Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
BAIN
and researchers who wish to understand the profound nature of the Russo-Cuban
relationship.” — Stephen Wilkinson, International Institute for the
Study of Cuba, London Metropolitan University
Russian-Cuban
“Balanced, informative, and timely, this book is the most thorough and helpful
Relations
This book addresses the relationship between the Russian Federation and Cuba
following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1992. Mervyn J. Bain analyzes
the reasons why the relationship between Moscow and Havana continues to thrive
even after the end of the Cold War and the death of international socialism. He
since 1992
argues that there are five main areas to be studied in order to understand why the
Russians and Cubans have maintained close cultural and political ties well into the
twenty-first century.
Bain first explores the effects that the collapse of the Soviet Union had on the
relationship between Moscow and Havana in the years since 1992. He goes on to
describe how the two countries have adapted (or failed to adapt) to the New World
Order and the ways in which their foreign policies have changed the shape of their
dialogue with each other. The third and fourth sections detail both the impact of continuing
globalization and the increased cultural, economic, and military exchange between
Russians and Cubans. Bain concludes by showing readers the importance of plac- camaraderie in a
ing the Russian-Cuban relationship in an international context, especially high-
lighting the influence of the United States. This book will interest students of post-
Soviet Russian foreign policy, Cuban foreign policy, and international relations.
post-soviet world
Mervyn J. Bain is a lecturer in the Department of Politics and International
Relations at the University of Aberdeen in the United Kingdom.
Mervyn J. Bain
1-800-462-6420
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Mervyn Bain
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List of Figures ix
Acknowledgments xi
Bibliography 153
Index 163
About the Author 169
vii
List of Figures
ix
Acknowledgments
T he work for this book has been conducted in a number of different lo-
cations including New York City, Miami, Moscow and Havana. These
research trips have been funded by the University of Aberdeen, College of
Arts and Social Sciences Research Awards from the University of Ab-
erdeen, the British Academy and for my trip to Havana I was awarded a
research grant from the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland. I
would like to thank all the people involved for giving me this funding,
which enabled me to conduct my research.
I would like to thank Professor Natalia Yegorova of the Institute of
Cold War History of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow for the
help which she gave me in organising my visit to Russia. With relation to
my trip to Cuba I would particularly like to acknowledge the debt which
I owe Liliana Fernández of the University of Havana for her help, gen-
erosity of sprit and her time which made my visit such a success. I would
also like to thank her husband, Arturo, and daughter, Rachel, for making
me feel so welcome in their home. I also extend my thanks to the staff at
the Centro de Estudios Europeos in Havana for their help during my stay
in Cuba.
I would also like to thank Professor Stephen White for his continuing
support and advice on my trip to Moscow. I would also like to acknowl-
edge the debt which I owe to Professor Trevor Salmon of the University
of Aberdeen not just for assistance and suggestions in relation to this book
but also in general. In addition, I would also like to show my appreciation
to Professor John Kirk for his enthusiasm and support which he continues
to show not just to my work but also myself.
xi
xii Acknowledgments
1
2 Chapter 1
with the foreign policies of both the United States and the Soviet Union
during the Cold War appearing to illustrate this. Realism is by no means
a new theory with its routes traceable to Thucydides’ work on the Pelo-
ponnesian War, but in the late 1970s Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of Interna-
tional Relations reinterpreted it. Waltz wrote that the structure of the inter-
national system was still key in deciding a state’s behaviour but that new
security challenges had appeared as a result of globalisation, chiefly in-
equality and economic disparity to challenge the traditional ones. In the
twenty-first century some believe that Washington’s foreign policy in
general, and its Cuban policy specifically, is still dominated by both real-
ism and neo-realism.1
Before the onset of the Cold War and the prominence of realist thinking,
the ideas of “collective security” and liberalism had been perceived as the
chief paradigm in international relations. U.S. President Woodrow Wil-
son’s “fourteen points” at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and the sub-
sequent creation of the League of Nations, in the hope of preventing an-
other global war, had illustrated this. The events of the 1930s and the
advent of the Second World War were a fatal blow for liberalism, but
again in the 1970s, as with the advent of neo-realism, neo-liberalism
evolved from classical liberalism.2
Neo-liberalism has reduced the distinction between high and low poli-
tics as this theory believes that in an increasingly interdependent world
there are many more actors in international relations than simply states.
In addition, neo-liberalists believe that absolute gains are of concern to
states whereas neo-realists believe that they are more concerned with rela-
tive gains. In 1992, these ideas were revitalised with the publication of Fran-
cis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man, as the end of the Cold
War, the spread of democracy in Eastern Europe, and re-democratisation in
Latin America all appeared to prove his theory to be correct. In the early
1990s, these ideas in general became prominent within the United States’
governmental thinking, but specifically with relation to Latin America it
spawned the appearance of the Washington Consensus.3
The momentous events in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and in the
Soviet Union in the early 1990s may have brought Fukuyama’s ideas to
the fore, but conversely they also appeared to signal the death knell of
Marxist ideology, which had been of the utmost significance in the ideo-
logical battle between the Soviet Union and United States during the Cold
War. Marxist theory had replaced the classic billiard ball analogy of real-
ism in international relations with that of a model of an octopus and its
tentacles, as Marxists believed that class and not nationalism or state ac-
tors was the most significant aspect in international relations. Moreover,
Marxism stated that many global problems had economic reasons at their
core, which has resulted in some people believing that despite the events
Russian and Cuban Foreign Policy 3
in the late 1980s and early 1990s disproving the inevitability of socialism,
much of the theory still retains its validity due to the adverse effects of the
globalisation process.4
This increase in global interdependence, along with the end of the Cold
War, is not just one of the most significant changes to occur in interna-
tional relations in the last fifty years, but also partly explains the emer-
gence of Dependency Theory in Latin America in the 1960s. This theory
tried to provide an explanation for why as both interdependence and
globalisation increased many countries in the South remained underde-
veloped. Dependency theory states that it is in the interests of the coun-
tries of the North for the countries in the South never to break their de-
pendency on them. In addition, some within these poorer countries will
act to protect their advantages with Fulgencio Batista in 1950s Cuba, often
cited as an example of this “comprador” class who would act in this way.
It has often been suggested that dependency has been a key element in the
formation of Cuban foreign policy, and will, therefore, be detailed in more
depth later in this chapter.5
Similarly, the Great Man Theory, which has also been of great signifi-
cance in Cuban foreign policy, will also be examined later in this chapter.
Throughout history an individual has sometimes emerged who appears to
have been able to control the political process due to their complete dom-
ination of their country. Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin are often seen in
this manner. This theory ignores the more formal networks of the foreign
policy making process and focuses instead on the idiosyncrasies of the par-
ticular individual involved.6 In this manner Moscow’s decision to station
nuclear weapons in Cuba in 1962 is sometimes explained by Nikhita
Khrushchev’s risk-taking personality. This does undoubtedly partly ex-
plain the decision, but ignores the role played in it by the remaining mem-
bers of the politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).7
Graham Allison’s seminal work on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Essence of
Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis reiterates this, as he outlines
three models that may provide an explanation for Moscow’s decision to
deploy nuclear weapons in Cuba, which are all very different from the
Great Man Theory. Security and stability are key in Model I, Model II sug-
gests that various organizations within a government all have their own
reasons for making a decision while Model III states that the individuals
involved all act while taking careful consideration of the political situation
within their own country. Allison analyses the Soviet decision-making
process in the summer of 1962 using these three different models, but they
can also be applied to the study of foreign-policy making in general.8
As stated, the end of the Cold War has been one of the most seismic
changes to occur in international relations, which many of these tradi-
tional theories had failed to predict. As a result of this, a number of new
4 Chapter 1
Russia’s role in the world.”17 This situation was only further complicated
by Russia becoming the legal successor to the Soviet Union. Aspects of
this inheritance, such as the Russian Federation obtaining the Soviet
Union’s place in the UN General Assembly and Security Council, made it
appear that Moscow still had a significant global influence. However, the
Russian Federation also inherited the debt that many countries in the De-
veloping World owed to Moscow which had been accumulated during
the Soviet era. This was most certainly the case with Cuba and it would
have a great impact on Russian-Cuban relations in the 1990s. This will be
examined at some length in chapter 4.
In this difficult situation the Yeltsin administration, most of whom had
very little foreign policy experience, turned to their Cold War enemy, but
the one remaining superpower, the United States, for help. Relations with
Washington would come to dominate Moscow’s foreign policy in the
early 1990s, and Bobo Lo would later write, “During the Yeltsin period,
America represented the single greatest external influence on Russian for-
eign policy.”18 Russian-United States relations in the 1990s undoubtedly
improved from the Cold War era with a great many summits being held
between the two countries throughout the decade.19
The result of this was that Russian foreign policy was not just very dif-
ferent from that pursued by Moscow during the Soviet era but also a de-
bate within the Russian Federation regarding foreign policy appeared,
with the main protagonists being Liberal Westernizers, Pragmatic Na-
tionalists and Fundamental Nationalists. This debate was also very
closely associated with the internal Russian situation, as a number of
Yeltsin’s polices, but particularly the implementation of market reforms,
were disliked by some Russians. Many thought that these reforms, in con-
junction with his pro-U.S. foreign policy, had resulted in an increase in
Russian dependency on the United States, which they found gravely of-
fensive to Russian nationalism. It also gave rise to the question of what
type of foreign policy Russia was following, which was only further com-
plicated by the haphazard nature of Yeltsin’s management style. Marxist-
Leninism may have been confined to history but it was replaced by a
number of other ideologies, with constructivism appearing to be signifi-
cant as were liberalism and great power ideology amongst others.20
Again, this was of utmost significance for Russian-Cuban relations and
will be examined in much more depth in chapter 3.
As the 1990s progressed, a change in Moscow’s foreign policy took
place with the importance of relations with the United States being re-
placed in Russia’s priorities by relations with its “near abroad” and Eu-
rope. This was partly driven by the electoral changes taking place within
Russia as more nationalistic parties began to come to the fore from the
time of the 1993 Duma elections onwards. People were not just unhappy
Russian and Cuban Foreign Policy 7
with the importance which Moscow attached to its relationship with the
United States, but many also blamed the economic difficulties, which con-
tinued to plague Russia, on the West due to the policies which the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank had imposed on Russia.21
Moreover, the Yeltsin government was becoming increasingly disillu-
sioned with Washington as it had not received the aid and assistance
which it had hoped for. Andrei Kozyrev, who had been closely associated
with the pro-U.S. stance, resigning as Foreign Minister in December 1995,
illustrated this change in policy. White has written of this, “In the end he
became a ‘virtual sacrifice’ to the new Duma.”22
Kozyrev’s replacement as Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, was not
just very different to his predecessor due to his education and career path
but also in his global outlook. Primakov believed in “spheres of influence”
and saw the world in much more multipolar terms than Kozyrev had, and
in conjunction with the nationalistic tendencies prevalent within the Rus-
sian Federation, wanted Moscow to try and reassert itself in international
relations.23 This led to a number of flashpoints with the West appearing.
The most prominent were over North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO) action in the former Yugoslavia which offended Slavic sensibili-
ties, and Moscow disliking the treatment that its friend Saddam Hussein
received from the West. In addition, Russia was gravely concerned at the
NATO expansion to the east that brought the organisation’s influence to
the very borders of the Russian Federation. These events did not go unno-
ticed in Cuba, with particularly Cuban academia commenting upon them,
as they had repercussions for Russian-Cuban relations and will therefore
be analysed more fully in chapter 5. Moreover, this chapter will also detail
the importance of Primakov himself in the improvement in Russian-
Cuban relations. By the end of the 1990s Russian foreign policy and its ob-
jectives were very different from the beginning of the decade with a much
less pro-U.S. and more multipolar stance being taken.24 It had appeared the
nationalistic tendencies had defeated the Liberal Westernizers.
As the world entered a new millennium Vladimir Putin became the
President of the Russian Federation, which prompted the question of
“Who is Mr Putin?” to arise in the West, as very little was known about
him except for his KGB past. Western uncertainty only increased as a re-
sult of his trips to North Korea and Cuba in the infancy of his presidency.
This led Andrei Grachev to comment, “In those first few months in office,
Putin seemed to be much more at ease with the leaders of former client
states of the Soviet Union . . . than with his Western counterparts.”25 This,
however, ignored the fact that when Putin became Russian President he
was the first resident of the Kremlin since Yury Andropov who had expe-
rience of living outside the borders of the Soviet Union or Russian Feder-
ation due to being stationed in the German Democratic Republic (GDR)
8 Chapter 1
from 1985 to 1990. This led some people to even believe that Putin had
somewhat of a pro-European outlook.26
However, this did not mean that he ignored the United States with re-
lations between Moscow and Washington visibly improving after Putin
met U.S. President George Bush in Slovenia in June 2001. Moreover, Putin
also gave the U.S. Russian backing and use of air bases in Central Asia af-
ter the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. If this had been done in the
hope of cultivating closer ties with the United States Putin was left disap-
pointed, as he did not appear to have gained what he hoped from Wash-
ington. This resulted in him aligning Russia with Germany and France
with regards U.S. and UK action in Iraq in 2003. On this Richard Pipes has
commented, “With the Germans and the French, the Russians can balance
the United States. Russia would not be a superpower, but it would be part
of a superpower complex. They can only be a junior partner with the
United States.”27
This has been important as Russian nationalism continued to be signif-
icant in the foreign policy pursued by Putin’s government. The economic
aspect of foreign relations has also increased in importance, as has been il-
lustrated by the sale of military hardware to Latin American countries
with the Venezuelan purchase of 100,000 Kalashnikovs attracting most at-
tention.28 The importance of this economic aspect in Russian foreign pol-
icy in Russian-Cuban relations cannot be overestimated, but has led many
to believe that Putin has in general been following a very pragmatic ap-
proach to foreign policy. This, however, has not prevented the recent ten-
sion between Moscow and Washington over U.S. plans to develop an anti-
missile defence system and U.S. concerns over the state of democracy
within the Russian Federation. Grachev has even suggested that a “Putin
Doctrine” has appeared which has close traditions to, and some Soviet
features, but also nationalistic sentiments and anti-Western reflexes.29
Dmitrii Medvedev may have won the Russian Presidential election in
March 2008 by winning just over 70 percent of the vote but this change in
the main resident of the Kremlin is unlikely to herald a dramatic change
in Moscow’s foreign policy. Some believe that Medvedev may oversee a
slight change in style but it would be a great surprise if this also applied
to the substance of Moscow’s foreign policy. This results from
Medvedev’s promise to continue with Putin’s policies, the fact that Putin
is likely to remain highly influential in Russian politics as a consequence
of being appointed Prime Minister and also because Putin’s United Party
easily won the elections held in December 2007. It won over 64 percent of
the vote and increased its representation in the State Duma to 315 seats
from a total of 450, not just illustrating the popularity of Putin’s policies
but also again making any great change in Russian foreign policy both un-
likely and difficult to implement.
Russian and Cuban Foreign Policy 9
specifically, are not the subject of Fidel Castro’s personal whim due to the
decreasing role that he has played in the everyday political life of the is-
land that culminated in February 2008 in his decision to relinquish the
Cuban Presidency.
From the time of joint Cuban and Soviet action in Africa in the mid-
1970s, the surrogate/superclient thesis attracted much academic attention
with U.S. Senator Daniel Moynihan even describing the FAR as the
“Ghurkhas of the Russian Empire.” The surrogate thesis suggests that
Moscow had control over both Cuba’s internal and foreign policies,
whereas, the superclient thesis, although giving Havana more power in
the relationship, stated that the Soviet Union ultimately had the right of
veto over Cuba’s actions.38
During the Cold War, Havana’s relationship with Moscow was un-
doubtedly of the utmost significance for the Cuban Revolution, and the
security it provided helped explain Havana’s overseas adventures. How-
ever, during the Soviet era this thesis was criticised for ignoring the strong
nationalistic strands evident in the revolution since its inception. This is a
crucial omission and, moreover, speeches by the Cuban elite and docu-
ments that have recently become available also disprove this theory.39
However, in the post-Soviet world the surrogate/superclient thesis is
most certainly no longer relevant to Cuban foreign policy.
Erisman adds dependency and counter dependency to the theories
prevalent in Cuban foreign policy. Cuba would appear to be a classic ex-
ample of dependency as the island has been dominated by outside pow-
ers since the time of the conquest. This was firstly Spain and then, from
the end of the nineteenth century, the United States, and some would ar-
gue that this continued even after the Cuban Revolution with depen-
dency on the United States being merely replaced by dependency on the
Soviet Union.40
Even while Soviet-Cuban relations were in existence Erisman writes
that the Castro regime continually tried to end this situation, as a result of
the importance of nationalism in the Cuban Revolution. This was most
apparent in Havana’s attempts to reduce its reliance on Moscow by di-
versifying both its political and economic policies. The result Erisman be-
lieves is counter dependency, the antithesis of the surrogate thesis, as
these policies also resulted in the Cuban regime acquiring bargaining
power, or leverage, in Moscow, which provided Havana with a semblance
of ‘control’ over Soviet-Cuban relations.41 Throughout the relationship
Havana continually strove to show its independence from and reduce its
dependence on the Soviet Union.
In the 1990s as Cuba attempted to come to terms with the loss of the So-
viet Union and the emergence of the New World Order this has increased
in importance for Havana with John Kirk having written that at this time,
12 Chapter 1
“The greatest single task in terms of foreign policy facing the Cuban gov-
ernment in the early 1990s, however, was how to keep the traditional
(self-declared) enemy at bay.”42 Erisman believes that despite the odds be-
ing stacked against the Caribbean island it has been able to achieve this
by a diversification of its foreign policy, which was done in the pursuit of
acquiring greater economic and political space.43 The results of this policy
have been numerous and varied, but they have had a fundamental impact
of Havana’s relationship with Moscow in the period from 1992 onwards.
As stated, some of these may have been unforeseen, but this is a topic that
will be examined throughout this book.
In relation to this, dependency issues have retained their significance in
the island’s foreign policy, but it has evolved with Havana playing a
much more significant role in hemispheric organisations with the Cuban
government attempting to keep their influence in international relations
by championing development issues and anti-globalisation ideas. The
staging in the Cuban capital of anti-globalisation conferences in both 1999
and 2001 and the Nonaligned Movement Congress in September 2006 al-
lowed the island’s government to showcase the significance of these ideas
in their foreign policy.44 Moreover, with the recent appearance of the
ALBA in Latin America this has if anything increased in significance for
the Cuban regime. As the Cuban Revolution approaches its fiftieth an-
niversary Kirk does not only believe that this will remain an important as-
pect of Cuba’s foreign policy for the foreseeable future but also that its
outcome with regards foreign policy is that contemporary Cuba has “an
approach that is totally sui generis, following its own blend of principles
and pragmatism, self-interest and selflessness, and fuelled by a volatile
blend of nationalism and pride in being distinctive.”45
In a similar manner to Dmitrii Medvedev replacing Vladimir Putin as
Russia President it is unlikely that there will be any dramatic change in
Cuba’s approach to foreign policy as a result of Fidel Castro’s surprising
announcement in February 2008 to give up the Presidency of Cuba. Some
may perceive Raúl as a possible reformer but since August 2006 when he
became Cuba’s acting President due to his brother’s ill-health he has not
overseen any widespread reform of the island’s foreign policy. Moreover,
the chance of this commencing due to Fidel’s further removal from the
everyday politics of the island remains low especially as much of Raúl’s
attention may have to be focused on the economy, but the chances of any
widespread reform are further reduced as a the result of the appointment
of Jose Ramon Machado Ventura, another guerrilla war veteran, as Cuba’s
Vice President instead of one of the island’s younger politicians. This
would appear to signal that it is more likely that a cautious approach in
general and in foreign policy specifically will be pursued for the foresee-
able future instead of the implementation of far reaching reforms.
Russian and Cuban Foreign Policy 13
The evolution of both Russian and Cuban foreign policy in the post-
Soviet world has obviously impacted hugely on Russian-Cuban relations
which since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991, has
become the almost ‘forgotten’ relationship in international relations and
been virtually ignored by the academic community. In 1992, their focus of
attention at first moved to the question of the very survival of the Cuban
Revolution after the loss of its largest trading partner and staunch politi-
cal ally, which only increased with the actions of the United States gov-
ernment in the 1990s, as it attempted to hasten the demise of the Castro
regime by tightening the trade embargo on Cuba still further. In relation
to this, the balsero crisis in the late summer of 1994, when many Cubans
fled the island for the United States, was taken as evidence of the Cuban
Revolution’s permanent decline. More recently academic scrutiny has
moved to the impact that Fidel Castro’s poor health has had for the island
with this only likely to further increase due to Raúl’s permanent succes-
sion to the Cuban Presidency in February 2008. With relation to Cuba’s
foreign policy academic focus will continue to be dominated by Havana’s
relationship with Washington to the detriment of both the island’s other
bilateral relationships in general and Russian-Cuban relations specifically.
In addition, the relationship between Moscow and Havana has also at-
tracted very little media attention with the situation regarding the Lour-
des listening post and Vladimir Putin’s trip to Cuba in December 2000 be-
ing notable exceptions.
As a result of this, very little has been written on the relationship that
has evolved between Moscow and Havana in the period since the dis-
integration of the Soviet Union, which is surprisingly also true of both
Russian and Cuban academics. In the early 1990s studies on the effects
of the disappearance of the Soviet Union for the Cuban economy were
published, most noticeably Cuba after the Cold War edited by Carmelo
Mesa-Lago, but these did not provide analysis on either why the rela-
tionship ended or the reasons for a semblance of it continuing after the
disintegration of the Soviet Union.46 Nicola Miller has, however, writ-
ten a chapter entitled, “Trying to Stay Friends: Cuba’s Relations with
Russia and Eastern Europe in the Age of U.S. Supremacy” that was in-
cluded in Morris Morely and Chris McGillion’s book Cuba, the United
States, and the Post-Cold War World. The International Dimensions of the
Washington-Havana Relationship. This chapter takes a much broader ap-
proach to the topic as it does not concentrate solely on relations be-
tween Havana and Moscow but also analyses Cuba’s relationship with
the other European countries of the former Soviet bloc. More recently
W. Alejandro Sanchez Nieto has published an article entitled “Cuba
and Russia: Love is Better the Second Time Around” that was published
in Cuban Affairs in 2007.47 This work is not only taken very much from the
14 Chapter 1
perspective of a Cuban American scholar but also only examines the pe-
riod from the year 2000 onwards. The result is that it omits the highly
significant period of the 1990s as relations between Moscow and Ha-
vana not only suffered a dramatic downturn when compared to the So-
viet period, but also an upturn from the mid-1990s onwards. This is
crucial as a number of the reasons for both are still of fundamental im-
portance to the relationship that continues to flourish between the two
countries as the Cuban Revolution approaches its fiftieth anniversary.
Some books have been published in Russia including Fidel Kastro
Politicheskaya Biogoafiya written by N.S. Leonov and V.A. Borodaev, Ga-
vana-Moskva: Pamiotnye Gody by Vitali Vorotnikov, Fidel Kastro: neistovgi
komandante Ostrava svobody written by I.U. Gavrikov and Politicheskaia
istorii Kuba XX Veka by Eugenio Larin.48 Not only do these utilise almost
exclusively Russian sources but are more general books on Cuba or the
relationship between Havana and Moscow which tend to concentrate
almost exclusively on Soviet-Cuban relations to the detriment of the
post-Soviet period.
This book will fill this scholarly gap that exists and provide analysis on
this ignored and ‘forgotten’ relationship and analyse both the period from
1992 to the year 2000 and the subsequent years of the new millennium. It
will examine not just the reasons and pressures which were instrumental
in its deterioration in the years immediately after 1991 but also in its im-
provement from the mid-1990s onwards, which resulted by the end of the
twentieth century in Russia remaining one of Cuba’s most important trad-
ing partners. This was very different from the years 1992 to 1994. More-
over, no other work of this length has been published on this specific
topic. Due to its contemporary nature and the characteristics of both gov-
ernments documental evidence at the moment does not exist. However,
this book will benefit from the publication of number of different memoir
sources since 1992 which includes Boris Yeltsin, Andrei Kozyrev, Yevgeny
Primakov and perhaps turning his attention to his legacy Fidel Castro has
also recently published, in conjunction with the French journalist Ignacio
Ramonet, his thoughts on his time in the Cuban political spotlight. Al-
though not a memoir in its truest sense it is undoubtedly highly signifi-
cant due to the general lack of such Cuban sources, which is partly the re-
sult of the island’s political system. Alina Revuelta Fernández, Castro’s
illegitimate daughter, has, however, published her memoirs after defect-
ing to the United States.49 Although it is more a personal account of her
relationship with her father rather than a political work it is still impor-
tant. These memoir sources that do exist will be augmented by both in-
terviews with Russian and Cuban academics who specialise in the study
of each other’s country if not the relationship between the two and also
the use of sources that are only available in Russia and Cuba. This in-
Russian and Cuban Foreign Policy 15
cludes both data collected for the Cuban Foreign Ministry (MINREX) and
the Russian embassy in Havana.
The importance of counter-dependency in Russian-Cuban relations
may have fallen in the period since 1991 but the framework of depen-
dency, which Erisman has outlined, which was significant in Cuban for-
eign policy in general and in Soviet-Cuban relations has, in my opinion,
retained its significance in the relationship that has evolved between Ha-
vana and Moscow in the post-Soviet world and will be important for this
work. In addition, pragmatism and more specifically realist pragmatism
will also be crucial because they were also of great significance through-
out the revolutionary period of Cuban history, but in light of many of the
reforms made in Cuba in the 1990s and the globalisation process in gen-
eral, continue to be. Moreover, as the Russian Federation also adapted to
the appearance of the New World Order, realist pragmatism has also be-
come a fundamental aspect of the foreign policy pursued by Moscow in
the post-Soviet era. In addition to this, the high prevalence of nationalism
within the foreign policies pursued by both countries will also be signifi-
cant for this work.
Realist pragmatism and nationalism continue to be significant in con-
temporary Cuban foreign policy while Russian foreign policy also contains
realist pragmatism and nationalism but these ideas only partly explain the
deterioration and subsequent improvement in Russian-Cuban relations
that have occurred in the years since the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
The legacy from the Soviet era has cast a colossal shadow over the relation-
ship in the period since 1991. Due to the all-encompassing nature of Soviet-
Cuban relations this is not surprising, but this legacy was not just signifi-
cant in explaining the deterioration in the years 1992 to 1994 but, conversely,
also their improvement from 1995 onwards. In the Gorbachev era of Soviet-
Cuban relations a resentment towards the Caribbean island had begun to
appear in the Soviet Union, in no small part the result of glasnost, but this
continued after its disintegration with many in the Russian Federation de-
lighted to have this ‘noose’ finally removed from around their country’s
neck. However, over time the realisation began to form in both countries
that in many ways it was easier, and even cheaper, for some semblance of
the relationship to continue. It was not just economic reasons that drove
this, but also some within both countries continuing to have affinity for the
other. This was particularly the case in Russia but as the prominence of both
countries on the global stage diminished in the immediate aftermath of the
implosion of the Soviet Union a relationship between Moscow and Ha-
vana illustrated both countries’ more glorious pasts. A study of the work
of both academic and journalists in Russia and Cuba will also be con-
ducted which will further enrich this study as it will provide both an im-
portant, but different, perspective of these events. In addition to this, it will
16 Chapter 1
also help explain this change in perception which took place in both Russia
and Cuba of each other which is vital in the improvement in the relation-
ship from the mid-1990s onwards.
Apart from analysing the Soviet legacy an examination of the variety of
different pressures that now underpin the relationship will also be con-
ducted. Some of these are vastly different from those of the Soviet era, but
interestingly some have not only survived the end of Soviet-Cuban rela-
tions, while others have remerged in the 1990s but they have continued to
help shape the contemporary relationship. Both their significance and rea-
sons for their survival will be detailed. Chapter 2 will provide a general his-
tory of Soviet-Cuban relations, which is not just important in itself but will
also allow the Soviet legacy to be concluded. Chapter 3 will analyse the sig-
nificance of ideology in relations between Moscow and Havana, which in
the Soviet era provided a cornerstone of the relationship. The importance of
Marxist-Leninism may have disappeared but ideology, and ironically the
neoliberal economic model, has been very important in the ‘new’ relation-
ship that has evolved. Chapter 4 will detail the effects that the Soviet legacy,
as outlined above, has and continues to play in Russian-Cuban relations.
Chapter 5 will analyse the significance of both the United States and the
global community in general, in Russian-Cuban relations. Particular atten-
tion will be given to the recent apparent move to the left of many countries
in Latin America and the appearance of ALBA. In addition to this, the
changes made to both Russian and Cuban foreign policies, detailed earlier
in this chapter, will also be crucial in explaining relations between Havana
and Moscow in the post-Soviet world.
NOTES
2005). 225. On Russia becoming the legal successor of the Soviet Union Martin
Malia has written, “the Yeltsin government inherited only rubble from the past.”
Martin Malia, “Martin Malia: History Lessons,” in Conversations on Russia: Reform
from Yeltsin to Putin, ed. Padma Desai, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006),
346.
18. Bobo Lo, Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era. Reality, Illusion and
Mythmaking, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 8.
19. White, Russia’s New Politics, 2004, 222–29.
20. For this debate see: Margot Light, “Foreign Policy Thinking” in Internal Fac-
tors in Russian Foreign Policy, ed. Alex Pravda, Roy Alison and Margot Light, (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 33–100. Neil Malcolm and Alex Pravda, “De-
mocratization and Russian Foreign Policy,” International Affairs, 72, 3, (1996),
537–52. Paul Kubicek, “Russian Foreign Policy and the West,” Political Science Jour-
nal, Volume 114, Number 4, (1999–2000), 547–50.
21. Light, “Foreign Policy Thinking,” 82–83.
22. White, Russia’s New Politics, 2004, 229.
23. White, Russia’s New Politics, 2004, 230. Lynch, “The Realism of Russia’s For-
eign Policy,” 9–12.
24. White, Russia’s New Politics, 2004, 231–39.
25. Andrei Grachev, “Putin’s Foreign Policy Choices,” in Leading Russia. Putin
in Perspective. Essays in Honour of Archie Brown, ed., Alex Pravda, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005) 256. Andrew Jack has also made this point that Putin’s for-
eign policy during his first year in office “offered ambiguous signals.” Andrew
Jack, Inside Putin’s Russia. Can There Be Reform Without Democracy? (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004), 258.
26. Bobo Lo, Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy, (Malden:
Blackwell Publishers, 2003), 16.
27. Richard Pipes, “Richard Pipes. The Past in the Present,” in Conversations on
Russia, 2006, 363. Jack has also made the point that Putin was disappointed with
the U.S. reaction to his offers after 11 September 2001. Jack, Inside Putin’s Russia,
2004, 289.
28. The sale of Russian military goods to Latin America has been a very impor-
tant aspect of the country’s recent increased interest in the continent. In April 2007,
RIA Novosti reported that Rosoboronexport was taking part in the Latin America
Aero and Defense (LAAD) arms exhibition held in Rio de Janeiro. See http://www
.rian.ru/russia/20070417 (25 April 2007). In June 2007, Hugo Chávez made a six-
day trip to Russia. See http://www.miamiherald.com (29 June 2007).
29. Grachev, “Putin’s Foreign Policy Choices,” 262–64. Sergei Rogov, “Sergei
Rogov. In Search of Checks and Balances at Home and Abroad,” in Conversations
on Russia, 2006, 219.
30. Domínguez, “From the Cold War to the Colder War,” 52.
31. Erisman, Cuba’s Foreign Relations, 2000, 23–26. The recently declassified Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) documents on covert operations against Cuba fur-
ther illustrate Washington’s desire to topple the Castro regime at this time. See
http://www.foia.cia.gov/browse_docs.asp (21 Sept. 2007).
32. Erisman, Cuba’s Foreign Relations, 2000, 25–26. J. Levesque, The USSR and the
Cuban Revolution Ideological and Strategic Perspectives (New York: Praeger Publish-
Russian and Cuban Foreign Policy 19
(Moscow: Veche, 2006). E.A. Larin, Politicheskaia istorii Kuba XX Veka (Moscow:
Veschaya shkola, 2007).
49. Boris H. Yeltsin, Midnight Diaries, (New York: Public Affairs, 2000). Andrei
Kozyrev, Preobrazhenie, (Moscow: ‘Mezhdunov otnoshenii,’ 1995). Yevgeny M.
Primakov, Minnoe pole politiki, (Moscow: Molodai gvardii, 2006). Fidel Castro and
Ignacio Ramonet, My Life, (London: Allen Lane, 2007). Alina Revuelta Fernández,
Castro’s Daughter: An Exile’s Memoir of Cuba, (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1999).
2
Soviet-Cuban Relations
21
22 Chapter 2
Cuba and the Soviet Union in some form was a possibility, but Aleksandr
Fursenko and Timothy Naftali have written that throughout 1959 Castro
was worried about the reaction of the Cuban population to closer ties
with Moscow and he was therefore uncertain of agreeing to this.11
Although this was the case, what was clear was that Castro wanted his
country’s relationship with Washington to change. This was partly the re-
sult of the U.S.’s hegemonic position on the island before 1959 on which
the Cuban leader would later comment, “We would not in any event have
ended up as close friends. The U.S. had dominated us for too long.”12
Moreover, the overthrow of the Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1954
by U.S.-backed exiles, which Che Guevara had personally witnessed, was
also crucial because when coupled with increased U.S. hostility towards
his fledging regime, which culminated in the failed Bay of Pigs invasion,
Castro’s decision to proclaim himself a Marxist-Leninist in December
1961 appears logical.13 The Cuban leader would have hoped that in-
creased Soviet security guarantees would have resulted, as he would have
known that for ideological reasons Moscow could not let the first com-
munist regime in the region be overthrown by the United States, espe-
cially one in such a significant geographic location. His proclamation that
he was Marxist-Leninist was designed to take advantage of this and in-
crease the pressure on the Soviet elite.14 In addition, the Soviet economic
and political models and economic assistance from Moscow all appealed
to the new Cuban government. The result was that close relations be-
tween the Soviet Union and Cuba were less strange than may first appear
as both countries gained from the relationship.
The appearance in December 1961 of the first Marxist-Leninist regime
in the western hemisphere was in no small part the result of the Cold War
setting in which it occurred. Moscow may have had some contact with
Cuba before January 1959 but the relationship that developed after this
occurred was to the benefit of both governments. The Soviet Union ob-
tained a priceless propaganda coup in the Cold War as it strove to have a
global presence, whereas Cuba was able to reduce its dependence on the
United States and at the same time obtain both a crucial economic partner
and some form of security from a hostile United States. In addition, in this
35 month period a number of pressures had appeared which would not
just drive the two countries together but also form part of the foundations
of the relationship for the next thirty years.
By the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis relations between Havana and
Moscow may have been in existence for less than 4 years, but even in this
Soviet-Cuban Relations 25
short period a variety of pressures had come to bear on it that had not
only pushed the two countries together but would also be severely tested
by the events of the last two weeks of October 1962 and its aftermath. The
Cuban government was unhappy with the agreement reached on 28 Oc-
tober 1962 between the U.S. and Soviet governments that had ended the
crisis due both to its content but also as a result of being excluded from
the negotiating processes. In conducting bilateral discussions with Wash-
ington, Moscow may have been able to find a peaceful solution to the cri-
sis but they had also simultaneously both offended Havana and ignored
the strong nationalistic strands prevalent within the Cuban Revolution.
This would adversely affect Soviet-Cuban relations and Khrushchev
would later write in his memoirs, “Our relations with Cuba, on the other
hand, took a sudden turn for the worse.”15
As a result of this, the reception that Anastas Mikoyan received in No-
vember 1962 when he visited the island was particularly frosty, despite
his close links to the Cuban elite. During this visit Mikoyan did his best to
placate his Cuban hosts by stating that the result of the crisis had been
both to make the Monroe Doctrine irrelevant for Cuba and also that the
“the prestige of the socialist camp has strengthened.”16 This did not stop
Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, President of the National Institute of Agrarian
Reform, stating in a meeting on 4 November 1962, that the Cuban au-
thorities believed there had been secret communications between
Moscow and Washington during the crisis that they had not been in-
formed of.17 Mikoyan may have been specially chosen for this trip due to
his close ties to the Cuban government but his trip can not be seen as a
success as the outcome of Cuban Missile Crisis fundamentally altered
Soviet-Cuban relations for a number of years. The honeymoon period in
the relationship was most certainly over.
This was not, however, immediately apparent with Fidel Castro himself
visiting the Soviet Union twice between Mikoyan’s November 1962 trip
and the end of January 1964. His first trip was in May 1963 when he re-
ceived a hero’s welcome throughout his month-long visit and during his
second trip he stated in a speech, “And if today a socialist revolution is
under way in Cuba, it became possible because the socialist revolution of
1917 took place to begin with.”18 Moreover, during this trip in January
1964 the second trade agreement between the countries since the Cuban
Missile Crisis was signed. Not only did this suggest that relations were
not strained, but the 1964 agreement was highly significant as it was the
first 5-year agreement signed between Moscow and Havana. This pro-
vided increased economic security for Cuba as it guaranteed both the
amount and price of goods that the Soviet Union bought from Cuba. In
addition, it also provided a template for future trade agreements signed
between the two countries in the 1970s and 1980s.19
26 Chapter 2
Castro’s two trips to the Soviet Union appeared to illustrate the healthy
state of relations between the two countries and that problems as a result
of the Cuban Missile Crisis had not occurred. However, and conversely to
this, these trips also strengthened the Cuban leader’s feeling of betrayal
due to the events of October 1962, because it was during his May 1963 trip
that Castro had learnt of the agreement regarding the removal of the
United States missiles in Turkey made during October 1962. This in itself
was bad enough but was only made worse as Khrushchev had only mis-
takenly referred to it during a conversation.20
A public schism may not have appeared but from the mid-1960s on-
wards problems between the two countries became increasingly obvious
as Cuban radicalism increased. Internally this was illustrated by the at-
tempts to produce the “new man” and its radical foreign policy showed
itself in a number of ways. The first was a speech given by Che Guevara
in February 1965, in which he not only criticized the Soviet Union in gen-
eral, but also accused Moscow both of degeneration and of practicing im-
perialism towards the Third World. 21
Throughout 1966, the differences between Soviet and Cuban policies
were highlighted by a number of events beginning in February 1966 when
the Cuban capital staged the First Tricontinental Conference with repre-
sentatives from Africa, Asia, and Latin America in attendance. The pro-
ceedings of this conference were very different from the policies pursued
by Moscow at this time towards the Developing World due to their highly
radical nature. The 23rd Congress of the CPSU was held in Moscow in
April 1966 with Armando Hart, a member of the politburo and secretary
of the Central Committee for the PCC, being the Cuban representative.
His speech to the congress was met with complete silence because in it
Hart had said that the First Tricontinental Conference in Havana had been
correct in the ideas that national liberation movements would help speed
revolutions in the Developing World. This was again not only very dif-
ferent from Moscow’s policies but also highly controversial.22 The radical
content of both Castro’s May Day speech at the Plaza de la Revolución
and the First Congress of the Organization for Latin American Solidarity
(OLAS) held in Havana in August 1966 further illustrated the differences
between Cuba and the Soviet Union. Moreover, in November 1967 Castro
snubbed the celebrations for the fiftieth anniversary of the victory of the
Russian Revolution by not personally attending them illustrating graphi-
cally the strained nature of Soviet-Cuban relations.23
The tension in the relationship arose for a number of reasons, but pri-
marily as both countries did not completely understand each other with
Moscow in particular failing to realize the significance and importance of
nationalism within the Cuban Revolution which had been gravely of-
fended by the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Moreover, as stated,
Soviet-Cuban Relations 27
the Castro regime also thought that the Soviet Union was suffering from
degeneration. This had manifested itself in Cuba wanting to choose its
own independent path and in conjunction with the Cuban government
believing that a radical foreign policy could help safeguard its survival by
moving capitalism’s attention from it to other parts of the world only fur-
ther increased the differences between Cuban and Soviet policies.24
However, a permanent schism had not materialized because even by
the mid-1960s a number of pressures had arisen in the relationship that
would have made this problematic. This included the 1964 trade agree-
ment that guaranteed Cuban economic security for five years; signifi-
cantly it was only after its signing that Cuban radicalism increased, and
even by this point of time some within the Soviet Union had felt that large
amounts of aid had been lavished on Cuba, which would have simply
been lost if a schism had appeared. This was something that Moscow was
unprepared to do. Moreover, Chinese accusations of Soviet revisionism,
and the fact that Maoism appeared to fit the developing world better than
Leninism, meant that Moscow could not break relations with Havana if it
wanted to retain its position at the pinnacle of the world revolution. The
outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis further increased the pressure on
Moscow as it had defended its actions by saying it had helped to safe-
guard the Cuban Revolution. This would have been lost if relations were
broken off. The upshot was that despite their differences, a permanent
schism would not have benefited either country and the Castro regime
had taken advantage of this situation, and pressures, to pursue its radical
internal and external policies.
This situation began to change from 1968 onwards as Cuba’s relation-
ship with the Soviet Union improved. It was not the result, as is often
thought, of Soviet pressure on the Caribbean island but was rather the re-
sult of the failure of Cuba’s radical policies. With regard to foreign policy,
Che Guevara’s death was a graphic illustration of this, but also Cuban po-
litical isolation within the region appeared to be coming to an end after
the appearance in 1968 of a left-leaning military regime in Peru. Moreover,
Cuban security and Castro’s pragmatism were also highly significant in
this process. The Cuban leader’s backing of the Warsaw Pact invasion of
Czechoslovakia in August 1968 may have gone against world opinion but
it signaled Cuba’s return to the Soviet fold. However, even Castro’s
speech on this increased the pressure on Moscow as he asked if similar ac-
tion would be taken to safeguard socialism in Vietnam, North Korea and
Cuba, with the implication being very clear.25 The failure to move capital-
ism’s focus away from Cuba due to the inability to spark other revolu-
tions only increased Cuban feelings of insecurity. Moreover, Peter Shear-
man has written that Castro’s backing of this Soviet action was not as
surprising as it may have first appeared since Castro believed that the
28 Chapter 2
had visited the Soviet Union for the first time in eight years during which
he stated in a speech in the Kremlin, “We are deeply satisfied with the
present state of our friendship and the present state of our fraternal rela-
tions, sincere relations based on mutual respect, the type of relations that
should exist between the revolutionary parties and revolutionary peoples.
We shall continue to work tirelessly for sake of this friendship and its
strengthening.”32
Although relations had undoubtedly improved, and membership in the
CMEA was of great prestige to the Caribbean island, many scholars be-
lieve that Castro may have been hoping for much more. This arose from
the fact that he had left Moscow a matter of days before the signing of the
CMEA agreement, which led many to conclude that his actual goal had
been membership of the Warsaw Pact and the increased security guaran-
tees that this would have provided.33 It appeared that despite the im-
provement in relations Moscow was not prepared to do this as it could
have resulted in large numbers of Soviet troops having to be sent to the
Caribbean to offset possible U.S. aggression. After the Cuban Missile Cri-
sis Moscow’s unwillingness to allow Cuba to again become a flashpoint
between the superpowers had been shown in 1970 when the Soviet gov-
ernment had quickly backed down in the face of the U.S. pressure over the
“mini-crisis” of Soviet nuclear submarines being moored at Cienfuegos.34
In addition to this, Cuban membership in the CMEA was of great ben-
efit to Moscow. Even by the early 1970s some within the Soviet Union
were concerned at the levels of Soviet economic involvement with the
Caribbean island, and its membership of this organization not only gave
Moscow an increased control over the Cuban economy, but significantly
it also allowed Moscow to spread the economic ‘burden’ of the Cuban
Revolution across all of the CMEA states. The result was that economi-
cally Cuba was no longer the Soviet Union’s sole responsibility.35
The ten-year period from 1962 to 1972 was a highly turbulent one in
Soviet-Cuban relations. During it both the first five-year plan between the
two countries was signed and Cuba also gained membership in the CMEA
but in the eight years between these two events a termination of the rela-
tionship had appeared possible. A number of reasons accounted for this
tension with the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Caribbean is-
land’s radicalism both being very significant. Despite this a permanent
schism had not taken place as even by the mid-1960s a number of pres-
sures had come to bear on the relationship that made this both unlikely
and problematic. These included the already large amounts of Soviet aid
lavished on the Caribbean island, the continuing propaganda significance
of the Cuban Revolution for the Kremlin and the fact that the Soviet gov-
ernment, in the face of growing Chinese pressure, could not afford for the
Cuban Revolution to fail if Moscow was to remain as the capital of the
30 Chapter 2
THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
THE CUBAN REVOLUTION (1972-1985)
The 1970s were very different from the turbulent days of the second half of
the 1960s as the two countries became increasingly intertwined, not least
economically. In addition, in January 1974 Leonid Brezhnev became the
first Soviet leader to visit Latin America when he travelled to Cuba, a fur-
ther illustration that the problems of the 1960s had been resolved. The So-
viet leader did not just travel throughout the island but was also awarded
Cuba’s highest honour, the Order of José Martí, and gave a speech in front
of one million Cubans on the Plaza de la Revolución in Havana. In this
speech he stated, “We are linked by bonds that are completely different
from those that are customary in the capitalist world. For the Soviet Union,
Cuba is not an object of exploitation and capital investment, not a strategic
base or a so-called sphere of influence. Our friendship, our closeness, is an
expression of the socialist nature of our countries, a living embodiment of
the lofty principles of socialist internationalism.”36
During the 1970s the two countries’ economies did not just become in-
creasingly interlinked but Cuba underwent a series of changes that made
it more closely resemble the Soviet Union. From the early 1970s the ap-
pearance in the top echelons of the Cuban elite of people more favorable
to Soviet policies, particularly Carlos Rafael Rodríguez and Blas Roca, her-
alded this, but this process culminated at the First Congress of the Cuban
Communist Party in December 1975. At this congress a new constitution,
which closely resembled the Soviet one, was ratified. On this Shearman
has written “Concomitant with CMEA membership came domestic Sovi-
etization of the economy and the polity.”37 In February 1976 in his speech
to the 25th Congress of the CPSU, Brezhnev stated, “The Congress of
Cuban Communists, the party’s programmatic platform and the country’s
new constitution show that the Western hemisphere’s first socialist state is
making steady progress.”38 However, even while this “sovietization” of
the Cuban Revolution was underway Castro again illustrated its distinct
nature. At the First Congress of the PCC he pointedly stated that the is-
Soviet-Cuban Relations 31
land’s revolutionary heritage dated from the nineteenth century and more-
over the congress also ratified Popular Power, which was systematic of
Cuba’s wish to have some form of independence from Moscow.39
In addition to this, from the mid-1970s, as stated, the Cuban army had
to face accusations that they were merely acting as the “Ghurkas of the
Russian Empire” as the two countries became involved in first Africa and
then at the end of the decade Central America, with this action being an
important element in the end of the period of détente that had existed in
the 1970s between the Soviet Union and the United States.40 This new di-
mension to Soviet-Cuban relations was in no small part borne out of Cas-
tro’s “goal to become leader of the Third World,”41 but the Cuban leader
has spoken on a number of occasions about this action, and has always
stressed the links which the Caribbean island had with both the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in Angola and Sandin-
istas in Nicaragua dating from the 1960s. He has even stated that the
MPLA asked for their assistance and that Cuba had only become involved
in any of these operations once the new governments were already in
power. In conjunction with this, the shared history and culture between
Cuba and both continents make Cuban involvement less strange than it
first appears.42
Havana and Moscow may have had shared objectives in these opera-
tions but contrary to this, the Cuban desire for a form of independence
from Moscow was also important, as was the fact that the spread of revo-
lution was an integral part of the Cuban Revolutionary philosophy. More-
over, it may have been hoped that Cuban security would increase as cap-
italism’s attention would be moved from the Caribbean to other parts of
the world. The timing of this action was also significant as by the mid-
1970s Cuba, for a number of reasons, could again employ a more expan-
sive foreign policy. This included the economic security that membership
in the CMEA gave the island, but also the of disintegration of the Salazar
dynasty in Portugal, that heralded the wars in Africa, and the overthrow
of the Somoza dynasty in Nicaragua gave the Cuban regime the opportu-
nity for these courses of action. Furthermore, the chance of a U.S. invasion
of the Caribbean island had by the mid-1970s receded due to the more in-
ward looking administration in Washington. This had resulted from both
the prevalence of war-weariness in the United States after its South-East
Asian debacle and the resignation of Richard Nixon in the aftermath of
the Watergate scandal.43
Cuba may have had to face accusations that it was acting merely as a
Soviet puppet but by taking this course of action the island’s leverage in
the Soviet capital increased, as the Castro regime would have hoped to
use this to obtain some form of severance from the Soviet Union for its ac-
tion in Africa and Central America. The result was that the pressure on
32 Chapter 2
to the original one. If this is done, 1975 has a figure of 387.7, 1980 one of
674.4 and 1985 a figure of 1312. Soviet trade with Cuba had continued to
expand throughout this period but particularly in the 1980s because by
1985 it had increased 13 fold when compared to the first five-year plan, or
more than doubled from the previous five years.
The sale of Cuban sugar to the Soviet Union is vital in explaining the
dramatic increase in the levels of trade in the early 1980s and also its
subsequent decrease at the end of this decade. Moscow did not just buy
the vast percentage of Cuba’s sugar export, but in the early 1980s also
continually paid above the world price. In 1985 Moscow bought 61 per-
cent of the Cuban sugar harvest for 45.00 US cents per pound compared
to a world market price of just 4.05 US cents per pound. This was in ex-
cess of ten times that of the world price, when it had been more normal
for the Soviet Union to only pay between one and a half and two times
the world price.50 In the late 1980s, the terms of trade began to turn
against Cuba as the difference between the price Moscow paid and the
world price fell. It was predominantly this, but also to a lesser extent
some adverse affects of the Soviet reforms, which resulted in the level of
trade in 1990 being lower than in 1985. The 1985 sugar price may have
distorted the trade figures but it could still not hide the huge levels of
Soviet involvement in the Cuban economy as even in 1990 trade was in
excess of eleven times that conducted during the first five-year plan in
1965. On this Carlos Rafael Rodríguez would comment, “there is not a
single sector of our national economy which is to any degree important
in which this cooperation (with the USSR) does not already exist or is
not planned.”51
By March 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of
the CPSU, the original pressures that had appeared in Soviet-Cuban rela-
tions were not just still in existence but new ones had also come to the
fore, which provided still more robust foundations for the relationship.
This did not just entail Moscow’s colossal economic investment, but by
the mid-1980s the two countries had a shared ideology, twenty-year his-
tory and the nature of the relationship had impacted on all aspects of so-
ciety within both countries. In addition, the Cold War had taken a general
turn for the worse, continuing to make the Cuban Revolution an impor-
tant propaganda tool for Moscow. Washington may no longer have been
attempting to overthrow the Castro regime by force but successive U.S.
administrations did wish to see its removal from power. This was in no
small part due to the fact that Cuba remained both a domestic and foreign
policy issue as a result of the powerful and influential Cuban exile com-
munity in the United States. The result was that Moscow’s Caribbean
commitments had continued to adversely affect superpower relations and
played a part in the failure of détente in the 1970s, and the strained nature
Soviet-Cuban Relations 35
within Soviet society it was hoped that this would simultaneously both
re-energize the country’s population and also end their practice of listen-
ing to Western radio broadcasts. This worried the Soviet government due
to the negative content that many of these reports contained on events
within the Soviet Union, which they feared could result in an increase in
tension within the population.56 These reform processes may have been
introduced to help alleviate the problems facing the Soviet Union in the
mid-1980s but they would all impact massively on Soviet-Cuban relations
during the remaining years of the Soviet era.
It was not just the Soviet Union that was undergoing problems in the
mid-1980s as the situation facing Cuba was also very grave. In his speech
in April 1986 to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Bay of Pigs, Fi-
del Castro expanded on what he had said at the 3rd Congress of the PCC
about this. He blamed the economic slow down on the effects of Hurri-
cane Kate that had hit the island in late 1985 and the continuing U.S. em-
bargo. Moreover, he also believed that the revolution was undergoing de-
generation due to increased bureaucracy, overstaffing and the effect of
allowing some forms of private enterprises to exist on the island. After
a number of years, degeneration in a socialist society is not unusual but
the island’s young population, many of whom could not remember pre-
revolutionary Cuba, only exacerbated this process.57
Castro’s proposed solution was the introduction of the campaign of rec-
tification of errors which would reduce bureaucracy and inefficiency and
also outlaw private enterprises and increase voluntary work.58 The first of
these ideas may have been similar to Gorbachev’s reforms but the others
were not and appeared to be a retrenchment of the revolution to the ideas
of the 1960s.
However, Western experts believe that other reasons were also impor-
tant for the campaign’s implementation. Marifeli Pérez-Stable believed
that the Cuban economic “model was largely exhausted” by this time due
to the changes in international economics in the late 1970s while it has
also been suggested that it was used to return power to the original rul-
ing elite in Cuba and away from Soviet trained technocrats, people such
as Humberto Pérez, the head of the Central Planning Board, who had be-
come increasingly powerful from the early 1980s onwards. In addition,
this continued the Cuban practice of being willing to experiment with dif-
ferent ideas, but the chances of this being an opening up of the system
were negligible due to Cuban fears of a possible U.S. invasion after Wash-
ington had invaded Grenada in 1983.59
As stated, the introduction of all of these reforms processes would have
a massive impact on Soviet-Cuban relations during the Gorbachev era,
but this was not immediately apparent, as both governments concen-
trated on the similarities between them.60 In addition, Moscow’s relation-
Soviet-Cuban Relations 37
ship with Havana may not have been of the highest priority for the Soviet
government at this time as they instead concentrated both on the internal
situation in the Soviet Union and on superpower relations. Moreover, this
also illustrated the traditional low importance, with the noticeable excep-
tions of the initial period of the relationship’s inception and the Cuban
Missile Crisis, of Soviet-Cuban relations to the Soviet governing elite.
Although this was the case, some tentative or ‘veiled’ criticisms did
take place, with the highest profile examples being Ligachev’s speech to
the 3rd PCC held in February 1986 and Castro’s address to the 27th Con-
gress of the CPSU held in the Soviet capital during the same month.61
However, from 1987 onwards this situation began to change with Soviet
criticism of Cuba becoming ever more public and scathing from this point
onwards. It focused in particular on Cuban economic inefficiency, which
in light of perestroika was not surprising, as it would have appeared to go
against the very ethos of this process if Moscow continued to subsidize an
inefficient Cuban economy as it struggled to reform its own. With relation
to the CMEA this was certainly the case because an unreformed Cuban
economy and continued Soviet subsidies to it could have led to awkward
questions for Moscow from other member states. As a result it was not
surprising that Nikolai Ryzhkov, Chairman of the USSR Council of Min-
isters, was very forthright in his criticism of Cuban economic inefficiency
in July 1988 at the 44th session of the CMEA held in Prague.62
This may have increased the pressure on Gorbachev with regards to So-
viet-Cuban relations but so too did glasnost. Quite simply some Soviet citi-
zens could not understand why Moscow continued to spend colossal
amounts of money and aid on the Cuban Revolution as Gorbachev’s re-
forms failed to produce the desired results within the Soviet Union. This
feeling only further increased as the geostrategic importance of the island to
Moscow fell as the superpower relations improved.63 Moreover, the Cuban
government’s close association with what had become by the late 1980s dis-
credited former Soviet regimes only further increased this criticism.
This became apparent in a number of different ways but particularly in
the Soviet press and academic writings. In August 1987, New Times
printed the article “An Uphill Task” written by Vladislav Chirkov that
was so scathing in its criticism of Cuba that it drew a response two
months later from none other than Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, the island’s
leading economist and member of the politburo of the PCC.64 In October
1990, the Cuban government felt compelled to repeat this when Pravda
printed a rebuttal written by the Cuban Ambassador to the Soviet Union,
Jose Ramon Balaguer, to an earlier article in Komsomolskaya Pravda that
had belittled the Castro brothers’ personal lives.65 In addition, Moscow’s
practice of paying above the world market price for Cuban sugar came in
for particularly strong and repeated criticism. In June 1989 this even
38 Chapter 2
such a regime, and the ever-increasing number of calls for this to change
only increased the pressure on Gorbachev.
The decrease in tension between the two superpowers, as stated, had
reduced the geostrategic importance of the island for the Kremlin, fueled
further calls within the Soviet Union for the relationship to be terminated.
However, the pressure on Gorbachev only further increased as the U.S.
administration used this improvement in relations with Moscow to try
and influence it regarding its relationship with the Cuban Revolution. On
a number of occasions George H. W. Bush told Gorbachev that Soviet-
Cuban relations were hindering further improvement in U.S.-Soviet rela-
tions. By the late 1980s the Cuban Revolution may have been in existence
for 30 years but time had not resulted in Washington’s dislike of it reced-
ing. Moreover, in August 1991 Jorge Mas Canosa, leader of the Cuban
America National Foundation (CANF), made a historic trip to the Soviet
capital where it appeared that even the Cuban exile community were at-
tempting to have an impact on Moscow’s relationship with Havana.74
Contrary to this, and explaining the lack of change in the relationship, a
reading of the Soviet leader’s memoirs would suggest he might have felt
personal affinity towards the island. In conjunction with this, the two coun-
tries had a shared thirty-year history and the relationship may even have
provided a form of stability, and as the terms of trade turned against Cuba
in the late 1980s even a competitive source of sugar, in a fast changing
world. In addition to this, and mirroring the Soviet internal situation, Gor-
bachev was also subjected to pressures from those who wished to see the
status quo with Cuba preserved. In relation to this, the power and influence
of the “Cuban lobby” in preventing further reform cannot be overesti-
mated. The trade agreement for 1991 was very different from previous
ones, as it was to last for only one year and not the more traditional five,
and trade was to be conducted at world market prices. However, the agree-
ment may have been even more different if Konstantin Katushev, who was
not only a former Soviet ambassador to Cuba but also a member of this
lobby, had not been the head of Foreign Economic Relations in Moscow.75
The lobby’s ability to slow reform in the relationship was perfectly il-
lustrated in the aftermath of the August 1991 coup in Moscow as its fail-
ure had also simultaneously ended the lobby’s power as the most signifi-
cant members of the coup had also been Cuba’s closest friends in
Moscow.76 This explains the Castro regime’s lack of comment on the un-
folding events in Moscow at this time, perfectly illustrating both their
‘wait and see’ policy and realist pragmatism, as they could not afford to
back the wrong side for fear of jeopardizing the relationship. Comment
was only made once events in Moscow had been played out and the coup
had failed.77 However, within one month of these dramatic events in
Moscow Gorbachev announced the removal of the final Soviet troops
Soviet-Cuban Relations 41
from Cuba, illustrating the influence that the lobby had been able to play
in Soviet-Cuban relations. In addition, the government in Havana was ex-
tremely unhappy about this announcement as not only had they not been
consulted about this decision, but Gorbachev had also made it during a
joint press conference in the Soviet capital with the U.S. Secretary of State
James Baker, resulting in accusations appearing that Washington had
been able to influence this decision.78
When compared to his predecessors Mikhail Gorbachev faced many
new and varied pressures with regards to Soviet-Cuban relations and
these had resulted in the relationship in December 1991 being very differ-
ent from what it had been in March 1985. With the reforms in Soviet for-
eign policy, both the geostrategic importance of the island and Marxist-
Leninism in the relationship had decreased. In addition, trade was
fundamentally different as it was by the end of 1991 conducted at world
market prices, an announcement that the final Soviet troops would be re-
moved from Cuba had been made and as a result of the August 1991 coup
in Moscow the island had lost its privileged position within the Soviet
governing elite. In short, Moscow’s relationship with Havana more
closely resembled that which the Soviet Union had with other countries.
The Cuban government may have generally employed a ‘wait and see’
policy, further illustrating the prevalence of realist pragmatism in their
decision making, as they had not wished to risk jeopardizing the rela-
tionship, but they had increased the pressure on Gorbachev regarding So-
viet-Cuban relations when their dislike of his reform processes had be-
come ever more vociferous from 1989 onwards. However, the relationship
continued to exist and at no point had Gorbachev called for it to be ter-
minated and it was only with the implosion of the Soviet Union that Soviet-
Cuban relations came to an abrupt end.
CONCLUSIONS
In the months after the victory of the Cuban Revolution as Havana’s rela-
tionship with Washington soured, it drastically improved with Moscow.
At first Cuba and the Soviet Union appeared very strange bedfellows but
their relationship was very much a product of its time due to the dynam-
ics of the Cold War and the fact that it benefited both countries. At this
time the Soviet Union was attempting to increase its global influence,
with the Cuban Revolution specifically appealing to Moscow due to both
its anti-American sentiments and also the geostrategic importance of the
island for the Soviet Union. In January 1959, closer relations with Moscow
may not have been one of the Cuban Revolution’s original goals but it
most certainly wished to change its relationship with Washington. At the
42 Chapter 2
height of the Cold War, if Havana did not have close relations with the
U.S. it required them with the Soviet Union especially as Washington ap-
peared determined to destroy the new regime in Havana. This would be
a constant factor throughout the Soviet era and would even continue af-
ter the end of the Cold War. In addition, the lack of a Soviet colonial past
and its political and economic models also all appealed to Cuba.
Very quickly a number of pressures appeared that would form the
foundations of the relationship for the next thirty years. Castro proclaim-
ing himself Marxist-Leninist and thus also the revolution in December
1961 was vital in this. Not only did the two countries now have a shared
ideology but this had also increased the pressure on Moscow regarding its
relationship with Cuba. By doing this, Castro had attempted to gain in-
creased security guarantees from the Soviet Union, significant in the af-
termath of the Bay of Pigs and continuing U.S. aggression, and although
these may not have been entirely forthcoming it certainly meant that
Moscow could not see the Cuban Revolution fail. This resulted from Cold
War geopolitics and the tensions that existed between Moscow and
Peking. In addition, the large amounts of aid and trade lavished on Cuba
by the Kremlin also resulted in pressures that ‘tied’ Moscow to Havana. If
the Cuban Revolution failed, these large amounts of money would have
simply been wasted, something that the Soviet Union could not afford.
The close personal affinity between Khrushchev and Castro was also
important in the burgeoning relationship between their two countries.
Khrushchev was very much a member of the “Cuban lobby” that had
quickly appeared after the inception of the relationship. These people
were vital throughout the Soviet era but also partly explains Cuba’s place
as ‘first among equals’ in the Soviet Union.
The events of the Cuban Missile Crisis added further pressure on
Moscow regarding Cuba because if the revolution failed the risks that the
Soviet Union had taken by deploying the missiles to Cuba would have
been in vain. Soviet prestige already dented by these events would have
suffered yet another blow. In addition, it may have also led to more ques-
tions about Soviet revisionism from China. This was something that
Moscow wished to avoid.
These pressures remained in place in March 1985 when Gorbachev be-
came General Secretary of the CPSU but new ones had also appeared in
the intervening years. These included the fact the Cuba remained an im-
portant propaganda tool for Moscow in the Cold War that had taken a
turn for the worse in the early 1980s, a shared twenty-year history and a
large number of joint projects that resulted in the relationship affecting
most parts of society in both countries. Joint education and social pro-
grammes were amongst these as were economic ones. The levels of trade
and aid had continued to escalate which was very beneficial for Cuba, but
Soviet-Cuban Relations 43
also meant that Moscow continued to be ‘tied’ to Cuba because if the rev-
olution failed these huge amounts of money over twenty years would
have been wasted. Moreover, the “Cuban lobby” remained in place and
Havana had also been able to exert some forms of leverage over Moscow
resulting from, amongst other reasons, joint Cuban and Soviet involve-
ment in Africa and Central America.
However, for the remainder of the Soviet period the relationship would
be affected by a number of powerful new forces, some of which were un-
foreseen, resulting from the various reforms implemented in both coun-
tries. The results of perestroika increased the pressure on Gorbachev as not
only could the Soviet Union not afford to continue to subsidize an ineffi-
cient Cuban economy while it struggled to reform its own, but it could
also have led to awkward questions within the CMEA as to why an inef-
ficient Cuban economy continued to have large amounts of money lav-
ished on it. In light of this, it is surprising that it took so long for these
pressures to appear but this resulted from the traditional low importance
of Cuba for the Soviet elite and also due to the fact the internal Soviet sit-
uation acquired their full attention. Calls for reform only increased due to
glasnost which led many in the Soviet Union to criticise both Soviet-Cuban
relations and also the Cuban Revolution itself, as many began to perceive
it as an anachronism and due to its close association with previous, and
what had become by the late 1980s, discredited Soviet regimes. In the in-
creasingly democratic Soviet Union of the late 1980s and early 1990s this
was something that Gorbachev could not ignore. The result was that those
wanting reform were pulling him in different directions from those who
wished to see the status quo with Cuba preserved.
This situation was further complicated by the fact that the reforms insti-
gated in Cuba were very different from the Soviet ones and appeared to be
more of a return to the ideas of the 1960s. At first this was not apparent as
both governments concentrated on their similarities and the Cuban govern-
ment, although not liking them, employed a ‘wait and see’ policy to unfold-
ing events in the Soviet Union in fear of jeopardizing the relationship. Their
reaction to the August 1991 coup in Moscow was the most graphic illustra-
tion of this. However, this began to change in 1989 as Castro’s dislike of the
Soviet reforms became ever more public from this point onwards. This in-
cluded his very public denouncement of them during Gorbachev’s visit.
This only further increased the pressure on Gorbachev. Moreover, what
would be vital for Russian-Cuban relations after 1991 were the changes in-
stigated by the Castro regime from 1989 onwards in an attempt to offset the
negative consequences of the Soviet reforms, with the desire to attract for-
eign investment from outside the socialist bloc being particularly significant.
Moreover, the “Cuban lobby” remained in place and continued to be able
to exact pressure on the Soviet government regarding Cuba and was able to
44 Chapter 2
NOTES
18. The Cuban leader may have traveled to the Soviet Union twice in the three
years immediately after the Cuban Missile Crisis but Che Guevara made three
trips in the same period. In addition, Cuba also signed two trade agreements with
the Soviet Union with the second being the first to last for a duration of five years.
Pravda, 18 January 1964, 1–2.
19. The 1964 agreement set both the levels of sugar and the price which
Moscow would pay until 1970. These levels were 2.1m tons in 1965, 3m tons in
1966, 4m tons in 1967, and 5m tons in both 1968 and 1969. The price was to be 6
US cents free alongside ship. This meant that delivery was included in the price.
Pravda, 23 January 1964, 1.
20. Blight and Brenner, Sad and Luminous Days, 35–85.
21. Ernesto Guevara, “Discurso en el Segundo Seminario Económico de Soli-
daridad Afroasiática” in Ernesto Che Guevara escritos y discursos, 7, (Havana: Edito-
rial de Ciencias Sociales, 1985), 341–54.
22. Granma, 7 February 1966, 1. Pravda, 2 April 1966, 7.
23. Fidel Castro, Fidel Castro Speaks, (London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press,
1969), 161–80.
24. Blight and Brenner, Sad and Luminous Days, 99-104. Erisman, Cuba’s Foreign
Relations, 80–82.
25. In relation to Cuban security Erisman states that the Cuban government
was happy with Soviet action as it illustrated that Moscow was prepared to use
military power to defend socialism, which after the Cuban Missile Crisis Havana
had been uncertain of. Erisman, Cuba’s Foreign Relations, 76.
26. Peter Shearman, The Soviet Union and Cuba, (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1987), 35.
27. Blight and Brenner, Sad and Luminous Days, 33–76.
28. Ibid. Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance, 90–92.
29. Cuba did not appear on the list of participating communist parties at this
conference. Pravda, 28 February 1968, 1.
30. J.D. Rudolph, The Evolution of a Crisis, (London: Praeger, 1992) 53–76.
31. Moreover, during this trip an exhibition was held in Cuba to mark the one
hundredth anniversary of Lenin’s birth. Pravda, 18 November 1969, 5. Pravda, 3
April 1971, 6–7.
32. Pravda, 3 September 1971, 4 and Granma, 12 July 1972, 1. Pravda, 28 June
1972, 1–2.
33. As Castro left Moscow five days before Cuba gained membership to the
CMEA Carmelo Mesa-Lago has written that he may have also wanted member-
ship to the Warsaw Pact. Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Cuba in the 1970s, Pragmatism and
Institutionalization, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1974), 16–17.
M. Robins has suggested that this did not happen as it meant that Moscow did not
have to grant Cuba a formal defense treaty. M. Robins, “The Soviet-Cuba Rela-
tionship” in Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1980s, ed. Roger E. Kanet, (New York:
Praeger, 1982) 152.
34. Nicola Miller, Soviet Relations with Latin America 1959–1987, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 92.
35. Soviet-Cuban trade did not dramatically rise with the Caribbean island’s
membership to the CMEA. In 1972 it was 938,464 million pesos and for 1973
Soviet-Cuban Relations 47
1,287,685 million pesos. However, Cuban trade with the other members of this or-
ganisation did increase sharply. Anuario Estadístico de Cuba, (Comité Estatal de
Estadísticas: Havana, 1975), 159. On the economic significance of the relationship
to Cuba Peter Shearman has written, “Unlike other distant Third World client
states of the Soviet Union, its very economic survival was dependent on aid from
Moscow. Shearman, The Soviet Union and Cuba, 29.
36. Pravda, 31 January 1974, 5.
37. Peter Shearman, “The Soviet Union and Cuba: the ‘Best’ of Friends” in Trou-
bled Friendships Moscow’s Third World Ventures, ed. by Margot Light, (London,
British Academic Press, 1993), 170.
38. Pravda, 25 February 1976, 3. Mesa-Lago, Cuba in the 1970s, 10–12. Shearman,
“The Soviet Union and Cuba,” 173. González has also stated this but on Castro’s
role in the process he wrote, “Fidel’s position as the supreme lider maximo has
now been institutionalized in his multiple roles as First Secretary, president of
both the Council of State and Council of Ministers, and commander in chief.” Ed-
ward González, “Institutionalization, Political Elites and Foreign Affairs” in Cuba
in the World, ed. Carmelo Mesa-Lago and Cole Blasier, (Pittsburgh, University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1979), 16.
39. Granma, 19 December 1975, 2–7. Munck, Revolutionary Trends, 53–57. In the
five different paradigms in Cuban foreign policy as outlined by Erisman he states
that Havana was continually striving for increased independence from Moscow.
Erisman, Cuba’s Foreign Relations, 22–48.
40. Erisman, Cuba’s Foreign Relations, 2000, 33–36.
41. Shearman, “The Soviet Union,” 172.
42. Domínguez, “Political and Military Limitations,” 107. Levesque, The USSR
and the Cuban Revolution, 188. Fidel Castro, “Angola: African Giron” in Fidel Castro
Speeches. Cuba’s Internationalist Foreign Policy, (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1981),
91–92. Erisman, Cuba’s Foreign Relations, 71, 80–82. On the decision to send troops
to Angola, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez told Alexander Haig, the United States Secre-
tary of State, in December 1981 during secret talks held in México City that “I can
assure unequivocally, in as much as I played a direct role in this matter, that when
the decision to dispatch Cuban forces into Angola was made, we communicated
nothing about it to the Soviet Union.” “Transcript of Meeting between US Secre-
tary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and Cuban Vice Premier Carlos Rafael Ro-
dríguez, México City, 23 November 1981” in Cold War International History Project,
Bulletin, Issues 8–9, 210.
43. Jorge Domínguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution. Cuba’s Foreign Policy
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 145, 229.
44. Erisman, Cuba’s Foreign Relations, 68–70. González, “Institutionalization,”
17, 23. Domínguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution, 151. Domínguez, “The
Armed Forces and Foreign Relations,” 53.
45. Erisman, Cuba’s Foreign Relations, 103–4.
46. K. U. Chernenko, Izbrannye rechi i stat’I (Moscow: Politizdat, 1984), 424–28.
47. A change in United States foreign policy had taken place in the late 1970s with
it once again becoming much more pro-active. The catalyst for this had been the
Iranian Revolution but it soon spread to Latin America. This policy became known
as the “Carter Doctrine.” Morley, Imperial State and Revolution, 366. Washington’s
48 Chapter 2
Cuba policy had since the early-1960s been heavily influenced by the Cuban-
America exile community as a result of their great wealth, the significance of the
state of Florida in Presidential elections that meant no Presidential candidate could
afford to ignore them and the creation of the Cuban American National Foundation
that was excellent at lobbying politicians in Washington. Morris Morley and Chris
McGillion, Unfinished Business. America and Cuba After the Cold War, 1989–2001,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 12–13.
48. Pravda, 11 November 1984, 1, 4.
49. V. Lavrentyev, ‘USSR-Cuban Brotherhood and Cooperation,’ (FBIS
LD182341 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0615, 18 April 1985).
50. Anuario Estadístico de Cuba, 1975, 1980; 168, 184–205. For economic analysis
of Soviet-Cuban relations after Cuba had gained access to the CMEA see amongst
others: Julio Díaz Vázquez, Cuba y el CAME (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias So-
ciales, 1988). A.D. Bekareich, “USSR-Cuba. Collaboration of Experience and Per-
spectives” in USSR-Latin America. Collaboration of Writings and Perspectives,
(Moscow: Nauka, 1989), 41–53. J.L. Rodríguez, “Las Relaciones Económicas Cuba-
URSS” Temas de Economía Mundial l, (1986), 7–33.
51. González, “Castro and Cuba’s New Orthodoxy,” 11.
52. Pravda, 24 April 1985, 1.
53. Yegor Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev’s Kremlin, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1996), 313.
54. Pravda, 26 February 1986, 5. It has been suggested that many of the out-
comes of the Soviet reform processes were unforeseen as this process had been
formulated on an adhoc basis. Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev’s Kremlin, 357–58.
55. In addition to this, the reforms in Soviet foreign policy also questioned the
ideas of the inevitability of the world revolution, reassessed traditional thinking
towards both the United States and its population, as Moscow wanted better re-
lations with the West, and a re-thinking of its nuclear strategy also commenced.
This change in foreign policy was aided by an enormous changeover in personnel
in the foreign policy making apparatus, with the highest profile example being
Andrei Gromyko being replaced as the Minister of Foreign Affairs by Eduard She-
vardnadze. Pravda, 26 February 1986, 6. The result of this, amongst others, was a
reduction in tension between the superpowers. For more analysis on this see:
Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika i novoe myshlenie dlia nashei strany i dlia vsego mira,
(Moscow: Politizdat, 1987), 158, 197–267. Stephen White, Gorbachev and After,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 174–214. Mikhail Gorbachev,
Zhizn i Reformy Kniga 2, (Moscow: Izdatelstvo “Novosti,” 1995), 312. S. F.
Akhromeev, and G. M. Kornienko. Glazami marshala i diplomata: kriticheskii vzgliad
na vneshniu politiku SSSR do i posle 1985 goda, (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye ot-
nosheniia, 1992), 55. Eduard Shevardnadze, Moi Vybor v Zashchitu Demokratii i Svo-
body, (Moscow: Novosti, 1991), 47.
56. The effects of glasnost were not, however, immediately felt and it was not
until after the Chernobyl disaster in April 1986, it had taken Moscow three weeks
to admit this accident had occurred, that the process accelerated. For a full analy-
sis of this see White, Gorbachev and After, 70–73.
57. Castro had talked about the problems facing the island on a number of oc-
casions see: Supplement to Granma 21 April 1986, Granma Weekly Review 2 August
Soviet-Cuban Relations 49
1986, 3 and at the 3rd Congress of the PCC. Fidel Castro, Fidel Castro: ideología, con-
ciencia y trabajo político, (Havana: Editora Política, 1986).
58. Antoni Kapcia, The Cuban Revolution in Crisis, (Research Institute for
Study of Conflict and Terrorism, Conflict Studies, 1992), 256. Antoni Kapcia, Po-
litical Change in Cuba: Before and After the Exodus, (Institute of Latin American
Studies, Occasional Papers No. 19, University of London). Kapcia, “Political
Change in Cuba: The Domestic Context for Foreign Policy” in Redefining Cuban
Foreign Policy, 27–28. Jorge Domínguez, “The Political Impact on Cuba of the Re-
form and Collapse of Communist Regimes” in Cuba After the Cold War, 104–17.
Marifeli Pérez -Stable, The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course and Legacy, (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 154. Andrew Zimbalist. “Cuban Political
Economy and Cubanology: An Overview” in Cuban Political Economy: Controver-
sies in Cubanology, ed. by Andrew Zimbalist, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1988.), 72.
59. Supplement to Granma, 21 April 1986.
60. For examples of this see: Moscow in Spanish to Cuba 0244 GMT 27 Sep-
tember 1987 (FBIS-SOV 6 October 1987, 33, PA021650). Carlos Rafael Rodríguez,
“La Oportunidad Que No Podernos Rehusar” America Latina No. 8, (1986): 4–8.
61. Ligachev’s speech contained the reasons why the reforms were needed in
the Soviet Union and significantly also in CMEA countries, which included Cuba.
Granma 6 February 1986, 7. In his speech to the 27th Congress of the CPSU Castro
had pointedly talked of national liberation movements when Gorbachev’s earlier
speech to the same congress had not, illustrating the differences in opinions.
Pravda, 27 February 1986, 7.
62. At the 44th session of the CMEA held in Prague in July 1988, Nikolai
Ryzhkov’s, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, stated in his speech, “It is
of paramount importance to make economic assistance significantly more effec-
tive and to improve the use that Vietnam, Cuba and Mongolia make of their own
resources, as well as of outside resources, to resolve key problems in these coun-
tries’ social and economic development and ensue their participation in the inter-
national division of labour.” Pravda, 6 July 1988, 4.
63. For this type of article see: Literturnaya Gazeta, 21 October 1987, 14. P. Bogo-
molov, “Plans by the Ocean. Journalist Raises Problem” Pravda, 1 June 1987, 5.
64. Vladislav Chirkov, “An Uphill Task” New Times, 33, (17 August 1987), 16–17.
Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, “A Difficult But Steady Ascent” New Times, 41, (19 Octo-
ber 1987), 16–21.
65. In an article in Moscow Komsomolskaya Pravda the Castro brothers’ personal
lives had been attacked with amongst other things the number of houses that they
owned was questioned as was even the number of children that each had fa-
thered. Moscow Komsomolskaya Pravda 28 August 1990, 2. (FBIS-SOV 4 September
1990, 44-45, PM3108115990). For the Cuban response to this see: Jose Ramon Bal-
aguer “Lies and Insults” Pravda, 26 October 1990, 5.
66. In his speech to the Congress the outspoken economist N.P. Shmelyev had
questioned Moscow paying 400 percent of the world market price for Cuban
sugar. Izvestia, 9 June 1989, 10.
67. For examples of these types of reports see: K. Khachaturov, “Latin America
and Us” International Affairs (10), (1992), 32–39. M.A. Belya, “Cuba: How Distant?”
50 Chapter 2
51
52 Chapter 3
in 1992 the Russian parliament held hearings on the subject of Cuba’s hu-
man rights record.7 A number of reasons explain this which will be dis-
cussed in chapter 5, but the fact that Moscow no longer had to defend a
fellow Marxist-Leninist state in these forums was a key factor in the Rus-
sian Federation voting in this manner.
The deterioration in relations was not just political but also economic.
In 1991 delivery problems of Soviet goods to the Caribbean may have
been blamed for the sudden drop in trade levels, but they fell still further
in 1992, when it crashed to a mere 823 million pesos, a figure less than 25
percent of the 1991 level, or below 9 percent of trade conducted in 1988.8
In four short years Havana had had to withstand a drop in excess of 90
percent, in trade with Moscow. This dramatic fall in trade continued in
1993 and 1994 but is even more graphically illustrated if a comparison to
1965 or the first five-year plan between the Soviet Union and Cuba is
made. If 1965 has a base figure of 100, 1992 has a figure of 110, 1993 a fig-
ure of 71 and 1994 only has a figure of 43. In the late 1980s, even as the
terms of trade had begun to turn against Cuba, this figure had exceeded
1100 or even 1200, but in 1994, twenty-nine years after the first five-year
agreement, trade was less that half of the 1965 level.9 The trade that did
take place consisted mainly of Russian oil being exchanged for Cuban
sugar, and the reasons for this will be analysed in detail in chapter 4.
Figure 3.1 further illustrates this spectacular fall in trade between Ha-
vana and Moscow in the years immediately after the disintegration of the
Soviet Union, which had a catastrophic effect on the Cuban economy, as
over 70 percent of the Caribbean island’s trade had been conducted with
the Soviet Union. This had been despite continued Cuban attempts dur-
ing the Soviet era to reduce dependency on Moscow, but the situation was
so dire that in 1993 Raúl Castro described its effect on the Cuban economy
was “as if a nuclear bomb had exploded.”10
Moreover, the seriousness of the situation is further shown by Figure 3.2
which has an even steeper downward gradient than Figure 3.1. Cuban im-
ports of Russian goods were falling even more quickly than overall trade
between the two countries. In 1992 Russian imports made up only 23 per-
cent of total trade and in 1993 this fell to just 13 percent. The Soviet Union
had been the source of many important goods for Cuba and this downturn
did not only still further weaken the island’s economy, but it also adversely
affected its citizens with the “special period in peacetime” becoming in-
creasingly grave as amongst other things consumer goods virtually van-
ished in this period. A variety of socio-economic figures illustrate this
point, not least Cuba’s falling Gross Domestic Product (GDP) which fell for
four straight years from 1990 with the decrease in the years from 1991 to
1993 all exceeding 10 percent.11 The result of this was an increase in tension
on the island which many observers believed would be terminal for the
Castro regime. Although this did not happen it did lead to the balsero cri-
sis of August 1994 when over 25,000 Cubans had fled the island.12
As stated in chapters 1 and 2, Marxist-Leninism had been a cornerstone
of Soviet-Cuban relations but its importance had been reduced during the
Gorbachev era, which had badly affected the relationship, but in the years
after 1992 it was completely removed from it. This meant that one of the
was much more forthright when he wrote that, “it is necessary to create
normal links between our two countries, after an abnormal fragile stereo-
type, which was based on ‘revolutionary romanticism’ which was politi-
cally and economically onerous for the USSR.”16
In addition, and related to this, the removal of Marxist-Leninism from
the relationship and the victory of the Liberal Westernizers in Russia was
also symbolic of the defeat of the “Cuban lobby” in Moscow who had
most certainly believed in this ideology. As stated in chapter 2, they had
been very influential in shielding the island from some of the adverse ef-
fects of Gorbachev’s reforms in the 1980s but their disappearance re-
moved this important brake to reform that resulted in changed relations
between Havana and Moscow not just speeding up, but the relationship
virtually disintegrating.
However, in the new democratic Russia Cuba remained a very emotive
subject for many Russians with Plankton believing that at this time a per-
son’s thinking on the “island of freedom” could even be used to show
their political orientation. Some were extremely unhappy with the effects
that Yeltsin’s policies were having for Cuba, blaming him for the grave sit-
uation that the Caribbean island found itself in, with the Russian Presi-
dent even being described as “a cowboy without the hat.”17 However,
with the Liberal Westernizers to the fore and as a result of both the Castro
regime’s previous close association with former discredited Soviet
regimes, and its refusal to change its socialist nature despite world events
which was illustrated by it being referred to as a “totalitarian regime”
during the 1992 Moscow conference which analysed the Cuban situation,
this for many simply provided further reasons for the relationship be-
tween the two countries to be terminated.18
The Cuban response to these events was extremely interesting and not
what may have been expected because although the Castro regime was no
longer constrained by a shared ideology or diplomatic protocol its reac-
tion was in many ways not dissimilar to the Gorbachev era of Soviet-
Cuban relations, as little or no analysis on events in Russia was given.
Granma did print a number of articles on the unfolding situation in the
former Soviet Union with many concentrating on the socio-economic
problems that faced the vast proportion of the population. A number of
Cuban academic articles at this time also commented upon this, as did
Castro who on a number of occasions also highlighted the socio-political
problems that engulfed Russia in the 1990s. He not only commented that
the effect of these reforms could be extremely dangerous due the fact that
Russia was a nuclear power, but interestingly he appeared to lay much of
the blame for Russia’s problems at forces from outside the Russian Feder-
ation, the implementation of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
World Bank policies in particular, but also on the increased influence of
The Continuing Role of Ideology 57
the mafia. As stated, Raúl Castro may have compared the effect of the loss
of the Soviet trade to the Cuban economy to that of a nuclear explosion
but he too blamed forces from outwith the Soviet Union for its collapse.19
This is not surprising due to their ideological aversion to both of these or-
ganisations policies but these attacks on the socio-political problems in
Russia also sent a very clear message to the island’s population: this was
the outcome of attempts to reform the socialist system, and would be the
fate awaiting them if a similar situation arose in Cuba.
Moreover, the Cuban academic Sofía Hernández Marmal, a researcher
at the Centro de Estudios Europeos (CEE) in Havana, has written that ne-
oliberalism resulted in an “economic Darwinism” appearing that hurt the
vast proportion of the Russian population. In addition to the criticism of
the IMF and World Bank the role of the United States was also attacked.
This will be examined in more depth in chapter 5 but Cuba was of the
opinion that the U.S. belief in free market economy and the influence that
Washington had in Moscow at this time had also been responsible for the
problems suffered by the Russian economy and in turn the country’s pop-
ulation. Moreover, this also had a knock-on effect for Russian foreign pol-
icy as specifically they believed that Kozyrev had fallen “in love with the
United States and the U.S way of life,” which had resulted in the appear-
ance of the “Kozyrev Doctrine” with its emphasis on good relations with
the West and U.S. in particular. 20
In August 1994, in a speech to Cuban solidarity groups in Colombia, the
Cuban leader was much more forthright on the economic effects that the
end of Soviet-Cuban relations had had on the Caribbean island. However,
it appears that the real intended audience was not an international one
but instead an internal Cuban one. In this speech he said, “when we are
subjected to a double blockade, because we practically do not have any
commerce with former socialist countries and with Russia.”21 This com-
parison to the U.S. economic embargo is significant for a number of rea-
sons, as it not only illustrated the impact that the Cuban leadership be-
lieved that the end of Soviet-Cuban relations had had for Cuba, but it was
also an attempt to absolve them of blame for the dire condition of the is-
land’s economy in the early 1990s. Traditionally the U.S. embargo had
been used by the Cuban elite to blame external reasons for the island’s
economic problems and Castro was using the fall in trade with Moscow
in a similar manner to ‘explain’ the worst economic crisis that had hit
Cuba in the revolutionary era. The timing of this speech was no accident
as it was at the very moment that the balsero crisis, due to the build up of
internal pressure as a result of the island’s failing economy, was about to
explode. Castro was attempting to use this speech to shift the blame for
this away from himself and his government to once again external reasons
beyond their control.
58 Chapter 3
Deputies and Supreme Council of Russia, which had both been significant
institutions in the Soviet Union.23
The reforms implemented by Gorbachev in the late 1980s reduced the
significance of Marxist-Leninism in the relationship between Moscow and
Havana, but after the disintegration of the Soviet Union it completely dis-
appeared from both its internal policies and foreign policy, both of which
had grave consequences for the relationship and the Cuban Revolution it-
self. Moreover, both the Russian Federation looking to the West and the
United States in particular, and the Castro government’s refusal to devi-
ate from its socialist path further adversely affected Russian-Cuban rela-
tions. This downturn was both political and economic with the Cuban
economy suffering greatly from the loss of its most important trading
partner. The result was that the disappearance of Marxist-Leninism from
relations between Moscow and Havana was a fundamental aspect in the
spectacular downturn in their relationship in the years 1992 to 1994.
socialist economic model. In the final years of the twentieth century glob-
alisation was at the centre of a multifaceted scholarly debate, which did
not just concentrate on the process in general, but also over a definitive
definition of it and whether it is even a new process or not.24 In relation to
this, investment in Latin America in general and Cuba in particular before
1959 from outwith the region was not new, but in the 1990s it was on a
truly global scale and not predominantly from the United States, as had
previously been the case.
The effects of globalisation have led some to believe that it has impinged
on states’ sovereignty, questioned the continued significance of national-
ism and resulted in the appearance of a number of new security dilemmas
as it has not just increased the power of multinational companies and
transnational enterprise but also impacted on many other parts of society
including politics. Although this is the case and the effects of globalisation
on countries even within the same region have not been universal, what
can be concluded is that interdependence between various world
economies has increased with the pre-eminence of international capital-
ism, illustrated by the growth of transnational investment.25 This was vital
for not just the Cuban Revolution but also Russian-Cuban relations.
As outlined, in the late 1980s Cuba had made attempts to encourage
foreign investment to the island from outwith the socialist bloc, but in the
1990s this process increased dramatically, with various legislation being
passed to encourage this. In 1992 the National Assembly changed the con-
stitution so that state property could be transferred to joint ventures with
foreign money and in September 1995 a new foreign investment law was
passed which not only allowed foreign companies to move their entire
profits abroad, but also very significantly allowed 100 percent foreign
ownership of investments in Cuba. This was truly historic due to the
prominence of nationalism in the Cuban Revolution. As stated, it was
hoped that Cuba’s tourist industry would be particularly attractive to for-
eign investors; with significantly the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)
and Raúl Castro being at the forefront of this.26 Moreover, in January 1995
it became legal for joint ventures with foreign capital to be created in both
oil and mineral exploration and production. In relation to this, in 1992
Consulting Associates (CONSAS) and in 1994 the Ministry of Foreign In-
vestment and Economic Cooperation (MIECE) had been created to help
facilitate foreign investment. Then, in 1997 free trade zones were created
in a further attempt to attract yet more foreign investment. In addition, in-
ternal reforms were also implemented which not only legalised both agri-
cultural and artisan markets to try and alleviate food shortages, but also
the possession of U.S. dollars on the island.27
These economic reforms perfectly illustrated the strong prevalence of
realist pragmatism that has existed within the Cuban ruling elite since the
The Continuing Role of Ideology 61
tries which Cuba now conducts most trade with. In the last year of the
twentieth century Spain was Cuba’s largest trading partner with
881,180m pesos worth of trade being conducted, or 15 percent of Cuba’s
overall trade.35
In addition to this, large quantities of foreign investment have also been
attracted to the island. By mid-1995, 212 joint ventures had come to
fruition with over nine different countries from around the world, and in
the period from 1998 to 2001 a further 190 joint enterprises, in conjunction
with twenty-eight countries, were created. In comparison in 1991 there
were only eleven joint ventures excluding those with socialist bloc coun-
tries. Mexican companies have tended to concentrate on Cuba’s telecom-
munications links while Canadian ones have invested in the island’s
nickel industry. European countries have taken an interest in the tourist,
tobacco and alcohol industries, with one of the highest profiles being in
1992 when the French company Pernod Ricard bought an interest in and
the global distribution rights for Havana Club rum. In the similar manner,
in the year 2000 the French-Spanish company Altadis bought 50 percent
of Habanos, the international distributor of Cuban cigars.36
The result has been that Cuba has once again returned to the global
economy having been removed from it for a number of years, illustrated
by the involvement of companies from over one hundred countries with
the island. This has been a remarkable change from the Soviet era, and is
made even more so when it has been achieved despite Washington’s con-
tinued attempts to economically strangle the Castro regime with the pass-
ing of both the Cuban Democracy Act, or Torricelli Bill, in 1992 and four
years later the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, or Helms-
Burton Act, which attempted to prevent companies from third party
countries trading with Cuba. In addition, this was also achieved despite
the Caribbean island not having access to money from the IMF, World
Bank or the Inter-American Development Bank.
Ironically, the United States embargo, despite being the antithesis of ne-
oliberal economics, has conversely made Cuba a more appealing invest-
ment opportunity for foreign companies, as they do not have to face com-
petition from U.S. companies, who held the pre-eminent position within the
Cuban economy before 1959. This has allowed foreign companies to gain a
foothold in the Cuban economy before the embargo ends when U.S. firms
will once again be permitted to invest in it. In 2005 a survey conducted in
Florida illustrated this, as 65 percent of the 417 executives polled would be
“likely to do business in a post-Castro Cuba.”37 Moreover, once U.S. citizens
are free to travel to Cuba, these foreign companies would hope that their
profits would further increase due to the expected influx of U.S. dollars.
The implosion of the Soviet Union had a catastrophic effect on the Cuban
Revolution, not least economically as the island also simultaneously lost its
64 Chapter 3
This change in the composition of the countries that the Caribbean island
traded with when compared to the Soviet era, which saw the Soviet pre-
eminent position in the Cuban economy being usurped, was vital to the
improvement in relations between Cuba and Russia from the mid-1990s
onwards. This occurred because in the early to mid-1990s Russian com-
panies came to realise that they had lost out due to the economic changes
made in Cuba. In March 1993, the journalist Nikolai Vlasov wrote in
Moscow News, “As last year’s experience has shown the Canadian, Span-
ish and Mexican companies started immediately to fill the vacuum
formed after the curtailment of Russian-Cuban investment cooperation.
They become firmly established in the most promising branches, using
with great benefit the industrial infrastructure created with our country’s
assistance.”38 Moreover, Stanislav Kondrashov, another journalist, wrote
on this subject, “in Cuba’s nickel industry, Canadian capital now reigns
supreme. And the Chinese dominate the consumer goods market. The
Spanish, the British and the Mexicans are investing in Cuba.”39
A number of politicians and academics also commented upon this
process including Yevgeny Primakov, the Russian Foreign Minister in the
mid to late 1990s. In addition, in the two-year period from 1995 to 1997,
260 joint projects with Cuban and foreign money were opened but only
two of these were with Cuban and Russian money. This was something
that Russian companies wished to address and once again become more
involved in the Cuban economy to take advantage of the investment op-
The Continuing Role of Ideology 65
predicted in 1992. The fact that this upturn in Russian-Cuban trade was
based on an increase in Cuban exports to Russia, very different from
Cuban trade with other countries that were primarily based on Cuba im-
porting goods and not exporting them, was equally remarkable. This led
Ricardo Cabrisas, Cuban Foreign Minister, in 1997 to even suggest that by
1999 or the year 2000 trade between Havana and Moscow may even re-
turn to the 1991 level.47
This, however, has not materialised as since 1996 trade with other coun-
tries, most noticeably Spain and Canada, has overtaken that which has
been conducted with Russia. This is partly explained by the economic cri-
sis that hit Russia in August 1998, but it most certainly does not mean that
Russian interest in the Cuban economy has waned. For example
Rosvooruzheniya, the Russian state arms company, never closed its Cuban
office while it did in other parts of Latin America. This would become very
significant in the twenty-first century as Russian interest in Latin America
increased.48 The result was that in the period from 1995 to 1999 Russia re-
mained in the top five of Cuba’s most significant trading partners.
Again the increase in trade was despite the Helms-Burton Act that had
seen Washington attempt to restrict Cuban trade with third party coun-
tries, and moreover, this act had even contained a section that concen-
trated specifically on Russia due to the listening post at Lourdes that re-
mained open throughout the 1990s. The importance of this will be
discussed in both chapters 4 and 5. Moscow not only voted against the
implementation of the act in the UN resolution that condemned it but ap-
peared to be prepared to both ignore and circumvent it. A Russian Foreign
Ministry declaration stated, “We confirm our intention to develop and
broaden beneficial co-operation with Cuba as well as sectors of mutual in-
terest, particularly in the commercial and economic sphere.”49
As has been suggested this increase in trade was partially driven by
Russian companies wishing to try and address the situation which had
seen the Soviet pre-eminent position within the Cuban economy usurped
by companies from other countries. This had occurred due to both the
globalisation process in general and the economic changes made in Cuba
in the 1990s, which resulted in making the Cuban economy an inviting in-
vestment opportunity for transnational capital. Other reasons, such as a
number of Cubans having a Russian language ability that made trade ne-
gotiations easier, as well as other aspects of the Soviet legacy were also
important and these will be analysed in detail in the next chapter. How-
ever, neoliberal economics was one of the key reasons that resulted in the
improvement of relations between Moscow and Havana from the mid-
1990s onwards. Just as in the Soviet era it appeared as if ideology was
again significant in the relationship, but ironically it was not Marxist-
Leninism but instead its very antithesis.
68 Chapter 3
This, however, gives rise to another very important question. Due to the
nature of the globalisation process was this Russian interest in the Cuban
economy not simply a result of the process in general and not due to the
Russian desire to correct the losses it sustained in it in the 1990s? If this was
the case it could also be expected that Russian trade with other Latin Amer-
ican countries would have also increased at an equivalent rate. However,
this is not the case as trade between Russia and Cuba far exceeded Russian
trade with any other Latin American country in the period from 1995 to
1999, with only trade with Brazil even approaching this level.50 It can there-
fore be concluded that it was not just a result of globalisation in general that
caused this upturn in Russian-Cuban trade, but instead the Russian desire
to correct the ‘wrongs’ of the 1990s that was more important.
The irony is that one of the key reasons for the improvement in Russian-
Cuban relations has been the effects of neoliberal economics. This was no
means by design, as it had not been the goal of the Castro regime to specif-
ically stimulate Russian interest in the Cuban economy, but was instead a
side effect of the reforms that were instigated in Cuba in the early to mid-
1990s in an attempt to deal with the economic effects of the disintegration
of Soviet-Cuban relations. This had again shown the prevalence of realist
pragmatism in the Cuban Revolution because ideologically the Cuban
regime may not have liked the nature of these reforms but they were fun-
damental in its economic revival from the mid-1990s onwards. As foreign
companies invested in Cuba the realisation formed in Russia that their
pre-eminent position within the Cuban economy had been lost and their
desire to address this was one of the key reasons for the improvement in
relations between Moscow and Havana from the mid-1990s onwards.
As has been suggested in chapter 1 Vladimir Putin’s KGB past and trips
to North Korea and Cuba in the infancy of his Presidency caused concern
in the West to arise that the Russian Federation’s foreign policy may have
been returning to a more traditional Soviet stance. Moreover, this was not
helped by the fact that during his trip to the Caribbean island the Russian
President visited both the monument to the unknown Soviet soldier and
the highly contentious Lourdes listening post on the outskirts of the
Cuban capital. Did this mean that Marxist-Leninism would return to
prominence in Russian-Cuban relations in the twenty-first century to the
detriment of neoliberal economics that had been one of the factors in the
improvement of relations from the mid-1990s onwards?
The short answer to this question is a resounding no, as the Russian
President demonstrated during his trip to Cuba. The Cuban government
The Continuing Role of Ideology 69
may have been delighted about his visit with Granma stating “The visit of
excelentismo Mr Vladimir Putin and his important delegation is met with
the great joy of our people and is of great importance for relations be-
tween Cuba and the Russian Federation.”51 Moreover, Professor Eugenio
Larin, Director of Latin American Studies at the Institute of Cold War His-
tory of the Russian Academy of Sciences, has written, “A new stage in
Russian-Cuban Relations officially opened with the visit of the President
of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin between 13 and 16 December
2000.”52 This visit was unquestionably significant as Putin became the first
Russian leader to visit Latin America but it did not mean that Marxist-
Leninism was increasing in importance in the relationship. While on the
island Putin stated: “We lost a lot of positions which were a top priority
for both countries, and our Russian companies in Cuba have been re-
placed by Western competitors.”53 It appeared that the trend of improved
Russian-Cuban relations being partly based on economic reasons and not
Marxist-Leninism was continuing.
This was also borne out with the agreements signed during Putin’s
visit. It was announced that the Norilisk Nickel company was to invest
$300m in the nickel-ore processing plant at Las Camariocas in Holguin
province and a joint agreement to build diesel equipment for the Cuban
sugar industry was signed. Moreover an exchange deal for 2001 to 2005
involving Cuban sugar, rum, medicines and medical equipment being ex-
changed for Russian oil, machinery and chemicals was also signed.54
In light of this agreement the downturn in trade between Cuba and
Russia, illustrated by Figure 3.4, is surprising, but most certainly shows
The result is that the ideas of the neoliberal economic model are a signifi-
cant factor in Russia’s recent increased interest in the western hemisphere.
Moreover, Russia’s interest in Cuba began before the appearance of this
apparent anti-U.S. bloc in the region, which does not diminish the impor-
tance of neoliberal economics to the start of the upturn in Russian-Cuban
relations. However, it has undoubtedly had repercussions for Russian-
Cuban relations, as Cuba’s relationship with Venezuela has become vital
to the Cuban Revolution, not least as a source of oil which may only in-
crease in importance with the recent surge in the price of oil, and the Rus-
sian share of the Cuban trade has subsequently fallen. In the year 2000,
Venezuela replaced Spain as Cuba’s most important trading partner, as it
supplied almost 19 percent of the island’s total imports. Moreover, in the
year 2004 total trade between Cuba and Venezuela reached 1.368b pesos,
which was the first time since 1991, when trade between Cuba and the So-
viet Union had been 3.3b pesos, that trade between Cuba and any other
country had exceeded 1b pesos. In 2005, Cuban-Venezuelan trade contin-
ued to increase to over 2b pesos.58 Moreover, China has also become a sig-
nificant player in the Cuban economy with trade in 2005 reaching almost
1b pesos. In addition to this, Peking offers the most attractive interest
rates on loans to the Cuban government, which tend to be 3 percent per
annum over twenty years, which far exceeds what any other country can
offer.59 This has made trade with China economically advantageous for
Havana, as has its close political ties with Venezuela, but this has not sig-
nalled a reduction in Russian interest in the Cuban economy stimulated
by the effects of neoliberal economics. This was illustrated in 2002 when
Dr Juan Triana Cordai of the Centro de Investigaciones de la Economía
Cubana (CEEC) in Havana wrote, “In 2001 Cuba had commercial links
with 166 countries. Venezuela, Spain, Canada, Russia and China are the
five principle countries that Cuba traded with in 2001.”60
Moreover, in 2002 Cuba remained Russia’s second largest trading part-
ner in Latin America and in 2005 its sixth. In March 2003 Leonid Reyman,
Russian Minister of Communication and Information Technology, spoke
of this trend while in Cuba when he said, “We are worried about a slow-
down in the bilateral trade and economic relations and we would like to
reverse the process with the Cuban side.”61 Reyman’s presence in Cuba il-
lustrated that it was hoped that Informational Technology and telecom-
munications could be part of this desired improvement. In addition, dur-
ing the previous year an international trade fair had been held in the
Cuban capital, which ten Russian companies had attended. Raúl de la
Nuez, Cuban Minister of Foreign Trade, had commented upon this when
he said, “Our countries have years of long good traditions of trade and co-
operation. Russia is one of the 10 biggest trade partners of Cuba.”62 In
2003 Russia was again represented at this fair with the Volga Car factory,
72 Chapter 3
VAZ, having one of the most prominent exhibits at it.63 These trade fairs
illustrate that despite the decrease in trade it remains significant for both
countries and Russia has by no means lost interest in the Cuban economy.
In addition, the presence of the different types of Russian companies at
these trade fairs also illustrate that economic ties between Havana and
Moscow have diversified. As suggested this includes IT but also projects
involving gas and oil fields, which would revolutionise the relationship,
are also desired. In February 2005, Fidel Castro told Grigory Elkin, head
of Russian Federal Technical Regulation and Metrology Agency that Rus-
sia could enter energy projects in Cuba and that they would like to pur-
chase electric generators from Russia. In February 2007, the Russian oil
company Gazprom (GAZP) and India’s Oil and Natural Gas Cooperation
(ONGC) discussed the possibility of joint work in Cuba while Jorge
Martínez, Cuban ambassador to Russia, said that the car industry and
modernization of railroads were also projects that Russia could become
involved in. The continuing Russian interest in the Cuban economy was
further illustrated in May 2005 when 132 Russian companies from the
Moscow area attended a Cuban trade fair held in the Russian capital and
Russian companies such as Grupo GAZ, Salyut, RusiaAutomotriz,
Zvezda S.A, Transchemexport S.R.L and Rosoboronexport all attended
the international trade fair held in Havana in November 2006. Ricardo
Alarcón, President of the Cuban National Assembly, spoke of his desire
for economic relations between Russia and Cuba to improve during his
trip to Moscow in late 2006, and moreover an agreement was signed in
April 2007 over the production of enriched food.64 Cuba has also pur-
chased two Russian made IL 96-300 airplanes, which have been partly
funded by a £200m credit from a syndicate of Russian banks, illustrating
their confidence in the Cuban economy. Moreover, further agreements on
the Cuban purchase of Russian made planes have recently been signed. In
a similar manner, in September 2006 Russian Prime Minister Mikhail
Fradkov signed a £355m grant with the Cuban government for the pur-
chase of Russian goods.65
In 2007, the official publication of the Cuban Chamber of Commerce
commented, “In short, it can be said that the following 10 countries have
been among the top countries of Cuba’s foreign trade in recent years:
Venezuela, Spain, China, Canada, Holland, Russia, Italy, Brazil, Mexico
and France. More than 70 percent of the country’s trade exchange is car-
ried out with these countries.”66 More than fifteen years after the disinte-
gration of the Soviet Union, Russian’s inclusion on this list was remark-
able and not what would have been expected in 1992. Furthermore and
very interestingly on 31 July 2007 the Cuban Economic Press Service
stated, “Russia, the principle nation of the former Soviet Union, is inter-
ested in increasing its commercial ties with the island.”67 This would ap-
The Continuing Role of Ideology 73
pear to suggest that Russian interest in the Cuban economy has most cer-
tainly not waned and if anything trade between the two countries might
increase in the future.
This diversification of economic ties between the two countries has also
included tourism, with Jorge Martínez commenting, “Investment in
tourism and hotel business might become a major sphere of cooperation
in the future.”68 In 1996 the ‘Latina’ travel agency opened in Moscow that
specialised in travel to Latin America and in addition, the Russian travel
agencies Atlantic Travel Agency, Atlas and Druzhina have all opened of-
fices in Havana. Moreover, in August 1999 the airline companies Air
France and KLM began flying routes from Russia to Havana with
stopovers in Paris and Amsterdam respectively. In December 1999
Aeroflot and Cubana began their own joint service from Russia to Cuba.69
Russian tourists may only make up a very small percentage of the total
number of tourists visiting the island, 1.5 percent in 1994 and less than 1 per-
cent in 2005, but as Figure 3.5 illustrates their number has steadily increased.
The introduction of the Air France, KLM and joint service from Aeroflot and
Cubana has undoubtedly made travel from Russia to Cuba easier, as is the
fact that Russians do not require visas to travel to Cuba. Moreover, the ap-
pearance of more wealthy Russians who can afford vacations in the
Caribbean has also helped this increase. In addition, in January 2004 Ernesto
Senti, acting Minister for Foreign Investments and Economic Cooperation,
stated that tourism was an area that it was hoped could be expanded. This
was shown in January 2007 when Mario Fernández, head of the Cuban
Tourism Foreign Relations department, stated that it was hoped that soon
100,000 Russian tourists would be visiting the island each year. Moreover, in
March 2007 a number of Russia tour operators attended the presentation of
the Cuban tourist board (MINTUR) at the Inturmarket Fair held in the Rus-
sian capital.70 Furthermore, and interestingly the Official Portal of Tourism,
Cubatravel.cu, has a Russian language option, further illustrating the im-
portance that the Cuban government attaches to Russian tourists.71
CONCLUSIONS
NOTES
11. In 1990, Cuba’s GDP fell by 2.5 percent, 1991 by 10.1 percent, 1992 by 10.2
percent and 1993 by 13 percent. “1990–2005: Depresión, crisis, reanimación” IPS, Año
18, No. 22, 30 November 2005, 20. This was also illustrated by the falling calorie
consumption of the Cuban population at this time and that in August 1993 the is-
land had been experiencing twelve hours a day with no power due to fuel short-
ages. Delai Luisa López García,”Economic Crisis, Adjustments and Democracy in
Cuba,” in Cuba in the 1990s, ed. José Bell Lara, (Havana: Editorial Jose Marti, 1999),
23. Elena Díaz González, “Cuban Socialism: Adjustments and Paradoxes,” in Cuba
in the 1990s, 60. Castro’s illegitimate daughter Alina Revuelta has written on the
effects that the end of the socialist bloc had for Cubans’ daily lives and the ways
that they attempted to cope with this. Alina Revuelta Fernández, Castro’s Daugh-
ter: An Exile’s Memoir of Cuba, (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1999), 217–19.
12. Recently Castro has commented upon the 1994 balsero crisis and the reasons
for it when he said, “The exodus of 1994 was brought on by the Soviet crisis, the
fall of the USSR, the beginning of the special period in Cuba.” Fidel Castro and
Ignacio Ramonet, My Life, (London: Allen Lane, 2007), 341.
13. Nadya Plankton, “Inferiority complex of Post-pioneers.” Paper presented at the
Symposium “Cuba, Russia and the Post-Soviet Experience,” the University of
Connecticut, Conn, February 2007, 3. Igor Ivanov, “Russian Diplomacy’s Latin
American Vecotr, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18 September 1999, 6.
14. A. Glinkin, “After Perestroika” Hemisphere. Volume 4, Number 2, (Win-
ter/Spring 1992), 14. Yury Petrov, “Latin America’s Relations with Russia and
Other Former Socialist Republics. Implications for U.S. Policy” North-South: The
Magazine of the Americas, Volume 2, Number 4, (December 1992–January 1993), 6.
15. Dr Rodolfo Humpierre of Centro de Estudios Europeos (CEE) in Havana
made this point to me about new Russian companies in the early 1990s being pre-
pared to trade with Cuba but only under new terms of trade during an interview
conducted in Havana on 14 February 2008 in Havana. The internal Russian situa-
tion was so grave at this time that Professor Nikolai Ivanov, Deputy Director of
the Center of Latin American Studies at the Institute of Cold War History of the
Russian Academy of Sciences, said it looked like Russia “may not survive.” Pro-
fessor Ivanov expressed these sentiments to me during discussion in Moscow on
9 January 2008. S. Lavrov, Latinskaia America, No. 1 2006, 3.
16. Pavlov, “Russian Policy Towards Latin America and Cuba,” 253. A. Er-
makov, “Cuba desde la nueva perspectiva de Moscú,” Hispano Americano, Numero
2599, (21 February 1992): 33. Andrei Kozyrev, Preobrazhenie, (Moscow: ‘Mezh-
dunov otnoshenii,’ 1995), 269–70.
17. Professor Eugenio Larin, Director of Latin American Studies at the Institute
of Cold War History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, used this phrase to de-
scribe the former Russian President during an interview conducted in Moscow on
9 January 2008. V. I. Vorotnikov, former Soviet ambassador to Cuba, has also
blamed Yeltsin for the problems which the Cuban Revolution was experiencing at
this time, which is not surprising due to his close association with it from the So-
viet era. V. I. Vorotnikov, Gavana-Moskva: pamiatnye gody, (Moscow: Fend imeni I.
D. Sytina, 2001), 390.
18. Tsipko, “From Totalitarianism to Democracy,” 27.
78 Chapter 3
19. For this type of reporting see for example Granma, 2 January 1992, 4 and
Granma, 3 January 1992, 4. F. Laguera in Bohemia wrote about the economic strug-
gle that most Russians faced and that state pensions were simply not enough to
survive on due to the spiralling prices. F. Laguera, “Especulación callejera” Bo-
hemia, 31 July 1992, 15–17. In 1993 Sofía Hernández Marmal, a researcher at the
Center of European Studies in Havana, wrote, “the Russian economy is in ruins.”
Sofía Hernández Marmal, “El conflicto de pobres en Rusia: herencia y desafío,”
Revista de Estudios Europeos, Nos. 25–26, (January–June 1993): 7. Ariel Dacal Díaz,
“Rusia: el sueno postergado de una ‘gran potencia,” Revista de Estudios Europeos,
(September–December 2001): 69. Fidel Castro, “Main Report to the 5th Congress of
the Communist Party of Cuba,” Main Report. Speech at the Closing the 5th Congress
of the Communist Party of Cuba, (Havana: Editora Política, 1998), 32–33. Fidel Cas-
tro, “Master Lecture at the autonomous university of Santa Domingo,” 24 August
1998. De Gorbachov a Yeltsin. Correra Rusia la misma suerte que le Union Sovietica? (Ha-
vana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales) 78–84. Fidel Castro, Una Revolución Solo Puede ser
Hija de la Cultura y las Ideas, (Havana: Editora Política, 1999), 23. A number of articles
appeared in Bohemia throughout the 1990s written by Eleana Claro which were
highly critical of the situation in Russia. For this see: “Expediente Peligroso,” Bo-
hemia, 28 February 1992, 46–47. “Jornada difícil,” Bohemia, 13 November 1992, 42–43.
“De galgos, podencos y abedules,” Bohemia, 5 July 1996, 45–47.
20. Hernández, “El conflicto de podres en Rusia,” Revista de Estudios Europeos
(January–June 1993): 9. Humpierre made this comment about Kozyrev during an
interview conducted in Havana on 14 February 2008 in Havana. Francisco Brown
Infante, “La política exterior rusa en el periodo 1991–2000. Del romance con Occi-
dente a la búsqueda de un mundo multipolar,” Revista de Estudios Europeos, (Jan-
uary–April 2001): 22–23.
21. Havana Cuba Vision Network in Spanish 0027 GMT 11 August 1994, FBIS-
LAT-94-155 FL1108133194.
22. José Bell Lara, Globalization and the Cuban Revolution, (Havana: Editorial José
Marti, 2002), 52.
23. “Falleció ex presidente ruso Boris Yeltsin,” Granma Digital, 23 April 2007. In-
terestingly, Castro has recently commented upon Yeltsin when he said, “back then
we had a high opinion of him, because of his radicalism. This was quite some time
before the disaster of the [Soviet Union’s] disintegration.” Castro and Ramonet,
My Life, 364.
24. M. Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, (Cambridge: Blackwell Publish-
ers, 2000). Richard Gilprin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International
Economic Order. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). R. N. Gwayne, and
C. Kay, Latin America Transformed. Globalization and Modernity, (London: Oxford
University Press, 1999). R. Robertson, The Three Waves of Globalisation. A History of
Developing Global Conscousiness. (Nova Scotia: Zed Books, 2003).
25. R. Munck, “Neoliberalism, necessitarianism and alternatives in Latin Amer-
ica: there is no alternative (TINA)?” Third World Quaterly, Vol. 24, No. 3, (2003):
495–511. R. L. Harris, “Resistance and Alternatives to Globalization in Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean,” Latin American Perspectives, Issue 127, Vol. 29, No. 6, (No-
vember 2002): 136–51. Robert C. Dash, “Globalization. For Whom and for What,”
Latin American Perspectives, Issue 103, Vol. 25, No. 6, (November 1998): 52–54.
The Continuing Role of Ideology 79
Ostrava svobody, (Moscow: Veche, 2006), 294. E.A. Larin, Latinskaia Amerika is-
torii.vtoraya polovina XX Veka. (Moscow: Nauka, 2004) 134. S. Batchikov, “The Cuba
That We are Losing and Everyone Else is Finding.” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 No-
vember 1997, 2. Moreover, the title of this article is also significant as it illustrates
the feelings that some people within Russia had about the loss of their pre-emi-
nent position within the Cuban economy, as companies from other countries in-
vested in the island. Dr Rodolfo Humpierre stated this during an interview con-
ducted in Havana on 14 February 2008 in Havana.
41. Boris Yeltsin, Midnight Diaries, (New York: Public Affairs, 2000), 200.
42. Humpierre, interview conducted on 14 February 2008 in Havana.
43. S. Batchikov, “Rossiisko-Kubinskie otnosheniia: retropektiva, nas-
toiashchee, perspektiva,” Rossiiskii ekonomicheskii zhurnal, No. 11 (1994), 38, 45.
44. For the dramatic fall in Russian tobacco production see I. Glasov, G. Kara-
Murza and A. Batchikov, El Libro Blanco. Las reformas neoliberales en Rusia,
1991–2004, (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2007) 119. Izvestia, 19 May
1999.
45. Professor Eugenio Larin stressed the particular importance of both sugar
and the creation of the Russian-Cuba Commission on Commercial, Economic, Sci-
entific and Technical Cooperation for Russian-Cuban relations during an inter-
view held in Moscow on 9 January 2008. Batchikov, “The Cuba That We are Los-
ing,” 1997, 2. Cronología de Cuba 1996, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MINREX), 32.
46. Cuba may have been exporting more goods to Russia than it was importing
but it did still import goods, and particularly machinery. In 1996, it was reported
that 450 ChMZAP8335 trailers were imported from Russia. Inzhenernaya Gazeta,
No. 6 1996, 2. Moscow Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 26 September 1996, 5.
47. C. Mesa-Lago and J. Pérez-López, Cuba’s Aborted Reform, 33–35. Interfax in
English 1753 GMT 6 June 1997.
48. Ilya Bulavinov, “Détente at Rosvooruzheniye,” Kommersant, 24 September
1998, 2.
49. Granma International, 17 April 1996, 13.
50. Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 2006. (Washington DC: International
Monetary Fund), 409.
51. Granma, 13 December 2000, 1.
52. Eugenio Larin, Politicheskaia istorii Kuba XX Veka. (Moscow: Visshaya
shkola, 2007), 164.
53. L. Newman, “Cuba, Russia Seek New Post-Cold War Relationship.” 1999,
see http//.www.cnn.com (24 February 2003).
54. This agreement involved Russia supplying $25–32m rolled steel prod-
ucts, $10-20m spare parts for agricultural machinery, $25–40m spare parts for
the motor and railroad transport, 100,000–150,000 tons of mineral fertilizers,
5,000–6,000 oil plant protective chemicals, 100,000–150,000 sets of car tyres and
$60–80m worth of other goods. Cuba was to supply $10–40m worth of medi-
cines, vaccines and medical equipment, 2,000–5,000 nickel and cobalt products,
4–9m cigarettes and $60–80m worth of citrus fruits, citrus concentrates, rum and
other products. Moscow Interfax in Eng 1203 GMT 22 March 01 FBIS-SOV 2001
0322027 CEP20010322000270.
55. Granma, 29 April 2005, 1.
The Continuing Role of Ideology 81
83
84 Chapter 4
nomic aid that Cuba received as the Soviet economy continued to under
perform despite the implementation of perestroika.5
It could therefore be seen that this downturn in relations in the years
from 1992 to 1994, and apparent lack of a Soviet legacy, was in fact a con-
tinuation of what had taken place during the Gorbachev era of Soviet-
Cuban relations and was consequently a legacy from this period if not
earlier ones. However, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union this
process unquestionably accelerated, as these feelings which may have
been fermenting for some time were suddenly brought to the surface
without fear of recrimination. Moreover, Cuba’s association not only with
the mistakes of past discredited Soviet regimes but also a political and
economic system which many Russians were delighted to see confined to
history only accelerated this process, as did both the removal of Marxist-
Leninism from the relationship and improved relations with the West be-
ing top of Moscow’s foreign policy priorities. In relation to the lack of re-
form on the island, the continued refusal of the Cuban government to
embrace reform in light of the fundamentally altered nature of interna-
tional relations in the 1990s simply made it an anachronism to many.
These feelings within Russia were very evident in 1992 with both the cre-
ation of the anti-Castro group Cuba Union and the publication of Eve of
Collapse, as detailed in the previous chapter.6
In addition to this, and most certainly a legacy from the Gorbachev pe-
riod, but also earlier ones in the Soviet era, was the low importance that
the Kremlin attached to relations with Cuba. Apart from some noticeable
exceptions, predominantly the period of the relationship’s inception and
the Cuban Missile Crisis, Cuba had never been at the top of the Soviet
government’s priorities. Relations with Washington and internal policies
were of more importance. This continued in the years from 1992 to 1994
when Russia was undergoing fundamental internal change in conjunction
with the importance of improved relations with the United States for the
Kremlin further explains the downturn in the relationship in these years.
As has been suggested the break in relations between Havana and
Moscow in 1992 was so swift and decisive that it appeared that a general
Soviet legacy did not exist. This is however, not completely accurate as the
continued presence of Soviet-designed Lada cars on Cuban roads, the use
of Russian names such as Olga, Niurka, Boris and even Vladimir on the
island and Lenin Park in the suburbs of Havana all testify to. Old Havana
may be a World Heritage sight, in no small part due to the Spanish colo-
nial architecture, but on the outskirts of the Cuban capital much less aes-
thetically appealing Soviet era housing blocs remain and the Miramar dis-
trict of Havana continues to be dominated by the former Soviet and now
Russian embassy. In short, despite the spectacular break in relations in
1992 a Soviet legacy does exist in Cuba and it is a vital component in
86 Chapter 4
As detailed in chapter 3 the final remaining troops from the former Red
Army returned to Russia from Cuba in the summer of 1993, but this by no
means heralded the end of Russian citizens living and working in Cuba.
A number of Russians remained on the island after this as a result of mar-
riage, which is again not surprising due to the long duration and the num-
ber of Soviet citizens who had visited Cuba while Soviet-Cuban relations
had existed. This process was repeated as a number of Cubans attempted
to remain in Russia in the 1990s rather than return to the Caribbean, as
outlined in chapter 3. This is significant as it not just illustrates that de-
spite appearances in 1992 a complete break in relations between Havana
and Moscow did not take place, but also due to intermarriage it resulted
in the appearance of a number of palavinos. This is the Cuban term for chil-
dren born on the island who have Cuban and Russian parents.
The importance of this is increased as it is partly as a result of inter-
marriage and the existence of palavinos that Cuba possesses a unique Rus-
sian speaking ability in Latin America. It is this, in conjunction with the
legacy of the education programmes that existed during the Soviet era
which saw many Cubans learn Russian with some believing this could be
as high as 20 percent of the population, and many Russians Spanish, that
explains this phenomenon. In 1996 when Yevgeny Primakov, the Russian
Foreign Minister, was in Cuba K. Khachaturov, President of Russian Com-
mission of Cooperation with Latin America, wrote about these Cubans
who had been educated in the Soviet Union as their “experience and
knowledge may be used successfully for the development of economic
and trade as well as scientific and technical ties.”7 This Russian language
ability not only eased the various types of talks that took place in the
1990s, but would also increase in importance at the beginning of the
twenty-first century as the Russian Federation became increasingly inter-
ested in Latin America. This will be analysed in more detail in the next
chapter.
In the aftermath of the break-up of the Soviet Union the Russian Feder-
ation became its legal successor, which did not only mean that Russia
gained the Soviet seat on the Security Council of the United Nations (UN)
and that throughout the world the Russian flag replaced the Soviet one
above former Soviet embassies but also that Boris Yeltsin’s government
inherited the debt which many countries, but particularly ones in the De-
veloping World, owed to Moscow. Cuba was certainly no different and
The Soviet Legacy 87
the generous levels of aid and assistance which Moscow had supplied to
Havana during the Soviet era had been both very important for the Cuban
Revolution but had also become increasingly contentious once glasnost
had begun to impact on the relationship. However, the debt that Havana
owed to Moscow would be both highly significant in relations between
the two countries in the 1990s and also cast a long shadow over them.
After 1991 not only was payment of the debt not forthcoming but the
two countries could not agree on the actual level of the debt, the currency
it was to be paid in or even the exchange rate that was to be used to cal-
culate it. In January 1995, a Russian State Duma hearing on Russian-
Cuban relations was held and in the Sevodnya report on this the journalist
Leonid Velekhov wrote, “The Russian side (and it is not alone; interna-
tional estimates are similar) puts Cuba’s debt at 17 billion transferable
rubles, which according to accepted practice is equivalent to the same
number of dollars. Cuba insists that its debt be calculated at a ratio of one
dollar to 50 transferable rubles.”8
Cuba’s debt to Russia was both a legacy from the Soviet era but also an
important reason in explaining the relationships continuation. Moreover,
the fact that it was a topic that the two countries continually discussed
throughout the 1990s meant that the relationship between Havana and
Moscow was never completely severed. The chances that Moscow would
be repaid were very small if not negligible due to the economic crisis that
engulfed the Caribbean island at this time, but if relations between the
two countries had been completely terminated the slim chance that it may
be repaid would have completely disappeared. As the Russian Federation
was also experiencing economic difficulties at this time, this was some-
thing that Moscow simply could not afford to do. In the aftermath of the
Cuban Missile Crisis, Moscow had been unable to cut its links with Ha-
vana due to the economic implications for the Soviet Union, and in a not
identical, but similar way the Russian Federation could also not afford to
write off the Cuban debt. This was shown by the fact that at the Russian
State Duma hearings it was even suggested that the Russian Federation
could be paid in the form of real estate and land on the island rather
than in hard currency.9 This may not have been the ideal scenario for
Russia, but it would have at least meant that the debt had been hon-
oured. The result was that an old pressure from the Soviet era appeared
to be re-emerging to impact on the relationship.
The debt may have been a controversial issue between Havana and
Moscow at this time, but it was not the most high-profile example of a
legacy from the Soviet era existing in the years immediately after 1991.
Moscow’s decision to keep the listening post at Lourdes on the outskirts
of Havana open was not just important for Russian-Cuban relations but
was also a large bone of contention between Moscow and Washington
88 Chapter 4
throughout the 1990s. Officially the Russian government stated that Lour-
des was “necessary in order to maintain stable communications with our
embassies in Latin America,”10 but by making this decision Moscow ob-
viously attached much importance to the information that they continued
to acquire from this facility. It also illustrated that relations between
Moscow and Washington, although undoubtedly improved, were per-
haps not as cordial as may at first appear. Moreover, the facility also acted
as a counterweight for Moscow to NATO expansion to the east. This will
be examined in chapter 5. However, with the end of the Cold War the U.S.
administration could not understand why the Russian Federation did not
close Lourdes.
In addition to this, and in light of the economic embargo against the is-
land being tightened still further in the 1990s in an attempt to herald the
end of the Castro regime, Washington was also unhappy with the fact that
Lourdes proved a valuable source of income for the Cuban government.
Initially the Cuban government had hoped to receive $1b a year in rent
from Russia for the use of Lourdes but eventually in November 1994 a
compromise deal was signed by Colonel General M. Kolesnikov, Russian
Chief of General Staff, while he was in Havana. This agreement stated
that Cuba would receive $200m a year and this would be paid in the form
of fuel, timber and spare parts for equipment which included military
equipment. Russia was delighted with this agreement and Sevodnya even
described this as a “rather modest sum.”11 The Cuban government may
have been hoping to receive a larger amount of money but due to their
economic situation it was still invaluable for the Caribbean island.
In relation to this and due to the nature of relations between Moscow
and Havana the source of both military hardware and industrial machin-
ery for Cuba during the Soviet era had been the socialist bloc countries
but particularly the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Soviet Union had also
supplied over 80 percent of the cars found on Cuban roads.12 As the 1990s
progressed this equipment became increasingly old and therefore in need
of repair, which resulted in Cuba requiring spare parts as the Castro
regime could most certainly not afford to replace this equipment due to
the economic problems which had befallen the island with the end of
Soviet-Cuban relations. However, these spare parts were becoming in-
creasingly difficult to find and Russia paying for the use of Lourdes in
kind, and especially spare parts, was a vital source of these for the
Caribbean island. Besides this, the Soviet equipment had proved to work
well in Cuban conditions and, in direct relation to this, the island’s work-
ers had been both trained to use this equipment and were also familiar
with it as it had been used on the island for a number of decades. This
made the continuation of its use appealing to the Cuban government, but
in conjunction with not being able to afford replacements it increased the
The Soviet Legacy 89
was most certainly the case with production of sugar which continued to
fall throughout the 1990s. The effect of this was to only increase the sig-
nificance of the purchase of Cuban sugar for Moscow. In addition to this,
during the Soviet era sugar refineries were able to work in a constant
twelve-month cycle due to the import of Cuban sugar as a result of the So-
viet and Cuban sugar harvests being at different times of the year. The
loss of this only further reduced Russia’s already poor agricultural out-
put.18 In the fast changing world of the 1990s, as both the Russian and
Cuban economies struggled to adapt to the new global situation oil for
sugar swaps were not just beneficial due to both cost and the lack of al-
ternative sources of these commodities for Russia and Cuba but it also
provided a very much needed semblance of stability for both countries,
while illustrating the existence of pragmatism within both governments.
It appeared somewhat ironic that the Russian purchase of Cuban sugar
as a result of it being more competitively priced than other sources was an
important reason for the continuation of the relationship in the post 1991
period as the price that Moscow paid for this commodity had attracted
much criticism in the final years of the Soviet era. This was despite both
Cuban attempts to reduce dependency on the Soviet Union and also the
terms of trade turning against the Caribbean island at this time. Even as
late in the Soviet period as August 1991, V. Churkin, Soviet Minister of
Foreign Economic Cooperation, had stated in an interview that economic
relations between Moscow and Havana were “doomed” to continue. This
was despite them being greatly affected by the Soviet reform processes,
but his attitude was synonymous with the negative feelings felt by many
within the Soviet Union at this time about both trade being conducted
with Cuba and Cuban-Soviet relations in general. However, the realisa-
tion had quickly formed in Russia after 1992 that contrary to this belief the
continuation of relations, due to the nature of Soviet-Cuban relations, was
in fact beneficial to both countries. In 1997, Olga Gridchina, a Russian
economist who lives and works in Cuba, likened the importance of sugar
for Russian-Cuban relations to that of oil in the relationship between the
United States and Saudi Arabia.19 The irony is still further increased as
Cuba’s traditional export since colonial times was still of the utmost sig-
nificance for the island and its relationship with Russia at the end of the
twentieth century. It appeared that Cuba was still heavily dependent on
this primary product.
The importance of trade with Cuba for the Russian Federation was
shown in 1992 by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations’s
reaction to the Cuban Democracy Act, or Torricelli Bill, that aimed to
tighten the U.S. embargo against the Caribbean island. In an interview
with Izvestia, a spokesmen from this ministry said, “there is a possibility
that Russia can circumvent the US embargo. The trick is to charter ships
The Soviet Legacy 91
vital to the Cuban Revolution, not least the Russian supply of oil, as the is-
land struggled to adapt to the loss of its closest economic and political ally.
As has been stated, it is not unusual for some semblance of a relation-
ship to continue between two countries which have a history such as that
which had existed between Moscow and Havana, as in many ways it is
simply easier for it to continue rather than attempt to cultivate links with
other countries. The title of Velekhov’s 22 December 1993 article in Sevod-
nya, “Old Friends: Russia and Cuba. It seems They Are Brothers Forever
After All,” certainly suggests this to be the case.25 However, the military
in both countries also played a part in this. In the 1990s with the Cold War
confined to history both militaries suffered a downturn in their fortunes.
However, a continuation of relations between Moscow and Havana was
an illustration of their more glorious past, and when this is coupled with
the very close ties that existed between them throughout the Soviet era, a
number of Soviet military officials had been members of the “Cuban
lobby,” it again provided evidence of both a Soviet legacy and also the im-
portance of the relationship that developed between the two countries in
the period after 1991. In November 1993 Izvestia stated that the Russian
military were fighting to keep their presence in Cuba. Lourdes remaining
open certainly showed this as did General Kolesnikov’s visit to Cuba in
November 1994, because the number of such visits had fallen drastically
with the end of the Soviet era.26
In the years immediately after the termination of Soviet-Cuban rela-
tions it may have appeared that a legacy from the Soviet era did not exist
in the relationship between Moscow and Havana, but the reality was
somewhat different, as it not only existed but was in fact multifaceted. It
included Russians remaining in Cuba and Cubans in Russia, the listening
post at Lourdes not being closed with the end of the Cold War, Russia be-
ing a more than willing vendor of spare parts for Soviet era machinery
that continued to be used in Cuba and close ties between the two mili-
taries. In addition, the legacy also comprised both Havana’s debt to
Moscow accumulated during the Soviet era, which Russia had inherited
on becoming the legal successor to the Soviet Union, and also that quickly
the realisation had formed in both countries that it was easier and cheaper
for oil for sugar swaps to be conducted rather than either country attempt
to cultivate new trade links. This did not just highlight the existence of
pragmatism within both ruling elites but also benefited both countries
due to a lack of alternative sources for either commodity. Moreover, in
Latin America Cuba has a unique Russian language ability due to inter-
marriage and educational programmes from the Soviet era which made
the bi-lateral talks which did take place easier. It could have been thought
that some form of a legacy could have been expected due to the duration
and nature of Soviet-Cuban relations, but the legacy was a vital reason for
The Soviet Legacy 93
the fact that even as relations between Moscow and Havana suffered a
downturn in the years immediately after the disintegration of the Soviet
Union they were never completely severed.
Relations between Moscow and Havana may have deteriorated in the pe-
riod from 1992 to 1995 but they were never completely broken with a
legacy from the Soviet era being an important element in this. However
the legacy was also important as relations between the two countries im-
proved from the middle of the final decade of the twentieth century on-
wards and was particularly prominent at the aforementioned Russian
State Duma hearings on Russian-Cuban relations held in January 1995.
The very fact that these meetings were even convened illustrate that the
significance of relations with Cuba was becoming an increasingly impor-
tant topic within Russia and that attitudes towards the Caribbean island
were beginning to change. Perhaps unsurprisingly the Russian Commu-
nist Party under the leadership of Gennady Zyuganov were very sup-
portive of these meetings and called not only for the revival of economic
ties with Cuba, but also for those who had been responsible for their
downturn immediately after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which
had led to the “collapse of the Cuban economy,” to be prosecuted.27 The
Russian Communist Party, many of whom had been members of the
“Cuban lobby” during the Soviet era, would have continued to have felt
an ideological tie to the Cuban regime. This was apparent in both June
1998 when Zyuganov travelled to Cuba at the invitation of the Central
Committee of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) and met Fidel Castro
and also in April 2007 when Zyuganov was again in Havana and Carlos
Lage, member of the politburo of the PCC and then Vice-President of
Cuba, accepted a medal on behalf of Fidel Castro from the Russian Com-
munist Party for his “distinguished merits in the construction of socialism
and belief in the ideas of the October Revolution.”28 In addition to shared
ideological beliefs, members of Russian Communist party, as with the
military in both Russia and Cuba, would have also felt that improved re-
lations between Moscow and Havana would have illustrated the halcyon
days of the Soviet era. Again, it appeared that even in the mid-1990s a
legacy from the Soviet era had been a large driving force behind these
meetings being convened, but they illustrated the changing attitude in
Russia towards its relationship with Cuba.
In addition to these feelings of affinity, a legacy also existed from the
massive economic investment that the Soviet Union had made in the
Cuban Revolution for over thirty years, which was again very important
94 Chapter 4
events of late February and early March 2008 which saw Dmitri
Medvedev win the Russian Presidential elections and Raúl Castro perma-
nently succeed his brother as Cuban President. It could even be suggested
that due to Raúl’s military past and close association with the Russian
military for a number of decades, agreements between the Russian mili-
tary and FAR were signed throughout the 1990s, that the importance of
Russian-Cuban relations may increase for Havana in the future.32
Besides this, in November 1995, S. Tsyplakov, head of the Russian Fed-
eration Government Department of International Cooperation, pointedly
commented that Cuba was “tied” to Russia due to this legacy.33 This was
despite Cuba’s continued attempts to reduce its dependency on Moscow
throughout the Soviet era and the dramatic change in the composition of
the Caribbean island’s trading partners in the 1990s detailed in the previ-
ous chapter. As has been suggested some form of a relationship continu-
ing to exist between two countries which have a shared history such as
Russia and Cuba is not unusual but in this specific case due to the colos-
sal Soviet economic investment in the Caribbean island it appeared par-
ticularly strong, which has resulted in some of the pressures that had
formed the foundations of Soviet-Cuban relations re-emerging in the
1990s, but at a reduced level from those during the Soviet era. In addition,
it also highlighted the prevalence of pragmatism within both govern-
ments, but as with the continued purchase of Cuban sugar, it appeared
somewhat ironic that this legacy from the Soviet era was so significant in
Russian-Cuban relations in the 1990s as they had been so heavily criti-
cised in the final years of the Soviet Union. Moreover, some believed it
had been so powerful that it could even outlive the Castro regime in Cuba
and the then expected influx of U.S. dollars from the north. This economic
legacy from the Soviet era was of the utmost importance, and was vital to
the improvement in relations between Cuba and Russia from the mid-
1990s onwards.
It was this desire not to waste the investment in the Cuban economy
from the Soviet era, and wish to reclaim some of their lost influence in it,
that drove this phenomenon and not the result of the globalisation
process in general. As argued in the previous chapter, some Russian in-
terest in Cuba in the 1990s may have been expected due to globalisation,
but, if this had been the case it would be logical to think that at this time
Russian interest in the rest of Latin America would also have been at a
similar level to that which had taken place in Cuba. This, however, was
not the case and it was the wish to reclaim some of their lost influence in
the Cuban economy that was more significant. This situation only arose
due to investment from the Cold War era or as a result of the economic
legacy from the Soviet period, further illustrating its importance in the
upturn in relations.
96 Chapter 4
breaking off of relations with Havana after the Soviet collapse had been a
historical mistake. This was music to the ears of Fidel Castro (who wel-
comed Putin at Jose Marti Airport in person).”41
On the following day in the previously quoted article by Aleksei
Chichkin, the significance of the Soviet legacy was shown even more
clearly. Chichkin wrote, “Before reporting on the agreements reached in
Havana, let us recall that over the past 10 years or so, since the break-up
of the USSR, we have changed more than our ideology. For some reason,
we thought that the foreign economic interests of the new Russian state
would be completely different, and that there would be no place in them
for ties (mainly economic) with the allies of the former USSR. Russia vol-
untarily pulled out of markets in which it had operating for some time (an
unprecedented occurrence in world economic history), where our manu-
factured goods were and remain in great demand. Mongolia and Cuba
were among the first countries that we ‘abandoned.’ The only remaining
economic link between Moscow and Havana is ‘Russian oil for Cuban
raw sugar.’ Most of our sugar mills process Cuban raw sugar during the
winter months, after our own sugar beets have run out. So there was no
compulsion to apply ideological clichés to this sector. From an overall per-
spective, however, Russia’s long-term economic interests were sacrificed
to political expediency.”42
Also during his trip to Cuba the Russian premier presented the Order
of Friendship to Carlos Dortes, the Cuban Health Minister. This was
awarded to thank the Cuban nation for both its health and development
ties with Russia, and also due to the fact that by the year 2000 some 19,000
children who had been affected by the Chernobyl disaster in April 1986
had enjoyed a period of convalescence in the Caribbean paid for by the
Cuban government. This was important as it provided further evidence
for both the fact that relations between Moscow and Havana had never
been completely broken in the early 1990s and also the existence of a
legacy from the Soviet era. In addition, it was quite remarkable that this
program, which showed the Cuban government’s continued belief in in-
ternationalism, had remained in place when relations between the two
countries had soured in the early 1990s and especially as its cost may have
become prohibitive when the Cuban economy had deteriorated drasti-
cally after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.43
As outlined in the previous chapter, Cuba’s biotechnological industry
has in general been both very significant for the recovery of the island’s
economy, but also for Russian-Cuban relations specifically due to Russian
interest in it. Although not directly a part of the Soviet legacy, it is again
important as Moscow has attempted to use its links to the Cuban Revolu-
tion from the Soviet era to try and gain access to the island’s biotechno-
logical products. Moscow’s desire to do this was evident during Putin’s
The Soviet Legacy 99
trip to Cuba when the Russian President visited the Center for Genetic
Engineering and Biotechnology in Havana and that the agreements he
signed while on the island involved Russian goods being exchanged for
Cuban medical ones. The Cuban economist Hiram Marquetti has also
written of the importance of pharmaceutical goods for the relationship
and Russia’s interest in it was seen by the fact that during the 2006 inter-
national trade fair in Havana a special presentation and workshop was
held where the possibilities of increased collaboration in biotechnology
were discussed.44 This again illustrated the significance and power of the
Soviet legacy to the post 1991 relationship between Havana and Moscow
as the Russian government was even trying to use it, and their friendship
built up over a number of decades, to cultivate links to parts of the Cuban
economy that had only begun to come to fruition in the final years of the
Soviet era.
Cuba’s recent purchase of two Russian-made IL 96-300 airplanes may
again not be a direct result of the Soviet legacy with a variety of other rea-
sons being significant, particularly the £200m credit from a syndicate of
Russian banks that helped to fund this transaction, but it does play a part
in it.45 The confidence that this syndicate of banks has shown in the Cuban
government would have been acquired over a period of time and the long
history of relations between Moscow and Havana will certainly not have
harmed this process. Moreover, as with Soviet era machinery in general
which had worked very well in Cuban conditions so too had Soviet
planes and in addition the island’s pilots and mechanics have consider-
able experience of working with Russian and Soviet made aircraft, many
of which were used for a considerable time period after the end of Soviet-
Cuban relations, and this will only have made the purchase of these
planes more appealing to the Cuban authorities.
The improvement in relations between Moscow and Havana and the
agreements signed between the two countries have been very important
for the Cuban Revolution as it has struggled to adjust to the loss of the So-
viet Union. In December 2000 during Putin’s trip to the Caribbean island
Fidel Castro commented upon the agreements signed when he said they
“reaffirm the traditional sentiments of friendship between our two peo-
ples.”46 Moreover, the Cuban academics Graciela Chailloux, Rosa Lopez
and Silvio Baro have written with regards to Cuba’s relationship with
Eastern Europe, “the Cuban foreign policy objective—based on the con-
sideration that these countries had had friendly relations with Cuba for
three decades—is directed to foster bilateral relations in the prevailing
conditions based on the ever-present mutual respect, continuity of the re-
lationship in all possible fields and ways.”47 Specifically they believed
that relations with Russia were the most important as a result of the much
larger volumes of exchange involved in comparison to the other former
100 Chapter 4
the Soviet Union and also the presence of a legacy from the Soviet era in
it. This is unquestionably true, but as the importance of oil and sugar in
Russian-Cuban relations has fallen the relationship has evolved and other
ones such as nickel and biotechnological products have replaced these
products. This, however, does not reduce the significance of the Soviet
legacy in the relationship that has evolved from the mid-1990s, as it was
vital to the improvement in relations before this change regarding oil and
sugar took place, or the fact that it continues to play in the relationship at
the beginning of the twenty-first century.
CONCLUSIONS
As has been suggested, throughout history it has often been the case that
a legacy exists between two countries which have had a shared history
such as that which existed between Moscow and Havana during the Soviet
era. This by no means is to suggest that Cuba was a colony of the Soviet
Union, due in no small part to both the prevalence of nationalism in the
Cuban Revolution and repeated attempts by Havana throughout the So-
viet era to reduce its dependency on Moscow. Contrary to this, and in-
creasing the likelihood that a legacy would exist, is the fact that the
Caribbean island was ‘first among equals’ for many within the Soviet rul-
ing elite which had meant that it had received huge levels of aid and trade
but also some of the most up to date Soviet military and civilian hardware.
Therefore this makes the sudden and dramatic break in relations be-
tween the two former Cold War allies in the immediate aftermath of the
collapse of the Soviet Union, when it appeared that a legacy didn’t exist,
unusual. However, even this could be perceived as a legacy from the Gor-
bachev era of Soviet-Cuban relations if not earlier ones, when great
change had occurred and many Soviet citizens perception of the relation-
ship and Cuba itself had soured.
Although this was the case, even in the years 1992 to 1995 a complete
break in relations between Russia and Cuba did not take place with a
legacy from the Soviet era being vital to this. This took a number of forms
including citizens of both countries remaining in the other country and
not returning to the one of their birth. This heralded the appearance of a
number of palavinos, and this in conjunction with a legacy of Cubans
studying in the Soviet Union, resulted in Cuba having a unique Russian
language ability in Latin America and, due to Soviet-Cuban relations a
large number of Russians learnt Spanish. In addition to this, the pro-
gramme whereby children affected by the Chernobyl disaster enjoyed a
period of convalescence in Cuba continued and Moscow also took the de-
cision to keep the listening post at Lourdes open, which was perhaps the
104 Chapter 4
most high-profile example of relations not only continuing but also of the
legacy itself.
Besides this, a number of the pressures that had been of the utmost sig-
nificance for Soviet-Cuban relations began to re-emerge as the 1990s pro-
gressed, although at a reduced level when compared to the Soviet era.
This most certainly included the enormous debt that Havana had accu-
mulated to Moscow during the Soviet era and was both a further illustra-
tion of this legacy and a vital component to the relationship in the 1990s.
Moreover, the legacy also contained further economic aspects as the
Caribbean island required spare parts for Soviet era machinery that con-
tinued to be used on the island, and also the realisation formed that in
many ways it was easier, cheaper and beneficial for both countries that oil
for sugar swaps continue. This did not just show the existence of prag-
matism within both governments, but was also particularly ironic when it
had been the economic element of Soviet-Cuban relations that had been
so widely criticized within the Soviet Union in the final years of the So-
viet era. Moreover, the irony is further increased that despite Cuban at-
tempts to both reduce dependency on the Soviet Union during the Cold
War period and diversify their economy, sugar, their primary export since
colonial times, proved to be such an important aspect in the continuation
of relations between Moscow and Havana in the post 1991 period.
In relation to this, the fact some semblances of the relationship had sur-
vived the end of the Soviet-Cuban relations also partly explains the sur-
prising lack of comment made by the Cuban government about the un-
folding situation in Russia, because although not constrained by
diplomatic protocol as they had been during the Soviet era they did not
want to jeopardize the trade that was continuing. Not only was this a
legacy in itself from the Soviet era, but it was also vital for the ailing
Cuban economy at this time. In addition, trade with Russia was only
made easier due to the ties which had existed between Havana and
Moscow for over thirty years. Moreover, this Cuban reaction was yet an-
other example of the strong prevalence of realist pragmatism in the
Cuban Revolution.
The legacy did not only illustrate that the relations between Moscow
and Havana were never completely severed but they were also vital in the
improvement in the relationship from the mid-1990s onwards. In January
1995 hearings on Russian-Cuban relations were held in the Russian State
Duma and unsurprisingly it was members of the Russian Communist
Party who were particularly prominent in these as they would have felt
‘tied’ to the Cuban Revolution for ideological reasons but also as it illus-
trated their more glorious past. This was repeated by the military in both
respective countries. However, it also signalled a change in Russian citi-
zens’ thinking towards Cuba which was vital. Contrary to the belief in the
The Soviet Legacy 105
late Soviet era that relations were “doomed” to continue many began to
realize that there were in fact benefits for Russia of the continuation of its
relationship with Cuba and that it remained mutually beneficial to both
countries.
This was certainly the case with the Russian business community as the
realisation formed that the huge Soviet investment in the Cuban economy
was simply being wasted by the downturn in relations. A desire to ad-
dress this was important as relations improved. Again, a pressure from
the Soviet era was re-emerging. The legacy has also been significant as
Russia has also tried to use it to gain access to Cuba’s biotechnological in-
dustry despite it only coming to fruition in the final years of the Soviet
era. Moreover, it also partly explains the Cuban purchase of Russian
planes, which had been found to work well in Caribbean conditions, as
Cuban pilots and mechanics would have experience of working with Rus-
sian technology from the Soviet era.
Cuba’s debt has continued to be significant in the relationship despite
an agreement over both its payment and even its size failing to have been
reached. In 2005 Moscow even deferred its payment, but significantly did
not simply cancel it, illustrating that not only did the Russian government
hope it would be repaid, but also as it was the first time Moscow had done
this it also resulted in Cuba receiving very different treatment compared
to other countries. This was most certainly a legacy from the Soviet era.
During the 1990s as Russian foreign policy evolved it resulted in the
two countries having a similar shared political outlook and Moscow back-
ing Havana over its various disputes with Washington. Again this was no
different from the Soviet era and a further illustration of the existence of
a legacy. Also its importance was highlighted by various official visits to
each other’s respective countries, with the return of such visits highlight-
ing the improvement in the relationship.
As has been outlined, Russian citizens’ thinking towards Cuba began to
change as the 1990s progressed. This was repeated to a lesser extent in
Cuba but it has resulted in the appearance of a number of recent cultural
events. This has been remarkable and would certainly not have been ex-
pected in the early 1990s as cultural links between the two peoples had of-
ten been mocked during the Soviet era. It does however show the strength
and power of the Soviet legacy. This changing attitude in both countries
has been absolutely vital to the upturn in relations and due to the nature
of Soviet-Cuban relations it is not surprising that it has taken a number of
years for this to occur.
It has been suggested that Russia continuing to use the listening post at
Lourdes was the highest-profile example of both relations between Ha-
vana and Moscow never being completely severed and the Soviet legacy.
It has however disappeared as this facility was closed in January 2002.
106 Chapter 4
NOTES
29. S. Batchikov, “The Cuba That we are Losing and Everyone Else is Finding,”
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 14 November 1997, 2.
30. Aleksei Chichkin, “Mutual Interest Replaces External Friendship,” Rossi-
iskaya Gazeta, 16 December 2000, 1, 7. Professor Eugenio Larin also emphasised the
importance of the Russian desire to become more involved in the Cuban economy
due to having lost their pre-eminent position in it. Interview conducted in
Moscow on 9 January 2008.
31. Aleksei Bausin, “Cuban Poker: It’s America’s Turn,” Moskovskiye novosti,
No. 38., May 28–June 4 1995, 12.
32. Interview conducted in Moscow on 9 January 2008. Dr Rodolfo Humpierre
also stated that a change in the leadership of Russia in March 2008 was unlikely
to affect Russian-Cuban relations. Interview conducted in Havana on 14 February
2008 in Havana. In December 1998 an agreement between the two militaries was
signed by Raul Castro and General Anatoli Kvashnin while he was in Cuba.
Navarro and Martin Duarte Hurtado, Cuba: 42 años de Revolución, 315.
33. Sevodnya, 1 November 1995, 2.
34. Granma International, 5 June 1996, 3.
35. Larin used this description of the relationship during an interview con-
ducted in Moscow on 9 January 2008.
36. I. Ivanov, “Russian Diplomacy’s Latin American Vector, Nezavisimaya gazeta,
18 September 1999, 6.
37. L. Newman, “Cuba, Russia Seek New Post-Cold War Relationship,” 28 Sep-
tember 1999. See http://www.cnn.com (24 February 2003).
38. Gennady Charodeyev, “Moscow Takes New View of Isle of Freedom,” Izves-
tia, 20 January 1999, 3.
39. Chichkin, “Mutual Interest,” Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 16 December 2000, 1, 7.
40. ITAR-TASS News Agency, 15 September 2005.
41. Gregory Bovt, “Visit to a ‘Lennonist’—Vladimir Putin Visits Fidel Castro,”
Izvestia, 15 December 2000, 3.
42. Chichkin, “Mutual Interest,” Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 16 December 2000, 1, 7
43. Moscow ITAR-TASS in Eng 2051 GMT 15 December 00 FBIS LAT 20001216
CEP20001216000078. This project has since been stopped with the facilities used
by the children now housing foreign students studying in Cuba, but it was re-
markable that this project survived for so long after the disintegration of Soviet-
Cuban relations.
44. Granma, 16 December 2000, 1. Marquetti, “Cuba-Rusia: Situación actual y
perspectivas,” 1997, 17. “Celebración el Día de Rusia en Feria de la Habana,” El
Ruso Cubano, No. 5, 2 November 2006, 3–4.
45. “Russia banks syndicate $203m aircraft loan for Cuba,” RIA Novosti
22 December 2006. See http://rian.ru/business/20061222/7603049-print.html
(4 January 2007).
46. Granma, 15 December 2000, 1.
47. Graciela Chailloux, Rosa Lopez and Silvio Baro, Globalization and the Cuban-
U.S. Conflict, (Havana: Editorial José Marti, 1999), 193.
48. Ibid, 5. Valerie Morodev and Yu. Korchagen, “History of Russian-Cuban Re-
lations,” No. 7, 2002, 99–102. “Un acuerdo ruso-cubano en las esfera deportiva,”
The Soviet Legacy 109
El Ruso cubano, No. 5, 2 November 2006, 6. “Los rusos y el idioma ruso en Cuba,”
El Ruso cubano, No. 8, 29 December 2006, 7.
49. J. Loss, “Wandering in Russia,” presented at the Sixth Cuban Research In-
stitute (CRI) Conference on Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, Florida Interna-
tional University, 6 February 2006.
50. Ariel Dacal Díaz, “Rusia: el sueno postergado de una ‘gran potencia,” Re-
vista de Estudios Europeos, (September–December 2001): 70.
51. “Rusia: el sueno postergado de una ‘gran potencia, Para la mayoría de los
rusos Fidel Castro as una gran figura política,” El Ruso cubano, No. 1, 7 September
2006, 3.
52. These will be examined in more detail in chapter 5 but has included in May
1996 the downing of two planes owned by the exile group “Brothers in Arms,” the
situation that developed over Elian González between Havana and Washington in
the year 2000 and the further tightening of the embargo in 2004.
53. The announcement that this facility was to close was made in October 2001.
Granma, 18 October 2001: 1.
5
Washington and
the Wider World
A s has been previously detailed Cuba since the time of the Spanish
conquest has been dependent on various world powers which has
meant that events occurring outwith the island have always impacted on
it. This may have firstly resulted from the role that Spain and subse-
quently the United States played in Cuba, but more recently the relation-
ship that developed between Moscow and Havana during the Soviet era.
In relation to this, the foreign policy pursued by the Castro regime not
only further increased the significance of global events for the island but
also allowed Cuba during the Cold War to break traditional international
relations thinking and acquire a disproportionately large amount of in-
fluence on the global stage. This influence, in conjunction with Moscow’s,
may have waned in the aftermath of the implosion of the Soviet Union
and disintegration of Soviet-Cuban relations but this has not decreased
the significance of world events for the Caribbean island in general, or
more specifically its relationship with Moscow.
As outlined in chapter 2, since the victory of the Cuban Revolution and
inception of relations between Moscow and Havana, Washington has
made repeated attempts to both destroy the Cuban regime and bring
pressure to bear on Moscow regarding its relationship with Havana. Even
with the end of the Cold War, improved relations between Moscow and
Washington, the implosion of the Soviet Union and disappearance of So-
viet-Cuban relations, Washington has continued to act in this way. On this
William LeoGrande has written, “Before 1991, Cuba’s partnership with
the Soviet Union and ideological antagonism towards the United States
made it a serious issue for Washington. Aiding revolutionaries in Latin
111
112 Chapter 5
ation to develop in order to acquire the “help” of the United States in their
economic and political transition but its result was, as stated in chapter 3,
the appearance of the “Kozyrev Doctrine” which was not just very differ-
ent from Soviet foreign policy but was also very Western orientated. They
thought that the Developing World in general had been adversely affected
by this but that with regards to Cuba specifically Richard Dello has written,
“Cuba was almost immediately subjected to a wave of hostile measures on
the part of the United States as Washington sought to exploit the opportu-
nities afforded by the moment. Intense diplomatic pressure was placed on
the tenuous Yeltsin regime, demanding that Moscow cease all commerce
with Cuba. Washington even succeeded in winning a series of sharp criti-
cisms of the Cuban government from its newfound Russian ally.”6
The most public example of Washington attempting to influence
Moscow’s Cuba policy was also the most high-profile illustration of the
existence of the Soviet legacy in Russian-Cuban relations and the fact that
relations between Moscow and Havana were never completely severed
even in the years from 1992 to 1995; the listening post at Lourdes. As
stated, Washington could not understand why Moscow would want to
continue to covertly gather information on the U.S. with the Cold War
consigned to history. It not only illustrated that relations between the two
former superpowers were not as cordial as may first appear, but Russia’s
continued use of the facility provided the Cuban government with much
needed revenue as Washington attempted to economically ‘strangle’ the
Castro regime.
Washington’s desire to try and get this facility closed was most obvious
in 1996 with the Cuban Liberty and Solidarity Act, or Helms-Burton Act,
which the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MINREX) described as an il-
lustration “of the attempt to impose on Cuba the hegemonic and expan-
sionist ideas that persist in the minds of the ruling elite in the United
States.”7 This act attempted to not only prevent third-party countries in
general from trading with Cuba, but also contained a section that focused
solely on Russia. The act read, “the President shall withhold from assis-
tance provided . . . for an independent state of the former Soviet Union un-
der this Act an amount equal to the sum of assistance and credits, if any,
provided on or after such a date by such state in support of intelligence fa-
cilities in Cuba, including the intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba.”8
However, this did not seem to have the desired result for Washington
because Moscow had backed Cuba in the UN vote that condemned this
act, and as stated in chapter 3, the Russian government appeared to be
prepared to ignore this piece of legislation as a Russian Foreign Ministry
declaration stated, “We confirm our intention to develop and broaden
mutually beneficial cooperation with Cuba as well as sectors of mutual in-
terest, particularly in the commercial and economic sphere.”9
114 Chapter 5
occurring with Putin becoming Russian President but rather when Pri-
makov became Foreign Minister.13
In the face of increasing U.S. hostility that continued to offend Cuban
nationalism with the Cuban Chamber of Commerce describing the ongo-
ing embargo as, “the longest and cruellest in the history of mankind. An
economic war that qualifies as an act of genocide,”14 this alteration in
Moscow’s policies and the Kremlin’s refusal to bend to pressure from
Washington regarding its Cuban policy obviously delighted Havana.
Moreover, this was only helped by a shared belief between Cuba and Rus-
sia over the desire for a multipolar world. The Cuban government has
been continually critical of the appearance of a unipolar world and the ef-
fect that it has had on the Developing World.15 As a result of their long his-
tory of strained relations with the United States and their ideological
aversion to neoliberal economics, this is not surprising, but Russia also
wanting to see this situation come to an end was music to the ears of the
Cuban government.
In relation to this, and as has already been detailed, a diversification in
the island’s foreign policy had been a fundamental aspect in the way in
which the Cuban Revolution had been able to survive the collapse of the
socialist bloc. Closer relations with Moscow most certainly constituted
part of this. In September 1999, this shared belief in a multipolar world
was touched upon when the then Russian Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov,
travelled to Cuba and commented “Cuba and Russia support a multipo-
lar world order.”16 Moreover, in the twenty-first century the appearance
of the “Putin Doctrine” in Russian foreign policy, which as stated in chap-
ter 1 has some Soviet features but also nationalistic sentiments and anti-
Western reflexes, has only increased Moscow’s desire to witness the emer-
gence of a multipolar world. Closer ties with Havana certainly constituted
part of this but the result is that this common belief only made an im-
provement in relations between Havana and Moscow logical for both
governments.
The Helms-Burton Act and the UN vote condemning it did not end
Lourdes being a contentious issue between Washington and Moscow, or
discourage the United States attempting to change Russia’s policy by in-
creasing the pressure on the Kremlin. In March 2000 Congresswoman
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, one of three Cuban-American representatives from
Florida in the U.S. Congress, attempted to get the $200m that Russia paid
Cuba annually linked to Russia’s debt with the Paris Club of creditors. Yet
another illustration of the exiled community’s power and ability to shape
U.S.-Cuba policy.17 Moreover, the significance that Washington attached to
this facility was seen yet again in July 2000 when the United States Con-
gress stated that the Russian debt would not be rescheduled until Lourdes
was closed. This decision was deeply unpopular in Russia with the Rus-
Washington and the Wider World 117
cision had been made due to cost.30 This appeared somewhat strange as
in November 1994, when the agreement on Lourdes had been reached be-
tween Moscow and Havana, the $200m a year Russia paid for the use of
this facility was described by the Russian press as a “rather modest
sum.”31 The Cuban government certainly believed that cost was not the
main reason for this decision with Granma at the time stating that the
$200m, ‘was not an extraordinary figure if one considers that it is barely 3
percent of the damage to our country’s economy by the disintegration of
the Socialist bloc and the USSR’.32 More recently Castro has likened the
decision to close Lourdes to the agreement at the end of the Cuban Mis-
sile Crisis when he said of the agreement over Lourdes, “it was a fait ac-
compli—they informed us, hoping we’d go along.”33 This certainly leaves
no doubt that the Cuban leader believed that a bilateral agreement be-
tween Moscow and Washington had been reached regarding Lourdes. In
2007 very interestingly the Cuban academic Dr Rodolfo Humpierre
wrote, “Moscow has suffered a number of frustrations with its ‘prag-
matic’ approach. In the aftermath of 9/11 Moscow dismantled its elec-
tronic radio listening station in Cuba and its naval base at Cam-Rang in
Vietnam. The U.S. responded by installing an electronic radio espionage
center in Estonia and deploying a number of spy planes to the Baltics.”34
It appears that Cuba very much believes that Moscow’s decision regard-
ing Lourdes was not as simple as the Kremlin attempted to make it ap-
pear, that U.S. pressure had also had a part to play in it and that Russia
may have hoped that this decision may win it favour in the U.S., but that
this has not been forthcoming.
This decision not only questioned the idea of the existence of the “Putin
Doctrine” with it very much appearing that it was not cost that explained
Moscow’s decision but rather U.S. pressure. Putin certainly left himself
open to this accusation because in June 2001 he met Bush in Slovenia, and
although no official statement was made on Lourdes, many felt that
Washington had been able to exert pressure on him regarding this facility
as the announcement on it was made so soon after this meeting. In an in-
terview, Igor Rodionov, former Russian Defense Minister, said of this de-
cision, “The intelligence-gathering center on Cuba is a defensive installa-
tion that enabled Russia to monitor the airwaves throughout the Western
Hemisphere and make appropriate domestic and foreign policy decisions
based on reliable information. Closing the center strikes another blow to
the security of Russia and its allies, a blow inflicted by our own hand in
the interests of the U.S. and NATO.”35 The Russian press also believed this
to be the case, with Fydor Lukyanov and Aeksei Slobodin writing in Vre-
mya novostei, “The Russian President is heading to his meeting with
George W. Bush in Shanghai tomorrow with a gift that no one expected of
him at this particular juncture. Mosocow’s decision . . . to close the
120 Chapter 5
sia, including the March 2008 Presidential elections, and a lack of freedom
in the press, which Bush warned Putin about in 2005. Moreover, further
problems exist over Russian membership of the World Trade Organization
(WTO), illustrated in March 2006 by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey
Lavrov, who during a press conference with Condolezza Rice held in
Washington, stated, “we have expressed certain concerns of the Russian
side with regards to the slow process of Russia’s WTO accession since the
United States is the only country of today which has not yet signed the
protocol on Russia’s WTO accession.”41 Even more worrying has been
Moscow’s reaction to Washington’s proposed nuclear military shield being
located in Europe with Putin stating, “If part of the U.S.’s strategic nuclear
arsenal is located in Europe and our military experts find that it poses a
threat to Russia, we will have to take appropriate retaliatory steps.”42
In March 2008 Dmitrii Medvedev won the Russian Presidential elec-
tions, but as stated in chapter 1, it is unlikely that his Presidency will her-
ald a great change in Russian foreign policy or its relations with the United
States. The same is also likely with whomever replaces George Bush as the
President of the United States as the attention of the new incumbent of the
White House is very much more likely to be focused on the Middle East or
the U.S. economy rather than relations with the Russian Federation. In re-
lation to this, Dr Rodolfo Humpierre suggested that no real great change
in either Washington’s or Moscow’s policies towards Havana were likely
to occur as a result of the elections in Russia and the United States during
2008. Moreover, it also appears that the Cuban government are not ex-
pecting any great change to occur when Medvedev becomes Russian Pres-
ident. The Granma report of his victory may have stated that the Russian
Communist Party had come second but it also pointedly stated that dur-
ing his campaign Medvedev had promised to continue Putin’s policies.
Cuba may have preferred if the communists had won but as relations be-
tween Moscow and Havana have been robust under Putin, Havana ap-
pears unconcerned by this change of Russian President.43 Raúl Castro re-
placing his brother as Cuban President in late February 2008 also appears
unlikely to affect Moscow or Washington’s policies towards the island. In
the case of the United States this was illustrated by the reaction of not just
U.S. Presidential candidates to this news but also the Cuban exile commu-
nity, who received this news much more stoically than they had to the an-
nouncement of Fidel Castro’s ill-health in August 2006.
In light of this, it appears that Moscow’s decision over Lourdes was very
much a ‘one off’ with regards to possible U.S. influence over Moscow’s
policies towards Cuba under Putin’s Presidency. This can be seen by the
fact that the Russian Federation has backed Cuba over its various disputes
with the United States. This has been apparent at UN Human Rights Con-
vention in Geneva where Moscow has continued to vote with Cuba which
122 Chapter 5
island’s other bilateral relationships. This has occurred not least because
of legislation such as the Helms-Burton Act. However, many other global
political situations have also affected Russian-Cuban relations in the post
1991 period.
As has been discussed at some length in chapter 3, the economic tran-
sition that the Russian Federation went through in the early to mid-1990s
had grave consequences for Russia, Russian-Cuban relations and the
Cuban Revolution. In a not dissimilar manner, the dissolution of the So-
viet Union which heralded the appearance of a number of new indepen-
dent countries also affected relations between Moscow and Havana. As
the Kremlin struggled to adapt to this and form relations with its “near
abroad” its relationship with Havana suffered as it was not of the highest
priority. Conversely, the importance of the “near abroad” was very sig-
nificant for Moscow for both geostrategic reasons, and also due to the fact
that large sections of the Soviet nuclear arsenal had been stationed in
these countries. Simply, at this time relations with the “near abroad” took
precedence over relations with the “island of freedom.” This was an im-
portant reason for the downturn in Russian-Cuban relations in the imme-
diate aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was created in April
1949 to offset the Western powers’ perception of possible Soviet aggres-
sion. Its basis was the ideas of collective security but with the end of the
Cold War in the late 1980s this organization, as with many others, had to
try and adapt to the New World Order with the very reasons for its cre-
ation, possible Soviet and Warsaw pact aggression, having disappeared.
The result was that NATO appeared somewhat of a relic from a previous
age, or even redundant.
It could therefore have been thought that due to this situation NATO
may have been disbanded, but instead of this taking place during the last
decade of the twentieth century it actually expanded with a number of the
former socialist countries of Eastern Europe gaining membership to this
organisation. This was very worrying for the Russian Federation as
NATO had after all been originally created to stop possible aggression
from Moscow. The result of this NATO expansion was to increase both
mistrust of the West and paranoia in the Russian capital.53 The NATO-
Russia Council may have been created in 1997 but before this, NATO ex-
pansion was a very contentious issue between Russia and the West, and
this remains the case. This has only been exacerbated by, as has been
stated, the fact that from the mid-1990s the Liberal Westernizers began to
be pushed to the periphery of the foreign policy decision making process
in Moscow as nationalistic thinking once again returned to prominence in
the Russian capital, which was gravely offended by NATO expansion. In
addition, the Kremlin disliked the expansion of NATO as it was perceived
Washington and the Wider World 125
government was in complete accordance with the Russian one when they
too criticised NATO action in Kosovo describing it as, “in direct correla-
tion of this organisation’s new strategic doctrine of organised aggressive
war.”58
This process was also seen in Moscow’s reaction to the West’s treatment
of Iraq throughout the 1990s. Russia may have backed the Allied forces
during the first Gulf War in 1991 but the Kremlin disliked the sanctions
subsequently put in place against the Arab country and most certainly did
not side with the United States and the United Kingdom over their action
in 2003. Again, this was a sentiment that was shared with the Cuban gov-
ernment, who perceived it as another example of U.S. aggression.59 Some
in the West may have questioned Moscow’s motives regarding Iraq but
the Russian government did not only believe that the invasion went
against international law but Moscow had enjoyed a relationship with
Baghdad throughout the second half of the twentieth century. This was
shown by the fact that Saddam Hussein was one of the first foreign lead-
ers to travel to Moscow after Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secre-
tary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in March 1985.60
In a similar manner to NATO expansion, Moscow wished to make the
point to the West and Washington in particular that Russian concerns
could not simply be ignored as it attempted to reassert itself in interna-
tional relations. Again, closer relations with Havana would vividly make
this point with the result being that geopolitics, and Russia jockeying for
increased global influence, once more provided powerful reasons for the
improvement in Russian-Cuban relations.
In the late 1950s and early 1960s the geostrategic importance of the is-
land for the Kremlin had been a very important reason for Moscow’s in-
terest in the Cuban Revolution. International relations may have changed
massively by the 1990s when compared to this earlier time but it appeared
that even in the 1990s and 2000s Cuba retained some of this importance
for Russia. Again an old pressure from a previous age had reappeared,
but at a reduced level.
Washington’s “war on terror” has also affected the relationship be-
tween Moscow and Havana in other ways. The Kremlin dislikes the fact
that U.S. influence has increased in Central Asia due to the continued and
prolonged presence of both U.S. troops being stationed in Afghanistan
and also the U.S. air force use of facilities in the region as part of this war.
Again, it felt that the West, or the U.S. in particular, has encroached on one
of its traditional “spheres of influence.” This has only further increased
Moscow’s desire to reassert itself in international relations with, as stated,
improved Russian-Cuban relations being very much part of this wish.
As has been discussed at some length both earlier in this chapter and
also in previous ones, Moscow’s voting behaviour at the UN Convention
Washington and the Wider World 127
on Human Rights in Geneva in the 1990s was very different from the So-
viet era as the Russian Federation voted against Cuba in the period 1992
to 1994. As this was truly historic it attracted much international attention.
Furthermore, evidence also exists that Russian authorities passed infor-
mation to the West about political prisoners on the Caribbean island.61 As
stated in chapter 2 the removal of Marxist-Leninism from the relationship
was important in this but D. Cobaliev, head of the Russian delegation in
Geneva, explained some of the other reasons for this decision to Cuban
émigrés as, “the moment has come for Russia to pay its debt to the inter-
national community of human rights.”62 In 1998 Vladimir Parshikov,
deputy head of the Russian delegation to the UN commission in Geneva,
spoke of Russia’s early voting behaviour when he said it had been, “to
demonstrate its resolve not to allow double standards where respect for
human rights is concerned.”63 Moscow’s wish to appear a responsible
member of the international community and repay it for some of its own
previous human rights abuses was important in this, but in light of the
importance of Russian-U.S. relations to Moscow at this time it may also
have been an attempt to gain favour in Washington.
However, from 1995 onwards Russia began to once again vote with
Cuba in this forum, with this practice since continuing. This occurred not
just for the variety of reasons that have been previously outlined but also
due to Russia’s involvement in the Chechen war. As the situation in
Chechnya deteriorated and the Russian army became embroiled in this
war, an increasing number of reports began to appear of human rights
abuses perpetrated by the Russian military against the Chechen popula-
tion. As stated, the Russian Federation very much wanted to appear a re-
sponsible member of the international community but these reports
greatly damaged this. International attention on this and Moscow’s vot-
ing behaviour in the UN only increased due to the groundbreaking nature
of the way it had voted regarding Cuba. Moreover, Fidel Castro managed
to bring further international focus to the Chechen situation by dispens-
ing with diplomatic protocol and stating, “This made me think of Chech-
nya. Strange things happen in this world. Let me be clear: I am against the
disintegration of any country. . . . However, the dispatches carried news
of who knows how many thousands of cannons shelling the region, hun-
dreds of planes and helicopters bombing the region, tens of thousands of
soldiers fighting, and civilian casualties. Yet, they voted against Cuba at
the Human Rights Commission, against a country that has never had a
single missing person, where never in 36 years of Revolution has there
been a political crime, where no one is tortured.”64 This was very differ-
ent from the traditional situation as it had been extremely unusual for the
Cuban leader in Soviet or post-Soviet times to make such comments about
Moscow’s actions.
128 Chapter 5
Cuba over this matter was somewhat nuanced with some of Russia’s mo-
tives relating to events very much geographically closer to Moscow than
Havana, and in addition also unrelated to the Caribbean island.
As has been detailed, the common belief in the desire to create a multi-
polar world has been of great significance to the improvement in relations
between Moscow and Havana from the mid-1990s onwards. The impor-
tance of this has even increased since Putin became the Russian premier,
which was illustrated during his December 2000 trip to Cuba. While on
the island he commented, “The unipolarity that we oppose is an attempt
to monopolize and dominate world affairs. History has seen several such
attempts. And what came of these is well known. There is no place for
monopolism in today’s world.”67 His Cuban counterpart, Fidel Castro
also spoke on this topic when he said, “Cuba is not alone in feeling alarm
at the domination of a single country: This alarm is shared by such coun-
tries as Russia, China and the states of Europe.”68
This shared belief has also become apparent in both Cuba and Russia
trying to increase their influence within Latin America. Havana’s interest
in the region may appear logical for geographical, cultural and historical
reasons but it became very important in the 1990s as the Caribbean is-
land’s foreign policy evolved as it struggled to adapt to the loss of its for-
mer socialist allies. Increased ties with Latin America illustrated both the
diversification of Cuba’s foreign policy and the prevalence of pragmatism
within in it as new relationships had to be cultivated in order for the rev-
olution to survive. This strategy can be perceived as having been a great
success because although Cuba may still be excluded from the Organisa-
tion of American States (OAS), Havana now enjoys more cordial relations
with the region when compared to previous eras.
Moscow’s interest appears somewhat different as it does not possess the
geographical, cultural or historical ties with the region that Havana has,
and in addition the region has traditionally been perceived as being within
the United States “sphere of influence.” In chapter 3 it was argued that eco-
nomic reasons, and especially the sale of military hardware, have been
very important in the increase in Russian interest in Latin America but so
has the Russian Federation’s belief in a multipolar world. This has become
apparent from the mid-1990s onwards due to the change in Russian for-
eign policy that has been previously outlined, which resulted in it moving
away from a pro-Western perspective with Moscow trying to reassert itself
in international relations. In December 1997 Yevgeny Primakov became
the first Russian Foreign Minister to visit Latin America when he travelled
to Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Costa Rica. During this he signed a
number of bilateral agreements on a variety of different subjects including
attempts to combat the international drugs trade but when questioned on
the reasons for his visit he said, “Russia was and still is a great power. As
130 Chapter 5
a great power or one of the main players in the international arena, Russia,
naturally, should have multilateral ties with all continents, with all regions
of the world.”69 Further illustrating the increased importance of Latin
America to the Kremlin was Vladimir Putin’s telegram, published by
Latinskaia Amerika, welcoming participants to a conference on Latin Amer-
ica held in the summer of 2006 in Moscow in which he stated, “Russia be-
lieves that it is important to create political dialogue and economic links
with Latin America. We are convinced that the construction of this will be
mutually beneficial for our peoples and strengthen links in science, educa-
tion and culture.”70 Moreover, in January 2006 Foreign Minister Lavrov
published an article in Latinskaia Amerika in which he outlined the impor-
tance that Moscow placed in its relations with Latin America. He wrote,
“In recent years the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean Basin
(LACB) occupy an increasingly noticeable place in the system of contem-
porary international relations. Our contacts with them, representing a sep-
arate thrust in Russian foreign policy, integrally blend into the fabric of
global and interregional cooperation and are an important component of
the international efforts of Russia in tackling the problems common to the
entire world community, in combating new challenges and threats, in
maintaining strategic stability and reinforcing security.”71 In addition,
Lavrov, but also Russian academics, attached great importance to Putin’s
2004 trip to Mexico, Brazil and Chile.72
What was also significant was that during Primakov’s 1997 trip he
spoke out against the Helms-Burton Law that had been put in place in the
previous year and was supported in his condemnation of it by the Latin
American countries. This shared outlook on the state of Cuban-U.S. rela-
tions was very important as it was also symbolic of the improved relations
that Cuba was enjoying with both Russia and Latin America. However,
Havana’s relationship with Moscow was also significant for the Russian
Federation attempts to cultivate closer ties with the Western Hemisphere.
Professor Eugenio Larin has suggested that regarding this it was logical
for Moscow to try and improve relations with Cuba before the rest of the
region as it was the country that it had a history of relations with and
knew best.73
However, just as economically Moscow had hoped that goods could be
produced in Cuba for sale in Latin America, politically closer ties between
the two Cold War allies increased Moscow’s prestige in the region. Russia
could use its improved relations with Cuba to illustrate to the rest of the
region its belief in a multipolar world and interest in the Western Hemi-
sphere. In addition, it would have been problematic for Moscow to try
and improve relations with Latin America if it did not have cordial rela-
tions with Cuba as accusations may have appeared of Moscow both hav-
ing abandoned a former close ally but also of not trying to help it in the
Washington and the Wider World 131
prestige amongst these new leaders. This last point is particularly signifi-
cant as U.S. prestige in Latin America is at the moment very low, which has
led Egor Gaidar, the former Russian Prime Minister, to even state that “it is
not necessary to be heroic or a powerful person” to be anti-American.77
The upshot is only to increase further the importance of relations between
Cuba and Russia for the Kremlin.
Russian interest in the appearance of this new wave of leaders in Latin
America was shown by both the number of articles appearing in Latinskaia
Amerika on this issue and also sections of the Russian press describing
Morales victory as ending “ . . . years of crypto-fascist oligarchic regimes
supported Washington, which has treated the continent like its back yard
for decades.”78 This willingness to challenge the United States and a
shared belief in a multipolar world has also been significant for the im-
provement in relations between Russia and Venezuela which was high-
lighted during Hugo Chávez’s trip to the Russian capital in June 2007. In
an interview with the RIA Novosti news agency Russian Foreign Minister
spokesman Mikhail Kaminin stated that Russian-Venezuelan relations
were based on this principle and that Russia hoped that relations could be
increased. Moreover, after his 2006 trip to Moscow Latinskaia Amerika de-
scribed Chávez as a “remarkable individual.”79 This is significant because
although trade is a very important element in this process, as discussed in
chapter 3, closer links between Russia and Latin America also contain a
political aspect.
Closer ties between Moscow and Caracas has delighted Havana, which
was illustrated by the Cuban newspaper Juventud Rebelede quoting the
Venezuelan President during his 2007 trip as telling the Russian State
Duma leader Boris Grizlov, “Venezuela is ready to increase the new wave
of relations and bilateral cooperation.”80 This is the result of not only
Venezuela and Russia both being major oil producers, which in an in-
creasingly resource conscientious world has increased both countries im-
portance, but also both governments have a distinctively anti-U.S. foreign
policy which challenges Washington’s influence both in Latin America
but also the apparent uniploar nature of international relations. If this re-
lationship was to develop, despite recent political events in Venezuela, the
Cuban regime would be extremely happy as it may result in the appear-
ance of a substantial counterweight to Washington in international rela-
tions, a very different scenario from the early 1990s. Again, it appears Ha-
vana and Moscow have shared ideas with close ties between the two
countries being mutually beneficial to both. On this Dr Alexander Sizo-
nenko, a history professor at the Latin American Studies at the Institute of
Cold War History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, has written, “the
Russian Federation and Cuba have a common approach and desire to see
the same conclusions to the world’s problems.”81
Washington and the Wider World 133
Increased Russian interest in both Latin America and Cuba has not just
been the result of reacting to the above geopolitical events or trying to re-
assert itself in international relations with regards to the United States but
also due to the increased role of China and the European Union (EU) in
the region, something which has not gone unnoticed in Russia. As U.S. in-
fluence within the region has waned and Washington’s focus has moved
to the Middle East in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 China, the EU
and Russia have all become more involved in the region. In the specific
case of Cuba the diversification of the island’s foreign policy aided this
process, but since the 2003 crackdown on dissidents on the island, Cuban-
EU relations have suffered.82 Russia, however, is able to use the advan-
tages that it has over both China and the EU, its shared thirty-year history
with Cuba, to increase its own prestige for the reasons detailed above and
therefore its influence in the region to prevent being pushed to the pe-
riphery in Latin America in general or more specifically in Cuba by China
and the EU. This again increases the importance that Moscow attaches to
its relationship with Havana.
Close relations between Russia and Cuba continue to benefit both coun-
tries. For the Russian Federation this includes its belief in a multipolar
world and attempts to reassert itself in international relations. Havana
continuing to face U.S. hostility still perceives Russia as an important
counterweight to Washington in various international forums and this
again reduces the likelihood that Russian-Cuban relations may deterio-
rate in the near future. Even in the twenty-first century for a variety of rea-
sons the relationship between Moscow and Havana remains mutually
beneficial to both countries.
CONCLUSIONS
During the Soviet era world events have always impacted on the Cuban
Revolution and affected its relationship with Moscow and this has re-
mained the case in the period since the disintegration of the Soviet Union
with a number of these providing very powerful reasons for both the
downturn in relations between Moscow and Havana in the early 1990s
and its subsequent upturn from the middle of the last decade of the twen-
tieth century.
This was most certainly the case with the United States which attempted
to take advantage of the disintegration of Soviet-Cuban relations to hasten
the demise of the Cuban regime by tightening its economic embargo
against the island. Moreover, Washington continued the practice of trying
to influence Moscow with regards its relationship with Havana. At first this
appeared to be successful as the Kremlin attached such importance to an
134 Chapter 5
improved relationship with the U.S. This manifested itself in Moscow’s vot-
ing behaviour in the early 1990s in various UN forums where it either ab-
stained or voted against Cuba. This was very different from the Soviet era.
Although this was the case, the U.S. also had an unwitting part to play
in the upturn in Russian-Cuban relations. As the 1990s progressed,
Moscow became increasingly disillusioned with its relationship with
Washington partly it is thought because Russia may not have gained what
it had hoped from the United States. Moreover, the Kremlin began to dis-
like the unipolar nature of international relations, a belief shared with Ha-
vana, and wanted to reassert itself in global politics. Nationalistic senti-
ments started to become much more prominent in Russian politics, with
many being deeply unhappy at the decrease in Russian global influence
and how the country had been pushed to the periphery of international
relations. The result was that from the mid-1990s a change in Moscow’s
foreign policy took place and part of this was the wish to reassert itself in
global politics. This would eventually lead to the “Putin Doctrine,” and
an improvement in Russian-Cuban relations, only increased in signifi-
cance for Moscow due to the continued strained nature of U.S.-Cuban re-
lations, was very much part of this desire to reassert itself on the global
stage and was an important reason for the upturn in the relationship.
The appearance of a unipolar world and Russian feelings of being mar-
ginalised with regards global events were also apparent in NATO expansion
to the east, the treatment that their fellow Serbs in the former Yugoslavia re-
ceived from this organisation throughout the 1990s and, due to Russia’s long
friendship with Iraq, by the West’s action towards Saddam Hussein that cul-
minated in the U.S. and UK led invasion of the country in 2003. These all
gravely offended Russian nationalistic sentiments with again the belief that
closer relations with Havana illustrating to the West and Washington in par-
ticular that Moscow still possessed a global influence. At the inception of the
Soviet-Cuban relations this had been a very important element in Moscow’s
interest in the Cuban Revolution but although international relations may
have been vastly different in the mid-1990s compared to the late 1950s and
early 1960s, it was again a highly significant reason for the improvement in
the relationship from the middle of the last decade of the twentieth century.
Again, a pressure from the Soviet era, although at a much reduced level, had
remerged in the 1990s to impact on the relationship.
This was repeated after 11 September 2001 with the continued presence
of U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan, Moscow perceived this as to be
infringing on its “sphere of influence,” and also in the decision in the pre-
vious decade to keep Lourdes open as it could be used to counter NATO
expansion to the east. The significance of Lourdes for Moscow was only
increased due to its contentious nature for Washington. It appeared that
once again Cuba had a geostrategic importance for the Kremlin.
Washington and the Wider World 135
This was also the case with regards to Russia’s increased interest in
Latin America that began in the late 1990s and has continued with the ap-
pearance of more left-leaning governments in the region with Russian in-
terest again being an illustration of Moscow’s increased prestige in inter-
national relations. Good relations with Cuba were important with regards
this as the Caribbean island was enjoying improved relations with the re-
gion as part of its diversification of its foreign policy in the 1990s. If Russian-
Cuban relations had not been cordial it would have had a negative impact
on Russian prestige in Latin America as it could be perceived that the
Kremlin had left Cuba to fend for itself in the face of continued U.S. ag-
gression. This, in conjunction with it making sense for Moscow to begin
its increased interest in Latin America with the country it knew best, was
another important element in the improvement in the relationship.
However, new pressures also emerged in the 1990s that also impacted
on the Russian-Cuban relations. The significance of Moscow having to
cultivate ties with its “near abroad” immediately after 1991 was not just
new but also resulted in the importance of relations with Cuba not being
of the highest priority for the Kremlin at this time partly explaining the
downturn in the relationship. Moreover, the situation in Chechnya would
also impact on Moscow’s relationship with Havana. As an increasing
number of reports emerged of human rights abuses, the Kremlin did not
wish to increase international attention on this by continuing to vote
against Cuba in the UN Human Rights Convention. The desire not to do
this was very important in Moscow once again voting with Cuba in this
forum. In addition, it may have been apparent that Fidel Castro had at-
tempted to increase the pressure on Moscow with regards this, and both
Cuba and Russia used this as a way to illustrate U.S. double standards on
human rights due to what they perceived as its selective interest in this
subject. However, the Russian desire not to draw more international at-
tention was of great importance in this.
Again events far removed from the Caribbean had impacted on Russian-
Cuban relations but the improvement in the relationship did not just bene-
fit Moscow but also Havana. As stated, in the 1990s the Caribbean island
had diversified its foreign policy in an attempt to survive the end of Soviet-
Cuban relations. In the face of continuing U.S. hostility, Russia siding with
Cuba in its various disputes was of great importance for Havana. Moscow’s
influence on the global stage may not have returned to the level of the Cold
War but it was still a permanent member of the UN Security Council and
the Cuban government believed that it could act as a counterweight to
Washington in not just this forum but also other ones. It was very much
hoped that this could lead to the emergence of a more multipolar world
with this common belief between Moscow and Havana being not just a rea-
son for the improvement in the relationship but also symbolic of it.
136 Chapter 5
The change in Russian foreign policy that was so important for Russian-
Cuban relations was symbolised by Yevgeny Primakov replacing Andrei
Kozyrev as Russian Foreign Minister. However, Primakov himself was
very important for relations between Moscow and Havana as it appeared
that he had a similar political outlook to the Cuban ruling elite and had a
personal affinity for the island. This again could be perceived as a throw-
back to an earlier time with members of the elite in Moscow championing
Cuba’s cause. The importance of Primakov did not go unnoticed in Ha-
vana with Cuba believing that Putin’s policies towards the island were a
continuation of what Primakov had started.
Russian-Cuban relations may have been adversely affected by
Moscow’s decision to close Lourdes but problems did not last for a sub-
stantial period of time despite Havana being deeply unhappy, with this
being another illustration of the prevalence of realist pragmatism in the
Cuban Revolution. However, it did appear that Washington had been able
to influence Moscow with regards this decision with the Cuban govern-
ment certainly believing this to be the case. However, it has not been the
beginning of a trend but instead a ‘one off’ as relations between Moscow
and Washington have since deteriorated and show no sign of immediate
improvement. Dmitrri Medvedev won the March 2008 Russian Presiden-
tial elections, Raúl Castro has replaced his brother as Cuban President and
a new resident of the White House will be in place by the end of January
2009 but it is unlikely any of these events will result in a massive change
in relations between any of these three countries. The result is that for
both Moscow and Havana the relationship between their two countries
will continue to have benefits for both with regards the international sit-
uation. Global events have always had a large impact on this relationship
and this has continued in the post 1991 period. They both partly explain
the downturn immediately after the disintegration of the Soviet Union
but also the improvement from the mid-1990s onwards.
NOTES
40. Since the inception of relations between Moscow and Havana direct pres-
sure from Washington on Moscow to change its Cuba policy worked on very few
occasions. The times when it did appear to work were during the Cuban Missile
Crisis, in 1970 over the discovery of Soviet nuclear submarines moored at Cien-
fuegos, Gorbachev’s 11 September 1991 announcement over the removal of the fi-
nal Soviet soldiers from the Caribbean island, possibly over Moscow’s voting be-
haviour in various UN forums in the period from 1992 to 1995 and with regards
to the closure of Lourdes.
41. Bobo Lo, Vladmimir Putin and the evolution of Russian foreign policy, (Oxford:
Blackwell Publishers, 2003) 102-132. “Bush flies in to Russian Tensions” 8 May
2005. See http://www.news.bbc.co.uk (19 May 2005). Press Conference 7 March
2006. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases (12 April 2006).
42. “Putin warns of measures against U.S. missile shield in Europe,” Ria Novosti,
4 June 2007. See http://rian.ru/russia/20070604/66620997-print.html (7 June 2007).
43. Catherine Belton, “Medvedev to hand baton back to Puitn,” 11 December
2007. See http://www.ft.com/cms/s (3 March 2008). With relation to Cuba, Dr.
Rodolfo Humpierre stated that a victory for either the Republican or Democratic
candidate in November’s U.S. Presidential elections was unlikely to make any
great change for Cuba or its relationship with the United States. Interview con-
ducted in Havana on 14 February 2008. Granma, 3 March 2008, 1.
44. Andrei Zlobin, “Security: A Threat From Cuba is Science Fiction,” Vremya
Novostei, 15 May 2003, 5.
45. “Cuba 9 USA 0,” 24 March 2005. See http://pravda.ru/printed.html (4 July
2007). W. Hoge, “New U.N. Rights Group Includes Six Nations With Poor
Records,” New York Times, 10 May 2006.
46. Zlobin, “Security,” 5.
47. “Axis of Evil Stretched,” 8 May 2002. See http://pravda.ru/printed.html (4
July 2007). Interfax, Russia, 29 September 2004.
48. Only the United States, Israel, the Marshall Islands, and Palau voted against
the resolution with Micronesia abstaining. Granma, 31 October 2007, 1.
49. Itar-Tass Weekly News, 4 November 2003.
50. “Cuba: Bush insists with the ‘dumbest policy of the world,” 5 October 2005.
See http://www.pravda.ru/printed.html (27 October 2005).
51. “Ricardo Alarcón comenta la colaboración entre Rusia y Cuba,” Boletín In-
formativo, 2 November 2006, 5.
52. Castro commented upon the importance of this during Yevgeny Primakov’s
visits to Cuba in May 1996 when he said, “For us it is indispensable to take into
consideration the importance of that country, a permanent member of the UN Se-
curity Council. We must consider its power, its clout. We cannot be happy with the
idea of a unipolar world under the control of the United States.” Radio Havana
Cuba in Spa 000GMT 24 May 96-FBIS-LAT-96-102 p8 PA2405032096.
53. Throughout history Russia has always been concerned about possible inva-
sion to such an extent that attempts to stop the possibility of this occurring has be-
come part of the national psyche.
54. Vladimir Borodaev, “Perspectives for the development of international ties
with Cuba,” Latinskaia Amerika, No. 1, (2001): 25. A. Sosnovsky, “On the Benefit of
Routine Professionalism” Moskovskiye novosti, No. 21, 26 May–2 June 1996, 5.
140 Chapter 5
South America,” New York Times, 2 November 2005. Egor Gaidar, “Interview with
Egor Gaidar,” Latinskaia Amerika, No. 10 (2006): 62.
78. “Bolivia: Nightmare scenario for Bush.” See http://pravdaru/opinion
/columnists/9306-bolivia-0 (23 March 2006).
79. “Reflexionando en viz alta sobre la visita de Hugo Chávez a Rusia,” Latin-
skaia Amerika, No. 9, (September 2006): 52.
80. “Reafirma Venezuela su alianza con Rusia y Bielorrusia” Juventud Rebelde 30
June 2007, see http://www.juventudrebelde.cu/internacionales (29 July 2007).
81. Alexandr Sizonenko, “The Presidential Diplomacy: The ‘model of visits’
with the New Actors in Relations between Russia and Latin America,” Latinskaia
Amerika, No. 4, (2007): 45. The problems for international relations of there not be-
ing a counterweight to the United States was also commented upon by Vladimir
Sudarev, another professor at the Latin American Studies at the Institute of Cold
War History of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Vladimir Sudarev, “The United
States and the ‘move to the left’ in Latin America,” Latinskaia Amerika, No. 5,
(2007): 6.
82. Igor Sheremetiev, “Latin America in the twenty-first century: the start of
problems,” Latinskaia Amerika, No. 4, 2006, 26.
6
Continuing Camaraderie
143
144 Chapter 6
Cuban government also no longer had people in the top echelons of the rul-
ing elite in Moscow championing their cause as they had throughout the
Soviet era due to the unpopularity of Marxist-Leninism in the ‘new’ Russia
of the early 1990s.
The removal of this ideology also affected Russian-Cuban relations in
other ways as internally the Kremlin replaced it with the ideas of neolib-
eral economics. As Boris Yeltsin’s government wholeheartedly embraced
these ideas and Russia entered its economic transition, trade with Cuba
crashed partly as a result of Russian companies not being able to compete
with other foreign companies in the Cuban economy as they struggled to
survive the Russian economic transition. In addition, other Russian com-
panies wished to see the terms of trade with Cuba decided by the market
rather than by Marxist-Leninism ideology, which had the effect of making
Russian goods prohibitively expensive for Cuba. This phenomenon can
also be seen in Havana’s decision in September 1992 to stop construction
of the nuclear plant at Juragua as a consequence of not being able to af-
ford to pay for the Russian specialist working on this project.
These changes were systematic of the debate taking place within Rus-
sia which regarding foreign policy was won by the Liberal Westernizers.
They did not just want the removal of Marxist-Leninism from Moscow’s
foreign policy but also for it to be much more pro-Western, with relations
with the United States being particularly important. This was not just
done for ideological reasons but it was also hoped that assistance in the
Russian transition could be obtained. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei
Kozyrev was extremely closely associated with these policies. However,
this also had a fundamental impact on Moscow’s relationship with Ha-
vana as a result of the continued strained nature of Cuban-U.S. relations
which simply meant that the Kremlin could not enjoy good relations with
both Washington and Havana and due to the importance which it at-
tached at this time to relations with the United States, those with Cuba
suffered.
In relation to this it also appears that the U.S. administration may also
have been able to bring pressure to bear on Moscow regarding its Cuba
policy. They had continually tried to do this during the Soviet era and this
practice not only continued in the post 1991 period but if anything in-
creased. Washington believed that the end of Soviet-Cuban relations was
a mere forerunner to the demise of the Castro regime and attempted to
speed this by passing both the Torricelli Bill and Helms-Burton Act, which
had a section specifically focused on the Russian Federation, during the
1990s. It was not just the U.S. administration who attempted to influence
Moscow regarding its relationship with Havana but also the Cuban exiles.
Washington certainly appears to have been able to do this regarding
Moscow’s voting behaviour in various United Nations (UN) forums in
Continuing Camaraderie 145
the period from 1992 to 1995 when Russia either abstained or voted
against Cuba. This was very different from the Soviet era with the desire
to both win favour in Washington, and regarding human rights, appear a
responsible member of the international community being key motivating
factors in this.
This change in Russian foreign policy, the improvement in relations be-
tween Moscow and Washington and the removal of Marxist-Leninism
from Russian-Cuban relations had yet further ramifications for the rela-
tionship, as it resulted in the geostrategic importance of the island for the
Kremlin falling dramatically when compared to the Cold War era. This in
itself provided yet another reason for downturn in the relationship. Sim-
ply the importance of the Cuban Revolution for Moscow had decreased
which was only exacerbated by Moscow’s need to cultivate relations with
its “near abroad” in the immediate aftermath of the disintegration of the
Soviet Union. This was systematic of the traditional low importance that
the Kremlin attached to its relationship with Havana with the noticeable
exceptions of the initial period of contact in the late 1950s and early 1960s
and during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
This situation was further complicated by the government in Havana’s
refusal to fundamentally alter the socialist nature of the Cuban Revolu-
tion, which in the New World Order of the 1990s meant that it appeared
to be swimming against world opinion and for some even made it an
anachronism. This was most certainly the case in Russia where many peo-
ple were delighted to see an end to both the Marxist-Leninist nature of
their own country and its ties to Cuba. They disliked the Cuban political
model and the economic burden that they believed the Caribbean coun-
try had been for Moscow. This process had first appeared in the Soviet
Union of the late 1980s and early 1990s due to the effects of glasnost, but
the result was that a legacy from the Gorbachev era, if not earlier ones,
had a large impact on Russian-Cuban relations in the post-Soviet era.
However, it undoubtedly accelerated after 1991, and was highly signifi-
cant in the downturn in the relationship.
As stated, by the end of 1992 it may have appeared as if the thirty-year
relationship between Moscow and Havana had never existed, but it was
never completely terminated. Mainly as a result of marriage a number of
Russians remained in Cuba while some Cubans continued to live in Rus-
sia. Other aspects of a Soviet legacy also survived including the use of
Russian names and cars in Cuba while partly the result of education pro-
grammes the island also possesses a unique Russian language ability in
Latin America. Moreover, even in the years immediately after the end of
Soviet-Cuban relations, oil for sugar swap deals were mooted.
This not only illustrated the fact that the relationship was never com-
pletely terminated but also explained the surprising lack of comment
146 Chapter 6
from the Cuban government regarding both the situation within Russia
and Russian-Cuban relations. Havana may no longer have been con-
strained by diplomatic protocol but it most certainly did not wish to en-
danger the possibility of these deals, vital for the very survival of the
Cuban Revolution due to the dire economic situation it faced, by being
overly critical. Criticism of the Council for Mutual Assistance (CMEA) did
appear but this was a very different scenario as this organisation had been
disbanded while, although massively reduced, a semblance of the rela-
tionship with Moscow continued to exist. Realist pragmatism was still
very much in evidence within the Cuban ruling elite.
What also illustrated this strong prevalence of realist pragmatism were
the changes implemented by the Cuban government in an attempt to ad-
just to the situation which they faced in the 1990s. This entailed a diversi-
fication of foreign policy in an attempt to cultivate links with countries
with which they had not previously had ties. Regarding its economic
strategy a variety of legislation was passed which did not just try and take
advantage of the increase in transnational investment and trade which oc-
curred in the early 1990s, but also whose basis was very different from
their previous economic model as parts of it were much closer to the ideas
of neoliberal economics rather than a planned economy. The Cuban elite
may have had an ideologically aversion to these, but they were of the ut-
most importance to the partial recovery of the Cuban economy while also
having important repercussions for Russian-Cuban relations.
Apart from helping the Cuban economy begin to recover from the
shocks of the early 1990s these reforms also dramatically changed the
composition of Cuba’s trading partners as its economy returned to the
world economy after being removed from it for a number of decades. This
was also vital for relations between Moscow and Havana as in short the
pre-eminent position of the Soviet Union in the Cuban economy had been
usurped. As the 1990s progressed the realisation began to form in Russia
that they were losing out on the investment potential that the Cuban econ-
omy offered. A desire to try and remedy this was of great significance for
the improvement in Russian-Cuban relations, and it was this and not the
effects of globalisation that caused this as increased Russian interest was,
at this time, not repeated elsewhere in Latin America. This was, however,
a very much unforeseen result of these economic reforms as the goal of
the Cuban government in instigating them had not been to specifically at-
tract Russian interest but just much needed increased levels of trade.
However, they were vital in the improvement in Russian-Cuban relations
from the mid-1990s onwards.
In a not dissimilar manner Russia also came to realise that the colossal
investment from the Soviet era was simply being squandered as a result
of the downturn in relations and the desire not to see this happen was
Continuing Camaraderie 147
with the realisation forming that there are a number of benefits for both
countries of the relationship’s continuation. In this manner a sufficient
time period has now passed where the relationship can now be analysed
more subjectively than in the early 1990s. This, in conjunction with feelings
of nostalgia generally increasing, particularly in Russia, has resulted in
even some cultural links re-emerging, but significantly also the relation-
ship between Moscow and Havana being seen in a very different light.
In a not dissimilar manner the change that has occurred within Russian
thinking on global events has been of the utmost significance for the im-
provement in the relationship. A number of events throughout the 1990s
including North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) expansion to the
east, this organisation’s treatment of Russia’s fellow Serbs in the former
Yugoslavia and Western action in Iraq amongst others all gravely of-
fended Russian nationalism as many in Russia perceived them as the
West in general and United States in particular encroaching on Moscow’s
traditional “spheres of influence.” This returned to the age-old question of
Russia’s place in the world as Russian pride had been dented by feelings
of marginalisation with regards international relations. This, combined
with nationalism in general becoming increasingly prominent in Russian
politics has resulted in a seismic shift in Moscow’s foreign policy when
compared to the period immediately after 1991.
These feelings have continued with the prolonged presence of Western
military personnel in Afghanistan in the aftermath of 11 September 2001
terrorist attacks on the United States. However, Washington also played
an unwitting role in this alteration to Russian foreign policy as it appears
that Moscow did not receive what it had wished for from the United
States in the early 1990s when it hoped that its foreign policy would win
it favour within the U.S. administration. These feelings manifested them-
selves in Moscow’s dislike of the unipolar nature of global politics in the
post-Soviet era. This belief was shared with Havana, but this change in
Moscow’s thinking and consequently its foreign policy was vital for the
upturn in relations with Cuba.
The Kremlin wanted to reassert itself in international relations and im-
proved relations with Havana was very much part of this belief as it il-
lustrated to the United States Moscow’s increased role in the world. It has
even been suggested that part of the decision to keep Lourdes open had
been to counter NATO expansion to the east. The importance of Cuba to
Moscow as it attempted to do this was only increased due to the contin-
ued strained nature of U.S.-Cuban relations. These very same reasons had
been highly significant for the interest that Moscow had originally shown
in the Cuban Revolution in the late 1950s and early 1960s. As the twenti-
eth century drew to a close, international relations were vastly different to
the Cold War era but despite this the geostrategic importance of the island
150 Chapter 6
for Moscow had increased when compared to the years immediately after
the end of Soviet-Cuban relations. An old pressure had again re-emerged,
although much reduced from the earlier period, to once again impact on
the relationship.
The strategic importance for Cuba for Moscow has further increased
with its increased interest in Latin America which was representative of
this change in its foreign policy. It is not only logical for Russian interest
to begin with the country it has the longest history of relations with and
knows best, but Russian prestige in the region could have been adversely
affected if it did not have cordial relations with Cuba as Moscow could
have been perceived as having abandoned Havana in the face of increas-
ing U.S. pressure. This only became more important due to the good rela-
tions that the Caribbean island now enjoys with Latin America as a result
of the diversification of its foreign policy and the low regard which the
United States is held in by many within the region. Moreover, the ap-
pearance of left-leaning governments in Latin America, and in particular
Hugo Chávez in Venezuela with the subsequent creation of the Bolivarian
Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) and Chávez’s relationship with
Moscow all appearing to show an end to unipolarity in world politics.
This has delighted both Russia and Cuba due to their belief in a multipo-
lar world.
Yevgeny Primakov replacing Andrei Kozyrev as Russian Foreign Min-
ister which was symbolic of this change in Moscow’s foreign policy was
also important for Moscow’s relationship with Havana. This resulted
from the fact that it very much appeared that he wanted to cultivate closer
ties with Cuba due to both the personal affinity that he had towards the
island and a common outlook on global events shared with the Cuban
ruling elite. This again appeared to be a throwback to a previous time
when Cuba had always had people within the top echelons of power in
Moscow championing their cause. Havana certainly preferred Primakov
to his predecessor Kozyrev, illustrated by Fidel Castro’s personal invita-
tion to holiday on the island after his resignation. In addition, Primakov’s
importance is increased due to the fact that Putin’s policies are perceived
in Cuba as a continuation of those started by Primakov.
This change in Moscow’s foreign policy and improvement in the rela-
tionship has also been of great benefit for Cuba. The aim of the diversifi-
cation of the island’s foreign policy had been to cultivate links with a va-
riety of different countries and close relations with Russia most certainly
did not go against this desire. Moreover, the history of the relationship be-
tween the two countries aided this but Russia’s increased influence in in-
ternational relations was of particular benefit for Havana as it could pro-
vide a potential counterbalance to U.S. hegemony. This has been
particularly important in light of the continued poor state of U.S.-Cuban
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160 Bibliography
Afghanistan, 32, 35, 45n8, 126, 134, 149 Bolivarian Alternative for the
Africa, 11, 22, 26, 31–32, 35, 43, 52, 112 Americas (ALBA), 10, 12, 16, 70,
Agreements and treaties, 66, 72, 95, 131, 150
97–99, 129. See also Putin; sugar; Bolivia, 131. See also Evo Morales
trade Brezhnev, Leonid, 30; “Brezhnev
Alarcón, Ricardo, 72, 126 Doctrine,” 5, 17n14, 35. See also
Aldana, Carlos, 39 Czechoslovakia; “Prague spring”
Alekseev, Aleksandr, 22 “Brothers in Arms,” 109n52, 114, 117.
Allende, Salvador, 28 See also Cuban American National
Andropov, Yury, 7 Foundation; Cuban exiles
Angola, 31, 39, 47n42 Brown, Francisco, 125
Arbenz, Jacob, 24 Bush, George H. W., 40, 50n74
August 1991 coup, 40–41, 43–44, Bush, George W., 117, 120–21, 123,
50n77. See also “Cuban lobby” 140n77, 151; meeting with Putin, 8,
“axis of evil,” 117, 122 119; relations with Cuba, 118, 122,
Azicri, Max, 61–62 138
163
164 Index
169