1

THE CENTENARY YEAR AND BEYOND— A STRATEGIC

PERSPECTIVE FOR THE CORPS

By

Lt Gen (retd) S. R. R.Aiyengar, PVSM, AVSM, VSM

“The vision of Signals Corps is to attain and maintain informatics ascendancy by

developing infostructure to cater for Network Centric Warfare in a digitized battlefield
of tomorrow. The aim and objective of Signals Corps is to make the Indian Army
Network Enabled Force by 2012 and Network Centric Force by 2017”

(Extracts from Official Website of Indian Army –Corps of Signals.)

Introduction

1. It has been rightly commented that the saga of wars has been a narrative of human
ingenuity and resilience amidst all adversities. The tales of valour epitomizes the ‘never
say die’ attitude of the soldier. The Corps can be justifiably proud of its alacrity and
professionalism of the highest order rubbing shoulders with their brethren from the
combat forces. In the words of one of the former SO-in-C’s, the Saga of the Corps has
been “a story of enterprise and endeavor, of accomplishment, and of courage and
consistency. The methods of signaling used in the yester years may appear very primitive
today, and one can only marvel at their ingenuity and determination.” The tasks on hand
for the Corps have been unenviable, given the thirst for signal communications and
keeping them ‘through’ always and every time. The accolades won testify the dexterity
and technical acumen punctuated with combat skills exhibited by all ranks of the Corps.
Some invaluable major pioneering efforts have been the “Area Grid Systems’, the
‘ASCON’, ‘Enterprise Wide Messaging Network’ and ‘Cellular Communications’.

2. As a part of the Centenary celebrations, it is planned to release the Third Volume of

The Corps History, a compilation done by a dedicated and committed Veteran of The
Corps-Maj Gen (retired) VK Singh. This painstaking compilation would surely reflect on
the rich and valuable contributions by all concerned during the period under review. Also
it would set the right framework for similar compilation of the ensuing years to the
present day .There is another monumental contribution by yet another visionary of the
Corps—Maj Gen (Retd) Yeshwant Deva,AVSM—“Dedicated to my son-The
Signalman” as he puts it. Laced with a strenuous research spread over two decades, this
 2

book titled “Sky is the Limit” is a first hand account of the ‘SIGNALS’ in Operation
Pawan, highlighting some very defining and inspiring acts of valor , dedication and
commitment our Corps personnel.

3. As we draw inspiration from the performance of the Corps in the years gone by, it is
also a good time to reflect on the future especially the challenges that lie ahead and how
we view the ‘the core competencies’ of the Corps in the coming years.. We should
logically arrive at a strategic perspective paving the way for what needs to be done
internally to culminate into a well thought out strategy for execution and as a long term
orientation of the Corps against the backdrop of warfare of the future. There is yet
another factor we have to contend with namely the influence of ‘technology’. It is tough
to make predictions especially of technology, but we do have some idea as to what are
likely in the years ahead. The speed and convergence of scientific and engineering
disciplines promise to fundamentally change the nature of deployment and redeployment,
and prolonged sustainement of forces. Discovery and innovative breakthroughs in
scientific areas related to high density- energy sources, superior material reliability, and
information and knowledge fusion across the operational, intelligence, and logistics
domain will vastly increase the combat readiness and operational effectives of the Armed
Forces. The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has become a reality and has
brought in significant changes in military doctrines at one level and in hardware at the
other. Military technologies are changing rapidly and their procurement and induction
demand a proper understanding of the wide array of the technology spectrum. We need
to factor all these aspects in the strategic perspective of the Corps

Looking Beyond the Horizon—Adapting to Netcentric Warfare(NCW)

Paradigm

4. Warfare over the past fifty years or so, and especially in the last decade, has undergone
dramatic changes. RMA has led to increasing battlefield transparency for commanders
down to soldiers, in the form of a digitized battlefield. It has changed the entire context of
surveillance, intelligence gathering, engagement of targets and decision support systems.
NCW is the requirement of the future as it brings Information superiority to the
forefront as an effective force multiplier. Metcalf Law states that the power of a network
increases as the square of the number of nodes in the network. Timely and accurate
availability of information increases its value manifold and results in sound decision
making. While powerful weapons platforms are obviously necessary for military
domination and deterrence, supremacy in the battles of the 21st century will hinge on
sophisticated command, control and communications systems that link the ‘shooters’ and
‘sensors’ together to achieve synergy through network centricity and effects-based
operations. The Battlefield Management System (BMS) is meant for communications
from the battalion headquarters forward to the companies and platoons. It will enable the
Commanding Officer to enhance his situational awareness and command his battalion
through a secure communications network with built-in redundancy. BMS involves big
numbers and will be fielded both in the plains and the mountains. Tactical
Communication System (TCS) for offensive operations -a mobile system that can
 3

'leapfrog' forward as the operation progresses into enemy territory will hopefully see the
light of the day soon.

5. Communication support topology in NCW environs is more infrastructural and

network based as against hierarchical. Dispersed and well spread out static and mobile
infrastructure forms the basic backbone fabric, with users hooking on at convenient
points to derive vertical and horizontal communication support. There would a large
number of disparate networks for different user-groups, but these would all converge at
some level. The convergence of Networks would not only enable real-time passage of
information from the source to the decision maker/ initiator of action, in the desired form,
but also allow sharing of information among different groups of users for achieving the
desired degree of synergy and synchronization of activities. The concept would have to
be extended to all the three services, joint war fighting, since NCW cannot succeed
without the requisite level of jointmanship. A Tri-Service Defence Communications
Network (DCN) is now under development and the proposals which have been received
are being evaluated. In essence, the power of NCW is derived from effective “Network
of Networks”. Mission effectiveness can be dramatically increased by robustly
networking a force, which improves information sharing and situational awareness. This
demands a “Seamless Integration of both Strategic and Tactical Networks.” Shared
situational awareness enables synergy amongst all components of battlefield but places a
very demand upon the bandwidth and quality of service. Command and control Centres
would be the prime targets in future wars. These requirements can be addressed by
having “Overlay Networks”. Especially in the Indian context, Communications and
informatics for the military has of necessity to be based on a multi-layered, multi-media
and multi systems infrastructure, with a view to ensure inherent attributes of
survivability, scalability and security. Towards this end ASCON (Army Static Switched
Communication Network) is the pioneer of our country’s enterprise- wide captive
Communication network—a first of its kind, and serves as the back bone of the overall
communication network. The future may beckon Indian Military to fight a war as part of
a coalition force, in the NCW environment. It is essential that adequate communication
infrastructure be developed to meet the challenges of Command, Control,
Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Inter-operability, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (C4I2SR), not only in terms of hardware, but software and most
importantly, the ‘Core Competencies of the Corps” in such an operational
environment.

Core Competencies/Thrust Areas of the Corps in the Days Ahead

6. Against the backdrop of what has been stressed in the preceding paragraphs of the
operational template, the following would emerge as the core competencies/thrust areas
of the Corps in the future. These by no means relegates many other competencies which
we have identified in the past and grouped under the general rubric of “Signalmanship”
and enhancing ‘professionalism’ of the Corps personnel. These revised core
competencies/ thrust areas are by no means exhaustive but surely are prime areas for
attention if we are carry out our assigned tasks in NCW scenario as ‘Information
Warriors’ which we all take great pride to be :-
 4

• Network management
• Information Ascendency/Dominence.
• Electro-Magnetic Spectrum Operations.
• Cyber Security Measures.
• Computer Network Defense;
• Formulation of a Corps Doctrine

Network Management

7. Network management refers to the activities, methods, procedures, and tools that
pertain to the operation, administration, maintenance, and provisioning of networked
systems. Very briefly these functions entail:-

• Operation deals with keeping the network (and the services that the network
provides) up and running smoothly. It includes monitoring the network to spot
problems as soon as possible, ideally before users are affected.
• Administration deals with keeping track of resources in the network and how
they are assigned. It includes all the "housekeeping" that is necessary to keep the
network under control.
• Maintenance is concerned with performing repairs and upgrades—for example,
when equipment must be replaced, when a router needs a patch for an operating
system image, when a new switch is added to a network. Maintenance also
involves corrective and preventive measures to make the managed network run
"better", such as adjusting device configuration parameters.
• Provisioning is concerned with configuring resources in the network to support a
given service. For example, this might include setting up the network so that a
new customer can receive voice service.

8. A common way of characterizing network management functions is FCAPS—Fault,

Configuration, Accounting, Performance and Security. Functions that are performed
as part of network management accordingly include controlling, planning, allocating,
deploying, coordinating, and monitoring the resources of a network, network planning,
frequency allocation, predetermined traffic routing to support load balancing,
cryptographic key distribution authorization, configuration management, fault
management, security management, performance management, bandwidth management,
Route analytics and accounting management. Data for network management is collected
through several mechanisms, including agents installed on infrastructure, synthetic
monitoring that simulates transactions, logs of activity, sniffers and real user monitoring.
In the past network management mainly consisted of monitoring whether devices were up
or down; today performance management has become a crucial part of the IT team's role
which brings about a host of challenges. There is a need to think of a dedicated
“Network Management Centre” to begin with at each of theatre hubs. Organizations
 5

for such tasks can be tailor made based on the requirement of the theatre. If suitably
constituted integrated theatre commands and functional (non-territorial) commands for
the Armed Forces as a whole come into being as a part of a greater transformation of the
Armed Forces at some future date, such organizations already in place would greatly
facilitate such a restructuring.

9. From the host of activities listed above it would be clear that our personnel
would have to be put through a very structured approach and training
schedule to fully comprehend the nature of tasks involved. This would have to
be followed by a very well monitored programme at the implementation level
overseen by specially trained personnel. The Corps has to give these aspects a
serious attention in the coming days. The Training Syllabi would need to
suitably incorporate these issues at both at the MCTE and our Training
Centers. A separate wing /faculty to be set-up at the MCTE and Training
Centres would be a step in the right direction to impart training on Network
Management related issues. Any adhocism in this regard will result in serious
voids in carrying out these exclusive functions. It is also for consideration for
an introduction of a new trade category to be called ‘Operator-Networks
‘ONW’. If for some reason new trade category is not accepted or delayed, it is
for consideration if any trade closest to this proficiency be re-designated and
oriented to Network Management Discipline. Such a discipline is essential for
a sound foundational knowledge of networks and systems. We need to
seriously introspect whether we are addressing all these issues holistically.

Information Ascendancy /Dominance

10. The important emphasis on today’s digitized battlefield is in the conection

between information and combat power battlefield. The key components of
this conection can be best described in an equation: Combat Power (Decision
Cycle) x Degree of Information Protection=Formation’s Combat Potential. By
ascendancy is generally meant, reaching a superior or dominant condition or
position. (The Concise OXFORD Dictionary). However more popularly
accepted terminology in the military parlance, it is also referred to by its near
equivalent term, ‘Information Dominance’. US Military Document FM100-6
defines Information Dominance as “the degree of information superiority that
allows the possessor to use information systems and capabilities to achieve an
operational advantage in a conflict or to control the situation in operations
short of war., while denying those capabilities to the adversary”. Without
doubt the ongoing RMA is one of information: what is it, who has it and how it
is transmitted. It is in this role of information dissemination, our Corps would
have a very big role to play. We are moving from a world of information
poverty, to that of abundance forming information economies based on
intelligence, creativity and innovation. The emerging model of the information
grid bears testimony to the fact of translating information superiority into
battle power by effectively linking knowledgeable entities in the battle space,
thereby improving situational awareness of commanders.Superior information
 6

is to be converted to superior knowledge which when combined with

organizational and doctrinal adaptations, relevant training and experience
and proper command and control mechanisms and tools will facilitate in
unassailable decision superiority . We in the Corps would have to be equally
proficient in all these adaptations.

11. Technology has changed the playing field in this regard as commanders no longer
have to rely purely only on intuition; they may still use it, but they don’t have to rely on it
absolutely. Through technology, a commander’s grasp of the battlefield can now be
exacted via electronic means available to him and can be applied at all levels from the
infantry platoon to the Joint Force Commander. Information Technologies (IT) can
overlay the relevant friendly and enemy pictures against the setting of the operational
environment. While it must also admitted that IT will never afford fool proof and
absolute visibility of the battlefield; but it will be possible to establish periodic
dominance by focusing resources at a particular time and place. Effective communications
over longer distances has always been the mainstay of quick reacting and quick responding
modern armies. Improvements in Battle Command can be made through the following: the
ability to command on the move inside the Network(s); combat identification to help prevent
fratricide; target identification and discrimination to reduce collateral damage; links to more
sensors and shooters; and communications relays to extend ranges for operations over more
complex terrain. The greater the decentralized nature of deployed combat units, their physical
dispersion, and the more complex the terrain, the more it is that units must rely on solid,
dependable, and reliable communications. One of the most important technological
necessities for the Soldier is advanced communications systems capable of delivering digital
voice and images over larger communications links. Multiple feeds from intelligence sensors
also empower Soldiers and give them access to the common operating picture. Advanced
networks will overcome poor intelligence and command and control limitations. The Corps
has a very important and vital role to play in providing such an integrated communication
infrastructure. Merely putting a logo “Information Warriors” on unit sign boards and DO pad
letters won’t get us far.

12. Information dominance must be fought for and won through a well planned and
practiced process, synchronized with other elements of the operation on hand.
It is not expected that a formation can ‘own’ the electromagnetic spectrum
throughout the battlefield, if only because, during contact, there are too many
claims on the available frequencies and means. But it is reasonable for the
commander to expect to dominate the Electromagnetic Spectrum within a
specified arena, if he is willing to allocate the resources. This brings into focus
another important core competency of the Corps i.e. ‘Conduct of
Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO)’.

Proficiency in the Conduct of Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations(EMSO)

13. Electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO) provide the resource necessary for
the implementation of the wireless portion of NCW. Understanding the operational process
in planning, managing, and employing this resource is critical to the conduct of all war
fighting functions. It consists of planning, operating and coordinating the use of the
 7

electromagnetic spectrum through operational, engineering, administrative and policy

implementation procedures. The objective of EMSO is to enable electronic systems that
rely on wireless connectivity to perform their functions in the intended environment
without causing or suffering unacceptable frequency fratricide. EMSO is largely a
hierarchal process that is bottom driven for requirements, but top fed for spectrum
resources. Coordination between Electronic warfare (EW), operations and other known
users is imperative in order to maximize use of the electromagnetic spectrum, hereafter
simply referred to as ‘spectrum.’ Spectrum management consists of evaluating and
mitigating electromagnetic environmental effects, managing frequency records and
databases, deconflicting frequencies, frequency interference resolution, allotting
frequencies, and EW coordination to ensure electromagnetic dependent systems operate
as intended. . The objective of Army spectrum management is to ensure access to the
frequency spectrum in order to support users conducting the Army’s operational mission.
Spectrum management enables the allotment of the vital, but limited, natural resources
that directly support operational forces throughout the world. The Army is dependent
upon the use of the radio spectrum to communicate from the strategic to the tactical
levels of war to carry out its assigned responsibilities for national security. Spectrum
management enables electronic systems to perform their functions in the intended
environment without causing or suffering unacceptable interference.

14. The Corps of Signals under its aegis carries out this very important function of
Spectrum Management. Its proficiency in carrying out this task would include among
other things:-

• Identifying the user’s spectrum service requirements (what, when, and where).
• Identifying which communications networks and spectrum dependent systems
require frequency
• Allocations to meet the user’s needs.
• Ensuring the availability of, and access to, the spectrum to meet the user’s
requirements.
• Protecting spectrum resources from misuse by stringently adhering to national,
international and Army policies.

15. EMSO is often addressed as an afterthought in the acquisition and operational

processes. Part of the mission of those that perform this function is to educate others on
the value of spectrum operations. This is particularly important at the tactical level, where
the wireless portion of the network is the key enabler of the network enabled force.
Commanders must realize that spectrum is a resource just like fuel or ammunition but it
cannot be touched or seen. The use of spectrum must be addressed early and throughout
acquisition, planning, and operational processes in order to ensure the execution of
continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability, and civil
support tasks. The spectrum is a resource, and while non-expendable, it is finite. A
limited number channels, or frequencies, can be accommodated at any given time in a
given area. While it is true that emerging systems are more efficient users of bandwidth
they also use more bandwidth to pass larger amounts of data which leads to frequency
congestion because never before have so many emitters been present in an area of
 8

operations. Spectrum managers must have the ability to manage and monitor the
spectrum for both communications systems and non-communications systems. This
includes radars, sensors, and robots to name a few. This must also encompass all
dimensions of the operational environment including airborne platforms such as surrogate
satellites, unmanned aerial platforms, space platforms and subterranean systems. Corps of
Signals personnel entrusted with this important function must appreciate the enormity of
the management functions comprising the three interacting and continuous functions of:
Planning, Coordinating, and Operating. During full spectrum operations these functions
occur concurrently. My interaction with some officers who have recently come out of
MCTE (after SODE course)doesn’t give me an assurance that we are paying sufficient
attention to this vital aspect.

Cyber Security Measures

16. We are increasingly dependent on computers, networks, and cyberspace resources to

accomplish military missions. Manifested via email, the web, databases, applications,
command and control messages, and myriad other form, the health and status of
cyberspace affects everyone. Information Technology (IT) is a strategic asset driving the
Armed Forces towards a culture change such that we are all “operators” in cyberspace.
As operators, each of us must maintain an appropriate level of situational awareness in
cyberspace. With our more and more dependence on computers, networks, internet and
ICT, we need to pay more attention to Cyber Space Security in so far as it affects
National Security. The most advanced armies in the world like the US also face 3,000 to
4,000 attempts a year to hack their networks. As our Army boosts its InfoTech levels, we
also become more vulnerable to such threats. Future conflicts will be fought by 'networks'
in digitized battlefield environments. Both China and Pakistan, for instance, are
bolstering their cyber-warfare or information warfare capabilities at a rapid clip. China, in
particular, has made cyber-warfare one of its topmost military priorities, with Chinese
hackers breaking into sensitive computer networks of the US, UK, Germany and even
India on a regular basis. It is a truism of the day that anti-technology is very closely
following technology at every level, as a result of which enemy hackers are active at all
times trying technology to probe and penetrate our networks. In this era of Cyber
Warfare, Information assurance is indeed a major challenge for the Corps of Signals. The
threats to information are not just from anti-technology, but even careless humans can
cause a major damage by certain unintentional actions. In the area of cyber space, the
battle between hackers and defenders is an ongoing process, influenced by latest
technological developments. Due to the dynamic nature of threats, institutional measures
have to be in place. A report in the US-based Defence Systems magazine found that there
were 25 million new strains of ‘malware’ created in 2009. That equals a new strain of
‘malware’ every 0.79 seconds. The report underlines how the current cyber threat
environment is dramatically changing and becoming more challenging as the clock ticks.

17. The Corps has been tasked to oversee the implementation of Cyber Security policies
laid down from time to time. A major initiative has been taken at the Army Headquarters-
to set up an Army Cyber Security Establishment (ACSE) with similar Cyber Security
cells being formed at all Headquarters right up to Divisional levels. Apart from creating
 9

cyber-security organizations down to the division-level to guard against cyber warfare

and data thefts, the Army top brass has also underlined the urgent need for "periodic
cyber-security audits" by ACSE. In security matters, there is nothing like absolute
security. We are only trying to build comfort levels because security costs money and
lack of it costs much more. Comfort level is a manifestation of efforts as well as
realization of their effectiveness and limitation. At the national level, the Department of
Information Technology has established the Indian Computer Emergency Response
Team (CERT-In) to protect the Indian cyber space. Indian Army too has taken a similar
initiative to establish CERT-Army to protect its info bearing networks from cyber threats.
Its mission is to enhance the security of Army's Information Infrastructure through
proactive action and effective collaboration. Its charter is, to become the Army's most
trusted referral agency for responding to computer security incidents as and when they
occur. The CERT-Army will also assist units and formations in implementing proactive
measures to reduce the risks of computer security incidents. The enormity of the tasks
envisaged suggests that these be functions must be decentralized to Brigade levels and
have a responsive both pro- active and reactive services as for forward as possible
instead of keeping such essential functions at the apex Army Headquarters level only.
However, Security Quality Management Services to include Risk Analysis, Security
Consultancy, Education and Training, Awareness Building, Product Evaluation and
Certification, can and should be coordinated at the Apex level. Our Corps personnel
engaged in such functions would need to be trained adequately and appropriately to
handle such sensitive tasks. Such training would need to be dovetailed in the scheme of
training syllabi at both at the MCTE and Training Centers to include all ranks. At the
MCTE, the present ‘Cipher Wing’ with its exiting infrastructure could be re-orientated to
teach also issues related to Cyber Security. It would also imply posting some additional
instructional staff suitably trained themselves on cyber security matters. With the reduced
load on Ciphers it would be an optimum utilization of these training assets we already
have at the MCTE.

Computer Network Defence(CND)

18. Computer Network Defense (CND), includes actions taken via computer networks
to protect, monitor, analyze, detect and respond to network attacks, intrusions, disruptions
or other unauthorized actions that would compromise or cripple defense information
systems and networks. The networks that result from open systems architectures are
generally referred to as ‘information grids’. They allow the users to gain access, process,
and transport information in near real time to anyone else on the network on the demand
of the user; they support local and area network operations. They are also the basic
components of larger grid networks that, when interconnected, support regional, theater,
and ultimately a global grid that is also referred to as the ‘infosphere’. Computers control
connectivity so quickly that wasteful and inefficient permanent or full period connectivity
is no longer required; an example could be cellular telephone networks where mobile
users maintain continuous virtual connectivity even though they are connected through
numerous links and nodal switching centers as they move during the course of a single
call. This allows a full range of user service to be distributed across vast areas—hence
these distributed grid networks are also extremely redundant; individual users have
 10

hundreds of computer selectable paths available vice one or two, making their service
many times more reliable.

19. Emerging open systems architectures offer significant improvements in the flow and
processing of information; however, their vulnerability to attack is increased. It must be
ensured that both passive and active command and control-protect operations are
conducted continuously to preserve the integrity and security of networks and nodal C4
systems from hostile attack. For example, powerful encryption and key management
systems provide passive protection of data while active protection may include
technical personnel monitoring systems to detect and locate unauthorized network
intrusion or attacking an enemy jammer with anti-radiation missiles.

20. Though these would fall within the overall ambit of ‘Network Management”, CND
would require accurate, custom rules with dedicated and qualified specialists who would
be manning the various monitoring systems for effective intrusion detection. No doubt
specific Firewall and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) can help control access even if
an attacker has gained access inside the Network perimeter, personnel engaged on such
tasks would require an understanding of the network protocol including the valid
structures and value ranges. It is in these aspects that we need to train our corps personnel
engaged in such tasks. Though it may be a specialized job but the fact, the Corps has
been assigned the role of a watchdog on Cyber Security; it is incumbent that we address
all aspects of Network Security in a holistic manner. A defence in depth approach to
secure our critical Infostructure including identifying and remediating existing
vulnerabilities in our current network architecture is the need of the hour. It is for
consideration that we create a separate Faculty in the MCTE, Mhow to address all issues
related to Network management and its various facets including Network Security. The
proposed Faculty should be also tasked to conduct capsular courses on “Cyber Audit”
Such audits can be considered as infrastructure review, best practices review and review
of existing cyber security policies in conjunction with ACSE. By both manually as well
as using software tools we should be able review both hardware and software
configurations with respect to routers, firewalls, servers and desktop and other
networking devices to ensure that they match the organizational policies and
requirements. The proposed “Network and Security Laboratory” to be set-up at the
MCTE would be a very useful training and testing facility. It can also be used to validate
all our policies pertaining to Physical, Perimeter, LAN, Host, Application and Data
Security related issues. Similar training facilities should also be created in our Training
Centres.

Formulation of a Corps Doctrine –MCTE’s Special role

21. Put most simply, doctrine is “that which is taught”. Doctrine provides a common
frame of reference across the military. It helps to standardize operations, facilitating
readiness by establishing common ways of accomplishing military tasks. Doctrine links
theory, history, experimentation, and practice. Its objective is to foster initiative and
creative thinking. Doctrine provides the military an authoritative body of statements on
how military forces conduct operations and provides a common lexicon for use by
 11

military planners and leaders. It has been rightly described as “as a common vehicle for
expression and a common plane of thought” (Sir Julian Corbett-A Maritime historian
and strategist-1854-1922) Flowing from the central Army doctrine should emerge the
Corps Doctrine. It should ideally be descriptive rather than prescriptive, requiring
judgment in application. It does not establish dogma or provide a checklist of procedures,
but is rather an authoritative guide, describing how The Corps would go about meeting its
commitments and tasks, As such it should be definitive enough to guide our Corps
activities, yet versatile enough to accommodate a wide variety of situations. Evolving in
response to changes in the strategic and technological background, in the light of
experience, it influences the way in which our communication philosophies and plans
have been developed, units are organized and trained and equipment procured. It is for
consideration if one such attempt be made to formulate a concise Corps Doctrine which
could guide all the corps members as to what is expected in carrying out variety of tasks
undertaken by the Corps. Knowledge and understanding of the Corps Doctrine, and its
application would aid in clarity of thought and unity of effort in the chaos of crisis and
war. The Corps doctrine should aim in providing a common approach and a way of
thinking, which is not bound by prescriptive rules. This will lead through training to
consistent behavior, mutual confidence and properly orchestrated collective action,
without constraining individual initiative. It is for considerations that a select body of
acknowledged professionals of Corps headed preferably by the Commandant of MCTE
could be assigned to draft the Corps Doctrine .The draft Doctrine so formulated could be
presented at the CSO’s/Commandant’s conference and put out on the Signals website
for inviting comments before finalizing it .

22. Our approach to Doctrine now needs to adapt to the challenges the Indian Army is
envisaging in the Transformation and Modernization processes it is undertaking. It is an
opportunity for the Corps to develop a process to match changing technology and
changing concepts of warfare. We need to take care not to discard what has been
validated through practice without a complete examination. Conversely it will not be
possible to implement new processes without adequate testing. This will entail
experimentation and analysis not just with current equipment and lessons learnt but
crucial to our doctrine’s long term success will be the inclusion of new and emerging
technologies. The process should centre on activities such as: development and testing
through simulation of new and modified doctrinal concepts, testing through exercises of
simulation proven concepts ideally with a well developed electronic opposition and
finally the introduction into service of the Doctrine. However, this is only the beginning.
Throughout the process and after the Doctrine has been introduced into service, feedback
will continue to drive the doctrine process.MCTE can play a very crucial role to play to
provide a sound foundation for the development of a dynamic doctrinal process which
has a rapid connection between concept and implementation. This important relationship
is seen at Figure 1. In an attempt to meet this challenge it is recommended that, MCTE
should establish a ‘Development Wing’. The ‘Development Wing, (Figure 2) is to
consist of three cells of expertise: Training Development, Doctrine and Innovation.
The aim of this Wing is to compress the current cycle between these elements. But
Innovation will lead. Ideas from all sources will be drawn together and validated within
the Innovation Cell using the existing and some newly proposed Labs in the MCTE as a
 12

part of ‘modernization’ to test the concepts. Whether a solution is to be technical,

procedural or doctrinal, it will be passed off to the Training Development cell for
inclusion in courses or to Doctrine for implementation. Importantly, this Wing will
ensure one point of focus that is held accountable to both coordinate the work and
promulgate the results on behalf of the SO-in-C. It must have the support of the
concerned sections of the Signals Directorate to ensure that the proposed wing being
suggested at the MCTE is not alone in these efforts; instead it should be an inclusive
process by a range of agencies based on teamwork. It will require a team effort across the
Corps utilizing the MCTE’s resources Given the importance of the tasks entailed , it
should function directly under the Deputy Commandant of MCTE , who is also the
‘Chief Instructor’ of the MCTE. A ‘Core Group’ comprising of the Dy Comdt MCTE,
and all the three ADG’s at the Dte Gen of Signals( ADG SS, ADG TacC, ADG T)should
carry out a bi-annual review of the working of the ‘Development Wing’ and submit its
report to the SO-in-C and Comdt MCTE. ADG Systems (preferably a Signals Officer)
with DG IS should also be invited to attend the deliberations of the Core Group
mentioned above.

23. A common refrain that one hears is that the general shortage of officers in the Trg
establishment does not permit pooling officers from trg faculties/wings for such tasks
outside their instructional duties. With the formal approval of re-employment now being
open to ‘Brigadiers’, it may well be an option open, to seek out those who otherwise are
very experienced and with sufficient seniority and for some reason, due to lack of
vacancies available or victims of the “quantification’ system now in vogue for
promotions, could be chosen to head such set-ups and assist the Corps, to be usefully
engaged and contribute in such tasks. It will be appreciated that such tasks also demand
experience and expertise and we could identify such officer’s as they retire, to opt for
reemployment avenues. Many of our retiring/retired Brigadiers would eminently be
suited to pursue such intellectually motivating assignments. Also working under the Dy
Comdt of MCTE should pose no problem of inter-se seniority etc. I also notice few of our
very senior veterans settled at MHOW whose guidance can also be sought informally.
Such an institunalized set up will provide a coherent and all inclusive framework in
Doctrine development. Temporary attachments of officers from the Faculty/Wings for
this purpose are NOT being recommended for obvious reasons as they also bring in ad-
hocism and lack of continuity. Hard scale authorizations of officers in the MCTE are
already in vogue and hence any further reduction in the availability of officers for
instructional duties will seriously affect the functioning of MCTE.
 13

CONCEPTS/
INNOVATION

DOCTRINE TRAINING

Figure 1: Innovation Cycle

DEV
WING

DOCTRINE INNOVATION
TRG DEV

Figure 2: Development Wing

Conclusion

24. We are passing through very interesting times and are at the threshold of a revolution
in communication and information infrastructure. Improvement of communication
infrastructure in the forward combat zone is also underway. The new systems will bestow
on all Corps members much bigger responsibilities in all the spheres including training,
project implementation, equipment procurement and maintenance. Information has been
acknowledged as the present currency of power. Unlike in the past where the elements of
power only included military, economic and diplomatic factors, in the 21st century,
information is rapidly assuming a place of primacy in the conduct of foreign policy. It is
a force multiplier, a decision –tool, a central theme for an offensive campaign and so
much more. But to be useful we need to have its assurance and to be used correctly. The
underlying technologies of networked computer hardware and software are not problem
free. They are susceptible to massive failure. But unlike physical networks that can be
engineered to be robust against natural events, random failures and even local sabotage,
information systems are particularly vulnerable to malicious acts. Attacks can exploit the
connections that are a major virtue and failures in one part of the system can propagate
widely. The number of attacks on information systems is increasing, as is the severity of
 14

their impact. The exploitation of these vulnerabilities can result in new strategic threats to
national security. To fight and win tomorrow’s wars, we must prepare now by improving
our ability to detect, investigate and respond to cyber attacks and by exploring more
effective ways of fostering grater security of networks so that they are less vulnerable to
attack.

25. Information Ascendancy/Domination and along with it Information assurance have

assumed great importance. We need to create state-of –art infostructure which is robust,
reliable and available to ensure maximum information dessimination.To enable the Corps
to act as a catalyst to make the Indian Armed Forces Network Centric, would require a
superb world class infostructure ably supported by matching organizations and training of
our Corps personnel. EW, Signal Intelligence and Cyber Security will have to be given
greater impetus than hitherto fore. As we transit from “Information Providers” to
“Information Warriors”, we also need to make some mental and attitudinal changes and
have a relook at out core competencies. We need to also initiate ways and means to
ensure Network availability under worst conditions. Along side we need to ensure in joint
working scenario inter-operability and systems integration to ensure seamless networking
with the other two Services and also at the National Level is achieved. This would be
acme of our professionalism and commitment. I am confident that the Corps as its
celebrates its Centenary will be well poised and come out with flying colours in the
highest traditions of the Corps as true Information Warriors of Digitized battlefields of
tomorrow.

26. We in the Signals Corps must continue to strive hard in developing the trust,
teamwork and confidence necessary to establish a truly doctrinal process to match the
dynamic nature of technology and the modern battlefield based on Net centricity. The
battlefield and particularly the area of operations must be considered as a multi-
dimensional space which includes its length, depth, breadth, the dimension of time and
now Electromagnetic Spectrum. As a consequence of the increased impact of the
Spectrum on combat, EMSO has risen in prominence. This prominence is not only
because they provide an integral element of reconnaissance through signal
intelligence/electronic support and the provision of ‘information grid’ to deliver the
information upon which decisions can be made, but now the strike/fire element can be
satisfied through electromagnetic and directed energy weapons. We have entered a new
and challenging era of a true electronic combat capability. We must support this potential
with the teamwork and trust necessary to achieve it. The catch cry across the Corps must
be ‘Achieving Excellence through teamwork’

TEEVRA CHAUKAS.