Republic of the Philippines The present case is one for malicious mischief.

There being no reservation

SUPREME COURT by the offended party of the civil liability, the civil action was deemed
Manila impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The offended party had,
therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be represented by a legal
counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused.
EN BANC

Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice
G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965
of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an
agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace
vs. Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that he
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant. was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional
capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or
intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes committed in the
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal
Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant. cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no
PAREDES, J.: possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant
City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case.
On the other hand, as already pointed out, the offended party in this criminal
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her
Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the
of said municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on criminal action.
replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by
City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private
prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D.
his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, Fule may appear before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna
he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the
any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private offended party.
prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case
of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al., WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been of Alaminos, Laguna, allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private
appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein prosecutor is dismissed, without costs.
qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel
then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in
the case is a violation of the above ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.
order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.
The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.1äwphï1.ñët
Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit
Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section
Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore
32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain
reproduced, and which we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense
attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this
counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35,
limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear
Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or other official or employee
and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in private law practice.
of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private
This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U.
practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims that
Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of
City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in
which read:
private practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not
constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice
is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise Republic of the Philippines
(State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall SUPREME COURT
within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually Manila
holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such
services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel
EN BANC
on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private
practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:
G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a vs.
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent
services. Office, respondent.

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.
permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for
complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative. respondent.

CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should MONTEMAYOR, J.:
be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant..
This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines
Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur. Patent Office.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had
scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are
qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said
examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before
said office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and
other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the
said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been
holding similar examinations.

It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has
passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in
the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the
Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the cat of the respondent Director
requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an
examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed
to practice before said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and
prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation
of the law.

In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the
prosecution of patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but
includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so
that, as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be handled
not only by lawyers, but also engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and
technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office;
. . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial
body from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to
handle cases before the Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph,
requires more of an application of scientific and technical knowledge than the mere
application of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the respondent is in
accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the
Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which
the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as that
prescribed by respondent. . . .
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of
America authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to
determine as to who practice before the United States Patent Office, the respondent,
is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165.
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have
been holding tests or examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required
qualification to practice before the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time
that the right of the Director of Patents to do so, specially as regards members of the
bar, has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we have given it
careful thought and consideration.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines 1 and to any member of the
Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity,
whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the
question arises as to whether or not appearance before the patent Office and the
preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included
in the practice of law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and social proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262,
263). (Emphasis supplied).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice
on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection
with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by
the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in
the order, can be drawn between that part which involves advice and
drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests
upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953
ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313,
quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A.
139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office,
the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of
their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights
in patent cases. In the first place, although the transaction of business in the Patent
Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific knowledge and
training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law,
as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent
Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office
involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as
the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and
procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall
not be patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or
welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it
was known or used by others in the Philippines before the invention thereof by the
inventor named in any printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign country
more than one year before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in
public use or on sale in the Philippines for more than one year before the application
for the patent therefor. Section 10 provides that the right to patent belongs to the true
and actual inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26
refer to connection of any mistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates the grounds for
cancellation of a patent; that although any person may apply for such cancellation,
under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of
a patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for cancellation. Section
31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of the petition for cancellation of the patent
by the Director of Patents in case the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section
34, at any time after the expiration of three years from the day the patent was granted,
any person patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented invention is not being
worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented
article in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented
article in the Philippines is not being met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms,
or if by reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a license on reasonable terms or by
reason of the condition attached by him to the license, purchase or use of the
patented article or working of the patented process or machine of production, the
establishment of a new trade or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent
or invention relates to food or medicine or is necessary to public health or public
safety. All these things involve the applications of laws, legal principles, practice and
procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and experience for which a member
of the bar has been prepared.
In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders
and decisions of the Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and
correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61,
provides that:
. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party
to a proceeding to cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and
any party to any other proceeding in the Office may appeal to the Supreme
Court from any final order or decision of the director.
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the
Patent Office and the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved
exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically,
the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of
scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the
functions and acts of the Head of the Patent Office.
. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues,
interferences, and extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents
are public records, and it is the duty of the Commissioner to give
authenticated copies to any person, on payment of the legal fees. (40 Am.
Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).
. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists
up to the granting and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide
whether the patent is new and whether it is the proper subject of a patent;
and his action in awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial function. In
passing on an application the commissioner should decide not only
questions of law, but also questions of fact, as whether there has been a
prior public use or sale of the article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460).
(Emphasis supplied).
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is
reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and
training, should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further
examination or other qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it
advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar practising before him
enlist the assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers and
documents, such as, the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine
sought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an application for the
registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan and
technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require
persons desiring to practice or to do business before him to submit an examination,
even if they are already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law,
Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent Law; and of the
United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that
which he (respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the
following provisions of said Rules of Practice:
Registration of attorneys and agents. — A register of an attorneys and a
register agents are kept in the Patent Office on which are entered the
names of all persons recognized as entitled to represent applicants before
the Patent Office in the preparation and prosecution of applicants for patent.
Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules shall
only entitle the person registered to practice before the Patent Office.
(a) Attorney at law. — Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to
practice before any United States Court or the highest court of any State or
Territory of the United States who fulfills the requirements and complied with
the provisions of these rules may be admitted to practice before the Patent
Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Requirement for registration. — No person will be admitted to practice
and register unless he shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing
on a prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all
requested information and material; and shall establish to the satisfaction of
the Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute
and possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications
necessary to enable him to render applicants for patent valuable service,
and is otherwise competent to advise and assist him in the presentation and
prosecution of their application before the Patent Office. In order that the
Commissioner may determine whether a person seeking to have his name
placed upon either of the registers has the qualifications specified,
satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute, and of sufficient basic
training in scientific and technical matters must be submitted and an
examination which is held from time to time must be taken and passed. The
taking of an examination may be waived in the case of any person who has
served for three years in the examining corps of the Patent Office.
Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States
Patent Office in Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself,
which reads as follows:
The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Commerce may prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of
agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other
parties before his office, and may require of such persons, agents,
or attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of applicants or
other persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in
good repute, are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them
to render to applicants or other persons valuable service, and are likewise to
competent to advise and assist applicants or other persons in the
presentation or prosecution of their applications or other business before the
Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and opportunity for a
hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case from
further practice before his office any person, agent or attorney shown to be
incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses
to comply with the said rules and regulations, or who shall, with intent to
defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or
prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective
applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective business before
the office, by word, circular, letter, or by advertising. The reasons for any
such suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action of the
Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of the person so refused
recognition or so suspended by the district court of the United States for the
District of Columbia under such conditions and upon such proceedings as
the said court may by its rules determine. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar
to the provisions of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules
and regulations requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should submit to
and pass an examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for
purposes of comparison:
SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director subject to the approval of
the Secretary of Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the
Patent Office.
The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the
provisions of the United States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations
to determine the qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Patent Office.
While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require
attorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications and competence to
render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which
showing may take the form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner,
our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this important point. Our attention has not
been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such authority to
determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to
prescribe forms and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to
secure the harmonious and efficient administration of his branch of the service and to
carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau.
Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the approval
of the Department Head, makes all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the
provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code,
Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon
recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful
rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the code. We
understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for the Bureau
of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to
govern the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision
of law giving the necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on
examination prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice before said Patent
Office, then there would be no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureau of
Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area are more or less
complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc.,
assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, and the classification of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures,
confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any
lawyer practising before them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of
clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar
authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their
profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said
office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the
Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to
establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or
quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the
law, taken to the Supreme Court.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent
Director is hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to
an examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and
practice before the Patent Office. No costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia, JJ.,concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary
of Budget and Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly
only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have
a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position
in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis
supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973
Constitution which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman
and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college
degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.'
(Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes
practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of
legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his
consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in
the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice
to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in
matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law
by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal
matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and
fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's
Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract
and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered
to be in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,
firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or
appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending
or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or
acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients
under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law,
or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of
court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-
177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
 conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
(Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice
on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection
with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by
the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in
the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which
involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and
drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests
upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953
ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313,
quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A.
139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new
lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms
as advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the
profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind
usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and
he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a
practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell,
155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice
of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally,
to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted
a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation
which I forgot to do during our review of the provisions on the Commission
on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the
Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by
Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am
quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar
who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make
the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does
not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to
interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are
using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then
they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners,
even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and
Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation
may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards
members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is
taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is
equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article
on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is
auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And,
 therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the
necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications
under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the
answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is
equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the
Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either
be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways
synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in
private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners.
(Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986],
p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly
understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of
delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole
practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership
and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as
professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the
members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger
or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is
essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers
do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota,
1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or
out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v.
Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958]
[quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]).
Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be
workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most
publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer.
Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire
practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do
continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image
and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not
reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate
lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this
wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is
one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar
and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed
societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work
also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is]
loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer
has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon.
I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided
where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law,"
Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a
number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal
processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing
numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal
services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax
practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an
importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative
agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the
relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much
else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of
traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and
negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and
mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is
constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some
of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most
prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed
both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a
social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of
corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are
emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of
practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary
transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional
groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy
decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging
trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an
accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law
research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal
policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning,"
has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many
decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the
sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major
trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of
action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute
danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow
theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure
must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein
a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to
test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects
flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in
predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate
finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention
in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a
cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those
trained primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to
multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling
such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate
degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal
policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the
concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently
engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would
require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal
implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and
maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to
as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big
money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of
business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not
explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of
attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type
of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all
their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel
only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to
handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the
legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may
include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as
corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and
other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange
Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with
the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the
legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These
include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in
management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated
from the action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the
work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to
see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is
sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of
the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a
multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law
field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of
companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived
by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In
most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while
the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries.
(Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of
finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein,
to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one
who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who
surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989,
p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm,"
so to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method
of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities
Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management
issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types
of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of
particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable
disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management
responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of
the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a
shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial
jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total
learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's
role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process,
including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides
counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a
corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is
being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly
collaborate not only with public entities but with each other — often with
those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the
corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a
new role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in the organization
and operations of governance through participation on boards and other
decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing
legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis
supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies
toward the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more
generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more
adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other
countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative
efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous.
(Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate
Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all
kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary
groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable
factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising
their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders,
promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such
external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal
group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer
vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current
research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures
and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance
considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors
are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an
effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and
pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback
loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts
of systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system
dynamics principles more accessible to managers — including corporate
counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions
involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it
can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation
settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio
of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can
be used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All
integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation
support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation
case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.
 [Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function,
concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that
comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ
from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such
legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being
considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are
undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It
needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and
organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global,
interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not
adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a
global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The
general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant
subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility
for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global
operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified
body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new
and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with
more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is
not enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a
full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if
the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on
corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working
knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the
basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business
Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more
than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their
work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law
territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the
lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding
and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989,
p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the
Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of
Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office.
On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for
certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent
appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null
and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been
paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty.
Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group
(1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa
Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-
countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the
Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group,
served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a
business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies
as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-
General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved
being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation
hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal
capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for
Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the
farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative
action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also
made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast
judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the
Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the
Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile
government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-
list system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a
member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and
which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise
during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there
are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and
an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the
contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven,
"Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff
Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11).
(Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays
down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of
any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental
parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of
closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring
program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and
legal advising, they score national development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted
by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development
of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by
the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis
supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely
renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in
legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a
sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an
economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they
should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent
counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support
personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts,
an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321).
( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the
set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a
failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement
must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state
the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an
obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that
principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan
agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international
affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they
are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and
serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and
4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law".
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the
liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past
work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and
the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the
Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed
by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only
condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the
ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom
which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service
Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all
the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no
alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil
Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment
on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position.
It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice.
To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the
appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary
power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis
supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four
(4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3)
issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on
Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent
appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v.
Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination
of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2)
Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall
hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last
Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case
shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his
definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law
practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law,
which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent
framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition
would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or
three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year
for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my
written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing
because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by
the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident
from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law
practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself
that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all
situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the
law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose
sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has
been practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons
practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected
President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more
qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition
be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified,
how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on
Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the
exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only
upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment.
In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective
power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for
has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President,
may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in
effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the
Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S.
Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible
that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth
life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea
asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah
agreed on condition that —
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an
iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes.
This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah
was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator
of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin?
Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter,
not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the
result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the
challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment
of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the
basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was
attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and
consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second
paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the
petition.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition
at bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I
was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin
respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the
Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting
for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties
concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification.
Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence
already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed
qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10)
years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced
that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has
not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration
because, ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper
construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of
COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions
involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution.
As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial
department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the
Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC
Chairman. Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such
standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to
the actual performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere
possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary
action.1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or
pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the
tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified
public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as
an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or
a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a
corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or
customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it
is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42
LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has
been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the
public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs.
Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a
Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a
particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14
SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when
one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the
general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes
 the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice
law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented
himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and
that his professional services are available to the public for compensation,
as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People
v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of
documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term
"practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics,
1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B.
901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law
(Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290
N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law.
(Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for
legal knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law".
(Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes
the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer
undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no
attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or
articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or
a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether
or not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for
at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice
of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so
HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the
records, I am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute
the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to
his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be
latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of
legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated
transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law."
To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession
of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva:4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in the activeand continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod
as not qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent
just the same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course
respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the
respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from
resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the
established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that
discretion would still be subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the
appointing authority to choosebetween two claimants to the same office who both
possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could
not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me
for lack of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an that he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the
appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments. Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in
which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not
as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an
listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and not
appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less
as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be
than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not
argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and
the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first
urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together
place.
with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide
Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities extended over
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently
the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman
law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities of the Commission on Elections.
accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not
even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras,
involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the
but I must regretfully vote to grant the petition.
insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or
give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is
another business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a
business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive
regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.
society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government
regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod
definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be
engaged in the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on
considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house
official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating
or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application
that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross
of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his
as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left
main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law
behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the
because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the
decision.
Energy Regulatory Board.

The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the
"performance of any acts ... in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice
of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because
lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental
realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to
be engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of
it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely)
connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the
lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled
ladies with pubescent pretensions.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of
a constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the
qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we
have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or
whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses
superior qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management,
educational background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant
recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the
petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the
Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has
never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but
to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life
to the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a
requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of
law.
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development
Corporation and affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer

Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer
also for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges
or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a
business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating 7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member
a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private
practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass
the bar examinations? 8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup
Attempt — Member

The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years." The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active 9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the
and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or following companies:
extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed
participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out
with intent and attention during the ten-year period.
b. Dataprep, Philippines

I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod
to the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced
law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he d. Semirara Coal Corporation
worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely
limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the
University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the United e. CBL Timber Corporation
States while not a member of the Bar there?
Member of the Board of the Following:
The professional life of the respondent follows:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar
examinations in 1961 consist of the following: b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
Pennsylvania
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department;
Operations, Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and
Middle East, International Finance Corporation e. Graphic Atelier

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e., f. Manila Electric Company
Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation,
Philippine Electric Corporation g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
 h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent
Monsod has given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of commitment and
participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged
in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers
working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was
the oneadvice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate
"engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of
endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian
reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary
layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every
resident of this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow,
or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary
for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman,
farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these
people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years." It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least
ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with
litigation but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of
advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or
knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal
effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully
determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77
N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards
State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of
what constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as
"Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and
customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of
service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or
rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge
or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being
substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's
Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87
N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be
activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually,
frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive.
He was asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in
real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He
answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times
he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his
business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than
half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall
making the statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a
large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what was
said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a
practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to
the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he
answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further
for an answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties
where he was not the broker, he finally answered: "I have done about
everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he
has a lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate
transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds,
mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in
these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that
connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or
employed by another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a
 class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in
legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law,
and non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the
single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be
an attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law
Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an
officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in
such court on the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are
(1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his
client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the
state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His
rights are to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit.
"Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to
do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a
succession of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or
repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a
profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v.
Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a
succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109
[1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice
of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for
such services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a
required component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and
issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually
holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14
SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one
sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general
practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the
oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation
with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all
courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v.
Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his
legal knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated
activities which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the
practice of law was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or
in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal
activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be
likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not
categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the
practice of law, doing business also should be active and continuous. Isolated
business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within
the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated,
Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the
Constitutional Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and
dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator,
Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification
of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of
COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The
Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its
mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of
discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent
Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the
result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the
challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment
of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the
basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was
attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and
consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second
paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the
petition.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition
at bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I
was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin
respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the
Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting
for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties
concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification.
Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence
already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed
qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10)
years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced
that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has
not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration
because, ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper
construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of
COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions
involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution.
As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial
department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the
Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC
Chairman. Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such
standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to
the actual performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere
possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary
action.1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or
pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the
tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified
public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as
an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or
a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a
corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or
customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it
is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42
LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has
been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the
public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs.
Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a
Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a
particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14
SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when
one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the
general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes
the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice
law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented
himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and
that his professional services are available to the public for compensation,
as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People
v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of
documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term
"practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics,
1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B.
901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law
(Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290
N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action
 taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law.
(Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for
legal knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law".
(Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes
the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer
undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no
attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or
articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or
a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether
or not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for
at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice
of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so
HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the
records, I am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute
the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to
his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be
latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of
legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated
transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law."
To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession
of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva:4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in the activeand continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod
as not qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent
just the same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course
respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the
respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from
resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the
established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that
discretion would still be subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the
appointing authority to choosebetween two claimants to the same office who both
possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could
not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court
for lack of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an
appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an
appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less
than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not
the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first
place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that
the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of
law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities
accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not
even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities
involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the
insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or
give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is
another business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such
business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and
regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern
society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government
regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the
definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be
considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house
or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application
of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his
main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law
because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the
Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the
"performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the
practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that
"because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to
be engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of
it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely)
connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the
lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled
ladies with pubescent pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me
that he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the
Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in
which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not
as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions
listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and not
as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be
argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and
urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together
with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide
Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities extended over
the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently
qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman
of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras,
but I must regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a
qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive
terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod
engaged in the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on
official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating
that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross
as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left
behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the
decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of
a constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the
qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we
have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or
whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses
superior qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management,
educational background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant
recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the
petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the
Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has
never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but
to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life
to the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a
requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of
law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but
also for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges
or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a
business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating
a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private
practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass
the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years." The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active
and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or
extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed
participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that
one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out
with intent and attention during the ten-year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
to the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he
worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely
limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the e. CBL Timber Corporation
University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the United
States while not a member of the Bar there?
Member of the Board of the Following:

The professional life of the respondent follows:

a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar

examinations in 1961 consist of the following: b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
Pennsylvania
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department;
Operations, Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and e. Graphic Atelier
Middle East, International Finance Corporation
f. Manila Electric Company
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e.,
Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation,
Philippine Electric Corporation g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development h. Philippine Electric Corporation

Corporation and affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup
Attempt — Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the
following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent
Monsod has given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of commitment and
participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged
in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers
working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was
the oneadvice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate
"engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of
endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian
reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary
layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every
resident of this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow,
or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary
for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman,
farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these
people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years." It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least
ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with
litigation but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of
advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or
knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal
effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully
determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77
N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards
State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of
what constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as
"Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and
customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of
service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or
rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge
or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being
substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's
Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87
N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be
activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually,
frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive.
He was asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in
real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He
answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times
he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his
business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than
half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall
making the statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a
large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what was
said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a
practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to
the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he
answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further
for an answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties
where he was not the broker, he finally answered: "I have done about
everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he
has a lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate
transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds,
mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in
these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that
connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or
employed by another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a
class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in
legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law,
and non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the
single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be
an attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law
Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an
officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in
such court on the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are
(1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his
client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the
state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His
rights are to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit.
"Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to
do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a
succession of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or
repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a
profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v.
Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a
succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109
[1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice
of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for
such services. ... . (at p. 112)
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the
Constitutional Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and
dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator,
Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification
of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of
COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The
Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its
mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of
discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a
required component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and
issued by it, to wit: Bidin, J., dissent

l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually

holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14
SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one
sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general
practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the
oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation
with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all
courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or

customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v.
Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)

xxx xxx xxx

While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his
legal knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated
activities which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the
practice of law was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or
in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal
activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be
likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not
categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the
practice of law, doing business also should be active and continuous. Isolated
business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within
the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated,
Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A.
DIAO,
vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.
BENGZON, C.J.:
After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A.
Diao was admitted to the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented
in his application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic
qualifications. The matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor General who
caused the charge to be investigated; and later he submitted a report recommending
that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the
allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed,
before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the
Department of Private Education, specially, in the following particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A.
diploma therefrom — which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in
support of his application for examination, and of his allegation therein of
successful completion of the "required pre-legal education".
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the
first charge: but he claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he
entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given
therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his
return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the
equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure
to exhibit any certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school officials.
However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly
meritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his
application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such
college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in
April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of
Quisumbing College, in his school records.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was
obviously of his own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A.
from Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949,
thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six
months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have
been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant for
the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had
successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education(A.A.) as
prescribed by the Department of Private Education," (emphasis on "previous").
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations;
but due to his false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and
was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false
pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular
manner is equally essential..
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of
Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty
days. So ordered.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes,
Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF
SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other
individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul
Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the
infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as
part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then
entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining,
pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This
plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of
the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a
period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for
probation with the lower court. The application for probation was granted in an Order
dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The
period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial
report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission
to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his
criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar
Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993.1 He passed
the Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the
attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge
Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11
April 1994. We note that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10)
months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18
June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of
his Petition for Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to
everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens
of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and
certified.2 The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is
stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard
as having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition
precedent to the applicant's right to receive a license to practice
law in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other
requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary
to make up such a character. It is something more than an
absence of bad character. It is the good name which the applicant
has acquired, or should have acquired, through association with
his fellows. It means that he must have conducted himself as a
man of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or
does. Such character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in
following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the will to
do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the
pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is
eminently proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer.
He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its
ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast interests are
committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with is client's property, reputation, his
life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of the Court,
whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of
justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx4
In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Law Examination of
1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater
temptations to deviate from the straight and narrow path than in
the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of
profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an
applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high moral
standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of
bar examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a
minute examination to be made of the moral standard of each
candidate for admission to practice. . . . It needs no further
argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the highest
degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of
a candidate who presents himself for admission to the bar. The
evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and
prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has
pursued his profession, and has established himself therein, a far
more difficult situation is presented to the court when proceedings
are instituted for disbarment and for the recalling and annulment
of his license.
In Re Keenan:6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every
citizen, as in the right to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It
is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those who
demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral
character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but
not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test
applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from the
unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to enter the
profession, and only those who maintain the standards are
allowed to remain in it.
Re Rouss:7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions,
and a fair private and professional character is one of them; to
refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not to punish him for
past offense: an examination into character, like the examination
into learning, is merely a test of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8
Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so
that they may not only protect the rights and interests of their
clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet
what protection to clients or assistance to courts could such
agents give? They are required to be of good moral character, so
that the agents and officers of the court, which they are, may not
bring discredit upon the due administration of the law, and it is of
the highest possible consequence that both those who have not
such qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them,
have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to
aid in the administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of
greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice
are concerned, than the possession of legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10
L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always
been to admit no person to the practice of the
law unless he covered an upright moral
character. The possession of this by the
attorney is more important, if anything, to the
public and to the proper administration of
justice than legal learning. Legal learning
may be acquired in after years, but if the
applicant passes the threshold of the bar with
a bad moral character the chances are that
his character will remain bad, and that he will
become a disgrace instead of an ornament to
his great calling — a curse instead of a
benefit to his community — a Quirk, a
Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a
Smith or a Ruffin.9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those
seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly
broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a
proceeding for his admission to practice is broader in scope than
in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells: 11
 . . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for
admission to the California Bar the court cannot reject him for
want of good moral character unless it appears that he has been
guilty of acts which would be cause for his disbarment or
suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is broader in
its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may
receive any evidence which tends to show the applicant's
character as respects honesty, integrity, and general
morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that
might not establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be
causes for disbarment.
how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the
family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in
other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that
he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the
law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written
manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default
thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from
notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and
sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.

The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct
expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a
general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with Bellosillo, J. is on leave.
inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the
progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our
legal system as we know it.12

Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short
of the required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely
accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to
the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character
flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused
had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a
"neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and
confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to
death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless
physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that
moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding
that the participant was then possessed of good moral character.

Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the
Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino
has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We
stress that good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be
demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take the bar
examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for admission
to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.

Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and EN BANC
consideration, evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the
requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the
bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible
members of the community who have a good reputation for truth and who
have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly since the [B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]
judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite
moral integrity for membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is
of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a
privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot
practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the
2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful
bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre
(complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the
Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave
misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during
the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention
Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys
pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers
oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave
misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as
counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of
Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that
respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office
of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and in
behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as
counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a
municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a
client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant
accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan
(Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents services. Complainant claims that
respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice
mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the
lawyers oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared
of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court required respondent to
comment on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance to
represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that he decided to assist and
advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law. Respondent
admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes
in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer
or represented himself as an attorney in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims
that he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on
the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable
Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent
further claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is
the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon,
Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that
he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and
refuted the claim of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only to
extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily
Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for proclamation as the winning candidate
for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When
respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his
appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and
(2) he was an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his
claim that the instant administrative case is motivated mainly by political vendetta.
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
OBCs Report and Recommendation
 The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel
for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that
respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that
respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath
on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious
doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that
respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the
practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission
to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which
respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a
government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his resignation was
accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before the
MBEC.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to
the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records
show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before
respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the
Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-
Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for George Bunan. In the
first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was
the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate,
GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had
authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the MBEC and
similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained
respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the
MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the
legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party. Respondent himself
wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his appearance as counsel
for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On
19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed
before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly,
respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine
Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court elucidated that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice
to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law,incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim
in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment,
and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice,
as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves
the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.
(5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law means any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform
acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to
practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge
or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the
proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so.
Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent
called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having
held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law,
respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.[3]
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a
privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications
duly ascertained and certified.The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession
of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust[4] since a
lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice
law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can
be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person
seeking admission had practiced law without a license. [5]
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v.
Abad,[6] a candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and
signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing law even
before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect
contempt of court.[7]
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers
oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-
fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial.
Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-
law.[8] Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer
still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court
and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.[9]
 On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not
allow respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court or administrative
body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan

prior to the acts complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter
dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of
the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning effective upon your
acceptance.[10] Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondents resignation effective 11 May
2001.[11] Thus, the evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as
counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that

Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the
MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent
nonetheless had no authority to practice law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the

Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-

Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo,
Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.