1.

G.R. No. L-68635 May 14, 1987

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO LAURETA, AND
OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE in G.R. No. 68635, entitled "EVA
MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL."

Digest:

Facts: Eva Maravilla-Ilustre sent letters to Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and
Florentino P. Feliciano, all members of the First Division. Ilustre using contemptuous language claimed that members of
the court rendered unjust decision on the case GR 68635: Eva Maravilla Ilustre vs. Intermediate Appellate Court. Ilustre
claimed that the Court acted unjustly when Justice Pedro Yap failed to inhibit himself from participating when in fact he is
a law-partner of the defense counsel Atty Sedfrey Ordonez. On 27 October 1986, the Court en banc reviewed the history
of the case and found no reason to take action, stating that Justice Yap inhibited himself from the case and was only
designated as Chairman of First Division on 14 July 1986 after the resolution of dismissal was issued on 14 May 1986.
Petitioner again addressed letters to Justices Narvasa, Herrera and Cruz with a warning of exposing the case to another
forum of justice, to which she made true by filing an Affidavit-Complaint to Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) on 16 Decemeber
1986. Atty. Laureta himself reportedly circulated copies of the Complaint to the press. Tanodbayan dismissed petitioner’s
Complaint
Issue:
Decision: Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in contempt and Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is found guilty of grave
professional misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law until further Orders.
Resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or division, speak for themselves and are
entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or inquiry under the same principle of conclusiveness of
enrolled bills of the legislature. The supremacy of the Supreme Court’s judicial power is a restatement of the fundamental
principle of separation of powers and checks and balances under a republican form of government such that the three co-
equal branches of government are each supreme and independent within the limits of its own sphere. Neither one can
interfere with the performance of the duties of the other.

2.

G.R. No. 155282 January 17, 2005

MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD (MTRCB), petitioner,

vs.
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION and LOREN LEGARDA, respondents.

Digest

Facts:
Respondent abs-cbn aired “Prosti-tuition”, an episode of the TV program “The Inside Story” produced and hosted
by respondent Legarda. It depicted female students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees.
PWU was named as the school of some of the students involved and the façade of the PWU building served as the
background of the episode. This caused upsoar in the PWU community and they filed a letter-complaint to the MTRCB.
MTRCB alleged that respondents
1) Did not submit “the inside story” to petitioner for review
 2) Exhibited the same without its permission, thus violating sec 7 of PD 1986 and some sections of MTRCB rules
and regulations
ABS-CBN averred:
1) The Inside Story is a public affairs program, news documentary and socio-political editorial, its airing is
protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press
2) Petitioners has no power, authority and jurisdiction to impose any form of prior restraint upon respondents.
After hearing and submission of the parties’ memoranda, MTRCB investigating committee ordered the
respondents to pay P20,000 for non-submission of the program
MTRCB affirmed the ruling
Respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari with RTC QC. RTC rendered a decision in favor of
respondents, annulling and setting aside the decision and resolution of the MTRCB and declaring and decreeing that
certain sections of PD 1986 & MTRCB do not cover the TV program “Inside Story”, they being a public affairs programs
which can be equated to a newspaper

Issue: Whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the “Inside Story” prior its exhibition or broadcast by TV.

Held:
Sec 3 of PD 1986 enumerates the powers, functions and duties of the board:
Xxx
b) to screen, review and examine all motion pictures herein defined, TV programs, including publicity materials
The court in INC v. CA rules that PD 1986 gives MTRCB the power to screen, review and examine ALL TV
PROGRAMS
*LESSON* where the law does not make any exceptions, courts may not exempt something therefrom, unless
there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it.
Thus, when the law says “all TV programs”, the word all covers all tv programs whether religious, public affairs,
news docu, etc
It then follows that since the Inside Story is a TV Program, MTRCB has the power to review it
The only exemptions from the MTRCB’s power to review are those mentioned in Sec 7 of PD 1986
1) TV programs imprinted or exhibited by Phil govt and/or departments and agencies
2) Newsreels
In a desperate attempt to be exempted, respondents content that Inside Story falls under the category of
newsreels.
MTRCB rules and reg defines newsreels as “straight news reporting, as distinguished from analyses,
commentaries, and opinions. Talk shows on a given issue are not considered newsreels.
Clearly, Inside Story is not a newsreel but more of a public affairs program and within petitioner’s power of review.
Issue related to Consti law:
Petitioner’s power to review television programs under Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986 does not amount to “prior
restraint.”
Ratio:
It is significant to note that in Iglesia ni Cristo, this Court declared that freedom of religion has been accorded a
preferred status by the framers of our fundamental laws, past and present, “designed to protect the broadest possible
liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs x x x.” Yet despite the fact that freedom of
religion has been accorded a preferred status, still this Court, did not exempt the Iglesia ni Cristo’s religious program from
petitioner’s review power.
Respondents claim that the showing of “The Inside Story” is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom
of speech and of the press. However, there has been no declaration at all by the framers of the Constitution that freedom
of expression and of the press has a preferred status.
If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo, did not exempt religious programs from the jurisdiction and review power of petitioner
MTRCB, with more reason, there is no justification to exempt therefrom “The Inside Story” which, according to
respondents, is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press, a freedom bearing no
preferred status.
The only exceptions from the MTRCB’s power of review are those expressly mentioned in Section 7 of P. D. No. 1986,
such as (1) television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and agencies,
and (2) newsreels.
 3.

U.S. Supreme Court

Grosjean v. American Press Co., Inc., 297 U.S. 233 (1936)
Grosjean v. American Press Co., Inc.
No. 303
Argued January 14, 1936
Decided February 10, 1936.

297 U.S. 233

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

Syllabus

1. As respects the amount in controversy, the District Court has jurisdiction of a suit where the requisite value is involved
as to each of several plaintiffs though not involved as to others. P. 297 U. S. 241.

2. A motion to dismiss the whole case because the amount in controversy as to some of the plaintiffs is too small should
be overruled. Id.

3. There is equitable jurisdiction to enjoin collection of an allegedly unconstitutional state tax where the taxpayer, if he
pays, is afforded no clear remedy of restitution. P. 297 U. S. 242.

4. Liberty of the press is a fundamental right protected against state aggression by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. P. 297 U. S. 242.

5. The fact that, as regards the Federal Government, the protection of this right is not left to the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment, but is guaranteed in specie by the First Amendment, is not a sufficient reason for excluding it from the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 297 U. S. 243.

6. A corporation is a "person" within the meaning of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. P. 297 U. S. 244.

7. A State license tax (La.Act No. 23, July 12, 1934) imposed on the owners of newspapers for the privilege of selling or
charging for the advertising therein, and measured by a percent. of the gross receipts from such advertisements, but
applicable only to newspapers enjoying a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week, held unconstitutional. P. 297 U.
S. 244.

8. From the history of the subject, it is plain that the English rule restricting freedom of the press to immunity from
censorship before publication was not accepted by the American colonists, and that the First Amendment was aimed at
any form of previous restraint upon printed publications or their circulation, including restraint by taxation of newspapers
and their advertising, which were well known and odious methods still used in England when the First Amendment was
adopted. P. 297 U. S. 245.

Page 297 U. S. 234

9. The predominant purpose of the grant of immunity was to preserve an untrammeled press as a vital source of public
information. P. 297 U. S. 250.

10. Construction of a constitutional provision phrased in terms of the common law is not determined by rules of the
common law which had been rejected in this country as unsuited to local civil or political conditions. P. 297 U. S. 248.

It is not intended in this case to suggest that the owners of newspapers are immune from any of the ordinary forms of
taxation for support of Government. The tax in question is not an ordinary form of tax, but one single in kind, with a long
history of hostile misuse against the freedom of the press. The manner of its use in this case is, in itself, suspicious; it is
not measured or limited by the volume of advertisements, but by the extent of the circulation of the publication in which
the advertisements are carried, with the plain purpose of penalizing the publishers and curtailing the circulation of a
selected group of newspapers.

10 F.Supp. 161, affirmed.

APPEAL from a decree permanently enjoining the enforcement of a state tax on newspapers.

Page 297 U. S. 240

MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.

This suit was brought by appellees, nine publishers of newspapers in the State of Louisiana, to enjoin the enforcement
against them of the provisions of § 1 of the act of the legislature of Louisiana known as Act No. 23, passed and approved
July 12, 1934, as follows:

"That every person, firm, association, or corporation, domestic or foreign, engaged in the business of selling, or making
any charge for, advertising or for advertisements, whether printed or published, or to be printed or published, in any
newspaper, magazine, periodical or publication whatever having a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week, or
displayed and exhibited, or to be displayed and exhibited by means of moving pictures, in the State of Louisiana, shall, in
addition to all other taxes and licenses levied and assessed in this State, pay a license tax for the privilege of engaging in
such business in this State of two percent. (2%) of the gross receipts of such business."

The nine publishers who brought the suit publish thirteen newspapers, and these thirteen publications are the

Page 297 U. S. 241

only ones within the State of Louisiana having each a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week, although the lower
court finds there are four other daily newspapers each having a circulation of "slightly less than 20,000 copies per week"
which are in competition with those published by appellees both as to circulation and as to advertising. In addition, there
are 120 weekly newspapers published in the state, also in competition, to a greater or less degree, with the newspapers
of appellees. The revenue derived from appellees' newspapers comes almost entirely from regular subscribers or
purchasers thereof and from payments received for the insertion of advertisements therein.

The act requires everyone subject to the tax to file a sworn report every three months showing the amount and the gross
receipts from the business described in § 1. The resulting tax must be paid when the report is filed. Failure to file the
report or pay the tax as thus provided constitutes a misdemeanor and subjects the offender to a fine not exceeding $500,
or imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both, for each violation. Any corporation violating the act subjects itself to
the payment of $50 to be recovered by suit. All of the appellees are corporations. The lower court entered a decree for
appellees and granted a permanent injunction. 10 F.Supp. 161.

First. Appellant assails the federal jurisdiction of the court below on the ground that the matter in controversy does not
exceed the sum or value of $3,000, as required by par. 1 of § 24 of the Judicial Code. The case arises under the Federal
Constitution, and the bill alleges, and the record shows, that the requisite amount is involved in respect of each of six of
the nine appellees. This is enough to sustain the jurisdiction of the district court. The motion was to dismiss the bill -- that
is to say, the bill in its entirety -- and in that form it was properly denied. No motion to dismiss was made or considered

Page 297 U. S. 242

by the lower court as to the three appellees in respect of whom the Jurisdictional amount was insufficient, and that
question, therefore, is not before us. The Rio Grande, 19 Wall. 178, 86 U. S. 189; Gibson v. Shufelt, 122 U. S. 27,122 U.
S. 32.

Second. The objection also is made that the bill does not make a case for equitable relief. But the objection is clearly
without merit. As pointed out in Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U. S. 813, 279 U. S. 815, the laws of Louisiana afford no
remedy whereby restitution of taxes and property exacted may be enforced, even where payment has been made under
both protest and compulsion. It is true that the present act contains a provision (§ 5) to the effect that, where it is
established to the satisfaction of the Supervisor of Public Accounts of the state that any payment has been made under
the act which was "not due and collectible," the Supervisor is authorized to refund the amount out of any funds on hand
collected by virtue of the act and not remitted to the state treasurer according to law. It seems clear that this refers only to
a payment not due and collectible within the terms of the act, and does not authorize a refund on the ground that the act is
invalid. Moreover, the act allows the Supervisor to make remittances immediately to the state treasurer of taxes paid
under the act, and requires him to do so not later than the 30th day after the last day of the preceding quarter, in which
event the right to a refund, if not sooner exercised, would be lost. Whether an aggrieved taxpayer may obtain relief under
§ 5 is, at best, a matter of speculation. In no view can it properly be said that there exists a plain, adequate and complete
remedy at law.Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U. S. 680, 156 U. S. 688; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Weld County, 247 U. S. 282, 247 U.
S. 285.

Third. The validity of the act is assailed as violating the Federal Constitution in two particulars -- (1) that it abridges the
freedom of the press in contravention of the due process clause contained in § 1 of the Fourteenth

Page 297 U. S. 243

Amendment; (2) that it denies appellees the equal protection of the laws in contravention of the same Amendment.

1. The first point presents a question of the utmost gravity and importance, for, if well made, it goes to the heart of the
natural right of the members of an organized society, united for their common good, to impart and acquire information
about their common interests. The First Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. . . ." While this provision is not a restraint upon the powers of the
states, the states are precluded from abridging the freedom of speech or of the press by force of the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In the case of Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, this Court held that the term "due process of law" does not require
presentment or indictment by a grand jury as a prerequisite to prosecution by a state for a criminal offense. And the
important point of that conclusion here is that it was deduced from the fact that the Fifth Amendment, which contains the
due process of law clause in its national aspect, also required an indictment as a prerequisite to a prosecution for crime
under federal law, and it was thought that, since no part of the amendment could be regarded as superfluous, the term
"due process of law" did not, ex vi termini, include presentment or indictment by a grand jury in any case, and that the due
process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should be interpreted as having been used in the same sense, and
as having no greater extent. But in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 287 U. S. 65, 287 U. S. 68, we held that, in the light
of subsequent decisions, the sweeping language of the Hurtado case could not be accepted without qualification. We
concluded that certain fundamental rights, safeguarded by the first eight amendments against federal action, were also
safeguarded

Page 297 U. S. 244

against state action by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and among them, the fundamental
right of the accused to the aid of counsel in a criminal prosecution.

That freedom of speech and of the press are rights of the same fundamental character, safeguarded by the due process
of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by state legislation, has likewise been settled by a series
of decisions of this Court beginning with Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 268 U. S. 666, and ending with Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 283 U. S. 707. The word "liberty" contained in that amendment embraces not only the right of a
person to be free from physical restraint, but the right to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties as well. Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 165 U. S. 589.

Appellant contends that the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to corporations; but this is only partly true. A
corporation, we have held, is not a "citizen" within the meaning of the privileges and immunities clause. Paul v. Virginia, 8
Wall. 168. But a corporation is a "person" within the meaning of the equal protection and due process of law clauses,
which are the clauses involved here. Covington & Lexington Turnpike Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 164 U. S.
592; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 169 U. S. 522.

The tax imposed is designated a "license tax for the privilege of engaging in such business" -- that is to say, the business
of selling, or making any charge for, advertising. As applied to appellees, it is a tax of two percent. on the gross receipts
derived from advertisements carried in their newspapers when, and only when, the newspapers of each enjoy a
circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week. It thus operates as a restraint in a double sense. First, its effect is to
curtail the amount of revenue realized from advertising, and, second, its direct

Page 297 U. S. 245

tendency is to restrict circulation. This is plain enough when we consider that, if it were increased to a high degree, as it
could be if valid (Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40, 292 U. S. 45, and cases cited), it well might result in destroying
both advertising and circulation.

A determination of the question whether the tax is valid in respect of the point now under review requires an examination
of the history and circumstances which antedated and attended the adoption of the abridgement clause of the First
Amendment, since that clause expresses one of those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base
of all our civil and political institutions" (Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 272 U. S. 316), and, as such, is embodied in
the concept "due process of law" (Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 211 U. S. 99), and, therefore, protected against
hostile state invasion by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Powell v. Alabama, supra, pp. 287 U.
S. 67-68. The history is a long one, but, for present purposes, it may be greatly abbreviated.

For more than a century prior to the adoption of the amendment -- and, indeed, for many years thereafter -- history
discloses a persistent effort on the part of the British government to prevent or abridge the free expression of any opinion
which seemed to criticize or exhibit in an unfavorable light, however truly, the agencies and operations of the government.
The struggle between the proponents of measures to that end and those who asserted the right of free expression was
continuous and unceasing. As early as 1644, John Milton, in an "Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing," assailed
an act of Parliament which had just been passed providing for censorship of the press previous to publication. He
vigorously defended the right of every man to make public his honest views "without previous censure", and declared the
impossibility of finding any man base enough to accept

Page 297 U. S. 246

the office of censor and at the same time good enough to be allowed to perform its duties. Collett, History of the Taxes on
Knowledge, vol. I, pp. 6. The act expired by its own terms in 1695. It was never renewed, and the liberty of the press thus
became, as pointed out by Wickwar (The Struggle for the Freedom of the Press, p. 15), merely "a right or liberty to
publish without a license what formerly could be published only with one." But mere exemption from previous censorship
was soon recognized as too narrow a view of the liberty of the press.

In 1712, in response to a message from Queen Anne (Hansard's Parliamentary History of England, vol. 6, p. 1063),
Parliament imposed a tax upon all newspapers and upon advertisements. Collett, vol. I, pp. 8-10. That the main purpose
of these taxes was to suppress the publication of comments and criticisms objectionable to the Crown does not admit of
doubt. Stewart, Lennox and the Taxes on Knowledge, 15 Scottish Historical Review, 322-327. There followed more than a
century of resistance to, and evasion of, the taxes, and of agitation for their repeal. In the article last referred to (p. 326),
which was written in 1918, it was pointed out that these taxes constituted one of the factors that aroused the American
colonists to protest against taxation for the purposes of the home government, and that the revolution really began when,
in 1765, that government sent stamps for newspaper duties to the American colonies.

These duties were quite commonly characterized as "taxes on knowledge," a phrase used for the purpose of describing
the effect of the exactions and at the same time condemning them. That the taxes had, and were intended to have, the
effect of curtailing the circulation of newspapers, and particularly the cheaper ones whose readers were generally found
among the masses of the people, went almost without question, even on the part of

Page 297 U. S. 247

those who defended the act. May (Constitutional History of England, 7th ed., vol. 2, p. 245), after discussing the control by
"previous censure," says:

". . . a new restraint was devised in the form of a stamp duty on newspapers and advertisements -- avowedly for the
purpose of repressing libels. This policy, being found effectual in limiting the circulation of cheap papers, was improved
upon in the two following reigns, and continued in high esteem until our own time."

Collett (vol. I, p. 14), says,

"Any man who carried on printing or publishing for a livelihood was actually at the mercy of the Commissioners of Stamps,
when they chose to exert their powers."

Citations of similar import might be multiplied many times, but the foregoing is enough to demonstrate beyond
peradventure that, in the adoption of the English newspaper stamp tax and the tax on advertisements, revenue was of
subordinate concern, and that the dominant and controlling aim was to prevent, or curtail the opportunity for, the
acquisition of knowledge by the people in respect of their governmental affairs. It is idle to suppose that so many of the
best men of England would for a century of time have waged, as they did, stubborn and often precarious warfare against
these taxes if a mere matter of taxation had been involved. The aim of the struggle was not to relieve taxpayers from a
burden, but to establish and preserve the right of the English people to full information in respect of the doings or
misdoings of their government. Upon the correctness of this conclusion the very characterization of the exactions as
"taxes on knowledge" sheds a flood of corroborative light. In the ultimate, an informed and enlightened public opinion was
the thing at stake, for, as Erskine, in his great speech in defense of Paine, has said, "The liberty of opinion keeps
governments themselves in due subjection to their

Page 297 U. S. 248

duties." Erskine's Speeches, High's ed. vol. I, p. 525. See May's Constitutional History of England, 7th ed., vol. 2, pp. 238-
245.

In 1785, only four years before Congress had proposed the First Amendment, the Massachusetts legislature, following the
English example, imposed a stamp tax on all newspapers and magazines. The following year, an advertisement tax was
imposed. Both taxes met with such violent opposition that the former was repealed in 1786, and the latter in 1788.
Duniway, Freedom of the Press in Massachusetts, pp. 136-137.

The framers of the First Amendment were familiar with the English struggle, which then had continued for nearly eighty
years and was destined to go on for another sixty-five years, at the end of which time it culminated in a lasting
abandonment of the obnoxious taxes. The framers were likewise familiar with the then recent Massachusetts episode, and
while that occurrence did much to bring about the adoption of the amendment (seePennsylvania and the Federal
Constitution, 1888, p. 181), the predominant influence must have come from the English experience. It is impossible to
concede that, by the words "freedom of the press," the framers of the amendment intended to adopt merely the narrow
view then reflected by the law of England that such freedom consisted only in immunity from previous censorship, for this
abuse had then permanently disappeared from English practice. It is equally impossible to believe that it was not intended
to bring within the reach of these words such modes of restraint as were embodied in the two forms of taxation already
described. Such belief must be rejected in the face of the then well known purpose of the exactions and the general
adverse sentiment of the colonies in respect of them. Undoubtedly, the range of a constitutional provision phrased in
terms of the common law sometimes may be fixed by recourse to the applicable rules of that

Page 297 U. S. 249

law. But the doctrine which justifies such recourse, like other canons of construction, must yield to more compelling
reasons whenever they exist. Cf. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 294 U. S. 648,294 U. S. 668-
669. And, obviously, it is subject to the qualification that the common law rule invoked shall be one not rejected by our
ancestors as unsuited to their civil or political conditions. Murray's lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How.
272, 59 U. S. 276-277; Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 441, 46 U. S. 454-457; Powell v. Alabama, supra, pp. 287 U. S. 60-65.

In the light of all that has now been said, it is evident that the restricted rules of the English law in respect of the freedom
of the press in force when the Constitution was adopted were never accepted by the American colonists, and that, by the
First Amendment, it was meant to preclude the national government, and, by the Fourteenth Amendment, to preclude the
states, from adopting any form of previous restraint upon printed publications, or their circulation, including that which had
theretofore been effected by these two well known and odious methods.

This court had occasion in Near v. Minnesota, supra at pp. 283 U. S. 713 et seq., to discuss at some length the subject in
its general aspect. The conclusion there stated is that the object of the constitutional provisions was to prevent previous
restraints on publication, and the court was careful not to limit the protection of the right to any particular way of abridging
it. Liberty of the press within the meaning of the constitutional provision, it was broadly said (p. 283 U. S. 716), meant
"principally, although not exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or [from] censorship."

Judge Cooley has laid down the test to be applied --

"The evils to be prevented were not the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government by

Page 297 U. S. 250

means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to
prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens."
2 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., p. 886.

It is not intended by anything we have said to suggest that the owners of newspapers are immune from any of the
ordinary forms of taxation for support of the government. But this is not an ordinary form of tax, but one single in kind, with
a long history of hostile misuse against the freedom of the press.

The predominant purpose of the grant of immunity here invoked was to preserve an untrammeled press as a vital source
of public information. The newspapers, magazines and other journals of the country, it is safe to say, have shed and
continue to shed, more light on the public and business affairs of the nation than any other instrumentality of publicity, and,
since informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or abridgement of
the publicity afforded by a free press cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave concern. The tax here involved is bad
not because it takes money from the pockets of the appellees. If that were all, a wholly different question would be
presented. It is bad because, in the light of its history and of its present setting, it is seen to be a deliberate and calculated
device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional
guaranties. A free press stands as one of the great interpreters between the government and the people. To allow it to be
fettered is to fetter ourselves.

In view of the persistent search for new subjects of taxation, it is not without significance that, with the single exception of
the Louisiana statute, so far as we can discover, no state during the one hundred fifty years of our

Page 297 U. S. 251

national existence has undertaken to impose tax like that now in question.

The form in which the tax is imposed is, in itself, suspicious. It is not measured or limited by the volume of advertisements.
It is measured alone by the extent of the circulation of the publication in which the advertisements are carried, with the
plain purpose of penalizing the publishers and curtailing the circulation of a selected group of newspapers.

2. Having reached the conclusion that the act imposing the tax in question is unconstitutional under the due process of
law clause because it abridges the freedom of the press, we deem it unnecessary to consider the further ground assigned
that it also constitutes a denial of the equal protection of the laws.

Decree affirmed.

Grosjean v. American Press Co., Inc., 297 U.S. 233 (1936)

Syllabus

1. As respects the amount in controversy, the District Court has jurisdiction of a suit where the requisite value is involved
as to each of several plaintiffs though not involved as to others. P. 297 U. S. 241.

2. A motion to dismiss the whole case because the amount in controversy as to some of the plaintiffs is too small should
be overruled. Id.

3. There is equitable jurisdiction to enjoin collection of an allegedly unconstitutional state tax where the taxpayer, if he
pays, is afforded no clear remedy of restitution. P. 297 U. S. 242.

4. Liberty of the press is a fundamental right protected against state aggression by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. P. 297 U. S. 242.

5. The fact that, as regards the Federal Government, the protection of this right is not left to the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment, but is guaranteed in specie by the First Amendment, is not a sufficient reason for excluding it from the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 297 U. S. 243.

6. A corporation is a "person" within the meaning of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. P. 297 U. S. 244.
7. A State license tax (La.Act No. 23, July 12, 1934) imposed on the owners of newspapers for the privilege of selling or
charging for the advertising therein, and measured by a percent. of the gross receipts from such advertisements, but
applicable only to newspapers enjoying a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week, held unconstitutional. P. 297 U.
S. 244.

8. From the history of the subject, it is plain that the English rule restricting freedom of the press to immunity from
censorship before publication was not accepted by the American colonists, and that the First Amendment was aimed at
any form of previous restraint upon printed publications or their circulation, including restraint by taxation of newspapers
and their advertising, which were well known and odious methods still used in England when the First Amendment was
adopted. P. 297 U. S. 245.

Page 297 U. S. 234

9. The predominant purpose of the grant of immunity was to preserve an untrammeled press as a vital source of public
information. P. 297 U. S. 250.

10. Construction of a constitutional provision phrased in terms of the common law is not determined by rules of the
common law which had been rejected in this country as unsuited to local civil or political conditions. P. 297 U. S. 248.

It is not intended in this case to suggest that the owners of newspapers are immune from any of the ordinary forms of
taxation for support of Government. The tax in question is not an ordinary form of tax, but one single in kind, with a long
history of hostile misuse against the freedom of the press. The manner of its use in this case is, in itself, suspicious; it is
not measured or limited by the volume of advertisements, but by the extent of the circulation of the publication in which
the advertisements are carried, with the plain purpose of penalizing the publishers and curtailing the circulation of a
selected group of newspapers.

10 F.Supp. 161, affirmed.

APPEAL from a decree permanently enjoining the enforcement of a state tax on newspapers.

4.

G.R. No. 119673 July 26, 1996

IGLESIA NI CRISTO, (INC.), petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOVING PICTURES AND TELEVISION and
HONORABLE HENRIETTA S. MENDOZA, respondents.

Digest:

Facts: Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on
Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices
often times in comparative studies with other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving
Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the
series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions
which is expressly prohibited by law." On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the Office of the President the classification
of its TV Series No. 128 which allowed it through a letter of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr.,
addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the decision of the respondent Board. According to the letter the episode in
is protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression and no indication that the episode poses any
clear and present danger. Petitioner also filed Civil Case. Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-
rating them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their Answer, respondent Board invoked its
power under PD No. 19861 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal
translation of the bible and says that our (Catholic) veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere
it is found in the bible. The board contended that it outrages Catholic and Protestant's beliefs. RTC ruled in favor of
petitioners. CA however reversed it hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or Not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is not constitutionally protected as a form of religious exercise
and expression.

Held: Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. It is the burden of the respondent
Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. This is
true in this case. So-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions.
RTC’s ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion.
“attack” is different from “offend” any race or religion. The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other
religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our
constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another
religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the
fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Respondent
board cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion
happens to be the most numerous church in our country. The basis of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is
best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be
justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of
harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech,
including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent
evil. It is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar because the issue involves the content
of speech and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be
measured, and the causal connection between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be established. The
determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside
the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be arrogated by an administrative
body such as a Board of Censors." A system of prior restraint may only be validly administered by judges and not left to
administrative agencies.

5.

G.R. No. L-1800 January 27, 1948

CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, General Campaign Manager of Coalesced Minority Parties, petitioner,

vs.
VALERIANO E. FUGOSO, Mayor of City of Manila, respondent.

Digest
Facts

In November 1947, the mayor of Manila refused to grant a permit to hold a public meeting at Plaza Miranda for the
purpose of petitioning the government for redress of grievances. The mayor’s reason: "that there is a reasonable ground
to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups,
remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the
people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a
disruption of public order." A Manila ordinance at that time required a mayor’s permit to hold a parade or procession, or, by
analogy, a public meeting or assembly. Primicias filed a case to compel the mayor to grant the permit.

Issue

May the mayor be compelled to grant the permit?

Ruling

Yes. The Supreme Court ordered the mayor to grant the permit, interpreting the ordinance to mean that the Mayor did not
have the power to grant or refuse the permit, only the discretion to specify where the parade may pass or where the
meeting may be held. The Court said that the constitutional right to free speech and peaceful assembly was a
fundamental right of the people and may not be suppressed unless there was the probability of serious injury to the state,
and quoted US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Whitney vs. California: "Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify
suppression of free speech and assembly.”

Primicias vs. Fugoso [L-18000. Jan 27, 1948] Doctrine: Clear and Present Danger Test, Freedom of Assembly and
Expression

FACTS: This case is an action of mandamus instituted by petitioner Cipriano Primicias, manager of the Coalesced
Minority Parties, against respondent Manila City Mayor, Valeriano Fugoso, to compel the latter to issue a permit for the
holding of a public meeting at the Plaza Miranda on Nov 16, 1947. The petitioner requested for a permit to hold a
“peaceful public meeting”. However, the respondent refused to issue such permit because he found “that there is a
reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of
the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and
confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly peace and a disruption of public order.” Respondent based
his refusal to the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and penalizes as a
misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect
with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any
lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor has the right to refuse to issue permit hence violating freedom of assembly.

HELD: The answer is negative. Supreme Court states that the freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and
guaranteed by the constitution. However, these rights are not absolute. They can be regulated under the state’s police
power – that they should not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor to the rights of the
community or society. The Court holds that there can be 2 interpretations of Sec. 1119: 1) the Mayor of the City of Manila
is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting,
parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; and 2) The right of the Mayor is subject
to reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used with the view to prevent confusion
by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper
policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court favored the second construction since the first construction is
tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of government no
such unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of national
emergency. It is to be noted that the permit to be issued is for the use of public places and not for the assembly itself. The
Court holds that the assembly is lawful and thus cannot be struck down. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify
suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To
justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is
practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be
reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one . The fact that speech is likely to result in some
violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious
injury to the state. PETITION IS GRANTED.
 6.

G.R. No. 103956 March 31, 1992

BLO UMPAR ADIONG, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Digest:

Facts: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 which provides that decals and stickers may be posted only in any of
the authorized posting areas, prohibiting posting in "mobile" places, public or private. Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a
senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 electionsnow assails the Resolution. In addition, the petitioner believes that with
the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer
grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition.

Issue: Whether or Not the COMELEC’s prohibition unconstitutional.

Held: The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech. The preferred freedom of
expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to
make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. The so-called balancing of interests — individual freedom on one
hand and substantial public interests on the other — is made even more difficult in election campaign cases because the
Constitution also gives specific authority to the Commission on Elections to supervise the conduct of free, honest, and
orderly elections. When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to
know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the
police, local officials and COMELEC, should lean in favor of freedom. The regulation of election campaign activity may not
pass the test of validity if it is too general in its terms or not limited in time and scope in its application, if it restricts one's
expression of belief in a candidate or one's opinion of his or herqualifications, if it cuts off the flow of media reporting, and
if the regulatory measure bears no clear and reasonable nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned objective.

The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial
government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the
cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger
be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp
over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his
preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate
but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner,
primarily his own and not of anybody else. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so
broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In
consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article
III of the Bill of Rightsprovides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.

The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in the authorized
areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship.

7.

Abelardo Subido vs. Roman Ozaeta and Mariano Villanueva

Categories: Information Disclosure
This case, decided before the right to information was included in the Bill of Rights of the Philippine Constitution,
involved a request by the editor of the Manila Post, a morning daily, for the Register of Deeds of Manila to furnish him a
list of real estates sold to aliens and registered with said Register of Deeds, but which request was denied.
(ABELARDO SUBIDO, Editor, The Manila Post, petitioner, vs. ROMAN OZAETA, Secretary of Justice, and MARIANO
VILLANUEVA, Register of Deeds of City of Manila, respondents. G.R. No. L-1631. February 27, 1948.)

This case, decided before the right to information was included in the Bill of Rights of the Philippine Constitution,
involved a request by the editor of the Manila Post, a morning daily, for the Register of Deeds of Manila to furnish him a
list of real estates sold to aliens and registered with said Register of Deeds, but which request was denied. In resolving
the petition for mandamus, the Court based its ruling on its interpretation of a statutory regulation which provides that "All
records relating to registered lands in the office of the Register of Deeds shall be open to the public subject to such
reasonable regulations as may be prescribed by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office…" The Court said that
the power to make regulations does not carry with it the power to prohibit. The regulations which the Register of Deeds is
empowered to promulgate are confined to prescribing the manner and hours of examination to the end that damage to, or
loss of, the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the books and documents
and other employees may be prevented, that the right of other persons entitled to make inspection may be insured, and
the like.

8.

Senate vs. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 169777* April 20, 2006

In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This
prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in
the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak
before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the
said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter.
Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already
made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the
department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the
judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be
determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the
president’s approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except
themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying
President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig.
Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings.
EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct
investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC
sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress’ power of inquiry is
expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution
expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it
may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as
to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary
to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting
the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess
the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative
power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members
of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of
legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of
legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the
House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was
meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22,
therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same
power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to
elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the
objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to
compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the
principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by
refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact
that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom
executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based
on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of
government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under
Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of
the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot,
however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such
instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is
subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has
issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such
department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping
with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in
which Congress requires their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the
same reasons stated in
9.

Tanada vs. Tuvera 146 SCRA 446

Facts:
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of
Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law. The government argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective immediately upon approval. The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming
the necessity for publication of some of the decrees. The court ordered the respondents to publish in the official gazette all
unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general force and effect. The petitioners suggest that there should be no
distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not. The publication means complete publication,
and that publication must be made in the official gazette. In a comment required by the solicitor general, he claimed first
that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and therefore be dismissed. And on the clause “unless otherwise
provided” in Article 2 of the new civil code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative, that the
publication when necessary, did not have to be made in the official gazette.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette.
(2) Whether or not publication in the official gazette must be in full.
Held:
(1) The court held that all statute including those of local application shall be published as condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
(2) The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of
the laws.
FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared that
they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their
publication;

2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself,
which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the
people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would
be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law
must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people
only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or
modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep
secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and
contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The
furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.