Digest Spec Pro |1
Maloles II vs. Philips GR No. 129505
FACTS: In 1995, Dr. Arturo De Los Santos filed a petition for probate of his will. He declared
that he has no compulsory heirs and that he is naming as sole devisee and legatee the Arturo
de Santos Foundation, Inc. (ASF). The named executrix is Pacita De Los Reyes Phillips. The
petition was filed in RTC Makati Branch 61. Judge Fernando Gorospe of said court determined
that Arturo is of sound mind and was not acting in duress when he signed his last will and
testament and so Branch 61 allowed the last will and testament on February 16, 1996.
Ten days from the allowance, Arturo died. Thereafter, Pacita, as executrix, filed a motion for
the issuance of letters of testamentary with Branch 61. She however withdrew the motion but
later on refilled it with RTC Makati Branch 65.
Meanwhile, a certain Octavio Maloles II filed a motion for intervention with Branch 61 claiming
that as a next of kin (him being the full blooded nephew of Arturo) he should be appointed as
the administrator of the estate and that he is an heir.
Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 issued an order transferring the motion filed by Pacita to
Branch 61. Judge Santos ratiocinated that since the probate proceeding started in Branch 61,
then it should be the same court which should hear Pacita’s motion. Branch 61 however
refused to consolidate and referred the case back to Branch 65. Branch 65 subsequently
consolidated the case per refusal of Branch 61. Eventually, Branch 65 allowed the motion for
intervention filed by Octavio.
ISSUE: Whether or not Octavio Maloles II has the right to intervene in the probate proceeding.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court first clarified that the probate of will filed in Branch 61 has
already terminated upon the allowance of the will. Hence when Pacita filed a motion with
Branch 65, the same is already a separate proceeding and not a continuance of the now
concluded probate in Branch 61. There is therefore no reason for Branch 65 to refer back the
case to Branch 61 as it initially did. Further even if the probate was terminated, under Rule 73
of the Rules of Court concerning the venue of settlement of estates, it is provided that when a
case is filed in one branch, jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the branch or judge
alone, to the exclusion of the other branches.
Anent the issue of Octavio being an heir, such contention has no merit. He is not an heir.
Arturo died testate. Next of kins may only inherit if a person dies intestate. In this case, Arturo
left a valid will which expressly provided that ASF is the sole legatee and devisee of his estate.
Tan vs Gedorio G.R. No. 166520 March 14, 2008
FACTS: Upon the death of Gerardo Tan on Oct. 14, 2000, private respondents Rogelo Lim
Suga and Helen Tan Racoma, who were claiming to be the children of the decedent moved for
the appointment of their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo Lim as special administrator. This was
opposed by the petitioner Vilma Tan, Jake Tan and Geraldine Tan, claiming that none of the
respondents can be appointed since they are not residing in the country, that Romualdo does
not have the same competence as Vilma Tan who was already acting as the de facto
administratrix of the estate, and that the nearest of kin, being the legitmate children, is
preferred in the choice of administrator (claiming that the respondent were illegitmate
children).
However, upon failure of Vilma to follow a court directive to account for the income of the
estate, the court granted Romualdo's appointment as special administrator.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals and was denied, hence the petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court violated Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court in their
selection of a special administrator.
RULING: The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin
refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the
appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable.
If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of preference , they should pursue
the appointment of a regular administrator and put to an end the delay which necessitated the
appointment of a special administrator.
G.R. No. 187879 July 5, 2010
DALISAY E. OCAMPO, VINCE E. OCAMPO, MELINDA CARLA E. OCAMPO, and
LEONARDO E. OCAMPO, JR.,
vs.
RENATO M. OCAMPO and ERLINDA M. OCAMPO,
FACTS: Petitioners Dalisay E. Ocampo (Dalisay), Vince E. Ocampo (Vince), Melinda Carla E.
Ocampo (Melinda), and Leonardo E. Ocampo, Jr. (Leonardo, Jr.) are the surviving wife and
the children of Leonardo Ocampo (Leonardo), who died on January 23, 2004. Leonardo and
his siblings, respondents Renato M. Ocampo (Renato) and Erlinda M. Ocampo (Erlinda) are
the legitimate children and only heirs of the spouses Vicente and Maxima Ocampo, who died
intestate on December 19, 1972 and February 19, 1996, respectively. Vicente and Maxima left
several properties, mostly situated in Biñan, Laguna. Vicente and Maxima left no will and no
debts.
On June 24, 2004, five (5) months after the death of Leonardo, petitioners initiated a petition
for intestate proceedings, entitled In Re: Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Sps. Vicente
Ocampo and Maxima Mercado Ocampo, and Leonardo M. Ocampo, in the RTC, Branch 24,
Biñan, Laguna, docketed as Spec. Proc. No. B-3089. The petition alleged that, upon the death
of Vicente and Maxima, respondents and their brother Leonardo jointly controlled, managed,
and administered the estate of their parents. Under such circumstance, Leonardo had been
receiving his share consisting of one-third (1/3) of the total income generated from the
properties of the estate. However, when Leonardo died, respondents took possession, control
and management of the properties to the exclusion of petitioners. The petition prayed for the
settlement of the estate of Vicente and Maxima and the estate of Leonardo. It, likewise, prayed
for the appointment of an administrator to apportion, divide, and award the two estates among
the lawful heirs of the decedents.
After long side by side filing of motions, petitions and oppositions, Renato and Erlinda were
appointed as special administrators but refused to give an inventory of properties as petitioned
by herein petitioners until after the court ruled in their petition for exemption in posting a bond.

Meanwhile, petitioners subsequently learned that respondents has disposed of real properties
for P2,700,000.00 saying it was only for P1,500,000.00 then move the court through a petition
in removing the respondents as administrators and proceed to partitioning the estate. The RTC
ruled in the affirmative and appointed Melinda as regular administrator conditioned with the
posting of P200,000.00 as bond which the later complied. The respondents appealed in the
CA and they received a favorable decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether the court should have acted with grave abuse of discretion in revoking and
terminating the appointment of Renato and Erlinda as joint special administrators, on account
of their failure to comply with its Order, particularly the posting of the required bond, and to
enter their duties and responsibilities as special administrators and in appointing Melinda as
regular administratrix, subject to the posting of a bond in the amount of P200,000.00.
RULING: The court ruled that the trial court did not act with grave abuse of discretion
in revoking the appointment of the respondents as special administrators and otherwise in
appointing Melinda as regular administrator opining and ordering that she should instead be
appointed as special administration as according to the rules.
A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and control,
expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, with a view to its smooth
administration and speedy settlement. When appointed, he or she is not regarded as an agent
or representative of the parties suggesting the appointment. The principal object of the
appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass to the
hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs,
pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.
While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their deceased parents
in their appointment as joint special administrators, this is not a mandatory requirement for the
appointment. It has long been settled that the selection or removal of special administrators is
not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. The
probate court may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than
those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that the need to first pass upon and
resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness and the application of the order of preference under
Section 6 of Rule 78, as would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not obtain.
As long as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity,
justice, and legal principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted. The appointment or
removal of special administrators, being discretionary, is thus interlocutory and may be
assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 81, the bond secures the performance of the duties and
obligations of an administrator namely: (1) to administer the estate and pay the debts; (2) to
perform all judicial orders; (3) to account within one (1) year and at any other time when
required by the probate court; and (4) to make an inventory within three (3) months. More
specifically, per Section 4 of the same Rule, the bond is conditioned on the faithful execution of
the administration of the decedents estate requiring the special administrator to (1) make and
return a true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which
come to his possession or knowledge; (2) truly account for such as received by him when
Digest Spec Pro |2
required by the court; and (3) deliver the same to the person appointed as executor or regular
administrator, or to such other person as may be authorized to receive them.
Verily, the administration bond is for the benefit of the creditors and the heirs, as it compels the
administrator, whether regular or special, to perform the trust reposed in, and discharge the
obligations incumbent upon, him. Its object and purpose is to safeguard the properties of the
decedent, and, therefore, the bond should not be considered as part of the necessary
expenses chargeable against the estate, not being included among the acts constituting the
care, management, and settlement of the estate. Moreover, the ability to post the bond is in the
nature of a qualification for the office of administration.
G.R. No. L-21917 November 29, 1966
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED CARLOS GURREA Y MONASTERIO. MARCELO
PIJUAN, special administrator-appellee,
vs.
MANUELA RUIZ VDA. DE GURREA, movant-appellant.
FACTS:
Appellant Manuela Ruiz (Mrs. Gurrea) and Carlos Gurrea were married in Spain,
where they lived together until 1945, when he abandoned her and came, with their son
Teodoro, to the Philippines. Here he lived maritally with Rizalina Perez by whom he had two
(2) children. Having been informed by her son that his father was residing in Pontevedra,
Negros Occidental, Manuela came to the Philippines but, Carlos Gurrea refused to admit her
to his residence.
She instituted, against Carlos Gurrea, Civil Case No. 5820 of the CFI of Negros
Occidental, for support and the annulment of some alleged donations of conjugal property, in
favor of his common-law wife. Said court issued an order granting Mrs. Gurrea a monthly
alimony, pendente lite, of P2,000.00 which was reduced by the Court of Appeals to P1,000.00.
Carlos Gurrea died leaving a document purporting to be his last will and testament, in
which he named Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof and disinherited Mrs. Gurrea and their
son, Teodoro. Pijuan instituted Special Proceedings No. 6582 , for the probate of said will.
Thereafter Pijuan was, upon his ex parte motion, appointed special administrator of the estate,
without bond. Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed by Mrs. Gurrea, her son,
Teodoro.
Mrs. Gurrea filed in said Special Proceedings No. 6582, a motion praying that the
Special Administrator be ordered to continue paying it pending the final determination of the
case. This motion was denied. Mrs. Gurrea moved for a reconsideration. She further moved for
her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased. But the same was denied.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N the the lower court erred in denying her petition for appointment as administratrix
(for, as widow of the deceased, she claims a right of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78 of
the Revised Rules of Court.)

RULING: Said preference exists "if no executor is named in the will or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person
dies intestate." None of these conditions obtains, however, in the case at bar. The deceased
Carlos Gurrea has left a document purporting to be his will, seemingly, is still pending probate.
So, it cannot be said, as yet, that he has died intestate. Again, said document names Marcelo
Pijuan as executor thereof, and it is not claimed that he is incompetent therefor. What is more,
he has not only not refused the trust, but, has, also, expressly accepted it, by applying for his
appointment as executor, and, upon his appointment as special administrator, has assumed
the duties thereof. It may not be amiss to note that the preference accorded by the
aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court to the surviving spouse refers to the appoint of
a regular administrator or administratrix, not to that of a special administrator, and that the
order appointing the latter lies within the discretion of the probate court, and is not appealable.
Co vs Rosario
G.R. No. 160671, April 30, 2008
FACTS: Petitioner Luis Co and Vicente Yu were appointed by the Regional Trial Court of
Makati on March 4, 1998, as special co-administrators of the estate of petitioner's father.
However, upon motion of other heirs, petitioner's appointment was set aside, whereby
petitioner nominated his son, Alvin Co, in his place, which was granted by the court.
Four years later, however, the RTC, upon motion of one the heirs, revoked the appointment of
Alvin in view of the several criminal cases filed against the latter. Petitioner files petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in revoking Alvin Co's appointment as special co-
administrator.
RULING: The trial court did not act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking Alvin’s
appointment as special co-administrator. Settled is the rule that the selection or removal of
special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of
regular administrators. Courts may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds
other than those enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion.
The special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and control
and who is expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, especially with respect to
its smooth administration and earliest settlement.
G.R. No. 193161 August 22, 2011
DIOSDADO S. MANUNGAS, Petitioner,
vs.
MARGARITA AVILA LORETO and FLORENCIA AVILA PARREÑO, Respondents.
FACTS: Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino Manungas. They had no children.
Florentino Manungas died intestate.Thereafter, Engracia Manungas filed a Motion for Partition
of Estate in the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas, of which she was the
administratrix. There, she stated that there are no other legal and compulsory heirs of
Florentino Manungas except for herself, and a Ramon Manungas, an acknowledged natural
Digest Spec Pro |3
child. Thereafter, a Decree of Final Distribution was issued distributing the properties to
Engracia Manungas and Ramon Manungas, the surviving heirs.
The RTC Panabo City, appointed Parreño, the niece of Engracia Manungas, as the
Judicial Guardian of the properties and person of her incompetent aunt. Engracia Manungas,
through Parreño, then instituted Civil Case No. 5196-96 against the spouses Diosdado
Manungas for illegal detainer and damages. In their answer, the spouses Salinas claimed that
Diosdado is the illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas. However, the answer was filed
beyond the reglementary period. Thus, the MTC issued a summary judgment in favor of
Engracia Manungas, ordering the spouses to vacate the premises and to restore possession to
Engracia Manungas.
Thereafter, Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
over the Estate of Engracia Manungas in his favor. He alleged that he, being an illegitimate
son of Florentino Manungas, is an heir of Engracia Manungas.
The petition was opposed by Margarita Avila Loreto (Loreto) and Parreño alleging
that Diosdado was incompetent as an administrator of the Estate of Manungas claiming that
1he was not a Manungas, that 2he was not an heir of Engracia Manungas, 3he was not a
creditor of Engracia Manungas or her estate and that 4he was in fact a debtor of the estate
having been found liable to Engracia Manungas by virtue of the illegal detainer case. Thus,
RTC issued an Order appointing Parreño as the administrator of the Estate of Manungas.
Diosdado filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In his motion, Diosdado argued that
Parreño’s appointment as special administrator of the Estate of Manungas was by virtue of her
being the judicial guardian of the latter but which relation ceased upon Engracia Manungas’
death. The RTC issued an Order reversing itself and ordering the revocation of its earlier
appointment of Parreño as the administrator of the Estate of Manungas while appointing
Diosdado as the Special Administrator.
Parreño and Loreto appealed to the CA. CA: RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion.
ISSUE: W/N The Court a Quo committed a grave error when it ruled to annul the appointment
of petitioner, Diosdado Manungas as judicial administrator and reinstating the appointment of
Florencia Parreño as special administrator.
RULING: Yes. The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino Manungas
does not mean that he is entitled or even qualified to become the special administrator of the
Estate of Manungas.
Jurisprudence teaches us that the appointment of a special administrator lies within the
discretion of the court. In Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel,24 it was stated
that:
 Digest Spec Pro |4

It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain persons August 28, 1962 – Juan UriarteZamacona commenced a special proceeding in CFI Manila for
to the appointment of administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory the probate of a document alleged to be the last will of the deceased Juan Uriarte and filed
provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or administrator under section 653 of Act with CFI Negros a Motion to Dismiss on these grounds:
No. 190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of special
administrator. x x x As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator  As a deceased left a last will, there was no basis to proceed with the intestate
and the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in the proceedings
selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical
or contrary to reason, justice or equity.  Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest to initiate the intestate
proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son of the decedent.
The role of a special administrator is to preserve the estate until a regular
administrator is appointed. Given this duty on the part of the special administrator, it would, Vicente opposed the MTD contending that, as CFI Negros was first to take cognizance of the
therefore, be prudent and reasonable to appoint someone interested in preserving the estate settlement of the estate of Juan Uriarte, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the same.
for its eventual distribution to the heirs. Such choice would ensure that such person would not
CFI Negros granted Juan UriarteZamacona’s MTD and dismissed the proceeding before it. MR
expose the estate to losses that would effectively diminish his or her share. There is no logical
reason to appoint a person who is a debtor of the estate and otherwise a stranger to the denied. He filed a notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal. The administrator
deceased. To do so would be tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. appointed by CFI Manila objected to the approval of the record on appeal. While this was
pending, Vicente Uriarte filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Therefore, CFI
The trial court erred in revoking the appointment of Florencia Avila Parreño as Special Negros disapproved the record on appeal to give way to the certiorari.
Administrator on the ground that it found merit in Diosdado’s contention that he is the
illegitimate child of the late Florentino Manangus. In fact, Diosdado is a debtor of the estate Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in CFI Manila asking for leave to intervene therein, for
and would have no interest in preserving its value. There is no reason to appoint him as its the dismissal of the petition and for the annulment of the proceedings had in the special
proceeding therein. Motion was denied.
special administrator.
It appears from the records that Vicente had filed a civil case in CFi Negros during the lifetime
Vicente Uriarte vs. CFI Negros Occidental, CFI Manila, Juan UriarteZamanoca and
of Juan Uriarte to obtain judgment for his compulsory acknowledgement as his natural child. It
HiginioUriarte ;May 29, 1970
is likewise clear that at the time he filed the action, as well as when he commenced the petition
for settlement of estate, he had not yet been acknowledged as natural son of Juan Uriarte.
FACTS: November 6, 1961 – Vicente filed with CFI Negros a petition for the settlement of the
estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte alleging therein that as a natural son of the latter, he was
The record further discloses that the special proceeding before CFI Negros has not gone
the sole heir and that during the lifetime of said decedent, Vicente had instituted a civil case in
further than the appointment of PNB as special administrator (who failed to qualify).
CFI Negros for his compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son
On the other hand, CFI Manila admitted to probate the document submitted to it, as thelast will
CFI Negros appointed the PNB as special administrator and later set the date for the hearing
of Juan Uriarte, the petition for probate appearing not to have been contested.
of the petition and ordered that the requisite notices be published in accordance with law.
ISSUE: Whether Juan UriarteZamacona should have filed the petition for probate of the last
The record discloses, however, that, for one reason or another, PNB never actually qualified
will of Juan Uriarte with CFI Negros or was entitled to commenced the corresponding separate
as special administrator.
proceedings in CFI Manila
December 19, 1961 – HiginioUriarte filed an opposition to the petition alleging that he was a
RULING: Rule 73, Section: the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the
nephew of the deceased Juan Uriarte who had executed a Last Will and Testament in Spain, a
time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of first instance in the
duly authenticated copy whereof has been requested and which shall be submitted to the court
province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
upon receipt and further questioning Vicente’s capacity and interest to commence the intestate
country, the court of first instance of any province in which he had estate.
proceeding.

The deceased Juan Uriarte was a non-resident alien. Therefore, the CFIs in provinces where
he left any property have concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper special
proceedings for the settlement of his estate.
Vicente argues that when CFI Negros took cognizance, CFI Manila no longer had jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the special proceeding.
It cannot be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of
a deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in
accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate.
It is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction,
testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence
over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in
the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the
decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the
intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the
latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the
executor subsequently appointed.
These facts support the view that Juan UriarteZamacona should have submitted the will for
probate in CFI Negros either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion in
the already pending special proceeding:
1. It is not in accord with public policy and the orderly and inexpensive administration of
justice to unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if several courts would be
involved.
2. When HiginioUriarte filed an opposition to Vicente’s petition for the issuance of letters
of sdministration, he had already informed the Negros Court that the deceased Juan
Uriarte had left a will in Spain, of which a copy had been requested for submission to
CFI Negros. When Juan UriarteZamacona filed his MTD in CFI Negros, he had
submitted there a copy of the alleged will of the decedent, from which fact it may be
inferred that he knew before filing the petition for probate with the Manila Court that
there was already a special proceeding pending in CFinegros for the settlement of the
estate of the same deceased person.
It is well settled that wrong venue is merely a waivable procedural defect, and in the light of the
circumstances obtaining in this case, Vicente has waived the right to raise such objection or is
precluded from doing so by laches. He knew of the existence of the will since 1961 when
HiginioUrirate opposed the initial petition in CFI Negros. He was also served with notice of the
alleged will and of the filing of petition for its probate when Juan UriarteZamacona filed an
MTD in CFI Negros on 1962. He only filed the omnibus motion in the Manila Court on April
1963. By then, The Manila Court had already appointed an administrator and had admitted the
Digest Spec Pro |5
will to probate. Toa llow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the
will by the Manila court and the validity of all the proceedings therein would put a premium on
his negligence.
SC is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not
the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in
some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection
against said proceedings is raised too late. DISPOITIVE petition dismissed.
Luzon Surety v Quebrar & Kilayko G.R. No. L-40517 January 31, 1984
FACTS:
Luzon Surety issued two administrator's bond in behalf of defendant Quebrar as administrator
of 2 estates (Chinsuy and Lipa). The plaintiff and both Quebrar and Kilayko bound themselves
solidarily after executing an indemnity agreement where both the defendants agreed to pay the
premiums every year. In the years 1954-55, the defendants paid the premiums and the
documnetary stamps. In 1957, the Court approved the project of partition, while in 1962,
Luzon Surety demanded payments of premiums from 1955 onwards. It was also in the same
year when the court granted the motion of the defendants to have both bonds cancelled.
Hence, plaintiff file a case in the CFI. The court (CFI) allowed the plaintiff to recover since the
bonds were in force and effect from the filing until 1962. The Court of Appeals certified the
case to the Supreme Court on questions of law.
ISSUE: Are the bonds still in force and effect from 1955 to 1962?
RULING: YES. Under Rule 81 (Sec.1) of the Rules of COurt, the administrator is required to
put up a bond for the purpose of indemnifying creditors, heirs, legatees and the estate. It is
conditioned uponthe faithful performance of the administrator's trust. Hence, the surety is then
liable udner the administrator's bond.
Even after the approved project of partitio, Quebrar as administrator still had something to do.
The administration is for the purpose of liquidation of the estate and the distribution of the
residue among the heirs and legatees. Liquidation means the determination of all the assets of
the estate and the payment of all debts and expenses. it appears that there are still deblts and
expenses to be paid after 1957.
Moreover, the bond stipulationdd not provide that it will terminate at the end of the 1st year if
the premium remains unpaid. Hence, it does not necessariy extinguish or terminate the
effectivity of the coutner bond in the absence of an express stipualtion to this effect. As such,
as long as the defendant remains the administrator of the estate, the bond will be held liable
and the plaintiff's liabilities subsist being the co-extensive with the administrator.