RULE 130

HELD:
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. JESUSA P.
REYES and CONRADO B. REYES It is a basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must
prove his own affirmative allegations by the degree of
[G.R. No. 157177, February 11, 2008] evidence required by law. In civil cases, the party having
the burden of proof must establish his case by
FACTS:
preponderance of evidence, or that evidence which is of
greater weight or is more convincing than that which is in
On December 7, 1990, respondent Jesusa Reyes
opposition to it. It does not mean absolute truth; rather, it
together with her daughter, went to BPI Zapote Branch to
means that the testimony of one side is more believable
open an ATM account.
than that of the other side, and that the probability of truth
is on one side than on the other.
Respondent informed one of petitioners employees, Mr.
Capati, that they wanted to open an ATM account for the
For a better perspective on the calibration of the evidence
amount of P200,000.00, P100,000.00 of which shall be
on hand, it must first be stressed that the judge who had
withdrawn from her exiting savings account with BPI bank
heard and seen the witnesses testify was not the same
which is account no. 0233-2433-88 and the other
judge who penned the decision. Thus, not having heard
P100,000.00 will be given by her in cash.
the testimonies himself, the trial judge or the appellate
court would not be in a better position than this Court to
Capati allegedly made a mistake and prepared a
assess the credibility of witnesses on the basis of their
withdrawal slip for P200,00.00 to be withdrawn from her
demeanor.
existing savings account with said bank and the
respondent believing in good faith that Capati prepared
Hence, to arrive at the truth, we thoroughly reviewed the
the papers with the correct amount signed the same
transcripts of the witnesses' testimonies and examined
unaware of the mistakes in figures.
the pieces of evidence on record.
Minutes later after the slips were presented to the teller,
After a careful and close examination of the records and
Capati returned to where the respondent was seating and
evidence presented by the parties, we find that
informed the latter that the withdrawable balance could
respondents failed to successfully prove by
not accommodate P200,000.00.
preponderance of evidence that respondent Jesusa made
an initial deposit of P200,000.00 in her Express Teller
Respondent explained that she is withdrawing the amount
account.
of P100,000.00 only and then changed and correct the
figure two (2) into one (1) with her signature super-
imposed thereto signifying the change, afterwhich the
amount of P100,000.00 in cash in two bundles containing People of the Philippines v. Benjamin Amansec y
100 pieces of P500.00 peso bill were given to Capati with Dona
her daughter Joan witnessing the same. Thereafter G.R. No. 186131, December 14, 2011
Capati prepared a deposit slip for P200,000.00 in the
name of resondent Jesusa Reyes with the new account FACTS:
no. 0235-0767-48 and brought the same to the teller's Accused-appellant Amansec was charged with a violation
booth. of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Act of 2002. The RTC
After a while, he returned and handed to the respondent found Amansec guilty of violating Section 5 of RA 9165 or
her duplicate copy of her deposit to account no. 0235- illegal sale of prohibited drugs but was acquitted of the
0767-48 reflecting the amount of P200,000.00 with receipt crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The CA
stamp showing December 7, as the date. affirmed the decision of RTC.

Later on, respondent would become aware that her ATM Acting on a report by a confidential informant, PIO
account only contained the amount of P100,000.00 with Villanueva formed a team for a buy-bust operation against
interest. Hence, she filed an action before the RTC. Amansec. PO1 Mabutol acted as the poseur-buyer with a
marked P100 peso bill. Mabutol and the informant moved
Petitioner claimed that there was actually no cash ahead to the house of Amansec while the rest of the team
involved with the transactions which happened on positioned themselves at a strategic location, keeping
December 7, 1990 as contained in the bank’s teller tape. Amansec within viewing distance. The informant then
introduced Mabutol to Amansec as a drug addict, in dire
On August 12, 1994, the RTC issued a Decision need of drugs. Mabutol had just told Amansec that he was
upholding the versions of respondents. going to purchase one hundred pesos worth
of shabu when another buyer, later identified as Jerome
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA which affirmed Pintis, came up to Amansec to also buy shabu. Amansec
the RTC decision with modification then showed both Pintis and Mabutol three plastic
sachets containing crystalline substance. Mabutol
ISSUE: thereafter examined the plastic sachet he obtained from
Amansec, and suspecting it to be shabu, scratched the
Whether the CA erred in sustaining the RTC's finding that right side of his head with his right hand to signal his team
respondent Jesusa made an initial deposit of to approach the target. Pascua thereafter frisked
P200,000.00 in her newly opened Express Teller account Amansec and retrieved the buy-bust money that Mabutol
on December 7, 1990. had given Amansec, and another plastic sachet.

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Accused-appellant questions the admissibility of the
evidence against him for having been obtained in violation
of section 21 of RA 9165. Accused-appellant also
questions the non-inclusion of Pintis in the case and the
non-presentation of the informant in court. He also
maintains that he is a victim of a frame-up as there was
no surveillance conducted prior to the buy-bust operation
and that the marked money used by PO1 Mabutol was not
dusted with ultraviolet powder.
ISSUE:
Is the accused guilty of the crime of illegal sale of drugs
punished under RA 9165?
HELD:
YES, the prosecution has proven the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. The acts of Pintis had nothing
to do with Amansec’s own acts and the Court sees no
reason why the accused-appellant and Pintis should have
been tried jointly. Further, the presentation of an informant
in an illegal drugs case is not essential for the conviction
nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution
because the informant’s testimony is not needed if the
sale of the illegal drug has been adequately proven. In this
case, the prosecution has successfully proven that an
illegal sale took place. Moreover, a prior surveillance is
not required for a valid buy-bust operation, especially if
the buy-bust team is accompanied to the target area by
their informant, hence, accused-appellant’s contention
that he was framed up due to lack of surveillance must
fail. Lastly, the failure of the police officers to use
ultraviolet powder on the buy-bust money is not an
indication that the buy-bust operation was a sham. In fact,
the use of initials to mark the money used in the buy-bust
operation has been accepted by the Court in numerous
cases.
Accused-appellant claims that Section 21 of RA 9165 was
violated when the police officers who arrested him did not
take his picture with the shabu they confiscated from him,
and when they made no physical inventory of the shabu in
his presence, or in the presence of his representative, the
media, the department of justice, or any elected public
official. Amansec avers that his presumption of innocence
prevails over the presumption that the police officers
performed their duty in a regular manner. He also avers
that the prosecution failed to prove the chain of custody
of the evidence obtained from him as the station
investigator.
A testimony about a perfect chain is not always the
standard as it is almost always impossible to obtain an
unbroken chain. Thus, even though the prosecution failed
to submit in evidence the physical inventory and
photograph of the seized drugs as required under Section
21 of Republic Act No. 9165, this will not render
Amansec’s arrest illegal or the items seized from him as
inadmissible in evidence. The Court has consistently held
that what is of utmost importance is the preservation of
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items.
In this case, the prosecution was able to demonstrate that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized
had been preserved. The presumption that the integrity of
the evidence has been preserved will remain unless it can
be shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering of
the evidence. Amansec failed to overcome his burden of
showing the foregoing to overcome the presumption that
the police officers handled the seized drugs with
regularity, and that they properly discharged their duties.
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It is evident in the case at bar that the prosecution was
able to establish the elements of illegal sale of drugs. As
such, the accused is guilty of violating Section 5, Article II
of RA 9165.
G.R. No. 189806
People of the Philippines v. Francisco Manlangit y
Tresballes
Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the Philippines
Accused-Appellant: Francisco Manlangit y Tresballes
Date: January 12, 2010
Ponente: J. Mendoza Jr.
Facts:
1. November 24, 2003, in the City of Makati,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the
Court, the accused, not being lawfully authorized
by law, did then and there wilfully and feloniously
sell, give away, distribute and deliver aero point
four (0.04) gram of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu), which is a dangerous
drug.
2. November 24, 2003, in the City of Makati,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the
Court, the accused, not being authorized by law
to use dangerous drugs, and having been
arrested and found positive for use of
Methylaphetamine, after a confirmatory test, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
use a dangerous drug in violation of the said law.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the accused-appellant be
convicted despite the prosecution’s failure to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Whether or not the findings in the procedure for
the custody and control of prohibited drugs was
complied with.
Held:
1. Yes. The accused-appellant’s guilt was proved
beyond reasonable doubt merely on the basis of
punishing the act of selling dangerous drugs
[Sec.5 of RA 9165] and the use of dangerous
drugs [Sec.15, RA 9165]. The pieces of evidence
found in the records demonstrate that all the
elements of the crimes charged were satisfied.
The lower courts gave credence to the
prosecution’s witnesses’ testimonies, which
established the guilt of the accused for the crimes
beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, settled is
the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or
test buy does not affect the legality of the buy-
bust operation.
2. No. the accused-appellant contends that the
arresting officers did not comply with the
requirements for the handling of seized
dangerous drugs as provided for under Sec.21
(1) of RA 9165 which states that custody and
disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or
surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment. Though the
accused argued that there was no photograph
made of plastic sheet in the presence of the
accused, media, any elected local official, or the
DOJ Rep. in clear violation of Section 21, R.A.
No. 9165, the court stated that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
 shall not render void such seizures and custody
over said items. Therefore, the failure of the
prosecution to show that the police officers
conducted the required physical inventory and
photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant
to said guidelines, is not fatal and does not
automatically render accused-appellant’s arrest
illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible.
Wherefore, the appeal is denied. CA’s decision is affirmed
in toto.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPO3 SANGKI ARA
Y MIRASOL et al. G.R. No. 185011 December 23, 2009
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the December 13, 2007 Decision
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00025B entitled People of the Philippines v. SPO3 Sangki
Ara y Mirasol, Mike Talib y Mama, Jordan Musa y
Bayan, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 9 in Davao City, convicting accused-
appellants of violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
Three Informations charged accused-appellants Sangki
Ara, Mike Talib, and Jordan Musa, as follows:
Criminal Case No. 51,471-2002 against
Ara
That on or about December 20, 2002, in
the City of Davao, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, without being
authorized by law, willfully, unlawfully
and consciously traded, transported and
delivered 26.6563 grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or
shabu, which is a dangerous drug, with
the aggravating circumstance of trading,
transporting and delivering said 26.6563
grams of shabu within 100 meters from
[the] school St. Peters College of Toril,
Davao City.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
Criminal Case No. 51,472-2002 against
Talib
That on or about December 20, 2002, in
the City of Davao, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, without being
authorized by law, willfully, unlawfully
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and consciously had in his possession
and control one (1) plastic sachet of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or
shabu, weighing 0.3559 gram, which is a
dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Criminal Case No. 51,473-2002 against
Musa
That on or about December 20, 2002, in
the City of Davao, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-mentioned accused, without
being authorized by law, willfully,
unlawfully and consciously had in his
possession and control five (5) big plastic
sachet[s] of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride or shabu weighing
14.2936 grams, which is a dangerous
drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
During their arraignment, accused-appellants all gave a
not guilty plea.
Version of the Prosecution
At the trial, the prosecution presented the following
witnesses: Forensic Chemist Noemi Austero, PO2 Ronald
Lao, SPO1 Bienvenido Furog, PO1 Enrique Ayao, Jr., SPO4
Rodrigo Mallorca, and PO2 Jacy Jay Francia.
In the morning of December 20, 2002, a confidential
informant (CI) came to the Heinous Crime Investigation
Section (HCIS) of the Davao City Police Department and
reported that three (3) suspected drug pushers had
contacted him for a deal involving six (6) plastic sachets
of shabu. He was instructed to go that same morning to
St. Peters College at Toril, Davao City and look for an
orange Nissan Sentra car.[4]
Police Chief Inspector Fulgencio Pavo, Sr. immediately
formed a buy-bust team composed of SPO3 Reynaldo
Capute, SPO4 Mario Galendez, SPO3 Antonio Balolong,
SPO2 Arturo Lascaos, SPO2 Jim Tan, SPO1 Rizalino
Aquino, SPO1 Bienvenido Furog, PO2 Vivencio Jumawan,
Jr., PO2 Ronald Lao, and PO1 Enrique Ayao, Jr., who
would act as poseur-buyer.[5]
The team proceeded to the school where PO1 Ayao and
the CI waited by the gate. At around 8:45 a.m., an orange
Nissan Sentra bearing plate number UGR 510 stopped in
front of them. The two men approached the vehicle and
the CI talked briefly with an old man in the front
seat. PO1 Ayao was then told to get in the back seat as
accused-appellant Mike Talib opened the door. The old
man, later identified as accused-appellant SPO3 Ara,
asked PO1 Ayao if he had the money and the latter
replied in the positive. Ara took out several sachets with
crystalline granules from his pocket and handed them to
PO1 Ayao, who thereupon gave the pre-arranged signal
of opening the car door. The driver of the car, later
identified as accused-appellant Jordan Musa, tried to
drive away but PO1 Ayao was able to switch off the car
engine in time. The back-up team appeared and SPO1
Furog held on to Musa while PO2 Lao restrained
Talib. PO1 Ayao then asked Ara to get out of the
vehicle.[6]
Recovered from the group were plastic sachets of white
crystalline substance: six (6) big sachets, weighing
26.6563 grams, from Ara by PO1 Ayao; five (5) big
sachets, weighing 14.2936 grams, from Musa by SPO1
Furog; and a small sachet, weighing 0.3559 gram, from
Talib by PO2 Lao.[7]
The three suspects were brought to the HCIS and the
seized items indorsed to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. Forensic
Chemist Austero, who conducted the examination,
found that the confiscated sachets all tested positive
for shabu.[8]
Version of the Defense
The defense offered the sole testimony of Ara, who said
that he had been a member of the PNP for 32 years, with
a spotless record. On December 20, 2002, SPO3 Ara was
in Cotabato City, at the house of his daughter Marilyn,
wife of his co-accused Musa. He was set to go that day to
the Ombudsmans Davao City office for some paperwork
in preparation for his retirement on July 8, 2003. He
recounted expecting at least PhP 1.6 million in
retirement benefits.[9] Early that morning, past three
oclock, he and Musa headed for Davao City on board the
latters car. As he was feeling weak, Ara slept in the back
seat.
Upon reaching Davao City, he was surprised to see
another man, Mike Talib, in the front seat of the car
when he woke up. Musa explained that Talib had hitched
a ride on a bridge they had passed.[10]
When they arrived in Toril, Ara noticed the car to be
overheating, so they stopped. Ara did not know that they
were near St. Peters College since he was not familiar
with the area. Talib alighted from the car and Ara
transferred to the front seat. While Talib was getting into
the back seat, PO1 Ayao came out of nowhere, pointed
his .45 caliber pistol at Ara even if he was not doing
anything, and ordered him to get off the vehicle. He saw
that guns were also pointed at his companions. As the
group were being arrested, he told PO1 Ayao that he was
also a police officer. Ara insisted that he was not holding
anything and that the shabu taken from him was
planted. He asserted that the only time he
saw shabu was on television.[11]
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC pronounced accused-appellants guilty of the
crimes charged. In its Decision dated March 1, 2003, the
trial court held that the prosecution was able to establish
the quantum of proof showing the guilt of accused-
appellants beyond reasonable doubt. It further ruled
that the intercept operation conducted by the buy-bust
team was valid.
4|Page
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premised on the
foregoing the Court finds the following:
In Criminal Case No. 51,471-2002, the
accused herein SANGKI ARA Y MASOL,
Filipino, 55 years old, widower, a resident
of Kabuntalan, Cotabato City, is hereby
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt,
and is CONVICTED of the crime of
violation of Sec. 5, 1st paragraph of
Republic Act 9165. He is hereby imposed
the DEATH PENALTY and FINE of TEN
MILLION PESOS (PhP 10,000,000) with
all the accessory penalties
corresponding thereto, including
absolute perpetual disqualification from
any public office, in view of the provision
of section 28 of RA 9165 quoted above.
Since the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt that the crime was
committed in the area which is only five
(5) to six (6) meters away from the
school, the provision of section 5
paragraph 3 Article II of RA 9165 was
applied in the imposition of the maximum
penalty against the herein accused.
In Criminal Case No. 51,472-2002, the
accused herein MIKE TALIB y MAMA,
Filipino, of legal age, single and a
resident of Parang, Cotabato, is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, and
is CONVICTED of the crime of violation
of Sec. 11, 3rd paragraph, Article II of
Republic Act 9165. He is hereby imposed
a penalty of Imprisonment of SIXTEEN
(16) YEARS and a fine of THREE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP
300,000) with all the accessory penalties
corresponding thereto.
In Criminal Case No. 51,473-2002 the
accused herein JORDAN MUSA Y
BAYAN, Filipino, 30 years old, married
and a resident of Cotabato City, is hereby
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
and is CONVICTED of the crime for
Violation of Sec. 11, 1st paragraph,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. He is
hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of
LIFE IMPRISONMENT and FINE of
FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(PhP 400,000) with all the accessory
penalties corresponding thereto.
SO ORDERED.[12]
As the death penalty was imposed on Ara, the case went
on automatic review before this Court. Conformably
with People v. Mateo,[13] we, however, ordered the
transfer of the case to the CA.
The Ruling of the Appellate Court
Contesting the RTC Decision, accused-appellants filed
separate appeals before the CA. Talib claimed that it was
erroneous for the trial court to have used the complaining
witnesses affidavits as basis for ruling that their arrest was
valid. He also cited as erroneous the trial courts refusal to
rule that the prosecutions evidence was inadmissible.
Lastly, he questioned the failure of the buy-bust team to
follow the requirements of RA 9165 on proper inventory
of seized drugs.
Ara and Musa filed a joint brief, alleging the following: (1)
the trial court erred in denying the Motion to Suppress
and/or exclude illegally obtained evidence; (2) the trial
court erred in denying the Demurrer to Evidence; (3) the
trial court failed to consider that the criminal informations
did not allege conspiracy among the accused; and (4) the
trial court erred in ruling that the intercept operation was
valid.
The CA affirmed the trial courts decision with some
modifications on the penalty imposed. It ruled that a
majority of the errors raised in the appeal referred to
technicalities in the conduct of buy-bust operations that
did not invalidate the police officers actions. On the issue
of the evidence presented, the CA held that the
presumption that police officers performed their duties in
a regular manner was not overturned.
The appellate court resolved the issue of the validity of the
buy-bust operation by stating that the law requires no
specific method of conducting such an operation. It ruled
that to require a warrant of arrest would not accomplish
the goal of apprehending drug pushers in flagrante
delicto. The CAs Decision emphasized that all the
elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of
drugs were established.
The fallo of the December 13, 2007 CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises foregoing, the
appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the
appealed March 1, 2003 Decision is
hereby AFFIRMED subject to the
modification insofar as the death penalty
imposed upon accused SPO3 Sangki
Ara is concerned. Accordingly, his
penalty is hereby reduced to life
imprisonment pursuant to Republic Act
No. 9346.
SO ORDERED.[14]
On December 17, 2008, this Court required the parties to
submit supplemental briefs if they so desired. The parties,
save for Musa, manifested their willingness to forego the
filing of additional briefs.
The Issues
Reiterating the matters raised before the CA, accused-
appellants alleged the following:
I
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that the arrest of the accused-
appellants was valid based on the
affidavits of the complaining witnesses
II
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in
disregarding the apparent defects and
inconsistencies in the affidavits of the
complaining witnesses
III
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in
refusing to consider the suppression or
exclusion of evidence
5|Page
IV
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in
not holding that the prosecution
miserably failed to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt
Talib also raises the following grounds for his acquittal:
I
Whether the arrest of Talib was illegal
and the evidence confiscated from him
illegally obtained
II
Whether the police officers who
conducted the illegal search and arrest
also deliberately failed and/or violated
the provisions of RA 9165
III
Whether the testimonies of the
prosecutions witnesses and their
respective affidavits were gravely
inconsistent
Ara and Musa additionally raise the following issues:
I
Whether the trial court erred in denying
the Demurrer to Evidence
II
Whether the trial court failed to consider
that the criminal informations did not
allege conspiracy among the accused
III
Whether the trial court erred in ruling that
the intercept operation was valid
Accused-appellant Musa also avers that the CA erred in
convicting him since the prosecution failed to prove
the corpus delicti of the offense charged.
The Ruling of this Court
What are mainly raised in this appeal are (1) whether the
buy-bust conducted was valid; (2) whether the crimes of
illegal sale and illegal possession of drugs were
sufficiently established; and (3) whether the chain of
custody over the shabu was unbroken.
Warrantless Arrest and Seizure Valid
In calling for their acquittal, accused-appellants decry
their arrest without probable cause and the violation of
their constitutional rights. They claim that the buy-bust
team had more than a month to apply for an arrest warrant
yet failed to do so.
Owing to the special circumstances surrounding the drug
trade, a buy-bust operation has long been held as a
legitimate method of catching offenders. It is a form of
entrapment employed as an effective way of
apprehending a criminal in the act of commission of an
offense.[15] We have ruled that a buy-bust operation can
be carried out after a long period of planning. The period
of planning for such operation cannot be dictated to the
police authorities who are to undertake such
operation.[16] It is unavailing then to argue that the
operatives had to first secure a warrant of arrest given that
the objective of the operation was to apprehend the
accused-appellants in flagrante delicto. In fact, one of the
situations covered by a lawful warrantless arrest under
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court is when a
person has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense in the presence of a
peace officer or private person.
It is erroneous as well to argue that there was no probable
cause to arrest accused-appellants. Probable cause, in
warrantless searches, must only be based on reasonable
ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been
committed or is about to be committed. There is no hard
and fast rule or fixed formula for determining probable
cause, for its determination varies according to the facts
of each case.[17] Probable cause was provided by
information gathered from the CI and from accused-
appellants themselves when they instructed PO1 Ayao to
enter their vehicle and begin the transaction. The illegal
sale of shabu inside accused-appellants vehicle was
afterwards clearly established. Thus, as we have
previously held, the arresting officers were justified in
making the arrests as accused-appellants had just
committed a crime when Ara sold shabu to PO1
Ayao.[18] Talib and Musa were also frisked for contraband
as it may be logically inferred that they were also part of
Aras drug activities inside the vehicle. This inference was
further strengthened by Musas attempt to drive the
vehicle away and elude arrest.
Moreover, the trial court correctly denied the Motion to
Suppress or Exclude Evidence. We need not reiterate that
the evidence was not excluded since the buy-bust
operation was shown to be a legitimate form of
entrapment. The pieces of evidence thus seized therein
were admissible. As the appellate court noted, it was
within legal bounds and no anomaly was found in the
conduct of the buy-bust operation. There is, therefore, no
basis for the assertion that the trial courts order denying
said motion was biased and committed with grave abuse
of discretion.
Prosecution Established Guilt Beyond Reasonable
Doubt
For the successful prosecution of the illegal sale of shabu,
the following elements must be established: (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale,
and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and its payment. What is material is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti as
evidence.[19] All these requisites were met by the
prosecution.
In contrast, Ara, the sole defense witness, could only
proffer the weak defenses of denial and alibi. He
expressed surprise at having Talib in his car and claimed
he was framed and that the shabu confiscated from him
was planted. According to the trial court, however, Aras
lying on the witness stand was so intense as he tried very
hard in vain to win the Courts sympathy.[20]
Given the prosecutions evidence, we rule that the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties has not been overturned. The presumption
remains because the defense failed to present clear and
convincing evidence that the police officers did not
properly perform their duty or that they were inspired by
an improper motive.[21] Ara could not explain why his
fellow police officers, who did not know him prior to his
arrest, would frame him for such a serious offense.
6|Page
Validity of Buy-Bust Operation
Likewise questioned by the defense in the
affidavits of the police officers was the allegation that
there was a legitimate buy-bust operation. No marked
money was presented to back up the police officers
claims. This argument lacks basis, however. There are
requirements that must be complied with in proving the
legitimacy of drug buy-bust operations. Nevertheless, this
Court has ruled that presentation of the marked money
used is not such a requirement. In the prosecution for the
sale of dangerous drugs, the absence of marked money
does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the
prosecution, as long as the sale of dangerous drugs is
adequately proved and the drug subject of the transaction
is presented before the court.[22] In the instant case, the
police officers testimonies adequately established the
illegal sale of shabu. The shabu was then presented
before the trial court. The non-presentation of the marked
money may, thus, be overlooked as a peripheral matter.
Talib further contends that it is incredible that
a shabu transaction would be carried out in a very open
and public place. Contrary to Talibs claim, however,
judicial experience has shown that drug transactions have
been conducted without much care for an inconspicuous
location.
Thus, we observed in People v. Roldan:
Drug pushing when done on a
small level x x x belongs to that class of
crimes that may be committed at anytime
and at any place. After the offer to buy is
accepted and the exchange is made, the
illegal transaction is completed in a few
minutes. The fact that the parties are in a
public place and in the presence of other
people may not always discourage them
from pursuing their illegal trade
these factors may even serve to
camouflage the same. Hence, the Court
has sustained the conviction of drug
pushers caught selling illegal drugs in a
billiard hall, in front of a store, along a
street at 1:45 p.m., and in front of a
house.[23]
It is also argued as impossible to believe that
even if there was already a deal between the informant
and accused-appellants, it was the apprehending police
officer who acted as the buyer and that he requested to
see the shabu first before showing the money. These
claims by Talib are similarly undeserving of
consideration. First, there is no uniform method by which
drug pushers and their buyers operate. Second, the
choice of effective ways to apprehend drug dealers is
within the ambit of police authority. Police officers have
the expertise to determine which specific approaches are
necessary to enforce their entrapment
operations.[24] Third, as long as they enjoy credibility as
witnesses, the police officers account of how the buy-bust
operation transpired is entitled to full faith and
credit. [25] Lastly, these arguments are merely incidental
and do not affect the elements of the crime which have
been, in the instant case, sufficiently established.
Talib also alleges that during his testimony, SPO1 Furog
was not certain as to the reason he was
apprehending Musa. Another claim is that SPO1 Furog,
when examined by the prosecutor and two different
defense lawyers, allegedly made relevant inconsistencies
in his testimony. The pertinent exchange reads:

Direct Examination of SPO1 Furog:
Prosecutor Weis:
Q What was your basis for stopping
[Musa] from letting the car go?
A I made him [stop] the car[.] [W]e [had]
to check them first because I think Ayao
saw [that] Ara [had] the suspected shabu.
Cross-Examination of SPO1 Furog:
Atty. Estrada
Q When you arrested Musa as you said,
it was because he attempted to drive the
car away, that was it?
A The most, when SPO3 Sangki Ara told
us that he was a PNP member
and when we saw the
substances from the two of them
first.
xxxx
Q You are referring to Musa and Ara?
A Yes sir.[26]
xxxx
Atty. Javines
Q Ayao did not arrest [Ara] inside the
vehicle?
A Only I rushed to the vehicle. I dont
know if he directly arrested him when he
saw the substance and [got] out of
the vehicle but I saw him get out from the
vehicle.[27]
The alleged inconsistencies in SPO1 Furogs reason for
apprehending Musa are, however, insignificant and do not
merit much consideration as well. The questioned parts in
the testimony of SPO1 Furog do not dent the totality of
evidence against accused-appellants. To repeat, the
elements of the crime of illegal sale of drugs and illegal
possession of drugs were both sufficiently established.
Although SPO1 Furog was not categorical in explaining
his basis for apprehending Musa, the arrest of the latter
must be considered as part of a legitimate buy-bust
operation which was consummated. Musas arrest came
after the pre-arranged signal was given to the back-up
team and this served as basis for the police officers to
apprehend all those in the vehicle, including Musa.
Denial of Demurrer to Evidence
Although alleged by accused-appellants Ara and Musa,
no reason was given in the appeal as to why the trial court
erred in denying their Demurrer to Evidence. Whatever
their basis may be, an action on a demurrer or on a motion
to dismiss rests on the sound exercise of judicial
discretion.[28] In Gutib v. CA,[29] we explained that:
A demurrer to evidence is an objection by
one of the parties in an action, to the
effect that the evidence which his
adversary produced is insufficient in point
of law, whether true or not, to make out a
7|Page
case or sustain the issue. The party
demurring challenges the sufficiency of
the whole evidence to sustain a verdict.
The court, in passing upon the sufficiency
of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is
merely required to ascertain whether
there is competent or sufficient evidence
to sustain the indictment or to support a
verdict of guilt.
Here, the trial court found competent and sufficient
evidence to support a conviction of all three accused-
appellants. We see no reason to overturn the trial courts
finding.
Allegation of Conspiracy in Information Not
Necessary
We find no merit in accused-appellants insistence that
conspiracy should have been alleged in the separate
Informations indicting them. We agree with the appellate
court, which succinctly stated that conspiracy was not
alleged precisely because they were charged with
different offenses for the distinct acts that each of them
committed. Ones possession of an illegal drug does not
need to be conspired by another who, on his part, also
possessed an illegal drug.[30] The three separate
indictments against Ara, Musa, and Talib do not need to
allege conspiracy, for the act of conspiring and all the
elements of the crime must be set forth in the complaint
or information only when conspiracy is charged as a
crime.[31]
Requirements of RA 9165 on Proper Inventory
Musa contends that since the markings on the seized
items were only made at the police station, there is a great
possibility that these were replaced. The result, he
argues, would be a lack of guarantee that what were
inventoried and photographed at the crime laboratory
were the same specimens confiscated from the accused.
As recently highlighted in People v. Cortez[32] and People
v. Lazaro, Jr.,[33] RA 9165 and its subsequent
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) do not require
strict compliance as to the chain of custody rule. The
arrest of an accused will not be invalidated and the items
seized from him rendered inadmissible on the sole ground
of non-compliance with Sec. 21, Article II of RA 9165. We
have emphasized that what is essential is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Briefly stated, non-compliance with the
procedural requirements under RA 9165 and its IRR
relative to the custody, photographing, and drug-testing of
the apprehended persons, is not a serious flaw that can
render void the seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-
bust operation.[34]
The chain of custody in the instant case did not suffer from
serious flaws as accused-appellants argue. The recovery
and handling of the seized drugs showed that, as to
Ara, first, PO1 Ayao recovered six plastic sachets of white
crystalline substance from Ara and marked them with both
his and Aras initials. Second, the sachets were likewise
signed by property custodian PO3 Pelenio. Third, PO1
Ayao signed a Request for Laboratory Examination then
personally delivered the sachets to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination. Fourth, SPO4 Mallorca then
received the sachets at the crime laboratory.
As to Musa, first, SPO1 Furog seized the sachets from
Musa and marked each with his own initials. Second, an
Inventory of Property Seized was then made by SPO4
Galendez. Lastly, SPO1 Furog later submitted a Request
for Laboratory Examination of the five (5) sachets
weighing a total of 14.2936 grams to the PNP Crime
Laboratory.
As to Talib, first, PO2 Lao seized a small sachet from
Talib during the buy-bust operation. Second, PO2 Lao
delivered a Request for Laboratory Examination of one (1)
sachet of suspected shabu weighing 0.3559
gram. Third, SPO4 Mallorca also received the items at the
PNP Crime Laboratory.
Forensic Chemist Noemi Austeros examination of the
sachets confiscated from all accused-appellants showed
that these were positive for shabu. During trial, the seized
items were identified in court. The five (5) sachets taken
from Musa were marked Exhibits A-1 to A-5, while the
sachet seized from Talib was marked Exhibit B. The six
(6) sachets taken from Ara were marked Exhibits B1-B6.
We are, thus, satisfied that the prosecution was able to
preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of
the shabu in all three criminal cases against accused-
appellants.
The rest of the arguments interposed are evidently
without merit and do not warrant discussion.
Penalties Imposed
Criminal Case No. 51,472-2002 against Talib
The crime of illegal possession of drugs is
punishable by Sec. 11 of RA 9165, as follows:
Sec. 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. x x x
xxxx
3) Imprisonment of twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years and a fine ranging from Three
hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00)
to Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00), if the quantities of
dangerous drugs are less than five (5)
grams of x x x methamphetamine
hydrochloride x x x.
Talib was sentenced to imprisonment of sixteen (16)
years and a fine of PhP 300,000.
Criminal Case No. 51,473-2002 against Musa
The provision Musa was charged of violating provides the
following penalty:
(1) Life imprisonment and a fine
ranging from Four hundred thousand
pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the
quantity of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu is ten (10) grams
or more but less than fifty (50) grams;
Musa was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of
PhP 400,000.
Criminal Case No. 51,471-2002 against Ara
The crime of illegal sale of shabu is penalized by Sec. 5,
Art. 11 of RA 9165:
SEC. 5. Sale, Trading,
Administration, Dispensation, Delivery,
8|Page
Distribution and Transportation of
Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals.
The penalty of life imprisonment to death
and a fine ranging from Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten
Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away
to another, distribute, dispatch in transit
or transport any dangerous drug,
including any and all species of opium
poppy regardless of the quantity and
purity involved, or shall act as a broker in
any of such transactions.
The same section contains the following provision:
If the sale, trading, administration,
dispensation, delivery, distribution or
transportation of any dangerous drug
and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical transpires within one hundred
(100) meters from the school, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed in
every case.
Since the sale of shabu was within five (5) to six (6)
meters from St. Peters College, the maximum penalty of
death should be imposed on Ara. Pursuant to RA 9346 or
An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in
the Philippines, however, only life imprisonment and a
fine shall be meted on him.
Ara was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of PhP
10,000,000. He, however, is no longer eligible for parole.
What distinguishes this case from others is that one of the
accused-appellants was a police officer himself who
should have known better than to break the law he was
duty-bound to enforce. What is more, he is charged with
the crime of selling illegal drugs, an offense so
horrendous for destroying the lives of its victims and their
families that the penalty of death used to be imposed on
its perpetrators. No one could have been more deserving
of such a punishment than someone who should be
enforcing the law but caught pushing drugs instead. As it
was, the death penalty was indeed originally imposed on
SPO3 Ara, who had been in the service for more than 30
years.
The ill effects of the use of illegal drugs are too repulsive
and shocking to enumerate. Thus, once the charges of
sale and possession of said drugs are established in
cases such as this, any errors or technicalities raised by
the suspects should not be allowed to invalidate the
actions of those involved in curtailing their illegal activities.
The punishments given to drug pushers should serve as
deterrent for others not to commit the same offense. No
price seems high enough for drug dealers to pay; it is just
unfortunate that the penalty of death can no longer be
imposed because it has been abolished.
As the penalties meted out to all three accused-appellants
are within the range provided by RA 9165, we affirm the
CAs sentence.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00025B entitled People of the
Philippines v. SPO3 Sangki Ara y Mirasol, Mike Talib y
Mama, Jordan Musa y Bayan is AFFIRMED with the
modification that accused-appellant Sangki Ara is not
eligible for parole.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 80505 : December 4, 1990.]
192 SCRA 28
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee,
vs.
MARIO TANDOY y LIM, Defendant-Appellant.
FACTS:
On May 27, 1986, at about 3:30 p.m. Lt. Salido, Jr. of the
Makati Police Station dispatched Pfc. Herino de la Cruz,
and Detectives Pablo R. Singayan, Nicanor Candolesas,
Luisito de la Cruz, Estanislao Dalumpines, Antonio
Manalastas and Virgilio Padua to conduct a buy-bust
operation at Solchuaga St., Barangay Singkamas,
Makati.
The target area was a store along the said street, and
Singayan was to pose as the buyer. He stood alone near
the store waiting for any pusher to approach. The other
members of the team strategically positioned themselves.
Soon, three men approached Singayan. One of them was
the accused-appellant, who said without preamble: "Pare,
gusto mo bang umiskor?" Singayan said yes. The
exchange was made then and there — two rolls/pieces of
marijuana for one P10.00 and two P5.00 bills marked
ANU (meaning Anti-Narcotics Unit).
The team then moved in and arrested Tandoy.
Manalastas and Candolesas made a body search of the
accused-appellant and took from him the marked money,
as well as eight more rolls/foils of marijuana and crushed
leaves.: nad
The arresting officers brought Tandoy to the Office of the
Anti-Narcotics Unit, Makati Police Station, for
investigation by Detective Marvin Pajilan. The accused-
appellant chose to remain silent after having been
informed of his constitutional rights.
These events were narrated under oath by De la Cruz,
Singayan and Pajilan. Microscopic, chemical and
chromotographic examination was performed on the
confiscated marijuana by Raquel P. Angeles, forensic
chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation, who later
testified that the findings were positive. The marijuana
was offered as an exhibit.
ISSUES:
1. The Court a quo erred in finding accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged despite lack of
evidence to prove that he sold marijuana to the poseur-
buyer.
2. The Court a quo erred in admitting in evidence against
the accused Exh. "E-2-A" which is merely a xerox copy of
the P10.00 bill allegedly used as buy-bust money.
RULING:
The trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses and to listen to their respective
testimonies, gave more credence to the statements of the
arresting officers. Applying the presumption that they had
performed their duties in a regular manner, it rejected
Tandoy's uncorroborated allegation that he had been
manhandled and framed. Tandoy had not submitted
sufficient evidence of his charges, let alone his admission
that he had no quarrel with the peace officers whom he
had met only on the day of his arrest.
We are convinced from the evidence on record that the
prosecution has overcome the constitutional presumption
of innocence in favor of the accused-appellant with proof
9|Page
beyond reasonable doubt of his guilt. He must therefore
suffer the penalty prescribed by law for those who would
visit the scourge of drug addiction upon our people.
Under the second assigned error, the accused-appellant
invokes the best evidence rule and questions the
admission by the trial court of the xerox copy only of the
marked P10.00 bill.:This assigned error centers on the
trial court's admission of the P10.00 bill marked money
(Exh. E-2-A) which, according to the appellant, is
excluded under the best evidence rule for being a mere
xerox copy. Apparently, appellant erroneously thinks that
said marked money is an ordinary document falling under
Sec. 2, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court which
excludes the introduction of secondary evidence except
in the five (5) instances mentioned therein.:-cralaw
The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of
the document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue
is only as to whether or not such document was actually
executed, or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or
surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not
apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.
Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the
prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its
existence and not its contents, other substitutionary
evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is therefore
admissible without the need of accounting for the original.
NOGALES V. PEOPLE, G.r. No. 191080, 21 November
2011
FACTS
Several electronic devices including desktop computer
CPUs and softwares were seized by virtue of a search
warrant in violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended in relation to R.A. No. 8972.The RTC
issued an order to keep the seized items in the NBI
evidence room with the undertaking to make said
confiscated items available whenever the court would
require them. Aggrieved by the issuance of the said order,
the named persons in the search warrant filed a Motion to
Quash Search Warrant and Return Seized Properties, but
were denied.
The Court of Appeals, in resolving the petition for
certiorari filed with it against the RTC judge, ordered the
release of the seized CPUs and softwares with the
condition that the hard disk be removed from the CPUs
and be destroyed, and if the softwares are determined to
be unlicensed or pirated copies, they shall be destroyed
in the manner allowed by law.
Petitioners argue that there is no evidence showing that
they were the source of pornographic printouts presented
by the NBI to the RTC or to the City Prosecutor of Manila.
Since the hard disks in their computers are not illegal per
se unlike shabu, opium, counterfeit money, or
pornographic magazines, said merchandise are lawful as
they are being used in the ordinary course of business,
the destruction of which would violate not only procedural,
but substantive due process.
ISSUE
Whether or not the removal and destruction of the hard
disks containing the pornographic and obscene materials
violates the property rights of its owner, considering the
criminal case for violation of Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code was dismissed.
RULING
NO.
The argument of petitioners is totally misplaced
considering the undisputed fact that the seized computer
units contained obscene materials or pornographic files.
Had it been otherwise, then, petitioners argument would
have been meritorious as there could be no basis for
destroying the hard disks of petitioners computer units.
While it may be true that the criminal case for violation of
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code was dismissed as
there was no concrete and strong evidence pointing to
them as the direct source of the subject pornographic
materials, it cannot be used as basis to recover the
confiscated hard disks. At the risk of being repetitious, it
appears undisputed that the seized computer units
belonging to them contained obscene materials or
pornographic files. Clearly, petitioners had no legitimate
expectation of protection of their supposed property
rights.
[T]he Court holds that the destruction of the hard disks
and the softwares used in any way in the violation of the
subject law (Article 201, RPC) addresses the purpose of
minimizing if not totally eradicating pornography. This will
serve as a lesson for those engaged in any way in the
proliferation of pornography or obscenity in this country.
The Court is not unmindful of the concerns of petitioners
but their supposed property rights must be balanced with
the welfare of the public in general.
People vs Alejandro, GR 176350, 10 Aug. 2011
Facts
: The RTC the appellant John-John Alejandro for violating
RA 9165 or theComprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002. It was alleged that he
soldshabu to an undercover police on September 1, 200
2. The appellantappealed the case in the Court of
Appeals but the appellate court affirmedthe decision of
the lower court stating that the defense already admitted
theadmissibility of certain evidences against the appellant
and further statedthat, in the absence of any motive to do
otherwise, the police officers arepresumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner. Thus,
theappellant raised the matter to the Supreme Court
claiming that the RTC erredin convicting him because the
prosecution failed to prove that the integrity of the seized
item, with police having failed to mark and photograph the
seizeditem, therefore, his guilt was not proven to be
beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue
10 | P a g e
: Is the evidentiary presumption that official duties have
been regularlyperformed by the police officers applicable
in the prosecution of RA 9165?
Ruling
: No. In convicting the appellant, the RTC and CA
relied on theevidentiary presumption that the police
officers have performed their dutiesin a regular manner.
However, this presumption is not conclusive and
cannot,by itself, overcome the constitutional presumption
of innocence. Thepresumption of regularity is assumed
only when there is no deviation fromthe regular
performance of duty. If there is any official act that is
questioned,the presumption of regularity is no longer
applied. In the case at bar, it wasclear that the officers
failed to follow the proper procedures stipulated
inparagraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
Simply put, the Court saidthat since they were not able to
properly mark the evidence, the integrity of the evidence
has been compromised, therefore we can never be fully
certainthat it was still the same item seized on the day of
the arrest. The failure tofollow the procedure is the reason
why the accused was acquitted by theCourt because his
guilt was not established to be beyond reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE VS RELATO, GR NO. 173794
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Statutory rules on preserving the chain of custody of
confiscated prohibited drugs and related items are
designed to ensure the integrity and reliability of the
evidence to be presented against the accused. Their
observance is the key to the successful prosecution of
illegal possession or illegal sale of prohibited drugs.
Darwin Relato y Ajero is now before the Court in a final
plea for exoneration from his conviction for violating
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002). Policemen had arrested
him on August 29, 2002 during a buy-bust operation and
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Sorsogon had
forthwith charged him with the offense on August 30, 2002
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65, in Bulan,
Sorsogon as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of August, 2002 at about
11:00 o’clock in the evening, in Barangay Aquino,
Municipality of Bulan, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, sell, dispense and deliver to a PNP asset
disguised as poseur-buyer, two (2) plastic sachets of
methamphetamine hydrochloride “shabu” weighing
0.0991 gram, for and in consideration of the sum of FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00), the serial number of which
was previously noted, without having been previously
authorized by law to sell or deliver the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Upon pleading not guilty to the information on November
19, 2002,2 Relato was tried.
Version of the Prosecution
At 6:00 pm of August 29, 2002, PO3 Sonny Evasco of the
Bulan Police Station received a tip from his asset to the
effect that Relato would be peddling illegal drugs around
midnight in Barangay Aquino, Zone 7, Bulan, Sorsogon.
PO3 Evasco immediately reported the tip to SPO1 Elmer
Masujer, the chief of the Intelligence Department of the
police station. In turn, SPO1 Masujer formed a team to
conduct a buy-bust operation against Relato consisting of
himself, PO3 Evasco, PO1 Wilfredo Lobrin and SPO2
Adolfo Villaroza. SPO1 Masujer prepared a P500.00 bill
to be the buy-bust money by marking the bill with his
initials.3
The team waited for the informant to call again. At 10:00
pm, PO3 Evasco finally received the call from his asset,
who confirmed that the proposed transaction would take
place beside the lamp post near the ice plant in Barangay
Aquino. With that, the team hastened to the site. PO3
Evasco and SPO2 Villaroya concealed themselves about
seven to 10 meters from the lamp post, while SPO1
Masujer and PO1 Lobrin provided area security from
about 10 to 15 meters away from where PO3 Evasco and
SPO2 Villaroya were.
A few minutes later, Relato and a companion (later
identified as Pido Paredes) arrived together on board a
motorcycle. Relato alighted to confer with the asset who
was the poseur buyer. After the transaction was
completed, PO3 Evasco signaled to the rest of the team,
who drew near and apprehended Relato. Seized from
Relato was the marked P500.00 buy-bust bill. The poseur
buyer turned over to PO3 Evasco the two transparent
sachets containing crystalline substances that Relato sold
to the poseur buyer. Paredes escaped.4
SPO1 Masujer marked the two transparent sachets with
his own initials “EM” upon returning to the police station.5
Forensic Chemical Officer Josephine Clemen of the PNP
Crime Laboratory in Region V conducted the laboratory
examination on the contents of the two transparent
sachets and found the contents to have a total weight of
0.991 gram. She certified that the contents were positive
for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride.6
Version of the Accused
Relato denied the accusation, and claimed that he had
been framed up. His version follows.
At about 11:00 pm of August 29, 2002, Relato and
Paredes were proceeding to his grandfather’s wake in
Magallanes, Sorsogon on board his motorcycle, with
Paredes driving. They stopped upon reaching Barangay
Aquino to allow Relato to adjust the fuel cock of the
motorcycle. SPO1 Masujer suddenly appeared and put
handcuffs on Relato, who resisted. The three other
officers came to SPO1 Masujer’s assistance and subdued
Relato. SPO1 Masujer then seized Relato’s 3310 Nokia
cellphone, its charger, and his personal money
of P3,500.00 in P500.00 bills. Relato claimed that the
11 | P a g e
cellphone belonged to Paredes while the cash was a gift
from an in-law. The officers boarded Relato in their jeep
and haled him to the police station of Bulan.
In the station, SPO1 Masujer and PO2 Villaroya required
him to remove his pants. He complied. They then
searched his person but did not find anything on him. He
then saw SPO1 Masujer take two sachets from his own
wallet and placed them on top of a table. SPO1 Masujer
then told Relato to point to the sachets, and a picture was
then taken of him in that pose. In the meanwhile, Paredes
notified his family about his arrest.7
Ruling of the RTC
On August 9, 2004, the RTC convicted Relato, 8 viz:
Prosecution having established by the required quantum
of proof and with moral certainty the CULPABALITY of the
herein accused to the crime as charged- HIS
CONVICTION HAS BECOME INEVITABLE.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Darwin
Ajero y Relato having been found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165 (Repealing R.A. No. 6425 and amending
R.A. 7659), is hereby sentenced to suffer the indivisible
penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT, absent any mitigating
or aggravating circumstance (Art. 63(2), R.P.C.), with all
the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay the
fine of P500,000.00.
All the proceeds of the crime shall be confiscated and
forfeited in favor of the government to be disposed of in
accordance with the provisions of Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165.
The period of the preventive imprisonment already served
by the herein accused shall be credited in the service of
his sentence pursuant to the provision of Art. 29 of the
Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.9
Ruling of the CA
Relato appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), submitting
that:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING FULL
CREDENCE TO THE CONFLICTING TESTIMONIES OF
THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME
CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE
TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT
On May 24, 2006, however, the CA affirmed the
conviction,10 stating:
In closing, there being no misappreciation of facts,
distortion of evidence, and speculative, arbitrary and
unsupported conclusions drawn by the court a quo in
support of its judgment of conviction, We defer to such
findings and conclusion. Thus, well- settled is the rule that
the findings of facts and assessment of credibility of
witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court because of
its unique position of having observed that elusive and
incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’ deportment
on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied
to the appellate courts (Lim, Jr. vs. San, 438 SCRA 102).
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing
disquisitions, the court a quo’s assailed decision dated 09
August is perforce affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
Relato argues that the CA should have reversed his
conviction for being contrary to the established facts, and
to the pertinent law and jurisprudence.
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 provides the
procedure to be followed in the seizure and custody of
prohibited drugs, to wit:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated,
Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. ̶ The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following
manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
xxx
The provisions of Article II, Section 21(a) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic
Act No. 9165 provide:
xxx
(a) The apprehending office/team having initial custody
and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the
12 | P a g e
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall
be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items;
xxx
A review of the records establishes that the aforestated
procedure laid down by Republic Act No. 9165 and its IRR
was not followed. Several lapses on the part of the buy-
bust team are readily apparent. To start with, no
photograph of the seized shabu was taken. Secondly, the
buy-bust team did not immediately mark the
seized shabu at the scene of the crime and in the
presence of Relato and witnesses. Thirdly, although there
was testimony about the marking of the seized items
being made at the police station, the records do not show
that the marking was done in the presence of Relato or
his chosen representative. And, fourthly, no
representative of the media and the Department of
Justice, or any elected official attended the taking of the
physical inventory and to sign the inventory.
Under the foregoing rules, the marking immediately after
seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, because
succeeding handlers of the prohibited drugs or related
items will use the markings as reference. It further serves
to segregate the marked evidence from the corpus of all
other similar and related evidence from the time they are
seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the
end of the criminal proceedings, obviating switching,
“planting,” or contamination of evidence.11 It is crucial in
ensuring the integrity of the chain of custody, which is
defined in Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board
Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002,12 thus:
b. “Chain of Custody” means the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such
record of movements and custody of seized item shall
include the identity and signature of the person who held
temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time
when such transfer of custody were made in the course
of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final
disposition;
While the last paragraph of Section 21(a) of the IRR
provides a saving mechanism to ensure that not every
case of non-compliance irreversibly prejudices the State’s
evidence, it is significant to note that the application of the
saving mechanism to a situation is expressly conditioned
upon the State rendering an explanation of the lapse or
lapses in the compliance with the procedures.13 Here,
however, the Prosecution tendered no explanation why
the buy-bust team had failed to mark the
seized shabu immediately after the arrest. Nevertheless,
even assuming that marking the shabu at the scene of the
crime by the buy-bust team had not been practical or
possible for the buy-bust team to do, the saving
mechanism would still not be applicable due to the lack of
a credible showing of any effort undertaken by the buy-
bust team to keep the shabu intact while in transit to the
police station.
The procedural lapses committed by the buy-bust team
underscored the uncertainty about the identity and
integrity of the shabu admitted as evidence against the
accused.14 They highlighted the failure of the Prosecution
to establish the chain of custody, by which the
incriminating evidence would have been
authenticated. An unavoidable consequence of the non-
establishment of the chain of custody was the serious
doubt on whether the shabu presented as evidence was
really the shabu supposedly seized from Relato.
In a prosecution of the sale and possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride prohibited under
Republic Act No. 9165,15 the State not only carries the
heavy burden of proving the elements of the offense of,
but also bears the obligation to prove the corpus delicti,
failing in which the State will not discharge its basic duty
of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. It is settled that the State does not establish
the corpus delicti when the prohibited substance subject
of the prosecution is missing or when substantial gaps in
the chain of custody of the prohibited substance raise
grave doubts about the authenticity of the prohibited
substance presented as evidence in court.16 Any gap
renders the case for the State less than complete in terms
of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.17 Thus, Relato deserves exculpation, especially as
we recall that his defense of frame-up became plausible
in the face of the weakness of the Prosecution’s evidence
of guilt.
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the decision promulgated
on May 24, 2006 affirming the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Bulan, Sorsogon, Branch 65;
and ACQUIT accused DARWIN RELATO y AJERO due
to the failure of the State to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
ACCORDINGLY, we DIRECT the
immediate release from detention of DARWIN
RELATO y AJERO, unless he is detained for some other
lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to
implement this Decision, and to report his action hereon
to this Court within 10 days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE v. ARIELITO ALIVIO G.R. No.
177771 May 30, 2011
FACTS:
The prosecution’s case relied on the theory that the police
apprehended the appellants during a buy-bust operation
13 | P a g e
conducted at Alivio’s residence. During the buy-bust
operation, the police found drug paraphernalia at Alivio’s
residence while a search on Dela Vega’s person yielded
one plastic sachet of shabu which the police seized.
The prosecution’s evidence showed that at around 9:30
p.m. of May 20, 2003, the Pasig City Police received a tip
from an asset that one "Ariel" was rampantly selling illegal
drugs in Bagong Ilog, Pasig City. A buy-bust team was
immediately formed in coordination with the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency. The buy-bust money, which
consisted of two (2) 100 peso bills, was prepared and
marked with the symbol, "3L." PO2 Lemuel Lagunay Laro
was designated to act as the poseur-buyer.
Together with SPO3 Lemuel Matias and PO1 Allan
Mapula, PO2 Laro and the asset went to the house of
Ariel. While the rest of the buy-bust team strategically
positioned themselves at the target area, PO2 Laro and
the asset met Ariel. The asset introduced PO2 Laro to
Ariel who was later on identified as Alivio. The asset told
Alivio that they wanted to buy shabu. Alivio asked how
much they wanted to buy, to which the asset replied:
"dalawang daan lang p’re at saka puwede kaming
gumamit d’yan?" The two were ushered into the second
floor of the house where they saw Dela Vega seated in
front of a table with drug paraphernalia. PO2 Laro then
gave the buy-bust money to Alivio who handed it to Dela
Vega. The latter then took out from his pocket one plastic
sachet of shabu which he gave to Alivio who handed it to
PO2 Laro. After the exchange, PO2 Laro introduced
himself as a police officer and arrested Alivio and Dela
Vega. The asset made a signal for the buy-bust team to
come inside the house. SPO3 Matias searched Dela
Vega and found him in possession of one plastic sachet
of shabu. The buy-bust team also retrieved the drug
paraphernalia on top of the table, which paraphernalia
they correspondingly marked. The buy-bust team took
Alivio, Dela Vega and the confiscated items to the police
station for investigation. Afterwards, the confiscated items
were taken by PO1 Mapula to the PNP Crime Laboratory
for examination. The two (2) plastic sachets tested
positive for shabu.
On February 28, 2005, the RTC convicted the appellants
of all charges laid. The RTC relied on the presumption of
regularity in the buy-bust operation and the lack of
improper motive on the part of the police officers. The
RTC rejected the proferred denial and frame-up as
defenses as they are inherently easy to concoct, and
found that the prosecution sufficiently established all the
elements of the crimes charged and the identity of the
appellants as perpetrators. The RTC thus concluded:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered, as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 12450-D both accused Arielito Alivio
and Ernesto Dela Vega are hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 5,
Article II, Republic Act 9165 (illegal sale of shabu) and are
hereby sentenced to LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to
solidarily pay a FINE of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(PHP500,000.00).1avvphi1
In Criminal Case No. 12451-D accused Ernesto dela
Vega is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the offense of Violation of Section 11, Article II,
Republic Act 9165 (illegal possession of shabu) and is
hereby sentenced to Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day
to Twenty (20) Years and to pay a Fine of Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (PHP 300,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 12452-D accused Arielito Alivio is
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of Violation of Section 12, Article II, of Republic
Act 9165 (illegal possession of drug paraphernalia) and is
hereby sentenced to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day to
Four (4) Years and a FINE of Ten Thousand Pesos (PHP
10,000.00).8
The appellants appealed to the CA.
On November 30, 2006, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision. The CA took into account the consistent
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses to support the
presumption that the police officers regularly performed
the buy-bust operation. The CA likewise ruled that the
appellants failed to substantiate their defenses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in finding the appellants
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of RA 9165
asserting that the presumption of regularity cannot take
precedence over the presumption of innocence in their
favor.
HELD:
We find no reversible error committed by the RTC and the
CA in convicting the appellants of the crimes charged.
While the presumption of innocence is the highest in the
hierarchy of presumptions, it remains a rebuttable
presumption. In a criminal case, the presumption of
innocence can be overcome by the presumption of
regularity when the latter is accompanied by strong
evidence supporting the guilt of the accused.10 Even
without the presumption of regularity, a drug conviction
can be sustained through competent evidence
establishing the existence of all the elements of the
crimes charged.
In this case, although the presumption of regularity did not
arise considering the evident lapses the police committed
in the prescribed procedures, we rule that the
prosecution’s evidence sufficiently established all the
elements of the three (3) crimes charged and the identity
of the appellants as the perpetrators.
The existence of the buy-bust operation
Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the
credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-
bust operation. Thus, we generally defer to the
assessment on this point by the trial court as it had the
opportunity to directly observe the witnesses, their
demeanor, and their credibility on the witness stand.11 Our
independent examination of the records shows no
compelling reason to depart from this rule.
Familiarity
What matters in drug related cases are not the existing
14 | P a g e
familiarity between the seller and the buyer, but their
agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery
of the dangerous drug. Besides, drug pushers, especially
small quantity or retail pushers, sell their prohibited wares
to anyone who can pay for the same, be they strangers or
not. It is of common knowledge that pushers, especially
small-time dealers, peddle prohibited drugs in the open
like any article of commerce. Drug pushers do no confine
their nefarious trade to known customers and complete
strangers are accommodated provided they have the
money to pay.22 [Citations omitted]
In this case, the prosecution’s evidence sufficiently
established the exchange of the shabu and the buy-bust
money between the appellants and PO2 Laro.
The identity of the confiscated shabu
and/or drug
paraphernalia
In ascertaining the identity of the illegal drugs and/or drug
paraphernalia presented in court as the ones actually
seized from the accused, the prosecution must show that:
(a) the prescribed procedure under Section 21(1), Article
II of R.A. No. 9165 has been complied with or falls within
the saving clause provided in Section 21(a), Article II of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A.
No. 9165; and (b) there was an unbroken link (not perfect
link) in the chain of custody with respect to the confiscated
items.
In this case, although the prescribed procedure under
Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was not strictly
complied with, we find that the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items were properly
preserved by the buy-bust team under the chain of
custody rule.
Under the circumstances, the prosecution’s evidence
clearly established an unbroken link in the chain of
custody, thus removing any doubt or suspicion that the
shabu and drug paraphernalia had been altered,
substituted or otherwise tampered with. The unbroken link
in the chain of custody also precluded the possibility that
a person, not in the chain, ever gained possession of the
seized evidence.32
The defenses of Denial and Frame-up
The appellants merely denied the buy-bust sale and their
possession of the shabu and the drug paraphernalia.
They claimed that they were framed by the police who
took their earnings and forcibly took them to the police
station. In light of the positive and credible testimony and
the concrete evidence showing the existence of the buy-
bust operation, these defenses are unworthy of belief.
Dela Vega’s injuries alone cannot rebut the consistent
evidence that the appellants were arrested pursuant to a
buy-bust operation. We particularly note in this regard that
the participating policemen denied that they previously
knew the appellants and that they entertained ulterior or
illicit motives to frame them.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM the
decision, dated November 30, 2006, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01138 which, in turn,
affirmed the decision, dated February 28, 2005, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Pasig City, in Criminal
Case Nos. 12450-52-D.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Capuno
Facts:
In its April 3, 2006 decision, the RTC of San
Mateo Rizal found appellant Erlinda Capuno guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu, under
Section 5, Art. II of RA No. 9165 of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The trial court’s decision
was affirmed by the CA but modified the penalty imposed.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The prosecution presented PO1 Jose Gordon
Antonio who narrated that around 11:00 a.m. of July 21,
2002, he was at the Rodriguez Police Station when a
civilian informant arrived and reported that a woman was
openly selling dangerous drugs on Manggahan Street,
Barangay Burgos, Montalban Rizal. Upon receiving the
information, he, PO1 Joseph Fernandez, and PO1
Fortunato Jiro planned an entrapment operation where he
posed as a buyer and his companions would act as back-
up. They went to Manggahan street and when they were
near, the informant pointed them to the appellant. PO1
Antonio approached the appellant and told her, “paiskor
ng halagang piso” ; he then handed a pre-marked one
hundred peso bill to appellant who pulled out a plastic
sachet and handed it to PO1 Antonio. PO1 Antonio
immediately held appellant’s arm, introduced himself to
her and stated her constitutional rights.
PO1 Jiro testified that around 11:00 a.m. of July
21, 2002, he was at the Police Station when a confidential
asset called and informed the police that he saw one
“alias Erlinda” selling illegal drugs. The police then
planned a buy-bust operation. Afterwards, PO1 Jiro, PO1
Antonio and PO1 Fernandez, along with the confidential
assed proceeded to Manahan Street where the buy-bust
operation was executed.
The defense on their part, presented a different
version of events. Appellant Capuno testified that around
11:00 am of July 21, 2002, she was sleeping at home with
her daughter when two persons who introduced
themselves as police officers, entered her house. The two
men, who were wearing maong pants and sando, asked
her if she was Erlinda Capuno and when she said yes,
they searched her house. When they found nothing in her
house, she, along with her daughter, were invited at the
municipal hall of montalban.
The RTC and CA convicted Capuno of the crime charged.
Upon appeal, Capuno claimed that the lower courts erred
in convicting her of the crime charged despite the
prosecution’s failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, anchoring her claim that PO1 Antonio and PO1
Jiro’s conflicting claims.
Issue: Whether appellant’s guilt was proved beyond
reasonable doubt
Held: No. The SC, after due consideration resolved to
acquit appellant for the prosecution’s failure to prove her
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start
with the law’s own starting perspective on the status of the
accused- in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed
innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven
beyond reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the
15 | P a g e
prosecution to overcome such presumption of innocence
by presenting the quantum of evidence required. In so
doing, the prosecution must rest on its own merits and not
rely on the weakness of the defense. And if the
prosecution fails to meet the required amount of evidence,
the defense may logically not event present evidence on
its behalf. In which case, the presumption prevails and the
accused should necessarily be acquitted.
ROBERT F. MALLILIN, vs. LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN and
the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 192718
February 18, 2015
Case Digest
ROBERT F. MALLILIN, vs. LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN and
the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 192718
February 18, 2015
Facts: Robert and Luz were married on September 6,
1972. They begot three (3) children. On March 16, 1994,
Robert filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage before the RTC, Branch 23, Cagayan de Oro
City (RTC-Br. 23). In the complaint, Robert alleged that at
the time of the celebration of their marriage, Luz was
suffering from psychological and mental incapacity and
unpreparedness to enter into such marital life and to
comply with its essential obligations and responsibilities.
Such incapacity became even more apparent during their
marriage when Luz exhibited clear manifestation of
immaturity, irresponsibility, deficiency of independent
rational judgment, and inability to cope with the heavy and
oftentimes demanding obligation of a parent.
Luz filed her Answer with Counterclaim contesting the
complaint. She averred that it was Robert who manifested
psychological incapacity in their marriage. Despite due
notice, however, she did not appear during the trial.
Assistant City Prosecutor Isabelo Sabanal appeared for
the State. When Robert testified, he disclosed that Luz
was already living in California, USA, and had married an
American. He also revealed that when they were still
engaged, Luz continued seeing and dating another
boyfriend, a certain Lt. Liwag. He also claimed that from
the outset, Luz had been remiss in her duties both as a
wife and as a mother as shown by the following
circumstances: (1) it was he who did the cleaning of the
room because Luz did not know how to keep order; (2) it
was her mother who prepared their meal while her sister
was the one who washed their clothes because she did
not want her polished nails destroyed; (3) it was also her
sister who took care of their children while she spent her
time sleeping and looking at the mirror; (4) when she
resumed her schooling, she dated different men; (5) he
received anonymous letters reporting her loitering with
male students; (6) when he was not home, she would
receive male visitors; (7) a certain Romy Padua slept in
their house when he was away; and (6) she would
contract loans without his knowledge
In addition, Robert presented the testimony of Myrna
Delos Reyes Villanueva (Villanueva), Guidance
Psychologist II of Northern Mindanao Medical Center.
On May 8, 2000, while the case was pending before the
trial court, Robert filed a petition for marriage annulment
with the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the
Archdiocese of Manila (Metropolitan Tribunal). On
October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal handed down
a decision declaring their marriage invalid ab initio on the
ground of grave lack of due discretion on the part of both
parties as contemplated by the second paragraph of
Canon1095. This decision was affirmed by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal (NAMT).
Prior to that, on September 20, 2002,the RTC had
rendered a decision declaring the marriage null and void
on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of
Luz as she failed to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
The CA, in its November 20, 2009 Decision,4 granted the
petition and reversed the RTC decision. The decision,
including the decretal portion, partially reads:
[W]e find that the trial court committed a reversible error.
Closer scrutiny of the records reveals, as correctly noted
by the Solicitor General, sexual infidelity are not rooted on
some debilitating psychological condition but a mere
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. x x x.
xxxx
In the case at bar, apart from his self-serving declarations,
the evidence adduced by Robert fell short of establishing
the fact that at the time of their marriage, Luz was
suffering from a psychological defect which in fact
deprived [her] of the ability to assume the essential duties
of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.
xxxx
We commiserate with the plaintiff-appellee’s undeserved
marital plight. Yet, Our paramount duty as a court
compels Us to apply the law at all costs, however harsh it
may be on whomsoever is called upon to bear its
unbiased brunt.FOR THESE REASONS, the appealed
Decision dated September 20, 2002 in Civil Case No. 94-
178 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
Issue: whether the totality of the evidence adduced
proves that Luz was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage
warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code.
Held: The petition is bereft of merit.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored
on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligation of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization. "Psychological
16 | P a g e
incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a
mental – not merely physical – incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in
Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their
mutual obligations to live together; observe love, respect
and fidelity; and render help and support. There is hardly
a doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.7
Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must
be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence
and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be
rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may only emerge after
the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.8
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo C. De
Quintos, Jr.,9 the Court reiterated the well-settled
guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage, embodied in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina,10based on Article 36 of the Family Code. Thus:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. x x x.
xxxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological
— not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. x x x.
xxxx
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the
time of the celebration" of the marriage. x x x.
xxxx
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable. x x x.
xxxx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot
be accepted as root causes. x x x.
xxxx
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
x x x.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. x x x.
Guided by these pronouncements, the Court is of the
considered view that Robert’s evidence failed to establish
the psychological incapacity of Luz.
First, the testimony of Robert failed to overcome the
burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage. Other
than his self-serving testimony, no other evidence was
adduced to show the alleged incapacity of Luz. He
presented no other witnesses to corroborate his
allegations on her behavior. Thus, his testimony was self-
serving and had no serious value as evidence.
Second, the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity of Luz was not medically or clinically identified,
and sufficiently proven during the trial. Based on the
records, Robert failed to prove that her disposition of not
cleaning the room, preparing their meal, washing the
clothes, and propensity for dating and receiving different
male visitors, was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable
within the parameters of jurisprudence on psychological
incapacity.
The alleged failure of Luz to assume her duties as a wife
and as a mother, as well as her emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility and infidelity, cannot rise to the level of
psychological incapacity that justifies the nullification of
the parties' marriage. The Court has repeatedly stressed
that psychological incapacity contemplates "downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
the basic marital obligations," not merely the refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the
errant spouse.11 Indeed, to be declared clinically or
17 | P a g e
medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant
to perform one's duties is another. Psychological
incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage.12
As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or
perversion and abandonment do not, by themselves,
constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on
psychological incapacity. Robert argues that the series of
sexual indiscretion of Luz were external manifestations of
the psychological defect that she was suffering within her
person, which could be considered as nymphomania or
"excessive sex hunger." Other than his allegations,
however, no other convincing evidence was adduced to
prove that these sexual indiscretions were considered as
nymphomania, and that it was grave, deeply rooted, and
incurable within the term of psychological incapacity
embodied in Article 36. To stress, Robert’s testimony
alone is insufficient to prove the existence of
psychological incapacity.
Pertinently, Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of Evidence
provides:
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose of which the evidence is
offered must be specified.
In this regard, the belated presentation of the decision of
the NAMT cannot be given value since it was not offered
during the trial, and the Court has in no way of
ascertaining the evidence considered by the same
tribunal.
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting
marriage:
1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of
judgment concerning the essential matrimonial rights and
obligations to be mutually given and accepted;
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological
nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the
declaration of nullity of marriage by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon
1095 which mentions causes of a psychological nature,
but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to
those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of
judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and
obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity,
the pertinent portion of the decision of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reads:
The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable
witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent
(despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999,
he did not appear before the Court, in effect waiving his
right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed)
corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with
moral certainty required by law and conclude that the
husband-respondent upon contacting marriage suffered
from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby
rendering nugatory his marital contract x x x.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of
Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and
having considered the pertinent Law and relevant
Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims,
declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence
from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on
the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the
1983 Code of Canon Law. x x x.
Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual
basis of the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal is similar to the facts established by petitioner
before the trial court, the decision of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the decree of
nullity of marriage by the court a quo is not based on the
psychological incapacity of respondent. Petitioner,
therefore, erred in stating that the conclusion of
Psychologist Cristina Gates regarding the psychological
incapacity of respondent is supported by the decision of
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the
Decision of the RTC. (Emphases in the original;
Underscoring supplied)
Hence, Robert’s reliance on the NAMT decision is
misplaced. To repeat, the decision of the NAMT was
based on the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which
refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion
of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and
obligations to be mutually given and accepted, a cause
not of psychological nature under Article 36 of the Family
Code. A cause of psychological nature similar to Article
36 is covered by the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the
Code of Canon Law (Santos v. Santos 19),
To consider church annulments as additional grounds for
annulment under Article 36 would be legislating from the
bench.1âwphi1 As stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Molina,20interpretations given by the NAMT of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines are given great respect
by our courts, but they are not controlling or decisive.
In Republic v. Galang,21 it was written that the
Constitution set out a policy of protecting and
strengthening the family as the basic social institution,
and the marriage was the foundation of the family.
18 | P a g e
Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the
State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden
of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies with the
plaintiff. Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a
situation where the parties, or one of them, could not have
validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and
serious psychological illness existing at the time it was
celebrated, the Court is compelled to uphold the
indissolubility of the marital tie.
In fine, the Court holds that the CA decided correctly.
Petitioner Robert failed to adduce sufficient and
convincing evidence to prove the alleged psychological
incapacity of Luz.
As asserted by the OSG, the allegations of the petitioner
make a case for legal separation. Hence, this decision is
without prejudice to an action for legal separation if a party
would want to pursue such proceedings. In this
disposition, the Court cannot decree a legal separation
because in such proceedings, there are matters and
consequences like custody and separation of properties
that need to be considered and settled.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78303-MIN,
dated November 20, 2009, and its Resolution, dated June
1, 2010, are hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice.
G.R. No. 184181 November 26, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOSEPH ROBELO y TUNGALA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is another instance where we are called upon to
resolve an issue concerning the constitutional
presumption of innocence accorded to an accused vis-à-
vis the corresponding presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties of police officers involved in
a drug buy-bust operation.
Assailed in this appeal interposed by appellant Joseph
Robelo y Tungala is February 27, 2008 Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02711,
which affirmed the January 26, 2007 Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the City of Manila, Branch
2, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of Illegal Possession and Illegal Sale of Dangerous
Drugs under Sections 11(3) and (5) in relation to Section
26, Article II, respectively, of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
Factual Antecedents
At about 10:00 a.m. of March 26, 2004, the Station of Anti-
Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force (SAID), Police
Station 2 in Moriones, Tondo, Manila received information
from a civilian informer that a certain alias "Kalbo"
(appellant) is involved in the sale of illegal drugs in Parola
Compound. Forthwith, the Chief of SAID organized a
team composed of eight police officers to conduct a "buy-
bust" operation to entrap appellant. PO2 Arnel Tubbali
(PO2 Tubbali) was designated as the poseur-buyer and
was thus handed a 100 peso bill which he marked with his
initials. The rest of the team were to serve as back-ups.
The civilian asset led PO2 Tubbali to the target area while
others positioned themselves in strategic places. Not long
after, appellant came out from Gate 16, Area 1-b with a
companion who was later identified as Teddy Umali
(Umali). Upon approaching the two, the civilian informer
introduced to them PO2 Tubbali as a friend and a
prospective buyer of shabu. PO2 Tubbali then conveyed
his desire to buy P100.00 worth of shabu and handed
Umali the marked P100.00 bill. After accepting the
money, Umali ordered appellant to give PO2 Tubbali one
plastic sachet of shabu to which the latter readily
complied. PO2 Tubbali then looked at the plastic sachet,
placed it in his pocket, and made the pre-arranged signal
by scratching his butt. Whereupon, the rest of the team
rushed to the scene and arrested appellant and Umali.
When frisked by PO2 Conrado Juano, one plastic sachet
suspected to contain shabu was found inside appellant’s
pocket. He and Umali were afterwards brought to the
precinct where the investigator marked the seized items
with the initials "JRT-1" and "JRT-2". The investigator
then prepared the Laboratory Request,3 Booking
Sheet,4 Arrest Report,5 Joint Affidavit of
Apprehension6 and a referral letter for inquest.7
After qualitative examination, the forensic chemist found
the items positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu, a dangerous drug.
Appellant was accordingly charged with illegal sale and
illegal possession of shabu in two separate Informations
while Umali was indicted in another Information raffled to
a different branch of the RTC.
The Informations against appellant read as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 04-225284
That on or about March 26, 2004, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, without being authorized by
law to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession
and under his custody and control one (1) transparent
plastic sachet containing ZERO POINT ZERO
NINETEEN (0.019) gram of white crystalline substance
known as shabu, containing methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 04-225285
That on or about March 26, 2004, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating with one whose true name, identity and
present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually
helping each other, not having been authorized by law to
sell, trade, deliver or give away to another any dangerous
drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
sell or offer for sale one (1) transparent plastic sachet
containing ZERO POINT ZERO THIRTEEN (0.013) gram
of white crystalline substance known as shabu, containing
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.9
During arraignment, appellant, assisted by his counsel,
pleaded "not guilty" in the two cases. After the termination
of the pre-trial, trial on the merits immediately ensued.
19 | P a g e
Appellant denied being a drug pusher and claimed
complete ignorance as to why he was being implicated in
the said crimes. He averred that he was repairing the floor
of his mother’s house when two police officers in civilian
clothes went inside the house, ransacked the closet and
without any reason handcuffed and brought him to the
precinct. At the precinct, the police officers demanded
from him P10,000.00 in exchange for his liberty.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After trial, the RTC rendered a verdict of conviction on
January 26, 2007,10 viz:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows,
to wit:
1. In Criminal Case No. 04-225284, finding accused,
Joseph Robelo y Tungala @ "Kalbo", GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 12 years
and 1 day as minimum to 17 years and 4 months as
maximum; to pay a fine of P300,000,00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
2. In Criminal Case No. 04-225285, finding accused,
Joseph Robelo y Tungala @ "Kalbo", GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, he is hereby
sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay the fine of
P500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs.
The specimens are forfeited in favor of the government
and the Branch Clerk of Court, accompanied by the
Branch Sheriff, is directed to turn over with dispatch and
upon receipt the said specimen to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposal in
accordance with the law and rules.
SO ORDERED.11
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA concurred with the RTC’s findings and
conclusions and, consequently, affirmed the said lower
court’s judgment in its assailed Decision12 of February 27,
2008, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The
assailed Decision dated January 26, 2007 is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.13
Still undeterred, appellant is now before us and by way of
assignment of errors reiterates the grounds and
arguments raised in his Brief filed before the CA, to wit:
I
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
RENDERING A VERDICT OF CONVICTION DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASOANBLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED
NOTWITHSTANDING THE POLICE OFFICERS’
FAILURE TO REGULARLY PERFORM THEIR
OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS.14
Our Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Appellant’s first assignment of error basically hinges on
the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, particularly in
their conduct of the buy-bust operation. He asserts that
the alleged buy-bust operation is tainted with infirmity due
to the absence of a prior surveillance or investigation.
Moreover, per the testimony of PO2 Tubbali, appellant did
not say anything when the former was introduced to him
as an interested buyer of shabu. Appellant points out that
it is contrary to human nature that the seller would say
nothing to the buyer who is a complete stranger to him.
We sustain the validity of the buy-bust operation.
A buy-bust operation has been proven to be an effective
mode of apprehending drug pushers. In this regard, police
authorities are given a wide latitude in employing their
own ways of trapping or apprehending drug dealers in
flagrante delicto. There is no prescribed method on how
the operation is to be conducted. As ruled in People v.
Garcia,15 the absence of a prior surveillance or test-buy
does not affect the legality of the buy-bust operation as
there is no text book method of conducting the same. As
long as the constitutional rights of the suspected drug
dealer are not violated, the regularity of the operation will
always be upheld. Thus, in People v. Salazar, 16 we ruled
that "if carried out with due regard to constitutional and
legal safeguards, buy-bust operation deserves judicial
sanction."
Neither impressive is appellant’s contention that it is
contrary to human nature to sell the illegal stuff to a
complete stranger. The law does not prescribe as an
element of the crime that the vendor and the vendee be
familiar with each other. As aptly held by the CA, peddlers
of illicit drugs have been known with ever increasing
casualness and recklessness to offer and sell their wares
for the right price to anybody, be they strangers or not.
While indeed there was little or no exchange between the
poseur-buyer and the appellant as it was the former and
Umali who negotiated for the sale, he still cannot escape
liability because of his passive complicity therein. Simply
stated, there was conspiracy between appellant and
Umali as can be deduced from the testimony of PO2
Tubbali, to wit:
Q. So when Teddy Umali received this One Hundred
Peso-bill (P100.00), what happened next, Mr. Witness?
A. Then he talked to Joseph Robelo alias "Kalbo" to give
me a shabu, one
(1) plastic sachet, sir.
Q. Did Robelo comply?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How did, this Joseph…
A. And then Joseph handed me one (1) plastic sachet,
sir.17
Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime
suggesting concerted action and unity of purpose among
them. In this case, the testimony of the poseur-buyer
clearly shows a unity of mind between appellant and
Umali in selling the illegal drugs to him. Hence, applying
the basic principle in conspiracy that the "act of one is the
20 | P a g e
act of all" appellant is guilty as a co-conspirator and
regardless of his participation, is liable as co-principal.
Appellant’s silence when the poseur-buyer was
introduced to him as an interested buyer of shabu is non-
sequitur.
Appellant denies his complicity in the crime by invoking
alibi and frame-up. He claims that in the morning of March
26, 2004, he was at his mother’s house doing some repair
job and was just suddenly arrested and brought to the
precinct where the arresting officers demanded
P10,000.00 for his liberty.
We, however, find that the RTC correctly rejected this
defense of the appellant.
Time and again, we have stressed virtually to the point of
repletion that alibi is one of the weakest defenses that an
accused can invoke because it is easy to fabricate. In
order to be given full faith and credit, an alibi must be
clearly established and must not leave any doubt as to its
plausibility and veracity. Here, appellant’s claim that he
was at his mother’s house at the time of the incident
cannot stand against the clear and positive identification
of him by the prosecution witnesses. As aptly held by the
RTC, "[t]he portrayal put forward by appellant remained
uncorroborated. The testimonies of the witnesses
presented by the defense do not jibe with one another and
that of the claim of the appellant himself. x x x Lastly, the
demand for money worth P10,000.00 remained
unsubstantiated. x x x If indeed appellant is innocent he
or his family who were his witnesses should have filed a
case of planting of evidence against the police which is
now punishable by life imprisonment."18
In fine, no error was committed by the RTC and the CA in
giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. The general rule is that findings of the trial
court on the credibility of witnesses deserve great weight,
and are generally not disturbed, on appeal. We find no
reason to depart from such old-age rule as there are no
compelling reasons which would warrant the reversal of
the verdict.
In his second assignment of error, appellant draws
attention to the failure of the apprehending officers to
comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 regarding the
physical inventory and photocopy of the seized items. He
asserts that this failure casts doubt on the validity of his
arrest and the identity of the suspected shabu allegedly
bought and confiscated from him.
Appellant’s contention fails to convince us.
It should be noted that the alleged non-compliance with
Section 21 of Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was not raised
before the trial court but only for the first time on appeal.
This cannot be done. In People v. Sta. Maria,19 People v.
Hernandez,20 and People v. Lazaro, Jr.,21 among others,
in which the very same issue was belatedly raised, we
ruled:
x x x Indeed the police officers’ alleged violations of
Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not
raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the
first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least
intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the
safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity
and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires
the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state
in the form of objection. Without such objection, he cannot
raise the question for the first time on appeal.
Moreover, "non-compliance with Section 21 does not
render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is
essential is the ‘preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items as the same would
be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused.’"22 The records reveal that at no instance did
appellant hint a doubt on the integrity of the seized items.
Undoubtedly, therefore, the suspected illegal drugs
confiscated from appellant were the very same substance
presented and identified in court. This Court, thus,
upholds the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duties by the apprehending police officers.
The Penalty
Under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, illegal sale of
shabu carries with it the penalty of life imprisonment to
death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million
irrespective of the quantity and purity of the substance.
On the other hand, Section 11(3), Article II of the same
law provides that illegal possession of less than five
grams of shabu is penalized with imprisonment of twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years plus a fine
ranging from P300,000.00 to P400,000.00.
Appellant was found guilty of selling 0.019 gram of shabu
and of possessing another 0.013 gram. Hence, applying
the above provisions, we find the penalties imposed by
the RTC as affirmed by the CA to be in order.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed
February 27, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02711 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189277 December 05, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RICARDO REMIGIO y ZAPANTA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For review through this appeal 1 is Decision2 dated
the 29
May 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 03169 which affirmed the conviction of herein
accused-appellant RICARDO REMIGIO y ZAP ANT A for
illegal sale of dangerous drugs in violation of Section 5,
Article 113 and illegal possession of dangerous drugs in
violation of Section 11, Article II4 of Republic Act (RA) No.
9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.
The factual rendition of the prosecution as presented by
its only witness PO2 Romelito Ramos (PO2 Ramos), a
member of the Cainta Police Station, follows:
PO2 Ramos testified that on 17 April 2003 at about six
o’clock in the evening, while giving assistance to the
devotees going to Antipolo City in the corner of General
Ricarte Street and Ortigas Avenue, Cainta, Rizal, one of
the police informants named Angel approached and told
him that an Alyas Footer was somewhere in the store near
21 | P a g e
General Ricarte Street.5 Immediately, PO2 Ramos
informed his Deputy Chief of Police, Colonel Bagtas (Col.
Bagtas) for the conduct of a buy-bust operation. At that
time, there were about seven to eight police officers in the
area also giving assistance to the devotees.6 Col. Bagtas
so ordered that such operation be done with PO2 Ramos
as the poseur-buyer.7 PO2 Ramos prepared the One
Hundred Peso bill (₱100.00) to be used as marked money
in the operation. He put his initials, RDR, on the face of
the bill.8
Having told the informant Angel that they will conduct a
buy-bust operation, the policeman and Angel proceeded
to the store in General Ricarte Street where Alyas Footer
was.9 Angel approached Alyas Footer first and PO2
Ramos waited for his signal from a distance of more or
less ten arms length.10 After Angel and Alyas Footer
talked for a while, Angel called PO2 Ramos to come
forward. Upon approaching, PO2 Ramos immediately told
Alyas Footer,"[p]are paiskor ng piso."11 This meant One
Hundred Pesos worth of illegal drugs.12 Alyas Footer,
prompted by the question, took a sachet of shabu from his
pocket and handed it over to PO2 Ramos. PO2 Ramos
then handed the marked money to Alyas Footer as
payment.13
After the transaction, PO2 Ramos introduced himself as
a policeman and asked Alyas Footer to take out all the
contents of his pocket. Alyas Footer complied and brought
out the One Hundred Peso bill marked money and
another plastic sachet of illegal drug.14 Three more
sachets of illegal drugs were found in the compartment of
the motorcycle of the accused. He also turned over his
student driver’s license to PO2 Ramos which indicated his
name as Remigio Zapanta.15 The name of the accused
would later be clarified by the prosecution through PO2
Ramos as referring to the same person as the accused
Ricardo Zapanta Remigio (Remigio).
The plastic sachets taken from Remigio were brought by
PO2 Ramos to Camp Crame for laboratory examination.
He testified that he personally transmitted the request for
actual testing of the contents of the sachets to the
chemist.16
Towards the end of his direct examination, he identified
the marked money as the one used in the transaction and
the picture of the motorcycle marked as Exhibit "C" as the
one possessed by Remigio when the buy-bust operation
was conducted.17
During his cross examination,18 PO2 Ramos admitted that
the buybust operation was recorded only after the
arrest.19 He also revealed that he already knew that there
was a standing alias warrant against Remigio and that
they have been conducting surveillance against Remigio
for some time prior to the buy-bust operation.20 He also
added that he was then wearing civilian clothes unlike the
other police officers visible in the area.21
On the other hand, the factual version of the defense as
presented by accused Remigio is as follows:
He testified that at about seven o’clock in the evening of
17 April 2003, he was at Helen’s Best store in Ortigas
Extension, Cainta, Rizal.22 He said that he rode his
motorcycle going there and parked it in front of the store
before buying food.23 There were about six policemen in
the area while he was in front of the store.24
He thereafter described the conduct of his arrest.
PO2 Ramos, wearing his official uniform, together with an
asset he knew by the name of Angel, approached and told
him to take the things out of his pocket.25 PO2 Ramos
then asked for his name in this manner, "ikaw ba si
Futter?"26 He replied that he is not the person. Just the
same, he complied and took out his keys and wallet from
his pocket and gave them to PO2 Ramos.27 PO2 Ramos
opened his wallet and was thereafter shown one (1)
plastic sachet of illegal drug which was allegedly taken
from his wallet.28 He told them that the sachet did not
belong to him but still was handcuffed.29 PO2 Ramos then
brought him together with Angel to the police station at
Karangalan Village on board a taxi.30 His motorcycle was
left in front of the store after his arrest.31
Upon reaching the police station, one of the police officers
there named Oscar Soliven told him that for ₱20,000.00
the police would not file the case for violation of Section 5
or illegal sale of dangerous drugs under R.A. No. 9165.
He did not agree to the proposal and was detained at the
station until his inquest on 21 April 2003.32
Subjected to cross-examination, Remigio was questioned
by the prosecution regarding a previous arrest relative to
dangerous drugs. He said that he was just a suspect in
that case and that he had filed a complaint against the
person who arrested him.33
A witness who was presented to corroborate the version
of Remigio was Nelia Diolata, his elementary school
classmate. She testified that she went to Helen’s Best
store in General Ricarte St. and Ortigas Avenue to buy
food.34There, she saw Remigio already waiting for the
food he bought.35 While leaving the store after she got her
food, she heard someone being asked if his name was
Footer.36 She saw a uniformed police officer asking the
question. She was able to identify the policeman as
"Ramos" through his nameplate,37 as she was only two
meters away from them.38 She then heard Remigio
answer composedly.39 She saw Remigio pull out his
wallet and a piece of paper which she recognized as
registration paper of a motor vehicle. Two more persons
in civilian clothes approached PO2 Ramos and Remigio.
She thereafter turned her back and proceeded
home.40 Two years after the arrest, she learned from
Remigio’s mother that he was arrested so she voluntarily
offered to testify.41
Eventually, two sets of Information were filed as follows:
For Criminal Case No. 03-25497 for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs:
That on or about the 17th day of April 2003 in the
Municipality of Cainta, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused without being authorized by law, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver
and give away to another 0.03 gram of white crystalline
substance contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet which was found positive to the test for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as
"Shabu[,]" a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-
cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.42
For Criminal Case No. 03-25498 for possession of
dangerous drugs:
That on or about the 17th day of April 2003 in the
Municipality of Cainta, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and
22 | P a g e
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, not being lawfully authorized by law, did,
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in
his possession, direct custody and control 0.03 gram,
0.03 gram, 0.03 gram and 0.03 gram with a total weight
of 0.12 gram of white crystalline substance contained in
four (4) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets which
were found positive to the test for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, also known as "Shabu[,]" a dangerous
drug, in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.43
Upon arraignment on 29 May 2003, accused Remigio with
the assistance of his counsel, pleaded NOT GUILTY to
the offenses charged against him.44
Trial ensued and on 12 October 2007, the trial
court45 found the accused guilty of the offenses charged
against him. The disposition reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Ricardo
Remigio is found guilty of the offense charged in the
Informations and is sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua in
Criminal Case No. 03-25497. In Criminal case No. 03-
25498, accused Ricardo Remigio is sentenced to suffer
an Imprisonment of Twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years and a fine of ₱300,000.00 as provided
for under Section 11, Par. (3) [o]f RA 9165. As
amended.46
Upon appeal, the accused-appellant argued that the trial
court erred in finding that the prosecution was able to
prove the requisites of a buy-bust operation.47 He doubted
the entrapment operation as there was already an existing
warrant of arrest against him.48 Further, he emphasized
the failure of the prosecution to establish the corpus
delicti of the case as the five plastic sachets allegedly
containing dangerous drug were not presented in court.
What were presented were only pictures which do not
prove that those in the pictures were the same ones
tested at the forensic laboratory.49 Finally, he questioned
the non-adherence to the procedures to establish the
chain of custody of evidence such as the marking of the
five sachets of confiscated drugs at the time and in the
place where the accused was arrested.50
The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
stressed the legality of a buy-bust operation.51 It relied on
the presumption of regularity of performance of police
officers in fulfilling their duties,52 and on the prosecution’s
proof of all the elements of illegal sale of shabu.53
After review, the CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court
with modification on the penalty imposed. The dispositive
portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the decision
subject of the present appeal is hereby AFFIRMED save
for a modification in the penalty imposed by the trial court.
Accordingly, the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer
life imprisonment and a fine of five hundred thousand
pesos (₱500,000.00).54
The appellate court gave great weight on the findings of
facts of the trial court and full credit to the presumption of
regularity of performance of the arresting officer Ramos.
It discredited the argument of the defense of frame-up and
upheld the presence of the requisites to prove illegal sale
of dangerous drugs.55 No weight was given by the CA to
the argument about non-compliance with the procedures
laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 to establish the
chain of custody of evidence ruling that there was no taint
in the integrity of the evidentiary value of the seized
items.56
This appeal is moored on the contention about the break
in the chain of custody and the absence of identification
of illegal drugs.57 Appellant capitalizes on the non-
marking of the sachets allegedly recovered from his wallet
and compartment of his motorcycle, the non-preparation
of an inventory report, the absence of photographs of the
arrest, and non-presentation of the actual dangerous
drugs before the court. The argument is that without the
requisite proof, there is insurmountable doubt whether the
sachets allegedly confiscated from him were the same
ones delivered to the forensic laboratory for
examination,58 and then presented during the trial.
We agree fully with the accused-appellant.
In order to successfully prosecute an offense of illegal
sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, the following
elements must first be established: (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object and consideration of the
sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor.59
On the other hand, a case of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs will prosper if the following elements are
present: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or
object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the drug.60
In both cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, it is important for the prosecution to
show the chain of custody over the dangerous drug in
order to establish the corpus delicti.61
Jurisprudence consistently pronounces that the
dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of
the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a
judgment of conviction.62 As such, the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti – the body or substance of the
crime – establishes the fact that a crime has actually been
committed.63
In this case, no illegal drug was presented as evidence
before the trial court. As pointed out by appellant, what
were presented were pictures of the supposedly
confiscated items. But, in the current course of drugs case
decisions, a picture is not worth a thousand words.64 The
image without the thing even prevents the telling of a
story.1âwphi1 It is indispensable for the prosecution to
present the drug itself in court.
We have decided that in prosecutions involving narcotics,
the narcotic substance itself constitutes the corpus
delicti of the offense and its existence is vital to sustain a
judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To
emphasize the importance of the corpus delicti in drug
charges, we have held that it is essential that the
prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect
is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit;
and that the identity of said drug be established with
the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to
make a finding of guilt.65
Thus, there are two indispensables. The illegal drug must
be offered before the court as exhibit and that which is
exhibited must be the very same substance recovered
from the suspect. The needfulness of both was stressed
in People v. Lorena,66 where We, after reiterating the
23 | P a g e
elements of the crime of sale of illegal drug, proceeded to
state that all these require evidence that the sale
transaction transpired coupled with the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti, i.e. the body or substance of
the crime, which in People v. Martinez,67 equates as
simply in People v. Gutierrez,68 was referred to as "the
drug itself."
In this case, there is no corpus delicti.
The prosecution failed to present the drug itself in court; it
relied only on the pictures of the alleged drugs. Nowhere
in the records is it shown that the prosecution made any
effort to present the very corpus delicti of the two drug
offenses. This is evident in the pertinent portions of the
direct testimony of PO2 Ramos:
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR: May we request Your Honor
that this picture be marked as Exhibit "C" and another
picture showing the whole body of motorcycle be marked
as Exhibit "C-1."
COURT: Mark them.
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:
Q: Where is the coin purse here, Mister witness?
A: Witness pointing to white object.
Q: Where is the plastic sachet?
A: Witness pointing to other 3 white objects depicting (sic)
in the picture.
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:May we request Your Honor
that this picture be marked as Exhibit "C-2."69
As already above indicated, the vitalness in court of both
the recovered substance and the certainty that what was
recovered from the accused is that which is presented in
evidence are underscored by the rule on the chain of
custody of evidence. Compliance with the chain of
custody of evidence is provided for in Section 21, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165. We quote:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated,
Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following
manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
xxxx
(8) Transitory Provision: a) Within twenty-four (24) hours
from the effectivity of this Act, dangerous drugs defined
herein which are presently in possession of law
enforcement agencies shall, with leave of court, be
burned or destroyed, in the presence of representatives
of the Court, DOJ, Department of Health (DOH) and the
accused/and or his/her counsel, and, b) Pending the
organization of the PDEA, the custody, disposition, and
burning or destruction of seized/surrendered dangerous
drugs provided under this Section shall be implemented
by the DOH.
These requirements are substantially complied with
through the proviso in Section 21(a) of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165:
Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
disposition in the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody
and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given copy thereof.
Provided, that the physical inventory and the photograph
shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant
is served; or at least the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long
as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending
team/officer, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items. (Emphasis
supplied)
By definition,70 "chain of custody" means the duly
recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of
dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court
for destruction. Such record of movements and custody
of seized item shall include the identity and signature of
the person who held temporary custody of the seized
item, the date and time when such transfer of custody
were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court
as evidence, and the final disposition.
The case of People v. Kamad71 enumerates the different
links that the prosecution must prove in order to establish
the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation, namely:
First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of
the illegal drug recovered from the accused by
the apprehending officer;
Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by
the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer;
24 | P a g e
Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of
the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and
Fourth, the turnover and submission of the
marked illegal drug seized by the forensic
chemist to the court.72
We could have stopped at the point where the prosecution
failed to present the substance allegedly recovered from
the appellant. The failure already renders fatally flawed
the decision of conviction. Indeed, an examination of the
chain of custody of the substance, without the substance
itself, is nonsensical. We, however, see more than an
academic need for a discussion of the concept of chain of
custody. We want to depict the carelessness, if not the
brazen unlawfulness, of the law enforcers in the
implementation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002. What happened in this case is a one-man
operation, seemingly towards the objective of the law, but
by means of outlawing those specifically outlined in the
statute, in the rules implementing the statute and in our
decisions interpreting law and rule. As testified to by the
prosecution’s sole witness, PO2 Ramos, he was the one
who conceived the operation; who, although with his
informant as the lone actor, conducted the operation by
himself being the poseur-buyer with a one hundred peso
bill he himself pre-marked and recorded in the police
blotter only after the arrest. PO2 Ramos was himself the
apprehending officer who confiscated the sachets of
illegal drugs together with the wallet of the accused.
There was no showing when, where and how the seized
plastic sachets were marked. It was not shown that there
was a marking of evidence at the place of arrest or at the
police station. It was unexplained why the five plastic
sachets containing white crystalline substance were
already marked as "RZR-1," "RZR-2," "RZR-3," "RZR-4"
and "RZR-5" when transmitted to the forensic chemist.
Already, the omission of the first link in the chain tainted
the identification of the drugs that was allegedly seized
from the accused. What followed was no less a series of
violations of the procedure in the conduct of buy-bust
operations.
As testified by PO2 Ramos, he did not transfer the seized
items to the investigating officer. And nothing in the
records reveals that there was such a transfer. From his
statements, he kept the alleged shabu from the time of
confiscation until the time he transferred them to the
forensic chemist. We quote:
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR: Now, what happened to the
plastic sachets of alleged shabu which were taken from
Alyas Footer?
A: It was brought to the Camp Crame laboratory for
examination, Sir.
Q: If you know, Mister witness, who personally transmitted
the request for chemist and actual testing of said sachet
of shabu.
A: Me, Sir.73
PO2 Ramos testified that he personally brought the
seized items to the forensic chemist. In further
muddlement of the prosecution’s evidence, in the records
of the Request for Laboratory Examination, a different
person named as PO2 Halim was indicated as having
delivered the five pieces of heat-sealed plastic sachets to
the laboratory for examination. 74 No document or
testimony was offered to clarify who PO2 Halim is and
what his participation was in the chain of custody of the
alleged illegal drug.
The failure to produce the corpus delicti in court cannot
be remedied by the stipulation regarding the forensic
chemist.
Forensic Chemist Annalee Forro failed to testify in court
regarding the result of the qualitative examination of the
substance in the sachets. The prosecution proposed a
stipulation about her findings. This was admitted by the
defense but with qualification. We quote the pertinent
portions:
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR: I am offering the following for
stipulations: that Annalee Forro is a forensic chemist
officer connected with the PNP Crime Laboratory Service
and that on April 18, 2003, she conducted the chemical
examination on the contents of the five plastic sachets
with markings RZR-1 to RZR-5 and found the same to be
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug and the name of the suspect as
mentioned in the information is Ricardo Remigio.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Admitted with qualification that
she merely copied the name of the suspect on the request
for laboratory examination delivered by member of the
Cainta Police Station.75
Proceeding from the vacuity of proof of identification of the
supposedly seized item and of the transfer of its custody,
from the arresting officer to the forensic chemist, no value
can be given to the document that merely states that the
sachets presented to the forensic chemist contained
prohibited drugs.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The 29 May
2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 03169 affirming the judgment of conviction dated
12 October 2007 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73
of Antipolo City in Criminal Case Nos. 03-25497 and 03-
25498 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-
appellant Ricardo Remigio y Zapanta is
hereby ACQUITTED and ordered immediately released
from detention unless his continued confinement is
warranted for some other cause or ground.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 192050 January 9, 2013
NELSON VALLENO y LUCITO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Facts:
The police officers, armed with a search warrant, together
with two baranggay officials conducted a search inside
the house of the petitioner. PO2 Endrano, one of the
police officers found a natel bag on top of a cabinet. He
passed the natel bag to PO2 valenzuela who handed it to
PO2 Villano. The latter unzipped the bag and uncovered
3 different sizes of white plastic bags containing white
granules. The bag also contained a weighing scale and a
25 | P a g e
bamboo stick. He placed his initials “JV” on the plastic
sachets, the weighing scale and bamboo stick in the
presence of the barangay officials. He likewise prepared
the Inventory Receipt, which was signed by the barangay
officials. Petitioner, however, refused to sign the Inventory
Receipt. PO3 Villano turned over the seized items to a
certain PO3 Molina.12 While in the police station, PO3
Villano prepared the return of the search warrant. He then
brought the Return of the Search Warrant, accompanied
by the seized items, to the RTC of Naga City. The court
ordered him to bring them to the PNP Crime Laboratory
for examination.
The trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for illegal possession of shabu.
The trial court ruled that the chain of custody over the
illegal drugs seized was properly established. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner’s conviction.
Petitioner highlights the manner of conducting the
physical inventory of the alleged drugs taken from
petitioner’s house appeared to be irregular as the seized
items were allowed to be handled by persons not
authorized to do so.
Issue:
whether the guilt of the accused has been established
beyond reasonable doubt.
Held:
Yes. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items,
as the same would be utilized in the determination of the
guilt or innocence of the accused. In the instant case, the
chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs was not
broken. The prosecution established that PO3 Edrano
recovered the white plastic sachets, later on confirmed
positive for traces of shabu. PO3 Edrano handed them
over to PO3 Villano, who made markings on the seized
items and prepared an inventory of the same while inside
petitioner’s house. It was also shown that PO3 Villano
brought the seized illegal drugs to the police station where
he himself prepared the inventory. While he presented the
same to a certain PO3 Molina, it was still PO3 Villano and
SPO4 Fabiano who first brought the seized illegal drugs
to the court, who in turn ordered him to bring it to the PNP
Crime Laboratory. In the letter request addressed to the
forensic chemist, it was PO3 Villano who signed as the
requesting party. Clearly therefore, the recovery and
handling of the seized illegal drugs were more than
satisfactorily established in this case.
People v. Frondozo, G.R. No. 177164, June 30, 2009
To establish the identity of the shabu seized from
Frondozo, the procedures laid down in Rep. Act No. 9165
should be complied with. Section 21 of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of Rep. Act No. 9165 clearly
outlines the post-seizure procedure in taking custody of
seized drugs. It states: (1) The apprehending team
having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy therof.
In this case, the arresting officers failed to strictly
comply with the procedures for the custody and
disposition of confiscated dangerous drugs as prescribed
by Rep. Act No. 9165. The arresting officers did not mark
the shabu immediately after they arrested
Frondozo. Further, while there was testimony regarding
the marking of the shbu after it was turned over to the
police investigator, no evidence was presented to prove
that the marking therof was done in the presence of
Frondozo. Also, fatal in the prosecution’s case is the
failure of the arresting officers to take a photograph and
make an inventory of the confiscated materials in the
presence of Frondozo. Likewise, there was no mention
that any representative from the media, DOJ or any
elected public official had been present during the
inventory or that any of these persons had been required
to sign the copies of the inventory.
G.R. No. 181318 April 16, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
GERMAN AGOJO y LUNA, Appellant.
TINGA, J.:
Subject of this appeal is the March 30, 2007 decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00946,
affirming the November 11, 2002 judgment2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tanauan, Batangas, finding
appellant German Agojo y Luna guilty of violation of
Section 15, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425.
Appellant was charged with illegal sale of shabu in an
Information dated October 14, 1999, the accusatory
portion of which reads:
That on or about the 27th day of August 1999 at about
11:30 o’clock in the evening at Poblacion, Municipality of
Tanauan, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without authority of law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, and deliver (4)
plastic bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride
commonly known as "shabu," weighing 51.00, 51.10,
52.67 and 51.55 grams, with a total weight of 206.32
grams, a regulated dangerous drug.
Contrary to law.3
Appellant was also charged with violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1866 (P.D. No. 1866) as amended by
Republic Act No. 8294 in an Information, the accusatory
portion of which reads:
That on or about the 27th day of August 1999 at about
11:30 o’clock in the evening at Poblacion, Municipality of
Tanauan, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control
one (1) caliber .45 pistol Ithaca with defaced serial
number, one (1) magazine and seven (7) rounds of live
ammunitions for caliber .45, without having secured the
necessary license and/or permit from the proper
authorities to possess the same.
Contrary to law. 4
26 | P a g e
Appellant entered a not guilty plea upon
arraignment.5 Thereafter, trial ensued. As culled from the
record, the evidence for the prosecution is as follows:
On August 23, 1999, Rodolfo Alonzo, a civilian informant,
reported the drug trading activities of appellant to Police
Chief Inspector Ablang.6 Alonzo narrated that appellant
agreed to sell him 200 grams of shabu for ₱70,000.00 on
a 50% cash and 50% credit basis. The sale was to take
place in front of the Mercado Hospital in Tanauan,
Batangas, on August 27, 1999 at 11:30 p.m. Ablang
formed a team to conduct the buy-bust operation.7
On August 27, 1999, the team proceeded to Mercado
Hospital. Ablang then entrusted Alonzo with ₱71,000.00
each marked "JUA." Alonzo was instructed to remove his
hat to signal the team that the sale had been
consummated. The buy-bust team arrived at Mercado
Hospital at 11:00 p.m. The team members immediately
took strategic positions. Alonzo stayed in an eatery in
front of the hospital.8
Agojo arrived at 11:30 p.m. aboard a white Mitsubishi
Lancer (Lancer) with plate number DRW-392. Appellant
then approached Alonzo to ask if the latter had the
money. Alonzo handed appellant the marked money.
Appellant took a VHS box from his car and handed it to
Alonzo. Appellant and Alonzo then walked along the
hospital gate near the emergency room. Appellant then
entered the hospital.
Alonzo examined the VHS box then took off his cap to
signal the buy-bust team. The buy-bust team immediately
proceeded to the scene. Alonzo told the team that
appellant had entered the hospital. Alonzo handed the
VHS box to Ablang. Upon examination, the box was found
to contain four (4) plastic bags of a crystalline substance
which the team suspected was shabu. Ablang instructed
Salazar to inform the appellant that his car had been
bumped.
Appellant then exited from the hospital via the emergency
room door. Salazar introduced himself as a policeman
and attempted to arrest HIM.9 Appellant resisted, but the
other team members handcuffed appellant. The team
recovered ₱10,000.00 of the buy-bust money. Ablang
opened appellant’s Lancer and recovered a .45 caliber
pistol containing seven (7) bullets and a Panasonic
cellular phone from the passenger seat.
Arsenio Ricero, the Chief of the PNP Batangas
Intelligence and Investigation Section, later requested a
laboratory examination of the contents of the four (4)
plastic sachets confiscated from appellant.10 Lorna Tria, a
chemist at the Philippine National Police (PNP) crime
laboratory in Camp Vicente Lim conducted an
examination of the four (4) plastic sachets. The
examination revealed that the sachets contained
methamphetamine hydrochloride with a total weight of
206.32 grams.
Appellant presented a different version of the facts, in
support of the defenses of denial and frame up. He said
that on August 27, 1999, appellant arrived at Mercado
Hospital at 8:25 p.m. Thereafter, he stayed in the room of
a certain Imelda Papasin. At this time, his wife, Precilla
was also confined in the hospital. She had asked him to
bring money to settle her bills, so she could be discharged
the next day. Upon being informed by a security guard
that his car had been sideswiped, he went down. The
police later arrested him when he reached the ground
floor. The police later opened his car. He was made to
board a police vehicle. While aboard, the police
confiscated ₱6,000.00 in cash, a wrist watch and a
necklace from him. He was brought to the police
headquarters in Kumintang Ilaya, Batangas City.
In a Decision11 dated November 11, 2002, the RTC found
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge
against him for violation of Section 1512 of R.A. No. 6425
and acquitted him of the charge of violation of P.D. No.
1866 for lack of sufficient evidence. The case was brought
on automatic review before the Supreme Court, since
appellant was sentenced to death by the trial court.13
In his brief dated July 30, 2003,14 appellant imputed three
(3) errors to the trial court, namely: (1) the trial court
convicted him despite failure of the prosecution to
overcome the presumption of innocence and to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court erred in
relying on the weakness of the defense rather than on the
strength of the prosecution evidence; and (3) the trial
court erred in considering the aggravating circumstances
of nighttime and use of a motor vehicle.
On September 28, 2003, Agojo moved for new trial ad
cautelam.15 Appellant claimed to have secured the
statistical data list from the cash department of Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas that seven (7) of the ₱71,000.00 peso
bills used in the buy-bust operation on September 4, 2003
were bogus. Appellant claimed that Ablang must have
merely copied the serial numbers of bills of other
denominations when he ran out of serial numbers of one
thousand peso bills.
In his brief dated January 30, 2004, for the People, the
Solicitor General asserted that the positive declarations of
Alonzo and the buy-bust team should prevail over Agojo’s
self-serving denial and allegations of having been framed
up.16 However, he urged the court to lower Agojo’s
penalty to reclusion perpetua, as the trial court erred in
ruling that nighttime and the use of a motor vehicle had
attended the offense.
On March 2, 2004, the Solicitor General filed its comment
on Agojo’s motion for new trial,17 averring that the motion
lacked merit since, during the trial, appellant could have
secured during the trial the BSP’s certification which was
relied upon for the new trial sought.
In a resolution dated August 31, 2004, this Court
transferred the case to the appellate court for intermediate
review, following the ruling in People v. Mateo.18 An
exchange of pleadings before the appellate court
followed, wherein the parties reiterated their earlier
stances.
On March 30, 2007, the appellate court addressed both
the errors raised in the appellant’s brief and the
appellant’s motion for new trial. It affirmed with
modification the decision of the trial court, but reduced the
penalty to reclusion perpetua in line with Republic Act No.
9346, "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death
Penalty in the Philippines," and because of the finding that
aggravating circumstances were not present.19
The case was again elevated to this Court. In a resolution
dated March 19, 2008, this Court required the parties to
file their supplemental briefs.20
The Solicitor General demurred, averring that the brief
earlier filed with the Court was sufficient.21
Appellant filed a supplemental memorandum, reiterating
that the appellate court had erred.22 Appellant maintains
27 | P a g e
that the prosecution was not able to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.23 He also claims that the evidence
proves that he was in fact framed-up by the buy-bust
team.
The appeal lacks merit.
The errors raised by the appellant boil down to the issue
of whether appellant’s guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt, as well as to the question whether
appellant was framed-up by the buy-bust team.
A thorough review of the records clearly shows
that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable
doubt that appellant sold the shabu to the poseur-
buyer. The testimony of Alonzo on the sale of
illegal drugs and the identification of appellant as
the seller is clear and
The testimony of Alonzo was corroborated by members
of the buy-bust team, particularly Calapati33 and
Salazar,34who both testified that they saw appellant hand
Alonzo the VHS tape containing the shabu despite only
partial payment for the shabu.
Appellant’s assertion that he was framed-up has no merit.
In almost every case involving a buy-bust operation, the
accused puts up the defense of frame-up. This court has
repeatedly emphasized that the defense of "frame-up" is
viewed with disfavor,35 since the defense is easily
concocted and is a common ploy of the
accused.36 Therefore, clear and convincing evidence of
the frame-up must be shown for such a defense to be
given merit.37
In this case, appellant points to the arrest not being
in flagrante delicto, the existence of discrepancies in the
serial numbers of the buy-bust money and a prior attempt
to frame him up as proofs of the frame-up. However, the
fact that the arrest was not in flagrante delicto is of no
consequence. The arrest was validly executed pursuant
to Section 5, paragraph (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, which states:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has
in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and, (c) When the person to be arrested is
a prisoner who has escaped from penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
(Emphasis supplied)1avvphi1
The second instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered
by paragraph (b) cited above necessitates two stringent
requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected:
(1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the
person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it.38 A review of the records shows that both requirements
were met in this case.
From the spot where the buy-bust team was, they
definitely witnessed the sale of shabu took place. So, too,
there was a large measure of immediacy between the
time of commission of the offense and the time of the
arrest.39 After Alonzo had signaled the buy-bust team
when he received the VHS tape from appellant, Ablang
approached Alonzo and immediately examined the
tape.40 Soon thereafter, he executed the ruse to make
appellant to go down, as the latter had in the meantime
gone up. The ruse succeeded when appellant went down,
and he was arrested right then and there.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED, the decision
dated March 30, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00946 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

There is similarly little weight in the claim of appellant that

the inconsistencies revealed by the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP) certification in the serial numbers of the
marked money, as well as the fact that only a fraction of
the money was recovered, should exonerate him. The
marked money used in the buy-bust operation is not
indispensable in drug cases.41 Otherwise stated, the
absence of marked money does not create a hiatus in the
evidences provided that the prosecution adequately
proves the sale.42 Only appellant would know what
happened to the rest of the marked money since only
₱10,000.00 out of the ₱70,000.00 was recovered from
him. In any event, the partial recovery of the marked
money from appellant would indicate that the buy-bust
operation did take place.

Questions have been raised in connection with the

admitted peculiar business sense of the appellant–selling
200 grams of shabu for ₱70,000.00 and accepting
payment by installments for the contraband. This aspect
of the tale may strike as incredulous, but the evidence is
plain that it did happen. Truth may sometimes be stranger
than fiction, and as long as such truth is corroborated by
evidence, the Court is bound by the facts.43

This Court has also taken judicial notice that drug pushers
sell their wares to any prospective customer, stranger or
not, in both public or private places, with no regard for time
as they have become increasingly daring and blatantly
defiant of the law.44 It is therefore not surprising that drug
pushers will even accept partial payment for their wares
with the balance payable on installment.

Appellant’s assertion that the chain of custody over the

drugs was not preserved also lacks merit. A thorough
review of the records of this case reveals that the chain of
custody of the seized substance was not broken, and that
the prosecution properly identified the drugs seized in this
case. Appellant sold the drugs to Alonzo in a legitimate
buy-bust operation.45 Alonzo then handed the VHS tape
containing the drugs to Major Ablang,46 who kept the
drugs during appellant’s

detention, and then turned them over to Ricero, so that

the packets could be marked when the buy-bust team
returned with Agojo to the Police Provincial Office in
Kumintang Ilaya, Batangas.47 The drugs, along with a
letter request, were then sent by Ricero to the PNP crime
laboratory in Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna for
examination. Lorna Tria, a PNP chemist working at Camp
Vicente Lim, examined the marked packets, which had
tested positive for shabu.48 These same marked packets
were identified in open court by Major
Ablang,49 Ricero50and Tria.51 Thus, the unbroken chain of
custody of the shabu, from their seizure from appellant
until their presentation in court, was clearly established.

Finally, the assertion that the buy-bust team had the habit
of framing him up is similarly misleading. The appellate
court acquitted appellant of a previous charge of
possession of shabu, because he was charged with illegal
sale rather than mere possession of shabu.52 Hence,
there was no attempt to frame him up in a prior case, nor
was there any evidence that such an attempt to frame him
up was made in this case.

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