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Appeal number: EA/2017/0019

FIRST TIER TRIBUNAL


GENERAL REGULATORY CHAMBER
(INFORMATION RIGHTS)

Applicant

- and -

THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER Respondent

TRIBUNAL: JUDGE ALISON McKENNA

Sitting in Chambers
on 17 January 2018

RULING ON APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL

1. Permission to appeal is refused.

2. I have considered in accordance with rule 44 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-


tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 whether to review the
Tribunal’s Decision but have decided not to undertake a review, as I am not satisfied
that there was an error of law in the Decision.

REASONS
Background to Appeal
3. On 10 June 2017, a panel of the First-tier Tribunal (Information Rights)
promulgated its Decision in this appeal. The Tribunal upheld the Information
Commissioner’s several Decision Notices dated 10 January 2017 and dismissed the

1
appeal, finding that the Applicant’s requests were vexatious within the meaning of s.
14 (1) FOIA.

4. On 6 July 2017, the Applicant applied for permission to appeal. That


application was made in time but, for reasons which are unclear, it was not promptly
considered by a Judge. I apologise for that error, which I now rectify by issuing this
Ruling. Any renewed application to the Upper Tribunal will be subject to the usual
time limits, applicable as from the date of this Ruling.

The Application for Permission to Appeal

5. The Applicant alleges one error of law only. It is that the Tribunal was biased
against him, and so by its Decision allowed the public authority to rely on s. 14 FOIA
in order to prevent the Applicant from uncovering wrong-doing.

Ruling

6. Appeals from the First-tier Tribunal to the Upper Tribunal can only be made if
there is an arguable error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision. Rule 42 of the
Tribunal’s Rules requires a person requesting permission to appeal to identify an
alleged error of law in their application for permission to appeal. It is not possible to
appeal simply because you do not agree with the Tribunal’s decision.

7. I have considered whether the ground of appeal identified above is arguable.


This means that there must be a realistic (as opposed to fanciful) prospect of
success – see Lord Woolf MR in Smith v Cosworth Casting Processes Ltd [1997] 1
WLR 1538. I have concluded that the ground is not arguable because it relies on an
unsubstantiated allegation of bias against the Tribunal. The Applicant’s argument is
essentially circular: the Tribunal dismissed his appeal, therefore it must be biased.
That argument is my view insufficient to form the basis for an appeal for error of law.

8. I have considered the Tribunal’s Decision generally, and concluded that it


applies the correct legal test and makes findings of fact which were open to it on the
evidence. The Applicant makes clear in his application that he disagrees with the
Tribunal’s decision but he has not, in my view, identified an arguable error of law.
Accordingly, I must now refuse permission to appeal.

9. The Applicant is of course entitled to renew his application for permission to the
Upper Tribunal.

(Signed)

DATE: 17 January 2018


Alison McKenna
PRINCIPAL JUDGE

© Crown Copyright 2018

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