The Political Rationality of Terror - Understanding Terrorism As The Result of Organizational Goal-Seeking - Student Pulse

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2018 Printable Version - The Political Rationality of Terror: Understanding Terrorism as the Result of Organizational Goal-Seeking - Student Pulse
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Lowicz, G. (2016). "The Political Rationality of Terror: Understanding Terrorism as the Result of
Organizational Goal-Seeking." Inquiries Journal, 8(11). Retrieved from http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/a?
id=1500
The Political Rationality of Terror: Understanding

Terrorism as the Result of Organizational Goal-
Seeking
By Guy Lowicz
2016, Vol. 8 No. 11
In the early 1990s, two terrorist organizations, Hamas and the Fatah-led Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO), were using terrorism to promote their political plight of Palestinian self-determination. Although both
organizations vowed to use armed struggles to promote the Palestinian plight, Fatah chose to desert violence in
favor of legitimate political channels. In the beginning, terrorism proved to be effective for both groups in
mobilizing popular support, legitimizing their cause, and raising capital. After years of armed tactics that proved
fruitful, Yassir Arafat, Fatah’s leader, dramatically changed his organization’s tactics. After 1995, Fatah did not
launch a single campaign against Israel. Given that, what makes terrorist organizations choose to change their
tactics from terrorism to diplomacy?
This paper argues that public opinion and political participation best explain why the PLO decided to stop
using terrorism while Hamas increased its terrorist activities. Terrorism has a pull and push relationship with
public opinion. Terrorist activities serve to attract support, but only so long as the public supports terrorism
as a tactic. Both Hamas and Fatah capitalized on public support for an armed struggle against Israel to raise
their banners. However, terrorism has very limited effectiveness in achieving political gains. While both
organizations raised their profile due to their use of terrorism, Arafat had the opportunity to achieve Fatah’s
political goal of negotiations with the US and Israel on the topic of establishing a Palestinian state. It was
Arafat’s constituents’ support for the peace process that made him renounce terrorism. Similarly, not
presented with the same opportunity as Arafat, coupled with having constituents that supported violence,
Hamas continued its terrorist activities.
Understanding the importance of popular support for violence has significant implications for policy makers
considering negotiations with terrorist organizations. Lack of popular support for diplomacy would explain
why such attempts are doomed to fail. Further, this paper shows why contemporary counterterrorism efforts
are inadequate. Scholars that argue that counterterrorism stops terrorism fail to recognize that once
counterterrorism stops, terrorism continues. Scholarship that argues that terrorism stops due to concessions
fails to recognize that concessions only prove that terrorism is useful. Moreover, this paper uses a two-level
analysis of terrorist organizations’ strategies developed by Peter Krause, an assistant professor of Political
Science from Boston College. In using Krause’s analysis, this paper addresses the effectiveness of terrorism
for the organization in ways that conventional wisdom fails to recognize. Joining Krause, this paper calls for
a new approach in assessing terrorism and terrorist organizations.
Terrorist organizations choose to stop using terrorism when a legitimate political channel becomes available
and is supported by the organization’s constituencies.
I argue that terrorist organizations choose to stop using terrorism when a legitimate political channel
becomes available and is supported by the organization’s constituencies. I start by deconstructing my theory,
explaining how terrorism serves different agendas for different purposes, organizational and strategic. I show
how terrorism affects the organization’s popularity, and how the organization’s popular support dictates its
use of terrorism. I then continue in explaining my approach to assessing my theory, the comparative method.
I then compare Hamas and Fatah and measure the accuracy of my theory. The comparison shows that
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15.01.2018 Printable Version - The Political Rationality of Terror: Understanding Terrorism as the Result of Organizational Goal-Seeking - Student Pulse
decisions of the leaderships of Fatah and Hamas as to when and how to exercise terrorism were directly
linked to opportunities for other methods to advance their political agendas and the support of the public for
such endeavors. The paper closes by addressing the implications both for policymakers and for future
scholarship.
Hypothesis: Groups stop using terrorism when it no longer serves their organizational objectives.
A terrorist organization will stop using terrorism when it loses its effectiveness in promoting the
organization’s goals. Specifically, this change is most likely to occur when popular support for the tactic
decreases and legitimate political participation broadens. An argument about the conditions that determine
the ineffectiveness of terrorism in promoting organizational goals needs to be preceded by an understanding
of a group’s goals and why it uses terrorism in the first place.
Peter Krause notes that a terrorist organization, similar to any political movement, operates on a two-level
framework of objectives: organizational and strategic.1 The organizational goals of a group consist of
objectives that would increase the strength and security of the group in hopes of promoting the group’s
strategic objectives. This may include management or leadership, an agenda or manifesto listing objectives,
capital, publicity, and since the group has political aspirations, a following. Organizational objectives also
include decreasing the strength of rival groups.2 Thus, organizational goals relate to the list of things that
would make an organization grow and operate better. Strategic goals, on the other hand, refer to the
organization’s manifesto or mission statement. They entail the group’s political agenda. This usually refers to
“ending military occupation, altering the nature of the ruling government, or changing discriminatory
policies.”3 Hence, strategic goals are what the organization seeks to achieve, or the reason for which it was
established. Because organizations operate on two levels of objectives, terrorism’s efficacy in achieving such
objectives needs to be measured separately.
While the efficacy of terrorism in promoting strategic goals is highly debatable in academia and has yet to be
agreed upon, it is easy to see how it fails to promote ambitious and abstract strategic objectives. Terrorism is
a tactic used when there is no other choice and because the group has a comparative advantage in using it.4
Especially in its early stages, an organization is too small and weak to effectively address its grievances with
its incumbent. Terrorism is thus used because it is the most effective weapon such groups have.5 Armed with
highly determined followings, organizations use terrorism because it is “cheap to execute yet expensive to
prevent.”6 Still, especially for groups with an ambitious agenda such as the dissolution of a country,
terrorism is seldom effective in achieving strategic goals. Pape’s argument that terrorism is effective in
achieving strategic goals is based on concessions that Israel made in response to specific terrorist
campaigns.7 However, these concessions were severely minor when compared with Hamas’s broader agenda
expressed in its charter, calling for the liberation of every inch of Palestine.8 So while Pape focuses on short-
term and immediate strategic achievements of terrorism, scholars agree that terrorism is ineffectual in
achieving any long-term goals.9 Still, these small concessions, accompanied by popular romanticized belief
that additional concessions would follow, further legitimize the organization’s use of violence. More
significantly, effective or not, the use of violence stems from the understanding that it is the only weapon the
organization has against its foe. Since I argue that terrorism is ineffective in promoting a group’s strategic
objectives, for the rest of my analysis I will focus on the relationship between the use of terrorism and the
advancements of organizational objectives.
For organizational purposes, terrorism can be effective in broadcasting groups’ messages and rallying
support, popular and material. In its early stages, an organization has difficulties in expressing its grievances,
as it has no access to political participation. In using terrorism, a group seeks to broadcast its message to as
broad an audience as possible, to show its determination to fight for its cause, to rally popular support, gather
material support, and recruit a following. Terrorism brings international attention and legitimacy to the group
and its agenda, which facilitates foreign monetary support.10 Moreover, it is an expression of determination
for the cause.11 As for rival groups, “The use of violence can help mobilize support for the organization
from the base and allow it to outbid other armed groups in the movement for leadership. Additionally, an
armed group can strike rival organizations directly to weaken them and improve its own position in the
movement hierarchy.”12 Hence, for an organization, especially in its early stages, terrorism is essential in
harvesting popular support in the forms of capital, arms, recruits, territory, political backing, and weakening
of rivalry, which are all crucial for a group’s sustainability.
Terrorism stops promoting organizational objectives when it is not backed by popular support. When
constituencies prefer other modes of operation, terrorism becomes harmful for the support of the group. Once
the organization’s constituency is no longer willing to sacrifice lives for the cause, or is changing its
preferences regarding the use of violence, the group loses its comparative advantage in terrorism. Piazza, for
example, demonstrates the importance of target selection as when a group launches campaigns that harm
civilians to whom their constituencies can relate, popular support for terrorism decreases.13 Terrorism then
becomes counterproductive to the group’s organizational objectives, decreasing popular support. Since a
group’s survival depends on its following’s approval, a decrease in popular support means losses in political
capital. In such instances, the group would change its strategy to facilitate its constituencies’ approval.
A decrease in support for violence is often facilitated by access to legitimate political participation, which
can promote the group’s strategic objectives. When real opportunities for promoting a group’s political
objectives become available, if the group’s constituencies support such endeavors, the group will forsake
terrorism. Though she does not account for popular support, Crenshaw shows that in instances in which
alternative modi operandi become available and more effective in achieving a group’s objectives, the group
will change its strategy from terrorism to pursue these legitimate paths.14 Similarly, Cronin and Crenshaw
recognize the feasibility of a transition from terrorism into legitimate political channels when negotiations
become available and more attractive.15 Indeed, as groups grow and increase their strength and influence,
they increase their bargaining power, and thus new modi operandi become available due to new military
capabilities, new diplomatic capabilities, or the willingness of other sides to negotiate or make concessions
due to damages inflicted. Due to its effectiveness for organizational purposes, terrorism facilitates access to
more opportunities for achieving the group’s strategic goals as it makes the organization bigger and more
influential. When constituencies believe that the pursuit of legitimate political paths would promote their
strategic agenda better than violence, the group would adhere to their demands and stop using terrorism.16
A small group with grievances and ambitious political aspirations has little access to political participation.
Terrorism is often the best tool they have to promote their political agenda. While it fails in achieving the
group’s ambitious aspirations, terrorism draws attention and support and expands a group’s constituencies,
and so it helps transform the group into a competent political actor with which other actors communicate.
Thus, terrorism brings more options for a group to negotiate grievances with others. Groups use terrorism to
facilitate their growth by attracting support, both material and popular. They continue using terrorism to
counter competition with other groups, while seeking further growth. With growth, terrorism can facilitate
political participation as it expends a group’s bargaining power. As a group’s bargaining power increases,
new political possibilities can develop. When popular support for terrorism subsides due to belief that newly
accessible political channels could better advance strategic objectives, organizations would stop using
terrorism as it becomes poisonous to the groups’ sustainability. Groups would stop using terrorism when
using it means losing support.
Methods & Case Selection

In assessing this hypothesis, I examine Fatah and Hamas and their violent activities from their establishment
and until 2013. In comparing both cases, I demonstrate the importance of popular opinion in shaping these
groups’ strategies. In assessing the groups’ similarities and differences, I validate my theory as an
overarching one in political science.
Fatah and Hamas epitomize the stereotypical terrorist organization that used ideas of “violence as only
choice” to mobilize support and advance organizational goals. Both Hamas and Fatah came about as
movements expressing Palestinian grievances, in pursuit of Palestinian liberation. Moreover, both operate
from the Occupied Territories. These groups used terrorism against Israel, the US, and against each other.
They both have had the international community, and especially Arab countries, influence their existence and
strategy. Hamas and Fatah resemble one another in their histories, but after the first intifada they differ in
their strategies. While Fatah adhered to diplomacy, Hamas persisted in armed struggles. Analyzing the
correlations between popular support, organizational objectives, and the use of terrorism reveals how my
theory can explain this divergence in strategies and why one group stopped using terrorism while the other
did not.
Organizationally, Fatah and Hamas typify the classic and generic process of other terrorist organizations and
their use of terrorism to advance their goals. As a result, Hamas and Fatah demonstrate the extent to which
my theory can be implemented in other cases. Though both Fatah and Hamas are Palestinian, they exemplify
the decision-making processes of any terrorist organization, and even any political movement vis-à-vis the
facilitation of mobilizing popular support for advancing the group’s organizational goals in order to advance
strategic goals.
The analyses are based on scholarship discussing strategic processes of terrorist organizations, along with
political literature surveying each organization. I use scholarship about terrorist organization strategy to
explain failures of conventional wisdoms to explain the links between the use of terrorism and political goal
achievement. I exhibit Palestinian public opinion using polls and surveys taken between 1990-2007. I then
correlate public polling found in scholars’ work with incidences of terrorism, as found in terrorism databases
from RAND and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), to examine the relationship between popular support
and the execution of terrorist campaigns.
Fatah
Fatah was formed in 1959 as a Palestinian liberation movement. Its early days showed very little
achievements due to lack of knowledge about the group. Through the 1970s and 1980s, Fatah’s leadership
facilitated the growth of the organization through armed struggle. They knew that violence will not achieve
their strategic objectives, but it would facilitate their plight, bringing them closer to the negotiation table. In
the 1970s, they used violence to combat rival groups, and they capitalized on public support for violence to
become a leading political movement among Palestinians. Persistently seeking political participation, the
Fatah-led PLO harnessed the opportunity of negotiations with Israel in 1991. As public support for violence
subsided due to faith in the peace process, Fatah gradually halted their use of terrorism.
Growth of Fatah
Terrorism helped facilitate Fatah’s organizational growth. In its early stages, the organization was weak, had
very few resources, and no access to political participation because Palestinians relied on Arab nations to
promote their plight. The group used armed struggle to unify followers and justify its cause. Fully aware that
it would not be able to present a militaristic threat to Israel and that a political channel is the correct path to
achieving concessions from Israel, Fatah chose violence for organizational purposes of mobilizing popular
support. “Fatah’s founder argued that it was the only way to impress the Palestinian cause on the
international agenda, and more important, the only way to rally the masses to the popular movement in
formation.”17 In using violence, Fatah’s founders sought to mobilize internal and external support
simultaneously, via the mobilization of Palestinians and the international community, respectively.
Furthermore, Fatah recognized that violence would be the only means at its disposal for achieving its
organizational goals of mobilization.
Fatah’s evolution into actual violence was a process. The organization’s initial strategies were the adoption of
an ambitious strategic goal of Palestinian nationalism as to reach a broad audience of followers, the adoption
of a strategy of armed struggle to legitimize the organization, and clandestine operations as to not risk the
organization’s survival. As such, Fatah started out underground. Its members tried to promote their political
agenda via publications of their ideological platform in the underground publication Filastinuna.18 Fatah did
not engage in actual violence until it served a very specific organizational purpose. The PLO, at that stage
was mostly led and influenced by Arab nations, and Fatah sought organizational independence.19 As such,
the PLO stood as a rival organization, and the use of violence by Fatah was about fighting over
constituencies. Fatah started participating in violent attacks secretly via its military arm al-Asifa (the storm)
because its members did not want to risk their exposure.20 At that point, Fatah did not claim responsibility
for its attacks. Its members avoided responsibility because the attacks were not meant to promote Fatah’s
strategy in regards to Israel, but its organizational goals of decreasing PLO’s influence. In 1969, Fatah took
over the PLO and established its dominance as the dominant Palestinian liberation movement.
The PLO engaged in violence to advance organizational goals. In 1970, Fatah faced competition within the
PLO from a rival Palestinian movement, Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).21 PFLP had
embarked on international terrorism missions that had raised their profile and inflated their constituencies. To
increase its profile and rally more supporters, Fatah established the Black September group that was
responsible for the assassination of eleven Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic games in 1972.22 Situated
in Lebanon, Fatah, much stronger than before, focused its attacks on Israel and nearly abandoned
international targets.23 After a 1982 IDF operation in southern Lebanon, the PLO leadership moved to
Tunis, but continued to engage in violence sent from Gaza and the West Bank.24 Because the PLO
leadership was operating in Tunis, it was integral to actively mobilize supporters from the occupied
territories as to deter competition. Thus, Fatah was committed to the use of violent campaigns vis-à-vis the
occupied territories to raise international attention and to maintain regional political supremacy.25
Organizational vs. Strategic Goals
Aware that violence advances its organizational goals, but not strategic, Fatah/PLO was open and willing to
negotiate with Israel. From an institutional pragmatist standpoint, with the background of possible
agreements between Israel and Arab states, Fatah realized an interim strategic amendment might be
necessary for the organization.26 Still seeking the support of Arab nations, Fatah incorporated some non-
violent means in its modus operandi to facilitate flexibility to changing regional dynamics mostly because
those were endorsed by Arab nations.27 Arafat was operating between two oppositional streams, trying to
appease both support for violence and support for diplomacy.28 Violent rhetoric mobilized his constituencies
and advanced his organizational goals, while non-violent means mobilized international support for a
political settlement, which advanced his strategic goals. This notion is evident in Arafat’s address to the UN
General Assembly in 1974 in which “he stated that he came to the UN ‘bearing an olive branch and a
freedom-fighter’s gun.’”29 As such, Fatah became much more careful in its violent endeavors, especially the
ones operated internationally. Violence would be embarked upon so long as it was advancing Fatah’s
institutional interests.
Political Participation
The first Intifada (uprising) in 1987 was a turning point for Fatah/PLO. Strategically, it brought international
attention to the Palestinian plight, which facilitated political processes and negotiations. Organizationally,
internal and external actors influenced the PLO and Fatah in different ways, and it was difficult to formulate
and execute a distinct strategy. The US intervened and presented Arafat with a list of demands as
prerequisites to negotiations with Israel. Pressures from the territories grew intensely, urging Arafat to adhere
to US demands.30 Kurtz notes, “By the end of the first year of the intifada, Fatah’s leadership in exile
realized that its failure to put forward a plan for translating the struggle into a political triumph had
undermined its normative status in the territories and its political standing internationally.”31 In 1988, in an
address to the UN General Assembly, Arafat stated he would commit to peaceful means to facilitate an
agreement with Israel and its neighboring Arab states.32 And in fact, between September 1987 and
beginning of 1991 the PLO had almost no terrorist interactions.33
The first intifada intensified the splintering of views in the Palestinian community, which facilitated political
upheavals. For constituents that supported political means, the intifada enabled negotiations with Israel, and
the Oslo Accords. At first, the talks were secret, which accounts for the lack of violent political competition
in the Territories.34 However, once the talks became public knowledge with the 1991 Madrid Conference,
violence intensified again due to competition within the Territories. The PLO officially declared commitment
to peaceful means. Fatah’s and the PLO’s organizational goals of mobilization rested upon negotiations.
However, Fatah and the PLO lost the support of radical factions, which in turn turned to militant
organizations like Hamas. These rival groups capitalized on Fatah’s commitment to peaceful means to raise
their own profiles. I elaborate more on the specifics of Hamas in the next case study. Suffice it to say that
these new dynamics in the Territories increased terrorist activities.
While expressing commitment to peaceful means to serve its strategic goals, Fatah used violence between
1991 and 1995 to facilitate its organizational goals to diminish Hamas’s influence. Moreover, the uprising of
the Palestinian populace as a bottom-up uprising demonstrated the Palestinian population’s commitment to
violence. Thus, public opinion generally supported violence as a demonstration of Palestinian grievances.
The PLO had to balance its use of violence according to its understanding of public opinion. A report for
United Stated Institute of Peace (USIP) states, “the 1993 Oslo accords led to greater public willingness to
oppose violence and support peace, negotiations, and reconciliation with Israel. Islamists lost much of their
public support during this period.”35 However, Between September 1993 and January 1994 Palestinian
support for the Oslo Accord dropped from 68.6 percent to 45.3.36 Similarly, terrorist activity of both
Fatah/PLO and Hamas spiked at the turn of 1994, with more terrorist activity by Hamas.37 Still, mainstream
constituencies of Fatah did not support the violence, and after 1995 the PLO, committed to the Oslo Accords,
stopped the use of terrorism.38 The PLO would engage in terrorist activity once more in 2007 in response to
tensions with Hamas, but I will elaborate on that more in the Hamas case study.
After signing the Oslo Accords in 1993 and 1995, the PLO adhered to its agreement to forsake terrorism.
Ostensibly, the PLO had achieved the best channel of achieving its strategic goals, legitimate political means.
From its early stages as a weak, unknown movement, Fatah used terrorism to facilitate its organizational
goals. Through terrorism, Fatah increased its bargaining power and thus got a seat at the negotiation table
with Israel and the US. Most significantly, Fatah’s decisions on whether or not and when to use terrorism
were made according to public opinion and popular support. The PLO stopped using terrorism once its
constituents were convinced that the political processes offered to them would promote their political
objectives better than terrorism.
Hamas
An offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas grew as an immediate response to the intifada, capitalizing
on the population’s need for violence to express its grievances. Hamas participated in the violence that was
spreading to capture Palestinian support for its organization. The Muslim Brothers recognized the intifada as
the perfect timing to harvest popular support through the use of violence. Hamas’s leadership was politically
active in the Territories in forming a social system from the 1970s, before Hamas was founded. This aided
their political legitimacy given that the reasons the intifada erupted were mostly about Palestinian poor
socioeconomic status. Hamas’s leadership operated for a decade in near silence, focusing on social
grievances of Palestinians. However, to establish their terrorist organization and achieve their organizational
goals, Hamas’s founders used violence as rhetoric. In a time in which popular support for violence for
strategic proposes was subsiding, the intifada facilitated an opportunity for the establishment of Hamas. Due
to the Fatah-led PLO’s supremacy in the Territories, Hamas’s opportunity to pose a potential threat to Fatah
was through the use of violence. As the dominant terrorist organization in the Territories and Israel, Hamas
became a valid threat to the PLO.
Growth of Hamas
Hamas used violence to undermine Fatah and draw support. After Arafat began secret negotiations with
Israel, his ability to embrace violence was depleted. His constituencies, so he thought, supported a political
process that they did not know was in the works. This allowed Hamas to use violence to delegitimize Fatah
and the PLO. However, after the 1991 Madrid Conference, as negotiations with Israel became known, the
Fatah-Hamas dispute turned to an ideological battle over constituents. In 1991, Hamas inflicted violence on
Palestinian collaborators in an attempt to weaken support for Fatah and its moderate methods. Hamas
quickly realized that such activities were counterproductive to rallying popular support among Palestinians.
Piazza discusses this effect in his discussion about targeting civilians that constituents could relate to.39 To
appease broader constituencies, after December 1991 Hamas focused on Israeli targets.
During the Oslo procedure, Hamas used terrorism to undermine the peace process, backed by Palestinian
lack of faith in the process and Arafat. Throughout the 1990s, Hamas’s terrorist campaigns were the
organization’s attempts to undermine Arafat, and legitimize Hamas. The organization launched campaigns
aimed at sabotaging Arafat’s peace processes with Israel. These were intended to delegitimize the PLO while
delegitimizing the PLO’s strategy of negotiations, as well. International partners could see that Arafat cannot
obtain monopoly on the use of violence in the PA, and doubt his capabilities to adhere to any agreement
signed. These doubts would interrupt political processes. Hamas would use that to argue that Arafat, Fatah,
and the PLO cannot deliver their strategic objective vis-à-vis peaceful means, and that the only way to
advance the Palestinian plight is through the use of violence. Furthermore, Israeli retaliation to the violence
of radical movements such as Hamas “[made] Hamas’s rhetoric appear valid and prescient.”40
The majority of the Palestinian population in the Territories did not support terrorism, and Hamas was
struggling to pose a significant threat to Arafat’s supremacy. Immediately after Oslo, Arafat suppressed
Hamas’s influence in the Territories mostly vis-à-vis arrests. Following the 1996 elections, in which Arafat
was elected president, the PLO had established its legitimate dominance in the Territories. This was
accompanied by a general belief in the peace process among Palestinians, which was also accompanied by a
Palestinian disapproval of terrorism.41 At this point, Hamas had suffered from very low support among
Palestinians, mostly because its rhetoric did not resonate with the masses, which was shown by very low
terrorist activity by Hamas.42
In 1999, Hamas’s luck has started to change in a way that was directly correlated with Palestinian popular
support. Hamas openly recognized Arafat’s legitimacy and the legitimacy of the PA. While this move drew
criticism from Hamas’s radical constituencies, it appeased the moderates, and thus broadened Hamas’s
support among Palestinians. In 2000, Palestinians had started to doubt Arafat, the PLO, and the peace
process. In the same year, Arafat had rejected the Barak Plan, the most generous proposal Israel had ever
made in terms of territory it was willing to give the PA. Coupled with deteriorating socioeconomic
conditions that some Palestinians felt Arafat failed in addressing, Arafat’s refusal of the Barak Plan
intensified Palestinians’ lack of faith in Arafat and his capabilities of advancing their strategic goals. As the
second intifada erupted in late 2000, Hamas emerged as a leading power again. Since Hamas was still
recovering from its most devastating period, suicide terrorism proved to be the best and only tactic to
advance its organizational goals, mostly because Palestinian popular support for violence increased. Via
terrorism Hamas was able to raise its profile to the international community, legitimizing its cause and
drawing capital. The perceived failure of legitimate political channels led Palestinians to believe that
violence was the only choice. This repeating notion of violence as the only choice resonated with the
Palestinian public as Hamas adopted it to mobilize support.
There is a direct correlation between the Palestinian population’s faith in the peace process and their support
for terrorism. Similarly, there is a direct correlation between Palestinian support for violence and Hamas’s
use of terrorism. Palestinian public opinion polls show that in 2001 most Palestinians had faith in
negotiations while supporting armed struggle as an alternative.43 However, these polls point to a trend
between 2000 and 2001 in which support largely shifted from Arafat and diplomacy towards Hamas and
violence. Figure 1 shows public support for violence against Israeli civilians between 1994-2005. Figure 2
shows the number of terrorist activities of Fatah/PLO and Hamas between those years. When the Palestinian
people believed peace is feasible, they opposed terrorism as means for achieving strategic goals, and
terrorism did not happen. Hamas was unable to mobilize popular support vis-à-vis terrorism because people
were opposed to it. In times when the Palestinian public was losing faith in the negotiations and peace
process, Hamas embarked on its most active campaign of terrorism.
Organizational vs. Strategic Goals
Hamas used terrorism and violence to advance their organization as rival to Fatah, and not as a way to further
their ambitious political aspiration against Israel. As Bloom notices, “Hamas’s leadership realized that
militant activities and terror would not bring about their long-term goals, and so they devised long-term
strategies and tactics.”44 Bloom further explains that should the Palestinian public show its dismay of
terrorism, Hamas would have to reconsider its use of it.45 Hamas, like Fatah, recognized that terrorism
would not promote its strategic goals, but it is Hamas’s best way to advance its organizational goals. Further,
once Hamas’s leadership would notice that terrorism becomes ineffective in advancing its goals, it would
revisit the decision to use terrorism. In allowing the desertion of terrorism to be an option, Hamas was
attempting to appeal to the moderate factions of the Territories, Fatah’s constituents. Hamas’s decision
regarding the use of terrorism was guided by popular support.
Rising Support for Violence
After 2005 Palestinian started losing faith in diplomatic measures, and support for violence gradually rose,
more so in Gaza than in the West Bank. With the rise in support for violence, Hamas engaged in more
terrorist activity. Polls conducted in November and December of 2005 show that in Gaza, more than in the
West Bank, Palestinians saw “suicide bombings [as] necessary to force Israel to make concessions.”46 While
general support for violence was on the rise, it was more noticeable in Gaza, which accompanied a greater
support for Hamas in Gaza than in the West Bank. The same polls showed that of all grievances, Palestinians
cared the most about prisoners’ release, more than twice as they did about job creation and other economic
hardships.47 Between December 2005 and June 2006, overall support for peaceful agreements subsided.48
While Hamas’s use of terrorism was on the rise in 2006, on June 25 of that year Hamas had abducted the
Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit.
Hamas and the PLO/Fatah
Similar to most terrorist organizations, both Fatah and Hamas used terrorism to launch their organization.
They had two different levels of objectives, organizational and strategic. Both adopted a strategic goal of
liberating Palestinian territory from Israel for the establishment of a Palestinian state in its place. Both
organizations recognized that terrorism would not advance these objectives, but it could serve to mobilize
people. As such, both organizations used terrorism to advance their organizational goals of legitimizing their
organization and cause, rallying the masses to support the cause and the organization, recruit, finance their
operations, and counter competition from rival factions. Differences begin with the outbreak of the first
intifada.
Fatah/PLO, after years of anticipation for an opportunity to advance its strategic goals via legitimate political
channels, ceased the opportunity to negotiate with the US and Israel. Fatah had already established its
legitimacy, and was striving to advance its strategic objectives. The PLO had increased its bargaining power
and was waiting for the opportunity to capitalize. Once the timing was right, and Arafat was presented with
an opportunity for negotiations at a time in which public opinion generally supported peaceful means, the
PLO had started its process of disengaging from terrorism. Hamas, on the other hand, was in its genesis. It
used the uprising to use violence in a way that would advance its organizational objectives. Having a
moderate PLO aided in the process. Hamas focused on terrorism to advance organization objectives.
Following the first intifada (uprising) in 1987, a generational cleavage divided Palestinian constituents along
support for diplomacy and support for continuation of the armed struggle.49 The aftermath of the intifada
brought the Fatah-led PLO closer to political participation with Israel and the US, while also generating the
growth of the Islamist Hamas. Since the PLO gained access to diplomatic measures and Hamas did not,
constituents supporting peaceful processes followed the PLO while those who favored violence supported
Hamas. After 1995, with the adherence of the PLO to the Oslo agreements, popular support for violence
meant larger support for Hamas and more terrorist activity, while popular support for legitimate political
procedures meant higher approval ratings for the PLO.
After the signing of Oslo II in 1995, Palestinian terrorism was an outcome of Palestinian popular support for
terrorism. When the population believed in peaceful means, the PLO/Fatah was in control, and no terrorism
had been used. Conversely, in times when the public lost faith in these processes, Hamas became more
influential and launched many terrorist campaigns.
The most significant time is after the second intifada. The Palestinian public generally supports martyrdom
and terrorism, but the PLO still does not engage in terrorism. This has to do with Fatah’s constituents as
much as it has to do with the PLO’s commitment to an unarmed engagement internationally. This suggests
that once an organization has made the transition into legitimate political means, as long as there is some
percentage of support, even if it is not the majority, the organization would persist in peaceful means and not
succumb back to terrorism.
Alternative Explanations
Conventional wisdom trying to identify the circumstances under which terrorism stops focus on the
immediate, rather than analyzing the organizations’ perspective regarding the efficacy of terrorist activity in
promoting their objectives. One conventional wisdom, promoted by Robert Pape, considers concessions and
the achievement of goals as the reason groups stop using terrorism. Concessions generally prove to the
organization that terrorism is effective in coercing state actors. Another conventional wisdom argues that
terrorism stops as a result of counterterrorism efforts as they diminish the organization’s capabilities. This
explanation, too, fails to recognize that the organization’s determination persists. Thus, once the organization
recuperates, terrorism will continue. Generally, contemporary scholarship focuses on the immediate
circumstances when trying to explain terrorism cessation.
Some scholars argue that terrorism stops once the organization’s goals are achieved. These scholars focus on
the ways in which terrorism advances an organization’s strategic goals – its political agenda. Robert Pape
substantiates his argument that terror works on concessions made by a target state in direct response to terror
campaigns, specifically Israel and Hamas in the mid 1990s.50 From his arguments, two conclusions can be
drawn: (1) when terrorist organizations achieve a goal, they reduce or stop their use of terrorism, but (2) as
they see that terrorism works, they will use such tactics in the future to further coerce a state until their
demands are fully answered. Audrey Kurth Cronin recognizes the African National Congress (ANC) and
other organizations as not only forsaking terrorist tactics, but also deceasing as terrorist organization once
achieved all of their goals.51 As such, while concessions might halt singular campaigns, they will only
promote groups to focus on terrorism as a coercive strategy in the long run due to its effectiveness.
This line of thought would predict less terrorist activity by Hamas or Fatah in response to Israeli concessions.
In the case of Hamas and its mid 1990s campaigns aimed at coercing Israel to adhere to the timeline agreed
in the Oslo agreements and withdraw from territories, while Hamas stopped its campaigns in response to
Israeli withdrawals, Hamas did not forsake terrorist tactics at large. Similarly, after the Israeli unilateral
disengagement from the Gaza strip in 2005, Pape should predict terrorism would stop. However, in 2006 it
only intensified. In both cases of Fatah and Hamas the data show the organizations used terrorism to advance
their organizational goals, not strategic.
Other conventional wisdoms believe that when terrorism becomes too costly, groups may forgo such tactics
until such costs subside. Counterterrorism efforts can make it harder for groups to launch terrorist
campaigns, and groups might cease terror operations when they become too costly. Counterterrorism
operations, however, have two effects: while diminishing the group’s capabilities, they also strengthen it by
bringing attention to its cause and increasing its willingness to retaliate. Mia Bloom argues that each terrorist
operation magnifies the organization’s support and number of operatives52. As such, counterterrorism both
stops the growth of the organization and diminishes its capabilities. Cronin demonstrates that a state can
weaken a group’s objectives by targeting its leader. She claims, “If a leader is captured and jailed,
undermining his credibility and cutting off inflammatory communications are critical to demoralizing his
following.”53 This is a very particular instance. Similarly, military repression has very limited productive
outcomes.54 Still, while these efforts might not terminate the use of terrorism, they diminish the capability of
a group to launch attacks. Edward Kaplan et al measure the strength of a terror organization using a terror-
stock model that computes the recruitment of operatives in relation to counterterrorism activities such as
arrests, killings, and interceptions55. Kaplan et al demonstrate the extent of the constraints counterterrorism
endeavors put on terrorist organizations. Once counterterrorism undertakings make it too costly for an
organization to launch terrorist attacks by diminishing its capabilities, the organization must cease its
operations. However, this does not mean it will forsake terrorism as a tactic, but only stop using it
temporarily.
Such wisdom predicts that an invasive expansive counterterrorism campaign by Israel should eradicate
terrorist activity. The longest period in which neither Hamas nor the PLO/Fatah had engaged in terrorist
activities was the three years following operation Cast Lead, in which the IDF entered the occupied
territories and arrested, interrogated, killed, and exiled terrorist activists, as well as confiscated arms and
destroyed underground infrastructure. In short, Israeli counterterrorism efforts work, for three years. Soon
after, in 2012, Hamas returned to use terrorism against Israel. Repression holds as long as it is consistent and
persistent. Having counterterrorism increase the costs of terrorism does not deter organizations from such
tactics. As noted, terrorist organizations often begin as small, weak, and unknown movements, and they use
terrorism to attract support, popular and material.
In trying to connect the use of terrorism to the achievement of strategic objectives, these wisdoms fail to
observe that terrorism advances only organizational goals, not strategic. Such was the case with the PLO in
the early 1990, when it used terrorism while negotiating with Israel only to delegitimize Hamas, which was
using terrorism to undermine the PLO and the negotiations. Similarly, linking repression and strategy does
not account for the growth of these groups and the fact that terrorism facilitates an organization’s growth.
In separating the two levels of strategy, my theory shows that an organization would choose not to use
terrorism when its organizational objectives are met, and when there is an opportunity to advance its strategic
objectives. Organizations use terrorism for organizational purposes that would increase their bargaining
power and in the process advance their strategic goals.
Conclusion
Conventional wisdoms fail to explain under what circumstances terrorist organizations choose to change
their strategy from terrorism to diplomacy because they fail to analyze the differences in using terrorism to
advance organizational goals versus strategic ones. In analyzing the use of terrorism for advancing an
organization’s objectives in two different levels, this paper demonstrates that terrorism is central to the
group’s organizational survival, and has less to do with its strategic advancements. Looking at Fatah and
Hamas, I sought to explain why one terrorist organization changed tactics while the other did not, given that
the two have similar strategic objectives. Fatah had gained access to a legitimate political process and its
constituents supported it. At that point, had Fatah continued using terrorism, it would have lost public
support. These cases illuminated the centrality terrorism plays in advancing organizational objectives, but not
strategic ones. Fatah and Hamas both used terrorism to raise their profile and increase their bargaining
power. Fatah renounced terrorism because it had the opportunity to advance its strategic goals at a time in
which public opinion supported such endeavors.
Such understanding of what role terrorism plays in an organization’s strategy has great implications
regarding counterterrorism. While conventional wisdoms explain how to reduce terrorism, or stop it
temporarily, my theory helps explain how to influence an organization to transform itself into a legitimate
political entity, with which it is possible to interact vis-à-vis conventional political channels. Combining my
theory with conventional wisdom, policy makers can facilitate both short-term and long-term solutions to
terrorist threats. When a new terrorist organization threatens to surface, states can immediately explore
legitimate political options to answer grievances and prevent escalation of violence. Furthermore, since
public opinion is guided by threat perception, which is guided by exposure, states can attempt to manipulate
public opinion. In the Palestinian territories, violence was supported when threat perception was high.
Palestinian’s perception of an Israeli threat stemmed from their contact with Israelis, which was mostly
confrontational with soldiers or settlers.56 Israel could increase Palestinian exposure to Israeli peaceful
means, providing aid within the territories in hopes that it would reduce threat perception and increase
popular support for diplomacy. Given that most counterterrorism campaigns actually have counter effective
results in undermining an organization’s legitimacy and support, my theory helps guide policy makers in
their planning of counterterrorism strategies.
This paper adopts Krause’s two-level framework and addresses previously examined questions in a new
light. It suggests that the use of terrorism has the potential of achieving political participation. This raises the
question of whether political participation can prevent terrorism. Further research should explore such
questions using the two-level framework. Krause’s two-level framework provides political scientists with a
new way of evaluating how terrorism serves organizations. As such, this paper advances Krause’s theory to
explore unresolved puzzles in the study of terrorism.
References
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Publishers, 2002.
Alexander, Yonah. Palestinian Secular Terrorism: Profiles of Fatah, Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and the Democratic Front for
the Liberation of Palestine. Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, 2003.
Bloom, Mia M. “Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding.”Political
Science Quarterly119 (1) 2004: 61-88.
Crenshaw, Martha. Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes, and Consequences. New York: Routledge,
2011.
Cronin, Audrey Kurth. “How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups.”International
Security31 (1) 2006: 7-48.
Cronin, Audrey Kurth. How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist
Campaigns. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.
Hasselknippe, Gro. “Palestinian Opinions on Peace and Conflict, Internal Affairs and Parliament Elections
2006 Results from Fafo polls in September and November–December 2005.” United States Institute of
Peace. Washington, DC (1200 17th St., NW, Suite 200, Washington 20036-3011): U.S. Institute of Peace.
Kaplan, Edward H., Alex Mintz, Shaul Mishal, and Claudio Samban. “What Happened to Suicide Bombings
in Israel? Insights From a Terror Stock Model.”Studies in Conflict & Terrorism28 (3) 2005: 225-35.
Krause, Peter. “The Political Effectiveness of Non-State Violence: A Two-Level Framework to Transform a
Deceptive Debate.”Security Studies22 (2) 2013 (04/01; 2014/12): 259-94.
Kurtz, Anat N. Fatah and the Politics of Violence: The Institutionalization of a Popular Struggle. Portland:
Sussex Academic Press, 2003.
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2013). Global
Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd
Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (2). July 9, 2001.
Accessed December 10, 2014.
Pape, Robert A. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.”American Political Science Review97 (3) 2003:
343-61.
Piazza, James A. “A Supply-Side View of Suicide Terrorism: A Cross-National Study.”The Journal of

Politics70 (1) 2008: 28-39.
Shamir, Jacob. “Public Opinion in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: From Geneva to Disengagement to
Kadima and Hamas.” United States Institute of Peace. Washington, DC (1200 17th St., NW, Suite 200,
Washington 20036-3011): U.S. Institute of Peace.
Shikaki, Khalil. “Willing to Compromise: Palestinian Public Opinion and the Peace Process.” United States
Institute of Peace. Washington, DC (1200 17th St., NW, Suite 200, Washington 20036-3011): U.S. Institute
of Peace.
United States Institute of Peace. 1999.How terrorism ends.Washington, DC (1200 17th St., NW, Suite 200,
Washington 20036-3011): U.S. Institute of Peace, .
Washington Report on Middle East Affairs. Public Opinion: Israeli, Palestinian Support for Peace Accord
Was Dropping Before Massacre. April 1, 1994. Accessed December 10, 2014.
Endnotes
1.) Peter Krause, “The Political Effectiveness of Non-State Violence: A Two-Level Framework to Transform
a Deceptive Debate,”Security Studies22 (2) 2013 (04/01; 2014/12): 259-94.
2.) Ibid 272.
3.) Ibid.
4.) James A. Piazza, “A Supply-Side View of Suicide Terrorism: A Cross-National Study,”The Journal of
Politics70 (1) 2008: 30.
5.) Mia M. Bloom, “Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding,”Political
Science Quarterly119 (1) 2004: 85; James A. Piazza, “A Supply-Side View of Suicide Terrorism,” 30.
6.) Ibid 28.
7.) Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.”American Political Science Review97 (3)
2003: 343-61.
8.) Yonah Alexander, Palestinian Religious Terrorism: Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Ardsley: Transnational
Publishers, 2002: 47-72.
9.) Peter Krause, “The Political Effectiveness of Non-State Violence,” 263-4.
10.) Mia M. Bloom, “Palestinian Suicide Bombing,” 62-85; James A. Piazza, “A Supply-Side View of
Suicide Terrorism,” 29.
11.) James A. Piazza, “A Supply-Side View of Suicide Terrorism,” 30.
12.) Peter Krause, “The Political Effectiveness of Non-State Violence,” 273.
13.) James A. Piazza, “A Supply-Side View of Suicide Terrorism,” 31-32.
14.) Martha Crenshaw, Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes, and Consequences. New York: Routledge,
2011, 219.
15.) Audrey Kurth Cronin, “How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups,”International
Security31 (1) 2006, 25; Martha Crenshaw in “How Terrorism Ends,”United States Institute of Peace. 1999.
Washington, DC (1200 17th St., NW, Suite 200, Washington 20036-3011): U.S. Institute of Peace: 3.
16.) Group would use violence despite of public opinion when it is aimed at tackling a rival group. However,
this stems from the organizational goal of sustaining the group’s power and supremacy over other groups.
For more, see Krause.
17.) Anat N. Kurtz, Fatah and the Politics of Violence: The Institutionalization of a Popular Struggle.
Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2003, 32.
18.) Ibid 30.
19.) Ibid 35-37.
20.) Yonah Alexander, Palestinian Secular Terrorism: Profiles of Fatah, Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and the Democratic Front for
the Liberation of Palestine. Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, 2003, 2; Anat N. Kurtz, Fatah and the
Politics of Violence, 38.
21.) Yonah Alexander, Palestinian Secular Terrorism, 2-3.
22.) Ibid.
23.) Ibid 3.
24.) Anat N. Kurtz, Fatah and the Politics of Violence, 83-84.
25.) Ibid 84.
26.) Ibid 79.
27.) Anat N. Kurtz, Fatah and the Politics of Violence, 79-80.
28.) Ibid 80-82.
29.) Ibid 82.
30.) Ibid 121.
31.) Ibid 121-2.
32.) Anat N. Kurtz, Fatah and the Politics of Violence, 122.
33.) National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2013). Global
Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd
34.) According to GTD, between September 1987 and December 1990 terrorism decreased dramatically.
35.) Khalil Shikaki, “Willing to Compromise: Palestinian Public Opinion and the Peace Process.” United
States Institute of Peace. Washington, DC (1200 17th St., NW, Suite 200, Washington 20036-3011): U.S.
Institute of Peace, 1.
36.) Washington Report on Middle East Affairs. Public Opinion: Israeli, Palestinian Support for Peace
Accord Was Dropping Before Massacre. April 1, 1994. Accessed December 10, 2014.
37.) National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).
38.) Ibid.
39.) James A. Piazza, “A Supply-Side View of Suicide Terrorism,” 31-32.
40.) Mia M. Bloom, “Palestinian Suicide Bombing,” 65.
41.) Ibid 67.
42.) National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).
43.) Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (2). July 9, 2001.
Accessed December 10, 2014.
46.) Gro Hasselknippe, “Palestinian Opinions on Peace and Conflict, Internal Affairs and Parliament
Elections 2006 Results from Fafo polls in September and November–December 2005” United States Institute
of Peace. Washington, DC (1200 17th St., NW, Suite 200, Washington 20036-3011): U.S. Institute of Peace,
14.
47.) Ibid 27.
48.) Jacob Shamir, “Public Opinion in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: From Geneva to Disengagement to
Kadima and Hamas.” United States Institute of Peace. Washington, DC (1200 17th St., NW, Suite 200,
Washington 20036-3011): U.S. Institute of Peace, 37-40.
49.) Jacob Shamir, “Public Opinion in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” 13-14.
50.) Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.”352-3.
51.) Audrey Kurth Cronin, “How al-Qaida Ends,” 24.
53.) Audrey Kurth Cronin, “How al-Qaida Ends,” 22.
54.) Ibid 30-1.
55.) Edward H. Kaplan, Alex Mintz, Shaul Mishal, and Claudio Samban, “What Happened to Suicide
Bombings in Israel? Insights From a Terror Stock Model,”Studies in Conflict & Terrorism28:3 (2005): 225-
35.
56.) Khalil Shikaki, “Willing to Compromise,” 13.

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15.01.

The Political Rationality of Terror: Understanding

Methods & Case Selection

Organizational vs. Strategic Goals

Organizational vs. Strategic Goals

Rising Support for Violence

Hamas and the PLO/Fatah

Piazza, James A. “A Supply-Side View of Suicide Terrorism: A Cross-National Study.”The Journal of

2.) Ibid 272.

6.) Ibid 28.

9.) Peter Krause, “The Political Effectiveness of Non-State Violence,” 263-4.

11.) James A. Piazza, “A Supply-Side View of Suicide Terrorism,” 30.

12.) Peter Krause, “The Political Effectiveness of Non-State Violence,” 273.

13.) James A. Piazza, “A Supply-Side View of Suicide Terrorism,” 31-32.

18.) Ibid 30.

19.) Ibid 35-37.

21.) Yonah Alexander, Palestinian Secular Terrorism, 2-3.

24.) Anat N. Kurtz, Fatah and the Politics of Violence, 83-84.

25.) Ibid 84.

26.) Ibid 79.

27.) Anat N. Kurtz, Fatah and the Politics of Violence, 79-80.

28.) Ibid 80-82.

29.) Ibid 82.

30.) Ibid 121.

31.) Ibid 121-2.

32.) Anat N. Kurtz, Fatah and the Politics of Violence, 122.

39.) James A. Piazza, “A Supply-Side View of Suicide Terrorism,” 31-32.

40.) Mia M. Bloom, “Palestinian Suicide Bombing,” 65.

41.) Ibid 67.

44.) Mia M. Bloom, “Palestinian Suicide Bombing,” 77.

45.) Mia M. Bloom, “Palestinian Suicide Bombing,” 77.

47.) Ibid 27.

49.) Jacob Shamir, “Public Opinion in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” 13-14.

50.) Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.”352-3.

51.) Audrey Kurth Cronin, “How al-Qaida Ends,” 24.

52.) Mia M. Bloom, “Palestinian Suicide Bombing,” 85.

53.) Audrey Kurth Cronin, “How al-Qaida Ends,” 22.

54.) Ibid 30-1.

56.) Khalil Shikaki, “Willing to Compromise,” 13.

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