FIRST DIVISION otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
The cases were
[G.R. NO. 170298 : June 26, 2007]
MANUEL S. ISIP, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, which seeks to set aside the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals dated 26 October 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 21275
entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Manuel S. Isip and Marietta
M. Isip" to the extent that it affirmed with modifications petitioner
Manuel S. Isip's conviction for Estafa in Criminal Case No. 136-84
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch XVII, Cavite City, and its
Amended Decision2 dated 26 October 2005 denying his Partial
Motion for Reconsideration.
The antecedents are the following:
Petitioner was charged with Estafa in Criminal Case No. 136-84
before Branch XVII of the RTC of Cavite City, under the following
information:
That on or about March 7, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of
the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, received from Leonardo A. Jose one (1)
seven carat diamond (men's ring), valued at P200,000.00, for the
purpose of selling the same on commission basis and to deliver the
proceeds of the sale thereof or return the jewelry if not sold, on or
before March 15, 1984, but the herein accused once in possession
of the above-described articles, with intent to defraud and with
grave abuse of confidence, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to
his own personal use and benefit and notwithstanding repeated
demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for the return of the jewelry or
the delivery of the proceeds of the sale thereof, failed to do so, to
the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid Leonardo A. Jose in the
abovestated amount of P200,000.00, Philippine Currency.3
Petitioner's wife, Marietta M. Isip, was indicted before the same
court for seven counts of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
docketed as Criminal Cases No. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84,
155-84, 156-84 and 157-84. The accusatory portion of the
information in Criminal Case No. 146-84 reads:
That on or about March 27, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of
the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, knowing fully well that her account with
the bank is insufficient, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly issue Pacific Banking Corporation Check
No. 518672 in the amount of P562,000.00, in payment for assorted
pieces of jewelry, received from Leonardo A. Jose, which check
upon presentation with the drawee bank for payment was
dishonored for insufficiency of funds and notwithstanding repeated
demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for the redemption of the said
check, accused refused and still refuses to do so, to the damage
and prejudice of the aforesaid Leonardo A. Jose in the above-stated
amount of P562,000.00, Philippine Currency.4
The six other Informations are similarly worded except for the date
when the offense was committed, the number and amount of the
check. The pertinent data in the other informations are as follows:
Crim. Case No. Date of Commission No. of Check Amount of Check
147-84 17 March 1984 518644 P50,000.00
148-84 30 March 1984 518645 P50,000.00
149-84 12 March 1984 0300865 P150,000.00
155-84 25 March 1984 518674 P95,000.00
156-84 29 March 1984 518646 P90,000.00
157-84 1 April 1984 518669 P25,000.00
The spouses Isip were likewise charged before the same court with
five (5) counts of Estafa. The cases were docketed as Criminal
Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84. The
Estafa charged in Crim. Case No. 256-84 was allegedly committed
as follows:
That on or about March 20, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of
the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and
mutually helping one another, received from one Leonardo A. Jose
the following pieces of jewelry, to wit: one (1) set dome shape ring
and earrings valued at P120,000.00, with the obligation of selling
the same on commission basis and deliver the proceeds of the sale
thereof or return them if not sold, on or before March 21, 1984,
but the herein accused, once in possession of the said jewelry by
means of false pretenses, with intent to defraud and with grave
abuse of confidence, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert them to their own
personal use and benefit and paid the same with Check Nos.
518646 and 518669, dated March 29, 1984 and April 1, 1984,
respectively, in the amount of P90,000 and P25,000, respectively,
which upon presentation with the bank was dishonored for
insufficiency of funds and notwithstanding repeated demands made
by Leonardo A. Jose for the redemption of the said check, failed to
do so, to his damage and prejudice in the abovestated amount
of P120,000.00, Philippine Currency.6
Except for the description and value of the pieces of jewelry
involved, date of receipt and agreed date of return, and the
number, date and amount of the checks issued in payment thereof,
the four other informations are similarly worded. The specifics
thereof are as follows:
Thus, the operation went smoothly - that was before February,
1984 (pp. 14-18, tsn, ibid).
On February 3, 1984, at complainant's residence in Caridad, Cavite
City, appellant spouses received from complainant a 6 carat men's
ring valued at P200,000.00 with the condition that they are going
to sell said jewelry x x x on commission basis for P200,000.00 and
if they are not able to sell the same, they have to return the ring if
sold on or before March 3, 1984 (p. 8, tsn, October 15, 1993).
On March 3, 1984, the Isips did not return the ring or the proceeds
thereof. Instead, Marietta Isip issued two (2) personal checks
dated March 17 and 30, 1984, respectively, for P50,000.00 each as
partial payment for the jewelry. The receipt of the jewelry was
acknowledged by Marietta Isip with Manuel acting as a witness (pp.
9-11, tsn, ibid).

Crim. Case Value of Date of Receipt Agreed Date Check No./Date Amount This particular men's ring is the subject of Criminal Case No. 378-
No. Jewelry 03-07-84 of Return 84 for Estafa while Check Nos. 518644 and 518645 (Pacific
257-84 P150,000 03-20-84 03-30-84 030086/03-12-84 P150,000 Banking Corp.) dated March 17 and 30, respectively, are the
260-84 P95,000 03-20-84 03-27-84 518647/03-25-84 P95,000 subject of Criminal Case Nos. 147-84 and 148-84.
261-84 P562,000 02-03-84 03-27-84 518672/03-27-84 P562,000
378-84 P200,000 - 518644/03-17-84 P50,000 In the morning of March 7, 1984, the Isip couple went again to
518645/03-30-84 P50,000 complainant's residence in Caridad, Cavite City where complainant
delivered one (1) Choker Pearl with 35 pieces of south sea pearls
When arraigned on the charges, petitioner and Marietta Isip with diamond worth P150,000.00. The condition was that the
pleaded not guilty. There being only one complainant in all the proceeds be turned over to complainant on or before March 30,
cases, joint trial of the cases followed. 1984 (pp. 27-29, tsn, ibid). March 30, 1984 came, but instead of
turning over the proceeds or return the Choker Pearl, Mrs. Isip
The versions of the prosecution and the defense, as taken by the issued a check dated March 12, 1984 for P150,000.00 (RCBC check
Court of Appeals in the parties' respective briefs, are the following: No. 030086) as payment (p. 34, ibid).

i) Prosecution Version.'
Sometime in 1982, appellant spouses Manuel and Marietta Isip
were introduced to complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose. The
introduction was made by complainant's father, Nemesio, business
associate of the Isips. Nemesio and the Isips were then engaged in
the buy and sell of pledged and unredeemed jewelry pawned by
gambling habitués (pp. 8-16, tsn, June 8, 1993).
Needing a bigger capital to finance the growing operation, the Isips
convinced complainant to be their capitalist, a proposition to which
complainant acceded to (p. 14, ibid).
This is the subject of Criminal Case No. 254-84 for Estafa against
the spouses and Criminal Case No. 149-84 for violation of BP 22
against Marietta Isip.
In the afternoon of the same day, Mr. Manuel Isip went to
complainant's residence in Cavite City and got from the latter a
men's ring (7 carats) worth P200,000.00. Mr. Isip signed a receipt
with the condition that he return the ring or deliver the proceeds, if
sold, on or before March 15, 1984. March 15, 1984 came, but Mr.
Isip sought an extension which fell due on April 7, 1984. April 7,
1984 came and went by, but Mr. Isip defaulted (pp. 41-46, tsn,
ibid). The above is the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 136-84
for Estafa against Manuel Isip.
On March 20, 1984, the Isips went again to Cavite City and got
from complainant one (1) Dome shaped ring with matching earring
with diamonds valued at P120,000.00. As with their previous
agreement, the item was to be returned or the proceeds of the sale
be delivered on March 21, 1984 (pp. 48-52, tsn, ibid). The
following morning, however, Mrs. Isip issued two (2) personal
checks (Check Nos. 518646 and 518669 dated March 29, 1984
for P90,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively) in payment for the
Dome shaped ring (p. 53, tsn, ibid).
This is the subject of Criminal Case No. 256084 for Estafa against
the spouses Isip and Criminal Case Nos. 156-84 and and (sic) 157-
84 for Violation of BP 22 against Marietta Isip.
At noontime on the same day, the Isip couple went back to the
residence of complainant and got from him one (1) collar heart
shaped necklace and one (1) baguette necklace worth P95,000.00
(p. 60, tsn, ibid). As agreed upon, Marietta Isip signed a receipt
with the condition that the jewelry or the proceeds thereof be
delivered to complainant on March 27, 1984. The Isips defaulted
and instead, Mrs. Isip issued a check (Check No. 518647) dated
March 27, 1984 in the amount of P90,000.00 (pp. 3-5, tsn, October
22, 1993).
The subject pieces of jewelry are the subject of Criminal Case No.
260-84 for Estafa against the Isip couple and Criminal Case No.
155-84 for Violation of BP 22 against Marietta Isip.
Again, in the early evening of March 20, 1984, the Isips went to
complainant informing him that Balikbayan doctors are having a
convention in Vigan, Ilocos Sur saying that, that was the most
opportune time to sell jewelries. Assorted pieces of jewelry were
delivered to Mrs. Isip as reflected in a receipt duly signed by her
(Exhibit 'O' ) acknowledging the value thereof to the tune
of P562,000.00.
Exhibit 'O' contained the promise that the jewelry or proceeds
thereof will be delivered on March 27, 1984. Inspite of the promise
contained in Exhibit 'O', Mrs. Isip issued a postdated check (Check
No. 51867) dated March 27, 1984 in the amount of P562,000.00 as
payment for the assorted pieces of jewelry (pp. 8-12, tsn, October
22, 1993).
This is the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 261-84 for Estafa
against the couple and Criminal Case No. 146-84 against Marietta
Isip for Violation of BP 22.
All of the checks covered by the above transactions were deposited
on April 6, 1984 (p. 14, tsn, ibid), but all of them bounced for
being drawn against insufficient funds. Demand letters sent to the
couple proved futile (pp. 15-20, ibid).
ii) Defense Version.
During all the times material to these cases, complainant Leonardo
Jose, who had his residence at Room 411, 4th Floor, Plaza Towers
Condominium on (sic) 3375 Guerrero Street, Ermita, Manila, but
claims he had his ancestral home at 506 P. Burgos Street, Caridad,
Cavite, was an employee of the Bureau of Customs, having been so
since 1964 (Tr., 6/8/93, 7). Upon the other hand, appellants
Manuel S. Isip (Manuel hereafter) and Marietta M. Isip (Marietta
hereafter) are spouses, residents at 3635 M. Arellano Street,
Bacood, Sta. Mesa, Manila (Tr., 8/29/93, 4) and engaged in various
business undertakings in Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Baguio City,
Olongapo City and Bataan (Tr., Idem, 9; Tr., 10/2/95, 13) -
appellant Manuel, in the brokerage and trucking business; while
appellant Marietta, in that of selling jewelry and financing, as well
as in PX goods, real estate and cars, which she started when she
was still single (Tr., Idem, 9-10; Tr., 10/2/95, 12). In 1982, at the
casino in Olongapo City, appellant Marietta started obtaining
jewelry from losing or financially-strapped players which she
repledged as security for financing she obtained from one Nemesio
Jose, father of complainant Leonardo Jose (Tr., Idem, 11-12; Tr.,
Idem, 14). After about a year, when Nemesio Jose ran short of
capital, he referred appellants to his son, complainant Leonardo
Jose, with address at the Plaza Towers Condominium aforesaid for
needed financing (Tr., Idem, 13-14; Tr., Idem, 17-19). Beginning
early 1983, at complainant's residence at Plaza Tower
Condominium in Manila, appellant Marietta, accompanied by her
husband who participated only as a witness, started having
transactions with complainant who, on different dates in February,
March and April, 1984, extended various amounts to her for which
appellant Marietta pledged jewelry which, in turn, were agreed
between her and complainant to be sold on commission and to turn
over the proceeds thereof or return the jewelry to complainant
(Tr., Idem, 16-18). In the course of the transactions, appellant
Marietta had issued several checks to complainant as guarantee for
the payment of the subject jewelry which have either been paid or
redeemed, had returned the unsold jewelry to complainant and had
conveyed, by way of payment for other jewelry, some personal
properties, like brass and antics, and real properties in Balanga,
Bataan and Mabalacat, Pampanga, to complainant who caused the
same to be registered in the names of his son, Christian Jose, and
his wife, Zenaida Jose (Exhibits 1, 2, 2-A, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6-A, 7, 7-A),
with the result that all the obligations of appellants to complainant
have already been paid for or offset (Tr., Idem, 23; Tr., Idem, 24,
34-36, 37-39; Tr., 3/4/96, 7-8). Also, all the checks that appellant
Marietta issued which were initially dishonored have already been
(sic) (Tr., 10/2/95, 25-30; Tr., 3/4/96, 8-9). In fact, complainant
caused the dismissal of some cases he filed against appellants.
Complainant however failed to return some of the redeemed
and/or paid checks issued to him by appellant Marietta on the
pretext that he did not bring them (Tr., 3/4/96, 20). Inasmuch as
appellant Marietta incurred some default in payment and
complainant suspected that she would not be able to redeem the
checks or pay for the pledged jewelry, complainant demanded that
appellants sign certain documents to avoid any misunderstanding,
with threat of prosecution before the Cavite courts if they do not
comply (Tr., Idem, 19-20; Tr., 3/4/96, 5-6). So, in order to
maintain good relations with complainant, appellant Marietta
signed the document acknowledging obligations to him in one
sitting, which appellant Manuel witnessed (Tr., Idem, 21-22).
Later, appellants learned that, although all the transactions were
entered into in Manila, complainant filed the cases herein before
the Cavite Regional Trial Court (Tr., Idem, 23-24).7
On November 25, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion thereof reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused
Dra. Marietta M. Isip guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a (sic)
violation of B.P. 22 in Crim. Cases Nos. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84,
149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84 and she is hereby sentenced
to undergo imprisonment of One (1) year of prision correctional
(sic) in each case; and of Estafa in the following Crim. Cases: No.
256-84 where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from
Twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to Twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the
complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of P120,000.00 for
the value of the articles misappropriated; Crim. Case No. 257-84
where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve
(12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the
complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of P150,000.00;
Crim. Case No. 260-84 where she is sentenced to undergo
imprisonment of, from Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty.
Leonardo Jose the amount of P95,000.00; Crim. Case No. 261-84
where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve
(12) years and One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to
Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to
indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount
of P562,000.00; Crim. Case No. 378-84 where she is sentenced to
undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years and One (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the
complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of P200,000.00 and
to pay the costs.
Likewise, accused Manuel Isip is acquitted in Crim. Cases Nos. 256-
84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84. However, in Crim. Case
No. 136-84, he is hereby found guilty of Estafa and he is hereby
sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years
and One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to indemnify the
complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose in the amount of P200,000.00
value of the jewelry misappropriated, and to pay the costs. 8
In ruling the way it did, the RTC found that the transactions
involved in these cases were sufficiently shown to have taken place
at complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose's ancestral house in Cavite City
when the latter was on leave of absence from the Bureau of
Customs where he was connected. It said the defense failed to
substantially prove its allegations that the transactions occurred in
Manila, particularly in the Towers Condominium, and that
complainant is a resident of Bigasan, Makati. It added that the
testimony of Marietta Isip that the money with which the
complainant initially agreed to finance their transactions was
withdrawn from the Sandigan Finance in Cavite City further refuted
the defense's claim that the transactions happened in Manila. The
trial court likewise found the defense's contention, that the
obligations were already paid and set-off with the turnover to
complainant of personal and real properties, to be untenable for it
is contrary to human nature to demand payment when the same
had already been made and the alleged set-offs were for other
cases which were settled amicably and subsequently dismissed
upon motion of the City Prosecutor's Office at the instance of the
complainant.
The trial court was convinced that accused Marietta Isip
misappropriated the pieces of jewelry involved in Criminal Cases
No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 and violated
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 when she issued the checks mentioned in
Criminal Cases No. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-
84 and 157-84. As to petitioner, the trial court acquitted him in
Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84
finding him to have acted as a mere witness when he signed the
receipts involved in said cases, but found him liable in Criminal
Case No. 136-84 for misappropriating a 7-carat diamond men's
ring which he secured from the complainant.
Aggrieved, petitioner and spouse appealed to the Court of Appeals
assigning the following as errors:
-I-
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF AND
DECIDING THE CASES AGAINST APPELLANTS AND IN NOT
DISMISSING THE SAME UPON THE GROUND THAT NONE OF THE
ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED THEREIN
WAS COMMITTED WITH (SIC) ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.
- II -
THE TRIAL COURT, ASSUMING IT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE
CASES BELOW, ERRD IN NOT HOLDING THAT NO CRIMINAL
LIABILITY UNDER BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22 WAS INCURRED BY
APPELLANT MARIETTA M. ISIP FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE
SUBJECT CHECKS INASMUCH AS SAID CHECKS WERE ISSUED AS
MERE GUARANTY FOR OBLIGATIONS INCURRED.
- III -
THE TRIAL COURT, ASSUMING ANY INCIPIENT LIABILITY FOR THE
CRIME OF ESTAFA HAD BEEN INCURRED BY APPELLANTS IN THE
PREMISES, ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT SUCH INCIPIENT
LIABILITY HAD BEEN EXTINGUISHED BY PAYMENTS/REDEMPTIONS
MADE AND/OR NOVATION ENTERED INTO BETWEEN
COMPLAINANT AND SAID APPELLANTS.
- IV -
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANTS MANUEL S.
ISIP AND MARIETTA M. ISIP GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF THE CRIMES OF ESTAFA AND VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA
BLG. 22 RESPECTFULLY IMPUTED UPON THEM AND IN NOT
ACQUITTING THEM UPON THE GROUND THAT THEIR GUILT
THEREOF, OR OF ANY CRIME FOR THAT MATTER, HAD NOT BEEN
ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND/OR THAT THE
LIABILITY INCURRED BY THEM, IF ANY, IS MERELY CIVIL.9
Before the Court of Appeals could have decided the case, Marietta
Isip died thereby extinguishing her criminal and civil liability, if
any.
In a decision promulgated 26 October 2004, the Court of Appeals
disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite City (Branch XVII)'
1. In Crim. Case No. 136-84 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that the sentence imposed on accused-appellant
Manuel S. Isip shall be two (2) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and that the sum of P200,000.00 he was ordered to pay
to Leonardo A. Jose shall bear interest at the legal rate from filing
of the information until fully paid;
2. In Crim. Cases Nos. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84,
156-84 and 157-84 is REVERSED and accused-appellant Marietta
M. Isip ACQUITTED of the crimes charged;
3. In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-
84 is REVERSED and accused-appellants Manuel S. Isip and
Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED of the crimes charged, but ordering
them to pay to Leonardo A. Jose, jointly and severally, the sums
of P120,000.00, P150,000.00, P95,000.00, P562,000.00
and P200,000.00 representing the amounts involved in said cases,
plus interest thereon at the legal rate from filing of the information
until fully paid.10
The Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's finding that the
venue was properly laid and that the checks were delivered by the
two accused and/or that the transactions transpired at
complainant's ancestral home in Cavite City, and that,
consequently, the offenses charged took place within its territorial
jurisdiction. With respect to the seven counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, the appellate court acquitted Marietta Isip of
the charges on the ground that since the checks involved were
issued prior to 8 August 1984, the dishonor thereof did not give
rise to a criminal liability pursuant to Ministry Circular No. 4 of the
Ministry of Justice.
As to the Estafa cases (Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-
84, 261-84 and 378-84), the Court of Appeals ruled that since the
checks issued by Marietta Isip as payment for the pieces of jewelry
were dishonored, there was no payment to speak of. It also found
the defense's claim of redemption/dacion en pago - that real and
personal properties were conveyed to complainant who executed
affidavits of desistance and caused the dismissal of some of the
cases - to be unmeritorious. However, the appellate court ruled
that though novation does not extinguish criminal liability, it may
prevent the rise of such liability as long at it occurs prior to the
filing of the criminal information in court. In these five cases, it
ruled that there was novation because complainant accepted the
checks issued by Marietta Isip as payment for the pieces of jewelry
involved in said cases. Consequently, the Court of Appeals
acquitted Marietta and petitioner,11 but held them liable to
complainant for the value of the jewelry involved.
As regards Criminal Case No. 136-84 for estafa against petitioner,
the appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling of conviction. It
found petitioner's claims that he did not receive the jewelry
worthP200,000.00 mentioned in the information; that the receipt
he issued for said jewelry was among those documents which were
forced upon him to sign under threat of criminal prosecution; and
that he signed the same to preserve his friendship with
complainant, to be not persuasive.
On 17 November 2004, petitioner, for himself and in representation
of his deceased wife, Marietta Isip, filed a Partial Motion for
Reconsideration insofar as it affirmed his conviction in Criminal
Case No. 136-84 and adjudged him civilly liable, jointly and
severally, with Marietta Isip in Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84,
260-84, 261-84 and 378-84.12
On 26 October 2005, the Court of Appeals, taking into account the
death of Marietta M. Isip prior to the promulgation of its decision,
rendered an Amended Decision with the following dispositive
portion:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated October 26, 2004 is AMENDED in
respect to par. 3 of the dispositive portion thereof which shall now
read as follows:
"3. In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-
84 is REVERSED, accused-appellants Manuel S. Isip and Marietta
M. Isip ACQUITTED of the crimes charged and the civil aspect of
those cases DISMISSED."13
Petitioner is now before us appealing his conviction in Criminal
Case No. 136-84. He raises the following issues:
First - WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION
OVER THE OFFENSE IMPUTED TO PETITIONER AND FOR WHICH HE
WAS CONVICTED;
Second - WHETHER THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY SHOWS THAT
PETITIONER RECEIVED THE SUBJECT OF SAID OFFENSE OR THAT
HE RECEIVED IT IN CAVITE CITY; andcralawlibrary
Third, WHETHER THE INCIPIENT CRIMINAL LIABILITY ARISING
FROM SAID OFFENSE, IS (sic) ANY, WAS EXTINGUISHED BY
NOVATION.
On the first issue, petitioner maintains that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the estafa charge in Criminal Case No. 136-84 and
it is pure speculation and conjectural, if not altogether improbable
or manifestly absurd, to suppose that any of the essential elements
of the Estafa charged in Criminal Case No. 136-84 took place in
Cavite City. First, he states that the residence of the parties is
immaterial and that it is the situs of the transaction that counts. He
argues that it is non sequitur that simply because complainant had
an alleged ancestral house in Caridad, Cavite, complainant actually
lived there and had the transactions there with him when he and
his late wife were actual residents of Manila. Mere convenience
suggests that their transaction was entered into in Manila. He adds
that the source of the fund used to finance the transactions is
likewise inconsequential because it is where the subject item was
delivered and received by petitioner and/or where it was to be
accounted for that determines venue where Estafa, if any, may be
charged and tried. Second, he further argues that it does not follow
that because complainant may have been on leave from the
Bureau of Customs, the transactions were necessarily entered into
during that leave and in Cavite City. He asserts that there is no
competent proof showing that during his leave of absence, he
stayed in Cavite City; and that the transactions involved, including
the subject of Criminal Case 136-84 covering roughly the period
from February to April 1984, coincided with his alleged leave.
The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil
cases, is jurisdictional.14 The place where the crime was committed
determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential
element of jurisdiction.15 It is a fundamental rule that for
jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense
should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients
should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where
the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense
allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take
jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly
committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the
jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so
shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case.
However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the
offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss
the action for want of jurisdiction.16
In the case at bar, we, like the RTC and the Court of Appeals, are
convinced that the venue was properly laid in the RTC of Cavite
City. The complainant had sufficiently shown that the transaction
covered by Criminal Case No. 136-84 took place in his ancestral
home in Cavite City when he was on approved leave of
absence17 from the Bureau of Customs. Since it has been shown
that venue was properly laid, it is now petitioner's task to prove
otherwise, for it is his claim that the transaction involved was
entered into in Manila. The age-old but familiar rule that he who
alleges must prove his allegations applies.18
In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and
competent evidence that the transaction happened in Manila.
Petitioner argues that since he and his late wife actually resided in
Manila, convenience alone unerringly suggests that the transaction
was entered into in Manila. We are not persuaded. The fact that
Cavite City is a bit far from Manila does not necessarily mean that
the transaction cannot or did not happen there. Distance will not
prevent any person from going to a distant place where he can
procure goods that he can sell so that he can earn a living. This is
true in the case at bar. It is not improbable or impossible for
petitioner and his wife to have gone, not once, but twice in one
day, to Cavite City if that is the number of times they received
pieces of jewelry from complainant. Moreover, the fact that the
checks issued by petitioner's late wife in all the transactions with
complainant were drawn against accounts with banks in Manila or
Makati likewise cannot lead to the conclusion that the transactions
were not entered into in Cavite City.
It is axiomatic that when it comes to credibility, the trial court's
assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and
binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact
or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious.
Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses'
deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better
position than the appellate court to evaluate properly testimonial
evidence.19 It is to be pointed out that the findings of fact of the
trial court have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is settled
that when the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the
appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding
upon this Court.20 In the case at bar, we find no compelling reason
to reverse the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, and to apply the exception. We so hold that there is
sufficient evidence to show that the particular transaction took
place in Cavite City.
On the second issue, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals'
holding that the ring subject of Crim. Case No. 136-84 was
delivered to and received by petitioner is seriously flawed. He
argues that assuming he signed the receipt evidencing delivery of
the ring, not due to the threat of prosecution but merely to
preserve his friendship with complainant, the fact remains that
there is no showing that the ring was actually delivered to him.
Petitioner insists there is no competent evidence that the ring
subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84 was ever actually received by,
or delivered to, him.
We find his contentions untenable. The finding of the Court of
Appeals that petitioner received the ring subject of Criminal Case
No. 136-84 is supported by the evidence on record. The
acknowledgment receipt21 executed by petitioner is very clear
evidence that he received the ring in question. Petitioner's claim
that he did not receive any ring and merely executed said receipt
in order to preserve his friendship with the complainant deserves
scant consideration.
Petitioner, an astute businessman as he is, knows the significance,
import and obligation of what he executed and signed. The
following disputable presumptions weigh heavily against petitioner,
namely: (a) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of
his voluntary act; (b) That a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns; (c) That private transactions have been fair and regular;
and (d) That the ordinary course of business has been
followed 22 Thus, it is presumed that one does not sign a document
without first informing himself of its contents and consequences.
We know that petitioner understood fully well the ramification of
the acknowledgment receipt he executed. It devolves upon him
then to overcome these presumptions. We, however, find that he
failed to do so. Aside from his self-serving allegation that he signed
the receipt to preserve his friendship with complainant, there is no
competent evidence that would rebut said presumptions. It is clear
from the evidence that petitioner signed the acknowledgment
receipt when he received the ring from complainant in Cavite City.
Petitioner's argument that he did not receive the subject ring 23 is
further belied by the testimony of his wife when the latter testified
that said ring was borrowed by him on 7 March 1984.24 In all, the
delivery of the ring and the transaction regarding the same
occurred in Cavite City.
Anent the third issue, petitioner argues that, assuming gratia
argumenti that any criminal liability was incurred by petitioner
respecting the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84, the same
was incipient, at best, and was effectively extinguished by
novation. The personal and real properties delivered/conveyed to
complainant were more than sufficient to cover or offset whatever
balance remained of the obligations incurred as shown by the fact
that complainant executed Affidavits of Desistance and caused the
dismissal of some of the cases filed. He maintains that the Court of
Appeals did not apply the rule of novation as regards the ring
subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84 because it rejected his denial
of receipt of said ring and his claim that he signed the receipt
supposedly covering the same under threat of prosecution and
merely to preserve their good relations. He claims the Court should
not have denied the application of the rule of novation on said case
because the rejected initial claim (that he did not receive the ring
and that he signed the receipt to preserve their good relations) was
but an alternative defense and its rejection is not a reason to deny
the application of the novation rule in said case.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that novation25 cannot be
applied in Criminal Case No. 136-84. The claim of petitioner that
the personal and real properties conveyed to complainant and/or to
his family were more than sufficient to cover or offset whatever
balance remained of the obligations incurred has no basis. If it
were true that the properties delivered to complainant were
sufficient, the latter would have caused the dismissal of all, not
some as in this instance, the cases against petitioner and his late
wife. This, complainant did not do for the simple reason that the
properties conveyed to him were not enough to cover all the
obligations incurred by petitioner and his deceased wife.
Complainant testified that the properties he received were in
settlement of cases other than the cases being tried herein.26 In
particular, he said that petitioner and his spouse settled eight
cases which were subsequently dismissed when they delivered
properties as payment.27 It follows then that the obligations
incurred by petitioner and his spouse were not yet settled when the
criminal cases herein tried were filed.
His contention, that the Court of Appeals did not apply the rule of
novation in Criminal Case No. 136-84 because it rejected or did not
believe his (alternative) defense of denial, is untenable. The main
reason why the Court of Appeals did not apply novation in said
case was that not all the elements of novation are present. For
novation to take place, four essential requisites have to be met,
namely, (1) a previous valid obligation; (2) an agreement of all
parties concerned to a new contract; (3) the extinguishment of the
old obligation; and (4) the birth of a valid new obligation. In
Criminal Case No. 136-84, only the first element is extant. What
distinguishes this case from Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84,
260-84, 261-84 and 378-84, where the Court of Appeals applied
the rule of novation, was that there were checks issued as
payment, though subsequently dishonored, for the pieces of
jewelry involved. In Criminal Case No. 136-84, it is very clear that
neither petitioner nor his wife issued any check as payment for the
subject ring that could have extinguished his old obligation and
brought to life a new obligation.
From the allegations of the information in Criminal Case No. 136-
84, it is clear that petitioner was charged with Estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1(b), of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of
estafa with abuse of confidence are: (1) the offender receives the
money, goods or other personal property in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (2) the
offender misappropriates or converts such money or property or
denies receiving such money or property; (3) the misappropriation
or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) the
offended party demands that the offender return the money or
property.28 All these are present in this case. Petitioner received
from complainant a seven-carat diamond (men's ring), valued
at P200,000.00, for the purpose of selling the same on commission
basis and to deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof or return the
jewelry if not sold. Petitioner misappropriated or converted said
ring for his own benefit and even denied receiving the same.
Despite repeated demands from complainant, petitioner failed to
return the ring or the proceeds of the sale thereof causing damage
and prejudice to complainant in the amount of P200,000.00.

As to the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on petitioner,

we find the same to be in order.

WHEREFORE, the decision and amended decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 21275 dated 26 October 2004 dated 26
October 2005, respectively, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 164631 : June 26, 2009]
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. RENE RALLA
BELISTA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court filed by Land Bank of the Philippines
(petitioner), seeking to annul and set aside the May 26, 2004
Decision1 and the July 28, 2004 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 81096.
The antecedent facts and proceedings, as narrated by the CA, are
as follows:
It appears that spouses Pablo Ralla and Carmen Munoz Ralla had
donated their eight (8) parcels of lot located in Ligao, Albay to their
daughter, Rene Ralla Belista, the herein private respondent.
The eight (8) parcels of lot were placed by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR, for brevity) under the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (Presidential Decree No.
27 and Executive Order No. 228). Consequently, private
respondent claimed payment of just compensation over said
agricultural lands.
It further appears that the DAR's evaluation of the subject farms
was only P227,582.58, while petitioner Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP, for brevity) assessed the same at P317,259.31.
Believing that her lots were grossly underestimated, private
respondent, on 11 November 2002, filed a Petition for Valuation
and Payment of Just Compensation against petitioning bank before
the DARAB-Regional Adjudicator for Region V (RARAD-V) docketed
as DCN D-05-02-VC-005.
On 07 July 2003, the RARAD-V issued a Decision, in favor of herein
private respondent, the fallo of which reads:
Wherefore, just compensation for the subject areas is hereby
preliminarily fixed at TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED NINETY-SIX
THOUSAND and FOUR HUNDRED EIGHT & 91/100 (P2,896,408.91)
PESOS. Land Bank of the Philippines, Legaspi City, is hereby
ordered to pay herein petitioner said amount pursuant to existing
rules and guidelines, minus the sum already remitted per Order
dated January 2, 2003.
SO ORDERED.
As both parties interposed their respective motions for
reconsideration, the RARAD-V eventually issued an Order dated 8
October 2003, the decretal portion of which reads:
Wherefore, the Decision dated July 7, 2003 is MODIFIED, fixing the
valuation claim of petitioner herein with respect to her due share in
the above lots to the tune of Two Million Five Hundred Forty
Thousand, Two Hundred Eleven and 58/100 (P2,540,211.58)
Pesos. Land Bank Legaspi City is hereby ordered to pay herein
petitioner said amount pursuant to existing rules and guidelines,
minus the sum already paid per Order dated January 2, 2003.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, petitioner Bank, on 28 October 2003, filed an original
Petition for Determination of Just Compensation at the same sala
of the RTC, docketed as Agrarian Case No. 03-06.
The court a quo motu propio dismissed the case when it issued the
herein first assailed Order dated 12 November 2003 "for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies and/or comply with Sections 5, 6,
and 7, Rule XIX, 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure.
Petitioner LBP lodged a Motion for Reconsideration arguing, inter
alia, "that the DARAB 2003 Rules of Procedure does not apply to
SAC nor its precursor DARAB Case and that the ground for
dismissal of the case is not among the instances when a court may
dismiss a case on its motion."
As the court a quo denied its Motion for Reconsideration in an
Order dated 28 November 2003, petitioner LBP elevated the case
before the Tribunal through the present Petition for Review,
theorizing:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE SAC A QUO ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
CASE MOTU PROPIO ON THE GROUND OF PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO
EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
II. WHETHER OR NOT SECTIONS 5, 6, AND 7, RULE XIX OF THE
DARAB 2003 RULES OF PROCEDURE APPLY TO CASES FILED AND
PENDING BEFORE THE DARAB OR ITS ADJUDICATORS PRIOR TO
ITS EFFECTIVITY AND TO CASES FILED AND PENDING WITH THE
SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURTS.3
On May 26, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision dismissing
the petition.
The CA ruled that under Section 5, Rule XIX of the 2003 DARAB
Rules of Procedure, an appeal from the adjudicator's resolution
shall be filed before the DARAB and not before the RTC; that
petitioner's filing of the case before the RTC without first seeking
the intervention of the DARAB is violative of the doctrine of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies. The CA found that
petitioner's petition for determination of just compensation was
filed in the RTC on October 28, 2003 when the 2003 DARAB Rules
of Procedure was already in effect, i.e., on February 8, 2003, and
under its transitory provision, it is provided that the 2003 Rules
shall govern all cases filed on or after its effectivity; and, since an
appeal from the adjudicator's resolution should first be filed with
the DARAB, the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), did
not err in dismissing petitioner's petition.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a
Resolution dated July 28, 2004.
Petitioner is now before the Court raising the following arguments:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN LAW IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION FOR REVIEW CONSIDERING THAT THE LBP DID NOT
VIOLATE THE "DOCTRINE OF NON-EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES" WHEN IT FILED THE ORIGINAL
PETITION FOR DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION BEFORE
THE COURT A QUO WITHOUT FIRST SEEKING THE INTERVENTION
OF THE DARAB.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE
APPLICABLE RULE IS THE 2003 DARAB RULES OF PROCEDURE,
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PETITION (FOR VALUATION AND
PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION) WAS FILED BEFORE THE
RARAD ON NOVEMBER 11, 2002.4
Petitioner contends that the petition for valuation and payment of
just compensation was filed with the DARAB - Regional Adjudicator
for Region V (RARAD) on November 11, 2002, long before the
effectivity of the 2003 Rules of Procedure; that under the transitory
provision of the 2003 DARAB Rules, all cases pending with the
Board and the adjudicators prior to the date of the Rules' effectivity
shall be governed by the DARAB Rules prevailing at the time of
their filing; that clear from the transitory provision that it is the
proceeding of the DARAB which is governed by the 2003 DARAB
Rules of Procedure, thus, it is the date of filing of the petition with
the DARAB or any of its adjudicators which is the reckoning date of
the applicability of the 2003 DARAB Rules and not the date of filing
with the SAC; that under the 1994 DARAB Rules prevailing at the
time of the filing of the respondent's claim for just compensation,
the Rules provided that the decision of the adjudicator on land
valuation and preliminary determination of just compensation shall
not be appealable to the Board, but shall be brought directly to the
RTC; that it was in the observance of the 1994 DARAB Rules that
petitioner brought the adjudicator's decision to the RTC sitting as
SAC.
In his Comment, respondent claims that petitioner's petition with
the RTC is an original action and, since the case was filed at a time
when appeal to the DARAB Central Office was already provided in
the 2003 DARAB Rules before resorting to judicial action, the RTC
correctly dismissed the petition, which was correctly affirmed by
the CA.
Petitioner filed a Reply reiterating its arguments in the petition.
The issue for resolution is whether it is necessary that in cases
involving claims for just compensation under Republic Act (RA) No.
6657 that the decision of the Adjudicator must first be appealed to
the DARAB before a party can resort to the RTC sitting as SAC.
The court rules in the negative.
Sections 50 and 57 of RA No. 6657 provide:
Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. - The DAR is hereby
vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) x x x
Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. - The Special Agrarian Court shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners, and the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. x x x
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases
under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from
submission of the case for decision.
Clearly, under Section 50, DAR has primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation
of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the DA and the DENR. Further exception to the DAR's
original and exclusive jurisdiction are all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners and the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA No. 6657, which are
within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian
Court. Thus, jurisdiction on just compensation cases for the taking
of lands under RA No. 6657 is vested in the courts.
In Republic v. CA,5 the Court explained:
Thus, Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are
given original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of
cases, to wit: (1) "all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners" and (2) "the prosecution of all
criminal offenses under [R.A. No. 6657]." The provisions of '50
must be construed in harmony with this provision by considering
cases involving the determination of just compensation and
criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the
plenitude of power conferred on the DAR. Indeed, there is a reason
for this distinction. The DAR is an administrative agency which
cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain (for
such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal cases.
Thus, in EPZA v. Dulay and Sumulong v. Guerrero - we held that
the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial
function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies, while
in Scoty's Department Store v. Micaller, we struck down a law
granting the then Court of Industrial Relations jurisdiction to try
criminal cases for violations of the Industrial Peace Act.6
In a number of cases, the Court has upheld the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, sitting as SAC, over all petitions
for determination of just compensation to landowners in
accordance with Section 57 of RA No. 6657.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco,7 the Court upheld the
RTC's jurisdiction over Wycoco's petition for determination of just
compensation even where no summary administrative proceedings
was held before the DARAB which has primary jurisdiction over the
determination of land valuation. The Court held:
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the landowner
filed an action for determination of just compensation without
waiting for the completion of DARAB's re-evaluation of the land.
This, notwithstanding, the Court held that the trial court properly
acquired jurisdiction because of its exclusive and original
jurisdiction over determination of just compensation, thus'
'It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian
Court, has "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for
the determination of just compensation to landowners." This
"original and exclusive" jurisdiction of the RTC would be
undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative officials
original jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC an
appellate court for the review of administrative decisions. Thus,
although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of
adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is
clear from Sec. 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such
jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original
jurisdiction of the RTCs into an appellate jurisdiction would be
contrary to Sec. 57 and, therefore, would be void. Thus, direct
resort to the SAC [Special Agrarian Court] by private respondent is
valid.
In the case at bar, therefore, the trial court properly acquired
jurisdiction over Wycoco's complaint for determination of just
compensation. It must be stressed that although no summary
administrative proceeding was held before the DARAB, LBP was
able to perform its legal mandate of initially determining the value
of Wycoco's land pursuant to Executive Order No. 405, Series of
1990.8 x x x
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad,9 wherein Land Bank
questioned the alleged failure of private respondents to seek
reconsideration of the DAR's valuation, but instead filed a petition
to fix just compensation with the RTC, the Court said:
At any rate, in Philippine Veterans Bank v. CA, we held that there
is nothing contradictory between the DAR's primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation
of agrarian reform, which includes the determination of questions
of just compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while
the second refers to judicial proceedings.
In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary
jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary
manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the
agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to
challenge before the courts. The resolution of just compensation
cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all,
essentially a judicial function.
Thus, the trial court did not err in taking cognizance of the case as
the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to
the courts of justice.10
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada,11 where the issue was
whether the SAC erred in assuming jurisdiction over respondent's
petition for determination of just compensation despite the
pendency of the administrative proceedings before the DARAB, the
Court stated that:
It would be well to emphasize that the taking of property under RA
No. 6657 is an exercise of the power of eminent domain by the
State. The valuation of property or determination of just
compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a
judicial function which is vested with the courts and not with
administrative agencies. Consequently, the SAC properly took
cognizance of respondent's petition for determination of just
compensation.12
The RTC dismissed petitioner's petition for determination of just
compensation relying on Sections 5, 6 and 7 of Article XIX of the
2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, to wit:
Section 5. Appeal. A party who disagrees with the resolution of the
Adjudicator may bring the matter to the Board by filing with the
Adjudicator concerned a Notice of Appeal within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the resolution. The filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration of said resolution shall interrupt the period herein
fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the
appeal within the remaining period, but in no case shall it be less
than five (5) days.
Section 6. When Resolution Deemed Final. Failure on the part of
the aggrieved party to contest the resolution of the Adjudicator
within the aforecited reglementary period provided shall be
deemed a concurrence by such party with the land valuation,
hence said valuation shall become final and executory.
Section 7. Filing of Original Action with the Special Agrarian Court
for Final Determination. The party who disagrees with the decision
of the Board may contest the same by filing an original action with
the Special Agrarian Court (SAC) having jurisdiction over the
subject property within fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the
Board's decision.
Notably, the above-mentioned provisions deviated from Section 11,
Rule XIII of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure which provides:
Section 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and
Payment of Just Compensation - The decision of the Adjudicator on
land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just
compensation shall not be appealable to the Board, but shall be
brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special
Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice
thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for
reconsideration. where DARAB acknowledges that the decision of
just compensation cases for the taking of lands under RA 6657 is a
power vested in the courts.13 Although Section 5, Rule XIX of the
2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure provides that the land valuation
cases decided by the adjudicator are now appealable to the Board,
such rule could not change the clear import of Section 57 of RA No.
6657 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just
compensation is in the RTC. Thus, Section 57 authorizes direct
resort to the SAC in cases involving petitions for the determination
of just compensation.14 In accordance with the said Section 57,
petitioner properly filed the petition before the RTC and, hence, the
RTC erred in dismissing the case. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred by law.15 Only a statute can confer jurisdiction
on courts and administrative agencies while rules of procedure
cannot.16

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The

Decision dated May 26, 2004 and the Resolution dated July 28,
2004, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81096, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 3,
Legaspi City, sitting as Special Agrarian Court, is directed to hear
without delay petitioner's petition for the determination of just
compensation.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NOS. 173935-38 : December 23, 2008]
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, Petitioner, v. MA. ERLINDA I.
BILDNER, LILY F. RAQUEÑO, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, MA.
CRISTINA A. ILUSORIO, AND AURORA I.
MONTEMAYOR, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Respondents Ma. Erlinda Bildner and Lily Raqueño were charged
by Erlinda K. Ilusorio (petitioner) before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Pasig City with perjury arising from their filing,
on behalf of Lakeridge Development Corp. (LDC), of a petition in
the Makati City Regional Trial Court (RTC) for issuance of new
owner's duplicate copy of Certificate of Condominium Title (CCT)
No. 21578 covering a condominium unit in Makati. The Information
reads:
On or about November 4, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
falsely subscribe and swear to a Petition for Issuance of a
New Owner's Duplicate Copy of Condominium Certificate of
Title No. 21578 before Rafael Arsenio S. Dizon, a notary
public in and for Pasig City, duly appointed, qualified and acting
as such, and in which Petition said accused subscribed and swore
to, among other things, facts known to them to be untrue, that is:
That the Petitioners claim that the title was lost, which fact was
material matter and required by law to be stated in said Petition,
when in truth and in fact as the said accused very well knew at the
time they swore to and signed the said petition for Issuance of a
New Owner's Duplicate Copy of Condominium Certificate of Title
No. 21578, that said statement appearing in paragraph 4 of said
Petition:
"4. Pending registration of the mortgage document with the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City, the petitioners had their
respective offices, renovated and by reason thereof, documents
were moved from their usual places and thereafter, sometime in
the early part of the second quarter of this year, when petitioners
were ready to have the mortgage documents registered, the said
owner's duplicate copy of CCT No. 21578 could no longer be
located at the places where they may and should likely be
found despite earnest and diligent efforts of all the
petitioners to locate the same;" was false and untrue because
the said title was in the possession of the complainant, Erlinda K.
Ilusorio, and the above false statement was made in order to
obtain a New Owner's Duplicate Copy of Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21578, to the damage and prejudice of
complainant Erlinda K. Ilusorio.
Contrary to law.1 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)cralawlibrary
Three similarly worded Informations for perjury were also filed
against respondents Sylvia Ilusorio, Ma. Cristina
Ilusorio and Aurora Montemayor also before the Pasig City MeTC
arising from their filing of three petitions, also on behalf of LDC,
before the Tagaytay City RTC for issuance of new owner's duplicate
copy of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos.
17010,2 170113 and 170124 covering properties located in
Tagaytay City.
As the purported corporate officers of LDC, respondents filed the
above-mentioned petitions for issuance of new owner's duplicate
copies of titles over properties located in Makati City and Tagaytay
City after the owner's copies thereof could no longer be found
"despite earnest and diligent efforts" to locate the same.
Petitioner, alleging that she, as bona fide chairman and president
of LDC,5 has in her possession those titles, filed her opposition to
respondents' petitions.6 Respondents forthwith amended their
respective petitions,7 the amendments reading, according to
petitioner, as follows:
4. On November 4, 1999, in the belief that the aforesaid owner's
duplicate copy of CCT No. 21578 had been lost and can no longer
be recovered, the petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City a petition for the cancellation and issuance of a new
owner's duplicate copy of CCT No. 21578 in lieu of the lost copy;
5. However, after the jurisdictional facts and evidence had been
presented before the said court, the above-named respondents,
through their counsel, filed their opposition to the petition on the
ground that the said owner's duplicate copy of Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21578 allegedly is not lost and is actually in
their possession and, thereafter, in a subsequent hearing held
on February 10, 2000, said respondents, through counsel,
presented before this Honorable Court the duplicate copy of
said CCT No. 21578;
6. The owner's duplicate copy of CCT No. 21578, pursuant to law,
should be in the actual possession of the registered owner thereof
and it is indubitable that LAKERIDGE DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION is the registered owner entitled to the possession
and control of the evidence of ownership of all corporate
properties;
7. The respondents have no authority nor legal basis to take and
continue to have possession of said CCT No. 21578, not one of
them being a corporate officer of LAKERIDGE DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, the registered owner of said property;
xxx
9. The respondents, in the absence of any authority or right to take
possession of CCT No. 21578, should be ordered by this Honorable
Court to surrender the owner's duplicate copy thereof, which they
continue to hold without legal and/or justifiable reasons, not only
for the purpose of causing the registration of the mortgage thereof
in favor of the mortgagee/petitioner, Ma. Erlinda I. Bildner, but
also for the reason that it is the corporation, as owner of the
property, who [sic] is entitled to possession and control and
therefore, said CCT must, pursuant to law, be kept at the
corporation's principal place of business.
x x x x. (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied)
Using as bases the contents of the original petitions filed in the
Makati and Tagaytay RTCs,8 petitioner filed charges of falsification
of public documents and perjury against respondents before the
Pasig City Prosecutor's Office.9
By Resolution of April 6, 2000, Investigating Prosecutor Edgardo
Bautista, with the imprimatur of the City Prosecutor, dismissed the
falsification charges but found probable cause to indict respondents
for perjury.10 Four informations for perjury were accordingly filed
before the MeTC Pasig, one against respondents Ma. Erlinda I.
Bildner and Lily F. Raquero; another against respondents Sylvia K.
Ilusorio, Maria Cristina A. Ilusorio and Aurora Montemayor; still
another against respondents Sylvia K. Ilusorio, Maria Cristina A.
Ilusorio and Aurora Montemayor; and the last against respondents
Sylvia K. Ilusorio, Maria Cristina Ilusorio and Aurora Montemayor,
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 121496, 121497, 121498 and
121499, respectively.
After the consolidation of the Informations, respondents moved for
their quashal on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction due to improper
venue, lack of bases of the charges as the original petitions had
already been withdrawn, and privileged character of the
pleadings.11
Branch 72 of the Pasig City MeTC, by Order12 of June 13, 2001,
ruled that venue was properly laid, viz:
To determine the correct venue (territorial jurisdiction)[,] the vital
point is the allegations [sic] in the complaint or information of the
situs of the offense charged. If the complaint or information alleges
that the crime was committed in the place where the court has
jurisdiction, then that court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the
case. (Colmenares v. Villar, 33 SCRA 186). In other words, what is
important is the allegation in the complaint that the crime was
committed in the place which is within the court's jurisdiction
(Mediante v. Ortiz, 19 SCRA 832).
In the instant cases, the information [sic] allege that the offenses
were committed in Pasig City. Hence, pursuant to the aforecited
doctrinal rulings, this court has the venue or territorial jurisdiction
over these cases. (Underscoring supplied)
Nonetheless, finding that respondents' petitions are privileged, the
MeTC, citing Flordelis v. Judge Himalalaon13 and People v. Aquino,
et al.,14 granted the Motions to Quash, viz:
However, the Court finds the third ground[-privileged character of
the pleadings] meritorious. In the case of Flordelis v. Himalaloan,
(84 SCRA 477) which is also a prosecution for Perjury, the
Supreme Court held:
"x x x x
Moreover, it is likewise clear that any statement contained in an
appropriate pleading filed in court that is relevant to the issues in
the case to which it relates is absolutely priveleged [sic] and it is
the law that the same may not be made the subject of a criminal
prosecution. (People v. Aquino, 18 SCRA 555.)"
Similarly, the alleged perjurious statements in the instant cases are
contained in a Petition filed before the Regional Trial Courts of
Makati and Tagaytay Cities which are relevant to the case the same
being for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of a
certificate of title alleged to be lost.
x x x x.
As the facts charged herein do not constitute an offense and/or the
information contains averments which, if true, would nonetheless
constitute a legal excuse or jurisdiction [sic], quashal of the
Information[s] is thus in order.
x x x x. (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied)
Reconsideration of the quashal of the Informations having been
denied,15 petitioner appealed to the Pasig City RTC Branch 263 of
which, by Decision16 of January 25, 2006, affirmed the ruling of the
MeTC. After the denial of her motion for
reconsideration,17 petitioner filed with this Court the present
Petition for Review on Certiorari, 18 contending that:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RELYING ON THE CASES
OF FLORDELI[S] v. HIMALALOAN(84 SCRA 477) AND PEOPLE v.
AQUINO (18 SCRA 555) [IN HOLDING] THAT STATEMENTS MADE
IN PLEADINGS, EVEN IF PERJURIOUS OR FALSE, ARE ABSOLUTELY
PRIVILEGED AND NOT SUBJECT TO CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.
(Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner is of the view that People v. Aquino19 cited by the RTC
does not apply in the present controversy as that case involved a
libel case and "there is no authority which states that the rules on
absolute privileged statements in pleadings apply to both crimes of
perjury and libel."20
Neither, petitioner posits, does the also cited case of Flordelis v.
Himalaloan21 apply wherein the Court sustained the quashal of the
therein information for perjury as the answer to the complaint
containing the alleged false allegations did not have to be under
oath.
In their Comment, respondents initially burrow into the petition's
alleged procedural crack by underscoring the apparent disregard by
petitioner of the established policy of judicial hierarchy of courts,
pointing out that the petition should have been first filed with the
Court of Appeals.22
On the merits, respondents reiterate, in the main, the congruent
rulings of the MeTC and RTC that allegations made by the parties
or their counsel in a pleading are privileged in nature. Moreover,
they contend that since they had amended the original petitions,
there were no more bases for the charges of perjury." 23
A word first on the procedural question raised by respondents. The
present petition is one for review oncertiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, not a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65. Rule 41 of the Rules of Court (APPEAL FROM THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURTS), Section 2(c) provides that in all cases where only
questions of law are raised, the appeal "shall be to the Supreme
Court by Petition for Review in accordance with Rule
45."24 Indubitably, the issue tendered in this case is a question of
law, hence, there is no violation of the principle of hierarchy of
courts.
On the merits, the Court denies the petition on the ground that,
contrary to the lower courts' ruling,venue of the Informations was
improperly laid in Pasig.
The allegations in each of the Informations indicate Pasig as
the situs of the offense charged where respondents' petitions were
notarized. Albeit the Informations referred to the "subscribed and
sworn" petitions of respondents as bases of the charges, there is
no mention therein that those petitions were filed in Makati City
and Tagaytay City. The Complaint-Affidavits,25 which initiated the
criminal actions, reflect such jurisdictional details. Consider this
allegation:
6. On November 4, 1999, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and LILY F.
RAQUENO allegedly representing LAKERIDGE filed a verified
Petition for Issuance of a New Owner's Duplicate Copy of
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21578 before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City x x x x, (Emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied)
as well as this:
06. On November 10, 1999, AURORA I. MONTEMAYOR, SYLVIA
ILUSORIO, and MA. CRISTINA A. ILUSORIO allegedly representing
LAKERIDGE filed three (3) verified Petitions for Issuance of a
New Owner's Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
17010, 17011 and 17012 before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 18, Tagaytay City x x x x. (Emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied)
The allegation in each of the four similarly-worded Informations
that perjury was committed in Pasig is neither controlling nor
sufficient to show that the Pasig MeTC has jurisdiction over them.
The purported perjurious petition quoted in each of the
Informations in fact indicates that, with respect to the CCT of the
Registry of Deeds of Makati the TCTs of the Registry of Deeds of
Tagaytay, venue of the criminal action arising therefrom is in
Makati and Tagaytay, respectively.
Perjury is committed as follows:
Article 183, Revised Penal Code.
False Testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmations.
- The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any
person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not
being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles,
shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material
matter before a competent person authorized to administer an
oath in cases in which the law so requires.
x x x x26 (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
There are thus four elements to be taken into account "in
determining whether there is a prima faciecase" of perjury, viz:
(a) that the accused made a statement under oath or executed an
affidavit upon a material matter; (b) that the statement or affidavit
was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and
administer oath; (c) that in the statement or affidavit, the accused
made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and (d) that
the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required
by law or made for a legal purpose.27 (Citation omitted)
It is the deliberate making of untruthful statements upon any
material matter, however, before a competent person authorized to
administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires,28 which is
imperative in perjury29
Venue, in criminal cases, being jurisdictional,30 the action for
perjury must be instituted and tried in the municipality or territory
where the deliberate making of an untruthful statement upon any
matter was made, in this case, in Makati and Tagaytay.31
It was in Makati and Tagaytay where the intent to assert an alleged
falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful
statement finds relevance or materiality in deciding the issue of
whether new owner's duplicate copies of the CCT and TCTs may
issue.
Whether the perjurious statements contained in the four petitions
were subscribed and sworn in Pasig is immaterial, the gist of the
offense of perjury being the intentional giving of false statement.
So United States v. Cañet 32 teaches, viz:
It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so
long as it appears from the information that the defendant, by
means of such affidavit, "swore to" and knowingly submitted false
evidence, material to a point at issue in a judicial proceeding
pending in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province. The gist of
the offense charged is not the making of the affidavit in Manila, but
the intentional giving of false evidence in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo Province by means of such affidavit.33 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
While the Court finds that, contrary to the MeTC and RTC ruling,
venue of the Informations was improperly laid, and on that score
the Court denies the present petition as priorly stated, it is
confronting the sole issue raised by petitioner - whether the
questioned petitions of respondents are, as the MeTC held and
which the RTC affirmed, absolutely privileged on the basis of
Flordelis and Aquino.
The issue had already been addressed by the Court in Choa v.
People,34 in this wise:
Sison and Aquino both involve libel cases. In Sison, this Court
categorically stressed that the term "absolute privilege" (or
"qualified privilege") has an "established technical meaning, in
connection with civil actions for libel and slander." x x x x.
x x x x.
The Flordelis case is likewise not in point. There, Flordelis was
charged with perjury for having alleged false statements in his
verified answer. This Court held that no perjury could be
committed by Flordelis because "an answer to a complaint in an
ordinary civil action need not be under oath," thus, "it is at once
apparent that one element of the crime of perjury is absent x x x,
namely, that the sworn statement complained of must be required
by law." 35 (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)

Verily, both the MeTC and the RTC misappreciated this Court's
rulings in Flordelis and Aquino as respondents' petitions-bases of
the subject Informations for perjury are required by law to be
under oath.

WHEREFORE, the petition is, on the ground that the Metropolitan

Trial Court of Pasig has no jurisdiction over the Informations for
perjury against respondents, DENIED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 182926, June 22, 2015
ANA LOU B. NAVAJA, Petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL A. DE
CASTRO, OR THE ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OF MCTC
JAGNA-GARCIA-HERNANDEZ, DKT PHILS., INC.,
REPRESENTED BY ATTY. EDGAR BORJE, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, assailing the Decision1dated August 28, 2007 and the
Resolution2 dated May 7, 2008 rendered by the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 02353, which affirmed the Order dated
September 21, 2006 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Loay, Bohol, Branch 50, in SP Civil Action No. 0356.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
The instant case arose from a Complaint-Affidavit3 filed by private
respondent DKT Philippines, Inc., represented by Atty. Edgar Borje,
against petitioner Ana Lou B. Navaja, alleging that while she was
still its Regional Sales Manager, she falsified a receipt by making it
appear that she incurred meal expenses in the amount of
P1,810.00, instead of the actual amount of P810.00, at Garden
Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, and claimed reimbursement for it.
Navaja is charged with the crime of falsification of private
document before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Jagna-
Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2904. The
accusatory portion of the Information filed against her reads:
That on or about the 2nd day of October 2003, in the municipality
of Jagna, province of Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
prejudice a juridical person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously falsify a commercial receipt No. 6729 of Garden
Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, by making an alteration or intercalation in the
said receipt No. 6729 from EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P810.00)
to ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P1,810.00) and
thereafter accused used the said receipt to claim reimbursement
with DKT Philippines, Inc. represented by Atty. Edgar Borje and
accused as a result of which received the amount of P1,810.00 to
her own benefit; to the damage and prejudice of the offended
party in the amount to be proved during trial. Acts committed
contrary to the provision of Article 172, No. 2, in relation to Article
171, No. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
Tagbilaran City, (for Jagna, Bohol) February 10, 2005.4
On August 1, 2005, Navaja filed a Motion to Quash and Defer
Arraignment5 on the ground that none of the essential elements of
the crime of falsification of private document occurred in Jagna,
Bohol, hence, the MCTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the case due to improper venue.
In the Order dated November 2, 2005, the MCTC denied the
motion to quash and set the case for arraignment, the decretal
portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, the motion is DENIED, but considering however that
accused has already submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the
court by filing cash bond for their respective temporary liberty, set
this case for ARRAIGNMENT on November 22, 2005, at 10:00
o'clock in the morning at the Session Hall, 10th MCTC, Jagna,
Bohol.
The previous Court Order setting these cases for arraignment on
November 09, 2005, is hereby set aside.
SO ORDERED.6
Navaja filed a motion for reconsideration of the November 2, 2005
Order, but the MCTC denied it in a Resolution 7 dated January 24,
2006.
Navaja filed a petition for certiorari8 before the RTC, assailing the
November 2, 2005 Order and January 24, 2006 Resolution of the
MCTC for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
On September 21, 2006, the RTC issued an Order denying the
petition for certiorari for lack of legal basis or merit.9 On Navaja's
contention that the case for falsification of private document
against her was filed with the MCTC which has no jurisdiction due
to wrong venue, hence, the RTC ruled:
The contention of the petitioner is untenable. As correctly pointed
out by the MCTC, the improper venue was already resolved
squarely by the Regional State Prosecutor when he held that “there
are sufficient evidences (sic) indicating that the falsification took
place in Jagna”.
This court notes that in that particular resolution, reference was
made to the sworn statement of Ms. Cherly Lavaro who narrated
that after she issued the receipt to Ms. Navaja, the latter borrowed
her pen and in her presence wrote something on the said receipt.
The Regional State Prosecutor then concluded that Ms. Lavaro's
statement “describes an apparent scheme or pattern of altering
receipts right after issuance. The borrowing of the cashier's pen
and the use thereof must have been intended to create an
impression that the receipt was prepared by the cashier herself.”
In the same affidavit, Ms. Lavaro corroborated the affidavit of
another witness, which categorically states that Ms. Navaja was in
Jagna when the questioned receipt was issued.
If the court were to follow the logic of the petition, her claim that
her request for reimbursement was made in Cebu City not in
Jagna, Bohol, would likewise give no showing or indication that the
falsification was done in Cebu City. In other words, the said
contention would necessarily result in a “neither here no there”
situation.10
Navaja elevated the case on appeal with the CA.
In the Decision dated August 28, 2007, the CA dismissed Navaja's
appeal and affirmed in toto the September 21, 2006 RTC Order.
Navaja filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied it in
the Resolution dated May 7, 2008. Aggrieved, she filed the instant
petition for review on certiorari, raising the following issues:
I. THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF JAGNA, BOHOL[,] DOES NOT
HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT CRIMINAL CASE.
i. Not one of the essential elements of the alleged crime of
falsification of a private document was committed in Jagna, Bohol.
ii. Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional and cannot be presumed
or established from the alleged acts of the petitioner on a totally
different and unrelated time and occasion.
iii. The strict rules on venue in criminal cases were established for
the protection of the rights of the accused and to prevent undue
harassment and oppression.
II. HEREIN PETITIONER PROPERLY AVAILED OF THE REMEDY OF
FILING A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IN QUESTIONING IMPROPER
VENUE IN THE INSTANT CASE.
III. SETTLED LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE CLEARLY PERMITS THE
FILING OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI TO QUESTION THE
DENIAL OF A MOTION TO QUASH.11
The petition lacks merit.
On the substantive issue of whether the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol, has
jurisdiction over her case for falsification of a private document,
Navaja argues that not one of the three (3) essential elements12 of
such crime was shown to have been committed in Jagna, Bohol.
She insists that there is no showing in the Information, or even in
the complaint-affidavit and the annexes thereto that the crime of
falsification of a private document was committed or consummated
in Jagna, Bohol. In particular, the allegation in the complaint-
affidavit that the subject receipt was issued by Garden Cafe in
Jagna, Bohol, cannot determine the venue because the place of
issuance of the receipt is not an element of the said crime. It was
also impossible for her to have committed the crime in Jagna,
Bohol, because the alleged request for reimbursement under the
Weekly Travel Expense Report for September 29 to October 4,
2003, was prepared and submitted on October 6, 2003 in Cebu
City, while the subject receipt was issued on October 2, 2003 by
Garden Cafe in Jagna, Bohol. She further insists that at the time of
the issuance of the subject receipt on October 2, 2003, the
element of damage was absent, hence, there is no crime of
falsification of private document to speak of. She explains that any
damage that private respondent could have suffered would only
occur when it pays the request for reimbursement in the Travel
Expense Report submitted on October 6, 2003, but not before that
date, much less at time of the issuance of the said receipt.
Navaja's arguments are misplaced.
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of
jurisdiction.13 This principle was explained by the Court in Foz, Jr.
v. People,14 thus:
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by
courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or
any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is
the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or
to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused.
Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an
offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And
once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the
case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that
the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should
dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.15
In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be
instituted and the court which has jurisdiction over it, Section
15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted
and tried in the court or municipality or territory where the offense
was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.
Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure pertinently states:
Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or information
is sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations that the
offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients
occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless
the particular place where it was committed constitutes an
essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its
identification.
In Union Bank of the Philippines v. People,16 the Court said that
both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over
criminal cases not only in the court where the offense was
committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took
place. In other words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction are
deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the
offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients
occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
In cases of falsification of private documents, the venue is the
place where the document is actually falsified, to the prejudice of
or with the intent to prejudice a third person, regardless whether
or not the falsified document is put to the improper or illegal use
for which it was intended.17chanrobleslaw
Contrary to Navaja's argument that the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol, has
no jurisdiction over the case because not one of the essential
elements of falsification of private document was committed within
its jurisdiction, the allegations in the Information and the
complaint-affidavit make out a prima facie case that such crime
was committed in Jagna, Bohol. In particular, the Information
clearly alleged that she committed such crime thereat, to wit:
That on or about the 2nd day of October 2003, in the municipality
of Jagna, province of Bohol, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with intent to prejudice a juridical person, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial
receipt No. 6729 of Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, by making an
alteration or intercalation in the said receipt No. 6729 from EIGHT
HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P810.00) to ONE THOUSAND EIGHT
HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P1,810.00) and thereafter accused used
the said receipt to claim reimbursement with DKT Philippines, Inc.
represented by Atty. Edgar Borje and accused as a result of which
received the amount of P1,810.00 to her own benefit; to the
damage and prejudice of the offended party in the amount to be
proved during trial. xxx18
Likewise, the Complaint-Affidavit dated February 18, 2004 alleged
that the she committed the said crime in Jagna, Bohol, viz:
“4. Among the expenses she reimbursed from DKT is the
amount of Php1,810.00 she supposedly incurred at Garden's
Cafe, Jagna branch. Photocopy of the receipt dated 02 October
2003 she sent to the DKT office in Metro Manila is hereto attached
as Annex “C”.
5. However, upon recent field investigation of Navaja's expenses in
Bohol, it was found that the actual amount she incurred at
Garden's (sic) Cafe is only Php810.00 Photocopy of the duplicate
original official receipt (pink copy) certified true and correct by the
cashier of Garden's Cafe, Jagna is hereto attached as Annex “D”.
6. Evidently, Navaja falsified the receipt in Bohol upon
receiving it with the intent of causing damage to DKT.”19
Guided by the settled rule that the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the allegations of the complaint or information and
not by the result of proof20, the Court holds that Navaja's case for
falsification of private document falls within the territorial
jurisdiction of the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol.
Meanwhile, Navaja's defense that it was impossible for her to have
committed the crime in Jagna, Bohol, cannot be sustained at this
point where the prosecution has yet to present evidence to prove
the material allegations of the charge against her, which include
the place where the subject receipt was falsified. However, given
that the defense of lack of jurisdiction due to improper venue may
be raised at any stage of the proceeding, the Court stresses that if
the evidence adduced during the trial would show that the crime
was indeed committed outside its territorial jurisdiction, the MCTC
should dismiss the case based on such ground.
On Navaja's claim that there is no crime of falsification of private
document to speak of because at the time of the issuance of the
subject receipt on October 2, 2003, the element of damage was
absent, the Court sustains the RTC ruling that such damage need
not be present, as Article 172 (2)21 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, states that mere intent to cause such damage is
sufficient.22chanrobleslaw
Navaja further contends that the CA's reliance on the findings of
the Regional State Prosecutor as to the sworn statement of a
certain Cheryl Labarro23 for purposes of determining venue was
misplaced, as her sworn statement pertains to an incident in
Miravilla Resort in Tagbilaran City, which was entirely separate and
distinct from the facts material to the case. She adds that the CA's
reliance on the said statement in upholding the venue of the case
clearly runs afoul with the provisions of Section 34, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.24 She submits that nowhere in the Rules of Court is
it allowed that the actions of the accused on a different occasion
maybe used to confer venue in another case, since venue must be
determined solely and exclusively on the facts obtaining in the
instant case and cannot be inferred or presumed from other
collateral allegations.
The Court finds no merit in Navaja's foregoing contentions which
boil down to the factual issue of whether the crime of falsification
of private document was committed in Jagna, Bohol or in Cebu
City.
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that petitions for
review on certiorari "shall raise only questions of law which must
be distinctly set forth." In Pagsibigan v. People, et al.,25 the Court
held:
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should
cover only questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable. A
question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is
on a certain set of facts. A question of fact exists when the doubt
centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being
resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of the
evidence. The issue to be resolved must be limited to determining
what the law is on a certain set of facts. Once the issue invites a
review of the evidence, the question posed is one of fact.
Whether the crime of falsification of private document was
committed in Jagna, Bohol or in Cebu City, is a question of fact.
Indeed, in the exercise of its power of review, the Court is not a
trier of facts and, subject to certain exceptions, it does not
normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented
by the parties during trial.26 In certain exceptional cases, however,
the Court may be urged to probe and resolve factual issues, viz:
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, or conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of
the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee;

(g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs, are not disputed by the
respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record;
or
(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify
a different conclusion.27
Navaja failed to show that any of these circumstances is present.
It also bears emphasis that the factual findings of the appellate
court generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight when
said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any
showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the
records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute
grave abuse of discretion.28 In this case, the CA, the RTC and the
MCTC all agree that the issue of improper venue was already
resolved by the Regional State Prosecutor when he held that “there
are sufficient evidences (sic) indicating that the falsification took
place in Jagna.”29 The Court perceives no compelling reason to
disturb such factual finding.
Anent Navaja's claim that the MCTC simply made reference to the
findings of the Regional State Prosecutor without specifying the
factual and legal bases of its resolution, the Court finds that the
RTC had squarely addressed such issue as follows:
This court notes that in that particular resolution, reference was
made to the sworn statement of Ms. Cherly Lavaro who narrated
that after she issued the receipt to Ms. Navaja, the latter borrowed
her pen and in her presence wrote something on the said receipt.
The Regional State Prosecutor then concluded that Ms. Lavaro's
statement “describes an apparent scheme or pattern of altering
receipts right after issuance. The borrowing of the cashier's pen
and the use thereof must have been intended to create an
impression that the receipt was prepared by the cashier herself.”
In the same affidavit, Ms. Lavaro corroborated the affidavit of
another witness, which categorically states that Ms. Navaja was in
Jagna when the questioned receipt was issued.
If the court were to follow the logic of the petition, her claim that
her request for reimbursement was made in Cebu City not in
Jagna, Bohol, would likewise give no showing or indication that the
falsification was done in Cebu City. In other words, the said
contention would necessarily result in a “neither here no there”
situation.30
On Navaja's argument that the CA's reliance on
Labarro's31 aforesaid statement in upholding the venue of the case
violates Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,32 the Court
holds that such evidentiary rule has no bearing in determining the
place where the crime was committed for purposes of filing a
criminal information which merely requires the existence of
probable cause. In Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr.,33 the Court
expounded on the concept of probable cause in this wise:
Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has
been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that
respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean
"actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It
is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable
cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it
is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged.
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing
that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the
suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of
guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man
weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the
calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no
technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is
determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It
does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient
evidence to secure a conviction.34
Also, Navaja insists that the rule on venue should have been
construed liberally in favor her favor as the accused, and strictly
against private respondent, given its purpose of preventing
harassment and inconvenience by compelling the accused to
appear in a different court from that of the province where the
crime was committed. Yet, private respondent willfully chose to
prosecute separately the other cases for falsification of private
document against her in different jurisdictions, namely, Cebu City,
Bacolod City, Iloilo City and Tagbilaran, Bohol, to harass and drain
her financial resources, when all these criminal cases, involving
minimal amounts of actual damages,35 should have been filed in
one (1) criminal jurisdiction to avoid multiplicity of actions.
The Court overrules Navaja's assertions, and upholds the RTC's
sound ruling thereon:
The petitioner's insistence that all the criminal complaints filed
against her should be filed in one jurisdiction would be a blatant
violation of the law on jurisdiction as one cannot file a criminal case
other than where the offense was allegedly committed.
In short, if it so happens that several offenses are alleged to have
been committed in different venues, then it is just unfortunate that
whatever complaints have to be filed, will have to filed in those
different venues. To do otherwise would be procedurally fatal.36
To stress, in criminal proceedings, improper venue is lack of
jurisdiction because venue in criminal cases is an essential element
of jurisdiction.37 Unlike in a civil case where venue may be waived,
this could not be done in a criminal case because it is an element
of jurisdiction. Thus, one cannot be held to answer for any crime
committed by him except in the jurisdiction where it was
committed. Be that as it may, Section 5 (4), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution provides that the Court has the power to order a
change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
Consequently, where there are serious and weighty reasons
present, which would prevent the court of original jurisdiction from
conducting a fair and impartial trial, the Court has been mandated
to order a change of venue so as to prevent a miscarriage of
justice.38 That private respondent filed several criminal cases for
falsification in different jurisdictions, which unduly forced Navaja to
spend scarce resources to defend herself in faraway places can
hardly be considered as compelling reason which would prevent the
MCTC from conducting a fair and impartial trial.
Besides, it is erroneous for Navaja to argue that the separate filing
of the falsification cases she allegedly committed in different
jurisdictions would result in multiplicity of actions. Such separate
filing of cases is only consistent with the principles that there are
as many acts of falsification as there are documents falsified39 and
that the venue of such cases is where the document was actually
falsified40.
The Court now resolves the second and third procedural issues.
On the second issue, Navaja states that she did not commit a
grave procedural error in filing a petition for certiorari from the
denial of her motion to quash. She posits that venue is an element
of the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of a criminal
proceeding, and that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
may be interposed at any stage of the proceeding. Thus, even if a
party fails to file a motion to quash, the accused may still question
the jurisdiction of the court later on, and such objection may be
raised or considered motu propio by the court at any stage of the
proceeding or on appeal.
On the third issue, Navaja asserts that the Supreme Court has
allowed the filing of a petition forcertiorari to question the denial of
a motion to quash in cases where grave abuse of discretion was
patently committed, or when the lower court acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction. She claims that not only did the lower
court commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to
quash, but there is likewise the issue of improper venue that need
to be settled with finality and dispatch. In support of her assertion,
she cites a ruling41 that when the court has no jurisdiction at the
time of the filing of the complaint, the court should dismiss the
case, instead of ordering its transfer.
Apropos to the second and third procedural issues is Querijero v.
Palmes-Limitar42 where the Court reiterated the fundamental
principle that an order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory
and, therefore, not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a
petition for certiorari, thus:
In Zamoranos v. People, this Court emphasized that “a special civil
action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of
a motion to quash an information. The established rule is that,
when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy
is not to resort forthwith to certiorari, but to continue with the case
in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to
take an appeal in the manner authorized by law.”
On a number of occasions, however, Court had sanctioned a writ
of certiorari as an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory
order in the following circumstances:

(1) when the court issued the order without or in excess of

jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion;

(2) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the

remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief;

(3) in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice;

(4) to promote public welfare and public policy; and

(5) when the cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it

essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof. 43
As can be gleaned from the Court's discussion on the substantive
issue of the case, Navaja failed to prove that any of the said
special circumstances obtains in this case, let alone the grave
abuse of discretion she imputed against the MCTC. Hence, the CA
did not err in affirming the RTC ruling that the MCTC correctly
denied her motion to quash.

Finally, the remaining factual issues raised by the parties need not
be discussed further, as they are properly resolved in due course of
the proceedings in the instant case before the MCTC and, when an
unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the
manner authorized by law.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Court of

Appeals Decision dated August 28, 2007 and the Resolution dated
May 7, 2008 in CA G.R. SP No. 02353 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 192565 : February 28, 2012]
UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES AND DESI TOMAS,
PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this Rule 45 petition, the decision [1] of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 65, Makati City (RTC-Makati City) in Civil Case
No. 09-1038. The petition seeks to reverse and set aside the RTC-
Makati City decision dismissing the petition for certiorari of
petitioners Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank) and Desi
Tomas (collectively, the petitioners). The RTC found that the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City (MeTC-Makati City)
did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the
motion to quash the information for perjury filed by Tomas.
The Antecedents
Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) for making a false narration in a
Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Information against her
reads:
That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful statements
under oath upon a material matter before a competent person
authorized to administer oath which the law requires to wit: said
accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of
a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin
docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not
commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same
issues in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that
said material statement was false thereby making a willful and
deliberate assertion of falsehood.[2]
The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Bank’s two (2)
complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin
against the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe.
The first complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0717, was filed
before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998.
The second complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 342-000, was
filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay
City. Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the
Certification against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was
charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely
declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in
the second complaint that she did not commence any other action
or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or
agency.
Tomas filed a Motion to Quash,[3] citing two grounds. First, she
argued that the venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City
court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted
and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate
against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over
the perjury case. Second, she argued that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense because: (a) the third element of perjury –
the willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood – was not alleged
with particularity without specifying what the other action or
proceeding commenced involving the same issues in another
tribunal or agency; (b) there was no other action or proceeding
pending in another court when the second complaint was filed; and
(c) she was charged with perjury by giving false testimony while
the allegations in the Information make out perjury by making a
false affidavit.
The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it
has jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate against Forum
Shopping was notarized in Makati City.[4] The MeTC-Makati City
also ruled that the allegations in the Information sufficiently
charged Tomas with perjury.[5] The MeTC-Makati City subsequently
denied Tomas’ motion for reconsideration.[6]
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati
City to annul and set aside the MeTC-Makati City orders on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion. The petitioners anchored their
petition on the rulings in United States v. Canet[7] and Ilusorio v.
Bildner[8] which ruled that venue and jurisdiction should be in the
place where the false document was presented.
The Assailed RTC Decision
In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the RTC-Makati City held:
[I]nsofar as the petitioner’s stance is concerned[,] the more recent
case of [Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy] (GR Nos. 174168 & 179438, March
30, 2009) however, reaffirms what has been the long standing
view on the venue with respect to perjury cases. In this particular
case[,] the high court reiterated the rule that the criminal action
shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or
territory where the offense was committed, or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred. It went on to declare that since the
subject document[,] the execution of which was the subject of the
charge[,] was subscribed and sworn to in Manila[,] then the court
of the said territorial jurisdiction was the proper venue of the
criminal action[.]
xxxx
x x x Given the present state of jurisprudence on the matter, it is
not amiss to state that the city court of Makati City has jurisdiction
to try and decide the case for perjury inasmuch as the gist of the
complaint itself which constitute[s] the charge against the
petitioner dwells solely on the act of subscribing to a false
certification. On the other hand, the charge against the accused
in the case of Ilusorio v. Bildner, et al., based on the complaint-
affidavits therein[,] was not simply the execution of the questioned
documents but rather the introduction of the false evidence
through the subject documents before the court of Makati
City.[9] (emphasis ours)
The RTC-Makati City ruled that the MeTC-Makati City did not
commit grave abuse of discretion since the order denying the
Motion to Quash was based on jurisprudence later
than Ilusorio. The RTC-Makati City also observed that the facts
in Ilusorio are different from the facts of the present case. Lastly,
the RTC-Makati City ruled that the Rule 65 petition was improper
since the petitioners can later appeal the decision in the principal
case. The RTC-Makati City subsequently denied the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.[10]
The Petition
The petitioners pray that we reverse the RTC-Makati City decision
and quash the Information for perjury against Tomas. The
petitioners contend that the Ilusorio ruling is more applicable to the
present facts than our ruling in Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim.[11]
They argued that the facts in Ilusorio showed that the filing of the
petitions in court containing the false statements was the essential
ingredient that consummated the perjury. In Sy Tiong, the
perjurious statements were made in a General Information Sheet
(GIS) that was submitted to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).
Interestingly, Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz shared the
petitioners’ view. In his Manifestation and Motion in lieu of
Comment (which we hereby treat as the Comment to the petition),
the Solicitor General also relied on Ilusorio and opined that the lis
mota in the crime of perjury is the deliberate or intentional giving
of false evidence in the court where the evidence is material. The
Solicitor General observed that the criminal intent to assert a
falsehood under oath only became manifest before the MeTC-Pasay
City.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of what the proper venue of
perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should be – Makati City,
where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or
Pasay City, where the Certification was presented to the trial court.
The Court’s Ruling
We deny the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is
the proper venue and the proper court to take cognizance of
the perjury case against the petitioners.
Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction
Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It
determines not only the place where the criminal action is to be
instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and
hear the case. The reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the
jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such
that a trial court can only hear and try cases involving crimes
committed within its territorial jurisdiction.[12] Second, laying the
venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice
of having an accused on trial in the municipality of province where
witnesses and other facilities for his defense are available.[13]
Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal
cases carries jurisdictional consequences. In determining the
venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court
which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court or municipality or territory where
the offense was committed or where any of its essential
ingredients occurred. [emphasis ours]
The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110
of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:
Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or information
is sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations that the
offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients
occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless
the particular place where it was committed constitutes an
essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its
identification.
Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over
criminal cases not only in the court where the offense was
committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took
place. In other words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction
are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that
the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients
occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Information Charging Perjury
Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, contains the requirement for a Certificate against Forum
Shopping. The Certificate against Forum Shopping can be made
either by a statement under oath in the complaint or initiatory
pleading asserting a claim or relief; it may also be in a sworn
certification annexed to the complaint or initiatory pleading. In
both instances, the affiant is required to execute a statement under
oath before a duly commissioned notary public or any competent
person authorized to administer oath that: (a) he or she has not
theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the
same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to
the best of his or her knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim,
a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he or
she should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim
has been filed or is pending, he or she shall report that fact within
five days therefrom to the court wherein his or her aforesaid
complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. In relation to the
crime of perjury, the material matter in a Certificate against Forum
Shopping is the truth of the required declarations which is designed
to guard against litigants pursuing simultaneous remedies in
different fora.[14]
In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury under
Article 183 of the RPC for making a false Certificate against Forum
Shopping. The elements of perjury under Article 183 are:
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an
affidavit upon amaterial matter.
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent
officer, authorized to receive and administer oath.
(c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful
and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity
is required by law or made for a legal purpose.[15] (emphasis ours)
Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal
case on the ground of improper venue, the allegations in the
complaint and information must be examined together with Section
15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
On this basis, we find that the allegations in the Information
sufficiently support a finding that the crime of perjury was
committed by Tomas within the territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC-
Makati City.
The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the
subject Certificate against Forum Shopping was alleged in the
Information to have been committed in Makati City. Likewise, the
second and fourth elements, requiring the Certificate against
Forum Shopping to be under oath before a notary public, were also
sufficiently alleged in the Information to have been made in Makati
City:
That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful statements
under oath upon a material matter before a competent person
authorized to administer oath which the law requires to wit: said
accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit x x x.[16]
We also find that the third element of willful and deliberate
falsehood was also sufficiently alleged to have been committed in
Makati City, not Pasay City, as indicated in the last portion of the
Information:
[S]aid accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of
merit of a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of
replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has
not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same
issues in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that
said material statement was false thereby making a willful and
deliberate assertion of falsehood.[17] (underscoring ours)
Tomas’ deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was
allegedly shown when she made the false declarations in the
Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati
City, despite her knowledge that the material statements she
subscribed and swore to were not true. Thus, Makati City is the
proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the
perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the essential
elements constituting the crime of perjury were committed within
the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City.
Referral to the En Banc
The present case was referred to the En Banc primarily to address
the seeming conflict between the division rulings of the Court in
the Ilusorio case that is cited as basis of this petition, and the Sy
Tiong case that was the basis of the assailed RTC-Makati City
ruling.
The Cited Ilusorio and Sy Tiong Cases
The subject matter of the perjury charge in Ilusorio involved false
statements contained in verified petitions filed with the
court for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copies of
certificates of title. The verified petitions containing the false
statements were subscribed and sworn to in Pasig City, but were
filed in Makati City and Tagaytay City. The question posed was:
which court (Pasig City, Makati City and/or Tagaytay City) had
jurisdiction to try and hear the perjury cases?
We ruled that the venues of the action were in Makati City and
Tagaytay City, the places where the verified petitions were filed.
The Court reasoned out that it was only upon filing that the intent
to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the
alleged untruthful statement found relevance or materiality. We
cited as jurisprudential authority the case of United States. v.
Cañet[18] which ruled:
It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so
long as it appears from the information that the defendant, by
means of such affidavit, "swore to" and knowingly submitted false
evidence, material to a point at issue in a judicial proceeding
pending in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province. The gist of
the offense charged is not the making of the affidavit in Manila, but
the intentional giving of false evidence in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo Province by means of such affidavit. [emphasis
and underscoring deleted]
In Sy Tiong, the perjured statements were made in a GIS which
was subscribed and sworn to in Manila. We ruled that the proper
venue for the perjury charges was in Manila where the GIS was
subscribed and sworn to. We held that the perjury was
consummated in Manila where the false statement was made. As
supporting jurisprudence, we cited the case of Villanueva v.
Secretary of Justice[19] that, in turn, cited an American case
entitled U.S. v. Norris.[20] We ruled in Villanueva that –
Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration well may affect
the dearest concerns of the parties before a tribunal. Deliberate
material falsification under oath constitutes the crime of perjury,
and the crime is complete when a witness' statement has once
been made.

The Crime of Perjury: A Background
To have a better appreciation of the issue facing the Court, a look
at the historical background of how the crime of perjury
(specifically, Article 183 of the RPC) evolved in our jurisdiction.
The RPC penalizes three forms of false testimonies. The first is
false testimony for and against the defendant in a criminal case
(Articles 180 and 181, RPC); the second is false testimony in a
civil case (Article 182, RPC); and the third is false testimony in
other cases (Article 183, RPC). Based on the Information filed, the
present case involves the making of an untruthful statement in an
affidavit on a material matter.
These RPC provisions, however, are not really the bases of the
rulings cited by the parties in their respective arguments. The
cited Ilusorio ruling, although issued by this Court in 2008, harked
back to the case of Cañet which was decided in 1915, i.e., before
the present RPC took effect.[21] Sy Tiong, on the other hand, is a
2009 ruling that cited Villanueva, a 2005 case that in turn
cited United States v. Norris, a 1937 American case. Significantly,
unlike Canet, Sy Tiong is entirely based on rulings rendered after
the present RPC took effect.[22]
The perjurious act in Cañet consisted of an information
charging perjury through the presentation in court of a motion
accompanied by a false sworn affidavit. At the time
the Cañet ruling was rendered, the prevailing law on perjury and
the rules on prosecution of criminal offenses were found in Section
3, Act No. 1697 of the Philippine Commission, and in Subsection 4,
Section 6 of General Order No. 58[23] for the procedural aspect.
Section 3 of Act No. 1697 reads:
Sec. 3. Any person who, having taken oath before a competent
tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the
Philippine Islands authorizes an oath to be administered, that he
will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written
testimony, declaration, disposition, or certificate by him subscribed
is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any
material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of
perjury, and shall be punished by a fine of not more than two
thousand pesos and by imprisonment for not more than five years;
and shall moreover, thereafter be incapable of holding any public
office or of giving testimony in any court of the Philippine Islands
until such time as the judgment against him is reversed.
This law was copied, with the necessary changes, from Sections
5392[24] and 5393[25] of the Revised Statutes of the United
States.[26] Act No. 1697 was intended to make the mere execution
of a false affidavit punishable in our jurisdiction. [27]
In turn, Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 provided
that the venue shall be the court of the place where the crime was
committed.
As applied and interpreted by the Court in Cañet, perjury was
committed by the act of representing a false document in a judicial
proceeding.[28] The venue of action was held by the Court to be at
the place where the false document was presented since the
presentation was the act that consummated the crime.
The annotation of Justices Aquino and Griño-Aquino in their
textbook on the RPC[29] interestingly explains the history of the
perjury provisions of the present RPC and traces as well the linkage
between Act No. 1697 and the present Code. To quote these
authors:[30]
Art. 180 was taken from art. 318 of the Old Penal Code and art.
154 of Del Pan’s Proposed Correctional Code, while art. 181 was
taken from art. 319 of the old Penal Code and Art. 157 of Del Pan’s
Proposed Correctional Code. Said arts. 318 and 319, together with
art. 321 of the old Penal Code, were impliedly repealed by Act
1697, the Perjury Law, passed on August 23, 1907, which in turn
was expressly repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916, Act
2657. In view of the express repeal of Act 1697, arts. 318 and 321
of the old Penal Code were deemed revived. However, Act 2718
expressly revived secs. 3 and 4 of the Perjury Law. Art. 367 of the
Revised Penal Code repealed Act Nos. 1697 and 2718.
It should be noted that perjury under Acts 1697 and 2718 includes
false testimony, whereas, under the Revised Penal Code, false
testimony includes perjury. Our law on false testimony is of
Spanish origin, but our law on perjury (art. 183 taken from sec. 3
of Act 1697) is derived from American statutes. The provisions of
the old Penal Code on false testimony embrace perjury committed
in court or in some contentious proceeding, while perjury as
defined in Act 1697 includes the making of a false affidavit. The
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on false testimony “are more
severe and strict than those of Act 1697” on perjury. [italics ours]
With this background, it can be appreciated that Article 183 of the
RPC which provides:
The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any
person, who knowingly makes untruthful statements and not being
included in the provisions of the next preceding articles,
shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any
material matter before a competent person authorized to
administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.
[emphasis supplied; emphases ours]
in fact refers to either of two punishable acts – (1) falsely testifying
under oath in a proceeding other than a criminal or civil case; and
(2) making a false affidavit before a person authorized to
administer an oath on any material matter where the law requires
an oath.
As above discussed, Sy Tiong – decided under Article 183 of the
RPC – essentially involved perjured statements made in a GIS that
was subscribed and sworn to in Manila and submitted to the SEC in
Mandaluyong City. Thus, the case involved the making of an
affidavit, not an actual testimony in a proceeding that is neither
criminal nor civil. From this perspective, the situs of the oath, i.e.,
the place where the oath was taken, is the place where the offense
was committed. By implication, the proper venue would have been
the City of Mandaluyong – the site of the SEC – had the charge
involved an actual testimony made before the SEC.
In contrast, Cañet involved the presentation in court of a motion
supported and accompanied by an affidavit that contained a falsity.
With Section 3 of Act No. 1697 as basis, the issue related to the
submission of the affidavit in a judicial proceeding. This came at a
time when Act No. 1697 was the perjury law, and made no
distinction between judicial and other proceedings, and at the same
time separately penalized the making of false statements under
oath (unlike the present RPC which separately deals with false
testimony in criminal, civil and other proceedings, while at the
same time also penalizing the making of false affidavits).
Understandably, the venue should be the place where the
submission was made to the court or the situs of the court; it could
not have been the place where the affidavit was sworn to simply
because this was not the offense charged in the Information.
The case of Ilusorio cited the Cañet case as its authority, in a
situation where the sworn petitions filed in court for the issuance of
duplicate certificates of title (that were allegedly lost) were the
cited sworn statements to support the charge of perjury for the
falsities stated in the sworn petitions. The Court ruled that the
proper venue should be the Cities of Makati and Tagaytay because
it was in the courts of these cities “where the intent to assert an
alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged
untruthful statement finds relevance or materiality in deciding the
issue of whether new owner’s duplicate copies of the [Certificate of
Condominium Title] and [Transfer Certificates of Title] may
issue.”[31] To the Court, “whether the perjurious statements
contained in the four petitions were subscribed and sworn in Pasig
is immaterial, the gist of the offense of perjury being the
intentional giving of false statement,”[32]citing Cañet as authority
for its statement.
The statement in Ilusorio may have partly led to the present
confusion on venue because of its very categorical tenor in pointing
to the considerations to be made in the determination of venue; it
leaves the impression that the place where the oath was taken is
not at all a material consideration, forgetting that Article 183 of the
RPC clearly speaks of two situations while Article 182 of the RPC
likewise applies to false testimony in civil cases.
The Ilusorio statement would have made perfect sense had the
basis for the charge been Article 182 of the RPC, on the
assumption that the petition itself constitutes a false testimony in a
civil case. The Cañetruling would then have been completely
applicable as the sworn statement is used in a civil case, although
no such distinction was made under Cañet because the applicable
law at the time (Act No. 1697) did not make any distinction.
If Article 183 of the RPC were to be used, as what in fact appears
in the Ilusorio ruling, then only that portion of the article, referring
to the making of an affidavit, would have been applicable as the
other portion refers to false testimony in other proceedings which a
judicial petition for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of
a Certificate of Condominium Title is not because it is a civil
proceeding in court. As a perjury based on the making of a false
affidavit, what assumes materiality is the site where the oath was
taken as this is the place where the oath was made, in this case,
Pasig City.
Procedurally, the rule on venue of criminal cases has been subject
to various changes from the time General Order No. 58 was
replaced by Rules 106 to 122 of the Rules of Court on July 1, 1940.
Section 14, Rule 106 of the Rules of Court provided for the rule on
venue of criminal actions and it expressly included, as proper
venue, the place where any one of the essential ingredients of the
crime took place. This change was followed by the passage of the
1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure,[33] the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure,[34] and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
which all adopted the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure’s expanded
venue of criminal actions. Thus, the venue of criminal cases isnot
only in the place where the offense was committed, but also where
any of its essential ingredients took place.
proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place
where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as
supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is
neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted,
venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement is
submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath
and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime
committed. In all cases, determination of venue shall be based on
the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime
committed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition
for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

In the present case, the Certification against Forum Shopping was

made integral parts of two complaints for sum of money with
prayer for a writ of replevin against the respondent spouses Eddie
Tamondong and Eliza B. Tamondong, who, in turn, filed a
complaint-affidavit against Tomas for violation of Article 183 of the
RPC. As alleged in the Information that followed, the criminal act
charged was for the execution by Tomas of an affidavit that
contained a falsity.

Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the

applicable provision; thus, jurisdiction and venue should be
determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who
“make[s] an affidavit, upon any material matter before a
competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in
which the law so requires.” The constitutive act of the offense
is the making of an affidavit; thus, the criminal act is
consummated when the statement containing a falsity is
subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized person.

Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong

is more in accord with Article 183 of the RPC and Section 15(a),
Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To
reiterate for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of
perjury committed through the making of a false affidavit under
Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant
subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time
that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When
the crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a
 FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-01-1349. July 12, 2001.]
BERNADETTE MONDEJAR, Complainant, v. JUDGE MARINO S.
BUBAN, MTCC, Tacloban City Branch 1, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
In a sworn letter complaint dated May 31, 1999, complainant
Bernadette Mondejar charged Judge Marino S. Buban, MTCC,
Tacloban City, Branch 1, with gross ignorance of the law, partiality,
serious irregularity and grave misconduct relative to Criminal Case
No. 98-07-CR-133 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Bernadette
Mondejar and Arlette Mondejar" for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22. She alleged that respondent judge issued a "hold
departure order" against her on October 23, 1998 in violation of
Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97 which provides that "hold
departure orders" shall be issued only in criminal cases within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. She further
alleged that respondent judge did not give her an opportunity to be
heard before issuing the questioned order.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
When required to comment on the matter, respondent judge
admitted having issued said order because he was not aware of the
Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97. He alleged that he was not
furnished a copy of the circular and managed to secure a copy only
after he instructed his legal researcher to get one from the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City.
Accordingly, on April 14, 1997, he issued an order lifting and
setting aside the hold departure order dated October 23, 1998. As
regards the issue of denial of due process, respondent judge
averred that complainant and her counsel were duly notified of the
scheduled hearing but neither appeared on said date.
The Court Administrator after finding that respondent judge erred
in issuing the assailed "hold departure order," recommended that
he be severely reprimanded with a stern warning that a repetition
of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
The recommendation of the Court Administrator is well-taken.
Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure
orders to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of second level
courts. Paragraph No. 1 of the said circular specifically provides
that "hold-departure orders shall be issued only in criminal cases
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial court." Clearly
then, criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of first level
courts do not fall within the ambit of the circular, and it was an
error on the part of respondent judge to have issued one in the
instant case.
Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct exhorts judges
to be "faithful to the law and maintain professional competence."
The Court, in exercising administrative supervision of all lower
courts, has not been remised in reminding the members of the
bench to exert due diligence in keeping abreast with the
development in law and jurisprudence. Besides, Circular No. 39-97
is not a new circular. It was circularized in 1997 and violation of
which has been accordingly dealt with in numerous cases before
the Court. Herein judge, therefore, cannot be excused for his
infraction. Judges should always be vigilant in their quest for new
developments in the law so they could discharge their duties and
functions with zeal and fervor.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
In recent cases, 1 involving similar violations, this Court imposed
the penalty of reprimand on erring judges. Hence, the same
penalty should be imposed on respondent judge.
WHEREFORE, Judge Marino S. Buban is hereby REPRIMANDED with
the warning that a repetition of the same and similar acts in the
future will be dealt with more severely.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION Portigo to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and
publish in the regular issue of said daily publication on July
VICENTE FOZ, JR. and DANNY G. G.R. No. 167764 5, 1994, a certain article entitled MEET DR. PORTIGO,
FAJARDO, COMPANY PHYSICIAN, quoted verbatim hereunder, to
Petitioners, Present: wit:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson, MEET DR. PORTIGO,

CARPIO MORALES,* COMPANY PHYSICIAN
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and PHYSICIAN (sic) are duly sworn to help to do
PERALTA, JJ. all their best to promote the health of their
patients. Especially if they are employed by a
Promulgated: company to serve its employees.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. October 9, 2009 However, the opposite appears to be happening
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x in the Local San Miguel Corporation office,
DECISION SMC employees are fuming mad about their
company physician, Dr. Portigo, because the
PERALTA, J.: latter is not doing well in his sworn obligation
Before the court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 in looking after the health problems of
of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), employees, reports reaching Aim.. Fire say.
Cebu City, dated November 24, 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522, which
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Iloilo One patient, Lita Payunan, wife of employee
City, dated December 4, 1997 in Criminal Case No. 44527 finding Wilfredo Payunan, and residing in Burgos,
petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of libel. Also assailed Lapaz, Iloilo City, has a sad tale to say about
is the CA Resolution[2] dated April 8, 2005 denying petitioners' motion for Dr. Portigo. Her story began September 19 last
reconsideration. year when she felt ill and had to go to Dr.
Portigo for consultation. The doctor put her
In an Information[3] dated October 17, 1994 filed before the RTC of
under observation, taking seven months to
Iloilo City, petitioners Vicente Foz, Jr. and Danny G. Fajardo were charged
conclude that she had rectum myoma and must
with the crime of libel committed as follows:
undergo an operation.

That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City Subsequently, the family sought the services of
of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court, a Dr. Celis and a Dr. de los Reyes at Doctor's
both the accused as columnist and Editor-Publisher, Hospital. Incidentally, where Dr. Portigo also
respectively, of Panay News, a daily publication with a maintains a clinic. Dr. Portigo got angry,
considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout sources said, after knowing that the family
the region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and chose a surgeon (Dr. Celis) on their own
feloniously with malicious intent of impeaching the virtue, without his nod as he had one to recommend.
honesty, integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a
physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, and with Lita was operated by Dr. de los Reyes last
the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar March and was released from the hospital two
weeks after. Later, however, she again
complained of difficulty in urinating and
defecating[. On] June 24, she was readmitted to
the hospital.
The second operation, done by Dr. Portigo's
recommendee, was devastating to the family
and the patient herself who woke to find out her
anus and vagina closed and a hole with a
catheter punched on her right side.
This was followed by a bad news that she had
cancer.
Dr. Portigo recommended another operation,
this time to bore another hole on the left side of
Lita. But a Dr. Rivera to whom he made the
referral frankly turned it down because it would
only be a waste of money since the disease was
already on the terminal state.
The company and the family spent
some P150,000.00 to pay for the wrong
diagnosis of the company physician.
My sympathy for Lita and her family. May the
good Lord, Healer of all healers, be on your
side, May the Healer of all healers likewise
touch the conscience of physicians to remind
them that their profession is no license for self-
enrichment at the expense of the poor. But, sad
to say, Lita passed away, July 2, 1994.
Lita is not alone. Society is replete with similar
experience where physicians treat their patients
for profits. Where physicians prefer to act like
agents of multinational corporations prescribing
expensive drugs seen if there are equivalent
drugs sold at the counter for much lower price.
Yes, Lita, we also have hospitals, owned by a
so-called charitable religious institutions and
so-called civic groups, too greedy for profits.
Instead of promoting baby-and mother-friendly
practices which are cheaper and more effective,
they still prefer the expensive yet unhealthy
practices.
The (sic) shun breast feeding and promote
infant milk formula although mother's milk is
many times cheaper and more nutrious (sic)
than the brands they peddle. These hospitals
separate newly born from their moms for days,
conditioning the former to milk formula while
at the same time stunting the mother's
mammalia from manufacturing milk. Kadiri to
death!
My deepest sympathy to the bereaved family
of Mrs. Lita Payunan who died July 2, 1994,
Her body lies at the Payunan residence located
at 236-G Burgos St., Lapaz, Iloilo City. May
you rest in peace, Inday Lita.
wherein said Dr. Portigo was portrayed as wanting in high
sense of professional integrity, trust and responsibility
expected of him as a physician, which imputation and
insinuation as both accused knew were entirely false and
malicious and without foundation in fact and therefore highly
libelous, offensive and derogatory to the good name,
character and reputation of the said Dr. Edgar Portigo.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Upon being arraigned[5] on March 1, 1995, petitioners, assisted by
counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in the
Information. Trial thereafter ensued.
On December 4, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision[6] finding petitioners
guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
 WHEREFORE, in the light of the facts obtaining and the
jurisprudence aforecited, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered
finding both accused Danny Fajardo and Vicente Foz,
Jr. GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT for the
crime of Libel defined in Article 353 and punishable under
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentencing
aforenamed accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of Three (3) Months and Eleven (11) Days of
Arresto Mayor, as Minimum, to One (1) Year, Eight (8)
Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of Prision Correccional,
as Maximum, and to pay a fine of P1,000.00 each.[7]
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in an
Order[8] dated February 20, 1998.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA.
On November 24, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision which
affirmed in toto the RTC decision.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied
in a Resolution dated April 8, 2005.
Hence, herein petition filed by petitioners based on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING
THE SUBJECT ARTICLE LIBELOUS WITHIN THE
MEANING AND INTENDMENT OF ARTICLE 353 OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF MALICE IN THIS CASE
AND IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUBJECT ARTICLE
IS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AS PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATIONS.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER
FAJARDO WHO HAPPENS TO BE MERELY PUBLISHER
OF PANAY NEWS AND COULD NOT POSSIBLY SHARE
ALL THE OPINIONS OF THE NEWSPAPER'S OPINION
COLUMNISTS.[9]
Petitioners argue that the CA erred in finding that the element of defamatory
imputation was satisfied when petitioner Foz, as columnist, portrayed Dr.
Portigo as an incompetent doctor and an opportunist who enriched himself at
the expense of the poor. Petitioners pose the question of whether a
newspaper opinion columnist, who sympathizes with a patient and her
family and expresses the family's outrage in print, commits libel when the
columnist criticizes the doctor's competence or lack of it, and such criticism
turns out to be lacking in basis if not entirely false. Petitioners claim that the
article was written in good faith in the belief that it would serve the public
good. They contend that the CA erred in finding the existence of malice in
the publication of the article; that no malice in law or actual malice was
proven by the prosecution; and that the article was printed pursuant to the
bounden duty of the press to report matters of public interest. Petitioners
further contend that the subject article was an opinion column, which was
the columnists exclusive views; and that petitioner Fajardo, as the editor and
publisher of Panay News, did not have to share those views and should not
be held responsible for the crime of libel.
The Solicitor General filed his Comment, alleging that only errors of law are
reviewable by this Court in a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45;
that petitioners are raising a factual issue, i.e., whether or not the element of
malice required in every indictment for libel was established by the
prosecution, which would require the weighing anew of the evidence already
passed upon by the CA and the RTC; and that factual findings of the CA,
affirming those of the RTC, are accorded finality, unless there appears on
records some facts or circumstance of weight which the court may have
overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly
considered, may alter the result of the case − a situation that is not, however,
obtaining in this case.
In their Reply, petitioners claim that the first two issues presented in their
petition do not require the evaluation of evidence submitted in court; that
malice, as an element of libel, has always been discussed whenever raised as
an issue via a petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners raise for the first
time the issue that the information charging them with libel did not contain
allegations sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo City.
The Court finds that the threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the
RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 23, had jurisdiction over the offense of libel as
charged in the Information dated October 17, 1994.
The Court notes that petitioners raised for the first time the issue of
the RTC's jurisdiction over the offense charged only in their Reply filed
before this Court and finds that petitioners are not precluded from doing so.
In Fukuzume v. People,[10] the Court ruled:
 It is noted that it was only in his petition with the Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
CA that Fukuzume raised the issue of the trial courts 4363, provides the specific rules as to the venue in cases of written
jurisdiction over the offense charged. Nonetheless, the rule is defamation, to wit:
settled that an objection based on the ground that the court
Article 360. Persons responsible.Any person who shall
lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged may be raised or
publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any
considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the
defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be
proceedings or on appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over the
responsible for the same.
subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon
the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise,
since such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or
authority which organized the court, and is given only by law business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial
in the manner and form prescribed by law. While an publication, shall be responsible for the defamations
exception to this rule was recognized by this Court beginning contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author
with the landmark case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, wherein thereof.
the defense of lack of jurisdiction by the court which
rendered the questioned ruling was considered to be barred The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of
by laches, we find that the factual circumstances involved in written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be
said case, a civil case, which justified the departure from the filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first
general rule are not present in the instant criminal case.[11] instance of the province or city where the libelous article
is printed and first published or where any of the
offended parties actually resides at the time of the
The Court finds merit in the petition.
commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The
one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is
Court held in Macasaet v. People[12] that:
in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by
offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
courts in criminal cases the offense should have been
Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province
committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place
where the libelous article is printed and first published, and
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court
Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance
has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense
of the province or city where he held office at the time of the
allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot
commission of the offense or where the libelous article is
take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense
printed and first published and in case one of the offended
allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal
Court of First Instance of the province or city where he
case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense
information. And once it is so shown, the court may
or where the libelous matter is printed and first published x x
validly take cognizance of the case.However, if the
x. (Emphasis supplied.)
evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was
In Agbayani v. Sayo,[14] the rules on venue in Article 360 were
committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the
restated as follows:
action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)[13]

1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private

person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First
 Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal
action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province where he actually resided at the time of the
commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is
in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the
action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office
outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where he held office at the
time of the commission of the offense.[15]
Applying the foregoing law to this case, since Dr. Portigo is a private
individual at the time of the publication of the alleged libelous article, the
venue of the libel case may be in the province or city where the libelous
article was printed and first published, or in the province where Dr. Portigo
actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
The relevant portion of the Information for libel filed in this case
which for convenience the Court quotes again, to wit:
That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City
of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court,
both the accused as columnists and Editor-Publisher,
respectively, of Panay News, a daily publication with a
considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout
the region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with malicious intent of impeaching the virtue,
honesty, integrity and reputation ofDr. Edgar Portigo, a
physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, and with
the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar
Portigo to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and
publish in the regular issue of said daily publication on July
5, 1994, a certain article entitled MEET DR. PORTIGO,
COMPANY PHYSICIAN....
The allegations in the Information that Panay News, a daily publication with
a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region only
showed that Iloilo was the place where Panay News was in considerable
circulation but did not establish that the said publication was printed and first
published in Iloilo City.
In Chavez v. Court of Appeals,[16] which involved a libel case filed by a
private individual with the RTC of Manila, a portion of the Information of
which reads:
That on or about March 1995, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused [Baskinas and Manapat]
conspiring and confederating with others whose true names,
real identities and present whereabouts are still unknown
and helping one another, with malicious intent of
impeaching the honesty, virtue, character and reputation of
one FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, former Solicitor General of
the Philippines, and with the evident purpose of injuring and
exposing him to public ridicule, hatred and contempt, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and maliciously cause to
be published in Smart File, a magazine of general circulation
in Manila, and in their respective capacity as Editor-in-Chief
and Author-Reporter, ....[17]
the Court ruled that the Information did not sufficiently vest jurisdiction in
the RTC of Manila to hear the libel charge in consonance with Article 360.
The Court made the following disquisition:
x x x Still, a perusal of the Information in this case reveals
that the word published is utilized in the precise context of
noting that the defendants cause[d] to be published in 'Smart
File', a magazine of general circulation in Manila. The
Information states that the libelous articles were published
in Smart File, and not that they were published in Manila.
The place Manila is in turn employed to situate where Smart
File was in general circulation, and not where the libel was
published or first printed. The fact that Smart File was in
general circulation in Manila does not necessarily establish
that it was published and first printed in Manila, in the same
way that while leading national dailies such as the Philippine
Daily Inquirer or the Philippine Star are in general
 circulation in Cebu, it does not mean that these newspapers residence involves the idea of something beyond a transient
are published and first printed in Cebu. stay in the place; and to be a resident, one must abide in a
Indeed, if we hold that the Information at hand sufficiently place where he had a house therein. To create a residence in
vests jurisdiction in Manila courts since the publication is in a particular place, two fundamental elements are essential:
general circulation in Manila, there would be no impediment The actual bodily presence in the place, combined with a
to the filing of the libel action in other locations where Smart freely exercised intention of remaining there permanently or
File is in general circulation. Using the example of for an indefinite time. While it is possible that as the Acting
the Inquirer or the Star, the granting of this petition would General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, the petitioner
allow a resident of Aparri to file a criminal case for libel may have been actually residing in Baguio City, the
against a reporter or editor in Jolo, simply because these Informations did not state that he was actually residing
newspapers are in general circulation in Jolo. Such a therein when the alleged crimes were committed. It is
consequence is precisely what Rep. Act No. 4363 sought to entirely possible that the private complainant may have been
avoid.[18] actually residing in another place. One who transacts
business in a place and spends considerable time thereat does
In Agustin v. Pamintuan,[19] which also involved a libel case filed by a
not render such person a resident therein. Where one may
private individual, the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club,
have or own a business does not of itself constitute residence
with the RTC of Baguio City where the Information therein alleged that the
within the meaning of the statute. Pursuit of business in a
libelous article was published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, a newspaper
place is not conclusive of residence there for purposes of
of general circulation in the City of Baguio and the entire Philippines, the
venue.[21]
Court did not consider the Informationsufficient to show that Baguio City
was the venue of the printing and first publication of the alleged libelous
Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is
article.
determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and the
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as amended provides that a private
offense must have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients
individual may also file the libel case in the RTC of the province where he
took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.[22]Considering that
actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense. The
the Information failed to allege the venue requirements for a libel case under
Information filed against petitioners failed to allege the residence of Dr.
Article 360, the Court finds that the RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to
Portigo. While the Information alleges that Dr. Edgar Portigo is a physician
hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of the crime of libel
and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, such allegation did not clearly and
should be set aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with
positively indicate that he was actually residing in Iloilo City at the time of
the court of competent jurisdiction.
the commission of the offense. It is possible that Dr. Portigo was actually
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November
residing in another place.
24, 2004 and the Resolution dated April 8, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 22522 are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of
Again, in Agustin v. Pamintuan,[20] where the Information for libel alleged
jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
that the offended party was the Acting General Manager of the Baguio
23, Iloilo City. Criminal Case No. 44527 is DISMISSED without prejudice.
Country Club and of good standing and reputation in the community, the
Court did not find such allegation sufficient to establish that the offended
SO ORDERED.
party was actually residing in Baguio City. The Court explained its ruling in
this wise:
The residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical
habitation or his actual residence or place of abode provided
he resides therein with continuity and consistency; no
particular length of time of residence is required. However,
the residence must be more than temporary. The term
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 198270, December 09, 2015
ARMILYN MORILLO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND RICHARD NATIVIDAD,Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 dated January 18, 2011 and Resolution2 dated August 9,
2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 32723 which
reversed and set aside the Decision3 dated February 23, 2009 and
Order4 dated July 13, 2009, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Criminal Case Nos. 08-1876-77, which, in turn, affirmed the Joint
Decision5 dated September 3, 2008 of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 337902-03.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime in July 2003, respondent Richard Natividad, Milo Malong
and Bing Nanquil, introducing themselves as contractors doing
business in Pampanga City under the name and style of RB
Custodio Construction, purchased construction materials for their
project inside the Subic Freeport Zone from petitioner Armilyn
Morillo, owner of Amasea General Merchandize and Construction
Supplies. The parties agreed that twenty percent (20%) of the
purchases shall be paid within seven (7) days after the first
delivery and the remaining eighty percent (80%) to be paid within
thirty-five (35) days after the last delivery, all of which shall be via
postdated checks.6
Pursuant to the agreement, petitioner delivered construction
materials amounting to a total of P500,054.00 at the construction
site where respondent and his partners were undertaking their
project. After the last delivery, respondent paid P20,000.00 in cash
and issued two (2) post-dated checks, drawn from Metrobank,
Pampanga branch, in the amounts of P393,000.00 and P87,054.00.
Upon maturity, petitioner attempted to deposit the checks in her
savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, San Lorenzo, Makati City.
They were, however, dishonored by the drawee bank. Immediately
thereafter, petitioner communicated the dishonor to respondent
and his partners and demanded for payment. Again, respondent
issued two (2) post-dated Metrobank checks and assured petitioner
that they will be honored upon maturity. Upon deposit in her
savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, Makati Branch, the checks
were once again dishonored for the reason that the account from
which they were drawn was already a closed account.
Consequently, petitioner made several demands from respondent
and his partners, but to no avail, prompting her to file a complaint
with the City Prosecution Office, Makati City.7 Thus, on August 12,
2004, two (2) Informations were filed against respondent and Milo
Malong, the accusatory portions of which read:
Criminal Case No. 337902
That on or about the 20th day of October 2003, or prior thereto, in
the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make out, draw
and issue to AMASEA GENERAL MERCHANDIZE AND
CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES herein represented by ARMILYN
MORILLO to apply on account or for value the check described
below:
Check
: 2960203217
No.
Drawn
: Metrobank
Against
In the :
amount Php434,430.00
Postdated : October 20,
/ Dated 2003
Payable : AMASEA GENERAL MERCHANDIZE AND
to CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof, said
accused did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check upon
its presentment which check when presented for payment within
ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Account Closed"
and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the said accused
failed lo pay said payee the face amount of said check or to make
arrangement for full payment thereof within five (5) banking days
after receiving notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 337903
alter receiving notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On September 15, 2004, the Assistant City Prosecutor issued a
Resolution recommending that respondent and his partners be
charged in court with the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code as well as for Violation of
Batas Pambansa No. 22 (BP 22), which was later docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 337902-03.

That on or about the 20th day of October 2003, or prior thereto, in On September 3, 2008, the MeTC rendered its Joint Decision,
the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the finding that the prosecution had proven all the elements of
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did violation of BP 22 as against respondent, the dispositive portion of
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make out, draw which reads:
and issue to AMASEA GENERAL MERCHANDIZE AND
CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES herein represented by ARMILYN WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in Criminal Cases Nos.
MORILLO to apply on account or for value the check described 337902-03 finding the accused, RICHARD NATIVIDAD, GUILTY
below: beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 and is sentenced to pay a fine equivalent to Two
Check : Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php200,000.00), for Check No.
No. 2960203218 2960203217 and Thirteen Thousand Thirty-Two Pesos for Check
No. 2960203218 or a total penalty of Two Hundred Thousand
Drawn Thirteen Thousand Thirty Two Pesos (Php213,032.00), with
: Metrobank
Against subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. However, accused
MILO MALONG, is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.
In the : Both accused Malong and Natividad are ordered to jointly pay the
amount Php13,032.00 private complainant the total sum of Four Hundred Forty-Seven
Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-Two Pesos (Php447,462.00) which
are the face value of the two (2) checks issued, subject of these
Postdated : October 20,
cases, with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum and three
/ Dated 2003
percent (3%) penalty per month as stipulated in the invoices,
reckoned from the date of receipt of the demand on February 28,
Payable : AMASEA GENERAL MERCHANDIZE AND 2004, until the amount is fully paid, plus the costs of suit.
to CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of evidence.
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof, said
accused did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
SO ORDERED.
bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check upon
its presentment which check when presented for payment within
Respondent appealed the decision of the MeTC to the RTC arguing
ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was subsequently
that the MeTC of Makati City had no jurisdiction over the case. He
dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Account Closed"
asserted that since the subject checks were issued, drawn, and
and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the said accused
delivered to petitioner in Subic, the venue of the action was
failed to pay said payee the face amount of said check or to make
improperly laid for none of the elements of the offense actually
arrangement for full payment thereof within five (5) banking days
transpired in Makati City. Respondent also pointed out that during
the retaking of petitioner's testimony on March 14, 2008, the
records of the case did not show that the public prosecutor
manifested his presence in court and that he delegated the
prosecution of the case to the private prosecutor. Thus, since there
was no appearance for the public prosecutor, nor was there a
proper delegation of authority, the proceedings should be declared
null and void.10
On February 23, 2009, the RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling in the
following wise:
Since accused Natividad failed to raise before the court [a quo] the
issue of authority of the private prosecutor to present witness
Morillo in the absence of the public prosecutor during the March 14,
2008 proceeding, and only did so after obtaining an adverse
judgment, it would be an injustice if all the proceedings had in the
case would be set aside.
The second issue raised on appeal also holds no ground. A violation
of BP 22 is a continuing or transitory offense, which is oft-repeated
in our jurisprudence. Under this doctrine, jurisdiction may be had
in several places where one of the acts material to the crime
occurred.
Accused Natividad postulates that since the checks were
presented suid dishonored in Makati City, which is not the
place where it was issued and delivered, the court [a quo]
lacks jurisdiction. This argument is, at best, specious. The
fact remains that the bank where it was presented lor
payment is in Makati City. These checks passed through this
bank for clearance, confirmation, and or validation
processes. Moreover, the eventual dishonour indeed took
place or was completed at the end of the collecting bank in
Makati City, where the private complainant maintains her
account over which the court [a quo] has jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, finding no merit on accused-appellant Natividad's
appeal, the same is hereby dismissed. Accordingly, the appealed
decision of the court [a quo] is hereby AFFIRMED in full.
SO ORDERED.11ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals, in its January 18, 2011
Decision, reversed the lower courts' rulings and dismissed the case
without prejudice to its refiling in the proper venue, the pertinent
portions of said Decision state:
In this case, records will reveal that the first element of the offense
happened in Pampanga. It was indisputably established that the
subject checks were issued to private complainant at petitioner's
office in Pampanga. Said checks were drawn from petitioner's
account in Metrobank, Pampanga branch.
The second element of the offense or the knowledge of dishonor of
the checks by the maker also transpired in Pampanga. After private
complainant was informed of the dishonor of the checks, she
immediately proceeded to petitioner's office in Pampanga,
personally informed him and his companions of the dishonor of the
checks and tendered a demand letter for the payment of the
construction materials.
Finally, the third element or dishonor of the checks by the
drawee bank also happened in Pampanga. Upon maturity of
the subject checks, private complainant deposited the same
in her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, Makati
Branch. Subsequently, she was informed by the latter bank
that the subject checks were dishonored by the drawee
bank, Metrobank, Pampanga branch.
Clearly, all the essential elements of the offense happened
in Pampanga. Consequently, the case can only be filed in
said place. Unfortunately, private complainant filed the case
in Makati City, under the erroneous assumption that since
she deposited the subject checks in Equitable PCI Bank,
Makati City, and was informed of lite dishonor of the checks
by the same bank, the case may be filed in Makati City.
However, as correctly argued by the OSG, the act of
depositing the check is not an essential clement of BP 22.
Likewise, the fact that private complainant was informed of
the dishonor of the checks at her bank in Makuti City did not
vest the MeTC, Makati City with jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case. To reiterate, a transitory crime can
only be tiled in any of the places where its constitutive
elements actually transpired. And, knowledge of the payee
of the dishonor of the checks is not an element of BP 22.
The law speaks only of the subsequent dishonor of the
checks by the drawee bank and the knowledge of the fact of
dishonor by the maker. Consequently, none of the elements
of the offense can be considered to have transpired in
Makati City. Thus, the venue of the instant case was
improperly laid.12ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant action invoking the following
argument:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT
THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY DID NOT HAVE
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE DESPITE A CLEAR SHOWING THAT
THE OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF
SAID COURT.
Petitioner maintains that the MeTC of Makati City, the place where
the dishonored checks were deposited, had jurisdiction over the
instant case. In support of her contention, petitioner cites the
ruling in Nieva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,14 wherein it was held that
since the check drawn in violation of BP 22 was deposited and
presented for encashment with the Angeles City Branch of the
Bank of the Philippine Islands, the RTC of Pampanga clearly had
jurisdiction over the crime of which accused therein was
charged.15 Thus, petitioner asserts that the appellate court erred in
ruling that the Makati MeTC did not have jurisdiction to try the
instant case. That none of the essential elements of the crime of
violation of BP 22 occurred in the City of Makati is belied by
the Nieva doctrine recognizing the jurisdiction of the court of the
place where the check was deposited and/or presented for
encashment.
Petitioner went on lo state that all the elements of violation of BP
22 were duly proven beyond reasonable doubt. First, the
prosecution sufficiently established that the respondent issued the
subject checks as shown by the documentary evidence submitted.
They were issued for value, as payment for the construction
supplies and materials which petitioner delivered to the accused.
As to the second and third elements, petitioner posits that it was
clearly shown that respondent had knowledge of the insufficiency
of funds in or credit with the drawee bank, which subsequently
dishonored the subject checks. Section 2 of BP 22 provides that
"the dishonor of a check when presented within ninety (90) days
from the date of the check shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or
drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes
arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check
within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check
has not been paid by the drawee." In this case, petitioner states
that the prosecution was able to sufficiently show that the subject
checks were presented within the time period required by law. In
fact, written demand relaying the fact that the drawee bank
dishonored the subject checks was even personally delivered by
petitioner to respondent as evidenced by the demand letter signed
by respondent. Thus, respondent cannot deny that he had
knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in his account with the
drawee bank and that the subject checks were subsequently
dishonored for the reason that the account from which they were
drawn was already a closed account.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing
the State, is in line with the appellate court's and respondent's
stance that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the instant case.
According to the OSG, the act of depositing the check is not an
essential element of the offense under the Bouncing Checks Law.
Citing the ruling in Rigor v. People,16 the OSG posited that the
place of deposit and the place of dishonor are distinct from each
other and that the place where the check was issued, delivered,
and dishonored is the proper venue, not the place where the check
was deposited, viz.:
The evidence clearly shows that the undated check was issued and
delivered at the Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila. x x x The
check was deposited with PS Bank, San Juan Branch, Metro Manila.
x x x The information at bar effectively charges San Juan as the
place of drawing and issuing. The jurisdiction of courts in criminal
cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or
information. Although the check was dishonored by the drawee,
Associated Bank, in its Tarlac Branch, appellant has drawn, issued
and delivered it at RBSJ, San Juan. The place of issue and delivery
was San Juan and knowledge, as an essential part of the offense,
was also overtly manifested in San Juan. There is no question that
crimes committed in San Juan are triable by the RTC stationed in
Pasig.
On the basis of the pronouncement in Rigor, the OSG thus claimed
that the MeTC of Makati City did not have jurisdiction over the
instant case for none of the essential elements of violation of BP 22
occurred therein.
The contention is untenable.
It is well settled that violations of BP 22 cases are categorized as
transitory or continuing crimes, meaning that some acts material
and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in
one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such
cases, the court wherein any of the crime's essential and material
acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it
being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same
excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or
transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory
where the offense was in part committed.18
The OSG, relying on our ruling in Rigor v. People, concluded that
"the Supreme Court regarded the place of deposit and the place of
dishonor as distinct from one another and considered the place
where the check was issued, delivered and dishonored, and not
where the check was deposited, as the proper venue for the filing
of a B.P. Blg. 22 case." The Court, however, cannot sustain such
conclusion.
In said case, She accused therein obtained a loan from the Rural
Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila, and in payment thereof, he issued
a check drawn against Associated Bank of Tarlac. Thereafter, Rural
Bank deposited the check at PS Bank, San Juan, but the same was
returned for the reason that it had been dishonored by Associated
Bank of Tarlac. When all other efforts to demand the repayment of
the loan proved futile, Rural Bank filed an action against the
accused for violation of BP 22 at the RTC of Pasig City, wherein
crimes committed in. San Juan are triable. The accused, however,
contends that the RTC of Pasig had no jurisdiction thereon since no
proof had been offered to show that his check was issued,
delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of hmrfficiency of funds
occurred in the Municipality of San Juan. The Court, however,
disagreed and held that while the check was dishonored by the
drawee. Associated Bank, in its Tarlac Branch, evidence clearly
showed that the accused had drawn, issued and delivered it at
Rural Bank, San Juan, viz.:
Lastly, positioner contends thai the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
h;ui no jurisdiction over this case since no proofhas been offered
that his check was issued, delivered, dishonored or that knowledge
of insufficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of San Juan,
Metro Manila.
The contention is untenable.
x x x x.
The evidence clearly shows that the undated check was issued and
delivered at the Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila on
November 16, 1989, and subsequently the check was dated
February 16, 1990 thereat. On May 25, 1990, the check was
deposited with PS Bank, San Juan Branch, Metro Manila. Thus, the
Court of Appeals correctly ruled:
iolations of B.P. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing
crimes. A suit on the check can be filed in any of the places where
any of the elements of the offense occurred, that is, where the
check is drawn, issued, delivered or dishonored. x x x
The information at bar effectively charges San Jisars as the
place of drawing and issuing. The jurisdiction of courts in
criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or information. Although, the check was
dishonored by the drawee, Associated Baisk, sit its Tariac
Branch, appellant has drawn, issued and delivered it at
RBSJ, San Juan. The place of issue airul delivery was San
Juan and knowledge, as an essential part of she offense,
was also overtly manifested in San Juan. There is no
question that crimes committed in November, 1989 in San
Juan arc triable by the RTC stationed in Pasig. In short both
allegation and proof in this case sufficiently vest jurisdiction
upon the RTC in Pasig City.
The bone of contention in Rigor, therefore, was whether the
prosecution had offered sufficient proof that the check drawn in
violation of BP 22 was issued, delivered, dishonored or that
lcnowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of
San Juan, thereby vesting jurisdiction upon the RTC of Pasig City.
Nowhere in the cited case, however, was it held, cither expressly or
impliedly, that the place where the check was deposited is not the
proper venue for actions involving violations of BP 22, it is true thai
the Court, in Rigor, acknowledged the feet that the check was
issued and delivered at the Rural Bank of San Juan, while the same
was deposited wilts the PS Bank of San Juan. But such
differentiation cannot be taken as basis sufficient enough to
conclude that the court of the place of deposit cannot exercise
jurisdiction over violations of BP 22. In the absence, thereiore, of
any ground, jurisprudential or otherwise, to sustain the OSG's
arguments, the Court cannot take cognizance of a doctrine that is
simply inapplicable to the issue at hand.
In contrast, the ruling in Nieva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals20 cited by
petitioner is more squarely on point with the instant case. In Nieva,
the accused delivered to Ramon Joven a post-dated check drawn
against the Commercial Bank of Manila as payment for Joven's
dump truck.
Said check was deposited in the Angeles City Branch of the Bank of
Philippine Islands, joven was advised, however, that the
Commercial Bank of Manila returned the check for the reason that
the account against which the check was drawn is a "closed
account." Consequently, the accused was charged with violation of
BP 22 before the RTC of Pampanga. On the contention of the
accused that said court had no jurisdiction to try the case, the
Court categorically ruled:
As to petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga has no jurisdiction to try the cases charged
herein as none of the essential elements thereof took place
in Pampanga, suffice it to say that such contention has no
basis. The evidence discloses that the check was deposited
and/or presented for encashment with the Angeles City
Branch of the Bank of the Philippine Islands. This fact
clearly confers jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga over the crimes of which petitioner is charged. It
must be noted that violations of B.P. Blg. 22 are categorized as
transitory or continuing crimes and so is the crime of estafa. The
rule is that a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly
tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part
committed.
In fact, in the more recent Yalong v. People,22 wherein the modes
of appeal and rules of procedure were the issues at hand, the Court
similarly inferred:
Besides, even discounting the above-discussed considerations,
Yalong's appeal still remains dismissible on the ground that, inter
alia, the MTCC had properly acquired jurisdiction over Criminal
Case No. 45414. It is welksedled that violation of BP 22 cases is
categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, which means that
the acts material and essential thereto occur in one municipality or
territory, while some occur in another. Accordingly, the court
wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been
committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being
understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same
excludes the other. Stated differently, a person charged with a
continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.
Applying these principles, a criminal case for violation of BP 22
may be tiled in any of the places where any of its elements
occurred - in particular, the place where the check is drawn,
issued, delivered, or dishonored.
In this case, while it is undisputed that the subject check
was drawn, issued, and delivered in Manila, records reveal
that Ylagan presented the same for deposit and encashment
at the LBC Bank in Batangas City where she learned of its
dishonor. As such, the MTCC [of Batangas City] correctly
took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 45414 as It had the
territorial jurisdiction to try and resolve the same. In this
light, the denial of the present petition remains warranted.
Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, there is no denying,
therefore, that the court of the place where the check was
deposited or presented for encashment; can be vested with
jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of BP 22. Thus, the fact
that the check subject of the instant case was drawn, issued, and
delivered in Pampanga does not strip off the Makati MeTC of its
jurisdiction over the instant case for it is undisputed that the
subject check was deposited and presented for encashment at the
Makati Branch of Equitable PC IBank. The MeTC of Makati,
therefore, correctly took cognizance of the instant case and
rendered its decision in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction.
It may be argued, however, that the instant petition ought to be
dismissed outright due to certain procedural infirmities. Section 35
(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code
provides that the OSG shall represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of lawyers. Specifically, it shall represent the
Government in all criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals.24 Thus, as a general rule, if a criminal
case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, the
appeal on the criminal aspect of the case must be instituted by the
Solicitor General on behalf of the State.25cralawred
There have been instances, however, where the Court permitted an
offended party to file an appeal without the intervention of the
OSG, such as when the offended party questions the civil aspect of
a decision of a lower court,26 when there is denial of due process of
law to the prosecution and the State or its agents refuse to act on
the case to the prejudice of the State and the private offended
party,27 when there is grave error committed by the judge, or
when the interest of substantial justice so requires. 28
Corollary, a judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing
that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not
merely reversible errors of judgment, but also exercised grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a
denial of due process, thereby rendering the assailed judgment null
and void. If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting the
aggrieved party's prayer is not tantamount to putting the accused
in double jeopardy,29 in violation of the general rule that the
prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a
judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case.
This is because a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and
executory, and the prosecution is barred from appealing lest the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be violated.30
Thus, it may be argued that since the instant petition is one for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, not under
Rule 65, and was not filed by the OSG representing the interest of
the Republic, the same should be summarily dismissed. The unique
and special circumstances attendant in the instant petition,
however, justify an adjudication by the Court on the merits and not
solely on technical grounds.
First of all, the Court stresses that the appellate court's dismissal of
the case is not an acquittal of respondent. Basic is the rule that a
dismissal of a case is different from an acquittal of the accused
therein. Except in a dismissal based on a Demurrer to Evidence
filed by the accused, or for violation of the right of the accused to a
speedy trial, the dismissal of a criminal case against the accused
will not result in his acquittal.31 In the oft-cited People v.
Salico,32 the Court explained:
This argument or reasoning is predicated on a confusion of the
legal concepts of dismissal and acquittal. Acquittal is always
based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted
because the evidence does not show that defendant's guilt
is beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal does tint decide
the case on the merits or that the defendant is not gniity.
Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the
court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the
evidence does noi show that the offense was committed
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the
complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form
and substance, etc.The only case in which the word dismissal is
commonly but not correctly used, instead of the proper term
acquittal, is when, after the prosecution has presented all its:
evidence, the defendant moves for me dismissal and the court
dismisses the ease on the ground that the evidence tails to show
beyond a reasonable doubt thai the defendant is guilty; for in such
case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal because the case is
decided on the merits. If the prosecution fails to prove that
the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not
an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the defendant could
not be again prosecuted before the court of competent
jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case, the
defendant may again be prosecuted for the same offense
before a court of competent jurisdiction.
Thus, when the appellate court herein dismissed the instant case
on the ground that the MeTC lacked jurisdiction over the offense
charged, it did not decide the same on the merits, let alone resolve
the issue of respondent's guilt or innocence based on the evidence
proffered by the prosecution.34 The appellate court merely
dismissed the case on the erroneous reasoning that none of the
elements of BP 22 was committed within the lower court's
jurisdiction, and not because of any finding that the evidence failed
to show respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly,
therefore, such dismissal did not operate as an acquittal, which, as
previously discussed, may be repudiated only by a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, showing a grave
abuse of discretion.
Thus, petitioner's resort to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court cannot be
struck down as improper. In a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45, the parties raise only questions of law
because the Court, in its exercise of its power of review, is not a
trier of facts. There is a question of law when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts and
which does not call for an existence of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties-litigants.35 In De Vera v.
Spouses Santiago,36 the Court categorically ruled that the issue of
whether the appellate court erred in annulling the RTC Decision for
lack of jurisdiction is a question of law, to wit:
Undeniably, the issue whether the CA erred in annulling the
RTC Decision for lack of jurisdiction is a question of law. The
resolution of such issue rests solely on what the law [B.P.
Blg. 129, as amended] provides on the given set of
circumstances as alleged in petitioners' complaint for
reconveyance of ownership and possession with damages.
In the instant case; the lone issue invoked by petitioner is precisely
"whether the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City did not have jurisdiction
over the case despite clear showing that the offense was
committed within the jurisdiction of said court." Evidently,
therefore, the instant petition was filed within the bounds of our
procedural rules for the issue herein rests solely on what the law
provides on the given set of circumstances insofar as the
commission of the crime of BP 22 is concerned. In criminal cases,
the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the
complaint or Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the
time of the filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty
provided by law for the crime charged at the time of its
commission.38 Thus, when a case involves a proper interpretation
of the rules and jurisprudence with respect to the jurisdiction of
courts to entertain complaints filed therewith, it deals with a
question of law that can be properly brought to this Court under
Rule 45.39
More importantly, moreover, since the dismissal of the instant case
cannot be considered as an acquittal of respondent herein, he
cannot likewise claim that his constitutional right to protection
against double jeopardy will be violated. In Paulin v. Hon.
Gimenez,40 the Court held:
Jurisprudence on double jeopardy as well as the exceptions thereto
which finds application to the case at bar has been laid down by
this Court as follows:
. . . However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of
dismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial court shall not
constitute double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon
motion, or with the express consent of the defendant; (2)
the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon
consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case;
and (3) the question to be passed upon by the appellate
court is purely legal so that should the dismissal he found
incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court
of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or
innocence of the defendant.
A cursory review of the records would readily reveal the presence
of the foregoing requisites. First, as early as the stage of
respondent's appeal of the MeTC's decision to the RTC, respondent
had already been moving for the dismissal of the case alleging the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the CA's dismissal on
said ground can rightly be considered to have been with
respondent's express consent. Second, as earlier mentioned, the
dismissal herein is not an acquittal or based upon a consideration
of the merits. Third, the question raised in this case is based purely
on a question of law. In view therefore of the presence of all three
requisites, the Court finds that petitioner's appeal of the appellate
court's dismissal cannot be barred by double jeopardy.
As to the issue of petitioner's legal standing to file the instant
petition in the absence of the OSG's participation, the
circumstances herein warrant the Court's consideration. In Narciso
v. Sta. Romana-Cruz,42 the Court gave due regard to the ends of
substantial justice by giving due course to a petition filed before it
by the private offended party, viz.:
Citing the "ends of substantial justice," People v. Calo, however,
provided an exception to the above doctrines in this manner:
While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals, only the Solicitor
General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines, or represent the People or the State in criminal
proceedings pending in this Court and the Court of Appeals
(Republic vs. Partisala, 118 SCRA 320 [1982]), the ends of
substantial justice would be better served, and the issues in
this action could be determined in a more just, speedy and
inexpensive manner, by entertaining the petition at bar. As
an offended party in a criminal case, private petitioner has
sufficient personality and a valid grievance against Judge
Adao's order granting bail to the alleged murderers of his
(private petitioner's) father.
xxxx
The ends of substantial justice indeed require the
affirmation of the appellate court's ruling on this point.
Clearly, the assailed Order of Judge Santiago was issued in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. A void order is no order at all. It cannot confer any
right or be the source of any relief. This Court is not merely a court
of law; it is likewise a court of justice.
To rule otherwise would leave the private respondent
without any recourse to rectify the public injustice brought
about by the trial court's Order, leaving her with only the
standing to file administrative charges for ignorance of the
law against the judge and the prosecutor. A party cannot be
left without recourse to address a substantive issue in law.
In a similar manner, the Court finds that in the interest of
substantial justice, it must give due course to the instant petition
and consequently rule on the merits of the same. The
circumstances surrounding this case left petitioner with no other
suitable recourse but to appeal the case herself. Not only was there
an absence of support from the OSG, said government office also
took a position in contrast to the rights and interests of petitioner.
Moreover, as discussed above, the arguments which ran counter to
petitioner's interest as well as the grounds used to support them
were simply inapplicable to the issue at hand. In fact, these
erroneous contentions were adopted by the appellate court in their
entirety, dismissing the instant case in a manner not in accord with
law and applicable jurisprudence. For the Court, now, to apply
procedural rules in their strict and literal sense by similarly
dismissing, as the CA had, petitioner's action poses serious
consequences tantamount to a miscarriage of justice. To rule that
the accused can postpone criminal prosecution and delay the
administration of justice at petitioner's expense on the erroneous
ground of lack of jurisdiction would create a hazardous precedent
and open loopholes in our criminal justice system.44
Indeed, the unique and exceptional circumstances in the instant
case demand that the Court forego a rigid application of the
technicalities under the law so as to prevent petitioner from
suffering a grave injustice. As disclosed by the records, petitioner
had already fulfilled her end of the agreement in giving
respondent, as early as in the year 2003, construction materials
amounting to half a million pesos and yet up until now, she has not
been paid therefor. In feet, after having sufficiently proven to the
satisfaction of both the MeTC and the RTC her right allegedly
violated by respondent, the CA simply dismissed, albeit without
prejudice to the re-filing of the case with the appropriate court, her
action for the incorrect ground of wrong venue. On the mistaken
reasoning that the MeTC of Makati City did not have jurisdiction
over the instant case, the CA, without providing any legal or
jurisprudential basis, would have petitioner start from the very
beginning and refile her complaint before the same court which
already had jurisdiction in the first place.
Thus, when there exists meritorious grounds to overlook strict
procedural matters, the Court cannot turn a blind eye thereto lest
the administration of justice be derailed by an overly stringent
application of the rules.45 Rules of procedure are meant to be tools
to facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of proceedings. Strict
adherence thereto must not get in the way of achieving substantial
justice. As long as their purpose is sufficiently met and no violation
of due process and fair play takes place, the rules should be
liberally construed.46 Dismissal of appeals purely on technical
grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to
encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of
procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense;
rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override
substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of
action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the
parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice
rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave
injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal
of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage
of justice.47
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 18, 2011 and Resolution
dated August 9, 2011 of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
32723 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
February 23, 2009 and Order dated July 13, 2009, of the Regional
Trial Court in Criminal Case Nos. 08-1876-77, which affirmed the
Joint Decision dated September 3, 2008 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court in Criminal Case Nos. 337902-03 are hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 167304 : August 25, 2009]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN
(third division) and VICTORIA AMANTE, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolution2 of the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated February 28, 2005
dismissing Criminal Case No. 27991, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Victoria Amante for lack of jurisdiction.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Toledo City, Province of Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. On
January 14, 1994, she was able to get hold of a cash advance in
the amount of P71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher in order
to defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and
Environmental Protection, which she headed. As of December 19,
1995, or after almost two years since she obtained the said cash
advance, no liquidation was made. As such, on December 22,
1995, Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao issued a demand letter
to respondent Amante asking the latter to settle her unliquidated
cash advance within seventy-two hours from receipt of the same
demand letter. The Commission on Audit, on May 17, 1996,
submitted an investigation report to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas), with the recommendation
that respondent Amante be further investigated to ascertain
whether appropriate charges could be filed against her under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise known as The
Auditing Code of the Philippines. Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas, on
September 30, 1999, issued a Resolution recommending the filing
of an Information for Malversation of Public Funds against
respondent Amante. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP),
upon review of the OMB-Visayas' Resolution, on April 6, 2001,
prepared a memorandum finding probable cause to indict
respondent Amante.
On May 21, 2004, the OSP filed an Information3 with the
Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of violating Section 89 of
P.D. No. 1445, which reads as follows:
That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or
subsequent thereto at Toledo City, Province of Cebu, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused VICTORIA AMANTE, a high-ranking public
officer, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo
City, and committing the offense in relation to office, having
obtained cash advances from the City Government of Toledo in the
total amount of SEVENTY-ONE THOUSAND NINETY-FIVE PESOS
(P71,095.00), Philippine Currency, which she received by reason of
her office, for which she is duty-bound to liquidate the same within
the period required by law, with deliberate intent and intent to
gain, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to
liquidate said cash advances ofP71,095.00, Philippine Currency,
despite demands to the damage and prejudice of the government
in aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan.
Thereafter, Amante filed with the said court a MOTION TO DEFER
ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION4 dated
November 18, 2004 stating that the Decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman (Visayas) dated September 14, 1999 at Cebu City
from of an incomplete proceeding in so far that respondent Amante
had already liquidated and/or refunded the unexpected balance of
her cash advance, which at the time of the investigation was not
included as the same liquidation papers were still in the process of
evaluation by the Accounting Department of Toledo City and that
the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the said criminal case
because respondent Amante was then a local official who was
occupying a position of salary grade 26, whereas Section 4 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan
shall have original jurisdiction only in cases where the accused
holds a position otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, R.A. No.
6758.
The OSP filed its Opposition5 dated December 8, 2004 arguing that
respondent Amante's claim of settlement of the cash advance dwelt
on matters of defense and the same should be established during
the trial of the case and not in a motion for reinvestigation. As to
the assailed jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the OSP contended
that the said court has jurisdiction over respondent Amante since
at the time relevant to the case, she was a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, therefore, falling under
those enumerated under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249. According to
the OSP, the language of the law is too plain and unambiguous that
it did not make any distinction as to the salary grade of city local
officials/heads.
The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution6 dated February 28, 2005,
dismissed the case against Amante, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this case is
hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The dismissal, however, is
without prejudice to the filing of this case to the proper court.
The Motion for Reinvestigation filed by the movant is hereby
considered moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner raises this lone issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION
OVER A CASE INVOLVING A SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD
MEMBER WHERE THE CRIME CHARGED IS ONE COMMITTED IN
RELATION TO OFFICE, BUT NOT FOR VIOLATION OF RA 3019, RA
1379 OR ANY OF THE FELONIES MENTIONED IN CHAPTER II,
SECTION 2, TITLE VII OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
In claiming that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case
in question, petitioner disputes the former's appreciation of this
Court's decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan. According to
petitioner, Inding did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or
confine the application of the enumeration provided for under
Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases
where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019,
R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in Section (a)(1)
of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249,
which was made applicable to cases concerning violations of R.A.
No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed in
relation to public office.
Respondent Amante, in her Comment8 dated January 16, 2006,
averred that, with the way the law was phrased in Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended, it is obvious that the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan was defined first, enumerating the several
exceptions to the general rule, while the exceptions to the general
rule are provided in the rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs
of Section 4. Therefore, according to respondent Amante, the
Sandiganbayan was correct in ruling that the latter has original
jurisdiction only over cases where the accused is a public official
with salary grade 27 and higher; and in cases where the accused is
public official below grade 27 but his position is one of those
mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g) of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended and his offense involves a violation of R.A.
No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code; and if the indictment involves offenses or
felonies other than the three aforementioned statutes, the general
rule that a public official must occupy a position with salary grade
27 and higher in order that the Sandiganbayan could exercise
jurisdiction over him must apply. The same respondent proceeded
to cite a decision9 of this Court where it was held that jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or
law; it cannot be fixed by the will of the parties; it cannot be
acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or
omission of the parties, neither is it conferred by acquiescence of
the court.
In its Reply10 dated March 23, 2006, the OSP reiterated that the
enumeration of public officials in Section 4(a)(1) to (a) to (g) of
P.D. No. 1606 as falling within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan should include their commission of other offenses
in relation to office under Section 4(b) of the same P.D. No. 1606.
It cited the case of Esteban v. Sandiganbayan, et al.11 wherein this
Court ruled that an offense is said to have been committed in
relation to the office if the offense is "intimately connected" with
the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the
performance of his official functions.
The petition is meritorious.
The focal issue raised in the petition is the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. As a background, this Court had thoroughly
discussed the history of the conferment of jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan in Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,12 thus:
x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486,
promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11,
1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official
conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the
concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the
highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency
and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.13
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was
promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.14
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23,
1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No.
7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments
to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997
by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. x x
Specifically, the question that needs to be resolved is whether or
not a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade
26 who was charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the
Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
This Court rules in the affirmative.
The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took effect on May
16, 1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A.
No. 8249. The alleged commission of the offense, as shown in the
Information was on or about December 19, 1995 and the filing of
the Information was on May 21, 2004. The jurisdiction of a court to
try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution
of the action, not at the time of the commission of the
offense.15 The exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A.
8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R.A. No.
3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case
as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of
the Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of
paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:
The present case falls under Section 4(b) where other offenses and
felonies committed by public officials or employees in relation to
their office are involved. Under the said provision, no exception is
contained. Thus, the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try
a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of
the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense applies
in this present case. Since the present case was instituted on May
21, 2004, the provisions of R.A. No. 8249 shall govern. Verily, the
pertinent provisions of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by R.A. No. 8249
are the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads.
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of
consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials
and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade
"27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of
the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; andcralawlibrary
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.
B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their
office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
The above law is clear as to the composition of the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4(a), the
following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan
to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be
committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch
occupying positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid
of exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may
still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that
they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same law.
Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors,
vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial
department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the
sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers,
and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service
occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and
air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and
provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. In connection therewith,
Section 4(b) of the same law provides that other offenses or
felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law,
respondent Amante, being a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod at the time of the alleged commission of an offense in
relation to her office, falls within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
However, the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution, dismissed the case
with the following ratiocination:
x x x the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Inding case, stating
that the Congress' act of specifically including the public officials
therein mentioned, "obviously intended cases mentioned in Section
4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975,
when committed by the officials enumerated in (1)(a) to (g)
thereof, regardless of their salary grades, to be tried by the
Sandiganbayan." Obviously, the Court was referring to cases
involving violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code only because they
are the specific cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606
as amended, so that when they are committed even by public
officials below salary grade '27', provided they belong to the
enumeration, jurisdiction would fall under the Sandiganbayan.
When the offense committed however, falls under Section 4(b) or
4(c) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended, it should be emphasized that
the general qualification that the public official must belong to
grade '27' is a requirement so that the Sandiganbayan could
exercise original jurisdiction over him. Otherwise, jurisdiction would
fall to the proper regional or municipal trial court.
In the case at bar, the accused is a Sangguniang Panlungsod
member, a position with salary grade '26'. Her office is included in
the enumerated public officials in Section 4(a) (1) (a) to (g) of P.D.
No. 1606 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975. However, she
is charged with violation of Section 89 of The Auditing Code of the
Philippines which is not a case falling under Section 4(a) but under
Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended. This being the case, the
principle declared in Inding is not applicable in the case at bar
because as stated, the charge must involve a violation of R.A. No.
3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code. Therefore, in the instant case, even if the
position of the accused is one of those enumerated public officials
under Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g), since she is being prosecuted of an
offense not mentioned in the aforesaid section, the general
qualification that accused must be a public official occupying a
position with salary grade '27' is a requirement before this Court
could exercise jurisdiction over her. And since the accused
occupied a public office with salary grade 26, then she is not
covered by the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner is correct in disputing the above ruling of the
Sandiganbayan. Central to the discussion of the Sandiganbayan is
the case of Inding v. Sandiganbayan16 where this Court ruled that
the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(a)(1) of P. D. No.
1606, as amended are included within the original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade. According to
petitioner, the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly
constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for
under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to
cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No.
3019, R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code. This observation is true in light of the facts
contained in the said case. In the Inding case, the public official
involved was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod with
Salary Grade 25 and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019.
In ruling that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the said
public official, this Court concentrated its disquisition on the
provisions contained in Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, where the offenses involved are specifically enumerated
and not on Section 4(b) where offenses or felonies involved are
those that are in relation to the public officials' office. Section 4(b)
of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, provides that:
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to
their office.
A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision
shows that those public officials enumerated in Section 4(a) of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the
Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also
with other offenses or felonies in relation to their office. The said
other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only
to those that are committed in relation to the public official or
employee's office. This Court had ruled that as long as the offense
charged in the information is intimately connected with the office
and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in
the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official
functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and
had the accused not have committed it had he not held the
aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted for "an
offense committed in relation" to his office. 17 Thus, in the case
of Lacson v. Executive Secretary,18 where the crime involved was
murder, this Court held that:
The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include
the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the
accused's official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what
determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position
or rank of the offender - that is, whether he is one of those public
officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. x x
x.
Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,19 where the public
official was charged with grave threats, this Court ruled:
x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained
allegations that the accused, petitioner herein, took advantage of
his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan
when he committed the crime of grave threats as defined in Article
282 of the Revised Penal Code against complainant Simeon G.
Legaspi, a municipal councilor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor
charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to kill
Legaspi during a public hearing, after the latter had rendered a
privilege speech critical of petitioner's administration. Clearly,
based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately
connected with the discharge of petitioner's official functions. This
was elaborated upon by public respondent in its April 25, 1997
resolution wherein it held that the "accused was performing his
official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public
hearing" and that "accused's violent act was precipitated by
complainant's criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief
executive of the municipality, during the latter's privilege speech.
It was his response to private complainant's attack to his office. If
he was not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or angered
by whatever private complainant might have said during said
privilege speech." Thus, based on the allegations in the
information, the Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction over
the case.
Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of
the Information filed against respondent Amante for violation of
The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said offense
was committed in relation to her office, making her fall under
Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended.
According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the
intention of the law had been to extend the application of the
exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan could
assert jurisdiction, then there would have been no need to
distinguish between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on the
one hand, and other offenses or felonies committed by public
officials and employees in relation to their office on the other. The
said reasoning is misleading because a distinction apparently
exists. In the offenses involved in Section 4(a), it is not disputed
that public office is essential as an element of the said offenses
themselves, while in those offenses and felonies involved in Section
4(b), it is enough that the said offenses and felonies were
committed in relation to the public officials or employees' office. In
expounding the meaning of offenses deemed to have been
committed in relation to office, this Court held:
In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court
elaborated on the scope and reach of the term "offense committed
in relation to [an accused's] office" by referring to the principle laid
down inMontilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and to an exception
to that principle which was recognized inPeople v. Montejo [108
Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is that
an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the
accused's office if "the offense cannot exist without the office" such
that "the office [is] a constituent element of the crime x x x."
In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion,
said that "although public office is not an element of the crime of
murder in [the] abstract," the facts in a particular case may show
that
x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the
accused's] respective offices and was perpetrated while they were
in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official
functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive to commit
the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held
their aforesaid offices. xx
Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provision of Section
4(b) does not mention any qualification as to the public officials
involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it
refers to those public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above,
except those specifically enumerated. It is a well-settled principle
of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in
their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and
signification,21 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a
technical or special legal meaning to those words.22 The intention
of the lawmakers î º who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and
lexicographers î º to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is
always presumed.23
WHEREFORE, the Petition dated April 20, 2005 is
hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division) dated February 28, 2005 is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
Consequently, let the case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan
for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 162059 - January 22, 2008]
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholaran** accused,
along with her brother, of swindling government funds?
MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng
bayan, at ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwa pinararatangan
ng estafa ng pera ng bayan?
The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition
for certiorari assailing the Resolutions1 of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth
Division, denying petitioner's motion to quash the information and
her motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the
University of the Philippines-Cebu. A student of a state university is
known as a government scholar. She was appointed by then
President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student
regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000
and ending on December 31, 2000.
In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President
Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman.2 On
September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives,
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the Office
of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).3
One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons
Hall Annex.4 President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos
(P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the
proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according to the
information, was the Office of the President.
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.5 The
succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine
Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a
system-wide alliance of student councils within the state university,
consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and
Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.6
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found
probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D.
Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the
Sandiganbayan.7The Information reads:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the
Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA
and JADE IAN D. SERANA of the crime of Estafa, defined and
penalized under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended committed as follows:
That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused,
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-ranking public officer, being
then the Student Regent of the University of the Philippines,
Diliman, Quezon City, while in the performance of her official
functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and
taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring
with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the
government by falsely and fraudulently representing to former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of the
Vinzons Hall of the University of the Philippines will be renovated
and renamed as "President Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall,"
and for which purpose accused HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA
requested the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS
(P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the
President, and the latter relying and believing on said false
pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said
accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in
the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which
check was subsequently encashed by accused Jade Ian D. Serana
on October 25, 2000 and misappropriated for their personal use
and benefit, and despite repeated demands made upon the
accused for them to return aforesaid amount, the said accused
failed and refused to do so to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the
Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense
charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent.
Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended
by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over which
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.8 It has no jurisdiction over the
crime ofestafa.9 It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title
VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers),
Book II of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title
X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not
within the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction.
She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government,
that was duped. Even assuming that she received
the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, not from the
coffers of the government.10
Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent, she was not a
public officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast to
the other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity.
She added that she was a simple student and did not receive any
salary as a student regent.
She further contended that she had no power or authority to
receive monies or funds. Such power was vested with the Board of
Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged in the
information that it was among her functions or duties to receive
funds, or that the crime was committed in connection with her
official functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.11
The Ombudsman opposed the motion.12 It disputed petitioner's
interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1606 clearly contains the catch -all phrase "in relation to
office," thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges
against petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution countered
that the source of the money is a matter of defense. It should be
threshed out during a full-blown trial.13
According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations,
iwas a public officer. As a member of the BOR, she hads the
general powers of administration and exerciseds the corporate
powers of UP. Based on Mechem's definition of a public office,
petitioner's stance that she was not compensated, hence, not a
public officer, is erroneous. Compensation is not an essential part
of public office. Parenthetically, compensation has been interpreted
to include allowances. By this definition, petitioner was
compensated.14
Sandiganbayan Disposition
In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan
denied petitioner's motion for lack of merit.15 It ratiocinated:
The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over this case.
It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses
covered by Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code are within the jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly
pointed out by the prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides
that the Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other offenses
committed by public officials and employees in relation to their
office. From this provision, there is no single doubt that this Court
has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa committed by a public
official in relation to his office.
Accused-movant's claim that being merely a member in
representation of the student body, she was never a public officer
since she never received any compensation nor does she fall under
Salary Grade 27, is of no moment, in view of the express provision
of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(A) x x x
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
x x x
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. (Italics supplied)

It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the
Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses
involving the officials enumerated in subsection (g),irrespective of
their salary grades, because the primordial consideration in the
inclusion of these officials is the nature of their responsibilities and
functions.
Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of law?
A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the University of the
Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents, to which accused-
movant belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of
administration and corporate powers in the university, such as: 1)
To receive and appropriate to the ends specified by law such sums
as may be provided by law for the support of the university; 2) To
prescribe rules for its own government and to enact for the
government of the university such general ordinances and
regulations, not contrary to law, as are consistent with the
purposes of the university; and 3) To appoint, on recommendation
of the President of the University, professors, instructors, lecturers
and other employees of the University; to fix their compensation,
hours of service, and such other duties and conditions as it may
deem proper; to grant to them in its discretion leave of absence
under such regulations as it may promulgate, any other provisions
of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and to remove them for
cause after an investigation and hearing shall have been had.
It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act
only through its board of directors, or board of trustees in the case
of non-stock corporations. The board of directors or trustees,
therefore, is the governing body of the corporation.
It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the
University of the Philippines is performing functions similar to those
of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This draws to
fore the conclusion that being a member of such board, accused-
movant undoubtedly falls within the category of public officials
upon whom this Court is vested with original exclusive jurisdiction,
regardless of the fact that she does not occupy a position classified
as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
Finally, this court finds that accused-movant's contention that the
same of P15 Million was received from former President Estrada
and not from the coffers of the government, is a matter a defense
that should be properly ventilated during the trial on the merits of
this case.16
On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration.17 The motion was denied with finality in a
Resolution dated February 4, 2004.18
Issue
Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that "THE
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT
QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND DISMISING THE CASE
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION."19
In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below,
namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b)
petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid
her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was not committed in
relation to her office; (d) the funds in question personally came
from President Estrada, not from the government.
Our Ruling
The petition cannot be granted.
Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to
quash is not correctible by certiorari.
We would ordinarily dismiss this Petition for Certiorari outright on
procedural grounds. Well-established is the rule that when a
motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a
Petition forCertiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without
prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion
to quash.20 Remedial measures as regards interlocutory orders,
such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often
dismissed.21 The evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity
of appeals in a single action.22
In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,23 the Court
clearly explained and illustrated the rule and the exceptions, thus:
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely
interlocutory and cannot be subject of appeal until final judgment
or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary procedure to
be followed in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the
decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final
judgment. The same rule applies to an order denying a motion to
quash, except that instead of filing an answer a plea is entered and
no appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal.
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in
denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion,
then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be
unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal
and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if
the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made
with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious
exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal
cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few examples of
the exceptions to the general rule.
In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion
to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
this Court granted the Petition for Certiorari and prohibition against
the City Court of Manila and directed the respondent court to
dismiss the case.
In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion
to quash based on lack of jurisdiction over the offense, this Court
granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent
court from further proceeding in the case.
In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a
motion to dismiss based on improper venue, this Court granted the
petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge from
taking cognizance of the case except to dismiss the same.
In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to
dismiss based on bar by prior judgment, this Court granted the
Petition for Certiorari and directed the respondent judge to dismiss
the case.
In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a
motion to dismiss based on the Statute of Frauds, this Court
granted the Petition for Certiorari and dismissed the amended
complaint.
In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the Petition
for Certiorari after the motion to quash based on double jeopardy
was denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist from
further action in the criminal case except to dismiss the same.
In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to
quash based on prescription was set aside on certiorari and the
criminal case was dismissed by this Court.24
We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave
abuse of discretion.
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
We first address petitioner's contention that the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan is determined by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). We note that
petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law yet quotes Section 4
of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash before the
Sandiganbayan.25 She repeats the reference in the instant Petition
for Certiorari26 and in her memorandum of authorities.27
We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or
typographical error. It bears stressing that petitioner repeated this
claim twice despite corrections made by the Sandiganbayan.28
Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history of the
statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan
was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to
attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public
officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers
and employees shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at
all times accountable to the people.29
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was
promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.30
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23,
1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No.
7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments
to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997
by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
" (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
" (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
"(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of
consul and higher;
" (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;
" (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the
position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintended or higher;
" (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and
officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and
special prosecutor;
" (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations.
" (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade
"27'" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989;
" (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution;
" (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
" (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27'"
and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989.
B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
" In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to Salary Grade "27'" or higher, as prescribed in the
said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned
above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper regional court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court,
and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to
their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended.
" The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over final judgments, resolutions or order of regional trial courts
whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their
appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
" The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over
petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other
ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and
over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or
that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the
jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the
Supreme Court.
" The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as
the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated
and may thereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for
review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions
for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to
the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme
Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special
prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in
cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986.
" In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and
employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over them.
" Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil
action for the recovery of civil liability shall, at all times, be
simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same
proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the
filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with
it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing such
civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized:
Provided, however, That where the civil action had heretofore been
filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered,
and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or
the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for
consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action,
otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned."
Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on
August 17, 1960. The said law represses certain acts of public
officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt
practices or which may lead thereto.31 Pursuant to Section 10 of
R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should
be filed with the Sandiganbayan.32
R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over
which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A.
No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private
individuals. We quote:
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. - (a) It shall be
unlawful for any person having family or close personal relation
with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of
such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly
requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary
advantage from any other person having some business,
transaction, application, request or contract with the government,
in which such public official has to intervene. Family relation shall
include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the
third civil degree. The word "close personal relation" shall include
close personal friendship, social and fraternal connections, and
professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures
free access to such public officer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause
any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section
3 hereof.
In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019,
as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices and provides for
their penalties.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
the offense of estafa.
Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends
that estafa is not among those crimes cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this argument, petitioner
isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without
regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision.
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should
receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an
absurd conclusion.33 Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda
est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is
ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and
absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan mayroong kalabuan, ang
pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap at katawa-
tawa.
Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be
expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the
effect contemplated by the legislature.34 The intention of the
legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and
every part of the act is to be taken into view.35 In other words,
petitioner's interpretation lies in direct opposition to the rule that a
statute must be interpreted as a whole under the principle that the
best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself.36 Optima statuti
interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Ang isang batas ay marapat
na bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng
prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na interpretasyon ay ang
mismong batas.
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies
committed by public officials in relation to their office. We see no
plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the
offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606.
Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is
simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is
committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section
4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is
committed in relation to their office.
In Perlas, Jr. v. People,37 the Court had occasion to explain that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an indictment for estafa v. a
director of the National Parks Development Committee, a
government instrumentality. The Court held then:
The National Parks Development Committee was created originally
as an Executive Committee on January 14, 1963, for the
development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national
parks (Executive Order No. 30). It was later designated as the
National Parks Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7,
1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos
and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated Chairman and Vice-
Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an attempt to transfer
it to the Bureau of Forest Development, Department of Natural
Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter of Implementation No.
39, issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November 27, 1975), the
NPDC has remained under the Office of the President (E.O. No.
709, dated July 27, 1981).
Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC
as a regular government agency under the Office of the President
and allotments for its maintenance and operating expenses were
issued direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).
The Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated with
greater firmness in Bondoc v. Sandiganbayan.38 Pertinent parts of
the Court's ruling in Bondoc read:
Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondoc's cases to
the Regional Trial Court, for the simple reason that the latter would
not have jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above intimated,
the inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of Bondoc's
cases and those of the government employees separately charged
for the same crimes, has not altered the nature of the offenses
charged, as estafa thru falsification punishable by penalties higher
than prision correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine
ofP6,000.00, committed by government employees in conspiracy
with private persons, including Bondoc. These crimes are within the
exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply
cannot be taken cognizance of by the regular courts, apart from
the fact that even if the cases could be so transferred, a joint trial
would nonetheless not be possible.
Petitioner UP student regent
is a public officer.
Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does
not receive any salary or remuneration as a UP student regent.
This is not the first or likely the last time that We will be called
upon to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the
Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition
of a public officer.39 The 1987 Constitution does not define who are
public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are
found in different statutes and jurisprudence.
In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that:

A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and
conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law
or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is
invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public
([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a
public office under our political system is therefore not a natural
right. It exists, when it exists at all only because and by virtue of
some law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it (Mechem
Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested interest or an
estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office.
Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity
as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any
vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).
In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court adopted the definition of Mechem
of a public office:
"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and
conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law
or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is
invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.
The individual so invested is a public officer."42
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade
27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student. This is
likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated
in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,43 We held that while the
first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27
and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive
officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher
but who are by express provision of law placed under the
jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision
of law.44
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the
Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to
those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation.45 By
express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as
contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an
essential element of public office.46 At most, it is merely incidental
to the public office.47
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office.
An investment in an individual of some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit
of the public makes one a public officer.48
The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with
Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate
governmental function by providing advanced instruction in
literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving
professional and technical training.49 Moreover, UP is maintained
by the Government and it declares no dividends and is not a
corporation created for profit.50
The offense charged was committed
in relation to public office, according
to the Information.
Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public
officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over the
offense because it was not committed in relation to her office.
According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act
without the approval of the BOR. She adds there was no Board
Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract with then
President Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the
governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was
done in a private capacity and not in relation to public office.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in
the information.51 More than that, jurisdiction is not affected by the
pleas or the theories set up by defendant or respondent in an
answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash.52 Otherwise,
jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the
whims of defendant or respondent.53
In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain
terms that petitioner, being then a student regent of U.P., "while in
the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in
relation to her office and taking advantage of her position, with
intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a
private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud the government x x x." (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the information based on this
ground.
Source of funds is a defense that should
be raised during trial on the merits.
The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v.
Ramos,55 where Atty Dionisio D. Ramos used the name Pedro D.D.
Ramos in connection with a criminal case. The Court ruled that
Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a name different from
that with which he was authorized. We severely reprimanded Atty.
Ramos and warned that a repetition may warrant suspension or
disbarment.56
We admonish petitioner's counsel to be more careful and accurate
in his citation. A lawyer's conduct before the court should be
characterized by candor and fairness.57 The administration of
justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act with complete
candor and honesty before the courts.58

It is contended anew that the amount came from President WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. SO
Estrada's private funds and not from the government coffers. ORDERED.
Petitioner insists the charge has no leg to stand on.

We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came

from the Office of the President and not its then occupant,
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the information, it is
averred that "petitioner requested the amount of Fifteen Million
Pesos (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the
President, and the latter relying and believing on said false
pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said
accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in
the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00)."

Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the

source of the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that should be
ventilated during the trial on the merits of the instant case.54

A lawyer owes candor, fairness

and honesty to the Court.

As a parting note, petitioner's counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz,

misrepresented his reference to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as a
quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of his motion
to quash, the instant Petition for Certiorari and his memorandum,
unveils the misquotation. We urge petitioner's counsel to observe
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically
Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that "a lawyer shall not misquote or
misrepresent."
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137237. September 17, 2002.]
ANTONIO PROSPERO ESQUIVEL and MARK ANTHONY
ESQUIVEL, Petitioners, v. THE HON. OMBUDSMAN, THE
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and HERMINIGILDO EDUARDO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus 1
with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order seeks to annul and set aside: (1) the Ombudsman resolution
2 dated June 15, 1998 finding prima facie case against herein
petitioners, and (2) the order 3 denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration. Further, in their supplemental petition, 4
petitioners assail the Sandiganbayan for taking cognizance of cases
without or beyond its jurisdiction. They impleaded that court and
the People of the Philippines as additional parties in this case.
The factual antecedents of this case are as follows:
PO2 Herminigildo C. Eduardo and SPO1 Modesto P. Catacutan are
both residents of Barangay Dampulan, Jaen, Nueva Ecija, but
assigned with the Regional Intelligence and Investigation Division
(RIID), Police Regional Office 3, Camp Olivas, San Fernando,
Pampanga. In their respective complaint-affidavits, 5 filed before
the Philippine National Police — Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (PNP-CIDG), Third Regional Office, Camp Olivas,
San Fernando, Pampanga, Eduardo and Catacutan charged herein
petitioners Antonio Prospero Esquivel, 6 municipal mayor of Jaen
and his brother, Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel, barangay captain
of barangay Apo, Jaen, with alleged illegal arrest, arbitrary
detention, maltreatment, attempted murder, and grave threats.
Also included in the charges were SPO1 Reynaldo Espiritu, SPO2
Nestor Villa Almayda, and LTO Officer Aurelio Diaz. PO2 Eduardo
and SPO1 Catacutan likewise accused P/S Insp. Bienvenido C.
Padua and SPO3 Inocencio P. Bautista of the Jaen Municipal Police
Force of dereliction of duty.
The initial investigation conducted by the PNP-CIDG showed that at
about 12:30 p.m. of March 14, 1998, PO2 Eduardo was about to
eat lunch at his parents’ house at Sta. Monica Village, Dampulan,
Jaen, Nueva Ecija, when petitioners arrived. SPO1 Espiritu, SPO2
Almayda, LTO Officer Diaz, and several unidentified persons
accompanied them. Without further ado, petitioners disarmed PO2
Eduardo of his Cal. 45 service pistol, which was covered by a
Memorandum Receipt and COMELEC Gun Ban Exemption. They
then forced him to board petitioners’ vehicle and brought him to
the Jaen Municipal Hall.
PO2 Eduardo also stated that while they were on their way to the
town hall, Mayor Esquivel mauled him with the use of a firearm and
threatened to kill him. Mayor Esquivel pointed a gun at PO2
Eduardo and said, "Putang-ina mo, papatayin kita, aaksidentihin
kita dito, bakit mo ako kinakalaban!" (You son of a bitch! I will kill
you, I will create an accident for you. Why are you against me?)
Upon reaching the municipal hall, Barangay Captain Mark Anthony
"Eboy" Esquivel shoved PO2 Eduardo inside an adjacent hut. Mayor
Esquivel then ordered SPO1 Espiritu to kill him, saying "Patayin mo
na iyan at gawan ng senaryo at report." (Kill him, then create a
scenario and make a report.)
At this point, according to SPO1 Catacutan, he arrived to verify
what happened to his teammate, PO2 Eduardo, but Mayor Esquivel
likewise threatened him. Mayor Esquivel then ordered P/S Insp.
Bienvenido Padua of the Jaen Police Station to file charges against
PO2 Eduardo. Then, the mayor once again struck PO2 Eduardo in
the nape with a handgun, while Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel was
holding the latter. PO2 Eduardo then fell and lost consciousness.
When he regained his consciousness, he was told that he would be
released. Prior to his release, however, he was forced to sign a
statement in the police blotter that he was in good physical
condition.
PO2 Eduardo told the PNP-CIDG investigators that he was most
likely maltreated and threatened because of jueteng and tupada.
He said the mayor believed he was among the law enforcers who
raided a jueteng den in Jaen that same day. He surmised that the
mayor disliked the fact that he arrested members of crime
syndicates with connections to the mayor. 7
In support of his sworn statement, PO2 Eduardo presented a
medical certificate showing the injuries he suffered and other
documentary evidence. 8
After the initial investigation, the PNP-CIDG Third Regional Office
forwarded the pertinent records to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon for appropriate action. 9
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon conducted a
preliminary investigation and required petitioners and their
companions to file their respective counter-affidavits. In their joint
counter-affidavit, 10 petitioners and their companions denied the
charges against them. Instead, they alleged that PO2 Eduardo is a
fugitive from justice with an outstanding warrant of arrest for
malversation. They further alleged that the gun confiscated from
PO2 Eduardo was the subject of an illegal possession of firearm
complaint.
On June 15, 1998, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued the
impugned resolution 11 recommending that both Mayor Esquivel
and Barangay Captain Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel be indicted
for the crime of less serious physical injuries, and Mayor Esquivel
alone for grave threats. The charges against the other respondents
below were dismissed, either provisionally or with finality.
On August 14, 1998, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the
aforesaid resolution.
Thereafter, separate informations docketed as Criminal Case No.
24777 12 for less serious physical injuries against Mayor Esquivel
and Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel, and Criminal Case No. 24778
13 for grave threats against petitioner mayor, were filed with the
Sandiganbayan.
On August 26, 1998, petitioners moved for reconsideration of the
August 14, 1998 resolution of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.
As directed by the Sandiganbayan, they likewise filed a motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation 14 with the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP). That motion was, however, denied by the OSP in
the assailed order 15 dated December 7, 1998. On December 11,
1998, the Ombudsman approved the OSP’s order of denial.
On February 8, 1999, petitioners were arraigned in both cases, and
they pleaded not guilty to the charges.
With their failure to extend the suspension of proceedings
previously granted by the Sandiganbayan by virtue of their motion
for reconsideration, petitioners elevated the matter to this Court
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents
in rendering the resolution and the order.
On June 9, 1999, we denied for lack of merit petitioners’ motion 16
reiterating their plea for the issuance of a TRO directing public
respondents to refrain from prosecuting Criminal Cases Nos. 24777
and 24778.
Petitioners now submit the following issues for our resolution:
1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING THE ADMISSION OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENT THAT HE WAS IN GOOD PHYSICAL
CONDITION WHEN HE WAS RELEASED FROM THE POLICE
HEADQUARTERS OF JAEN, NUEVA ECIJA;
2. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE FOR
GRAVE THREATS WHEN PETITIONERS WERE LEGALLY EFFECTING
THE ARREST OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT BY VIRTUE OF THE
WARRANT OF ARREST ISSUED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
GAPAN, NUEVA ECIJA UNDER CRIM. CASE NO. 4925 FOR
MALVERSATION OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY; and
3. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSES FILED AGAINST
PETITIONERS.
Petitioners’ formulation of the issues may be reduced to the
following:
(1) Did the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion in
directing the filing of the informations against petitioners?
(2) Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion in
assuming jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777 and 24778?
Petitioners argue that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion when he failed to consider the exculpatory evidence in
their favor, namely, the admission of PO2 Eduardo that he was in
good physical condition when he left the police station in Jaen,
Nueva Ecija. 18 With such admission, PO2 Eduardo is now
estopped from claiming that he was injured since it is conclusive
evidence against him and need not be proven in any other
proceeding.
Public respondents, represented by the Office of the Ombudsman
through the OSP, counter that petitioners raise a factual issue
which is not a proper subject of a certiorari action. They further
postulate that this is the very same defense advanced by
petitioners in the charges against them and being evidentiary in
nature, its resolution can only be threshed out in a full-blown trial.
20
We find the present petition without merit.
The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file
the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. 21
Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily
interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and
prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to
indicate otherwise. 22 Said exercise of powers is based upon his
constitutional mandate 23 and the courts will not interfere in its
exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution
to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well.
Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper
the functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way
that courts will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of
discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time they decided
to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant. 24 Thus, in Rodrigo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 25 we
held that:
This Court, moreover, has maintained a consistent policy of non-
interference in the determination of the Ombudsman regarding the
existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in
the exercise of such discretion.
In this case, petitioners utterly failed to establish that the
Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the
disputed resolution and order.
There was no abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman,
much less grave abuse in disregarding PO2 Eduardo’s admission
that he was in good physical condition when he was released from
the police headquarters. 26 Such admission was never brought up
during the preliminary investigation. The records show that no such
averment was made in petitioners’ counter-affidavit 27 nor was
there any document purporting to be the exculpatory statement
attached therein as an annex or exhibit. Petitioners only raised this
issue in their motion for reconsideration. 28 In his opposition to
said motion, PO2 Eduardo did admit signing a document to the
effect that he was in good physical condition when he left the
police station. However, the admission merely applied to the
execution of said document and not to the truthfulness of its
contents. Consequently, the admission that petitioners brand as
incontrovertible is but a matter of evidence best addressed to the
public respondents’ appreciation. It is evidentiary in nature and its
probative value can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on
the merits.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Given these circumstances, certiorari is not the proper remedy. As
previously held, but now bears stressing:
. . . [t]his Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its function to
examine and evaluate the probative value of all evidence presented
to the concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned
decision, resolution or order. 29
Petitioners would have this Court review the Sandiganbayan’s
exercise of jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777-78.
Petitioners theorize that the latter has no jurisdiction over their
persons as they hold positions excluded in Republic Act No. 7975.
30 As the positions of municipal mayors and barangay captains are
not mentioned therein, they claim they are not covered by said law
under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 31
Petitioners’ claim lacks merit. In Rodrigo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 32
Binay v. Sandiganbayan, 33 and Layus v. Sandiganbayan, 34 we
already held that municipal mayors fall under the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Nor can Barangay
Captain Mark Anthony Esquivel claim that since he is not a
municipal mayor, he is outside the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.
R.A. 7975, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, 35 provides that it is
only in cases where "none of the accused (Emphasis supplied) are
occupying positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher"
36 that "exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper preventing unnecessary litigation; 45 it cannot be presumed that
regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, the lower court would not properly rule on a jurisdictional objection
and municipal circuit court, as the case may be, pursuant to their if it were properly presented to it. 46 The records show that
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as petitioners only raised the issue of the alleged lack of jurisdiction
amended." 37 Note that under the 1991 Local Government Code, by the Sandiganbayan before this Court.
Mayor Esquivel has a salary grade of 27. 38 Since Barangay
Captain Esquivel is the co-accused in Criminal Case No. 24777 of Nor can petitioners claim entitlement to a writ of mandamus.
Mayor Esquivel, whose position falls under salary grade 27, the Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused,
Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion in of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a discretionary
assuming jurisdiction over said criminal case, as well as over duty. 47 The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the
Criminal Case No. 24778, involving both of them. Hence, the writ same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor
of certiorari cannot issue in petitioners’ favor. judgment. 48 Hence, this Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus
to control or review the exercise of discretion by the Ombudsman,
For the same reason, petitioners’ prayer for a writ of prohibition for it is his discretion and judgment that is to be exercised and not
must also be denied. that of the Court. When a decision has been reached in a matter
involving discretion, a writ of mandamus may not be availed of to
First, note that a writ of prohibition is directed to the court itself, review or correct it, however erroneous it may be. 49 Moreover, as
commanding it to cease from the exercise of a jurisdiction to which earlier discussed, petitioners had another remedy available in the
it has no legal claim. 39 As earlier discussed, the Sandiganbayan’s ordinary course of law. Where such remedy is available in the
jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777-78 is clearly founded ordinary course of law, mandamus will not lie. 50
on law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Second, being an extraordinary remedy, prohibition cannot be Costs against petitioners.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
resorted to when the ordinary and usual remedies provided by law
are adequate and available. 40 Prohibition is granted only where no SO ORDERED.
other remedy is available or sufficient to afford redress. That the
petitioners have another and complete remedy at law, through an
appeal or otherwise, is generally held sufficient reason for denying
the issuance of the writ. 41 In this case, petitioners were not
devoid of a remedy in the ordinary course of law. They could have
filed a motion to quash the informations at the first instance but
they did not. They have only themselves to blame for this
procedural lapse as they have not shown any adequate excuse for
their failure to do so. Petitioners did make a belated oral motion for
time to file a motion to quash the informations, during their much
delayed arraignment, 42 but its denial is not a proper subject
forcertiorari or prohibition as said denial is merely an interlocutory
order. 43

Third, a writ of prohibition will not be issued against an inferior

court unless the attention of the court whose proceedings are
sought to be stayed has been called to the alleged lack or excess of
jurisdiction. 44 The foundation of this rule is the respect and
consideration due to the lower court and the expediency of
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 191894, July 15, 2015
DANILO A. DUNCANO, Petitioner, v. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN
(2ND DIVISION), AND HON. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
(Rules) with prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order seeks to reverse and set aside the
August 18, 2009 Resolution1 and February 8, 2010 Order2 of
respondent Sandiganbayan Second Division in Criminal Case No.
SB-09-CRM-0080, which denied petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The facts are plain and undisputed.
Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case,
the Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with
Salary Grade 26 as classified under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6758.3 On March 24, 2009,4 the Office of the Special Prosecutor
(OSP), Office of the Ombudsman, filed a criminal case against him
for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No.
6713,5 allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about April 15, 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused DANILO DUNCANO y ACIDO, a high
ranking public officer, being the Regional Director of Revenue
Region No. 7, of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Quezon City, and
as such is under an obligation to accomplish and submit
declarations under oath of his assets, liabilities and net worth and
financial and business interests, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally fail to disclose in his Sworn Statement of
Assets and Liabilities and Networth (SALN) for the year 2002, his
financial and business interests/connection in Documail Provides
Corporation and Don Plus Trading of which he and his family are
the registered owners thereof, and the 1993 Nissan Patrol motor
vehicle registered in the name of his son VINCENT LOUIS P.
DUNCANO which are part of his assets, to the damage and
prejudice of public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Prior to his arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss With
Prayer to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest7 before
respondent Sandiganbayan Second Division. As the OSP alleged,
he admitted that he is a Regional Director with Salary Grade 26.
Citing Inding v. Sandiganbayan8 and Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et
al.,9 he asserted that under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606,
as amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249,10 the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try and hear the case
because he is an official of the executive branch occupying the
position of a Regional Director but with a compensation that is
classified as below Salary Grade 27.
In its Opposition,11 the OSP argued that a reading of Section 4 (A)
(1) (a) to (g) of the subject law would clearly show that the
qualification as to Salary Grade 27 and higher applies only to
officials of the executive branch other than the Regional Director
and those specifically enumerated. This is so since the term
“Regional Director” and “higher” are separated by the conjunction
“and,” which signifies that these two positions are different, apart
and distinct, words but are conjoined together “relating one to the
other” to give effect to the purpose of the law. The fact that the
position of Regional Director was specifically mentioned without
indication as to its salary grade signifies the lawmakers’ intention
that officials occupying such position, regardless of salary grade,
fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. This issue, it is claimed, was already resolved
in Inding. Finally, the OSP contended that the filing of the motion
to dismiss is premature considering that the Sandiganbayan has
yet to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
Still not to be outdone, petitioner invoked the applicability of Cuyco
v. Sandiganbayan12 and Organo v. Sandiganbayan13 in his
rejoinder.
On August 18, 2009, the Sandiganbayan Second Division
promulgated its Resolution, disposing:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court
hereby DENIES the instant Motion to Dismiss for being devoid of
merit. Let a Warrant of Arrest be therefore issued against the
accused. SO ORDERED.
The respondent court ruled that the position of Regional Director is
one of those exceptions where the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
even if such position is not Salary Grade 27. It was opined that
Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249 unequivocally provides that
respondent court has jurisdiction over officials of the executive
branch of the government occupying the position of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Salary Grade 27 and
higher, of R.A. No. 6758, including those officials who are expressly
enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (g). In support of the ruling,
this Court’s pronouncements in Indingand Binay v.
Sandiganbayan15 were cited.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was
denied;16 Hence, this petition.
Instead of issuing a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction, the Court required respondents to file a
comment on the petition without necessarily giving due course
thereto.17 Upon compliance of the OSP, a Rejoinder (supposedly a
Reply) was filed by petitioner.
At the heart of the controversy is the determination of whether,
according to P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of
R.A No. 8249, only Regional Directors with Salary Grade of 27 and
higher, as classified under R.A. No. 6758, fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Arguing that he is not included
among the public officials specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A)
(1) (a) to (g) of the law and heavily relying as well on Cuyco,
petitioner insists that respondent court lacks jurisdiction over him,
who is merely a Regional Director with Salary Grade 26. On the
contrary, the OSP maintains that a Regional Director, irrespective
of salary grade, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
We find merit in the petition.
The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5,
Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution.18By virtue of the powers
vested in him by the Constitution and pursuant to Proclamation No.
1081, dated September 21, 1972, former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos issued P.D. No. 1486.19 The decree was later amended by
P.D. No. 1606,20 Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,21 P.D. No.
1860,22 and P.D. No. 1861.
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was
retained as provided for in Section 4, Article XI thereof.24 Aside
from Executive Order Nos. 1425 and 14-a,26 and R.A. 7080,27 which
expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 was
further modified by R.A. No. 7975,28 R.A. No. 8249,29 and just this
year, R.A. No. 10660.30redarclaw
For the purpose of this case, the relevant provision is Section 4 of
R.A. No. 8249, which states:
SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to
read as follows:
“SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
“A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
“(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other provincial department heads;
"(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul
and higher;
"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;
"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the
position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent or higher;

"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials
and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations.
"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade ‘27’
and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989;
"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’ and
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
“B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
“C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
x x x”
Based on the afore-quoted, those that fall within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of the executive
branch with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2) officials specifically
enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary
grades.31 While the first part of Section 4 (A) covers only officials of
the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part
specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not
be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of
law placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.32redarclaw
That the phrase “otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher”
qualifies “regional director and higher” is apparent from the
Sponsorship Speech of Senator Raul S. Roco on Senate Bill Nos. 1353
and 844, which eventually became R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8249,
respectively:
As proposed by the Committee, the Sandiganbayan shall exercise
original jurisdiction over the cases assigned to it only in instances
where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the
positions of regional director and higher or are otherwise classified as
Grade 27 and higher by the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity at the
time of the commission of the offense. The jurisdiction, therefore,
refers to a certain grade upwards, which shall remain with the
Sandiganbayan.33 (Emphasis supplied)
To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 7975 was
enacted for that Court to concentrate on the “larger fish” and leave the
“small fry” to the lower courts. This law became effective on May 6,
1995 and it provided a two-pronged solution to the clogging of the
dockets of that court, to wit:
It divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over public
officials whose salary grades were at Grade “26” or lower,
devolving thereby these cases to the lower courts, and
retaining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only over public
officials whose salary grades were at Grade “27” or higher and
over other specific public officials holding important positions
in government regardless of salary grade; x x x34 (Emphasis
supplied)
The legislative intent is to allow the Sandiganbayan to devote its time
and expertise to big-time cases involving the so-called “big fishes” in
the government rather than those accused who are of limited means
who stand trial for “petty crimes,” the so-called “small fry,” which, in
turn, helps the court decongest its dockets.35redarclaw
Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still
fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, provided that they
hold the positions enumerated by the law.36 In this category, it is the
position held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan.37 The specific inclusion constitutes an exception
to the general qualification relating to “officials of the executive branch
occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.”38 As ruled in Inding:
Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides
that if the accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27, the
proper trial court has jurisdiction, can only be properly interpreted as
applying to those cases where the principal accused is occupying a
position lower than SG 27 and not among those specifically included in
the enumeration in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g). Stated otherwise,
except for those officials specifically included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to
(g), regardless of their salary grades, over whom the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction, all other public officials below SG 27 shall be under
the jurisdiction of the proper trial courts “where none of the principal
accused are occupying positions corresponding to SG 27 or higher.”
By this construction, the entire Section 4 is given effect. The cardinal
rule, after all, in statutory construction is that the particular words,
clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to
produce a harmonious whole. And courts should adopt a construction
that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. Ut
magis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which
gives effect to the whole of the statute – its every word. 39
Thus, to cite a few, We have held that a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod,40 a department manager of the Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation (Philhealth),41 a student regent of the University
of the Philippines,42 and a Head of the Legal Department and Chief of
the Documentation with corresponding ranks of Vice-Presidents and
Assistant Vice-President of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS)43 fall within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or higher.
Neither does he hold any position particularly enumerated in Section 4
(A) (1) (a) to (g). As he correctly argues, his case is, in fact, on all
fours with Cuyco. Therein, the accused was the Regional Director of
the Land Transportation Office, Region IX, Zamboanga City, but at the
time of the commission of the crime in 1992, his position was classified
as Director II with Salary Grade 26.44 It was opined:
relation to their office.
In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner admittedly
occupied the position of Director II with Salary Grade "26" under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of jurisdiction, and
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
in suspending petitioner from office, entitling petitioner to the reliefs
prayed for.45
In the same way, a certification issued by the OIC – Assistant Chief,
Personnel Division of the BIR shows that, although petitioner is a
Regional Director of the BIR, his position is classified as Director II
with Salary Grade 26.46redarclaw
There is no merit in the OSP’s allegation that the petition was
prematurely filed on the ground that respondent court has not yet
acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. Records disclose
that when a warrant of arrest was issued by respondent court,
petitioner voluntarily surrendered and posted a cash bond on
September 17, 2009. Also, he was arraigned on April 14, 2010, prior
to the filing of the petition on April 30, 2010.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition
for certiorari is GRANTED. The August 18, 2009 Resolution and
February 8, 2010 Order of the Sandiganbayan Second Division, which
denied petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner contends that at the time of the commission of the offense

in 1992, he was occupying the position of Director II, Salary Grade 26,
hence, jurisdiction over the cases falls with the Regional Trial Court.

We sustain petitioner's contention.

The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a)

and (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, unless committed by
public officials and employees occupying positions of regional director
and higher with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in
 EN BANC
[G.R. NO. 149311 : February 11, 2005]
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, through SECRETARY
HERNANDO PEREZ, THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION through DIRECTOR REYNALDO WYCOCO,
STATE PROSECUTORS LEO B. DACERA III, MISAEL M.
LADAGA AND MARY JOSEPHINE P. LAZARO, petitioners, vs.
HON. HERMOGENES R. LIWAG, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge Branch 55, Regional Trial Court, Manila, PANFILO M.
LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and prohibition filed by the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) under it, seeking to challenge the Order dated
June 22, 2001 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated June
25, 2001 issued by the late Judge Hermogenes R. Liwag of Branch
55 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 01-
100934.
The facts are as follows:
Alleging that she was a former undercover agent of the Presidential
Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) and the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Narcotics Group, Mary Ong filed a complaint-
affidavit on January 8, 2001 before the Ombudsman against PNP
General Panfilo M. Lacson, PNP Colonel Michael Ray B. Aquino,
other high-ranking officials of the PNP, and several private
individuals. Her complaint-affidavit gave rise to separate cases
involving different offenses imputed to respondents Lacson and
Aquino. The cases were docketed as OMB Case Nos. 4-01-00-76,
4-01-00-77, 4-01-00-80, 4-01-00-81, 4-01-00-82, and 4-01-00-
84. The Ombudsman found the complaint-affidavit of Mary Ong
sufficient in form and substance and thus required the respondents
therein to file their counter-affidavits on the charges. On February
28, 2001, said respondents submitted their counter-affidavits and
prayed that the charges against them be dismissed.
Subsequently, on March 9, 2001, Mary Ong and other witnesses
executed sworn statements before the NBI, alleging the same facts
and circumstances revealed by Mary Ong in her complaint-affidavit
before the Ombudsman.1 NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco, in a letter
dated May 4, 2001 addressed to then Secretary of Justice
Hernando Perez, recommended the investigation of Lacson,
Aquino, other PNP officials, and private individuals for the following
alleged crimes:
A.) kidnapping for ransom of Zeng Jia Xuan, Hong Zhen Quiao,
Zeng Kang Pang, James Wong and Wong Kam Chong;
b.) murder of Wong Kam Chong; andcralawlibrary
c.) kidnapping for ransom and murder of Chong Hiu Ming.2
In the said letter, Director Wycoco likewise manifested that this
recommendation was made after taking the sworn statements of
Mary Ong and other witnesses such as Chong Kam Fai, Zeng Kang
Pang, and Quenna Yuet Yuet. The sworn statements of these
witnesses were attached to the letter.3
On May 7, 2001, a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a
subpoena to Lacson, Aquino and the other persons named in the
witnesses' sworn statements. Lacson and Aquino received the
subpoena on May 8, 2001. The subpoena directed them to submit
their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence at the
scheduled preliminary investigation on the complaint filed by the
NBI on May 18, 2001 at the DOJ Multi-Purpose Hall. However,
Lacson and Aquino, through their counsel, manifested in a letter
dated May 18, 2001, that the DOJ panel of prosecutors should
dismiss the complaint filed therewith by Mary Ong since there are
complaints pending before the Ombudsman alleging a similar set of
facts against the same respondents. Furthermore, they claimed
that according to the Court's ruling in Uy v. Sandiganbayan,4 the
Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over criminal cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this
primary jurisdiction, he may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such
cases involving public officials, including police and military officials
such as private respondents.5
The DOJ construed the aforesaid letter as a motion to dismiss and,
on May 28, 2001, denied the dismissal of the cases before it
through an Order that stated the following as basis of the denial:
It appearing that the subject letter is essentially a motion to
dismiss which is not allowed under the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure[;]

It appearing further that respondent's rank and/or civil service
classification has no bearing in the determination of jurisdiction as
the crimes charged herein do not involve violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Unlawfully Acquired Property [or]
Bribery, nor are they related to respondents' discharge of their
official duties;
It appearing finally that paragraph 2 of the Joint Circular of the
Office of the Ombudsman and the Department of Justice No. 95-
001 dated October 5, 1995, provides that offenses committed not
in relation to office and cognizable by the regular courts shall be
investigated and prosecuted by the Office of the Provincial/City
Prosecutor which shall rule thereon with finality;6
On the very same day that the DOJ issued the aforesaid Order, the
Solicitor General received a copy of a petition for prohibition filed
by Lacson and Aquino before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila. In the said petition for prohibition, Lacson and Aquino
maintained that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct a
preliminary investigation on the complaints submitted by Mary Ong
and the other witnesses. They argued that by conducting a
preliminary investigation, the DOJ was violating the Ombudsman's
mandate of having the primary and exclusive jurisdiction to
investigate criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Again,
they relied on Uy v. Sandiganbayan to bolster their claim.
On June 22, 2001, Judge Liwag issued the Order herein assailed
prohibiting the Department of Justice from conducting the
preliminary investigation against Lacson and Aquino. A Writ of
Preliminary Injunction was likewise issued by the trial court. The
dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Prohibition is
hereby GRANTED, and accordingly a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
is hereby ISSUED, enjoining the respondents and their
subordinates, agents[,] and other persons acting in their behalf,
individually and collectively, from conducting a preliminary
investigation in IS No. 2001-402, insofar as petitioners here are
concerned, and directing the petitioners to file their counter-
affidavits in said case until such time that the Office of the
Ombudsman shall have disclaimed jurisdiction over the offenses
subject matter of the investigations before it, or until such Office
shall have categorized the said offenses as being committed by the
petitioners not in relation to their respective offices.
Let the corresponding Writ of Preliminary Injunction, therefore,
issue without bond, as there is no showing whatsoever in the
pleadings of the parties that the respondents will suffer any injury
by reason of the issuance of the writ prayed for, in accordance with
Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED.7
Hence, this petition was filed before this Court by the DOJ, through
then Secretary Hernando Perez, the NBI, through Director
Reynaldo Wycoco, and the panel of prosecutors designated by the
DOJ to conduct the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 2001-402.
In their petition, they raise the following issues:
I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN DISREGARDING THE CRYSTAL CLEAR AUTHORITY OF
PETITIONERS DOJ AND THE PANEL OF STATE PROSECUTORS TO
CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 08, SERIES OF 1990 OF THE OFFICE
OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND SECTION 4 OF RULE 112 OF THE RULES
OF COURT.
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN RULING THAT THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS TAKEN
OVER THE NBI COMPLAINT FILED WITH THE DOJ; AND IN
IGNORING THE FACT THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO
AVAIL OF AN ADEQUATE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY BEFORE THE
FILING OF A PETITION FOR PROHIBITION.
III
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN CONSIDERING THE NBI COMPLAINT FILED WITH THE DOJ AND
THE COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT FILED BY MARY ONG BEFORE THE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AS INVOLVING ABSOLUTELY THE
SAME OFFENSES, RESPONDENTS AND ALLEGED VICTIMS.
IV
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN GRANTING RELIEF TO RESPONDENT MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO
DESPITE THE GLARING FACT THAT HE IS CHARGED WITH
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT OFFENSES BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN AND THE DOJ.
V Section 1. Declaration of policy. 'It is the declared policy of the
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN PREJUDGING THE MAIN CASE FOR PROHIBITION BY GRANTING
THE SAME DESPITE THE FACT THAT HEARINGS IN THE CASE WERE
ONLY HELD FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE MERIT OF
THE PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION.8
A perusal of the issues raised reveals that the present petition puts
forth one central question to be resolved: whether or not the DOJ
has jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation despite the
pendency before the Ombudsman of a complaint involving the
same accused, facts, and circumstances. The addition of other
names in the second proceedings does not alter the nature thereof
as being principally directed against the respondents herein in
connection with substantially the same set of facts alleged.
First, however, a threshold question has to be resolved.
Petitioners came to this Court without filing a motion before the
trial court to reconsider the assailed Order. They maintain that it
was imperative for them to do so for the sake of the speedy
administration of justice and that this is all the more compelling, in
this case, considering that this involves the high-ranking officers of
the PNP and the crimes being charged have already attracted
nationwide attention.
Indeed, this Court finds that time is of the essence in this case. At
stake here may not only be the safety of witnesses who risked life
and limb to give their statements to the authorities, but also the
rights of the respondents, who may need to clear their names and
reputations of the accusations against them. Procedural laws are
adopted not as ends in themselves but as means conducive to the
realization of justice. The rules of procedure are not to be applied
when such application would clearly defeat the very rationale for
their conception and existence.9
Now, to the merits.
The authority of the DOJ to conduct a preliminary investigation is
based on the provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code under
Chapter I, Title III, Book IV, governing the DOJ, which states:
State to provide the government with a principal law agency which
shall be both its legal counsel and prosecution arm; administer the
criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes
thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of
offenders and administration of the correctional system; . . .
Section 3. Powers and Functions. 'To accomplish its mandate, the
Department shall have the following powers and functions:
...
(2) Investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and
administer the probation and correction system;
...
Furthermore, Section 1 of the Presidential Decree 1275, effective
April 11, 1978, provides:
Section 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service;
Supervision and Control of the Secretary of Justice. - There is
hereby created and established a National Prosecution Service
under the supervision and control of the Secretary of Justice, to be
composed of the Prosecution Staff in the Office of the Secretary of
Justice and such number of Regional State Prosecution Offices, and
Provincial and City Fiscal's Offices as are hereinafter provided,
which shall be primarily responsible for the investigation and
prosecution of all cases involving violations of penal laws.
Respondents Lacson and Aquino claim that the Ombudsman has
primary jurisdiction over the cases filed against them, to the
exclusion of any other investigatory agency of Government
pursuant to law and existing jurisprudence. They rely on the
doctrine in Uy v. Sandiganbayan aforementioned, and contend that
the Ombudsman, in the exercise of the said primary jurisdiction,
may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
Government, the investigation of cases involving public officials,
including police and military officials. They likewise claim that it
should be deemed that the Ombudsman has already taken over the
investigation of these cases, considering that there are already
pending complaints filed therewith involving the same accused,
facts and circumstances.
Section 15, Republic Act No. 6640, known as the Ombudsman Act
of 1989, provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this
primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such
cases; '.10
The question is whether or not the Ombudsman has in effect taken
over the investigation of the case or cases in question to the
exclusion of other investigatory agencies, including the DOJ. In
granting the petition for prohibition, RTC Judge Liwag gave the
following rationale:
Since the Ombudsman has taken hold of the situation of the parties
in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over the matter, it is the
feeling of this Court that the respondents cannot insist on
conducting a preliminary investigation on the same matter under
the pretext of a shared and concurrent authority. In the final
analysis, the resolution on the matter by the Ombudsman is final.
In the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman
itself, the other investigative agencies of the Government have no
power and right to add an input into the Ombudsman's
investigation. Only in matters where the other investigative
agencies are expressly allowed by the Ombudsman to make
preliminary investigation may such agencies conduct the
investigation, subject to the final decision of the Ombudsman. That
is the situation. It is not otherwise. To allow the respondents to
meddle with the investigation of similar cases being investigated by
the Ombudsman would put them to a higher plane than the source
of their powers with respect to such cases. This is, of course,
anathema to orderly judicial procedures. This is contrary to
ordinary common sense. It would certainly be presumpt[u]ous, if
not ridiculous, for the Department of Justice to be making
recommendation as to its preliminary investigation to the
Ombudsman in matters being handled by such Office itself. Such
recommendation would be pre-emptive of the actions of the said
Office. Such a situation must thus be disallowed.
The public respondents capitalized on the fact that the Ombudsman
may take over, at any stage, from any investigative agency of the
Government, the investigation of cases involving public officials,
including police and military officials such as the petitioners. It is
the feeling of this Court that the respondents cannot find comfort
in that provision of the law. That situation presupposes the conduct
by other Government agencies of preliminary investigations
involving public officials in cases not theretofore being taken
cognizance of by the Ombudsman. If the Ombudsman, as in the
case, has already taken hold of the situation of the parties, it
cannot take over, at any stage of the proceedings, the
investigation being conducted by another agency. It has the case
before it. Rudimentary common sense and becoming respect for
power and authority would thus require the respondents to desist
from interfering with the case already handled by the Ombudsman.
Indeed, as conceded by the respondents, they are deputized
prosecutors by the Ombudsman. If that is so, and that is the truth,
the exercise by the principal of the powers negates absolutely the
exercise by the agents of a particular power and authority. The
hierarchy of powers must be remembered. The principle of agency
must be recalled.11
Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution specifically vests in the
Office of the Ombudsman the plenary power to investigate any
malfeasance, misfeasance or non-feasance of public officers or
employees.12 To discharge its duty effectively, the Constitution
endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with special features
which puts it a notch above other grievance-handling,
investigate bodies. First and foremost, it extended
independence to the Ombudsman and insulated it from the
intrusions of partisan politics. Thus, the Constitution provided
for stringent qualification requirements for the selection of the
Ombudsman and his deputies, i.e., they should be natural-born
citizens, of recognized probity and independence and must not
have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately
preceding election.13 The Ombudsman and his deputies were given
the rank and salary equal to that of the Chairman and Members,
respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, with a prohibition
for any decrease in their salary during their term of office.14 They
were given a fixed term of seven years, without
reappointment.15 Upon their cessation from office, they are
prohibited from running for any elective office in the immediately
succeeding election.16 Finally, unlike other investigative bodies, the
Constitution granted the Office of the Ombudsman fiscal
autonomy.17 Clearly, all these measures are intended to enhance
the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Office of the Ombudsman was likewise envisioned by the
Constitution to serve as the principal and primary complaints
and action center for the aggrieved layman baffled by the
bureaucratic maze of procedures. For this purpose, it was granted
more than the usual powers given to prosecutors. It was
vested with the power to investigate complaints against a public
office or officer on its own initiative, even without a formal
complaint lodged before it.18 It can inquire into acts of government
agencies and public servants based on reports in the media and
those which come to his attention through sources other than a
complaint. The method of filing a complaint with the Ombudsman
is direct, informal, speedy and inexpensive. All that may be
required from a complainant is sufficient information detailing the
illegal or improper acts complained of. The ordinary citizen, who
has become increasingly dependent on public agencies, is put to
minimal expense and difficulty in getting his complaint acted on by
the Office of the Ombudsman.Vis - Ã -vis other prosecutors, the
exercise by the Ombudsman of its power to investigate public
officials is given preference over other bodies.
As aforementioned, Congress itself acknowledged the significant
role played by the Office of Ombudsman when it enacted Republic
Act No. 6770. Section 15 (1) of said law gives the
Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and authorizes him to take over, at any
stage, from any investigatory agency, the investigation of
such cases. This power to take over a case at any time is not
given to other investigative bodies. All this means that the power
of the Ombudsman to investigate cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan is notco-equal with other investigative
bodies, such as the DOJ. The Ombudsman can delegate the
power but the delegate cannot claim equal power.
Clearly, therefore, while the DOJ has general jurisdiction to
conduct preliminary investigation of cases involving
violations of the Revised Penal Code, this general jurisdiction
cannot diminish the plenary power and primary jurisdiction of
the Ombudsman to investigate complaints specifically
directed against public officers and employees. The Office of
the Ombudsman is a constitutional creation. In contrast, the DOJ
is an extension of the executive department, bereft of the
constitutional independence granted to the Ombudsman.
Petitioners cannot seek sanctuary in the doctrine of concurrent
jurisdiction. While thedoctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means
equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter, 19 the
settled rule is that the body or agency that first takes
cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the others.20 Thus, assuming there is concurrent
jurisdiction between the Ombudsman and the DOJ in the conduct of
preliminary investigation, this concurrence is not to be taken
as an unrestrained freedom to file the same case before
both bodies or be viewed as a contest between these bodies as to
which will first complete the investigation. In the present case, it is
the Ombudsman before whom the complaint was initially filed.
Hence, it has the authority to proceed with the preliminary
investigation to the exclusion of the DOJ.
None of the cases previously decided by this Court involved a
factual situation similar to that of the present case. In Cojuangco,
Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),21 the
Court upheld the special authority of the PCGG to conduct the
preliminary investigation of ill-gotten wealth cases pursuant to
Executive Order No. 1, issued by then President Aquino, creating
the PCGG. While the Court emphasized inCojuangco that the power
of the Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary investigation over said
cases is not exclusive but a shared authority, the complaints for
the alleged misuse of coconut levy funds were filed directly
with the PCGG. No complaint was filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman. Moreover, a close scrutiny of said case will disclose
that the Court recognized the primary, albeit shared,
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate all ill-gotten
wealth cases.22 In fact, it ordered the PCGG to desist from
proceeding with the preliminary investigation as it doubted the
impartiality of the PCGG to conduct the investigation after it had
previously caused the issuance of sequestration orders against
petitioner's assets.
In Sanchez v. Demetriou,23 the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission filed a complaint with the DOJ against petitioner
Mayor Sanchez for the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of
Gomez. After the DOJ panel prosecutors conducted the preliminary
investigation, a warrant of arrest was issued and the corresponding
Informations were filed in court by the DOJ prosecutors. Petitioner
claimed that it is only the Ombudsman who has the power to
conduct investigation of cases involving public officers like him. The
Court reiterated its previous ruling that the authority to investigate
and prosecute illegal acts of public officers is not an exclusive
authority of the Ombudsman but a shared authority. However, it
will be noted that the complaint for preliminary investigation
in that case was filed solely with the DOJ.
In Aguinaldo v. Domagas,24 a letter-complaint charging
petitioners with sedition was filed with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor in Cagayan. After investigation by the DOJ
panel of prosecutors, the corresponding Information was filed in
court. The pertinent issue raised by petitioners was whether the
prosecutors can file the said Information without previous authority
from the Ombudsman. The Court ruled in the affirmative and
reiterated its ruling regarding the shared authority of the DOJ to
investigate the case. Again, it should be noted that the complaint
in that case was addressed solely to the provincial
prosecutor.
The same factual scenario obtains in the cases of Natividad v.
Felix25 and Honasan v. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the
DOJ26 where the letter-complaint against petitioners public officers
were brought alone to the DOJ prosecutors for investigation.
In sum, in none of the aforecited cases was the complaint
filed ahead with the Office of the Ombudsman for
preliminary investigation. Hence, there was no simultaneous
exercise of power between two coordinate bodies and no
risk of conflicting findings or orders. In stark contrast with the
present case, Mary Ong filed a complaint against
respondents initially with the Office of the Ombudsman for
preliminary investigation which was immediately acted on by said
Office. For reasons not readily apparent on the records, she
thereafter refiled substantially the same complaint with the
NBI and the DOJ.
Not only this.
The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in the
conduct of preliminary investigation over the cases filed against the
respondents would not promote an orderly administration of
justice. Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial, it is not
a casual affair either. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or
proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof
and should be held for trial.27 When one is hailed before an
investigative body on specific charges, the very act of filing said
complaint for preliminary investigation immediately exposes the
respondent and his family to anxiety, humiliation and expense. To
allow the same complaint to be filed successively before two
or more investigative bodies would promote multiplicity of
proceedings. It would also cause undue difficulties to the
respondent who would have to appear and defend his
position before every agency or body where the same
complaint was filed. This would leave hapless litigants at a loss
as to where to appear and plead their cause or defense.
There is yet another undesirable consequence. There is the
distinct possibility that the two bodies exercising
jurisdiction at the same time would come up with conflicting
resolutions regarding the guilt of the respondents.
Finally, the second investigation would entail an unnecessary
expenditure of public funds, and the use of valuable and limited
resources of Government, inaduplication of proceedings
already started with the Ombudsman.
From all the foregoing, it is clear that petitioners have not shown
any grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction committed by the respondent Judge.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
No costs. SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 147097 : June 5, 2009]
CARMELO F. LAZATIN, MARINO A. MORALES, TEODORO L.
DAVID and ANGELITO A. PELAYO,Petitioner, v. HON. ANIANO
A. DESIERTO as OMBUDSMAN, and SANDIGANBAYAN,
THIRD DIVISION, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, praying that the Ombudsman's disapproval of the Office
of the Special Prosecutor's (OSP) Resolution1 dated September 18,
2000, recommending dismissal of the criminal cases filed against
herein petitioners, be reversed and set aside.
The antecedent facts are as follows.
On July 22, 1998, the Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the
Office of the Ombudsman filed a Complaint-Affidavit docketed as
OMB-0-98-1500, charging herein petitioners with Illegal Use of
Public Funds as defined and penalized under Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code and violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a) and
(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended.
The complaint alleged that there were irregularities in the use by
then Congressman Carmello F. Lazatin of his Countrywide
Development Fund (CDF) for the calendar year 1996, i.e., he was
both proponent and implementer of the projects funded from his
CDF; he signed vouchers and supporting papers pertinent to the
disbursement as Disbursing Officer; and he received, as claimant,
eighteen (18) checks amounting toP4,868,277.08. Thus, petitioner
Lazatin, with the help of petitioners Marino A. Morales, Angelito A.
Pelayo and Teodoro L. David, was allegedly able to convert his CDF
into cash.
A preliminary investigation was conducted and, thereafter, the
Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) issued a
Resolution2 dated May 29, 2000 recommending the filing against
herein petitioners of fourteen (14) counts each of Malversation of
Public Funds and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Said
Resolution was approved by the Ombudsman; hence, twenty-eight
(28) Informations docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 26087 to 26114
were filed against herein petitioners before the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner Lazatin and his co-petitioners then filed their respective
Motions for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, which motions were
granted by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division). The
Sandiganbayan also ordered the prosecution to re-evaluate the
cases against petitioners.
Subsequently, the OSP submitted to the Ombudsman its
Resolution3 dated September 18, 2000. It recommended the
dismissal of the cases against petitioners for lack or insufficiency of
evidence.
The Ombudsman, however, ordered the Office of the Legal Affairs
(OLA) to review the OSP Resolution. In a Memorandum4 dated
October 24, 2000, the OLA recommended that the OSP Resolution
be disapproved and the OSP be directed to proceed with the trial of
the cases against petitioners. On October 27, 2000, the
Ombudsman adopted the OLA Memorandum, thereby disapproving
the OSP Resolution dated September 18, 2000 and ordering the
aggressive prosecution of the subject cases. The cases were then
returned to the Sandiganbayan for continuation of criminal
proceedings.
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition.
Petitioners allege that:
I.
THE OMBUDSMAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR
ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION.
II.
THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION WAS BASED ON
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, SPECULATIONS, SURMISES AND
CONJECTURES.5
Amplifying their arguments, petitioners asseverate that the
Ombudsman had no authority to overturn the OSP's Resolution
dismissing the cases against petitioners because, under Section 13,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman is clothed only
with the power to watch, investigate and recommend the filing of
proper cases against erring officials, but it was not granted the
power to prosecute. They point out that under the Constitution, the
power to prosecute belongs to the OSP (formerly the Tanodbayan),
which was intended by the framers to be a separate and distinct
entity from the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioners conclude
that, as provided by the Constitution, the OSP being a separate
and distinct entity, the Ombudsman should have no power and
authority over the OSP. Thus, petitioners maintain that R.A. No.
6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), which made the OSP an
organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman, should be
struck down for being unconstitutional.
Next, petitioners insist that they should be absolved from any
liability because the checks were issued to petitioner Lazatin
allegedly as reimbursement for the advances he made from his
personal funds for expenses incurred to ensure the immediate
implementation of projects that are badly needed by the Pinatubo
victims.
The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.
Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770 is
stale. It has long been settled that the provisions of R.A. No. 6770
granting the Office of the Ombudsman prosecutorial powers and
placing the OSP under said office have no constitutional infirmity.
The issue of whether said provisions of R.A. No. 6770 violated the
Constitution had been fully dissected as far back as 1995 in Acop v.
Office of the Ombudsman.6
Therein, the Court held that giving prosecutorial powers to the
Ombudsman is in accordance with the Constitution as paragraph 8,
Section 13, Article XI provides that the Ombudsman shall "exercise
such other functions or duties as may be provided by law."
Elucidating on this matter, the Court stated:
x x x While the intention to withhold prosecutorial powers from the
Ombudsman was indeed present, the Commission [referring to the
Constitutional Commission of 1986] did not hesitate to recommend
that the Legislature could, through statute, prescribe such other
powers, functions, and duties to the Ombudsman. x x x As finally
approved by the Commission after several amendments, this is
now embodied in paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI
(Accountability of Public Officers) of the Constitution, which
provides:
Sec.13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions, and duties:
xxx
Promulgate its rules and procedure and exercise such other
functions or duties as may be provided by law.
Expounding on this power of Congress to prescribe other powers,
functions, and duties to the Ombudsman, we quote Commissioners
Colayco and Monsod during interpellation by Commissioner
Rodrigo:
xxx
MR. RODRIGO:
Precisely, I am coming to that. The last of the enumerated
functions of the Ombudsman is: "to exercise such powers or
perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law." So,
the legislature may vest him with powers taken away from the
Tanodbayan, may it not?cralawred
MR. COLAYCO:
Yes.
MR. MONSOD:
Yes.
xxx
MR. RODRIGO:
Madam President. Section 5 reads: "The Tanodbayan shall continue
to function and exercise its powers as provided by law."
MR. COLAYCO:
That is correct, because it is under P.D. No. 1630.
MR. RODRIGO:
So, if it is provided by law, it can be taken away by law, I suppose.
MR. COLAYCO:
That is correct.
MR. RODRIGO:
And precisely, Section 12(6) says that among the functions that
can be performed by the Ombudsman are "such functions or duties
as may be provided by law." The sponsors admitted that the
legislature later on might remove some powers from the
Tanodbayan and transfer these to the Ombudsman.
MR. COLAYCO:
Madam President, that is correct.
xxx
MR. RODRIGO:
Madam President, what I am worried about is, if we create a
constitutional body which has neither punitive nor prosecutory
powers but only persuasive powers, we might be raising the hopes
of our people too much and then disappoint them.
MR. MONSOD:
I agree with the Commissioner.
MR. RODRIGO:
Anyway, since we state that the powers of the Ombudsman can
later on be implemented by the legislature, why not leave this to
the legislature?
xxx
MR. MONSOD: (reacting to statements of Commissioner Blas
Ople):
xxx
With respect to the argument that he is a toothless animal, we
would like to say that we are promoting the concept in its form at
the present, but we are also saying that he can exercise such
powers and functions as may be provided by law in accordance
with the direction of the thinking of Commissioner Rodrigo. We do
not think that at this time we should prescribe this, but we leave it
up to Congress at some future time if it feels that it may need to
designate what powers the Ombudsman need in order that he be
more effective.
This is not foreclosed.
So, this is a reversible disability, unlike that of a eunuch; it is not
an irreversible disability.7
The constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which
subsumed the OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman, was
likewise upheld by the Court in Acop. It was explained, thus:
x x x the petitioners conclude that the inclusion of the Office of the
Special Prosecutor as among the offices under the Office of the
Ombudsman in Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770 ("An Act Providing for
the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the
Ombudsman and for Other Purposes") is unconstitutional and void.
The contention is not impressed with merit. x x x
xxx
x x x Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the then
existing Tanodbayan, to be henceforth known as the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, "shall continue to function and exercise its
powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those
conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this
Constitution." The underscored phrase evidently refers to the
Tanodbayan's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or subsequent
amendatory legislation. It follows then that Congress may remove
any of the Tanodbayan's/Special Prosecutor's powers under P.D.
No. 1630 or grant it other powers, except those powers conferred
by the Constitution on the Office of the Ombudsman.
Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that by
express mandate of paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the
Constitution, the Ombudsman may "exercise such other powers or
perform functions or duties as may be provided by law," it is
indubitable then that Congress has the power to place the Office of
the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the Ombudsman. In the
same vein, Congress may remove some of the powers granted to
the Tanodbayan by P.D. No. 1630 and transfer them to the
Ombudsman; or grant the Office of the Special Prosecutor such
other powers and functions and duties as Congress may deem fit
and wise. This Congress did through the passage of R.A. No.
6770.8
The foregoing ruling of the Court has been reiterated in Camanag
v. Guerrero.9 More recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v.
Valera,10 the Court, basing its ratio decidendi on its ruling
in Acop and Camanag, declared that the OSP is "merely a
component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act
under the supervision and control, and upon authority of the
Ombudsman" and ruled that under R.A. No. 6770, the power to
preventively suspend is lodged only with the Ombudsman and
Deputy Ombudsman.11 The Court's ruling in Acop that the authority
of the Ombudsman to prosecute based on R.A. No. 6770 was
authorized by the Constitution was also made the foundation for
the decision in Perez v. Sandiganbayan,12 where it was held that
the power to prosecute carries with it the power to authorize the
filing of informations, which power had not been delegated to the
OSP. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that under the Constitution,
Congress was not proscribed from legislating the grant of
additional powers to the Ombudsman or placing the OSP under the
Office of the Ombudsman.
Petitioners now assert that the Court's ruling on the
constitutionality of the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 should be
revisited and the principle of stare decisis set aside. Again, this
contention deserves scant consideration.
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to
precedents and not to unsettle things which are established) is
embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
It was further explained in Fermin v. People13 as follows:
The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial
precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the rule
established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That
decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent
cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is
based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to
further argument.
In Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine
Islands v. Remington Steel Corporation,15the Court expounded on
the importance of the foregoing doctrine, stating that:
The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the
necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions,
thus:
Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and
necessary judicial practicethatwhen a court has laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will
adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the
facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta
movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is
settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of
certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be
applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the
same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from
the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be
decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the
same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated
as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent
court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to
relitigate the same issue.16
The doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial system that
the Court has ruled that "[a]bandonment thereof must be
based only on strong and compelling reasons, otherwise, the
becoming virtue of predictability which is expected from this Court
would be immeasurably affected and the public's confidence in the
stability of the solemn pronouncements diminished."17 Verily, only
upon showing that circumstances attendant in a particular case
override the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the
doctrine of stare decisis, can the courts be justified in setting aside
the same.
In this case, petitioners have not shown any strong, compelling
reason to convince the Court that the doctrine of stare
decisis should not be applied to this case. They have not
successfully demonstrated how or why it would be grave abuse of
discretion for the Ombudsman, who has been validly conferred by
law with the power of control and supervision over the OSP, to
disapprove or overturn any resolution issued by the latter.
The second issue advanced by petitioners is that the Ombudsman's
disapproval of the OSP Resolution recommending dismissal of the
cases is based on misapprehension of facts, speculations, surmises
and conjectures. The question is really whether the Ombudsman
correctly ruled that there was enough evidence to support a finding
of probable cause. That issue, however, pertains to a mere error of
judgment. It must be stressed that certiorari is a remedy meant to
correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. This has
been emphasized in First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of
the Court of Appeals,18 to wit:
It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and
evidence is not the province of the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari, which is extra ordinem - beyond the ambit of
appeal. In certiorariproceedings, judicial review does not go
as far as to examine and assess the evidence of the parties
and to weigh the probative value thereof. It does not
include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of
evidence. Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence
is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied
by certiorari . An error of judgment is one which the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is
one where the act complained of was issued by the court without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, which
is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is
correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari . Certiorari
will not be issued to cure errors of the trial court in its
appreciation of the evidence of the parties, or its
conclusions anchored on the said findings and its
conclusions of law. It is not for this Court to re-examine
conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the
witnesses or substitute the findings of fact of the court a
quo.19
Evidently, the issue of whether the evidence indeed supports a
finding of probable cause would necessitate an examination and re-
evaluation of the evidence upon which the Ombudsman based its
disapproval of the OSP Resolution. Hence, the Petition
for Certiorari should not be given due course.
Likewise noteworthy is the holding of the Court in Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto,20 imparting the value of the Ombudsman's independence,
stating thus:
Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and
RA 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), the Ombudsman has the
power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a public
officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has been the consistent
ruling of the Court not to interfere with the Ombudsman's
exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers as
long as his rulings are supported by substantial
evidence. Envisioned as the champion of the people and preserver
of the integrity of public service, he has wide latitude in
exercising his powers and is free from intervention from the
three branches of government. This is to ensure that his
Office is insulated from any outside pressure and improper
influence.21
Indeed, for the Court to overturn the Ombudsman's finding of
probable cause, it is imperative for petitioners to clearly prove that
said public official acted with grave abuse of discretion.
In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto,22 the
Court elaborated on what constitutes such abuse, to wit:
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The
Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an
arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. x
x x23
In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate that the Ombudsman
acted in a manner described above. Clearly, the Ombudsman was
acting in accordance with R.A. No. 6770 and properly exercised its
power of control and supervision over the OSP when it disapproved
the Resolution dated September 18, 2000.
It should also be noted that the petition does not question any
order or action of the Sandiganbayan Third Division; hence, it
should not have been included as a respondent in this petition.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 135687 : July 24, 2007]
(Re: OMB-0-96-2643)
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON
BEHEST LOANS, represented by: PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT(PCGG), Petitioner, v. HON. OMBUDSMAN
ANIANO DESIERTO, WENCESLAO PASCUAL, GAUDENCIO
VIDUYA, JULIA M. MACUJA, PLACIDO MAPA, JR., JOSE
TEVES, ALEJANDRO MELCHOR, RECIO M. GARCIA, DBP
BOARD OF DIRECTORS LORENZA N. SALCEDO, JOSEPHINE S.
GARCIA, STOCKHOLDERS OF P.R. GARCIA & SONS
DEVELOPMENT and INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to
annul and set aside the Order1 of the Ombudsman dated July 6,
1998 dismissing three complaints filed by petitioner docketed as
OMB-0-96-2643, OMB-0-96-2644 and OMB-0-96-2645, and its
Order2 of August 31, 1998, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Administrative Order No. 13, which created herein petitioner
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans
(Committee).
On March 6, 1996 and June 28, 1996, Orlando S. Salvador
(Salvador), in his capacity as PCGG consultant, executed three
separate Sworn Statements stating that among the loan accounts
referred by the Assets Privatization Trust to the Committee for
investigation, report and recommendation are those of the
following corporations: P.R. Garcia and Sons Development and
Investment Corporation (PRGS), Golden River Mining Corporation
(Golden River), and Filipinas Carbon and Mining Corporation
(Filcarbon).
With respect to the loan account of PRGS, Salvador alleged that
the said corporation obtained from the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) an initial loan guarantee of P26,726,774.72 and a
straight industrial loan amounting to P29,226,774.72 on October
26, 1967 for the purpose of redeeming mortgaged properties,
rehabilitating buildings and equipment and defraying its operational
expenses.
Anent the loan account of Golden River, Salvador claimed that the
corporation obtained loan accommodations from DBP beginning
from 1975 until 1982 and that as of October 31, 1986, it had a
total obligation of P43,193,000.00; that out of its five loan
accounts, only the first two loans of Golden River obtained in 1975
and 1977 were sufficiently collateralized, leaving three other loans
without any sufficient collateral, to wit: refinancing loan obtained in
1980 for the amount of P14,724,430.00; refinancing loan obtained
on March 13, 1982 for the amount of P5,551,000.00; and
refinancing loan obtained on December 1, 1982 for the amount
of P7,118,656.52.
As to the loan account of Filcarbon, Salvador averred that the said
corporation applied with the National Investment Development
Corporation (NIDC) a loan guarantee of P27.4 Million on January
17, 1977; that the loan application was favorably recommended by
the President of the Philippine National Bank (PNB); that the
application was subsequently approved by PNB's Board of Directors
on August 17, 1977.
Salvador alleged that, based on the evidence submitted to the
Committee, these three corporations did not have sufficient
collaterals for the loans they obtained, except with respect to the
loans obtained by Golden River in 1975 and 1977. Salvador also
alleged that the above-mentioned corporations did not have
adequate capital to ensure not only the viability of their operations
but also their ability to repay all their loans. Accordingly, the
Committee found the loan accounts of the above-mentioned three
corporations as behest loans.
The Committee submitted its report to President Ramos who
instructed then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo, sitting as
the Committee's ex-officio Chairman, to file the necessary charges
against the DBP Chairman and members of the Board of Directors,
the former PNB President and former NIDC General Manager,
together with the respective stockholders/officers of the three
corporations.
Subsequently, the Sworn Statements of Salvador were used by the
Committee as its bases in filing separate complaints with the Office
of the Ombudsman against herein private respondents for alleged
violation of the provisions of Sections 3 (e)3 and (g)4 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
The complaint against respondents Lorenzo N. Salcedo and
Josephine S. Garcia, stockholders of PRGS; and Wenceslao Pascual,
Gaudencio Viduya, Julia D. Macuja, Placido L. Mapa, Jr., Jose
Teves, Alejandro Melchor, Recio Garcia, Rafael Sison, Cesar
Zalamea, Don M. Perry and Rolando Soza, then officers and
members of the Board of Directors of DBP, is docketed as OMB-0-
96-2643.
The complaint against Ricardo Silverio, Sr., Ricardo Silverio, Jr.,
and Ricardo S. Tangco, stockholders of Golden River; and Placido
Mapa, Jose de Ocampo, Recio Garcia, Jose Tengco, Jr., Rafael
Sison, Jose de Ocampo, Jose R. Tengco, Alice L. Reyes, Cesar
Zalamea, Don Perry and Rolando M. Soza, then officers and
members of the Board of Directors of DBP, is docketed as OMB-0-
96-2644.
The complaint against Panfilo O. Domingo, then PNB President;
Conrado S. Reyes, then NIDC General Manager; and Conrado
Calalang, Antonio M. Gonzales, Norberto L. Villarama, Sene B. dela
Costa, Antonio O. Mendoza, Jr. and Ignacio C. Bertumen, officers
and stockholders of Filcarbon, is docketed as OMB-0-96-2645.
Subsequently, the three aforementioned cases were consolidated
by the Office of the Ombudsman.
In his assailed Order of July 6, 1998, the Ombudsman, upon the
recommendation of the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation
Bureau, dismissed the complaints against herein respondents. The
Ombudsman ruled that, except with respect to the two loan
transactions entered into by Golden River in 1982, all the offenses
alleged by the Committee as having been committed by herein
respondents had already prescribed under the provisions of Section
11 of R.A. No. 3019. As to the two 1982 transactions of Golden
River, the Ombudsman found that, contrary to the claims of herein
petitioner, the loan accounts obtained by the said corporation have
sufficient collaterals.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Ombudsman
denied it in its Order dated August 31, 1998.
Hence, herein petition.
Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman erred in dismissing, motu
proprio, the three complaints without first requiring respondents to
submit their counter-affidavits and petitioner to file its reply
thereto. Such dismissal, petitioner avers, is premature. Petitioner
further argues that even granting that the Ombudsman feels that
petitioner's evidence is insufficient, the Ombudsman should have
first required petitioner to clarify said evidence or to adduce
additional evidence, in accordance with due process.
Petitioner also asserts that the Ombudsman erred in dismissing
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that it was
filed out of time as evidence shows that the said motion was timely
filed.
Petitioner contends that the consolidation of the three complaints
and the subsequent issuance of a single Order dismissing them is
erroneous. Petitioner argues that the three complaints cannot be
lumped together and a single order issued for their resolution as
these complaints involve different sets of facts and are based on
different loan transactions.
Petitioner further avers that the pieces of evidence submitted as
part of the complaints were not considered by the Ombudsman
when it issued the assailed Orders; that the findings of the
Committee that the subject loans are behest loans prevail; and,
that the right of the State to recover behest loans as ill-gotten
wealth is not barred by prescription.
In his Comment, the Ombudsman, citing the proceedings of the
1986 Constitutional Commission as authority, contends that the
provisions of Section 15, Article XI of the Constitution, which
provides for the imprescriptibility of the right of the State to
recover ill-gotten wealth, applies only to civil actions and not to
criminal cases. The Ombudsman further avers that prior to its
amendment, Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 provided that the period
for the prescription or extinguishment of a violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was ten years. Subsequently, the
said provision was amended in 1982 increasing the prescriptive
period to fifteen years. Applying the Constitution and the law to the
present case, the Ombudsman argues that, except with respect to
the two loan transactions entered into by Golden River in 1982, all
the other alleged criminal acts of herein private respondents in
connection with the loan transactions they entered into in the years
1967 until 1980 had already prescribed in 1995. Hence, private
respondents can no longer be prosecuted with respect to these
transactions.
The Ombudsman also avers that under Section 2, Rule II of
Administrative Order No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman), the Ombudsman is authorized to
dismiss, motu proprio, a complaint even without requiring the
respondents to file their counter-affidavits and even without
conducting a preliminary investigation.
As to the loan accounts of Golden River obtained on March 13,
1982 and December 1, 1982, the Ombusman contends that based
on pieces of evidence presented by the complainant, the said loans
had more than sufficient collateral.
The Ombudsman asserts that his findings of fact and his
application of pertinent laws as well as rules of evidence deserve
great weight and respect and even accorded full faith and credit in
the absence of any showing of any error or grave abuse of
discretion.
Respondents Panfilo O. Domingo, Jose R. Tengco, Jr., Alicia Ll.
Reyes, Cesar Zalamea, Placido L. Mapa, Jr., Conrado T. Calalang,
Norberto Villarama and Ricardo C. Silverio filed their respective
Comments. While the present petition is pending in this Court,
respondents Conrado Reyes and Jose Teves died.5 In a
Resolution6 issued by this Court dated February 22, 2006,
respondents Wenceslao Pascual, Senen dela Costa, Lorenzo
Salcedo and Antonio Mendoza were dropped as respondents for an
earlier resolution of the case after all efforts of petitioner to
ascertain their correct and present addresses proved to be in vain.
With respect to the other respondents who failed to file their
respective comments, the Court dispenses with the comments in
order that the present petition may be resolved.
The Court shall first deal with the issue of prescription as this was
the main basis of the Ombudsman in dismissing petitioner's
complaints.
Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by
public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or
transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or
estoppel.
In Presidential Ad Hoc Committee v. Hon. Desierto7, the Court held
that the imprescriptibility of the right of the State to recover ill-
gotten wealth applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten
wealth, and not to criminal cases. In other words, the prosecution
of offenses arising from, relating or incident to, or involving ill-
gotten wealth contemplated in the above-mentioned provision of
the Constitution may be barred by prescription.8
Under Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended
by Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 195, which took effect on March 16,
1982, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the
said Act was increased from ten to fifteen years.
As to whether or not the subject complaints filed against herein
respondents had already prescribed, the Court's disquisition on an
identical issue in Salvador v. Desierto9 is instructive, to wit:
The applicable laws on prescription of criminal offenses defined and
penalized under the Revised Penal Code are found in Articles 90
and 91 of the same Code. For those penalized by special laws, Act
No. 3326, as amended, applies. Here, since R.A. 3019, the law
alleged to have been violated, is a special law, the applicable law in
the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No.
3326, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same not be
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if
the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy."
The above provisions are clear and need no interpretation.
In Presidential Ad Hoc Committee v. Hon. Desierto*, we held:
x x x it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party,
to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the
questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the public
officials concerned connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries of
the loans." Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE that the
prescriptive period for the offenses with which respondents in
OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the
discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such
commission.
The assertion by the Ombudsman that the phrase 'if the same not
be known' in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 does not mean 'lack of
knowledge' but that the crime 'is not reasonably knowable' is
unacceptable, as it provides an interpretation that defeats or
negates the intent of the law, which is written in a clear and
unambiguous language and thus provides no room for
interpretation but only application."
We reiterated the above ruling in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto** thus:
In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to
the February 1986 Edsa Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand
E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as the aggrieved party
could not have known of the violations at the time the questioned
transactions were made (PCGG v. Desierto, G.R. No. 140232,
January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA 767; Domingo v. Sandiganbayan,
supra, Note 14; Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on
Behest Loans v. Desierto, supra, Note 16). Moreover, no person
would have dared to question the legality of those transactions.
Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the
date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive
investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest
Loans.
As to when the period of prescription was interrupted, the second
paragraph of Section 2, Act No. 3326, as amended, provides
that prescription is interrupted 'when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person.10
The complaints filed against respondents did not specify the exact
dates when the alleged offenses were discovered. However, it is
not disputed that it was the Committee that discovered the same.
As such, the discovery could not have been made earlier than
October 13, 1992, the date when the Committee was created. It is
clear, therefore, that the alleged criminal offenses against herein
respondents had not yet prescribed when the complaints were filed
in 1996. Thus, the Ombudsman seriously erred in dismissing the
three complaints filed by petitioner on the ground of prescription.
As to petitioner's claim that it is error on the part of the
Ombudsman to deny petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration on the
ground that the same was filed out of time:
The Ombudsman is presumed to have regularly performed its
official duty in the determination of whether or not the said Motion
was really filed beyond the reglementary period as provided under
the pertinent rules of the Office of the Ombudsman. However, this
presumption is disputable. In the present case, petitioner contends
that the subject Motion was sent by registered mail on July 29,
1998, which was the last day allowed for filing of the same. As
proof of such mailing, petitioner presented a Certification11 issued
by the Central Post Office in Manila stating therein that Registered
Letter No. 74220 was sent by the PCGG on July 29, 1998,
addressed to the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila, and that said
letter was duly delivered to and received on August 5, 1998 by an
authorized representative of the Office of the Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman failed to controvert petitioner's submission in any of
the pleadings filed in the present petition. A simple referral to the
date that appears on the front page of the Motion for
Reconsideration, indicating the date when the Office of the
Ombudsman received the Motion, would have easily disputed the
allegation of petitioners. In the absence thereof, the Court finds
that the presumption of regularity of the Ombudsman's
performance of his official duties must yield to the evidence
presented by petitioner. As such, petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of the Ombudsman dated July 6,
1998 should be considered as timely filed.
Nonetheless, a perusal of the assailed Order dated August 31,
1998 of the Ombudsman shows that there are grounds other than
late filing upon which the Ombudsman denied petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration, to wit:
xxx
All the foregoing notwithstanding, and bearing in mind the peculiar
circumstances of this case, particularly the fact that the subject
loans are now alleged as ill-gotten wealth and behest loans, the
same remains to be bare allegations with no new evidence
tendered to thwart the Order in question.
The complaints herein are plain and simple. There is no allegation
even that the questioned loans were granted "at the behest" of
respondent officials in these cases x x x.
x x x x12
It, thus, appears that the Ombudsman's basis for dismissing the
complaints was not merely the prescription of the complaints, but
also the lack of any allegation therein that the questioned loans are
behest loans.
However, while there was no specific or particular mention that the
questioned loan accounts were "behest loans," the complaints
contain allegations consistent with the criteria laid down by
Memorandum Order No. 61 issued by President Ramos on
November 9, 1992.
The said Memorandum provides for the following as a frame of
reference in determining whether a loan, which is under scrutiny, is
behest:
(a) It is under-collateralized;
(b) The borrower corporation is undercapitalized;
(c) Direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials,
like the presence of marginal notes;
(d) Stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are
identified as cronies;
(e) Deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended;
(f) Use of corporate layering;
(g) Non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being
sought; andcralawlibrary
(h) Extraordinary speed with which the loan release was
made.13 (Emphasis supplied).
In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Hon.
Desierto,14 the Ombudsman adopted the position that to qualify as
a behest loan, two or more of the criteria enumerated in
Memorandum Order No. 61 must be present.
It is therefore erroneous for the Ombudsman to conclude in the
present case that the complaints against PRGS and Filcarbon were
bereft of any allegations that their questioned loans are behest,
considering that said complaints explicitly alleged the presence of
two of the criteria: that the subject loans are "under-collateralized"
and that the borrower corporations are "undercapitalized."
Section 2, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7 of the Office of the
Ombudsman, otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman, provides:
SEC. 2. Evaluation. - Upon evaluating the complaint, the
investigating officer shall recommend whether it may be:
a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;
b) referred to respondent for comment;
c) indorsed to the proper government office or agency which has
jurisdiction over the case;
d) forwarded to the appropriate officer or official for fact-finding
investigation;
e) referred for administrative adjudication; or
f) subjected to a preliminary investigation.
While under this Rule, the Ombudsman may dismiss a complaint
outright for want of palpable merit, but a sense of justice and
fairness demands that the Ombudsman must set forth in a
Resolution the reasons for such dismissal.
It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be
informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual
and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. 15 This
Court has held that the constitutional and statutory mandate that
no decision shall be rendered by any court of record without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based applies as well to dispositions by quasi-judicial
and administrative bodies.16 In fact, Section 18 of R.A. No. 6770,
otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, makes the Rules
of Court applicable, in a suppletory manner, to its own rules of
procedure. One of the requirements provided under Section 1, Rule
36 of the Rules of Court is that a judgment or final order
determining the merits of the case should state the facts and the
law on which it is based.
A careful reading of the questioned Orders of the Ombudsman
shows that there is no express finding that the complaints filed by
petitioner were manifestly without merit. There is no explanation or
discussion, whatsoever, as to how it reached its conclusion that the
disputed loans are not behest insofar as PRGS and Filcarbon are
concerned.
Thus, for a proper disposition of the complaints against PRGS and
Filcarbon, the Court finds it necessary to refer them back to the
Ombudsman for proper evaluation based on their merits.
As to Golden River, the Ombudsman did not err in dismissing the
complaint against it with respect to its loan transactions obtained
on March 13, 1982 and December 1, 1982. The Court finds no
cogent reason to deviate from the findings of the Ombudsman, to
wit:
Discussing these two loans, we find that in 1980, Golden River
Corporation was granted a refinance in the amount of P14,724,430
pesos. Such grant in 1982 for P5,551,000.00 is less than 50% of
the said P14,724,430 pesos, hence, this cannot be said to be
granted with insufficient collateral, taking the same as reference
point alone without the previous collaterals and assets which were
admittedly sufficient as admitted by complainant in paragraph b, p.
2 of the Sworn Statement of Orlando L. Salvador (p. 10, Records,
OMB-0-96-2644)
xxx
Likewise, the loans for P7,118,656.52 on December 1, 1982 is not
more than 50% of the additional assets alone which is the money
equivalent of the two refinanced loans of P14,724,430.00 and
P5,551,000.00 the total of which is P20,275,430.00 pesos.
Considering that the refinancing ratio has a maximum of 70% of
the total assets/collaterals, even the last two loans which were
within the prescriptive period are not without sufficient collaterals.
In other words, collaterals were sufficient in accordance with Sec.
78, R.A. 337, as amended (General Banking Act) x x x17
This Court has consistently held that the Ombudsman has
discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its facts and
circumstances, should be filed or not. It is basically his call. He
may dismiss the complaint forthwith should he find it to be
insufficient in form and substance or, should he find it otherwise, to
continue with the inquiry; or he may proceed with the investigation
if, in his view, the complaint is in due and proper form and
substance. Quite relevant is the Court's ruling in Espinosa v. Office
of the Ombudsman18 and reiterated in the case of The Presidential
Ad Hoc Fact - Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Hon.
Desierto,19 to wit:
The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested
in the Office of the Ombudsman. To insulate the Office from
outside pressure and improper influence, the Constitution as well
as R.A. 6770 has endowed it with a wide latitude of investigatory
and prosecutory powers virtually free from legislative, executive or
judicial intervention. This court consistently refrains from
interfering with the exercise of its powers, and respects the
initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who,
'beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the
preserver of the integrity of the public service.'20
As a rule, the Court shall not unduly interfere in the Ombudsman's
exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers, as provided
in the Constitution, without good and compelling reasons to
indicate otherwise.21 The basis for this rule was provided in the
case of Ocampo IV v. Ombudsman22 where the Court held as
follows:
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and
prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions
of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions
assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by
the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before
it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely
swamped if they would be compelled to review the exercise of
discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each
time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a
complaint by a private complainant.23
While the Court has previously held that it may interfere with the
discretion of the Ombudsman in case of clear abuse of
discretion,24 the Ombudsman is not guilty of abuse of discretion in
dismissing the complaint against Golden River insofar as the two
1982 loan transactions are concerned.
However, the complaint against Golden River had not been
completely disposed of by the Ombudsman as it failed to discuss
the refinancing loan obtained by the said corporation in 1980 for
the amount ofP14,724,430.00. Hence, the complaint against
Golden River should also be referred back to the Ombudsman for
proper evaluation of its merits with respect to the aforementioned
loan.
of Golden River obtained on March 13, 1982, and December 1,
1982, the assailed Orders of the Ombudsman dated July 6, 1998
and August 31, 1998 in OMB-0-96-2643, OMB-0-96-2644 and
OMB-0-96-2645 are SET ASIDE.
The Office of the Ombudsman is directed to conduct with dispatch
an evaluation on the respective merits of the complaints against
herein respondents pursuant to the provisions of Section 2, Rule II
of its Rules of Procedure.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner contended that the Ombudsman erred in dismissing the

complaints without requiring respondents to file their counter-
affidavits and petitioner its reply, or to further require petitioner to
clarify its evidence or adduce additional evidence.

It is quite clear under Section 2(a), Rule II of the Rules of

Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, that it may dismiss a
complaint outright for want of palpable merit. At that point, the
Ombudsman does not have to conduct a preliminary investigation
upon receipt of a complaint.25 Should the investigating officer find
the complaint devoid of merit, then he may recommend its outright
dismissal.26 The Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether
a preliminary investigation is proper.27 It is only when the
Ombudsman opts not to dismiss the complaint outright for lack of
palpable merit would the Ombudsman be expected to require the
respondents to file their counter-affidavit and petitioner, its reply.

Lastly, the Court finds nothing erroneous in the Ombudsman's act

of consolidating the three complaints and of issuing a single order
for their dismissal considering that, with the exception of the
complaint regarding the two 1982 loan accounts of Golden River
which was separately discussed by the Ombudsman on their
merits, the dismissal of all the other complaints was based on a
common ground, which is prescription.

However, in the remand of the complaints against respondents,

orderly administration of justice behooves the Ombudsman not to
consolidate the three complaints, as the respective respondents
therein would inevitably raise different defenses which would
require separate presentation of evidence by the parties involved.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

Except with respect to the complaints relative to the loan accounts
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 163586 : January 27, 2009]
SHARON CASTRO, Petitioner, v. HON. MERLIN DELORIA, as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Guimaras;
the COA-Region VI, represented by its Director; and HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court filed by Sharon Castro (petitioner) to assail the July
22, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed
CA-G.R. SP No. 69350; and the March 26, 2004 CA
Resolution2 which denied the motion for reconsideration.
The facts are of record.
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged by the Ombudsman
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65, Guimaras, with
Malversation of Public Funds, under an Information which reads, as
follows:
That on or about the 17th day of August 1998, and for sometime
prior thereto, in the Municipality of Buenavista, Province of
Guimaras, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the this
Honorable Court, abovenamed accused, a public officer, being the
Revenue Officer I of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Buenavista,
Guimaras and as such, was in the custody and possession of public
funds in the amount of P556,681.53, Philippine Currency,
representing the value of her collections and other accountabilities,
for which she is accountable by reason of the duties of her office, in
such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office,
taking advantage of her public position, with deliberate intent, and
with intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously appropriate, take, misappropriate, embezzle and
convert to her own personal use and benefit said amount of
P556,681.53, and despite notice and demands made upon her
account for said public funds, she has failed to do so, to the
damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Petitioner pleaded NOT GUILTY when arraigned on February 16,
2001.
On August 31, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority of the
Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation and file the
Information. Petitioner argued that the Information failed to allege
her salary grade - - a material fact upon which depends the
jurisdiction of the RTC. Citing Uy v. Sandiganbayan,4 petitioner
further argued that as she was a public employee with salary grade
27, the case filed against her was cognizable by the RTC and may
be investigated and prosecuted only by the public prosecutor, and
not by the Ombudsman whose prosecutorial power was limited to
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.5
The RTC denied the Motion to Quash in an Order6 dated September
7, 2001. It held that the jurisdiction of the RTC over the case did
not depend on the salary grade of petitioner, but on the penalty
imposable upon the latter for the offense charged.7 Moreover, it
sustained the prosecutorial authority of the Ombudsman in the
case, pointing out that in Uy, upon motion for clarification filed by
the Ombudsman, the Court set aside its August 9, 1999 Decision
and issued a March 20, 2001 Resolution expressly recognizing the
prosecutorial and investigatory authority of the Ombudsman in
cases cognizable by the RTC.
The RTC further held that the Motion to Quash was contrary to Sec.
1, Rule 117, for it was filed after petitioner pleaded not guilty
under the Information.8
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 which the RTC denied
in its December 18, 2001 Order.10
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari11 with the CA, but the latter
dismissed the petition in the Decision under review.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration12 was also denied.
Hence, the present petition, confining the issues to the following:
1. Whether or not the Ombudsman, as of May 31, 2000, when the
Information for Malvesation of Public Funds was instituted against
the Petitioner, had the authority to file the same in light of this
Supreme Court's ruling in the First "Uy v. Sandiganbayan" case,
which declared that the prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman is
limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
2. Whether or not the clarificatory Resolution issued by the
Supreme Court dated February 22, 2001 in the Uy v.
Sandiganbayan case can be made applicable to the Petitioner-
Accused, without violating the constitutional provision on ex-post
facto laws and denial of the accused to due process.13
Petitioner contends that from the time of the promulgation on
August 9, 1999 of the Decision of the Court in Uy up to the time of
issuance on March 20, 2001 of the Resolution of the Court in the
same case, the prevailing jurisprudence was that the Ombudsman
had no prosecutorial powers over cases cognizable by the RTC. As
the investigation and prosecution against petitioner was conducted
by the Ombudsman beginning April 26, 2000, then the August 9,
1999 Decision in Uy was applicable, notwithstanding that the said
decision was set aside in the March 20, 2001 Resolution of the
Court in said case. Hence, the Information that was filed against
petitioner was void for at that time the Ombudsman had no
investigatory and prosecutorial powers over the case.
The petition lacks merit.
The petition calls to mind Office of the Ombudsman v.
Enoc,14 wherein accused Ruben Enoc, et al. invoked the August 9,
1999 Decision of the Court in Uy15 in a motion to dismiss the 11
counts of malversation that were filed against them by the
Ombudsman before the RTC. The RTC granted the motion but upon
petition filed by the Ombudsman, the Court reversed the RTC and
held:
In turn, petitioner filed a Manifestation invoking the very same
resolution promulgated on March 20, 2001 in Uy v. Sandiganbayan
reconsidering the ruling that the prosecutory power of the
Ombudsman extended only to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan.
Indeed, this Court has reconsidered the said ruling and held that
the Ombudsman has powers to prosecute not only graft cases
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those
cognizable by the regular courts. It held:
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the
Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or
omission of any public officer or employee when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The
law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been
held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public
official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a
public officer or employee.
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15(1) giving the
Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, and Section 11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor
the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute
criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should
not be construed as confining the scope of the investigatory and
prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.
Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction
over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The law defines such
primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over,
at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government,
the investigation of such cases." The grant of this authority does
not necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases
involving public officers and employees cognizable by other courts.
The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with
the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other
offenses committed by public officers and employees. Indeed, it
must be stressed that the powers granted by the legislature to the
Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public
officers and employees during their tenure of office.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should
not be equated with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor
under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor
is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may
only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of
the Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary investigation
and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to
confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the
Ombudsman to these types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated
by law to act on all complaints against officers and employees of
the government and to enforce their administrative, civil and
criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants. To
carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of
his office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in
the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor
to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases.
Those designated or deputized to assist him work under his
supervision and control. The law likewise allows him to direct the
Special prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11(4c) of RA 6770.
We, therefore, hold that the Ombudsman has authority to
investigate and prosecute Criminal Case Nos. 374(97) to 385(97)
against respondents in the RTC, Branch 19 of Digos, Davao Del Sur
even as this authority is not exclusive and is shared by him with
the regular prosecutors.
WHEREFORE, the order, dated October 7, 2000, of the Regional
Trial Court, branch 19 of Digos, Davao del Sur is SET ASIDE and
Criminal Case Nos. 374(97) to 385(97) are hereby REINSTATED
and the Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to try and decide the
same.
Similarly relevant is the case of Office of Ombudsman v. Hon.
Breva,16 in which, citing the August 9, 1999 Decision in Uy, the
RTC dismissed a criminal complaint that was filed before it by the
Ombudsman. The Court reversed the RTC, for, "given the Court's
Uy ruling under its March 20, 2001 Resolution, the trial court's
assailed Orders x x x are, in hindsight, without legal support and
must, therefore, be set aside."
It is settled, therefore, that the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy,
that the Ombudsman has prosecutorial powers in cases cognizable
by the RTC, extends even to criminal information filed or pending
at the time when its August 9, 1999 Decision was the operative
ruling on the issue.
Petitioner would argue, however, that the March 20, 2001
Resolution in Uy cannot have retroactive effect, for otherwise it
would amount to "an ex-post facto law, which is constitutionally
proscribed."17
Petitioner is grasping at straws.
A judicial interpretation of a statute, such as the Ombudsman Act,
constitutes part of that law as of the date of its original passage.
Such interpretation does not create a new law but construes a pre-
existing one; it merely casts light upon the contemporaneous
legislative intent of that law.18 Hence, the March 20, 2001
Resolution of the Court in Uy interpreting the Ombudsman Act is
deemed part of the law as of the date of its effectivity on
December 7, 1989.
Where a judicial interpretation declares a law unconstitutional or
abandons a doctrinal interpretation of such law, the Court,
recognizing that acts may have been performed under the
impression of the constitutionality of the law or the validity of its
interpretation, has consistently held that such operative fact cannot
be undone by the mere subsequent declaration of the nullity of the
law or its interpretation; thus, the declaration can only have a
prospective application.19 But where no law is invalidated nor
doctrine abandoned, a judicial interpretation of the law should be
deemed incorporated at the moment of its legislation.20
In the present case, the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy made no
declaration of unconstitutionality of any law nor did it vacate a
doctrine long held by the Court and relied upon by the public.
Rather, it set aside an erroneous pubescent interpretation of the
Ombudsman Act as expressed in the August 9, 1999 Decision in
the same case. Its effect has therefore been held by the Court to
reach back to validate investigatory and prosecutorial processes
conducted by the Ombudsman, such as the filing of the
Information against petitioner.
With the foregoing disquisition, the second issue is rendered moot
and academic.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
costs. SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 144492 : December 18, 2008]
LUWALHATI R. ANTONINO, Petitioner, v. HON. OMBUDSMAN
ANIANO A. DESIERTO, ROSALITA T. NUÑEZ, AUGUSTUS L.
MOMONGAN, JUDGE ABEDNEGO O. ADRE, PEDRO G.
NALANGAN, ASTERIA E. CRUZABRA, JULIO C. DIAZ and
AGAPITO BORINAGA, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari 1 under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure filed by petitioner, former Congresswoman
Luwalhati R. Antonino (petitioner) of the First Congressional
District of South Cotabato which includes General Santos City
(city), assailing that portion of the Resolution2 dated January 20,
1999 of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) dismissing
the case against private respondents, former city Mayor Rosalita T.
Nuñez (Mayor Nuñez), Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Regional Executive Director for Region XI
Augustus L. Momongan (Momongan), Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Judge Abednego O. Adre (Judge Adre), former City Legal Officer
Pedro G. Nalangan III (Nalangan), Register of Deeds Asteria E.
Cruzabra (Cruzabra), Land Management Officer III of the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of South
Cotabato Julio C. Diaz (Diaz) and Regional Technical Director of the
DENR for Region XI Agapito Borinaga (Borinaga) (respondents).
The facts, as narrated by the Ombudsman, are as follows:
Presidential Proclamation No. 168 was issued by then President
Diosdado Macapagal on October 3, 1963 (Record, pp. 23-24). The
pertinent provision of which states that:
do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for
recreational and health resort site purposes, under the
administration of the municipality of General Santos, subject to
private rights, if any there be, a certain parcel of land of the public
domain situated in the said municipality and more particularly
described as follows:
Mr-1160-D Municipal Reservation
The Municipal Government of General Santos Magsaysay Park
A parcel of land (as shown on plan Mr-1160-D) situated in the
barrio of Dadiangas, Municipality of General Santos, province of
Cotabato. x x x containing an area of 52,678 square meters.
On January 22, 1968, Republic Act No. 5412 (Record, pp. 25-26),
known as the "Charter of the City of General Santos" was enacted
creating the City of General Santos where it is provided that "The
National Government hereby cedes to the City of General Santos
the ownership and possession to all lands of the public domain
within the city." Later, said Act was amended by Republic Act No.
6386 on August 16, 1971 (Record, pp. 27-28) wherein it read that
"The disposition of all lands of the public domain within the city
shall be in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act
Numbered One hundred forty-one, as amended: Provided, That all
incomes and receipts derived from such disposition shall accrue
exclusively to the city as provided in this Act."
On the other hand, the property subject of Presidential
Proclamation No. 168 was thereafter subdivided into three lots,
namely: Lot Y-1 with an area of 18,695 square meters, Lot X
containing 15,020 square meters and Lot Y-2 with 18,963 square
meters, or a total of 52,678 square meters which is still equivalent
to the original area.
However, on February 25, 1983, former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2273 amending Proclamation No.
168 (Record, pp. 29-31), which provides that:
do hereby exclude from the operation of Proclamation No. 168
dated October 3, 1963,which established the recreational and
health resort reservation situated in the Municipality of General
Santos, now General Santos City, Island of Mindanao, certain
portions of the land embraced therein and declare the same open
to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act, which
parcels of land are more particularly described as follows:
Lot Y-1, MR-1160-D
(Magsaysay Park)
A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot Y-1, MR-1160-D, Magsaysay Park)
situated in the Municipality of General Santos, now General Santos
City, Island of Mindanao. x x x containing an area of EIGHTEEN
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED NINETY-FIVE (18,695) SQUARE
METERS. x x x
Lot Y-2, MR-1160-D
(Magsaysay Park)
A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot Y-2, MR-1160-D, Magsaysay Park)
situated in the Municipality of General Santos, now General Santos
City, Island of Mindanao. x x x containing an area of EIGHTEEN
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SIXTY-THREE (18,963) SQUARE
METERS. x x x
Thus, leaving only Lot X as that covered by Presidential
Proclamation No. 168 and is therefore reserved for recreational and
health resort site purposes.
As a result of such exclusion, the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop applied for
Free Patent with the District Land Office and consequently
Certificates of Title were issued sometime in 1983. In 1984, two
cases were filed by the local government of General Santos City
against the said Heirs of Kusop for Declaration of Nullity of Titles
and, on the other hand, the Heirs of Kusop filed a case against the
said local government for Injunction and Damages. The said three
cases were consolidated before the Regional Trial Court of General
Santos City, Branch 22, presided by respondent Judge Abednego
Adre.
On May 23, 1991, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of General Santos
City passed Resolution No. 87, Series of 1991, entitled "Resolution
Approving the Compromise Agreement to be entered into by and
between the City Government of General Santos represented by
the City Mayor and the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop, re: Magsaysay Park"
(Record, pp. 1506-1507). Significant provisions of the said
Compromise Agreement (Record, pp. 33-39) state that:
1. The subject matter of this agreement are Lots Y-1, MR-1160-D
and Y-2, MR-1160-D with combined area of THIRTY-SEVEN
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-EIGHT (37,658) SQUARE
METERS, and from this the HEIRS AND BENEFICIARIES shall
receive a total net area of TWENTY THOUSAND (20,000) SQUARE
METERS and to the CITY shall pertain the remainder of SEVENTEEN
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-EIGHT (17,658) SQUARE METERS
which if added to Lot X, MR-1160-D, previously donated to
the CITY as stated in par. 7 of the WHEREAS clause, with an area
of FIFTEEN THOUSAND AND TWENTY (15,020) SQUARE METERS
(located in between Lots Y-1 and Y-2), the CITY shall retain a total
area of THIRTY TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY-EIGHT
(32,678) SQUARE METERS.
Said Compromise Agreement was signed by respondent City Mayor
Rosalita Nuñez, assisted by respondent Pepito Nalangan III, and
the heirs and beneficiaries of Cabalo Kusop.
As a consequence of the said Compromise Agreement, respondent
Judge Abednego Adre issued an Order (Record, pp. 40-52),
covering the three pending cases, on May 6, 1992, the dispositive
portion of which states:
ACCORDINGLY, finding the foregoing "Compromise Agreement" in
conformity with Article 6 in correlation with Article 1306 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, the same is hereby APPROVED and
ADOPTED as judgment in these cases. The parties are enjoined to
faithfully comply therewith.
A Writ of Execution was accordingly issued on November 28, 1995.
However, on July 22, 1997, acting upon the "Motion for Exclusion
of an Extraneous Subject from the Coverage of the Judgment
thereof" and the "Motion for Issuance of Clarificatory Order"
submitted by the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop and jointly by CENR Officer
and Regional Technical Director of DENR, respectively, respondent
Judge issued another Order [assailed RTC Order] (Record, pp. 53-
59) in the above-cited three cases, stating that:
ACCORDINGLY, based on all the foregoing facts, law and
jurisprudence, the motion for exclusion of Lot X, MR-1160-D
comprising an area of 15,020 SQUARE METERS is GRANTED. The
movants heirs of Kusop are, however, enjoined to donate to
the City of General Santos in keeping with the intent and
spirit of the compromise agreement.
On July 23, 1997, the following private respondents applied for
Miscellaneous Sales Patent over portions of Lot X, to be divided as
follows (refer to affidavits, Record, pp. 60-75):
Applicants Area applied
1. Mad Guaybar - 999 sq. m.;
2. Oliver Guaybar - 999 sq. m.; from the coverage of the Compromise Judgment dated May 6,
1992 per said court's order dated July 22, 1997."
3. Jonathan Guaybar - 999 sq. m.;
Thereupon, public respondents Cesar Jonillo and City Assessor
4. Alex Guaybar - 999 sq. m.;
Leonardo Dinopol, together with recommendation for approval from
5. Jack Guiwan - 999 sq. m.; respondent Rivera, submitted an appraisal of lots X-1 to X-16
stating therein the appraisal amount of P100.00 per square meter
6. Nicolas Ynot - 999 sq. m.; and existing improvements of residential light house per lot with an
7. Carlito Flaviano III - 999 sq. m.; appraised value ranging from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00 (refer to
application papers, Record, pp. 421-500).
8. Jolito Poralan - 999 sq. m.;
Subsequently, on August 4, 1997, respondent Cesar Jonillo
9. Miguela Cabi-ao - 999 sq. m.; prepared a letter-report addressed to the Regional Executive
10. Jose Rommel Saludar - 999 sq. m.; Director of DENR for each of the sixteen (16) applicants
recommending for the private sale of the subject lots to the above-
11. Joel Teves - 999 sq. m.; named applicants-respondents, without public auction (refer to
sample letter-report of recommendation in favor of Rico Altizo,
12. Rico Altizo - 999 sq. m.; Record, p. 77). Respondent CENR Officer, Renato Rivera, also
13. Johnny Medillo - 999 sq. m.; issued recommendation letters for each of the sixteen applicants
addressed to the PENR Officer for the approval of the appraisal of
14. Martin Saycon - 999 sq. m.; the subject lots and of the private sale (please refer to sample
recommendation letter in favor of Rico Altiz[o], Record, p. 78).
15. Arsenio delos Reyes, Jr. - 510 sq. m.; and,
A notice of sale was issued by respondent Julio Diaz also on the
16. Jose Bomez - 524 sq. m. same date stating therein that on September 5, 1997 the subject
lot/s will be sold (Record, p. 79).
The following day, July 24, 1997, public respondent Cesar Jonillo, On September 18, 1997, the following Certificates of Titles were
as Deputy Land Management Inspector, recommended for the issued by the Register of Deeds of General Santos City, respondent
approval of the survey authority requested by the above-named Asteria Cruzabra, which titles were also signed by respondent
private respondents for Lot X (Record, p. 418). Augustus Momongan, as DENR Regional Executive Director, to wit:

Within the same day, the Survey Authority was issued to private
Name of Owner OCT No. Lot No. Record Page No.
respondents by public respondent CENR Officer Renato Rivera
(Record, p. 419). As a result of which, Lot X was subdivided into 16 1. Mad Guaybar P-6393-A X-1 80-82;
lots (refer to subdivision plan, Record, p. 32).
2. Oliver Guaybar P-6392 X-2 83-85;
On August 2, 1997, respondent City Mayor Rosalita T. Nuñez, 3. Jonathan Guaybar P-6389-A X-3 86-88;
assisted by respondent City Legal Officer Pedro Nalangan III issued
1st Indorsements (refer to application documents, Record, pp. 421- 4. Alex Guaybar P-6393 X-4 89-91;
500) addressed to CENRO, DENR for portions of Lot X applied by 5. Jack Guiwan P-6399 X-5 92-94;
private respondents and stated therein that "this office interposes
no objection to whatever legal proceedings your office may pursue 6. Nicolas Ynot P-6388-A X-6 95-97;
on application covering portions thereof after the Regional Trial
Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 excluded Lot X, MR-1160-D 7. Carlito Flaviano III P-6389 X-7 98-100;
8. Jolito Poralan P-6391 X-8 101-103; (j), Section 3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,5 as amended, and
for malversation of public funds or property through falsification of
9. Miguela Cabi-ao P-6392-A X-9 104-106; public documents.
10. Jose Rommel Saludar P-6388 X-10 107-109;
The Ombudsman's Ruling
11. Joel Teves P-6396 X-11 110-112;
In the assailed Resolution dated January 20, 1999, the
12. Rico Altizo P-6395 X-12 113-115; Ombudsman held that Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan, among
13. Johnny Medillo P-6390 X-13 116-117; others, entered into the Compromise Agreement on behalf of the
city and pursuant to the authority granted to them by
14. Martin Saycon P-6394-A X-14 118-120; the Sangguniang Panlungsod by virtue of Resolution No. 87;
hence, it is not the sole responsibility of Mayor Nuñez and
15. Arsenio delos Reyes P-6395-A X-15 121-123; Nalangan but of the entire Sangguniang Panlungsod. Moreover, the
16. Jose Bomez P-6394 X-16 124-127. Ombudsman opined that the validity of the Compromise
Agreement had been settled when the Office of the Solicitor
Sometime on September 24 and 25, 1997, except for lots X-6, X-7, General (OSG) and the RTC found it to be in order. The
X-15 and X-16, the above-named registered owners sold their lots, Ombudsman also ruled that the Order of Judge Adre was made in
through their attorney-in-fact, respondent Atty. Nilo Flaviano, to accordance with the facts of the case, while Diaz, Borinaga,
the AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) in Momongan and Cruzabra were found to have regularly performed
the amount of Two Million Nine Hundred Ninety-Seven Thousand their official functions. Accordingly, the charges against the
Pesos (P2,997,000.00) per 999 sq. m. lot (Record, pp. 127-150). respondents were dismissed. Thus, the case was disposed in this
Then, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-81051 to 81062 were wise:
issued in the name of the vendee on September 25, 1997 (Record,
pp. 151-173). WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds and so
holds that the following crimes were committed and that
On the other hand, the registered owners of lot numbers X-6 and respondents, whose names appear below, are probably guilty
X-7 executed a Deed of Exchange with AFP-RSBS, represented by thereof:
respondent Jose Ramiscal, Jr., consenting to the exchange of lots
X-6 and X-7 with lots Y-1-A-1 and Y-1-A-2, respectively, the latter 1. CESAR JONILLO - sixteen (16) counts of Falsification of public
two lots being owned by AFP-RSBS (Record, pp. 175-178). While document to the sixteen (16) recommendation reports submitted;
lots X-15 and X-16 were exchanged with one office unit or condo 2. RENATO RIVERA - sixteen (16) counts of Falsification of public
unit to be given or ceded to respondent Nilo Flaviano (Record, pp. document relative to the sixteen (16) reports submitted, all dated
179-182).3 August 4, 1997;
3. MAD GUAYBAR, OLIVER GUAYBAR, JONATHAN GUAYBAR, ALEX
Based on the foregoing, petitioner filed a verified complaint- GUAYBAR, JACK GUIWAN, CARLITO FLAVIANO III, NICOLAS YNOT,
affidavit4 before the Ombudsman against the respondents together JOLITO PORALAN, MIGUELA CABI-AO, JOSE ROMMEL SALUDAR,
with Cesar Jonillo (Jonillo), Renato Rivera (Rivera), Mad Guaybar, JOEL TEVES, RICO ALTIZO, JOHNNY MED[I]LLO, MARTIN SAYCON,
Oliver Guaybar, Jonathan Guaybar, Alex Guaybar, Jack Guiwan, ARSENIO DE LOS REYES, and JOSE BOMEZ in conspiracy with
Carlito Flaviano III, Nicolas Ynot, Jolito Poralan, Miguela Cabi-ao, public respondents CESAR JONILLO and RENATO RIVERA' one (1)
Jose Rommel Saludar, Joel Teves, Rico Altizo, Johnny Medillo, count each for private respondents and sixteen (16) counts each
Martin Saycon, Arsenio de los Reyes, and Jose Bomez (Mad for public respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019;
Guaybar and his companions), Gen. Jose Ramiscal, Jr. (Gen. 4. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., WILFREDO PABALAN, NILO FLAVIANO - as
Ramiscal), Wilfredo Pabalan (Pabalan), and Atty. Nilo Flaviano conspirators for twelve (12) counts of falsification of public
(Atty. Flaviano) (indicted) for violation of Paragraphs (e), (g) and documents relative to the twelve (12) unilateral Deeds of Sale;
5. MAD GUAYBAR, OLIVER GUAYBAR, JONATHAN GUAYBAR, ALEX
GUAYBAR, JACK GUIWAN, JOLITO PORALAN, MIGUELA CABI-AO,
JOSE ROMMEL SALUDAR, [J]OEL TEVES, RICO ALTIZO, JOHNNY
MEDILLO, MARTIN SAYSON - one (1) count each as conspirator in
the falsification of public document relative to the corresponding
unilateral Deed of Sale executed by their agent in their behalf;
6. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., WILFREDO PABALAN and NILO FLAVIANO
- twelve (12) counts of violation of section 3(e) of RA 3019 for
short-changing the government inn the correct amount of taxes
due for the sale of Lot-X to AFP-RSBS; andcralawlibrary
7. MAD GUAYBAR, OLIVER GUAYBAR, JONATHAN GUAYBAR, ALEX
GUAYBAR, JACK GUIWAN, JOLITO PORALAN, MIGUELA CABI-AO,
JOSE ROMMEL SALUDAR, [J]OEL TEVES, RICO ALTIZO, JOHNNY
MEDILLO, MARTIN SAYSON - one (1) count each of violation of
section 3(e) of RA 3019 as conspirator in short-changing the
government in the payment of taxes for the sale of Lot-X to AFP-
RSBS.
Let the herein attached Informations against aforementioned
respondents be filed with the proper courts.
Charges against respondents ROSALITA NUÑEZ, AUGUSTUS
MOMONGAN, ABEDNEGO ADRE, ASTERIA CRUZABRA, PEDRO
NALANGAN III, JULIO DIAZ and AGAPITO BORINAGA are
hereby DISMISSED, without prejudice to the filing of
criminal cases against private respondents, for offenses
committed not in conspiracy with the herein public
respondents, by the proper parties-in-interest.
SO RESOLVED.6
On February 4, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was, however, denied by the Ombudsman in his
Order7 dated April 26, 2000. The Ombudsman held that since the
criminal Informations were already filed against the
aforementioned indicted and the cases were already pending
before the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts of General Santos
City, the Ombudsman had lost jurisdiction over the said case.
The Sole Issue
Hence, this Petition, on the sole ground that:
THE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN THE
EXERCISE OF HIS PROSECUTORY FUNCTIONS, BY DISMISSING
THE CHARGES AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS DESPITE CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION AND
INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONSPIRACY TO CHEAT AND DEFRAUD THE
CITY GOVERNMENT OF GENERAL SANTOS CITY THROUGH THE
ILLEGAL DISPOSITION OF LOT X OF THE MAGSAYSAY PARK IN
VIOLATION OF LAW AND ITS CHARTER.8
Petitioner avers that the Ombudsman ignored substantial evidence
pointing to the existence of a conspiracy among all the respondents
and those indicted, which led to the illegal and fraudulent
disposition of Lot X of the Magsaysay Park. To prove her claim of a
grand conspiracy, petitioner outlines the individual participation,
cooperation and involvement of each respondent, as follows:
1. The assailed RTC Order issued by Judge Adre on July 22, 1997
was part of the grand scheme and was made the basis for the filing
of the miscellaneous sales applications of Mad Guaybar and his
companions. The same Order was likewise used by Mayor Nuñez
and Nalangan as the reason for interposing no objection to the said
applications. The assailed RTC Order was issued by Judge Adre
almost five (5) years after his Judgment based on the Compromise
Agreement had long become final; thus, it was issued with grave
abuse of discretion and in gross ignorance of the law. Judge Adre,
therefore, violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
2. Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan knew or ought to have known, by
reason of their respective offices and as administrators of the
properties of the city, that Lot X of the Magsaysay Park is owned
by the city and reserved as health and recreation site. Yet,
Nalangan's Comment, filed before Judge Adre issued the assailed
RTC Order, stated that per verification, there was no existing
donation from the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop to the city. Likewise, in
their 1st Indorsement dated August 2, 1997, instead of opposing
the applications of Mad Guaybar and his companions, Mayor
Nuñez and Nalangan endorsed the same and interposed no
objection thereto. Said Indorsement was part of the grand
conspiracy and was utilized as a front for the resale of the said
property to AFP-RSBS, to the injury of the city. Petitioner submits
that Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan also violated Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019.
3. After Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan issued their 1st Indorsement
on August 2, 1997 and after Jonillo submitted his falsified report on
August 4, 1997, Diaz, on the same date, scheduled the sale of Lot
X to Mad Guaybar and his companions on September 5, 1997.
Thus, Diaz issued notices of sale of the subdivided lots of Lot X on
September 5, 1997 without public auction and at the
disadvantageous price recommended by Rivera. Therefore, Diaz, as
a co-conspirator, should be similarly charged with Jonillo and
Rivera for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and for
falsification of public documents.
4. Borinaga, conspiring with Rivera, filed on June 9, 1997 the
Motion for Issuance of a Clarificatory Order before Judge Adre,
which led to the issuance by the latter of the assailed RTC Order.
Borinaga and Rivera likewise represented to the RTC that upon
verification, they did not find in the records any deed of donation
executed by the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop. Borinaga should be held
liable as an active participant in a grand scheme to defraud the
city.
5. Momongan, by the nature of his office, knew that Lot X is not
disposable and alienable and is, therefore, not a proper subject of a
sales patent application. Despite such knowledge and based on the
falsified reports of Jonillo and Rivera, Momongan allowed Lot X to
be subdivided and sold to Mad Guaybar and his companions by
approving their miscellaneous sales application and issuing the
Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) covering the subdivided lots of
Lot X. In sum, Momongan adopted as his own the false reports,
and granted unwarranted benefit and advantage to Mad Guaybar
and his companions, to the injury of the city.
6. While the function of Cruzabra in the registration of documents
and titles may be considered as ministerial, the circumstances
under which the titles were issued in the names of Mad Guaybar
and his companions and eventually, in the name of AFP-RSBS,
indicate that Cruzabra was aware and was part of the grand
conspiracy to defraud the city. Each of the sixteen (16) OCTs was
transcribed and signed by Cruzabra on September 22, 1997. On
the same date, Atty. Flaviano claimed and received the owners'
copies of the OCTs; Mad Guaybar and his companions executed a
Joint Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing Atty. Flaviano to
be their attorney-in-fact, for the purpose of selling their respective
lots; and Cruzabra registered and annotated said SPA in their
respective titles. On September 25, 1997, Atty. Flaviano registered
with Cruzabra twelve (12) Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of AFP-
RSBS, after paying the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on the
same day the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax due
thereon. On the same day, Cruzabra canceled the OCTs and
issued, in lieu thereof, twelve (12) Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCTs) in favor of AFP-RSBS. The remaining four (4) lots were
transferred and registered in the name of AFP-RSBS on October
10, 1997 by virtue of deeds of exchange executed by the
registered owners in favor of the former. Petitioner submits that
Cruzabra could not have been unaware of the restrictions; instead,
she allowed the transfer and registration of the said lots to AFP-
RSBS so swiftly, that it could only be interpreted as part of the
scheme to defraud the city.9
In sum, petitioner ascribes to the Ombudsman grave abuse of
discretion in the exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory
functions, by completely ignoring and disregarding the pieces of
substantial evidence which clearly establish the existence of a
common design among the respondents and those indicted in the
fraudulent sale and disposition of Lot X of the Magsaysay Park.
On the other hand, respondents separately raise their respective
defenses against petitioner's claims, as follows:
1. The Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor
(OSP), contends that, in effect, petitioner is asking this Court to
review the pieces of evidence gathered by the Ombudsman during
the preliminary investigation. This is not proper. In Espinosa v.
Office of the Ombudsman10 and Young v. Office of the
Ombudsman,11 this Court accorded highest respect for the factual
findings of the Ombudsman, absent a clear case of grave abuse of
discretion. The OSP claims that the Ombudsman did not commit
grave abuse of discretion because the respondents, based on their
counter-affidavits, have valid and legal justifications, sufficient for
the Ombudsman to exculpate them from the charges.12
2. Cruzabra avers that there is no showing that conspiracy exists
between her and other respondents charged before the
Ombudsman. Petitioner's allegations with respect to Cruzabra refer
to recorded transactions which are legal acts. Such allegations did
not discuss how the alleged conspiracy was committed; they are
merely conjectures and bare allegations. Inasmuch as conspiracy
cannot be presumed, and there is no convincing evidence to
support such allegations, the Ombudsman did not commit grave
abuse of discretion. Lastly, Cruzabra claims that the canceled OCTs
do not contain any restriction to transfer the respective lots to AFP-
RSBS. As such, Cruzabra submits that it would be most unfair if
she would be made a part of the alleged conspiracy simply because
she exercised her ministerial functions as Register of Deeds.13
3. Momongan alleges, among others, that as Regional Executive
Director of the DENR, he is duly authorized to sign patents and
reconstituted patents. Since the standard procedure and processes
were complied with, Momongan simply relied on his subordinates
and on their good faith. He argues that he acted in accordance with
law, department guidelines, rules and regulations, and that to
require him to scrutinize every phase of a report of a subordinate is
a very tall order.14
4. Judge Adre manifests that in the Joint Resolution15 of the Senate
Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation
(Blue Ribbon) and National Defense and Security, dated December
23, 1998, not one of the respondents was recommended for
prosecution in connection with the irregularity involving the
Magsaysay Park. Judge Adre claims that he acted properly, and
even sought the opinion of the OSG before the Compromise
Agreement was approved. However, Judge Adre narrated that due
to the vagaries of politics, the judgment lay dormant, as no motion
for execution was filed by then Mayor Adelbert Antonino, husband
of petitioner, after Mayor Nuñez lost in the elections.
Subsequently, the writ was not issued as the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop
did not execute any deed of donation in favor of the city. He
declared that the RTC did not lose jurisdiction over the case when
the Motions for Clarification and Exclusion were filed; thus, the
issuance of the assailed RTC Order excluding Lot X andenjoining
the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop from donating the same to the city in
keeping with the intent and spirit of the compromise agreement,
was proper.16
5. Borinaga posits that the Ombudsman's factual findings need not
be disturbed, as they are not attended by grave abuse of
discretion. He maintains that he acted in accordance with law; that
as the Regional Technical Director is not required to go to the
premises of the land subject of miscellaneous applications, and he
may rely on the data submitted by the CENRO and reviewed by the
PENRO.17Moreover, Borinaga argues that the Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioner assailing the Ombudsman's
Resolution was filed out of time.18 The Certification19 dated October
1, 2003, issued by Severo A. Sotto, Records Officer IV of the Office
of the Ombudsman, shows that petitioner was personally served
with a copy of the assailed Resolution on February 24, 1999 by
Jose Ruel Bermejo, Process Server, and she filed her Motion for
Reconsideration only on February 4, 2000.
6. Diaz opines that there is no substantial evidence to prove that
he participated in a grand scheme to unlawfully dispose of the lots
covered by Lot X. He vouches that when he issued the notice of
sale, he did so on the basis of the requisite documents submitted
to his office.20
7. Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan contend that Mayor Nuñez did
not violate the Charter of the City, because when she entered into
the Compromise Agreement with the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop, she
was authorized by the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Resolution
No. 87, series of 1991, after almost one (1) year of committee and
public hearings. The same was also referred to the OSG, which
recommended its approval. When the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop filed a
Motion for Exclusion of Lot X, Nalangan had no recourse but to tell
the truth that, indeed, he found no deed of donation made in favor
of the city. While they admit to have issued Indorsements, they
made it clear that the DENR shall undertake only what is legally
feasible. Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan asseverate that they had no
intention of giving up the claim of the city over Lot X, as they even
filed a case against Mad Guaybar and his companions.21
Our Ruling
The instant Petition lacks merit.
Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of
1989)22 provides:
SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. - (1) All provisionary
orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective
and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of
the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days
after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any
of the following grounds:
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the
order, directive or decision;
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial
to the interest of the movant. The motion for reconsideration shall
be resolved within three (3) days from filing: Provided, That only
one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
Other than the statement of material dates wherein petitioner
claimed that she received through counsel the assailed Resolution
of the Ombudsman on January 21, 2000, she failed to establish
that her Motion for Reconsideration was indeed filed on time, and
thus, failed to refute the assertion of the respondents based on the
aforementioned Certification that petitioner was personally served
a copy of the assailed Resolution on February 24, 1999. There are
a number of instances when rules of procedure are relaxed in the
interest of justice. However, in this case, petitioner did not proffer
any explanation at all for the late filing of the motion for
reconsideration. After the respondents made such allegation,
petitioner did not bother to respond and meet the issue head-on.
We find no justification why the Ombudsman entertained the
motion for reconsideration, when, at the time of the filing of the
motion for reconsideration the assailed Resolution was already
final.
Even only on the basis of this fatal procedural infirmity, the instant
Petition ought to be dismissed. And on the substantive issue
raised, the petition is likewise bereft of merit.
Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, and
pursuant to R.A. No. 6770, the Ombudsman has the power to
investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a public officer or
employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient.23 Well-settled is the rule that this Courtwill
not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his
investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling
reasons that indicate otherwise. The rule is based not only upon
respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by
the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon
practicality as well. A contrary rule would encourage innumerable
petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted
by the Ombudsman, which would grievously hamper the functions
of the office and the courts, in much the same way that courts
would be swamped by a deluge of cases if they have to review the
exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time
they decide to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a
private complainant.24
Of course, this rule is not absolute. The aggrieved party may file a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when the
finding of the Ombudsman is tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as what the petitioner
did in this case, consistent with our ruling in Collantes v.
Marcelo,25 where we laid down the following exceptions to the rule:
1. When necessary to afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused;
2. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to
avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
3. When there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice;
4. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of
authority;
5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or
regulation;
6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
9. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the
lust for vengeance;
10. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused
and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied.
Grave abuse of discretion exists where a power is exercised in an
arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to
evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by, or in contemplation of law.26
The alleged grave abuse of discretion imputed to the Ombudsman
is found wanting in this case. Thus, this Court finds no reason to
deviate from the general rule. We concur with the disquisition of
GIO I Rubillar-Arao in dismissing the charges against respondents,
as approved by Ombudsman Desierto, thus:
Hence, without ruling on the validity of the titles, this Office is
constrained to limit its evaluation of the issue on the participation
of each respondent in the titling of Lot X, whether the same would
constitute a violation of RA 3019 and/or other illegal acts.
1. Respondent Abednego Adre - His participation extends only to
his issuance of an Order excluding Lot-X from the coverage of the
Compromise Agreement.
A review of the terms and conditions of the subject Compromise
Agreement confirms the Order of the respondent that indeed Lot X
was excluded. The Order of respondent judge was made in
accordance with the facts of the case. It is even noteworthy that
respondent judge assisted in preserving the claim of the
government of General Santos City over Lot X by enjoining the
donation of said property by the private respondents.
2. Respondents Nuñez and Nalangan - Said respondents'
participation in the titling of Lot-X was when they issued or caused
the issuance of Indorsements stating therein that "this office
(Office of the Mayor) interposes no objection to whatever legal
proceedings your (CENRO) office may pursue on the application
covering portions thereof (Lot-X)."
The contents of the Indorsements, as quoted above, cannot be
construed as a waiver on the part of General Santos City on its
claim over Lot-X. On the contrary, it has given DENR the authority
to take the necessary legal proceedings relative to the titling of the
property. Moreover, it should be taken into account that DENR has
the responsibility, authority and the power to grant alienable and
disposable lands to deserving claimants.
Based on these circumstances, there is no evidence to prove that
respondents Nuñez and Nalangan gave unwarranted benefit to
the claimants by issuing said Indorsements. In fact, they protected
the interest of the government over Lot-X by immediately filing a
case for nullification of titles upon knowing of the issuances
thereof.
xxx
[5.] Public respondents Julio C. Diaz, Agapito Borinaga, Augustus L.
Momongan, Asteria E. Cruzabra - Based on the evidences on
record, these respondents were in the regular performance of their
official functions. Their participation in the titling of Lot-X was due
to the fact that the documents for titling were submitted to their
respective offices as a matter of course, and there is nothing that
they can do but to follow the established procedure upon finding
that all the documents for titling were submitted.27
Indeed, while the Ombudsman's discretion in determining the
existence of probable cause is not absolute, nonetheless, petitioner
must prove that such discretion was gravely abused in order to
warrant the reversal of the Ombudsman's findings by this Court. In
this respect, petitioner fails.28
Moreover, the elements of the offense, essential for the conviction
of an accused under Section 3(e), R. A. No. 3019, are as follows:
(1) The accused is a public officer or a private person charged in
conspiracy with the former;
(2) The said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the
performance of his or her official duties, or in relation to his or her
public functions;
(3) That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the
government or a private party;
(4) Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference to such parties; andcralawlibrary
(5) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable neglect.29
Thus, in order to be held guilty of violating Section 3(e), R. A. No.
3019, the act of the accused that caused undue injury must have
been done with evident bad faith or with gross inexcusable
negligence. Bad faith per se is not enough for one to be held liable
under the law; bad faith must be evident. Bad faith does not
simply connote bad moral judgment or negligence. There must be
some dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of a wrong, a breach of a sworn duty through some motive
or intent or ill will. It partakes of the nature of fraud. It
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
design or some motive of self-interest, or ill will for ulterior
purposes. On the other hand, gross negligence is characterized by
the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a willful or
intentional manner displaying a conscious indifference to
consequences as far as other persons may be affected.30
As found by the Ombudsman and based on the records, there is no
showing of evident bad faith and/or gross negligence in the
respective acts of the respondents. It must be stressed that it is
good faith, not bad faith, which is presumed, as the chapter on
Human Relations of the Civil Code directs every person, inter alia,
to observe good faith, which springs from the fountain of good
conscience.31
Finally, petitioner speaks of conspiracy among the respondents and
those indicted. However, as found by the Ombudsman, such
conspiracy alleged in the complaint was not supported by ample
evidence. At best, the evidence adduced was not clear as to
respondents' participation in the acts in question. Actori incumbit
onus probandi - the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff or the
prosecution. The inherent weakness of complainant's case is not a
ground for the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary
investigation.32 For it is fundamental that conspiracy cannot be
presumed. Conspiracy must be proved by direct evidence or by
proof of the overt acts of the accused, before, during and after the
commission of the crime charged indicative of a common
design.33 This, the petitioner sadly failed to establish.

All told, the Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing the criminal complaint against respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. NO. MTJ-05-1581 : February 28, 2005]
PETER L. SESBREÑO, Complainant, v. JUDGE GLORIA B.
AGLUGUB, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 2, San Pedro,
Laguna, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
Peter L. Sesbreño filed a Verified Complaint dated March 2, 2004
1
against respondent judge, Hon. Gloria B. Aglugub, charging the
latter with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Neglect of Duty and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service relative to
Criminal Case No. 39806 entitled People v. Enrique Marcelino, et
al.
It appears that complainant filed three (3) separate complaints
against Enrique Marcelino (Marcelino), Susan Nuñez (Nuñez),
Edna Tabazon (Tabazon) and Fely Carunungan (Carunungan), all
from the Traffic Management Unit of San Pedro, Laguna, for
Falsification, Grave Threats and Usurpation of Authority. The three
(3) cases were assigned to respondent judge's branch and
subsequently consolidated for disposition.
After conducting a preliminary examination, respondent issued
a Consolidated Resolution2 dated May 6, 2003, dismissing the
cases for Falsification and Grave Threats for lack of probable cause,
and setting for arraignment the case for Usurpation of Authority.
Except for Marcelino who failed to appear during the arraignment,
all of the accused were arraigned. Respondent judge issued a
warrant for Marcelino's arrest.
Subsequently, complainant filed a Private Complainants' Urgent
Manifestation3 dated February 6, 2004 alleging that the accused
were also charged with violation of Republic Act No. 104 (R.A. 10)
and praying that warrants of arrest be likewise issued against all of
the accused.
Acting upon this manifestation, respondent judge issued
an Order5 dated February 12, 2004 stating that a charge for
violation of R.A. 10 was indeed alleged in the complaint for
Usurpation of Authority but was not resolved due to oversight.
However, since the statute only applies to members of seditious
organizations engaged in subversive activities pursuant to People
v. Lidres,6 and considering that the complaint failed to allege this
element, respondent judge found no probable cause and dismissed
the charge for violation of R.A. 10. Further, citing Sec. 6(b), Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules), respondent
judge denied complainant's prayer for the issuance of warrants of
arrest against the accused and ordered the records forwarded to
the Provincial Prosecutor's Office (PPO) for review.
Thereafter, complainant's counsel, Atty. Raul Sesbreño (Atty.
Sesbreño), filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion for Issuance of Warrant of Arrest Against Non-
Appearing Accused. Respondent judge, however, did not act on
these motions allegedly because the court had already lost
jurisdiction over the case by then.
The PPO affirmed respondent's order and remanded the case to the
court for further proceedings on the charge of Usurpation of
Authority.
During the hearing of the case on February 14, 2004, Tabazon,
Carunungan and Nuñez did not appear. Atty. Sesbreño,
however, did not move for the issuance of warrants of arrest
against them. Neither did he object to the cancellation of the
scheduled hearing.
The foregoing circumstances brought about the filing of the instant
administrative complaint.
Complainant contends that respondent judge violated Sec. 6(b),
Rule 112 of the Rules when she refused to issue warrants of arrest
against the accused. Complainant also faults respondent judge for
allegedlymotu proprio reconsidering her Consolidated
Resolution dated May 6, 2003 and failing to order its transmittal to
the Office of the Ombudsman within ten (10) days.
In her Comment With Motion To Dismiss The Administrative
Complaint7 dated March 26, 2004, respondent judge counters that
the issuance of a warrant of arrest is discretionary upon the judge.
Since she found no indication that the accused would abscond, she
found it unnecessary to issue the warrant. Moreover, under
Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of
1989, the PPO has been designated as the Deputized Ombudsman
Prosecutor. The PPO can take action on similar cases for review
and appropriate action. Thus, she acted in accordance with law
when she forwarded the records of the case to the PPO for review
and not to the Office of the Ombudsman as complainant insists.
Respondent judge further accuses complainant and Atty.
Sesbreño of falsification, and the latter of violation of Rule 1.01
and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Allegedly, the affidavit which was attached to the instant verified
complaint was not notarized by Atty. Raul Corro as indicated
therein. Further, Atty. Sesbreño was allegedly convicted of
Homicide and may have been suspended from the practice of law.
Complainant reiterates his allegations in his Complainant's Reply
To Respondent's Comment Dated March 26, 20048 dated May 11,
2004. He further contends that there is no provision in the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 specifically deputizing the PPO to be the
"Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor" as respondent judge
contends. He adds that respondent judge failed to comply with
Administrative Order No. 8 since she has yet to forward her
resolution to the Deputy Ombudsman.
Moreover, complainant points out that the affidavit attached to his
complaint was notarized by Atty. Corro as certified by a member of
the latter's staff. Complainant also disproves respondent judge's
allegation that Atty. Sesbreño is in the habit of filing
administrative complaints against judges, explaining that the latter
merely acted as counsel for litigants who filed administrative
complaints against certain judges.
In another Verified Complaint9 filed on March 18, 2004,
complainant further charges respondent with violating Sec. 9(b),
Rule 112 of the Rules.
Respondent Judge filed a Comment With Motion To Dismiss
Administrative Complaint10 dated May 7, 2004 clarifying that
contrary to complainant's allegation, she did not conduct a
preliminary investigation in the case for Usurpation of Authority.
What was submitted for preliminary investigation was the charge
for violation of R.A. 10. It was her resolution dismissing the charge
for violation of R.A. 10 which was transmitted to the PPO for
appropriate action. However, since the charges for violation of R.A.
10 and Usurpation of Authority were contained in a single
complaint, respondent judge deemed it proper to forward the
entire records to the PPO.
Complainant filed a Complainant's Reply To Respondent's Comment
Dated May 7, 200411 dated May 20, 2004 substantially reiterating
his allegations.
The Verified Complaint filed on March 18, 2004 was treated as a
supplemental complaint per the notation in
the Memorandum12 dated June 25, 2004.
In sum, complainant asserts that respondent judge erred in
conducting a preliminary investigation for the charge of Usurpation
of Authority; in not issuing warrants of arrest for failure of the
accused to appear during trial; in issuing her Order dated February
12, 2004 dismissing the complaint for violation of R.A. 10; and in
transmitting the records of the case to the PPO instead of the
Office of the Ombudsman.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends that the instant
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit but that respondent judge
should be reminded to be more circumspect in the performance of
her duties.13 It made the following findings:
A careful consideration of the records as well as the pertinent rules
reveals that there is nothing in the Rules of Criminal Procedure
which requires a judge to issue a warrant of arrest for the non-
appearance of the accused during the trial. Hence, its issuance
rests on the sound discretion of the presiding judge. More so in this
case, the private prosecutor did not move for the issuance of such
warrant.
As regards the next issue, Rep. Act No. 10 penalizes a person who,
with or without pretense of official position, shall perform any act
pertaining to the Government, or to any person in authority or
public officer, without being lawfully entitled to do so, shall be
punished with imprisonment of not less than two (2) years nor
more than ten (10) years. Violation thereof is cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court but subject to preliminary investigation.
Respondent judge admitted that she overlooked the charge when
she conducted the preliminary examination of the complaints.
Nonetheless, after reviewing the case, respondent Judge found no
probable cause and ordered the dismissal of the case. Therefore,
when respondent Judge motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the
case for lack of probable cause, she was acting in accordance with
the procedure on preliminary investigation laid down in Sec. 3,
Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Respondent Judge also directed that the records of the case be
forwarded to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office on review. Sec. 5 of
Rule 112 provides that the resolution of the Investigating Judge is
subject to review by the provincial or city prosecutor, or the
Ombudsman or his deputy, as the case may be.
It is respondent Judge's contention that the resolution shall be
reviewed by the Provincial Prosecutor. She explained that pursuant
to the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Provincial Prosecutor has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the charge of Violation of R.A. No.
10.
However, Sec. 31 of Rep. Act No. 6770 or "The Ombudsman Act of
1989" provides that prosecutors can (be) deputized by the
Ombudsman to act as special investigator or prosecutor only on
certain cases. Such provision is not applicable to the issue at hand.
Therefore, respondent Judge erred when she forwarded the case
for review to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office. Nonetheless,
complainant failed to show that respondent Judge was motivated
by bad faith when she issued the assailed order. At most, she is
guilty of judicial error for which she could not be held
administratively accountable absent any proof of fraud or other evil
motive.14
A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a
complaint or information for an offense where the penalty
prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day without regard to the fine.15 Thus, a preliminary
investigation is not required nor was one conducted for the charge
of violation of Art. 177 of the Revised Penal Code which is
punishable by prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods or from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years
and two (2) months.16
This being so, Sec. 9, Rule 112 of the Rules is applicable. Said
section provides:
Sec. 9. Cases not requiring a preliminary investigation nor covered
by the Rule on Summary Procedure.'
(b) If filed with the Municipal Trial Court. 'If the complaint or
information is filed with the Municipal Trial Court or Municipal
Circuit Trial Court for an offense covered by this section, the
procedure in section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. If within
ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint or information, the
judge finds no probable cause after personally evaluating the
evidence, or after personally examining in writing and under oath
the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers, he shall dismiss the same. He may,
however, require the submission of additional evidence, within ten
(10) days from notice, to determine further the existence of
probable cause. If the judge still finds no probable cause despite
the additional evidence, he shall, within ten (10) days from its
submission or expiration of said period, dismiss the case.
When he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest,
or a commitment order if the accused had already been arrested,
and hold him for trial. However, if the judge is satisfied that there
is no necessity for placing the accused under custody, he may
issue summons instead of a warrant of arrest.
Under the foregoing section, if a complaint or information is filed
directly with the Municipal Trial Court, the procedure laid down in
Sec. 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules shall be observed. If the judge
finds no sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial, he shall
dismiss the complaint or information. Otherwise, he shall issue a
warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused had
already been arrested, and hold the latter for trial. However, the
judge is given the discretion to merely issue summons instead of a
warrant of arrest if he does not find it necessary to place the
accused under custody.
It is thus not obligatory but merely discretionary upon the
investigating judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused
even after having personally examined the complainant and his
witnesses in the form of searching questions for the determination
of whether probable cause exists. Whether it is necessary to place
the accused in custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice
is left to the judge's sound judgment.17
Moreover, the judge is not required to transmit the records of the
case to the prosecutor for review.
In this case, respondent judge, following the foregoing procedure,
found probable cause to hold the accused for trial for the charge of
Usurpation of Authority and forthwith set their arraignment and the
pre-trial. There is nothing irregular in the course of action taken by
respondent judge.
Neither is there merit in complainant's contention that respondent
judge should have issued a warrant of arrest against the accused
for their failure to appear during the initial presentation of evidence
for the prosecution for the charge of Usurpation of Authority. The
issuance of a warrant of arrest for non-appearance of the accused
during trial is discretionary upon the judge. Indeed, there is
nothing in the Rules which requires a judge to issue a warrant of
arrest for non-appearance of the accused during trial.
Respondent judge concedes, however, that due to oversight, she
failed to rule on the charge of violation of R.A. 10 in
her Consolidated Resolution dated May 6, 2003. Nonetheless, she
asserts in her Comment With Motion To Dismiss Administrative
Complaint18 dated May 7, 2004 that she conducted a preliminary
investigation for the charge of violation of R.A. 10 and dismissed
the charge after taking into consideration the affidavits and
evidence presented. Complainant does not dispute the fact that
indeed a preliminary investigation was conducted for this
charge.19 Thus, when respondent judge dismissed the complaint for
violation of R.A. 10, she merely did so to correct an oversight.
Furthermore, as the Order dated February 12, 2004 confirms, it
was the dismissal of the charge for violation of R.A. 10 that was
elevated to the PPO for review. It was imprudent, however, for
respondent judge to transmit the entire records of the case to the
PPO knowing that the charge for Usurpation of Authority was
included in the records of the case. Respondent judge should have
ensured that at least one complete set of the records remained in
her sala so that the prosecution for Usurpation of Authority would
not be held up. Injudicious though her actuation was, we do not
agree with complainant that respondent judge was motivated by an
evil intent to delay the case.
This brings us to the issue of whether respondent should have
transmitted her Order dated February 12, 2004 dismissing the
charge of violation of R.A. 10 to the Office of the Ombudsman
instead of the PPO. Complainant asserts that since the charge of
violation of R.A. 10 is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, the Office
of the Ombudsman has the primary jurisdiction to review the
resolution of dismissal.
This issue is answered by Administrative Order No.
820 entitled Clarifying and Modifying Certain Rules of Procedure of
the Ombudsman, which provides "that all prosecutors are now
deputized Ombudsman prosecutors." Moreover, "[R]esolutions in
Ombudsman cases21 against public officers and employees
prepared by a deputized assistant prosecutor shall be submitted to
the Provincial or City Prosecutor concerned who shall, in turn,
forward the same to the Deputy Ombudsman of the area with his
recommendation for the approval or disapproval thereof. The
Deputy Ombudsman shall take appropriate final action thereon,
including the approval of its filing in the proper regular court or the
dismissal of the complaint, if the crime charged is punishable
by prision correccional or lower, or fine of not more thanP6,000.00
or both. Resolutions involving offenses falling within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan shall be forwarded by the Deputy
Ombudsman with his recommendation thereon to the Office of the
Ombudsman."
Thus, respondent judge did not err and was, in fact, merely acting
in accordance with law when she forwarded the case for violation of
R.A. 10 to the PPO. The fact that the PPO remanded the case to the
court for further proceedings instead of forwarding the same to the
Deputy Ombudsman as required by Administrative Order No. 8 is
quite another matter. In any event, respondent judge should have
taken the necessary steps to remedy the lapse in order to preclude
delay in the disposition of the case.
In sum, for liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed
order, decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of
official duties must not only be found to be erroneous but, most
importantly, it must be established that he was moved by bad
faith, dishonesty or some other like motive. Respondent judge's
actuations are hardly indicative of bad faith or any motive to delay
the case which characterizes the offense of gross ignorance of the
law.22
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant complaint is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Respondent Judge Gloria B. Aglugub
is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of her
duties in the future.
SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 158543. July 21, 2004]
ROSALINDA PUNZALAN, RANDALL PUNZALANand RAINIER
PUNZALAN, Petitioners, v. DENCIO DELA PEA and ROBERT
CAGARA, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court is the June 6, 2002 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
and its May 23, 2003 Resolution which denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration.
The Punzalan and the Plata families were neighbors in Hulo Bliss,
Mandaluyong City. At around 11:00 p.m. of August 13, 1997,
Dencio dela Pea, a house boarder of the Platas, was in front of a
store near their house when the group of Rainier Punzalan, Randall
Punzalan, Ricky Eugenio, Jose Gregorio, Alex Toto Ofrin, and
several others arrived. Ricky Eugenio shouted at Dela Pea, Hoy,
kalbo, saan mo binili and sumbrero mo?2 Dela Pea replied, Kalbo
nga ako, ay pinagtatawanan pa ninyo ako.3 Irked by the response,
Jose Gregorio slapped Dela Pea while Rainier punched him in the
mouth. The group then ganged up on him. In the course of the
melee, somebody shouted, Yariin na yan!4 Thereafter, Alex Toto
Ofrin kicked Dela Pea and tried to stab him with a balisong but
missed because he was able to run. The group chased him.
While Dela Pea was fleeing, he met Robert Cagara, the Platas
family driver, who was carrying a gun. He grabbed the gun from
Cagara and pointed it to the group chasing him in order to scare
them. Michael Plata, who was nearby, intervened and tried to
wrestle the gun away from Dela Pea. The gun accidentally went off
and hit Rainier Punzalan on the thigh.
Shocked, Dela Pea, Cagara and Plata ran towards the latters house
and locked themselves in. The group ran after them and when they
got to the Platas house, shouted, Lumabas kayo dyan, putang ina
ninyo! Papatayin namin kayo!5 Dela Pea, Cagara, and Plata left the
house through the back door and proceeded to the police station to
seek assistance.
As a result of the incident, Rainier Punzalan filed a criminal
complaint against Michael Plata for Attempted Homicide6 and
against Robert Cagara for Illegal Possession of Firearm. In turn,
Plata, Cagara and Dela Pea filed several counter-charges7 for grave
oral defamation, grave threats, robbery, malicious mischief and
slight physical injuries against the Punzalans, including one for
Attempted Murder filed by Dela Pea against Rainier and Randall
Punzalan and fourteen others (I.S. No. 97-11528); and one for
Grave Threats filed by Dela Pea against Alex Toto Ofrin (I.S. No.
97-11520-21).
In their counter-affidavit,8 the Punzalans argued that the charges
against them were fabricated in order to dissuade them from
testifying in the Attempted Homicide and Illegal Possession of
Firearm cases instituted by Rainier against Plata and Cagara,
respectively.
Subsequently, Robert Cagara also filed a complaint for Grave Oral
Defamation, docketed as I.S. No. 97-11522, against Rosalinda
Punzalan, mother of Rainier, alleging that on October 16, 1997 at
the Office of the Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, Rosalinda
approached him, and within hearing distance of other people, told
him, Hoy Robert, magkanong ibinigay ng mga Plata sa iyo sa
pagtestigo? Dodoblehin ko at ipapasok pa kita ng trabaho.9 In her
defense, Rosalinda denied having uttered the alleged defamatory
statements.
On July 28, 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong
City dismissed the complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against
Rosalinda Punzalan,10 holding that Cagara failed to show that the
alleged defamatory statements would cast dishonor, discredit or
contempt upon him. He also found that the statements were
uttered by Rosalinda in a state of distress and, hence, were not
actionable.11 The charge of Attempted Murder against Rainier,
Randall and 14 others was also dismissed by the Assistant
Prosecutor because complainant Dela Peas claim that he
accidentally shot Rainier forms part of the defense of Michael Plata
in the Attempted Homicide case previously filed by Rainier against
the latter.
Dela Pea and Cagara separately appealed to the Department of
Justice. On March 23, 2000, then Justice Secretary Artemio
Tuquero issued a Resolution modifying the July 28, 1998 Joint
Resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor by ordering, among
others (1) that the charge of Grave Oral Defamation against
Rosalinda Punzalan be downgraded to Slight Oral Defamation; (2)
that the charge of Attempted Murder against Rainier, Randall and
14 others be downgraded to Attempted Homicide; and (3) that the
charge of Grave Threats against Alex Toto Ofrin be downgraded to
Other Light Threats. The dispositive portion of the Resolution
reads:
WHEREFORE, the resolution is hereby MODIFIED. The City
Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City is directed to file information for
three (3) counts of slight oral defamation against Rosalinda
Punzalan; information for two (2) counts [of] other light threats
against Alexander Toto Ofrin; information for attempted homicide
against Alexander Toto Ofrin, Rainier Punzalan, Jose Gregorio
Lanuzo, Avelino Serrano, Lito dela Cruz, Emmanuel Nobida, Randall
Punzalan, Mark Catap, Ricky Eugenio, Alejandro Diez, Vicente
Joven Manda, Herson Mendoza, Mark Labrador, Alex Pascua, Edwin
Vivar and Raymond Poliquit; information for malicious mischief and
theft against Rainier Punzalan, Mark Catap, Alejandro Diez, Jose
Gregorio Lanuzo, Alexander Toto Ofrin, Herson Mendoza,
Emmanuel Nobida, Edwin Vivar, Avelino Bobby Serrano, and John
Does; and to report action taken within 10 days from receipt
hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners, Rosalinda, Rainier and Randall Punzalan, together with
their co-respondents, filed separate motions for reconsideration.
On June 6, 2000, the Secretary of Justice set aside the March 23,
2000 Resolution and directed the withdrawal of the Informations
against the movants. He ruled, among others, that the Oral
Defamation case should be dismissed because the alleged
defamatory statements were uttered without malice as Rosalinda
was then in a state of shock and anger. Anent the Attempted
Homicide case filed by Dela Pea against Rainier, the Secretary held
that the allegations in support thereof should first be threshed out
in the trial of the Attempted Homicide case filed by Rainier against
Michael Plata. He added that Dela Pea failed to prove that Rainier,
Randall and his companions intended to kill him. The dispositive
portion thereof reads:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the appealed resolution is
REVERSED. The resolution dated March 23, 2000 is set aside and
the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City is directed to withdraw the
separate informations for slight oral defamation, other light
threats, attempted homicide, malicious mischief and theft against
all respondents and to report the action taken within ten (10) days
from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing
Resolution, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated October
11, 2000.
On January 11, 2001, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals praying that the City Prosecutor of
Mandaluyong be directed to file one count of Slight Oral
Defamation against Rosalinda; one count of Attempted Homicide
against Rainier, Randall and 14 others; and two counts of Other
Light Threats against Alex Toto Ofrin.
On June 6, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted and the
questioned Resolutions of public respondent dated 06 June 2000
and 11 October 2000 are set aside insofar as it directed the
withdrawal of informations for slight oral defamation against
Rosalinda Punzalan and attempted homicide against the
respondents Alexander Toto Ofrin, Rainier Punzalan, Jose Gregorio
Lanuzo, Avelino Serrano, Lito de la Cruz, Emmanuel Nobido,
Randall Punzalan, Mark Catap, Ricky Eugenio, Alejandro Diez,
Vicente Joven Manda, Herson Mendoza, Mark Labrador, Alex
Pascua, Edwin Vivar, and Raymond Poliquit.
The resolution dated 06 June 2000 and 11 October 2000 is hereby
affirmed insofar as it directed the withdrawal of information for two
(2) counts of other light threats against Alexander Toto Ofrin.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.18 Hence, the
instant petition raising the following assignment of errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND
SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN SETTING ASIDE THE
RESOLUTIONS OF THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
DATED JUNE 6, 2000 AND OCTOBER 11, 2000.
 II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT,
MORE LIKELY THAN NOT, SLIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION HAD BEEN
COMMITTED AND WAS COMMITTED BY HEREIN PETITIONER
ROSALINDA PUNZALAN.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE ALLEGATIONS OF RESPONDENTS AND THEIR
WITNESSES, WHICH SHOULD BE GIVEN WEIGHT, ARE SUFFICIENT
TO PROVE INTENT TO KILL SUCH THAT PETITIONERS RANDALLL
AND RAINIER PUNZALAN MUST BE PROSECUTED FOR ATTEMPTED
HOMICIDE.19 cralawred
The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not there is
sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of probable cause against
petitioner Rosalinda Punzalan for Slight Oral Defamation and
against petitioners Randall and Rainier Punzalan for Attempted
Homicide.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The pertinent law in relation to this case is Section 1 of Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal, or any plain speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is
no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law.
Where the error is in the judges findings and conclusions or to cure
erroneous conclusions of law and fact, appeal is the remedy.
Lack of jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction are distinguished
thus: the respondent acts without jurisdiction if he does not have
the legal power to determine the case; where the respondent,
being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps his
authority as determined by law, he is performing a function in
excess of his jurisdiction.21 In the case of Meat Packing Corp. v.
Sandiganbayan,22 it was held that grave abuse of discretion implies
a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and
it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. It is
not sufficient that a tribunal, in the exercise of its power, abused
its discretion; such abuse must be grave.23 cralawred
We now resolve whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave
abuse of discretion in his Resolutions dated June 6, 2000 and
October 11, 2000. Under the Revised Administrative Code, the
Secretary of Justice exercises the power of direct control and
supervision over the decisions or resolutions of the prosecutors.
Supervision and control includes the authority to act directly
whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate; to direct the performance of duty; and to approve,
revise or modify acts and decision of subordinate officials or units.
In the case of People v. Peralta,25 we reiterated the rule that the
right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of
discretion the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the
exercise of which depends on a variety of factors which are best
appreciated by prosecutors. Likewise, in the case ofHegerty v.
Court of Appeals,26 we declared that:
A public prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no
compulsion to file a criminal information where no clear legal
justification has been shown, and no sufficient evidence of guilt
nor prima facie case has been presented by the petitioner.
We need only to stress that the determination of probable cause
during a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation is recognized
as an executive function exclusively of the prosecutor. An
investigating prosecutor is under no obligation to file a criminal
action where he is not convinced that he has the quantum of
evidence at hand to support the averments. Prosecuting officers
have equally the duty not to prosecute when after investigation or
reinvestigation they are convinced that the evidence adduced was
not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Thus, the
determination of the persons to be prosecuted rests primarily with
the prosecutor who is vested with discretion in the discharge of this
function.
Thus, the question of whether or not to dismiss a complaint is
within the purview of the functions of the prosecutor and,
ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice.
The reasons of the Secretary of Justice in directing the City
Prosecutor to withdraw the informations for slight oral defamation
against Rosalinda Punzalan and for attempted homicide against the
other respondents other than Rosalinda Punzalan is determinative
of whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion.
First, in the charge of slight oral defamation, the records show that
the defamatory remarks were uttered within the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City. The Court of Appeals in its
Decision dated June 6, 2002 stated the settled rule that the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses is best left to the trial
court in view of its opportunity to observe the demeanor and
conduct of the witnesses on the stand. The City Prosecutor, the
proper officer at the time of the occurrence of the incident, is the
best person to observe the demeanor and conduct of the parties
and their witnesses and determine probable cause whether the
alleged defamatory utterances were made within the hearing
distance of third parties. The investigating prosecutor found that no
sufficient evidence existed. The Secretary of Justice in his
Resolution affirmed the decision of the City Prosecutor.
that resulted in the serious injury of herein petitioner Rainier
Punzalan.
In the case at bar, therefore, the Secretary of Justice did not
commit grave abuse of discretion contrary to the finding of the
Court of Appeals. It is well-settled in the recent case of Samson, et
al. v. Guingona27 that the Court will not interfere in the conduct of
preliminary investigations or reinvestigations and leave to the
investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the
exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as
will establish probable cause for the filing of information against an
offender. Moreover, his findings are not subject to review unless
shown to have been made with grave abuse.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated June 6, 2002 and the Resolution dated May 23,
2003 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the Secretary of Justice,
directing the withdrawal of the informations for slight oral
defamation and attempted homicide against the Petitioners, is
REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

As to the charge of attempted homicide against the herein

petitioners other than Rosalinda Punzalan, the Secretary of Justice
resolved to dismiss the complaint because it was in the nature of a
countercharge. The Department of Justice in a Resolution dated
June 18, 1998 had already directed that Dencio Dela Pea be
likewise investigated for the charge of attempted homicide in
connection with the shooting incident that occurred on August 13,
1997 making him a party to the case filed by Rainier Punzalan. This
resulted in the resolution of the Secretary of Justice that the
complaint of herein respondent Dencio Dela Pea should be
threshed out in the proceedings relevant to the shooting incident