Bail hearing is mandatory - A.M. No. RTJ- 04-1845 4.
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval
A.M. No. RTJ- 04-1845
I II
Bail hearing was mandatory
in Criminal Case No. 1138-03
Judge Infante would excuse himself from blame and responsibility by insisting that
the hearing was no longer necessary considering that the accused had not filed a
petition for bail; that inasmuch as no application for bail had been filed by the
accused, his twin orders of April 23, 2003 were not orders granting an application
for bail, but were instead his approval of the bail bond posted; and that Atty.
Gacal’s very urgent motion and other motions and written submissions lacked the
requisite written conformity of the public prosecutor, rendering them null and
void.
We cannot relieve Judge Infante from blame and responsibility.
The willingness of Judge Infante to rely on the mere representation of the public
prosecutor that his grant of bail upon the public prosecutor’s recommendation
had been proper, and that his (public prosecutor) recommendation of bail had in
effect waived the need for a bail hearing perplexes the Court. He thereby betrayed
an uncommon readiness to trust more in the public prosecutor’s judgment than
in his own judicious discretion as a trial judge. He should not do so.
Judge Infante made the situation worse by brushing aside the valid remonstrations
expressed in Atty. Gacal’s very urgent motion thusly:
This Court is not unaware that the charge of murder being a capital offense is not
bailable xxx
xxxx
The phrase “xxx application for admission to bail xxx” is not an irrelevant but a
significant infusion in the cited rule (section 8), the plain import of which is that
bail hearing is preceded by a motion/petition for admission to bail filed by a
detained accused himself or thru counsel.
The peculiar feature of the instant case, however, is the absence of a
petition/motion for admission to bail filed by the herein accused. On the contrary,
it is the consistent position of the fiscal to recommend bail since the prosecution
evidence being merely circumstantial, is not strong for the purpose of granting
bail. xxx. This court believes that bail hearing, albeit necessary in the grant of bail
involving capital offense, is not at all times and in all instances essential to afford
the party the right to due process especially so, when the fiscal in this case was
given reasonable opportunity to explain his side, and yet he maintained the
propriety of grant of bail without need of hearing since the prosecution evidence
is not strong for the purpose of granting bail.
Further, while it is preponderant of judicial experience to adopt the fiscal’s
recommendation in bail fixing, this court, however, had in addition and in accord
with Section 6(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, evaluated the record
of the case, and only upon being convinced and satisfied that the prosecution
evidence as contained in the affidavits of all the prosecution witnesses, no one
being an eye-witness are merely circumstantial evidence, that this court in the
exercise of sound discretion allowed the accused to post bail.
xxxx
The convergence of the foregoing factors - absence of motion for admission to bail
filed by the accused, the recommendation of the fiscal to grant bail, the pro forma
motion of the private prosecutor for lack of prior approval from the fiscal and this
court’s evaluation of the records – sufficiently warrants the grant of bail to herein
accused.[14]
Judge Infante specifically cited judicial experience as sanctioning his adoption and
approval of the public prosecutor’s recommendation on the fixing of bail. Yet, it
was not concealed from him that the public prosecutor’s recommendation had
been mainly based on the documentary evidence adduced,[15] and on the public
prosecutor’s misguided position that the evidence of guilt was weak because only
circumstantial evidence had been presented. As such, Judge Infante’s
unquestioning echoing of the public prosecutor’s conclusion about the evidence
of guilt not being sufficient to deny bail did not justify his dispensing with the bail
hearing.
Judge Infante apparently acted as if the requirement for the bail hearing was a
merely minor rule to be dispensed with. Although, in theory, the only function of
bail is to ensure the appearance of the accused at the time set for the arraignment
and trial; and, in practice, bail serves the further purpose of preventing the release
of an accused who may be dangerous to society or whom the judge may not want
to release,[16] a hearing upon notice ismandatory before the grant of bail,
whether bail is a matter of right or discretion.[17] With more reason is this true in
criminal prosecutions of a capital offense, or of an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, states that: “No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable byreclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt
is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of criminal action.”
In Cortes v. Catral,[18] therefore, the Court has outlined the following duties of
the judge once an application for bail is filed, to wit:
1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor
of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless or whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show
that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8, id);
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
of the bail bond (Section 19, id); otherwise, the petition should be denied.
[emphasis supplied]
Judge Infante disregarded rules and guidelines
in Criminal Case No. 1138-03
Ostensibly, Judge Infante disregarded basic but well-known rules and guidelines
on the matter of bail.
1.
In case no application for bail is filed,
bail hearing was not dispensable
Judge Infante contends that a bail hearing in Criminal Case No. 1138-03 was not
necessary because the accused did not file an application for bail; and because the
public prosecutor had recommended bail.
Judge Infante’s contention is unwarranted.
Even where there is no petition for bail in a case like Criminal Case No. 1138-03, a
hearing should still be held. This hearing is separate and distinct from the initial
hearing to determine the existence of probable cause, in which the trial judge
ascertains whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty of
the crime. The Prosecution must be given a chance to show the strength of its
evidence; otherwise, a violation of due process occurs.[19]
The fact that the public prosecutor recommended bail for Ancheta did not warrant
dispensing with the hearing. The public prosecutor’s recommendation of bail was
not material in deciding whether to conduct the mandatory hearing or not. For
one, the public prosecutor’s recommendation, albeit persuasive, did not
necessarily bind the trial judge,[20] in whom alone the discretion to determine
whether to grant bail or not was vested. Whatever the public prosecutor
recommended, including the amount of bail, was non-binding. Nor did such
recommendation constitute a showing that the evidence of guilt was not strong.
If it was otherwise, the trial judge could become unavoidably controlled by the
Prosecution.
Being the trial judge, Judge Infante had to be aware of the precedents laid down
by the Supreme Court regarding the bail hearing being mandatory and
indispensable. He ought to have remembered, then, that it was only through such
hearing that he could be put in a position to determine whether the evidence for
the Prosecution was weak or strong.[21] Hence, his dispensing with the hearing
manifested a gross ignorance of the law and the rules.
2.
Public prosecutor’s failure to oppose
application for bail or to adduce evidence
did not dispense with hearing
That the Prosecution did not oppose the grant of bail to Ancheta, as in fact it
recommended bail, and that the Prosecution did not want to adduce evidence
were irrelevant, and did not dispense with the bail hearing. The gravity of the
charge in Criminal Case No. 1138-03 made it still mandatory for Judge Infante to
conduct a bail hearing in which he could have made on his own searching and
clarificatory questions from which to infer the strength or weakness of the
evidence of guilt. He should not have readily and easily gone along with the public
prosecutor’s opinion that the evidence of guilt, being circumstantial, was not
strong enough to deny bail; else, he might be regarded as having abdicated from
a responsibility that was his alone as the trial judge.
Judge Infante’s holding that circumstantial evidence of guilt was of a lesser weight
than direct evidence in the establishment of guilt was also surprising. His training
and experience should have cautioned him enough on the point that the lack or
absence of direct evidence did not necessarily mean that the guilt of the accused
could not anymore be proved, because circumstantial evidence, if sufficient, could
supplant the absence of direct evidence.[22] In short, evidence of guilt was not
necessarily weak because it was circumstantial.
Instead, Judge Infante should have assiduously determined why the Prosecution
refused to satisfy its burden of proof in the admission of the accused to bail.
Should he have found that the public prosecutor’s refusal was not justified, he
could have then himself inquired on the nature and extent of the evidence of guilt
for the purpose of enabling himself to ascertain whether or not such evidence was
strong. He could not have ignored the possibility that the public prosecutor might
have erred in assessing the evidence of guilt as weak.[23] At any rate, if he found
the Prosecution to be uncooperative, he could still have endeavored to determine
on his own the existence of such evidence,[24] with the assistance of the private
prosecutor.
3.
Judge Infante’s granting of bail without a hearing was
censurable for gross ignorance of the law and the rules
Every judge should be faithful to the law and should maintain professional
competence.[25] His role in the administration of justice requires a continuous
study of the law and jurisprudence, lest public confidence in the Judiciary be
eroded by incompetence and irresponsible conduct.[26]
In that light, the failure of Judge Infante to conduct a hearing prior to the grant of
bail in capital offenses was inexcusable and reflected gross ignorance of the law
and the rules as well as a cavalier disregard of its requirement.[27] He well knew
that the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong was a
matter of judicial discretion,[28] and that the discretion lay not in the
determination of whether or not a hearing should be held, but in the appreciation
and evaluation of the weight of the Prosecution’s evidence of guilt against the
accused.[29] His fault was made worse by his granting bail despite the absence of
a petition for bail from the accused.[30]Consequently, any order he issued in the
absence of the requisite evidence was not a product of sound judicial discretion
but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.[31]
III
Imposable Penalty
We next determine the penalty imposable on Judge Infante for his gross ignorance
of the law and the rules.
The Court imposed a fine of P20,000.00 on the respondent judge inDocena-Caspe
v. Bugtas.[32] In that case, the respondent judge granted bail to the two accused
who had been charged with murder without first conducting a hearing. Likewise,
in Loyola v. Gabo,[33] the Court fined the respondent judge in the similar amount
of P20,000.00 for granting bail to the accused in a murder case without the
requisite bail hearing. To accord with such precedents, the Court prescribes a fine
of P20,000.00 on Judge Infante, with a stern warning that a repetition of the
offense or the commission of another serious offense will be more severely dealt
with.
WHEREFORE, we FIND AND DECLARE Judge Jaime I. Infante guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and the rules; and, accordingly, FINEhim in the amount of
P20,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the offense or the
commission of another serious offense will be more severely dealt with.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator
for proper dissemination to all trial judges.
SO ORDERED."
PETITION FOR BAIL and NON BAILABLE CRIMES.
I have been reading a lot of legal and not so legal commentaries about the recent
bail granted to accused Cedric et al. Some are obviously well thought of, some
bordering craziness and absurdity. So what does Bail really mean in our legal
system?
Under RULE 114 of our Rules of Court-
Section 1. Bail defined. – Bail is the security given for the release of a person in
custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance
before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may
be given in the form of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or
recognizance.
Purposes of Bail:
1. To give premium to the constitutional presumption of innocence until his guilt is
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
2. To relieve an accused from the rigors of imprisonment until his conviction and
yet secure his appearance at trial. (Almeda v Villaluz G.R. L-31665, August 6,
1975)
3. To enable him to prepare his defense without being subject to incarceration prior
to conviction.
Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. – At the hearing of an application for bail
filed by a person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden
of showing that evidence of guilt is strong.
Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. – No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted
to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the state of the criminal
prosecution.
Burden Of Proof In Bail Application
Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. – At the hearing of an application
for bail filed by a person who is in custody for the commission of an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution
has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence
presented during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced
at the trial but, upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness
for additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or
otherwise unable to testify.
The grant or denial of bail in capital offense hinges on the strength of the evidence
of guilt. This requires that the trial court to conduct bail hearings wherein both
the prosecution and the defense are afforded sufficient opportunity to present
their respective evidence. The burden of proof lies with the prosecution to show
the evidence of guilt is strong. But the determination of whether the evidence of
guilt is strong is a matter of judicial discretion. Though not absolute nor beyond
control, the discretion of the trial court must be sound and exercised within
reasonable grounds.
MUST THE DEFENSE PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE DURING THE HEARING ON THE
APPLICATION FOR BAIL?
> No, the burden of proof is upon the prosecution to show that the evidence of
guilt of accused is strong
WHAT ARE THE DUTIES OF THE TRIAL JUDGE IN CASE AN APPLICATION FOR BAIL
IS FILED?
1. Notify the prosecutor of the hearing or require him to submit a
recommendation
2. Conduct a hearing
3. Decide whether the evidence of guilt is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bail bond. If evidence of guilt is strong, the petition should be
denied.
EVALUATION:
Respondent Judge insists that, for purposes of bail hearing, only the prosecution
is required to present evidence since it is not yet a trial of the main case and the
court is only preliminarily tasked to determine if the evidence of guilt is strong. He
claims that in decreeing such position he merely exercised his discretion, bail being
discretionary in the subject cases, and that if ever he erred in his ruling it is merely
an error of judgment.
The Constitution guarantees to every person under legal custody the right to bail,
except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong. The rules likewise mandate that before ruling on an
application for bail, a hearing should first be conducted to determine the existence
of a strong evidence against the accused.
A hearing for bail is summary in nature or otherwise in the discretion of the court.
Summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of receiving and
considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose
of the hearing which is merely to determine the weight of the evidence for
purposes of bail. The course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the
court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to
substantial matters avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and
cross-examination of witnesses and reducing to a reasonable minimum the
amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to the
purpose of the hearing.
It is true that the weight of the evidence adduced is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. However, such discretion may be exercised only after the
hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of
determining whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty. At the
hearing, the court should assure that the prosecution is afforded the opportunity
to adduce evidence relevant to the factual issue, with the applicant having the
right of cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. Both the
prosecution and the defense must be given reasonable opportunity to prove, in
the case of the prosecution, that evidence of guilt of the applicant is strong; and,
in the case of the defense, that such evidence of guilt is not strong. The accused
has the right to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the prosecution and to
introduce his evidence in rebuttal to establish his right to bail.
In fine, the hearing is for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise sound
discretion as to whether or not under the Constitution and laws in force the
accused is entitled to provisional release on bail. At the hearing, the petitioner can
rightfully cross examine the witnesses presented by the prosecution and introduce
his own evidence in rebuttal.
In the instant case, respondent cut short the hearing after the prosecution
presented its evidence and dispensed altogether with the defense's turn to
adduce evidence in rebuttal. Said denial of the request to present evidence shows
deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment on the part of respondent Judge.
The deficiency is magnified by respondent's outright denial of complainants'
request to make a tender of proof, which is allowed under the Rules. It is not
accurate to contend that hearing the prosecution overcome its burden of proof
would suffice. Dictates of fair play should have at least reminded respondent to
inquire first the nature of the evidence proposed to be presented, determine
whether or not they will be essential for the purpose of ascertaining entitlement
to bail, before discarding any evidence outright. This is in keeping with procedural
due process, given established rules and jurisprudence on bail.
It is a pressing responsibility of judges to endeavor at all times to avoid such
actions as would impress upon litigants the disregard of due process. On this,
respondent had been remiss.
True, as a matter of public policy, a judge may not be disciplined for error of
judgment absent proof that such error was made with a conscious and deliberate
intent to cause injustice. This does not mean, however, that a judge need not
observe propriety, discreetness and due care in the performance of his official
functions. In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and
the applicable law unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion or fear of
criticism.
The records, however, fail to establish bad faith, corruption, dishonesty or fraud
on the part of respondent, thereby meriting for him a tempered penalty. In fact, a
finding of good faith is consistent with the fact that respondent still granted both
parties opportunity to submit their respective memorandum after he disallowed
the defense to present evidence.
Finally, the rest of the charges against respondent lack merit. Specifically, the
charge of bias and partiality was not substantiated. Moreover, that the decision
was based on a one-sentence conclusion that the evidence of guilt is strong is
inaccurate. The conclusion to that effect was actually preceded by a thorough
summary of the evidence. The fact that there was no categorical discussion on
how the conclusion was reached does not make it less a reasonable conclusion.
Obviously, respondent accorded the evidence probative weight, which he deemed
to be adequate for his inference. At any rate, the inadequacy of expression of the
questioned Order is outweighed by its substantial compliance with the
requirements for an Order granting or denying bail.
[A.M. No. RTJ-96-1335. March 5, 1997]
INOCENCIO BASCO, complainant, vs. JUDGE LEO H. RAPATALO, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union, respondent.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
In a sworn letter-complaint dated August 14, 1995, complainant Inocencio Basco
charged respondent Judge Leo M. Rapatalo of RTC, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union with
gross ignorance or willful disregard of established rule of law for granting bail to
an accused in a murder case (Criminal Case No. 2927) without receiving evidence
and conducting a hearing.
Complainant, who is the father of the victim, alleged that an information for
murder was filed against a certain Roger Morente, one of three accused. The
accused Morente filed a petition for bail. The hearing for said petition was set for
May 31, 1995 by petitioner but was not heard since the respondent Judge was
then on leave. It was reset to June 8, 1995 but on said date, respondent Judge
reset it to June 22, 1995. The hearing for June 22, 1995, however, did not
materialize. Instead, the accused was arraigned and trial was set. Again, the
petition for bail was not heard on said date as the prosecution's witnesses in
connection with said petition were not notified. Another attempt was made to
reset the hearing to July 17, 1995.
In the meantime, complainant allegedly saw the accused in Rosario, La Union on
July 3, 1995. He later learned that the accused was out on bail despite the fact that
the petition had not been heard at all. Upon investigation, complainant discovered
that bail had been granted and a release order dated June 29, 1995[1] was issued
on the basis of a marginal note[2] dated June 22, 1995, at the bottom of the bail
petition by Assistant Prosecutor Manuel Oliva which stated: "No objection:
P80,000.00," signed and approved by the assistant prosecutor and eventually by
respondent Judge. Note that there was already a release order dated June 29,
1995 on the basis of the marginal note of the Assistant Prosecutor dated June 22,
1995 (when the hearing of the petition for bail was aborted and instead
arraignment took place) when another hearing was scheduled for July 17, 1995.
In his comment dated October 16, 1995, respondent Judge alleged that he granted
the petition based on the prosecutor's option not to oppose the petition as well
as the latter's recommendation setting the bailbond in the amount of P80,000.00.
He averred that when the prosecution chose not to oppose the petition for bail,
he had the discretion on whether to approve it or not. He further declared that
when he approved the petition, he had a right to presume that the prosecutor
knew what he was doing since he was more familiar with the case, having
conducted the preliminary investigation. Furthermore, the private prosecutor was
not around at the time the public prosecutor recommended bail.
Respondent Judge stated that in any case, the bailbond posted by accused was
cancelled and a warrant for his arrest was issued on account of complainant's
motion for reconsideration. The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor apparently
conformed to and approved the motion for reconsideration.[3] To date, accused
is confined at the La Union Provincial Jail.
A better understanding of bail as an aspect of criminal procedure entails
appreciating its nature and purposes. "Bail" is the security required by the court
and given by the accused to ensure that the accused appears before the proper
court at the scheduled time and place to answer the charges brought against him
or her. In theory, the only function of bail is to ensure the appearance of the
defendant at the time set for trial. The sole purpose of confining the accused in
jail before conviction, it has been observed, is to assure his presence at the trial.[4]
In other words, if the denial of bail is authorized in capital offenses, it is only in
theory that the proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the
opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the court. Hence the exception to the
fundamental right to be bailed should be applied in direct ratio to the extent of
probability of evasion of the prosecution.[5] In practice, bail has also been used to
prevent the release of an accused who might otherwise be dangerous to society
or whom the judges might not want to release."[6]
It is in view of the abovementioned practical function of bail that it is not a matter
of right in cases where the person is charged with a capital offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Article 114, section 7 of the Rules
of Court, as amended, states, "No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence
of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
action."
When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing
that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the
determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of
judicial discretion, remains with the judge. "This discretion by the very nature of
things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court
at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and
since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced
before the court,[7] it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion
requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having
the right of cross examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal."[8]
To be sure, the discretion of the trial court, "is not absolute nor beyond control. It
must be sound, and exercised within reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion, by its
very nature involves the exercise of the judge's individual opinion and the law has
wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-known rules which, while
allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of his own individual views,
prevent them from getting out of control. An uncontrolled or uncontrollable
discretion on the part of a judge is a misnomer. It is a fallacy. Lord Mansfield,
speaking of the discretion to be exercised in granting or denying bail said: "But
discretion when applied to a court of justice, means sound discretion guided by
law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague
and fanciful; but legal and regular."[9]
Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense
cpunishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether
summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, must actually be conducted
to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
"A summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of receiving and
considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose
of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes
of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into
any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or
against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what
further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may
be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such
evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross examination."[10] If a party is denied
the opportunity to be heard, there would be a violation of procedural due process.
That it is mandatory for the judge to require a hearing in a petition for bail is
emphasized in the following cases:
(1) People v. Sola decided in 1981.[11] In this case seven separate information for
murder were filed against the accused Sola and 18 other persons. After
preliminary investigation, the municipal trial court issued warrants for their arrest.
However without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. the court granted them the right
to post bail for their temporary release. Citing People v. San Diego,[12] we held:
"We are of the considered opinion that whether the motion for bail of a defendant
who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in
the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to
present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce
before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case
involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such
an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the
order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground."
(2) People v. Dacudao decided in 1989.[13] In this case, an information was filed
against the accused for murder, a non-bailable offense. The judge, without
conducting any hearing, granted bail on the ground that there was not enough
evidence to warrant a case for murder because only affidavits of the prosecution
witnesses who were allegedly not eyewitnesses to the crime were filed. We held:
"Whatever the court possessed at the time it issued the questioned ruling was
intended only for prima facie determining whether or not there is sufficient
ground to engender a well founded belief that the crime was committed and
pinpointing the persons who probably committed it. Whether or not the evidence
of guilt is strong for each individual accused still has to established unless the
prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has already presented. To appreciate
the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be
consulted or held. It is equally entitled to due process."
(3) People v. Calo decided in 1990.[14] In this case, the prosecution was scheduled
to present nine witnesses at the hearings held to determine whether the evidence
against the private respondents was strong. After hearing the fifth witness, the
respondent judge insisted on terminating the proceedings. We held: "The
prosecution in the instant case was not given adequate opportunity to prove that
there is strong evidence of guilt and to present within a reasonable time all the
evidence it desired to present."
(4) Libarios v. Dabalo decided in 1991[15] which involved an administrative
complaint against the respondent judge for ignorance of the law and grave abuse
of discretion. In this case, the respondent judge, without conducting any prior
hearing, directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused charged
with murder, fixing at the same time the bail at P50,000.00 each on the ground
that the evidence against them was merely circumstantial. We held: "Where a
person is accused of a capital offense, the trial court must conduct a hearing in a
summary proceeding to allow the prosecution to present, within a reasonable
time, all evidence it may desire to produce to prove that the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong before resolving the issue of bail for the temporary
release of the accused. Failure to conduct a hearing before fixing bail in the instant
case amounted to a violation of due process." The respondent judge was ordered
to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and warned to exercise more care in the performance
of his duties.
(5) People v. Nano decided in 1992.[16] In this case. the judge issued an order
admitting the accused in a kidnapping and murder case to bail without any
hearing. We held: "The prosecution must first be given an opportunity to present
evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the
basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in determining
whether the guilt of the accused is strong."
(6) Pico v. Combong, Jr. decided in 1992.[17] In this administrative case, the
respondent judge granted bail to an accused charged with an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua, without notice and hearing and even before the accused
had been arrested or detained. We held: "It is well settled that an application for
bail from a person charged with a capital offense (now an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua) must be set for hearing at which both the defense and the
prosecution must be given reasonable opportunity to prove (in case of the
prosecution) that the evidence of guilt of the applicant is strong, or (in the case of
the defense) that such evidence of guilt was not strong." The respondent judge
was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and warned to exercise greater care and
diligence in the performance of his duties.
(7) De Guia v. Maglalang decided in 1993,[18] the respondent judge issued a
warrant of arrest and also fixed the bail of an accused charged with the non
bailable offense of statutory rape without allowing the prosecution an opportunity
to show that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. Respondent judge
alleged that the only evidence on record the sworn statements of the complaining
witness and her guardian were not sufficient to justify the denial of bail. We held:
"It is an established principle that in cases where a person is accused of a capital
offense, the trial court must conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding, to allow
the prosecution an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all evidence
it may desire to produce to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong, before resolving the issue of bail for the temporary release of the accused.
Failure to conduct a hearing before fixing bail amounts to a violation of due
process." It was noted that the warrant of arrest was returned unserved and that
after the case was re-raffled to the complainant judge's sala, the warrant was set
aside and cancelled. There was no evidence on record showing whether the
approved bail was revoked by the complainant judge, whether the accused was
apprehended or whether the accused filed an application for bail. Hence, the
respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 instead of the usual
P20,000.00 that the court imposes on judges who grant the application of bail
without notice and hearing.
(8) Borinaga v. Tamin decided in 1993.[19] In this case, a complaint for murder
was filed against five persons. While the preliminary investigation was pending in
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, a petition for bail was filed by one of the accused
before the respondent judge in the Regional Trial Court. The respondent judge
ordered the prosecutor to appear at the hearing to present evidence that the guilt
of the accused is strong. At the scheduled hearing, the public prosecutor failed to
appear prompting the respondent to grant the application for bail. We held:
"Whether the motion for bail of an accused who is in custody for a capital offense
be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to present within a reasonable time all
evidence it may desire to introduce before the court may resolve the motion for
bail." The respondent judge was fined P20,000.00 and was warned that the
commission of a similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
(9) Aurillo v. Francisco decided in 1994.[20] In this administrative case, the
respondent judge issued two separate warrants of arrest against two persons
charged with murder and parricide, but fixed the amount of bail for each accused
without notifying the prosecution of any motion to fix bail nor of any order
granting the same. Citing People v. Dacudao,[21] we held: "A hearing is absolutely
indispensable before a judge can properly determine whether the prosecution's
evidence is weak or strong. Hence, a denial of the prosecution's request to adduce
evidence, deprives it of procedural due process, a right to which it is equally
entitled as the defense. A hearing is required to afford the judge a basis for
determining the existence of those factors set forth under Rule 114, Sec 6." The
respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000 with a warning that the
commission of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
(10) Estoya v. Abraham-Singson decided in 1994[22] In this case, an administrative
complaint was filed against the respondent judge, alleging, among others, that she
granted an application for bail filed by the accused charged with murder. The grant
was made over the objection of the prosecution which insisted that the evidence
of guilt was strong and without allowing the prosecution to present evidence in
this regard. We held: "In immediately granting bail and fixing it at only P20,000.00
for each of the accused without allowing the prosecution to present its evidence,
the respondent denied the prosecution due process. This Court had said so in
many cases and had imposed sanctions on judges who granted applications for
bail in capital offenses and in offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua without
giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt is
strong." The respondent judge was dismissed from service because the erroneous
granting of bail was just one of the offenses found to have been committed by her
in the aforesaid complaint.
(11) Aguirre v. Belmonte decided in 1994.[23] In this administrative case the
respondent judge issued warrants of arrest and, at the same time and on his own
motion. authorized the provisional release on bail of the accused in two criminal
cases for murder. The accused were still at large at the time the order granting
bail was issued. We held: "A hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to
an accused who is charged with a capital offense." The judge was ordered to pay
a fine of P25,000.00 with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in
the future will be dealt with more severely. He was meted a fine in a higher
amount than the usual P20,000.00 because it involved two criminal cases wherein
the respondent judge, "was not only the grantor of bail but likewise the applicant
therefor."
(12) Lardizabal v. Reyes decided in 1994.[24] In this administrative case, the
respondent judge issued an order directing the arrest of the accused charged with
rape and, motu proprio, fixed the bail of the accused in the amount of P80,000.00
without application on the part of the accused to be admitted to bail. When the
accused filed a motion to reduce bailbond, the respondent judge again, without
any prior notice and hearing, reduced the bail to P40,000.00. We held: "The rule
is explicit that when an accused is charged with a serious offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua, such as rape, bail may be granted only after a motion for that
purpose has been filed by the accused and a hearing thereon conducted by a judge
to determine whether or not the prosecution's evidence of guilt is strong." The
respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 with a warning that a
repetition of similar or the same offense will be dealt with more severely.
(13) Guillermo v. Reyes decided in 1995[25] involving an administrative complaint
against the respondent judge for granting bail to the two accused charged with
serious illegal detention. When the two accused first filed a joint application for
bail, the petition for bail was duly heard and the evidence offered by the accused
and the prosecution in opposition thereto were properly taken into account.
However, the respondent judge denied the application for bail on the ground that
it was premature since the accused were not yet in custody of the law. In a
subsequent order, the respondent judge, without conducting any hearing on the
aforestated application and thereby denying the prosecution an opportunity to
oppose the same, granted said petition upon the voluntary appearance in court of
the two accused. Respondent judge insisted that there was a hearing but the
proceeding he adverted to was that which was conducted when the motion for
bail was first considered and then denied for being premature. We held: "The error
of the respondent judge lies in the fact that in his subsequent consideration of the
application for bail, he acted affirmatively thereon without conducting another
hearing and what is worse, his order concededly lacked the requisite summary or
resume of the evidence presented by the parties and necessary to support the
grant of bail." The respondent judge was reprimanded because despite the
irregularity in the procedure adopted in the proceeding, the prosecution was
undeniably afforded the benefit of notice and hearing. No erroneous appreciation
of the evidence was alleged nor did the prosecution indicate its desire to introduce
additional evidence in an appropriate challenge to the aforestated grant of bail by
the respondent.
(14) Santos v. Ofilada decided in 1995.[26] In this case, an administrative
complaint was filed against the respondent judge, who, without notice and
hearing to the prosecution, granted bail to an accused charged with murder and
illegal possession of firearm. We held: "Where admission to bail is a matter of
discretion, a hearing is mandatory before an accused can be granted bail. At the
hearing, both the prosecution and the defense must be given reasonable
opportunity to prove, in case of the prosecution, that the evidence of guilt of the
applicant is strong, and in the case of the defense, that evidence of such guilt is
not strong." The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 with a
warning that a repetition of similar acts will warrant a more severe sanction.
(15) Sule v. Biteng decided in 1995.[27] In this administrative case, the respondent
judge, without affording the prosecution the opportunity to be heard, granted
with indecent haste the petition for bail filed by the accused charged with murder
because the accused "x x x voluntarily surrendered to the authorities as soon as
he was informed that he was one of the suspect (sic) x x x" We held: "With his
open admission that he granted bail to the accused without giving the prosecution
any opportunity to be heard, the respondent deliberately disregarded decisions of
this court holding that such act amounts to a denial of due process, and made
himself administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for which appropriate
sanctions may be imposed." The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of
P20,000.00 and warned that commission of the same or similar acts in the future
will be dealt with more severely.
(16) Reymualdo Buzon, Jr. v. Judge Tirso Velasco decided in 1996.[28] In this
administrative case, the respondent judge, without hearing nor comment from
the prosecution, granted bail to an accused charged with murder. Notably, no bail
was recommended in the warrant of arrest. We held: "When bail is a matter of
discretion, the judge is required to conduct a hearing and to give notice of such
hearing to the fiscal or require him to submit his recommendation. x x x Truly, a
judge would not be in a position to determine whether the prosecution's evidence
is weak or strong unless a hearing is first conducted." A fine of P20,000.00 was
imposed on the respondent judge with the stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
The aforecited cases are all to the effect that when bail is discretionary, a hearing,
whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be
conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence, or lack of it, against the
accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence
presented by the parties.
Since the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, the judge is mandated to
conduct a hearing even in cases where the prosecution chooses to just file a
comment or leave the application for bail to the discretion of the court. Hence:
(1) In the case of Gimeno v. Arcueno, Sr.,[29] an administrative complaint was filed
against the respondent judge for granting bail to one of the accused in a robbery
with homicide case without affording the prosecution a chance to be heard. The
respondent judge explained that he issued an order for the motion to fix bail but
the public prosecutor filed a comment instead which respondent judge thought
was adequate compliance with law. Respondent added that the evidence of guilt
of the accused, as disclosed by the records, was not so strong as to deny the
application for bail. In fact, the accused who filed for bail, together with three
others, were later dropped by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor from the
information for failure of the witnesses to positively identify them. We held: "The
grant of bail is a matter of right except in cases involving capital offenses when the
matter is left to the sound discretion of the court. That discretion lies, not in the
determination whether or not a hearing should be held but in the appreciation
and evaluation of the prosecution's evidence of guilt against the accused. x x x A
hearing is plainly indispensable before a judge can aptly be said to be in a position
to determine whether the evidence for the prosecution is weak or strong."
Although the respondent judge's explanation was not enough to completely
exculpate him, the circumstances, coupled with his sincere belief in the propriety
of his order warranted a mitigation of the usual sanction the Court imposes in
cases of this nature. The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00
and warned that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt
with more severely.
(2) In the case of Concerned Citizens v. Elma,[30] an administrative complaint was
filed against the respondent judge for granting bail to a person charged with illegal
recruitment in large scale and estafa in five separate information. The accused
filed a motion to fix bail and the respondent judge instead of setting the
application for hearing, directed the prosecution to file its comment or opposition.
The prosecution submitted its comment leaving the application for bail to the
discretion of the court. The respondent judge, in granting the bail of the accused
rationalized that in ordering the prosecution to comment on the accused's motion
to fix bail, he has substantially complied with the requirement of a formal hearing.
He further claimed that he required the prosecution to adduce evidence but the
latter refused and left the determination of the motion to his discretion. This Court
held, "It is true that the weight of the evidence adduced is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. However, such discretion may only be exercised after the
hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of
determining whether or not he should be granted liberty. x x x In the case at bar,
however, no formal hearing was conducted by the respondent judge. He could not
have assessed the weight of evidence against the accused Gatus before granting
the latter's application for bail." The respondent judge was dismissed from service
because he was previously fined for a similar offense and was sternly warned that
a repetition of the same or similar offense would be dealt with more severely.
(3) In the case of Baylon v. Sison,[31] an administrative complaint was filed against
the respondent judge for granting bail to several accused in a double murder case.
The respondent judge claimed that he granted the application for bail because the
assistant prosecutor who was present at the hearing did not interpose an
objection thereto and that the prosecution never requested that it be allowed to
show that the evidence of guilt is strong but instead, submitted the incident for
resolution. The respondent judge further claimed that the motion for
reconsideration of the order granting bail was denied only after due consideration
of the pertinent affidavits. We held: "The discretion of the court, in cases involving
capital offenses may be exercised only after there has been a hearing called to
ascertain the weight of the evidence against the accused. Peremptorily, the
discretion lies, not in determining whether or not there will be a hearing, but in
appreciating and evaluating the weight of the evidence of guilt against the
accused." The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 with a
stern warning that the commission of the same or similar offense in the future
would be dealt with more severely.
A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in
opposition to the application to grant and fix bail. "The importance of a hearing
has been emphasized in not a few cases wherein the court ruled that even if the
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the
motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask
searching questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt,
or the lack of it, against the accused."[32]
In the recent case of Tucay v. Domagas,[33] an administrative complaint was filed
against the respondent judge for granting bail to an accused charged with murder.
The application for bail contained the annotation "No objection" of the provincial
prosecutor and the respondent judge, without holding a hearing to determine
whether the evidence of the prosecution was strong, granted bail and ordered the
release of the accused from detention with instructions to the bondsman to
register the bond with the Register of Deeds within ten days. It was later found
out that the assessed value of the property given was short of the amount fixed
for the release of the accused. We held: "Although the provincial prosecutor had
interposed no objection to the grant of bail to the accused, respondent judge
should have nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing and diligently
ascertained from the prosecution whether the latter was not really contesting the
bail application. x x x Only after satisfying himself that the prosecution did not wish
to oppose the petition for bail for justifiable cause (e.g., for tactical reasons) and
taking into account the factors enumerated in Rule 114, Sec. 6 for fixing bail should
respondent judge have ordered the petition for bail and ordered the release of
the accused." Respondent judge herein was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00
and was given a stern warning that the commission of a similar offense in the
future would be dealt with more severely.
Corollarily, another reason why hearing of a petition for bail is required, as can be
gleaned from the abovecited case, is for the court to take into consideration the
guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the amount
of bail.[34] This Court, in a number of cases[35] held that even if the prosecution
fails to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail of an accused, the
court may still require that it answer questions in order to ascertain not only the
strength of the state's evidence but also the adequacy of the amount of bail.
After hearing, the court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary
of the evidence for the prosecution.[36] On the basis thereof, the judge should
then formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is
strong enough as to indicate the guilt of the accused. Otherwise, the order
granting or denying the application for bail may be invalidated because the
summary of evidence for the prosecution which contains the judge's evaluation of
the evidence may be considered as an aspect of procedural due process for both
the prosecution and the defense.
This court in the case of Carpio v. Maglalang[37] invalidated the order of
respondent judge granting bail to the accused because "Without summarizing the
factual basis of its order granting bail, the court merely stated the number of
prosecution witnesses but not their respective testimonies, and concluded that
the evidence presented by the prosecution was not "sufficiently strong" to deny
bail to Escano."
With the mounting precedents, this Court sees no reason why it has to repeatedly
remind trial court judges to perform their mandatory duty of conducting the
required hearing in bail applications where the accused stands charged with a
capital offense.
An evaluation of the records in the case at bar reveals that respondent Judge
granted bail to the accused without first conducting a hearing to prove that the
guilt of the accused is strong despite his knowledge that the offense charged is a
capital offense in disregard of the procedure laid down in Section 8, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-94.
Respondent judge admittedly granted the petition for bail based on the
prosecution's declaration not to oppose the petition. Respondent's assertion,
however, that he has a right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is
doing on account of the latter's familiarity with the case due to his having
conducted the preliminary investigation is faulty. Said reasoning is tantamount to
ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine
whether the guilt of the accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the
judge before whom the petition for provisional liberty will be decided. The
mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed upon the
prosecutor.
In the case of Montalbo v. Santamaria,[38] this Court held that the respondent
judge is duty bound to exercise judicial discretion conferred upon him by law to
determine whether in the case at bar, the proof is evident or the presumption of
guilt is strong against the defendant and to grant or deny the petition for
provisional liberty. It also held that a writ of mandamus will lie in order to compel
the respondent judge to perform a duty imposed upon him by law.
The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for granting bail to
the accused. It is the court's determination after a hearing that the guilt of the
accused is not strong that forms the basis for granting bail. Respondent Judge
should not have relied solely on the recommendation made by the prosecutor but
should have ascertained personally whether the evidence of guilt is strong. After
all, the judge is not bound by the prosecutor's recommendation. Moreover, there
will be a violation of due process if the respondent Judge grants the application
for bail without hearing since Section 8 of Rule 114 provides that whatever
evidence presented for or against the accused's provisional release will be
determined at the hearing.
The practice by trial court judges of granting bail to the accused when the
prosecutor refuses or fails to present evidence to prove that the evidence of guilt
of the accused is strong can be traced to the case of Herras Teehankee v. Director
of Prisons[39] where this Court gave the following "instructions" to the People's
Court,[40] thus:
"1) In capital cases like the present when the prosecutor does not oppose the
petition for release on bail, the court should, as a general rule, in the proper
exercise of its discretion, grant the release after the approval of the bail which it
should fix for the purpose;
2) But if the court has reasons to believe that the special prosecutor's attitude is
not justified, it may ask him questions to ascertain the strength of the state's
evidence or to judge the adequacy of the amount of bail;
3) When, however, the special prosecutor refuses to answer any particular
question on the ground that the answer may involve a disclosure imperiling the
success of the prosecution or jeopardizing the public interest, the court may not
compel him to do so, if and when he exhibits a statement to that effect of the
Solicitor General, who, as head of the Office of Special Prosecutors, is vested with
the direction and control of the prosecution, and may not, even at the trial, be
ordered by the court to present evidence which he does not want to introduce
provided, of course, that such refusal shall not prejudice the rights of the
defendant or detainee."[41]
The rationale for the first instruction was stated by this Court, as follows:
"If, for any reason, any party should abstain from introducing evidence in the case
for any definite purpose, no law nor rule exists by which he may be so compelled
and the court before which the case is pending has to act without that evidence
and, in so doing, it clearly would not be failing in its duties. If the Constitution or
the law plots a certain course of action to be taken by the court when certain
evidence is found by it to exist, and the opposite course if that evidence is wanting,
and said evidence is not voluntarily adduced by the proper party, the court's clear
duty would be to adopt that course which has been provided for in case of absence
of such evidence. Applying the principle to the case at bar, it was no more within
the power nor discretion of the court to coerce the prosecution into presenting
its evidence than to force the prisoner into adducing hers. And when both elected
not to do so, as they had a perfect right to elect, the only thing remaining for the
court to do was to grant the application for bail."
As for the second instruction, this Court stated that:
"The prosecutor might not oppose the application for bail and might refuse to
satisfy his burden of proof, but where the court has reasons to believe that the
prosecutor's attitude is not justified, as when he is evidently committing a gross
error or a dereliction of duty, the court must possess a reasonable degree of
control over him in the paramount interest of justice. Under such circumstance,
the court is authorized by our second instruction to inquire from the prosecutor
as to the nature of his evidence to determine whether or not it is strong, it being
possible for the prosecutor to have erred in considering it weak and, therefore,
recommending bail."
As for the third instruction, this Court declared:
"It must be observed that the court is made to rely upon the official statement of
the Solicitor General on the question of whether or not the revelation of evidence
may endanger the success of the prosecution and jeopardize the public interest.
This is so, for there is no way for the court to determine that question without
having the evidence disclosed in the presence of the applicant, disclosure which is
sought to be avoided to protect the interests of the prosecution before the trial."
It is to be recalled that Herras Teehankee was decided fully half a century ago
under a completely different factual milieu. Haydee Herras Teehankee was
indicted under a law dealing with treason cases and collaboration with the enemy.
The said "instructions" given in the said case under the 1940 Rules of Court no
longer apply due to the amendments introduced in the 1985 Rules of Court.
In the 1940 Rules of Court of the Philippines, the applicable provisions on "Bail"
provides, as follows:
"Sec. 5. Capital offenses defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in this rule,
is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at
the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death.
Sec. 6. Capital offenses not bailable. No person in custody for the commission of a
capital offense shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Sec. 7. Capital offense Burden of proof . On the hearing of an application for
admission to bail made by any person who is in custody for the commission of a
capital offense, the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong is on the
prosecution.
The above-cited provisions have not been adopted in toto in the 1985 Rules of
Court, as amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-94, since some phrases and
lines have been intercalated, as shown by the underscored phrases and
statements below:
"Sec. 6. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in these
rules, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission and
at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished with death.
Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, of an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. At the hearing of an application for
admission to bail filed by any person who is in custody for the commission of an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the
prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The
evidence presented during the bail hearings shall be considered automatically
reproduced at the trial, but upon motion of either party, the court may recall any
witness for additional examination unless the witness is dead, outside of the
Philippines or otherwise unable to testify."
It should be noted that there has been added in Section 8 a crucial sentence not
found in the counterpart provision, Section 7, Rule 110 of the 1940 Rules of Court.
The above-underscored sentence in Section 8, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Court,
as amended, was added to address a situation where in case the prosecution does
not choose to present evidence to oppose the application for bail, the judge may
feel duty-bound to grant the bail application. In such a case, the judge may well
lose control of the proceedings. In a sense, this undermines the authority of a
judge since all that the prosecution has to do to "force" the judge to grant the bail
application is to refrain from presenting evidence opposing the same. In effect,
this situation makes Sections 6 and 7 of the 1940 Rules of Court on "Bail"
meaningless since whether or not the evidence of guilt of a person charged with
a capital offense is strong cannot be determined if the prosecution chooses not to
present evidence or oppose the bail application in a hearing precisely to be
conducted by the trial judge for that purpose, as called for in the two sections. In
the event that the prosecution fails or refuses to adduce evidence in the scheduled
hearing, then a hearing as in a regular trial should be scheduled. In this regard, a
hearing in the application for bail necessarily means presentation of evidence, and
the filing of a comment or a written opposition to the bail application by the
prosecution will not suffice.
The prosecution under the revised provision is duty bound to present evidence in
the bail hearing to prove whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong
and not merely to oppose the grant of bail to the accused. "This also prevents the
practice in the past wherein a petition for bail was used as a means to force the
prosecution into a premature revelation of its evidence and, if it refused to do so,
the accused would claim the grant of bail on the ground that the evidence of guilt
was not strong."[42]
It should be stressed at this point, however, that the nature of the hearing in an
application for bail must be equated with its purpose i.e., to determine the
bailability of the accused. If the prosecution were permitted to conduct a hearing
for bail as if it were a full-dress trial on the merits, the purpose of the proceeding,
which is to secure provisional liberty of the accused to enable him to prepare for
his defense, could be defeated. At any rate, in case of a summary hearing, the
prosecution witnesses could always be recalled at the trial on the merits.[43]
In the light of the applicable rules on bail and the jurisprudential principles just
enunciated, this Court reiterates the duties of the trial judge in case an application
for bail is filed:
(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him
to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as
amended);
(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion
(Sections 7 and 8, supra);
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison, supra);
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be
denied.
The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room for doubt as to the
duties of the trial judge in cases of bail applications. So basic and fundamental is it
to conduct a hearing in connection with the grant of bail in the proper cases that
it would amount to judicial apostasy for any member of the judiciary to disclaim
knowledge or awareness thereof.[44] A judge owes it to the public and the
administration of justice to know the law he is supposed to apply to a given
controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance
with the statutes and procedural rules. There will be faith in the administration of
justice only if there be a belief on the part of litigants that the occupants of the
bench cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.[45]
Respondent judge herein insists that he could exercise his discretion in granting
bail to the accused since the Assistant Prosecutor signified in writing that he had
no objection to the grant of bail and recommended, instead, the bailbond in the
sum of P80,000.00. It is to be emphasized that although the court may have the
discretion to grant the application for bail, in cases of capital offenses, the
determination as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong can only be
reached after due hearing which, in this particular instance has not been
substantially complied with by the respondent Judge.
While it may be true that the respondent judge set the application for bail for
hearing three times, thus showing lack of malice or bad faith in granting bail to the
accused, nonetheless, this does not completely exculpate him because the fact
remains that a hearing has not actually been conducted in violation of his duty to
determine whether or not the evidence against the accused is strong for purposes
of bail. Normally, the Court imposes a penalty of P20,000.00 fine in cases where
the judge grants the application for bail without notice and hearing. In view
however of the circumstances of this case, a reprimand instead of the P20,000.00
would suffice.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge Leo M. Rapatalo, RTC,
Branch 32, Agoo, La Union, is hereby REPRIMANDED with the WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Filing of a petition for bail is standard for defense lawyers
The defense lawyers filed the petition for bail claiming that the evidence of guilt is
weak. For the millions of Filipinos who are following the developments of this case
on television and the Internet, this claim seems highly incredible since the evidence
of guilt appears to be stronger than the steel on a back hoe. But the filing of a
petition for bail is a standard tactic of defense lawyers. Let me explain.
This kind of petition is allowed under the Rules on Criminal Procedure and is in
keeping with the Constitutional presumption of innocence. Once such a petition
has been filed, the prosecution is required to prove that indeed evidence of guilt
is strong. After the hearings, the judge can deny or grant the petition for bail.
What happens if the petition for bail is granted?
If you remember the kidnapping case involving actor/congressman Dennis Roldan,
the judge ruled that the evidence of guilt was weak. He was allowed to post bail.
If the petition for bail is granted, the case will then proceed as in the normal
procedure:
• The prosecution will present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused.
All the testimonies and evidences presented during the hearings of the
petition for bail will become part of the hearing on the main issues.
The witnesses who testified during the hearings for the petition for bail
will not be required to appear and testify again during the hearings on
the main issues of the case.However, since the petition for bail has been
granted, the prosecution is put on notice that it should review its case
and strengthen its evidence.
• After the prosecution has presented its evidence, the accused may then
present evidence of his innocence. (Before presenting his evidence, he
can with the leave or consent of the court, submit what is called a
demurrer to evidence. This is essentially a motion to dismiss the case.
If the court grants the demurrer, the case is dismissed and the accused
is set free. If the court denies the demurrer, then the accused has to
present his evidence.)
For the accused and his lawyers therefore, filing a petition for bail is advantageous
for at least two reasons:
• If the petition is granted, he can be released from custody and enjoy
his liberty while the case is going on; and
• He can know whether in the mind of the judge the evidence of his guilt
is strong or not. If the judge denies his petition, he has the time to
strengthen his defense. He may even consider a plea bargain.
Let’s discuss some practical matters about bail:
[1] “Bail” is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law,
furnished by him or a
bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the
conditions hereinafter specified.
[2] The information filed by the fiscal contains at the lower portion a notation on
the bail recommended. The bail may be given in the form of corporate surety,
property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance. The legal term is “to post bail”
but “to pay the bail” is the layman’s expression.
No bail necessary for cases under the Rules on Summary Procedure (for example,
BP 22)
For cases falling under the Rules on Summary Procedure, the court does not issue
a warrant of arrest. Thus the posting of bail is not necessary (even if the
information states a recommended bail). For example, persons accused of
violation of BP 22 (bouncing checks) do not have to post bail. However, the court
may issue a warrant of arrest and require the posting of bail if the accused fails to
appear during the hearings.
Release on recognizance
[3] “ROR” (Release on recognizance) means that the accused will not post the bail
in money or security; instead, the accused will be released to the custody of a
government official like barangay officials or previously, in the case of minors, of
parents. The person to whom custody is entrusted will guarantee that the accused
will be present during the hearings.
Motion to reduce bail
[4] Sometimes, the accused and/or his family cannot afford to post the
recommended bail. The usual procedure is to file what is called “Motion to reduce
bail”. For example, if the recommended bail is sixty thousand pesos, the accused
may ask the court to reduce the bail to around twenty five thousand pesos. The
court may grant the motion to reduce bail but then it requires that the bail be paid
in cash.
Seeking the help of bail bondsman or “pyansador”
[5] If you know someone who has been arrested but who cannot afford to pay the
bail, you can ask the clerks and security guards at fiscal’s offices and/or the Hall of
Justice as to who the bail bondsmen (“pyansador”) are. These are men and women
who make a living out of helping persons accused of a crime to avail of the services
of surety companies. These companies will pay the recommended bail and the
accused has to pay only the premium. The “pyansador” will work on all the papers.
(Sometimes, the court staff or the police officers serving the warrant have
contacts with the “psyansador”. Once the accused has been arrested, the court
staff or the police officers will tell him that they can help work on their release.
Needless to say, these practices of court staff and police officers are against Civil
Service rules.)
Pictures needed
[6] The accused, in working on his bail, has to provide pictures of himself (front,
left and right profiles) which will be attached to the documents. There are
photographers who hang around fiscal’s offices and Halls of Justice, waiting for
clients. The “pyansador” also has contacts with photographers.
If the accused has not yet been arrested and is working on the posting of his bail,
he can go to a photo studio and ask that his pictures be taken. If he tells the photo
studio that he needs the pictures for posting bail, the studio already knows what
kind of pictures to take.
Posting bail to avoid being arrested; how to prevent being harassed
[7] To avoid being arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest, the accused posts
the recommended bail through his lawyer or relatives. In the meantime, the
accused hides or makes himself scarce. Once the bail has been posted, the
accused should always bring with him proof of payment of bail. This way, he can
avoid being harassed by the police. For the same reason, if the accused has been
arrested and then posts bail, he should carry with him a copy of the release order.
What to do if someone borrows money from you to post the bail
[8] If an accused approaches you for help in paying his bail and you want to make
sure that the money is returned to you eventually, ask that your name be indicated
in the official receipt as the payor of the bail.
Bail is cancelled if accused is absent during the hearings; motion to lift the warrant
of arrest and to reinstate bail
[9] If the accused who has posted bail fails to appear at a hearing, then the court
may order that his bail be forfeited. The court also issues what is called a “bench
warrant” for the arrest of the accused. If the accused has a valid reason for his
absence (like sickness or he was not informed of the hearing), he may file a
“motion to lift the warrant of arrest and to reinstate bail”.
But if the accused does not have any valid reason for being absent during the
hearings, he will be forced to post bail again.
Posted below are the complete provisions of “The Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure” on bail.
Rule 114 – Bail
Section 1. Bail defined. – Bail is the security given for the release of a person in
custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance
before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may
be given in the form of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or
recognizance.
Sec. 6. Capital offense defined. – A capital offense is an offense which, under the
law existing at the time of its commission and of the application for admission to
bail, may be punished with death.
Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. – No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted
to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the state of the criminal
prosecution.
Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. – At the hearing of an application for bail
filed by a person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the
burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during
the bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial but,
upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for additional
examination unless the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable
to testify.
Update as of June 30, 2014
A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC (March 18, 2014) “Guidelines for Decongesting Holding Jails
by Enforcing the Rights of Accused Persons to Bail and Speedy Trial”
The order fixing the amount of bail cannot be appealed. (Sec. 4)
Bail in offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment (Sec.
6):
Hearing is summary in nature; the prosecution must show that the evidence of
guilt is strong.
The accused may submit affidavits of witnesses. The prosecution may (1) examine
its witnesses on direct or (2) adopt the affidavits they executed during the
preliminary investigation as their direct testimonies.
The court must examine the witnesses on their direct testimonies or affidavits to
ascertain if the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. The court’s questions
need not follow any particular order and may shift from one witness to another.
The court must then allow counsels from both sides to examine the witnesses as
well. The court must hear afterwards the oral arguments of the parties.
Within 48 hours after the hearing, the court must issue an order containing a brief
summary of the evidence presented before it, followed by its conclusion of
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.
This conclusion must not be regarded as a pre-judgment on the merits of the case,
which will be determined only after a full-blown trial.