in question or nullified by the Court.—For one, neither the De Agbayani case nor the Municipality of
Malabang case elaborates what “executive act” mean. Moreover, while orders, rules and regulations Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is
issued by the President or the executive branch have fixed definitions and meaning in the one which ― involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of
Administrative Code and jurisprudence, the phrase “executive act” does not have such specific judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.―By
definition under existing laws. It should be noted that in the cases cited by the minority, nowhere can constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy. This is
it be found that the term “executive act” is confined to the foregoing. Contrarily, the term “executive embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that “[j]udicial
act” is broad enough to encompass decisions of administrative bodies and agencies under the power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
executive department which are subsequently revoked by the agency in question or nullified by the are legally demandable and enforceable x x x.” Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or
Court. controversy is one which “involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims,
susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or
Same; Operative Fact Doctrine; The operative fact doctrine is not confined to statutes and rules and dispute.” In other words, “[t]here must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and
regulations issued by the executive department that are accorded the same status as that of a statute enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.” Related to the requirement of an actual
or those which are quasi-legislative in nature.—The operative fact doctrine is not confined to statutes case or controversy is the requirement of “ripeness,” meaning that the questions raised for
constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. “A question is ripe for adjudication when the
15
act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a the issue to a coordinate political department,” “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a standards for resolving it” or “the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or kind clearly for non-judicial discretion.” Cast against this light, respondents submit that the “[t]he
threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action.” “Withal, courts will decline to pass political branches are in the best position not only to perform budget-related reforms but also to do
upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve them in response to the specific demands of their constituents” and, as such, “urge [the Court] not to
hypothetical or moot questions.” impose a solution at this stage.”

Same; Same; Pork Barrel System; The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by Same; Same; Same; The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue
the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the ― Pork Barrel System.―The dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the
requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon.―A political question refers to “those
parties on the constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System.” Also, the questions in these consolidated questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity,
cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive
utilization — such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund — are currently existing and operational; particular measure.” The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue
hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the
unconstitutional use of these public funds. Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system
along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are incapable of
Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); Moot and Academic; Neither will rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present
the President’s declaration that he had already ― abolished the Priority Development Assistance Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but essentially
Fund (PDAF) render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cannot be any
has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the clearer: “The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through the passage of a established by law. [It] includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality.―As for the PDAF, the involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.
Differing from this description, the Court observes that respondents’ proposed line-item budgeting Same; Same; Same; When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since assert any superiority over the other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of
said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct the legislature [or the executive], but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by
subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the President’s declaration that he the Constitution.―It must also be borne in mind that “when the judiciary mediates to allocate
had already “abolished the PDAF” render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; does not in
branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature [or the executive], but only asserts the solemn and
constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution.” To a great extent, the Court is laudably
through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality. cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co-equal branches of government. But it is by
constitutional force that the Court must faithfully perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Court’s
Same; Same; Same; The “limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies” avowed intention that a resolution of these cases would not arrest or in any manner impede the
carries the assurance that “the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact, help ensure that the pillars of change are erected
government.”―The “limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies” on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the people that each great branch
carries the assurance that “the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a holistic and genuine
government.” Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political question doctrine solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court cannot heed respondents’ plea
which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186 82, S. Ct. 691, L. Ed. 2d. 663 [1962], for judicial restraint.
applies when there is found, among others, “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of

16
5. [David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160(2006)] committed illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Checks and Balances; Judicial Review; One of the greatest justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues that must be resolved in the present
contributions of the American system to this country is the concept of judicial review enunciated in petitions. It must be stressed that “an unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).—One of the greatest contributions of the American no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative.” The “moot and
system to this country is the concept of judicial review enunciated in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch academic” principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a
137 (1803). This concept rests on the extraordinary simple foundation—The Constitution is the case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
supreme law. It was ordained by the people, the ultimate source of all political authority. It confers Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
limited powers on the national government. x x x If the government consciously or unconsciously involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
oversteps these limitations there must be some authority competent to hold it in control, to thwart guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading
its unconstitutional attempt, and thus to vindicate and preserve inviolate the will of the people as review.
expressed in the Constitution. This power the courts exercise. This is the beginning and the end of the
theory of judicial review. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Locus Standi; Words and Phrases; Locus standi is defined as “a right
of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”—Locus standi is defined as “a right of
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites; The power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing is governed by the
“self-starting capacity.”—The power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a “self- “real-parties-in interest” rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
starting capacity.” Courts may exercise such power only when the following requisites are present: amended. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
first, there must be an actual case or controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a question of party in interest.” Accordingly, the “real-party-in interest” is “the party who stands to be benefited or
constitutionality; third, the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” Succinctly put, the
fourth, the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.
case itself.
; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits, as
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; An actual case or controversy involves a conflict here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as
of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution—it is “definite and concrete, a representative of the general public.—The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public
touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest,” a real and substantial suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does
controversy admitting of specific relief.—An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from
right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is “definite and concrete, touching any other person. He could be suing as a “stranger,” or in the category of a “citizen,” or ‘taxpayer.” In
the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest”; a real and substantial controversy either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words,
admitting of specific relief. The Solicitor General refutes the existence of such actual case or he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief
controversy, contending that the present petitions were rendered “moot and academic” by President as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.
Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021.
; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Taxpayer’s Suits; Citizen’s Suits; The plaintiff in a taxpayer’s suit is
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Moot and Academic Questions; The “moot and academic” principle in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen’s suit—in the former, the plaintiff is affected by
is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case; Courts will the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public
decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution, concern.—Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both “citizen” and “taxpayer” standing in public
second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved, actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in
third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the a taxpayer’s suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen’s suit. In the former, the
bench, the bar, and the public, and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.—A plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere
moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v.
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, Collins: “In matter of mere public right, however . . . the people are the real parties . . . It is at least
courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. The Court holds that the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly
President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic. pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied.” With respect to taxpayer’s suits,
During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners,

17
Terr v. Jordanheld that “the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain and (5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their
the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied.” prerogatives as legislators. Significantly, recent decisions show a certain toughening in the Court’s
attitude toward legal standing.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Direct Injury” Test; To prevent just about any
person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he disagreed with, Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is in the interest of justice that those affected by
and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United States Presidential Proclamation (PP) 1017 can be represented by their Congressmen in bringing to the
Supreme Court laid down the more stringent “direct injury” test, which test has been adopted in this attention of the Court the alleged violations of their basic rights.—In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition
jurisdiction.—To prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy Congressmen alleged there was usurpation of legislative powers. They also raised the issue of
or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to
engaged in public service, the United States Supreme Court laid down the more stringent “direct Martial Law are used. Moreover, it is in the interest of justice that those affected by PP 1017 can be
injury” test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a represented by their Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the Court the alleged violations of
private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative their basic rights.
action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not
sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public. This Court adopted the Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that
“direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937), it held that the person who the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws.—In G.R. No. 171400,
impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that (ALGI), this Court applied the liberality rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994), Kapatiran
he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of Ng Mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, Association of Small Landowners in the
cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers’ Association v. De la Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix. Corporation, 197 SCRA 52 (1991), and Tañada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985), that when the issue
concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of execution of the laws.
locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion, such as in cases of
“transcendental importance,” or where the issues raised have “far-reaching implications.”—Being a
mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the 6. [Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 446 SCRA 299(2004)]
exercise of its discretion. This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan, Same; Same; Same; Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding
84 Phil. 368 (1949), where the “transcendental importance” of the cases prompted the Court to act questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its
liberally. Such liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental. In Aquino v. Comelec, 62 SCRA 275 (1975), legislative power.—Concerns have been raised as to the propriety of a ruling voiding the challenged
this Court resolved to pass upon the issues raised due to the “far-reaching implications” of the provision. It has been proffered that the remedy of petitioner is not with this Court, but with
petition notwithstanding its categorical statement that petitioner therein had no personality to file Congress, which alone has the power to erase any inequity perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653. Indeed, a
the suit. Indeed, there is a chain of cases where this liberal policy has been observed, allowing bill proposing the exemption of the BSP rank- and-file from the SSL has supposedly been filed. Under
ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality,
constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings. recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny
would be based on the “rational basis” test, and the legislative discretion would be given deferential
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites in order that Taxpayers, Voters, Concerned treatment. But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the
Citizens and Legislators may be Accorded Standing to Sue; Recent decisions show a certain perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial
toughening in the Court’s attitude toward legal standing.—By way of summary, the following rules scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down view would call for the abdication of this
may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and Court’s solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines.
legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met: (1) This is true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the
cases involve constitutional issues; (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of
public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (3) for voters, there must be a showing of the character or nature of the actor. [Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs. Bangko Sentral ng
obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; (4) for concerned citizens, there must Pilipinas, 446 SCRA 299(2004)]
be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early;

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Same; Judicial Review; Judicial Legislation; Considering that the record fails to show (1) that the Under our constitutional scheme, the Supreme Court is the ultimate guardian of the Constitution,
statutory provision in question affects either a fundamental right or a suspect class, and, more particularly of the allocation of powers, the guarantee of individual liberties and the assurance of the
importantly, (2) that the classification contained therein was completely bereft of any possible people’s sovereignty. The Court has the distinguished but delicate duty of determining and defining
rational and real basis, it would appear that judicial restraint is not merely preferred but is in fact constitutional meaning, divining constitutional intent and deciding constitutional disputes.
mandatory, lest this Court stray from its function of adjudication and trespass into the realm of Nonetheless, its judicial supremacy is never judicial superiority (for it is co-equal with the other
legislation.—While the main opinion acknowledges the propriety of judicial restraint “under most branches) or judicial tyranny (for it is supposed to be the least dangerous branch). Instead, judicial
circumstances” when deciding questions of constitutionality, in recognition of the “broad discretion supremacy is the conscious and cautious awareness and acceptance of its proper place in the overall
given to Congress in exercising its legislative power,” it nevertheless advocates active intervention scheme of government with the objective of asserting and promoting the supremacy of the
with respect to the exemption of the BSP rank and file employees from the Compensation Constitution. Thus, whenever the Court exercises its function of checking the excesses of any branch
Classification System of the Salary Standardization Law. Considering, however, that the record fails to of government, it is also duty-bound to check itself. Otherwise, who will guard the guardian?
show (1) that the statutory provision in question affects either a fundamental right or a suspect class,
and, more importantly, (2) that the classification contained therein was completely bereft of any Same; Same; Same; Election Law; Election Contests; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
possible rational and real basis, it would appear that judicial restraint is not merely preferred but is in (HRET); So long as the Constitution grants the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) the
fact mandatory, lest this Court stray from its function of adjudication and trespass into the realm of power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
legislation. To be sure, inasmuch as exemption from the Salary Standardization Law requires a members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the House of Representatives
factually grounded policy determination by the legislature that such exemption is necessary and Electoral Tribunal (HRET) on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this
desirable for a government agency or GOCC to accomplish its purpose, the appropriate remedy of Court—the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal excludes the exercise of any authority on the part
petitioner is with Congress and not with the courts. As the branch of government entrusted with the of the Supreme Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same; The
plenary power to make and amend laws, it is well within the powers of Congress to grant exceptions Supreme Court will neither assume a power that belongs exclusively to the House of Representatives
to, or to amend where necessary, the Salary Standardization Law, where the public good so requires. Electoral Tribunal (HRET) nor substitute its own judgment for that of the Tribunal.—The petition has
At the same time, in line with its duty to determine the proper allocation of powers between the no merit. We base our decision not only on the constitutional authority of the HRET as the “sole
several departments, this Court is naturally hesitant to intrude too readily into the domain of another judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications” of its members but also on
co-equal branch of government where the absence of reason and the vice of arbitrariness are not the limitation of the Court’s power of judicial review. The Court itself has delineated the parameters
clearly and unmistakably established. of its power of review in cases involving the HRET—... so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the
power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
Same; Same; Same; For the Supreme Court to intervene now, when no intervention is called for, members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its
would be to prematurely curtail the public debate on the issue of compensation of the employees of jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court …. the power granted to the Electoral
the GOCCs and GFIs, and effectively substitute this Court’s policy judgments for those of the Tribunal x x x excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise
legislature, with whom the “power of the purse” is constitutionally lodged.—Whether any of the restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same. (emphasis supplied) Guided by this basic principle, the
foregoing measures will actually be implemented by the Congress still remains to be seen. However, Court will neither assume a power that belongs exclusively to the HRET nor substitute its own
what is important is that Congress is actively reviewing the policies concerning GOCCs and GFIs with judgment for that of the Tribunal.
respect to the Salary Standardization Law. Hence, for this Court to intervene now, when no
intervention is called for, would be to prematurely curtail the public debate on the issue of Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Due regard and respect for the authority of the House of
compensation of the employees of the GOCCs and GFIs, and effectively substitute this Court’s policy Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) as an independent constitutional body require that any
judgments for those of the legislature, with whom the “power of the purse” is constitutionally finding of grave abuse of discretion against that body should be based on firm and convincing proof,
lodged. Such would not only constitute an improper exercise of the Court’s power of judicial, review, not on shaky assumptions.—Due regard and respect for the authority of the HRET as an independent
but may also effectively stunt the growth and maturity of the nation as a political body as well. constitutional body require that any finding of grave abuse of discretion against that body should be
based on firm and convincing proof, not on shaky assumptions. Any accusation of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the HRET must be established by a clear showing of arbitrariness and
7. [Dueñas, Jr. vs. House of Representatives Electorial Tribunal, 593 SCRA 316(2009)] improvidence. But the Court finds no evidence of such grave abuse of discretion by the HRET.
Courts; Supreme Court; Judicial Review; Judicial Restraint; Whenever the Supreme Court exercises its
function of checking the excesses of any branch of government, it is also duty-bound to check itself.—
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8. [Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 514(1998)] that the judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to the Executive. The
Courts; Administrative Law; Judicial Review; Social Justice; This is one instance when, pursuant to particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the judgment and writ of
prudence and judicial restraint, a tribunal’s zeal in bestowing compassion should have yielded to the execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while the executive
precept in administrative law that in absence of grave abuse of discretion, courts are loathe to has no power over the person of the convict except to provide for carrying out of the penalty and to
interfere with and should respect the findings of quasi-judicial agencies in fields where they are pardon. Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of
deemed and held to be experts due to their special technical knowledge and training.—All told, what a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be
the Court of Appeals should have done here was to respect the findings of the ECC on the technical requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that notwithstanding
matter concerning the nature of the deceased’s illness, Hepatitis B. As likewise quoted above, plainly, the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the
the ECC’s rejection of private respondent’s claim was not unfounded, in fact, the ECC even took the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law this
pains to quote from a medical manual in order to substantiate its holding. This is one instance when, postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) by command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio)
pursuant to prudence and judicial restraint, a tribunal’s zeal in bestowing compassion should have of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law.
yielded to the precept in administrative law that in absence of grave abuse of discretion, courts are
loathe to interfere with and should respect the findings of quasi-judicial agencies in fields where they Same; Same; Same; Same; The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of
are deemed and held to be experts due to their special technical knowledge and training. jurisdiction—supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to
intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness.—The power to control the
execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial
9. [Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice, 301 SCRA 96(1999)] subtraction for our Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such
Courts; Judgments; The rule on finality of judgment cannot divest the Supreme Court of its lower courts as may be established by law. To be sure, the most important part of a litigation,
jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment—the finality of a judgment does not mean whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may
that the Court has lost all its powers over the case.—Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the
General, the rule on finality of judgment cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforseen, supervening contingencies that
enforce the same judgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the well established courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders
jurisprudence on this issue as follows: x x x “the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court to make them conformable to law and justice.
has lost all its powers over the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its
jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final the court Same; Same; Same; Same; What the Supreme Court temporarily restrained is the execution of its own
retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the Decision to give it reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as
court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former alleged by petitioner—it did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by Congress.—Section 6 of
continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the Rule 135 provides that “when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary
latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. x x x For after the judgment has become final writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or
facts and circumstances may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible. officer and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically
pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted
Same; Same; Criminal Law; Death Penalty; Notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules.” It bears repeating that what the Court
nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it reasonable time to check its
sentences of death.—In truth, the argument of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to
Court. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, as early as 1915, this Court has unequivocably ruled in popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by Congress.
the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge of First Instance, viz.: “This Supreme Court has repeatedly
declared in various decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, Same; Same; Rule-Making Powers; Pleadings and Practice; It should be stressed that the power to
after the sentence has been pronounced and the period for reopening the same has elapsed, the promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted by the Constitution to the
court cannot change or alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated . . . When in cases of Supreme Court to enhance its independence.—The more disquieting dimension of the submission of
appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment the public respondents that this Court has no jurisdiction to restrain the execution of petitioner is
has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not follow that it can diminish the independence of the judiciary. Since the implant of republicanism in our soil,
from this cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause our courts have been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce their final decisions. In accord with this

20
unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court promulgated rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure
which, among others, spelled out the rules on execution of judgments. These rules are all predicated
on the assumption that courts have the inherent, necessary and incidental power to control and
supervise the process of execution of their decisions. Rule 39 governs execution, satisfaction and
effects of judgments in civil cases. Rule 120 governs judgments in criminal cases. It should be stressed
that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted by our
Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz
“without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the
maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; The 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.—The rule making power of this Court
was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the
power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most
importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. If
the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, it is
inutile to urge, as public respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the process of
execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has exercised since time immemorial.

10.

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