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Tañada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders,
letters of implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal
personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the
date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The word “shall” therein
imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of
law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared
that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and effect.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which
cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in
general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an

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intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the
public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a
whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall
begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it
finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets.
Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed
by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded
saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

G.R. No. 191667 Case Digest

G.R. No. 191667, April 17, 2013

Land Bank of the Philippines

vs Eduardo M. Cacayuran

Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe

Facts:

This is a petition for Review on Certiorari of the CA affirming the RTC in declaring the nullity of the loan agreements entered into by
Land Bank and the Municipality of Agoo, La Union.

Agoo SB passed a certain resolution to implement a redevelopment plan to redevelop the Agoo Public Plaza. To finance the plan,
SB passed a resolution authorizing then Maor Eriguel to obtain a loan from Land Bank, incidental to it, mortgaged a portion of the
plaza as collateral. It has also authorized the assignment of a portion if the IRA and monthly income in favor of Land Bank to secure
the payment. 10 Kiosks were made at the plaza, then were rented out. Later, a commercial center on the Plaza lot was built too,
with a loan from Land Bank, posting the same securities as the first loan.

The commercial loan was opposed by some residents of the municipality embodied in a manifesto launched through a signature
campaign by the residents and Cacayuran. Invoking his right as taxpayer, Cacayuran filed a complaint against the officials and Land
bank assailing the validity of the loans on the ground that the Plaza lot used as collateral is property of public dominion and
therefore beyond the commerce of man.

RTC Ruling: declared the nullity of the subject loans, saying that the oans were passed in a highly irregular manner, as such, the
Municipality is not bound by the same.

Aggrieved, Land Bank filed notice of appeal.

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Ruling of CA: affirmed with modification the RTC's ruling, excluding the Vice Mayor from any personal liability arising from the
subject loans. Cacayuran has locus standi as resident and taxpayer in the municipality and the issue involves public interest. The
plaza cannot be a valid collateral to a loans for it is of public dominion.

Land Bank filed this instant petition.

Issues:

(1) whether Cacayuran has locus standi (2) whether the subject resolutions were validly passed and (3) whether the subject loans
are ultra vires. [The doctrine in the law of corporations that holds that if a corporation enters into a contract that is beyond the scope
of its corporate powers, the contract is illegal.]

SC Ruling:

(1) Taxpayer is allowed to sue if: (1) public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and
in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed; and (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act.

In the case, the proceeds from the Subject Loans had already been converted into public funds by the Municipality’s receipt thereof.
Funds coming from private sources become impressed with the characteristics of public funds when they are under official custody.
Public plaza belongs to public dominion, Cacayuran need not to be a privy to the loans, as long as taxes are involved, people have
a right to question the contracts entered into by the government.

(2) While ordinances are laws and possess a general and permanent character, resolutions are merely declarations of the sentiment
or opinion of a law making body on a specific matter and are temporary in nature. As opposed to ordinances, "no rights can be
conferred by and be inferred from a resolution." In this accord, it cannot be denied that the SB violated Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of the
LGC altogether. Noticeably, the passage of the Subject Resolutions was also tainted with other irregularities, such as (1) the SB’s
failure to submit the Subject Resolutions to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of La Union for its review contrary to Section 56 of the
LGC; and (2) the lack of publication and posting in contravention of Section 59 of the LGC.

(3) Generally, an ultra vires act is one committed outside the object for which a corporation is created as defined by the law of its
organization and therefore beyond the powers conferred upon it by law.43 There are two (2) types of ultra vires acts. There is a
distinction between an act utterly beyond the jurisdiction of a municipal corporation and the irregular exercise of a basic power under
the legislative grant in matters not in themselves jurisdictional. The former are ultra vires in the primary sense and void; the latter,
ultra vires only in a secondary sense which does not preclude ratification or the application of the doctrine of estoppel in the interest
of equity and essential justice.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, it is clear that the Subject Loans belong to the first class of ultra vires acts deemed as
void. Records disclose that the said loans were executed by the Municipality for the purpose of funding the conversion of the Agoo
Plaza into a commercial center pursuant to the Redevelopment Plan. However, the conversion of the said plaza is beyond the
Municipality’s jurisdiction considering the property’s nature as one for public use and thereby, forming part of the public dominion.
Accordingly, it cannot be the object of appropriation either by the State or by private persons. Nor can it be the subject of lease or
any other contractual undertaking.

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PESIGAN vs. ANGELES, G.R. No. L-64279, April 30, 1984

FACTS:

Petitioners Anselmo and Marcelino Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in a 10-wheeler truck in April 1982, 26 carabaos and a
calf, from Camarines Sur to Batangas. Despite the health certificate, permit to transport, and certificate of inspection issued to them
by the provincial veterinarian, provincial commander and constabulary command, respectively, while petitioners were negotiating the
town of Basud, Camarines Norte, the carabaos were confiscated by private respondents, Police Station Commander Lt. Zanarosa,
and provincial veterinarian Dr. Miranda. The confiscation was based on Executive Order 626-A which prohibited the transport of
carabaos from one province to another. Pursuant to EO 626-A, Dr Miranda distributed the carabaos to 25 farmers of
Basud. Petitioners filed for recovery of the carabaos and damages, against private respondent Judge Angeles who heard the case
in Daet and later transferred to Caloocan City, and dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not EO 626-A be enforced before its publication in the Official Gazette.

HELD:

Said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal
regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days
thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code.

The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication
is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected
thereby.

MARBELLA-BOBIS v. BOBIS

MARBELLA-BOBIS v. BOBIS

July 31, 2000 (G.R. No. 138509)

PARTIES:

Petitioner: IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS

Respondent: ISAGANI D. BOBIS

FACTS:

• October 21, 1985, first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Not annulled, nullified or terminated

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• January 25, 1996, second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis

• Third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez

• February 25, 1998, Imelda Bobis filed bigamy

• Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the

ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license

• Petitioner argues that respondent should have first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into

the second marriage

*After petitioner sued for bigamy, it’s just when the respondent filed a declaration of absolute nullity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question

to a criminal case for bigamy

HELD:

• A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue

involved therein.3It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it

determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. Its two essential elements are:7

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed

In Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can

not be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. In the current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a

judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The reason is

that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for

all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner.

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Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the

subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is,

therefore, not a prejudicial question

*Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior

to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then

assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy (Landicho v. Relova)

PEOPLE VS PATALIN 311 SCRA 186

Tuesday, January 20, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Criminal Law

Facts: Alfonso Patalin and Alex Mijaque, herein accused were convicted of Robbery with Multiple Rape committed in the evening of

August 11, 1984 against the Aliman family. They were meted the supreme penalty of death. At the time the crimes charged were

committed in 1984, robbery with rape was punishable by death, however, by virtue of the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the

death penalty was abolished and all death penalties already imposed were reduced to reclusion perpetua. The decision for the

present case was promulgated on June 14, 1995, after the effectivity of RA 7659 which restored the death penalty. Appellants now

contend that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty as the same was suspended upon ratification of the 1987

Constitution.

Issue: When the death penalty was abolished in 1987 and was retroactively applied to herein accused, did they gain a vested right

thereto so that any future law restoring the death penalty would no longer cover them?

Held: Although at the time of the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution the present casewas still its trial stage, it is clear that the

framers intended the provision to have a retroactive effect on pending cases without any penalty of death having been imposed yet.

The retroactive effect may be given during three possible stages of a criminal prosecution: a) when the crime has been committed

and the prosecution began; b) when sentence has been passed but service has not begun; and c) when the sentence is being

carried out. The abolition of the death penalty benefits herein accused by virtue of Art 22 of the RPC which provides that penal laws

shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of the felony who is not a habitual criminal.Hence, they are

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subject to a reduction of penalty from death to reclusion perpetua. A subsequent statute cannot be applied retroactively as to impair

a right that accrued under the old law.

Bernabe vs Alejo
Bernabe vs. Alejo

GR No. 140500, January 21, 2002

FACTS:

The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary Carolina Alejo and was named Adrian Bernabe who was
born on September 18, 1981. After Ernesto Bernabe and Rosalina (legal wife) died, the sole surviving heir left was
Ernestina. Carolina, in behalf of his son Adrian, filed a complaint that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal
Bernabe and be given a share of his father’s estate.

Trial court’s ruling: Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the
alleged parent to give the latter an opportunity to either affirm or deny the child’s filiation.

CA ruling: The rights of Adrian are governed under Article 285 of the Civil Code which allows an action for recognition to be filed
within 4 years after the child has attained the age of majority and that subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away
his right.

ISSUE: Whether or not Adrian Bernabe may be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son.

HELD:

The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is
given by the new code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that “illegitimate children” are usually begotten and raised in
secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence.

Furthermore, the grounds or instances for the acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to establish the filiation of spurious
children.

Hence, the petition wad denied and assailed decision was affirmed.

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Cui vs Arellano University

TITLE: Emetrio Cui v Arellano University

CITATION: GR NO. L15127, May 30, 1961 | 112 Phil 135

FACTS:

Emetrio Cui took his preparatory law course at Arellano University. He then enrolled in its College of Law from first year (SY1948-
1949) until first semester of his 4th year. During these years, he was awarded scholarship grants of the said university amounting to
a total of P1,033.87. He then transferred and took his last semester as a law student at Abad Santos University. To secure
permission to take the bar, he needed his transcript of records from Arellano University. The defendant refused to issue the TOR
until he had paid back the P1,033.87 scholarship grant which Emetrio refunded as he could not take the bar without Arellano’s
issuance of his TOR.

On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38 addressing all heads of private schools, colleges
and universities. Part of the memorandum states that “the amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships
should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another
institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a school”.

ISSUE: Whether or not Emetrio Cui can refund the P1,033.97 payment for the scholarship grant provided by Arellano University.

HELD:

The memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law where the provision set therein was advisory and not mandatory in
nature. Moreover, the stipulation in question, asking previous students to pay back the scholarship grant if they transfer before
graduation, is contrary to public policy, sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights
and hence, null and void.

The court sentenced the defendant to pay Cui the sum of P1,033.87 with interest thereon at the legal rate from Sept.1, 1954, date of
the institution of this case as well as the costs and dismissing defendant’s counterclaim.

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CASE DIGEST: FERRER V. DIAZ ET. AL.

Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer v. Spouses Alfredo Diaz and Imelda Diaz

G.R. No. 165300, April 23, 2010

FACTS:

Allegedly, the Diazes, as represented by their daughter Comandante obtained from him a loan of P1,118,228.00. The loan was
secured by a Real Estate MortgageContract by way of second mortgage over Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and a Promissory
Note payable within six months or up to November 7, 1999. Comandante also issued to petitioner post-dated checks to secure
payment of said loan.

Petitioner further claimed that prior to this or on May 29, 1998, Comandante, for a valuable consideration of P600,000.00, which
amount formed part of the above mentioned secured loan, executed in his favor an instrument entitled Waiver of Hereditary Rights
and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided), and which property is titled and registered in the name of my parents Alfredo T.
Diaz and Imelda G. Diaz, as evidenced by a Transfer Certificate of Title. On the basis of said waiver, petitioner executed an Affidavit
of Adverse Claim which he caused to be annotated at the back of the TCT.

The Diazes, however, reneged on their obligation as the checks issued by Comandante were dishonored upon presentment.
Despite repeated demands, said respondents still failed and refused to settle the loan. Thus, petitioner filed on September 29, 1999
a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money Secured by Real Estate Mortgage Contract against the Diazes and Comandante. At the
Pangans’ end, they alleged that they acquired the subject property by purchase in good faith and for a consideration of
P3,000,000.00 on November 11, 1999 from the Diazes through the latter’s daughter Comandante. However, on December 21,
1999, they were surprised upon being informed by petitioner that the subject land had been mortgaged to him by the Diazes. As
affirmative defense, the Pangans asserted that the annotation of petitioner’s adverse claim on TCT No. RT-6604 cannot impair their
rights as new owners of the subject property. They claimed that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property
(Still Undivided) upon which petitioner’s adverse claim is anchored cannot be the source of any right or interest over the property
considering that it is null and void under paragraph 2 of Article 1347 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Is a waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another executed by a future heir while the parents are still living valid?

RULING:

Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance
except in cases expressly authorized by law. For the inheritance to be considered “future”, the succession must not have been
opened at the time of the contract. A contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second
paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites concur:

(1) That the succession has not yet been opened.

(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and,

(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right
which is purely hereditary in nature.[38]

In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of Comandante’s Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest over a Real
Property (Still Undivided), succession to either of her parent’s properties has not yet been opened since both of them are still living.
With respect to the other two requisites, both are likewisepresent considering that the property subject matter of Comandante’s
waiver concededly forms part of the properties that she expect to inherit from her parents upon their death and, such expectancy of
a right, as shown by the facts, is undoubtedly purely hereditary in nature.

From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner entered into a contract involving the former’s future inheritance
as embodied in the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by her in petitioner’s
favor. The Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by Comandante in favor of
petitioner as not valid and that same cannot be the source of any right or create any obligation between them for being violative of
the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code.

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ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
Ponente: CAMPOS, JR.
FACTS:
Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC). Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman, in his 7th Indorsement, denied petitioner’s
claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292),
solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the latter. Petitioner also anchored his claim on
Department of Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 by Secretary Drilon stating that “the issuance of the Administrative Code did not
operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code. The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that
the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the RAC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.

HELD:
NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on petitioner’s claim for benefits.

RATIO:
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the
legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must
be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to
repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not
a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment.

It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. The presumption is against
inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted
inconsistent or conflicting statutes. The two Codes should be read in pari materia.

Case Digest: Phil. International Trading Corp. v. COA

G.R. No. 183517 : June 22, 2010

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.

PEREZ, J.:

FACTS:

With the issuance of PD 1071, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the Philippine International Trading Corporation, then
President Marcos issued EO 756, authorizing the reorganization of PITC. On February 18, 1983, President Marcos issued Executive
Order No. 87. Romero, an officer of petitioner, filed a July 16, 2001 request, seeking from petitioner payment of retirement
differentials on the strength of Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756. COA Comm. Habitan issued the assailed ruling,stating that
Reserve for Retirement Gratuity and Commutation of Leave Credits of petitioners employees did not include allowances outside of
the basic salary, said officer ruled that Executive Order No. 756 was a special law issued only for the specific purpose of
reorganizing petitioner corporation. Finding that Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 was simply an incentive to encourage
employees to resign or retire at the height of petitioners reorganization, said decision went on to make the following

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pronouncements, to wit:"Moreover, RA No. 4968 prohibits the creation of any insurance retirement plan by any government agency
and government-owned or controlled corporation other than the GSIS.

ISSUE: Whether Executive Order No. 756 is an additional alternative to existing general retirement laws and/or an exception to the
prohibition against separate or supplementary insurance retirement or pension plans.

HELD: No.

POLITICAL LAW: interpretation of statute; Executive Order No. 756 as an additional alternative to existing general
retirement law.

Time and again, it has been held that every statute must be so interpreted and brought in accord with other laws as to form a
uniform system of jurisprudence. In the absence of a manifest and specific intent from which the same may be gleaned, Section 6 of
Executive Order No. 756 cannot be construed as an additional alternative to existing general retirement laws and/or an exception to
the prohibition against separate or supplementary insurance retirement or pension plans as aforesaid. Aside from the fact that a
meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein by
construction, petitioner would likewise do well to remember that repeal of laws should be made clear and express. Repeals by
implication are not favored as laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all laws existing on the
subject, the congruent application of which the courts must generally presume. For this reason, it has been held that the failure to
add a specific repealing clause particularly mentioning the statute to be repealed indicates that the intent was not to repeal any
existing law on the matter, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws.

As an adjunct to the reorganization mandated under Executive Order No. 756, SC find that the foregoing provision cannot be
interpreted independent of the purpose or intent of the law. Rather than the permanent retirement law for its employees that
petitioner now characterizes it to be, SC stated that the provision of gratuities equivalent to one month pay for every year of service
computed at highest salary received including all allowances was clearly meant as an incentive for employees who retire, resign or
are separated from service during or as a consequence of the reorganization petitioners Board of Directors was tasked to
implement. Again, as a temporary measure, it cannot be interpreted as an exception to the general prohibition against separate or
supplementary insurance and/or retirement or pension plans under Section 28, Subsection (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186,
amended.

Petition is DENIED.

People vs. Jabinal (Case Digest)

People vs. Jabinal

55 SCRA 607 27 February 1974

Antonio J.

Facts:

The instant case was an appeal form the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas finding the accused guilty of the crime of
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. The validity of the conviction was based upon a retroactive application of the
Supreme Court’s ruling in People vs. Mapa.

As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the
revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint was without the requisite license a permit. He however, contended that he
was a SECRET AGENT appointed by the governor, and was likewise subsequently appended as Confidential Agent, which granted
him the authority to possess fire arm in the performance of his official duties as peace officer. Relying on the Supreme Court’s
decision in People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero, the accused sought for his aquittal.

Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused, the trial court nonetheless decided otherwise, citing that People vs.
Macarandang and People vs. Lucero were reversed and subsequently abandoned in people vs. mapa.

Issue:

Should appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme Court rulings in Macarandana and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in
view of the completer reversal of Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa?

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Ruling:

The judgment appealed was reversed, and the appellant was acquitted.

Reason:

The doctrine laid down in lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, at the time appellant was found
in possession of fire arm in question and he was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case
in 1967, but when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a new one is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively, and should not apply to partres who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. LUDIVICO D. ARCIAGA, TAURINO SINGSON AND THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
March 16,1987.

Facts:

On August 24, 1960 Taurino Singson from Cabugao Ilocos Sur suffered multiple serious physical injuries when the
Philippine Rabbit bus crashed against an acacia tree at La union causing him to file a complaint for contractual tort against the latter.
The defendant alleged that the collision was accidental. The trial then was set on December 23,1965 but upon the motion of both
counsels, it was postponed and moved to February 3 and 4 1966. Then, on October 6,1966 the Court noted that no pre-trial has
ever been conducted so both parties were ordered to agree for a compromise agreement at the office of Philippine Rabbit in Tarlac.
The trial was again postponed to November 14,1966 and then transferred again on January 20,1967 upon the petition filed by
counsel for Phil.Rabbit and moved again to April 29,1967. During the scheduled trial on April 29,1967, only the defendant was
present on the said date. So, the court dismissed the case for non-appearance of the plaintiff.

On July 6,1967 (61 days from receipt of dismissal)Plaintiff Taurino Singson filed a petition for Relief with an affidavit alleging that he
went to the trial but due to engine trouble, he arrived late. The lower court grant plaintiff’s petition for relief. Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines Inc. filed a motion for reconsideration but the lower court denied the motion. Afterwhich Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc. again
filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus for preliminary injunction in the Court of Appeals but C.A denied the motion. The
company moved for reconsideration but it was also denied.

Issue:

Whether or not the court of Appeals erred in not holding that the 60-day period provided in Sec.38 of the rules of court is mandatory
and non-extendible.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in applying the rule of equity in the case at bar.

Ruling:

According to Sec.3 of Rule 38 of the rules of court, a petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this rule must be
verified, filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than
6 months after such judgment or order was entered or said proceeding was taken. The petition for relief was filed 61 days from
receipt of the notice of dismissal or one day late. The records show that counsel for private respondent learned of the dismissal on
the same day. The records further shows that counsel for private respondent did not move for reconsideration of the order of
dismissal, nor for new trial, neither to appeal,thereby allowing the decision to be final and executory.

No one can invoke equity as a ground for reopening a case if an express provision of law exists which the remedy can be invoked.
The rule is “equity follows the law” this means that there are instances wherein a court gives remedy, where the law gives none ; but
if where a particular remedy is given by the law and that remedy is bounded and circumscribed by particular rules, it would not be
proper for the court to take it up where the law leaves it and extend it further than the law allows. Thus, the legal maxim “equity aids
the vigilant,not those who slumber on their rights” is applicable to this case.

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Bellis vs Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased, PEOPLE’S BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
executor, MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, VS.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET. AL., heir-appellees
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

FACTS:
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had 5 legitimate children with his wife,
Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate children with his 2nd wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children.

Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which his distributable estate should be divided in trust in the
following order and manner:

a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;

b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each;
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal shares.

Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to probate in the Philippines. The
People’s Bank and Trust Company, an executor of the will, paid the entire bequest therein.

Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its “Executor’s Final Account, Report of Administration and
Project of Partition” where it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock amounting to
$240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies of the 3 illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the
project partition, the executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions
for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd marriages.

Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective opposition to the project partition on
the ground that they were deprived of their legitimates as illegitimate children.

The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply.

RULING:
It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. So that even
assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule providing that the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law, but
would still refer to Texas Law.

Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where
the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence,
however of proofs as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from our appellants, position is therefore
not rested on the doctrine of renvoi.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, USA and that under the Laws of Texas, there
are no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional
rights has to be determined under Texas Law, the Philippine Law on legitimates can not be applied to the testate of Amos Bellis.

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