SEC.

B THE CITY AS PUBLIC OR PRIVATE 39

has never been granted, to hold their meetings in other private places,
merely because the owner has admitted the public to them for other
limited purposes. Even though we have reached the point where this
Court is required to force private owners to open their property for the
practice there of religious activities or propaganda distasteful to the
owner, because of the public interest in freedom of speech and religion,
there is no need for the application of such a doctrine here. Appellant
* * * was free to engage in such practices on the public highways, without
becoming a trespasser on the company’s property.

INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA

CONSCIOUSNESS, INC. v. LEE
Supreme Court of the United States, 1992.
505 U.S. 672, 112 S.Ct. 2701, 120 L.Ed.2d 541.

JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. * * *

Petitioner International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISK-
CON) is a not-for-profit religious corporation whose members perform a
ritual known as sankirtan. The ritual consists of ‘‘ ‘going into public
places, disseminating religious literature and soliciting funds to support
the religion.’ ’’ The primary purpose of this ritual is raising funds for the
movement.
Respondent Walter Lee, now deceased, was the police superintendent
of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey * * *. The Port
Authority owns and operates three major airports in the greater New York
City area: John F. Kennedy International Airport (Kennedy), La Guardia
Airport (La Guardia), and Newark International Airport (Newark). The
three airports collectively form one of the world’s busiest metropolitan
airport complexes. * * *
The airports are funded by user fees and operated to make a regulat-
ed profit. Most space at the three airports is leased to commercial airlines,
which bear primary responsibility for the leasehold. The Port Authority
retains control over unleased portions, including La Guardia’s Central
Terminal Building, portions of Kennedy’s International Arrivals Building,
and Newark’s North Terminal Building (we refer to these areas collective-
ly as the ‘‘terminals’’). The terminals are generally accessible to the
general public and contain various commercial establishments such as
restaurants, snack stands, bars, newsstands, and stores of various types.
Virtually all who visit the terminals do so for purposes related to air
travel. * * *
The Port Authority has adopted a regulation forbidding within the
terminals the repetitive solicitation of money or distribution of literature.
* * * The regulation effectively prohibits petitioner from performing
sankirtan in the terminals. As a result, petitioner brought suit seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the
regulation worked to deprive them of rights guaranteed under the First
Amendment. * * *
40 PROBLEMS OF DECENTRALIZATION CH. 1

It is uncontested that the solicitation at issue in this case is a form of

speech protected under the First Amendment. But it is also well settled
that the government need not permit all forms of speech on property that
it owns and controls. Where the government is acting as a proprietor,
managing its internal operations, rather than acting as lawmaker with the
power to regulate or license, its action will not be subjected to the
heightened review to which its actions as a lawmaker may be subject.
Thus, we have upheld a ban on political advertisements in city-operated
transit vehicles even though the city permitted other types of advertising
on those vehicles. Similarly, we have permitted a school district to limit
access to an internal mail system used to communicate with teachers
employed by the district.
These cases reflect, either implicitly or explicitly, a ‘‘forum-based’’
approach for assessing restrictions that the government seeks to place on
the use of its property. Under this approach, regulation of speech on
government property that has traditionally been available for public
expression is subject to the highest scrutiny. Such regulations survive only
if they are narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling state interest. The
second category of public property is the designated public forum, whether
of a limited or unlimited character—property that the state has opened for
expressive activity by part or all of the public. Regulation of such property
is subject to the same limitations as that governing a traditional public
forum. Finally, there is all remaining public property. Limitations on
expressive activity conducted on this last category of property must
survive only a much more limited review. The challenged regulation need
only be reasonable, as long as the regulation is not an effort to suppress
the speaker’s activity due to disagreement with the speaker’s view. * * *
The suggestion that the government has a high burden in justifying
speech restrictions relating to traditional public fora made its first appear-
ance in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496,
515, 516, 59 S.Ct. 954, 963, 964, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939). Justice Roberts,
concluding that individuals have a right to use ‘‘streets and parks for
communication of views,’’ reasoned that such a right flowed from the fact
that ‘‘streets and parks * * * have immemorially been held in trust for
the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions.’’ We confirmed this observation in Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S.
474, 481, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 2500, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988), where we held
that a residential street was a public forum.
Our recent cases provide additional guidance on the characteristics of
a public forum. In Cornelius [v. NAACP Legal Defense and Education
Fund, Inc.,] we noted that a traditional public forum is property that has
as ‘‘a principal purpose * * * the free exchange of ideas.’’ 473 U.S. [788],
at 800, 105 S.Ct. [3439], at 3448. Moreover, consistent with the notion
that the government—like other property owners—‘‘has power to preserve
the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicat-
ed,’’ Greer [v. Spock], 424 U.S. [828], at 836, 96 S.Ct. [1211], at 1217, the
SEC. B THE CITY AS PUBLIC OR PRIVATE 41

government does not create a public forum by inaction. Nor is a public

forum created ‘‘whenever members of the public are permitted freely to
visit a place owned or operated by the Government.’’ Ibid. The decision to
create a public forum must instead be made ‘‘by intentionally opening a
nontraditional forum for public discourse.’’ Cornelius, supra, 473 U.S., at
802, 105 S.Ct., at 3449. Finally, we have recognized that the location of
property also has bearing because separation from acknowledged public
areas may serve to indicate that the separated property is a special
enclave, subject to greater restriction.
These precedents foreclose the conclusion that airport terminals are
public fora. Reflecting the general growth of the air travel industry,
airport terminals have only recently achieved their contemporary size and
character. But given the lateness with which the modern air terminal has
made its appearance, it hardly qualifies for the description of having
‘‘immemorially * * * time out of mind’’ been held in the public trust and
used for purposes of expressive activity. Moreover, even within the rather
short history of air transport, it is only ‘‘[i]n recent years [that] it has
become a common practice for various religious and non-profit organiza-
tions to use commercial airports as a forum for the distribution of
literature, the solicitation of funds, the proselytizing of new members, and
other similar activities.’’ 45 Fed.Reg. 35314 (1980). Thus, the tradition of
airport activity does not demonstrate that airports have historically been
made available for speech activity. Nor can we say that these particular
terminals, or airport terminals generally, have been intentionally opened
by their operators to such activity; the frequent and continuing litigation
evidencing the operators’ objections belies any such claim. In short, there
can be no argument that society’s time-tested judgment, expressed
through acquiescence in a continuing practice, has resolved the issue in
petitioner’s favor.
Petitioner attempts to circumvent the history and practice governing
airport activity by pointing our attention to the variety of speech activity
that it claims historically occurred at various ‘‘transportation nodes’’ such
as rail stations, bus stations, wharves, and Ellis Island. Even if we were
inclined to accept petitioner’s historical account describing speech activity
at these locations, an account respondent contests, we think that such
evidence is of little import for two reasons. First, much of the evidence is
irrelevant to public fora analysis, because sites such as bus and rail
terminals traditionally have had private ownership. The development of
privately owned parks that ban speech activity would not change the
public fora status of publicly held parks. But the reverse is also true. The
practices of privately held transportation centers do not bear on the
government’s regulatory authority over a publicly owned airport.
Second, the relevant unit for our inquiry is an airport, not ‘‘transpor-
tation nodes’’ generally. * * * To blithely equate airports with other
transportation centers * * * would be a mistake. * * * As commercial
enterprises, airports must provide services attractive to the marketplace.
In light of this, it cannot fairly be said that an airport terminal has as a
42 PROBLEMS OF DECENTRALIZATION CH. 1

principal purpose ‘‘promoting the free exchange of ideas.’’ Cornelius v.

NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 105
S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985). To the contrary, the record demon-
strates that Port Authority management considers the purpose of the
terminals to be the facilitation of passenger air travel, not the promotion
of expression. * * * Thus, we think that neither by tradition nor purpose
can the terminals be described as satisfying the standards we have
previously set out for identifying a public forum.
The restrictions here challenged, therefore, need only satisfy a re-
quirement of reasonableness. * * * We have no doubt that under this
standard the prohibition on solicitation passes muster. * * *
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring * * *.
I * * * agree that publicly owned airports are not public fora. * * *
There is little doubt that airports are among those publicly owned facili-
ties that could be closed to all except those who have legitimate business
there. Public access to airports is thus not ‘‘inherent in the open nature of
the locations,’’ as it is for most streets and parks, but is rather a ‘‘matter
of grace by government officials.’’ United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720,
743, 110 S.Ct. 3115, 3128, 111 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). * * * The airports house restaurants, cafeterias, snack bars, coffee
shops, cocktail lounges, post offices, banks, telegraph offices, clothing
shops, drug stores, food stores, nurseries, barber shops, currency ex-
changes, art exhibits, commercial advertising displays, bookstores, news-
stands, dental offices and private clubs. The International Arrivals Build-
ing at JFK Airport even has two branches of Bloomingdale’s. * * * In my
view, the Port Authority is operating a shopping mall as well as an
airport. The reasonableness inquiry, therefore, is not whether the restric-
tions on speech are ‘‘consistent with * * * preserving the property’’ for
air travel, Perry, 460 U.S. at 50–51, 103 S.Ct., at 958, but whether they
are reasonably related to maintaining the multipurpose environment that
the Port Authority has deliberately created. * * *
JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN, JUSTICE STEVENS, and
JUSTICE SOUTER join as to Part I, concurring in the judgment. * * *

I
* * * [T]he Court’s analysis * * * leaves the government with almost
unlimited authority to restrict speech on its property by doing nothing
more than articulating a non-speech-related purpose for the area, and it
leaves almost no scope for the development of new public forums absent
the rare approval of the government. The Court’s error lies in its conclu-
sion that the public-forum status of public property depends on the
government’s defined purpose for the property, or on an explicit decision
by the government to dedicate the property to expressive activity. In my
view, the inquiry must be an objective one, based on the actual, physical
characteristics and uses of the property.
SEC. B THE CITY AS PUBLIC OR PRIVATE 43

The First Amendment is a limitation on government, not a grant of

power. Its design is to prevent the government from controlling speech.
Yet under the Court’s view the authority of the government to control
speech on its property is paramount, for in almost all cases the critical
step in the Court’s analysis is a classification of the property that turns on
the government’s own definition or decision, unconstrained by an indepen-
dent duty to respect the speech its citizens can voice there. The Court
acknowledges as much, by reintroducing today into our First Amendment
law a strict doctrinal line between the proprietary and regulatory func-
tions of government which I thought had been abandoned long ago. * * *
The Court’s analysis rests on an inaccurate view of history. The
notion that traditional public forums are property which have public
discourse as their principal purpose is a most doubtful fiction. The types of
property that we have recognized as the quintessential public forums are
streets, parks, and sidewalks. It would seem apparent that the principal
purpose of streets and sidewalks, like airports, is to facilitate transporta-
tion, not public discourse, and we have recognized as much. Similarly, the
purpose for the creation of public parks may be as much for beauty and
open space as for discourse. Thus under the Court’s analysis, even the
quintessential public forums would appear to lack the necessary elements
of what the Court defines as a public forum.
The effect of the Court’s narrow view of the first category of public
forums is compounded by its description of the second purported category,
the so-called ‘‘designated’’ forum. The requirements for such a designa-
tion are so stringent that I cannot be certain whether the category has any
content left at all. In any event, it seems evident that under the Court’s
analysis today few if any types of property other than those already
recognized as public forums will be accorded that status.
The Court’s answer to these objections appears to be a recourse to
history as justifying its recognition of streets, parks, and sidewalks, but
apparently no other types of government property, as traditional public
forums. * * * In my view the policies underlying the doctrine cannot be
given effect unless we recognize that open, public spaces and thorough-
fares which are suitable for discourse may be public forums, whatever
their historical pedigree and without concern for a precise classification of
the property. * * * Without this recognition our forum doctrine retains no
relevance in times of fast-changing technology and increasing insularity.
In a country where most citizens travel by automobile, and parks all too
often become locales for crime rather than social intercourse, our failure
to recognize the possibility that new types of government property may be
appropriate forums for speech will lead to a serious curtailment of our
expressive activity.
One of the places left in our mobile society that is suitable for
discourse is a metropolitan airport. It is of particular importance to
recognize that such spaces are public forums because in these days an
airport is one of the few government-owned spaces where many persons
44 PROBLEMS OF DECENTRALIZATION CH. 1

have extensive contact with other members of the public. Given that
private spaces of similar character are not subject to the dictates of the
First Amendment, see Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 96 S.Ct. 1029, 47
L.Ed.2d 196 (1976), it is critical that we preserve these areas for protected
speech. In my view, our public forum doctrine must recognize this reality,
and allow the creation of public forums which do not fit within the narrow
tradition of streets, sidewalks, and parks. * * * Under the proper circum-
stances I would accord public forum status to other forms of property,
regardless of its ancient or contemporary origins and whether or not it fits
within a narrow historic tradition. If the objective, physical characteristics
of the property at issue and the actual public access and uses which have
been permitted by the government indicate that expressive activity would
be appropriate and compatible with those uses, the property is a public
forum. The most important considerations in this analysis are whether the
property shares physical similarities with more traditional public forums,
whether the government has permitted or acquiesced in broad public
access to the property, and whether expressive activity would tend to
interfere in a significant way with the uses to which the government has
as a factual matter dedicated the property. In conducting the last inquiry,
courts must consider the consistency of those uses with expressive activi-
ties in general, rather than the specific sort of speech at issue in the case
before it; otherwise the analysis would be one not of classification but
rather of case-by-case balancing, and would provide little guidance to the
State regarding its discretion to regulate speech. Courts must also consid-
er the availability of reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions in
undertaking this compatibility analysis. The possibility of some theoretical
inconsistency between expressive activities and the property’s uses should
not bar a finding of a public forum, if those inconsistencies can be avoided
through simple and permitted regulations. * * *
Under this analysis, it is evident that the public spaces of the Port
Authority’s airports are public forums. First, the District Court made
detailed findings regarding the physical similarities between the Port
Authority’s airports and public streets. These findings show that the
public spaces in the airports are broad, public thoroughfares full of people
and lined with stores and other commercial activities. An airport corridor
is of course not a street, but that is not the proper inquiry. The question is
one of physical similarities, sufficient to suggest that the airport corridor
should be a public forum for the same reasons that streets and sidewalks
have been treated as public forums by the people who use them.
Second, the airport areas involved here are open to the public without
restriction. * * * [W]hile most people who come to the Port Authority’s
airports do so for a reason related to air travel, either because they are
passengers or because they are picking up or dropping off passengers, this
does not distinguish an airport from streets or sidewalks, which most
people use for travel. * * *
Third, and perhaps most important, it is apparent from the record,
and from the recent history of airports, that when adequate time, place,
SEC. B THE CITY AS PUBLIC OR PRIVATE 45

and manner regulations are in place, expressive activity is quite compati-

ble with the uses of major airports. * * * In fact, the history of the
Authority’s own airports, as well as other major airports in this country,
leaves little doubt that such a solution is quite feasible. The Port Authori-
ty has for many years permitted expressive activities by the plaintiffs and
others, without any apparent interference with its ability to meet its
transportation purposes. * * * [P]roblems have been dealt with in the
past, and in other settings, through proper time, place, and manner
restrictions; and the Port Authority does not make any showing that
similar regulations would not be effective in its airports. * * *

NEW JERSEY COALITION AGAINST WAR

IN THE MIDDLE EAST v. J.M.B.
REALTY CORPORATION
Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1994.
138 N.J. 326, 650 A.2d 757.

WILENTZ, C.J.
The question in this case is whether the defendant regional and
community shopping centers must permit leafletting on societal issues. We
hold that they must, subject to reasonable conditions set by them. Our
ruling is limited to leafletting at such centers, and it applies nowhere else.
It is based on our citizens’ right of free speech embodied in our State
Constitution. It follows the course we set in our decision in State v.
Schmid, 84 N.J. 535 (1980).
In Schmid we ruled that our State Constitution conferred on our
citizens an affirmative right of free speech that was protected not only
from governmental restraint—the extent of First Amendment protec-
tion—but from the restraint of private property owners as well. We noted
that those state constitutional protections are ‘‘available against unrea-
sonably restrictive or oppressive conduct on the part of private entities
that have otherwise assumed a constitutional obligation not to abridge the
individual exercise of such freedoms because of the public use of their
property.’’ And we set forth the standard to determine what public use
will give rise to that constitutional obligation. The standard takes into
account the normal use of the property, the extent and nature of the
public’s invitation to use it, and the purpose of the expressional activity in
relation to both its private and public use. This ‘‘multi-faceted’’ standard
determines whether private property owners ‘‘may be required to permit,
subject to suitable restrictions, the reasonable exercise by individuals of
the constitutional freedoms of speech and assembly.’’ That is to say, they
determine whether, taken together, the normal uses of the property, the
extent of the public’s invitation, and the purpose of free speech in relation
to the property’s use result in a suitability for free speech on the property
that on balance, is sufficiently compelling to warrant limiting the private
property owner’s right to exclude it, a suitability so compelling as to be
constitutionally required. * * *
46 PROBLEMS OF DECENTRALIZATION CH. 1

On November 8, [1990] President Bush announced a major increase

in the number of troops stationed in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf in
order to provide ‘‘an adequate offensive military option.’’ Plaintiff—a
coalition of numerous groups—opposed military intervention and sought
public support for its views. * * * On November 10 plaintiff’s members
and representatives went to the malls and requested permission to leaflet.
Four of the defendant malls granted plaintiff permission to leaflet on their
premises, and plaintiff did in fact leaflet at two of those malls. * * *
Although the six remaining malls refused permission, one of those malls—
Hamilton—ultimately allowed plaintiff to leaflet. * * * As a consequence
of defendants’ refusal to allow plaintiff access to the malls, and the
restrictions imposed on such access where allowed, few of the thousands of
people at those malls on November 10 learned of plaintiff’s views. * * *
Each of the ten defendant shopping centers is very large. For in-
stance, one defendant mall, Woodbridge Center, serves an area with a
population of 1,400,000. On an average day in 1990, approximately 28,750
people shopped there. * * * Nine of the defendant shopping centers are
‘‘regional centers.’’ A regional shopping center is defined in the industry
as one that provides shopping goods, general merchandise, apparel, furni-
ture and home furnishings in full depth and variety. It is built around the
full-line department store, with a minimum GLA [gross leasable area] of
100,000 square feet, as the major drawing power. * * * The regional
centers involved in this case have from 93 to 244 tenants, including not
only department stores, but also restaurants and other retail and business
establishments, such as art galleries, automotive centers and gas stations,
banks, brokerage houses and finance companies, leisure and entertain-
ment centers, optical centers, travel agencies, hair salons, shoe repair
shops, theaters, ticket agents, insurance agencies, doctors’ offices, and a
United States postal booth during the holiday seasons. * * * The tenth
defendant is a ‘‘community’’ shopping center. A community center is
smaller than a regional center and lacks the variety of merchandise
available at a regional mall. * * * [A community center] is built around a
junior department store, variety store or discount department store al-
though it may have a strong specialty store. The typical size of a commu-
nity center is 150,000 square feet. In practice a community center can
range from 100,000 to 300,000 square feet. The only community center
involved in this case, the Mall at Mill Creek, covers twenty-seven acres. It
has a discount department store, a supermarket, sixty-two smaller retail
stores, and a seven-restaurant food court. * * *
Each of the defendants permits and encourages a variety of non-
shopping activities on its premises. Six of the malls provide access to
community groups. * * * Some of the non-shopping activities permitted
by defendants involved speech, politics, and community issues.* * * De-
spite the myriad of permitted uses, including many involving the distribu-
tion of issue-oriented literature—leaflets—and accompanying speech, de-
spite the explicit permission given to plaintiff to leaflet at four of them,
and despite the display of tenants’ posters at most of them, posters that
SEC. B THE CITY AS PUBLIC OR PRIVATE 47

were visible from the common areas and expressed support for our armed
forces in the Persian Gulf, all of the centers claim to prohibit issue-
oriented speech and leafletting. * * *
Before reaching our discussion of the law, we must first examine the
background against which this question is raised. * * * Statistical evi-
dence tells the story of the growth of shopping malls. In 1950, privately-
owned shopping centers of any size numbered fewer than 100 across the
country. * * * By 1992, the number expanded to at least 1,835. * * * The
share of retail sales attributable to regional and super-regional malls has
demonstrated a similar pattern. Nationally, regional malls’ market share
of ‘‘shopper goods sales’’ was 13% in 1967 and 31% in 1979. In 1991 retail
sales in ‘‘shopping centers,’’ a category that includes not only regional
malls but other types of urban and suburban retail centers, ‘‘accounted for
over 56% of total retail sales in the United States, excluding sales by
automotive dealers and gasoline service stations.’’ * * * Thus, malls are
where the people can be found today. Indeed, 70% of the national adult
population shop at regional malls and do so an average of 3.9 times a
month, about once a week. Therefore, based on adult population data from
the 1990 census, more than four million people on average shop at our
regional shopping centers every week, assuming New Jersey follows this
national pattern.
The converse story, the decline of downtown business districts, is not
so easily documented by statistics. But for the purposes of this case, we do
not need statistics. This Court takes judicial notice of the fact that in
every major city of this state, over the past twenty years, there has been
not only a decline, but in many cases a disastrous decline. This Court
further takes judicial notice of the fact that this decline has been accompa-
nied and caused by the combination of the move of residents from the city
to the suburbs and the construction of shopping centers in those suburbs.
* * * That some downtown business districts have survived, and indeed
thrive, is also fact, demonstrated on the record before us. The overriding
fact, however, is that the movement from cities to the suburbs has
transformed New Jersey, as it has many states. The economic lifeblood
once found downtown has moved to suburban shopping centers, which
have substantially displaced the downtown business districts as the cen-
ters of commercial and social activity.
The defendants in this case cannot rebut this observation. Indeed, the
shopping center industry frequently boasts of the achievement. The indus-
try often refers to large malls as ‘‘ ‘the new downtowns.’ ’’ It correctly
asserts that ‘‘the shopping center is an integral part of the economic and
social fabric of America.’’ * * * Beyond that, one expert maintains that
shopping centers have ‘‘evolved beyond the strictly retail stage to become
a public square where people gather[ ]; it is often the only large contained
place in a suburb and it provides a place for exhibitions that no other
space can offer.’’ * * *
48 PROBLEMS OF DECENTRALIZATION CH. 1

The question whether citizens may exercise a right of free speech at

privately-owned shopping centers without permission of the owners has
been litigated extensively. * * * It is now clear that the Federal Constitu-
tion affords no general right to free speech in privately-owned shopping
centers, [Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972)], and most State
courts facing the issue have ruled the same way when State constitutional
rights have been asserted. * * * California, Oregon, Massachusetts, Colo-
rado, and Washington, however, have held that their citizens have a right
to engage in certain types of expressive conduct at privately-owned malls.
Of those five, only California has held that its free speech clause protects
citizens from private action as well as state action and grants issue-
oriented free speech rights at a regional shopping center. Robins v.
Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal.1979), aff’d, 447 U.S. 74,
100 S. Ct. 2035, 64 L. Ed. 2d 741 (1980). Massachusetts and Oregon relied
on clauses other than their free speech clauses. Batchelder v. Allied Stores
Int’l, 445 N.E.2d 590, 593 (Mass.1983) (relying on state constitution’s
‘‘free-and-equal elections’’ provision); Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, 849 P.2d
446, 453–54 (Or.1993) (Whiffen II) (relying on state constitution’s initia-
tive and referendum provision and declining to address whether free
speech clause was also source of right to collect signatures at mall).
Colorado relied on its constitution’s free speech provision to hold that
political activists had a constitutional right to distribute literature at a
privately-owned mall. Bock v. Westminster Mall Company, 819 P.2d 55
(Colo.1991). The Bock court, however, did not dispense with a state action
requirement for its free speech provision; rather, the Court found that the
mall that sought to prohibit the distribution of literature was a state
actor. * * *
In New Jersey, we have once before discussed the application of our
State constitutional right of free speech to private conduct. In State v.
Schmid, * * * we held that Schmid, though lacking permission from
Princetown University, had the right to enter the campus, distribute
leaflets, and sell political materials. We ruled that the right of free speech
could be exercised on the campus subject to the University’s reasonable
regulations. * * * We find that each of the elements of the standard in
Schmid, the use, the invitation, and the suitability of free speech at the
centers, supports the existence of a constitutional free speech right in the
plaintiff and a corresponding obligation in the defendants. ‘‘Taken togeth-
er, these TTT relevant considerations’’ of the ‘‘multi-faceted’’ standard set
forth in Schmid lead to the conclusion that these regional and community
shopping centers must ‘‘be required to permit, subject to suitable restric-
tions, the reasonable exercise by individuals of the constitutional freedoms
of speech and assembly,’’ here the leafletting sought by plaintiff. * * *
Our holding today applies to all regional shopping centers. That
holding is based on their essential nature. The mammoth size of these
regional centers, the proliferation of uses, the all-embracing quality of the
implied invitation, and the compatibility of free speech with those uses:
the inevitable presence and coexistence of all of those factors more than
SEC. B THE CITY AS PUBLIC OR PRIVATE 49

satisfy the three elements of the Schmid standard. Furthermore, these

regional shopping centers are, in all significant respects, the functional
equivalent of a downtown business district, a fact that provides further
support for our holding. These are the essential places for the preservation
of the free speech that nourishes society and was found in downtown
business districts when they flourished. * * * We are unable, however, to
apply that command to community shopping centers with only one such
center before us, for while we believe all others share its characteristics,
we are not yet sufficiently certain of that fact. * * *
Our holding is limited to leafletting and associated speech in support
of, or in opposition to, causes, candidates, and parties—political and
societal free speech. We affirmatively rule that our State Constitution does
not confer free speech rights at regional and community shopping centers
that go beyond such speech. In addition to some doubt—the issue is really
not before us—whether our constitutional provision was intended to cover
commercial speech in any way at all, we find this limitation the result of
our application of the elements and standard in Schmid. * * * [T]he
commercial free speech could obviously be directly in conflict with the
centers’ activities, uses, and success, the most obvious example being
leafletting seeking to persuade shoppers and non-shoppers to go else-
where. We will not require these centers to carefully review every applica-
tion for commercial free speech and put them to the test of justifying its
exclusion under some balance. It is obviously a most serious intrusion on
the property interests of these owners; it does not satisfy the standard of
Schmid; it does not have State constitutional protection.
As for the manner of speech, our ruling is confined to leafletting and
associated free speech: the speech that normally and necessarily accompa-
nies leafletting. Plaintiff has sought no more. It does not include bull-
horns, megaphones, or even a soapbox; it does not include placards,
pickets, parades, and demonstrations; it does not include anything other
than normal speech and then only such as is necessary to the effectiveness
of the leafletting. The free speech associated with leafletting, handbilling,
and pamphleteering, as commonly understood, is only that which is
needed to attract the attention of passersby—in a normal voice—to the
cause and to the fact that leaflets are available, without pressure, harass-
ment, following, pestering, of any kind. Additionally, the sale of literature
and the solicitation of funds on the spot (as distinguished from appeals
found in the leaflets themselves) are not covered by the protection. * * *
We do not believe our opinion will result in any harm to these centers,
to their businesses, nor any less enjoyment for those who visit, shoppers
and non-shoppers. The free speech we have permitted * * * is the least
intrusive form of free speech and the easiest to control. The experience
elsewhere proves the ability of those centers to absorb such speech
without harm. The rare instances of disturbance resulted from circum-
stances most unlikely to occur here. Obviously, we cannot guarantee that
disturbances will not occur as a result of our decision. Indeed, we could
not guarantee freedom from such disturbances even in the absence of a
50 PROBLEMS OF DECENTRALIZATION CH. 1

right to leaflet. However, the slim possibility of disruption is the price we

all pay as citizens of this state; the danger that some will abuse their
rights is a necessary result of our constitutional commitment to free
speech. * * *
GARIBALDI, J., dissenting. * * *
[T]he majority departs from the Schmid test and argues that shop-
ping malls are the ‘‘functional equivalent’’ of the traditional downtown
business districts or town squares. In support of that theory, the majority
relies on ‘‘common knowledge’’ of the Court outside the record, ignoring
the factual findings of the trial court and evidence that many of the towns
in Essex, Hudson, and Morris Counties around the malls have become
more, not less, vibrant. Under the majority’s theory, private property
becomes municipal land and private-property owners become the govern-
ment. * * * The inescapable mission of shopping malls is not to be the
successor to downtown business districts; rather, it is to provide a com-
fortable and conducive atmosphere for shopping, a mission into which
mall owners have invested large sums and energy.
Common sense also dictates that privately-owned-and-operated shop-
ping malls are not the functional equivalent of downtown business dis-
tricts. They are not ‘‘replicas of the community itself.’’ Shopping malls do
not have housing, town halls, libraries, houses of worship, hospitals, or
schools. Nor do they contain the small stores, such as the corner grocer,
that used to serve as the forum for exchange of ideas. Indeed, most
shopping malls do not allow people even to walk their dogs there.
The shopping mall is not a community. There is no ‘‘mayor of the
mall.’’ Shoppers do not elect a common council. They do not have a say in
the day-to-day affairs of the mall, nor do they expect one. They do not visit
the mall to be informed or to inform others of social or political causes;
they go to shop. Even though the malls sponsor community events, visits
from Santa, and orchestral concerts, visitors do not mistake them for
grassroots gathering places, Santa’s Workshop, or a mecca of the arts or
culture. * * *
The majority’s opinion ignores the basic commercial purpose of these
private malls, ascribes to them the downfall of urban business districts,
and delegates to them the responsibility to fulfill the role once, and
arguably still, played by town squares. It does all of that without any
legitimate or rational justification. Moreover, the Court places burdens on
the private malls that they are ill-suited to handle. Ultimately, mall
owners will pass those burdens on to the consumer. The private property
owner and ultimately the consumer, the forgotten person in the majority
opinion, will have to pay the increased costs that result from the expanded
security and other expenses associated with the public’s free access to the
mall for expressional activities. Unlike the municipalities that the majority
thinks the malls have supplanted, malls are not exempt from most tort
claims under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act.
SEC. B THE CITY AS PUBLIC OR PRIVATE 51

Plaintiffs cannot claim that they have no means to express their

opinion to the public other than by distributing pamphlets in shopping
malls. No evidence shows that plaintiffs could not effectively distribute
their pamphlets in other areas. Indeed, according to plaintiff’s November
9, 1990, press release, they distributed their materials in at least thirty
locations, including several downtown areas. They were able to distribute
over 85,000 pamphlets in those locations during a three-day period.
Plaintiffs do not need to use the malls, save for their own convenience.
* * * Were we to adhere to Schmid and deny access to the malls,
plaintiffs would nevertheless remain able to reach the public outside
supermarkets and movie theaters, at train stations and bus stops, in parks
and post offices, in the media, and even in the numerous still-vibrant
downtown shopping districts. Plaintiffs can voice their opinions today
more readily and more accessibly in more places and in more formats than
ever before in human history. * * *

COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER TWIN RIVERS v. TWIN

RIVERS HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION
Supreme Court of New Jersey, 2007.
192 N.J. 344, 929 A.2d 1060.

JUSTICE WALLACE, JR. delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal, we determine whether the rules and regulations
enacted by a homeowners’ association governing the posting of signs, the
use of the community room, and access to its newsletter violated our state
constitutional guarantees of free expression. * * * We start from the
proposition that all citizens of this State, including the residents of Twin
Rivers, possess the constitutional right to free speech and assembly. We
acknowledge, however, that those rights are not absolute, as citizens may
waive or otherwise curtail their rights. This case presents us with a hybrid
setting to apply the standards set forth in State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535,
423 A.2d 615 (1980) and New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle
East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 138 N.J. 326, 650 A.2d 757 (1994). In applying
the Schmid/Coalition multi-faceted standard, we conclude that the Associ-
ation’s policies, as set forth in its rules and regulations, do not violate our
constitution.
The facts are from the record created in the parties’ crossmotions for
summary judgment. Twin Rivers is a planned unit development consisting
of privately owned condominium duplexes, townhouses, single-family
homes, apartments, and commercial buildings located in East Windsor,
New Jersey. The community covers approximately one square mile and
has a population of approximately 10,000 residents. The Twin Rivers
Community Trust (Trust) is a private corporation that owns Twin Rivers’s
common property and facilities. The Trust was created by indenture on
November 13, 1969, for the stated purpose of owning, managing, operat-
ing, and maintaining the residential common property of Twin Rivers. The
administrator of the Trust certified that ‘‘Trust-owned property and
52 PROBLEMS OF DECENTRALIZATION CH. 1

facilities are for the exclusive use of Twin Rivers residents and their
invited guests,’’ and that the ‘‘general public is not invited’’ to use them.
The Twin Rivers Homeowners’ Association (Association) is a private
corporation that serves as trustee of the Trust. The Trust authorizes the
Association to make rules and regulations for the conduct of its members
while occupying the land owned or controlled by the Trust, to provide
services to its members, and to maintain the common lands and facilities
in Twin Rivers. The Association maintains the Trust’s private residential
roads, provides street lighting and snow removal, assigns parking spaces
in its parking lots, and collects rubbish in portions of Twin Rivers. By
acquiring property in Twin Rivers, the owner automatically becomes a
member of the Association and subject to its Articles of Incorporation
(Articles) and Bylaws.
The Articles authorize the Association to exercise all of the powers,
rights, and privileges provided to corporations organized under the New
Jersey Nonprofit Corporation Act, N.J.S.A. 15A:1–1 to–10. The Bylaws
additionally authorize the Association to adopt, publish, and enforce rules
governing the use of common areas and facilities. The Bylaws may be
amended by a majority of a quorum of members present in person or by
proxy at a regular or special meeting of the members.
The Association is governed by a Board of Directors (Board), whose
members are elected by all eligible voting members of the Association. The
Board is responsible for making and enforcing the rules, and for providing
services to its members that are financed through mandatory assessments
levied against residents pursuant to an annual budget adopted by the
Board.
Prior to the commencement of this litigation, various residents of
Twin Rivers formed a committee, known as the Committee for a Better
Twin Rivers (Committee), for the purpose of affecting the manner in
which Twin Rivers was governed. Eventually, the Committee and three
individual residents of Twin Rivers (collectively, plaintiffs) filed a nine-
count complaint against the Association and Scott Pohl, the president of
the Association, seeking to invalidate various rules and regulations. * * *
The thrust of the complaint was that the Association had effectively
replaced the role of the municipality in the lives of its residents, and
therefore, the Association’s internal rules and regulations should be
subject to the free speech and free association clauses of the New Jersey
Constitution. Although plaintiffs’ complaint consisted of nine counts, only
the first three counts are relevant to this appeal.
In count one of the complaint, plaintiffs sought to invalidate the
Association’s policy relating to the posting of signs. The Association’s sign
policy provided that residents may post a sign in any window of their
residence and outside in the flower beds so long as the sign was no more
than three feet from the residence. In essence, the policy limits signs to
one per lawn and one per window. The policy also forbids the posting of
signs on utility poles and natural features within the community. The
SEC. B THE CITY AS PUBLIC OR PRIVATE 53

stated purpose for the sign policy is to avoid the clutter of signs and to
preserve the aesthetic value of the common areas, as well as to allow for
lawn maintenance and leaf collection. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to
permit the posting of political signs on the property of community resi-
dents ‘‘and on common elements under reasonable regulation,’’ on the
basis that the current policy was unconstitutional.
In count two, plaintiffs complained of the Association’s policy in
respect of the use of its community room. In general, the community room
is available to residents of Twin Rivers, as well as clubs, organizations,
and committees approved by the Trust who want to rent the room for
parties or other events. When the complaint was filed, the community
room policy involved a two tiered rental charge system that differentiated
between the uses of the room. However, during the pendency of this
action, the Association amended the community room policy to eliminate
the tier system in favor of a uniform rental fee of $165 and a refundable
security deposit of $250. Additionally, a certificate of insurance naming
the Association as an insured was required. The rental fees were intended
to cover the costs associated with the maintenance of the room.
Plaintiffs asserted that the community room policy denied them equal
protection of the laws and unreasonably and unconstitutionally violated
their right to access the community room on a fair and equitable basis.
They sought temporary and permanent injunctions ‘‘to allow [p]laintiffs to
utilize the community room in the same manner as other similarly
situated entities.’’ Plaintiffs also urged that the rental fees were excessive
because they were not related to the actual rental costs incurred by the
Association.
In count three, plaintiffs alleged they were denied equal access to the
Association’s monthly newspaper, Twin Rivers Today (Today). The pur-
pose of the newspaper is to provide residents with news and information
that concerns the community. The editorial committee of Today selects
the content of the newspaper. The paper is delivered to all Twin Rivers
residents, but not to the general public. Plaintiffs sought a declaration
that all Twin Rivers residents should have ‘‘equal access’’ to the pages of
Today. Also, plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction enjoining the presi-
dent of the Board from using Today ‘‘as his own personal political
trumpet.’’ * * *
Our constitution affirmatively grants to individuals the rights of
speech and assembly. * * * This Court has long held that the rights of
speech and assembly cannot be curtailed by the government.* * * Federal
case law has evolved to require that there must be ‘‘state action’’ to
enforce constitutional rights against private entities. * * * Our jurispru-
dence has not been as confining. * * * We concluded in Schmid, supra,
that the rights of free speech and assembly under our constitution are not
only secure from interference by governmental or public bodies, but under
certain circumstances from the interference by the owner of private
property as well. Simply stated, we have not followed the approach of
54 PROBLEMS OF DECENTRALIZATION CH. 1

other jurisdictions to require some state action before the free speech and
assembly clauses under our constitution may be invoked.
With those general principles as a backdrop, we turn now to apply the
Schmid/Coalition test to the present matter. As noted, our constitution’s
free speech provision is ‘‘broader than practically all others in the nation.’’
Green Party [v. Hartz Mountain Indus.], 164 N.J. at 145, 752 A.2d 315.
Consequently, we have not followed the approach of other jurisdictions to
require some state action before the free speech and assembly clauses
under our constitution may be invoked. Even in the absence of state
action, we must determine whether the acts of a homeowners’ association
violated its members’ free speech and association rights in the setting of
this private housing association.
This case presents an additional complication: it involves restrictions
on conduct both on the private housing association’s property and on the
homeowners’ properties. However, ‘‘[i]t is the extent of the restriction,
and the circumstances of the restriction that are critical, not the identity
of the party restricting free speech.’’ Coalition, supra. We conclude that
the three-pronged test in Schmid and the general balancing of expression-
al rights and private property interests in Coalition are the appropriate
standards to decide this case. * * * The first Schmid factor requires that
we consider the nature, purposes, and primary use of the property. Twin
Rivers is a common interest community ‘‘in which the property is bur-
dened by servitudes requiring property owners to contribute to mainte-
nance of commonly held property or to pay dues or assessments to an
owners association that provides services or facilities to the community.’’
Restatement (Third)of Property:Servitudes § 6 (2000). We have recognized
that ‘‘[a] common-interest community is distinguishable from any other
form of real property ownership because ‘there is a commonality of
interest, an interdependence directly tied to the use, enjoyment, and
ownership of property.’ ’’ Fox v. Kings Grant Maint. Ass’n, 167 N.J. 208,
222, 770 A.2d 707 (2001).
The primary use of the property in Twin Rivers is residential. There
are privately owned businesses within the borders of Twin Rivers, but the
Association derives no revenue from them. East Windsor Township, not
Twin Rivers, provides for the school system, the police and fire depart-
ments, the municipal court system, and the first aid services. Twin Rivers
offers its residents services in the form of landscape maintenance, upkeep
of trust-owned roads, removal of trash from certain sections of the
community, and cleaning of snow. Thus, we find the nature, purposes, and
primary use of Twin Rivers’ property is for private purposes and does not
favor a finding that the Association’s rules and regulations violated
plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
The second Schmid factor requires that we examine the extent and
nature of the public’s invitation to use the property. A public invitation to
use the premises may be express or implied. As we explained in Coalition,
supra, an implied invitation can be inferred where the property owner
SEC. B THE CITY AS PUBLIC OR PRIVATE 55

permits and encourages public use of the property. Here, the Association
has not invited the public to use its property. Although Twin Rivers is not
a gated community and its roads are accessible to public traffic, we agree
with the Association’s position that ‘‘Trust-owned property and facilities
are for the exclusive use of Twin Rivers residents and their invited
guests.’’ Moreover, the mere fact that owners may sell or rent property to
members of the public who are invited to come into Twin Rivers and
inspect such property hardly implicates a public invitation. We conclude
that the limited nature of the public’s invitation to use the property does
not favor a finding that the Association’s rules and regulations violated
plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
The third Schmid factor concerns the purpose of the expressional
activity in relation to both the private and public use of the property. This
part of the test requires that we examine ‘‘the compatibility of the free
speech sought to be exercised with the uses of the property.’’ Essentially,
we must look to the fairness of the restrictions imposed by the Association
in relation to plaintiffs’ free speech rights. In this case, plaintiffs’ expres-
sional activities—posting political signs, free use of the community room,
and access to the community newspaper—involve political-like speech
aimed at affecting the manner in which Twin Rivers is managed.
We find that plaintiffs’ expressional activities are not unreasonably
restricted. As the Association points out, the relationship between it and
the homeowners is a contractual one, formalized in reasonable covenants
that appear in all deeds. Moreover, unlike the university in Schmid, and
the shopping center in Coalition, Twin Rivers is not a private forum that
invites the public on its property to either facilitate academic discourse or
to encourage public commerce. Rather, Twin Rivers is a private, residen-
tial community whose residents have contractually agreed to abide by the
common rules and regulations of the Association. The mutual benefit and
reciprocal nature of those rules and regulations, and their enforcement, is
essential to the fundamental nature of the communal living arrangement
that Twin Rivers residents enjoy. We further conclude that this factor
does not weigh in favor of finding that the Association’s rules and
regulations violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
We are mindful that at least in regard to the signs on the property of
the homeowners, it is the private homeowner’s property and not that of
the Association that is impacted. The private property owner not only is
‘‘protected under due process standards from untoward interference with
or confiscatory restrictions upon its reasonable use,’’ Schmid, supra, but
also our constitution affirmatively grants the homeowner free speech and
assembly rights that may be exercised on that property. Notably, the
Association permits expressional activities to take place on plaintiffs’
property but with some minor restrictions. Homeowners are permitted to
place a single sign in each window and signs may be placed in the flower
beds adjacent to the homes. Those limitations are clearly not an ‘‘unto-
ward interference with’’ or a ‘‘confiscatory restriction’’ on the reasonable
use by plaintiffs’ on their property to implicate due process standards.
56 PROBLEMS OF DECENTRALIZATION CH. 1

The outcome of the balancing of the expressional rights and the

privacy interests is obvious. ‘‘We do not interfere lightly with private
property rights.’’ Coalition, supra. We find that the minor restrictions on
plaintiffs’ expressional activities are not unreasonable or oppressive, and
the Association is not acting as a municipality. The Association’s restric-
tions concerning the placement of the signs, the use of the community
room, and access to its newspaper are reasonable ‘‘concerning the time,
place, and manner of’’ such restrictions. Neither singularly nor in combi-
nation is the Schmid/Coalition test satisfied in favor of concluding that a
constitutional right was infringed here. Consequently, we conclude that in
balancing plaintiffs’ expressional rights against the Association’s private
property interest, the Association’s policies do not violate the free speech
and right of assembly clauses of the New Jersey Constitution. * * *

COUNCIL OF ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHERS

FOR EDUCATION ABOUT PAROCHIAID,
INC. v. ENGLER
Supreme Court of Michigan, 1997.
455 Mich. 557, 566 N.W.2d 208.

BRICKLEY, JUSTICE.
This case concerns 1993 P.A. 362, the statute commonly known as the
charter schools act, which authorized the creation of public school acade-
mies. The plaintiffs brought this suit to enjoin the distribution of public
funds by challenging the constitutionality of the statute. * * *
Under Act 362, a public school academy is organized as a nonprofit
corporation under the Nonprofit Corporation Act. A public school academy
is administered under the direction of a board of directors in accordance
with Act 362 and the nonprofit corporation bylaws contained in the public
school academy’s contract. * * * To organize a public school academy, an
applicant, either a person or an entity, must submit an application to an
authorizing body. * * * Act 362 specifies four types of authorizing bodies:
(1) the board of a school district, (2) intermediate school board, (3) the
board of a community college, and (4) the governing board of a state
public university. An authorizing body is not required to issue any public
school academy contracts, but if it does, it must issue the contracts ‘‘on a
competitive basis taking into consideration the resources available for the
proposed public school academy, the population to be served by the
proposed public school academy, and the educational goals to be achieved
by the proposed public school academy.’’ Before granting a contract to
operate a public school academy, an authorizing body is required to adopt
a resolution establishing the method of selection, length of term, and
number of members of the public school academy’s board of directors. The
authorizing body for a public school academy is the fiscal agent for the
public school academy, and its aid payments are paid to the authorizing
body. The authorizing body is responsible for the public school academy’s
compliance with the contract and all applicable law. Further, the contract