Democracy and Human Rights are both values1 that are universally endorsed almost everywhere

and by everyone, or at least in modern-day liberal societies so as to say, and so it may seem
somewhat finicky to ask whether they can be interconnected together in the way that my
statement suggests, Democracy itself is something to which we should have a human right to.
Nevertheless, I feel that there are two questions that need to be taken into consideration before
proceeding with the paper and to lay a foundation for understanding the assertion made. First, it
is essential to know not only what our political principles merely are, but also why do we hold
them. For example, In case of democracy, we have to be clear whether it matters to us
instrumentally, for the other goods and values it helps to promote, or whether it matters for its
own sake. Equally, in the case of human rights, if we are going to avoid the mistake of packing
everything that’s important to us into that particular box, we need to further understand and
explore the grounds of human rights, and see whether those grounds can get us all the way to an
institutional arrangement such as democracy. Those are the more philosophical reasons for
exploring the statement. But there is a more practical, second reason. If there is indeed a human
right to democracy, and if, as many believe, for a state to be politically legitimate it must respect
human rights, it immediately follows that the many undemocratic states that exist in today’s
world are illegitimate, and don’t deserve the respect that we owe to all legitimate states. This
would undermine the position of individuals like John Rawls2 or societies who envisage a
pluralistic but tolerant world in which liberal democracies co-exist on terms of mutual respect
with ‘decent hierarchical societies’ whose political institutions are not democratic. It would
considerably alter the standings on which we cooperate with such states. The states would have a
moral obligation to see that the human right to democracy was realised, even if they have to
interfere into such states internal affairs.

1
The concept of Democracy as a value can be subjective from country to country, region to region. However the
most core elements of it can be implemented and can be found beneficial to people in all parts of the world, not
merely because it is what is considered right, but because it has an appeal to anyone and everyone who believes they
should be protected by a safety net of consistent reliable governance. Amartya Sen clarifies this the best: “The
distinguishing mark of a universal value is not that it already enjoys universal acceptance but that people everywhere
have reason to see it as valuable.”
2
John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), esp. sections 8-9. Note that Rawls’
short list of human rights on does not include a right to democracy, and that he is explicit that human rights should
not be confused with ‘all the rights that liberal governments guarantee’