Vera v.

Cuevas

Facts:
Private respondents herein, are engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of filled milk
products throughout the Philippines. The products of private respondent, Consolidated
Philippines Inc. are marketed and sold under the brand Darigold whereas those of private
respondent, General Milk Company (Phil.), Inc., under the brand "Liberty;" and those of private
respondent, Milk Industries Inc., under the brand "Dutch Baby." Private respondent, Institute of
Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, is a corporation organized for the
principal purpose of upholding and maintaining at its highest the standards of local filled milk
industry, of which all the other private respondents are members.
CIR required the respondents to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk products which
do not bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the order. Failure to comply will result to penalties. Section 169 talks of the inscription
to be placed in skimmed milk wherein all condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever
form, from which the fatty part has been removed totally or in part, sold or put on sale in the
Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its immediate containers, and in all the
language in which such containers are marked, with the words, "This milk is not suitable for
nourishment for infants less than one year of age," or with other equivalent words.
The CFI Manila ordered the CIR to perpetually restrain from requiring the respondents to print
on the labels of their product the words "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants
less than one year of age.". Also, it ordered the Fair Trade Board to perpetually restrain from
investigating the respondents related to the manufacture/sale of their filled milk products.

Issue:
Whether or not skimmed milk is included in the scope of Section 169 of the Tax Code.

Held:
No, Section 169 of the Tax Code is not applicable to filled milk. The use of specific and
qualifying terms "skimmed milk" in the headnote and "condensed skimmed milk" in the text of
the cited section, would restrict the scope of the general clause "all milk, in whatever form, from
which the fatty pat has been removed totally or in part." In other words, the general clause is
restricted by the specific term "skimmed milk" under the familiar rule of ejusdem generis that
general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms they follow in the
statute.
The difference, therefore, between skimmed milk and filled milk is that in the former, the fatty
part has been removed while in the latter, the fatty part is likewise removed but is substituted
with refined coconut oil or corn oil or both. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that
Section 169 applies both to skimmed milk and filled milk. It cannot then be readily or safely
assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed milk and filled milk. Also, it has been found
out that "the filled milk products of the petitioners (now private respondents) are safe, nutritious,
wholesome and suitable for feeding infants of all ages" (p. 44, Rollo) and that "up to the present,
Filipino infants fed since birth with filled milk have not suffered any defects, illness or disease
attributable to their having been fed with filled milk."
Hence, applying Section 169 to it would cause a deprivation of property without due process of
law.
 Buenaseda vs Flavier

Legal Ethics – Legal Profession – Motion for Disbarment Improperly Filed

Administrative Law – Power of the Ombudsman – Preventive Suspension

In 1992, the NCMH Nurses Association (NCMH) filed a case of graft and corruption against Dr.
Brigida Buenaseda and several other government officials of the Department of Health (DOH).
The Ombudsman (then Conrado Vasquez), ordered the suspension of Buenaseda et al. The
suspension was carried on by then DOH Secretary Juan Flavier, being the officer in charge
over Buenaseda et al. Buenaseda et al then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, questioning the suspension order. NCMH submitted its
Comment on the Petition where they attached a Motion for Disbarment against the lawyers of
Buenaseda et al.

Allegedly, the lawyers of Buenaseda et al advised them not to obey the suspension order, which
is a lawful order from a duly constituted authority. NCMH maintains that such advice from the
lawyers constitute a violation against the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Solicitor General, commenting on the case, agreed with Buenaseda’s lawyers as he
maintained that all the Ombudsman can do is to recommend suspensions not impose them. The
Sol-Gen based his argument on Section 13 (3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the
Office of the Ombudsman shall have inter alia the power, function, and duty to:

Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at
fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and
ensure compliance therewith.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials.
Whether or not a Motion for Disbarment may be filed in a special civil action.

HELD: Yes, the Ombudsman may impose suspension orders. The Supreme Court clarifies that
what the Ombudsman issued is an order of preventive suspension pending the resolution of the
case or investigation thereof. It is not imposing suspension as a penalty (not punitive
suspension). What the Constitution contemplates that the Ombudsman may recommend are
punitive suspensions.

Anent the issue of the Motion for Disbarment filed with the Ombudsman, the same is not proper.
It cannot be filed in this special civil action which is confined to questions of jurisdiction or
abuse of discretion for the purpose of relieving persons from the arbitrary acts of judges and
quasi-judicial officers. There is a set of procedure for the discipline of members of the bar
separate and apart from the present special civil action. However, the lawyers of Buenaseda
were reminded not be carried away in espousing their client’s cause. The language of a lawyer,
both oral or written, must be respectful and restrained in keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession and with his behavioral attitude toward his brethren in the profession
 San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation vs CIR

Statutory Construction – Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius

San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation (SPMC) was assessed a 3% tax on its sales of corn and
edible oil as manufactured products – this is pursuant to Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code.
Said corn and edible oil products were sold to United Coconut Chemicals (UNICHEM) who in
turn exports these products and sell them abroad.

SPMC invoked that it is exempt from the tax as it invoked the same Section of the 1987 Tax
Code which provides in part:
xxx Provided, however, That this tax shall not apply to rope, coconut oil, palm oil and the by-
product of copra from which it is produced or manufactured and desiccated coconut, if such
rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products and desiccated coconuts, shall be removed for
exportation by the proprietor or operator of the factory or the miller himself, and are actually
exported without returning to the Philippines, whether in their original state or as an ingredient or
part of any manufactured article or products: xxx (underscore added by uberdigests)

SPMC’s interpretation of the law is as follows:

1. That there is indeed a 3% tax on edible oil products;

2. But that said tax exempts manufacturers who export these edible oil products;
3. That SPMC is considered to be an exporter because it sells the oil products to UNICHEM, its
purchaser, who then exports the oil products.

ISSUE: Whether or not SPMC’s interpretation is correct.

HELD: No. The legal maxim “Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius” applies. Nowhere in the law
was “corn oil” included in the enumeration of tax exempt exported products. Nor did it mention
to exempt a manufacturer who, though not directly exporting its edible oil products nevertheless
sells said product to a purchaser who does export. Where the law enumerates the subject or
condition upon which it applies, it is to be construed as excluding from its effects all those not
expressly mentioned. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Anything that is not included in the
enumeration is excluded therefrom and a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or
reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein. The rule proceeds from
the premise that the legislature would not have made specific enumerations in a statute if it had
the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
People vs. Guillermo Manantan [G.R. No L-14129. July 31, 1962]
Ponente: REGALA, J.
FACTS:
[D]efendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The defense moved to dismiss the
information on the ground that as justice of the peace the defendant is one of the officers
enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the said
motion. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision
of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg applying the rule of “expressio unius, est
exclusion alterius”. The lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the
authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. The issue was raised to the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a justice of the peace was included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code.

HELD:
YES. The order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case was
remanded for trial on the merits.

RATIO:
The application of the rule of casus omissus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case
is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or
thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons
already mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has only been a substitution of
terms. On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee’s contention that justices of the
peace are not covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To accept it is to render
ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically laid down by the legislature.
Although it was observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of
“expressio unius, est exclusion alterius” in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the peace
are not covered by Section 54, the rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to
exclude a justice of the peace from the purview of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the
Court of Appeals has given the reason for the exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reason for
the alleged change. Hence, the rule of expressio unius est exclusion alterius has been
erroneously applied.

Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, provides:

“ No justice, fiscal, treasurer, assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, no
member of thenational, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force, and no classified civil
service officer or employee shall aidany candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in
any election or take part therein, if he is a peace officer,”
The defendant argued that the justice of the peace was not comprehended among theofficers
enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. That the word “justice of peace “ was
omitted, and the omission revealed the intention of the legislature to exclude justice of the
peace from its operation. Invoking the rule of “ casus omisus pro omissohabendus est,” under
the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumerationmust be held to have been
omitted intentionally.

Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, which provided the following:

“Sec. 449- Persons prohibited from influencing elections.- No judge of the First Instance, justice
of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer of employee of the
Phippine Constabulary, or any Bureauor employee of the classified civil service, shall aid
any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise
than exercising the right to vote.”

The court of appeals and the trial court applied the rule of “expression unius est
exclusionalterius,” which means, the express mention of one person, thing or consequence
impliesthe exclusion of all the others, in arriving at the conclusion that the justices of the peace
was covered by Section 54

Socorro D. Ramirez vs. CA and Esther GarciaGR No. 93833 September 28, 1995

FACTS

A civil case for damages was filed by Socorro Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City against private respondent Esther Garcia alleging that the latter “vexed,insulted and
humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive topetitioner's dignity and
personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”Ramirez produced a verbatim
transcript of the event alleged. The transcript was takenfrom a tape recording of the
confrontation made by Ramirez.As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging
that the said act of secretlytaping the confrontation was illegal, Respondent Garcia
filed a criminal case againstRamirez alleging that the recording of the event was illegal and
thus, a violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and
otherrelated violations of private communication, and other purposes.”Ramirez filed a motion to
quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitutean offense. The trial court agreed
with her and granted the motion to quash, reasoningthat the facts charged do not
constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that theviolation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a
the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to the communication. The
Court of Appeals, however, reversedreasoning that the allegations sufficiently constituted
an offense under Section 1 of RA4200.

ISSUES

Whether Section 1 of RA 4200 applies to the taping of private conversation by one of

theparties to the conversation and not only to the unauthorized taping of a privatecommunicatio
n by a party other than those involved in the communicationWhether the substance or content of
the conversation must be alleged in the
InformationWhether RA 4200 penalizes a “private communication” only and not a “privateconver
sation”

HELD and RATIO

1.Section 1 of RA 4200 applies to the taping of private conversations by one of theparties to the
conversation. Section 1 of RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally
makesit illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any privatecommunication to s
ecretly record such communication by means of a taperecorder. The law makes no distinction
as to whether the party sought to bepenalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from thoseinvolved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all
personsunauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier"any". A
perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports therespondent court's
conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers
indeedcontemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of privateconversations or
communications taken either by the parties themselves or bythird persons.

2.The substance or content of the conversation need not be alleged in theinformation. The
nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of
thestatute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in theinformation. What
R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an
individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder
would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A 4200

3. The taping of both private communications and private conversations are penalizd as there is
no difference between the two The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare,
meaning “to share or to impart”. In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of
sharing or imparting, as in a conversation or signifies the “process by which meanings or
thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language
signs or gestures)”. These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written
or expressive communication of meanings or thoughts
Florentino v. PNB
G.R. No. L-8782. April 28, 1956

FACTS:
The petitioners and appellants filed a petition for mandamus against Philippine National Bank to
compel it to accept the backpay certificate of petitioner Marcelino B. Florentino to pay an
indebtedness in the sum of P6,800 secured by real estate mortgage plus interest. The debt
incurred on January 2, 1953, which is due on January 2, 1954. Petitioner is a holder of Backpay
Acknowledgment No. 1721 dated October 6, 1954, in the amount of P22,896.33 by virtue of
Republic Act No. 897 approved on June 20, 1953. Petitioners offered to pay their loan with the
respondent bank with their backpay certificate, but the respondent bank, on December 29,
1953, refused to accept the latter's backpay certificate. Under section 2 of Republic Act No. 879,
respondent-appellee contends that the qualifying clause refers to all the antecedents, whereas
the appellant's contention is that it refers only to the last antecedent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the clause “who may be willing to accept the same for settlement” refers to all
antecedents mentioned in the last sentence of section 2 of Republic Act No. 879.

HELD:
No. Grammatically, the qualifying clause refers only to the last antecedent; that is, "any citizen
of the Philippines or any association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines."
It should be noted that there is a comma before the words "or to any citizen, etc.," which
separates said phrase from the preceding ones. But even disregarding the grammatical
construction, to make the acceptance of the backpay certificates obligatory upon any citizen,
association, or corporation, which are not government entities or owned or controlled by the
government, would render section 2 of Republic Act No. 897 unconstitutional for it would
amount to an impairment of the obligation of contracts by compelling private creditors to accept
a sort of promissory note payable within ten years with interest at a rate very much lower than
the current or even the legal one. It was also found out in the Congressional Record that the
amendatory bill to Sec. 2 was made which permits the use of backpay certificates as payment
for obligations and indebtedness in favor of the government. Another reason is that it is matter
of general knowledge that many officials and employees of the Philippine Government, who had
served during the Japanese Occupation, have already received their backpay certificates and
used them for the payment of the obligations to the Government and its entities for debts
incurred before the approval of Republic Act No. 304.
Florentino incurred his debt to the PNB on January 2, 1953. Hence, the obligation was
subsisting when the Amendatory Act No. 897 was approved. Consequently, the present case
falls squarely under the provisions of section 2 of the Amendatory Act No. 897.

People v. Tamani
1
Facts:On February 14, 1963, the lower court found Tamani guilty of consummated and
attempted murder. On
February 25, 1963, Tamani’s counsel received a copy of the decision and consequently filed for
a motion
for reconsideration on March 1, 1963. It was denied. On July 13, 1963, the lower court sent a
denial orderto the counsel through his wife via registered mail. On September 10, 1963, the said
counsel appealed
the lower court’s decision.
Then, the appellees argued that the appeal should be dismissed contendingthat the appeal
should have been made up to July 24, 1963 which is the 15 day period of appeal from thedate
of notice and not from the date of promulgation. Thus, the appellees claimed that the appeal
wasfiled 47 days late.

Issue:Whether the 15-day period should commence from the date of promulgation or from the
date of notice ofthe decision.Held: Appeal was dismissed. The 15-day period should commence
from the date of promulgation.Ratio:Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides:SEC. 6.
When appeal to be taken an appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) daysfrom promulgation or
notice of the judgment or order appealed from. This period forperfecting an appeal shall be
interrupted from the time a motion for new trial is filed untilnotice of the order overruling the
motion shall have been served upon the defendant orhis attorney.
3
The assumption that the fifteen-day period should be counted from February 25, 1963, when a
copy ofthe decision was allegedly served on appellant's counsel by registered mail, is not well-
taken. The word"promulgation" in section 6 should be construed as referring to "judgment" while
the word "notice" shouldbe construed as referring to "order". That construction is sanctioned by
the rule of reddendo singulasingulis
: "referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object", or
"leteach be put in its proper place, that is, the words should be taken distributively". Therefore,
when theorder denying appellant's motion for reconsideration was served by registered mail on
July 13th onappellant's counsel, he had only 1 day within which to file his notice of appeal and
not 11 days. AppellantTamani's notice of appeal, filed on September 10, 1963, was 58 days
late.
G.R. No. 152640 June 15 2006

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM rep. by SECRETARY HERNANI A.BRAGANZA

Petitioner,vs.
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORP.
Respondent.
FACTS
:The controversy involves a parcel of land owned by respondent PHILCOMSATsituated within
the area which had been declared a security zone underPresidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1845, as
amended by P.D. No. 1848, which issubjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
of the government. In1992, a Notice of Coverage was sent to PHILCOMSAT by petitioner
DARinforming the former that the land in question shall be placed under CARP'scompulsory
acquisition scheme. PHILCOMSAT wrote to DAR seeking anexemption of the subject property
from CARP coverage, insisting that the landwill be utilized for the expansion of its operations.
During the pendency of theapplication, then DAR Secretary Garilao, suggested that respondent
enter into ausufructuary agreement with the occupants of the subject property until such
timethat it will have to use the property for its planned expansion. The occupants,however,
refused to enter into such an agreement.Meanwhile, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tanay, Rizal,
moved for the coverage of the700-hectare PHILCOMSAT property within the security zone
under CARP. TheProvincial Agrarian Reform Officer further opined that subjecting the
surroundingagricultural area within the security zone under CARP will not be detrimental tothe
operations of PHILCOMSAT. An Order was issued by then Secretary Garilaorejecting
PHILCOMSAT's application for exemption from CARP. Having beendenied, PHILCOMSAT filed
a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals to which the appellate court granted.
Consequently, DAR mover for reconsideration but the same was denied hence this petition.

ISSUE: WON the subject property of PHILCOMSAT which had been declared a security zone
under P.D. No. 1845m as amended by P.D. No. 1848, can be subjected to CARP

HELD: The area, however, should be exempt from CARP coverage by virtue of P.D No. 1845,
as amended, which, as stated earlier, declared the area to be a security zone under the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of National Defense. It is evident from the very wording of the law that
the government recognized the crucial role of PHILCOMSAT’s operations to national security,
thereby necessitating the protection of its operations from unnecessary and even anticipated
disruption.

Section 10 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or R.A No. 6657, as amended, provides
that lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense
shall be exempt from the coverage of the Act. The determinations as to whether or not the
subject property is actually, directly, and exclusively used for national defense usually entails a
finding of fact which this Court will not normally delve in considering that, subject to certain
exceptions, in a petitions or certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Court is called
upon to review only errors of law. Suffice it to state, however, that as a matter of principle, it
cannot seriously be denied that the act of securing a vital communications facility is an act of
national defense. Hence, the lawm by segregating an area for purposes of a security zone for
such facilities, in effect devoted that area to national defense.
RUFINO LOPEZ & SONS, INC., v. THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS
G.R. No. L-9274 February 1, 1957
Facts:
1. Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal wire netting from Hamburg, Germany. The Manila
Collector of Customs assessed the corresponding customs duties on the importation on the
basis of consular and supplies invoices. Said customs duties were paid and the shipments were
released. Subsequently, however, and freight of said wire netting and as a result of the
reassessment, additional customs duties were levied and imposed upon petitioner.
2. On May 23, 1955, a motion to dismiss was filed at the Court of Tax Appeal but was dismissed
on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to review decisions of the Collector of Customs of
Manila, citing section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, creating said tax court
Issue:
Whether Section 11 of RA 1125 allows the respondent court to review decisions of the Collector
of Customs?
Held:
The court holds that under the law, particularly, the Customs Law and Republic Act No. 1125,
the Court of Tax Appeals has no jurisdiction to review by appeal, decisions of the Collector of
Customs. The Commissioner of Customs is purely administrative, whereas, appeal to the Court
of Tax Appeal is manifestly judicial. And it is a sound rule that before one resorts to the Courts,
the administrative remedy provided by law should first be exhausted. In the second place, the
two remedies suggested by the petitioner would result in confusion because a person adversely
affected by a decision of a Collector of Customs could not be sure where to seek the remedy,
whether with the Commissioner of Customs or with the Court of Tax Appeals, and it might even
be difficult for him to decide because, if he took the appeal directly to the Tax Court, that would
ordinarily cut off his remedy before the Commissioner of Customs for the reason that, should
the Court of Tax Appeals decide against him, he may not appeal said decision to the
Commissioner of Customs because the Commissioner as an administrative officer may not
review the decision of the Court. On the other hand, if the person affected by a decision of a
Collector of Customs took his appeal to the Commissioner of Customs, and there receives an
adverse decision, he may yet appeal wherefrom to the Court of Tax Appeals. In the third place,
even if the person affected by an adverse ruling of the Collector of Customs took his appeal to
the Court of Tax Appeals, as advocated by counsel for the petitioner, under the literal meaning
of section 11, the Tax Court may refuse to entertain said appeal, as was done in the present
case, on the ground that under section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, it had no jurisdiction to
review a decision of the Collector of Customs, section 7 clearly limiting its appellate jurisdiction
to review decisions of the Commissioner of Customs
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON, CLARO
SANTILLON, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U. MIRANDA and ROSARIO CORRALES, oppositors-
appellees.

Clodualdo P. Surio and Claro Santillon (in his own behalf) for petitioner-appellant.
Patricio M. Patajo for oppositors-appellees.

BENGZON, C.J.:

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, specifying the
respective shares of the principal parties herein in the intestate estate of Pedro Santillon.

On November 21, 1953, Santillon died without testament in Tayug, Pangasinan, his residence,
leaving one son, Claro, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his marriage, Pedro acquired
several parcels of land located in that province.

About four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of administration.
Opposition to said petition was entered by the widow Perfecta Miranda and the spouses Benito
U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales on the following grounds: (a) that the properties enumerated in
the petition were all conjugal, except three parcels which Perfecta Miranda claimed to be her
exclusive properties; (b) that Perfecta Miranda by virtue of two documents had conveyed 3/4 of
her undivided share in most of the properties enumerated in the petition to said spouses Benito
and Rosario; (c) that administration of the estate was not necessary, there being a case for
partition pending; and (d) that if administration was necessary at all, the oppositor Perfecta
Miranda and not the petitioner was better qualified for the post. It appears that subsequently,
oppositor Perfecta Miranda was appointed administratrix of the estate.

On March 22, 1961, the court appointed commissioners to draft within sixty days, a project of
partition and distribution of all the properties of the deceased Pedro Santillon.

On April 25, 1961, Claro filed a "Motion to Declare Share of Heirs" and to resolve the conflicting
claims of the parties with respect to their respective rights in the estate. Invoking Art. 892 of the
New Civil Code, he insisted that after deducting 1/2 from the conjugal properties is the conjugal
share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must be divided as follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4 for him.
Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand, claimed that besides her conjugal half, she was entitled
under Art. 996 of the New Civil Code to another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words, Claro
claimed 3/4 of Pedro's inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2.

After due notice and hearing, the court, on June 28, 1961, issued an order, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS it is hereby ruled and ordered that

in the intestate succession of the deceased Pedro Santillon, the surviving spouse
Perfecta Miranda shall inherit ONE-HALF (1/2) share and the remaining ONE-HALF
(1/2) share for the only son, Atty. Claro Santillon. This is after deducting the share of the
widow as co-owner of the conjugal properties. ... .
From this order, petitioner Claro Santillon has appealed to this Court. Two questions of law are
involved. The first, raised in Perfecta's Motion to Dismiss Appeal, is whether the order of the
lower court is appealable. And the second, raised in appellant's lone assignment of error, is:
How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be divided when the only survivors are the
spouse and one legitimate child?

The First Issue: — It is clear that the order of the lower court is final and, therefore, appealable
to this Court.

Under Rule 109, sec. 1, a person may appeal in special proceedings from an order of the Court
of First Instance where such order "determines ... the distributive share of the estate to which
such person is entitled."

The Second Issue: — Petitioner rests his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate on Art. 892 of the
New Civil Code which provides that:

If only the legitimate child or descendant of the deceased survives the widow or widower
shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate. ... .

As she gets one-fourth, therefore, I get 3/4, says Claro. Perfecta, on the other hand, cites Art.
996 which provides:

If a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving
spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children.

Replying to Perfecta's claim, Claro says the article is unjust and unequitable to the extent that it
grants the widow the same share as that of the children in intestate succession, whereas in
testate, she is given 1/4 and the only child 1/2.

Oppositor Perfecta Miranda, on the other hand, contends that Art. 996 should control,
regardless of its alleged inequity, being as it is, a provision on intestate succession involving a
surviving spouse and a legitimate child, inasmuch as in statutory construction, the plural word
"children" includes the singular "child."

Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession; whereas
Art. 996 comes under the chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Such being the case, it is
obvious that Claro cannot rely on Art. 892 to support his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate. Art
892 merely fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art. 888 thereof, the legitime of
children in testate succession. While it may indicate the intent of the law with respect to the ideal
shares that a child and a spouse should get when they concur with each other, it does not fix
the amount of shares that such child and spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs. Because
if the latter happens, the pertinent provision on intestate succession shall apply, i.e., Art. 996.

Some commentators of our New Civil Code seem to support Claro's contention; at least, his
objection to fifty-fifty sharing. But others confirm the half and half idea of the Pangasinan court.

This is, remember, intestate proceedings. In the New Civil Code's chapter on legal or intestate
succession, the only article applicable is Art. 996. Our colleague, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
professor of Civil Law, is quoted as having expressed the opinion that under this article, when
the widow survives with only one legitimate child, they share the estate in equal parts. 1 Senator
Tolentino in his commentaries writes as follows:

One child Surviving. — If there is only one legitimate child surviving with the spouse,
since they share equally, one-half of the estate goes to the child and the other half goes
to the surviving spouse. Although the law refers to "children or descendants," the rule in
statutory construction that the plural can be understood to include the singular is
applicable in this case. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, p. 436.)

The theory of those holding otherwise seems to be premised on these propositions: (a) Art. 996
speaks of "Children," therefore it does not apply when there is only one "child"; consequently
Art. 892 (and Art. 888) should be applied, thru a process of judicial construction and analogy; (b)
Art. 996 is unjust or unfair because, whereas intestate succession, the widow is assigned one-
fourth only (Art. 892), she would get 1/2 in intestate.

A. Children. — It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the

singular. 2 So Art. 996 could or should be read (and so applied) : "If the widow or widower and a
legitimate child are left, the surviving spouse has the same share as that of the child." Indeed, if
we refuse to apply the article to this case on the ground that "child" is not included in "children,"
the consequences would be tremendous, because "children" will not include "child" in the
following articles:

ART. 887. — The following are compulsory heirs: (1) legitimate children and
descendants ... .

ART. 888. — The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of
the hereditary estate ... .

ART. 896. — Illegitimate children who may survive ... are entitled to one-fourth of the
hereditary estate ... . (See also Art. 901).

In fact, those who say "children" in Art. 996 does not include "child" seem to be inconsistent
when they argue from the premise that "in testate succession the only legitimate child gets one-
half and the widow, one-fourth." The inconsistency is clear, because the only legitimate
child gets one-half under Art. 888, which speaks of "children," not "child." So if "children" in Art.
888 includes "child," the same meaning should be given to Art. 996.

B. Unfairness of Art. 996. — Such position, more clearly stated, is this: In testate succession,
where there is only one child of the marriage, the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower
one-fourth. But in intestate , if Art. 996 is applied now, the child gets one-half, and the widow or
widower one-half. Unfair or inequitable, they insist.

On this point, it is not correct to assume that in testate succession the widow or widower "gets
only one-fourth." She or he may get one-half — if the testator so wishes. So, the law virtually
leaves it to each of the spouses to decide (by testament, whether his or her only child shall get
more than his or her survivor).

Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance that whereas
Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which Art. 996 was taken, contained two paragraphs
governing two contingencies, the first, where the widow or widower survives with legitimate
children (general rule), and the second, where the widow or widower survives with only one
child (exception), Art. 996 omitted to provide for the second situation, thereby indicating the
legislator's desire to promulgate just one general rule applicable to both situations.

The resultant division may be unfair as some writers explain — and this we are not called upon
to discuss — but it is the clear mandate of the statute, which we are bound to enforce.

The appealed decision is affirmed. No costs in this instance.

Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ.,
concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.
Barrera, J., is on leave.