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Climate change and the nuclear securitisation of UK energy policy

By David Toke, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Aberdeen,

School of Social Science, Edward Wright Building, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen AB24
3QY, davidtoke21@gmail.com

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between energy security, neoliberalism and climate change in the
development of UK energy policy from 2003 to 2011, with a particular focus on nuclear power. A
‘securitisation’ discourse has been associated with the promotion of nuclear interests, although the Government
policy storylines have been associated as much with changing party political priorities as with justifying
instrumental policy objectives. However, the extent to which neoliberal electricity arrangements will be
overridden in the wake of the securitising agenda is uncertain, due to the embedded nature of neoliberal
practices.

Keywords: climate change, nuclear power, energy security, securitisation, neoliberalism

In July 2011 the UK Government published its long-awaited White Paper on Electricity
Market Reform (DECC 2011a). According to the secretary of State for Energy, Chris Huhne,
‘These reforms will yield the biggest transformation of the market since privatisation,
securing our future electricity supplies and heralding the shift toward a low-carbon economy’
(DECC 2011a, 4). The policy led on from a move, initiated by the Blair Government five
years earlier, to develop a programme of new nuclear power stations. This paper analyses
these policy developments as involving ‘securitisation’ of energy policy, and intervention in
the market against the grain of a British energy system previously dominated by a neoliberal
competitive discourse.

The study of this topic is important for at least two reasons. First, because of the empirical
importance of the issue in environmental political studies. Second, is the theoretical issue of
the interaction of securitisation and neoliberalism. There has been considerable analysis of
neoliberalism (Harvey 2005) and also of ‘securitisation’ (Buzan et al 1998). However, less
work has been done on the interaction of these two trends. Both are powerful forces, but what
is the outcome when they interact? This is the key research question studied here. One case
study will not generate an all-purpose generalisation, but it could generate a hypothesis that
could be used as a basis for study of other cases involving interacting of securitisation and
neoliberalism.

Neoliberalism, as will be discussed, is a dominant mode of economic thinking that places a

primacy on promoting competitive economic arrangements, whereas securitisation is a
process where policy measures are taken which override ‘business as usual’ conditions, in
defence of the state or nation itself. This account will begin by describing the nature of neo-
liberalism. Then there will be a discussion of the nature of securitisation and its relationship
with interest. The methods will then be outlined, focussing on use of analysis of storylines
and its relationship with the politics of interests. This will be followed by the analysis of UK
energy policy as a case study. The analysis will begin in the period before the Labour
Government signalled a priority for development of new nuclear power stations and end with
the publication of the Electricity Market Reform White Paper.

Neoliberalism
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According to Harvey (2005: 2, 65) neoliberalism involves ‘an institutional framework

characterised by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the
state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practice………
Competition…is held to be a primary virtue. The ground rules for market competition must
be properly observed, of course. In situations where such rules are not clearly laid out or
where property rights are hard to define, the state must use its power to impose or invent
market systems…’

There is widespread agreement that under neoliberalism the state has to take up an organising
role in defining the nature of the markets, something that differentiates neoliberalism from
laissez faire (Barry et al 1996: 10; Thrift 1999: 277-278). Hence when the UK privatised the
British electricity system at the end of 1980s it established a set of rules to define and
organise competition, the rationale for which was that this would lower costs for the
electricity consumer. Electricity generators, as well as electricity suppliers, were expected to
raise finance for investments from private markets. The Regulator set standards for electricity
distribution which remained a natural monopoly. Rule changes were agreed by the Regulator
in conversation with a network of stakeholders. This type of decision making, involving
decisions being delegated to markets and non-government networks has been characterised as
the ‘hollowed out state’ (Rhodes 2007).

In Britain, the liberalised arrangements appeared to deliver low energy prices for the
consumer until around 2004, when energy prices began to increase, sometimes with alarming
volatility. This situation generated, as will be discussed, a situation where not only was a
threat to ‘security’ used to justify new types of Government intervention, but that intervention
was introduced with an aim of constructing nuclear power stations. Thomas (2006b) has
argued that the problem of assuring security of supply was leading to market liberalisation
being abandoned in all but name around the world. Yet, as may be indicated in this case
study, this argument may have its limits since under liberalised arrangements embedded
practices reduce the ability of particular Governments to implement their choices about
technological outcomes.

This emphasises an important point. This is that neoliberalism should not be discussed merely
as a discourse, but also as involving non-discursive practices which arise in association with
the discourse. Analytical attention therefore has to be given to these non-discursive practices.

Under neoliberalism special markets are established in order to pursue non-market objectives
such as renewable energy development. Different versions of neoliberalism exist, with some
favouring state action in support of allowing greater competitive possibilities for small and
independent companies, while Anglo-Saxon versions involve the creation of artificial markets
that appear to favour large electricity companies (Toke and Lauber 2007). Certainly, when the
Labour Government in the UK opted to introduce a major renewable energy programme,
aiming to generate first 10 per cent of electricity from renewables (and extended by 2003
towards an ‘aspiration’ for 20 per cent), it was done in ways which at least kept up the
appearance of market competition. Trading in renewable energy certificates was established
with the aim of delivering the renewable energy whereby the market decides what renewable
energy is supplied at what price. In Germany, on the other hand, ‘feed-in tariff’ prices to be
paid to renewable energy generators were set by the Government.
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Securitisation

As will be discussed, ‘security’ issues became an increasingly important part of the energy
policy discourse in the UK as the first decade of the 21st century wore on. It has been
associated with policies that constrain the neo-liberal approach to electricity policy and is
closely associated with efforts to steer UK policy to encourage the construction of a new
generation of nuclear power stations. This ‘securitisation’ is familiar in other areas of policy:

‘If by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat the
securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise
be bound by, we are witnessing a case of securitization’ (Buzan et al, 1998, 25)
In addition to ‘breaking free’ of rules, securitising actors may also be interested in instituting
new rules. In this case, for example, this may involve new rules to make nuclear storage safe
or to reduce the likelihood of nuclear accidents.
Securitisation, therefore could seem an apt way to analyse the politics of how the neo-liberal
electricity strategy has been countermanded. Perhaps we can talk of a struggle between two
powerful trends; neoliberalism and securitisation. It is thus possible to talk about
securitisation, as in the case of neoliberalism, being seen as a discourse. However, we need to
make a careful analytical distinction since securitisation may be seen as a normatively laden
discourse applied to a specific situation, but it is also held to be a theoretical framework for
analysis of securitisation as a process which does not necessarily involve making normative
judgements (Taurek 2006). Arguably, the same could be said for neoliberalism, that is it is
deployed as a normatively laden discourse but also it can be used as a framework of
theoretical analysis.

Hitherto, though there have been many discussions about energy security, they are principally
oriented towards either measuring it or discussing the ‘essence’ of energy security (Stirling
1993, Stirling 1994, Awerbuch and Berger (2003), Chalvatzis and Hooper (2009), Löschel et
al 2010a and 2010b, Bradshaw 2010). There has been much less focus on studying how
energy security appears as a discourse or discourses and achieves policy hegemony. In fact
energy is problematic for securitisation theory. ‘No easy fit can be found between energy and
existing security theories’ says Ciuta (2010, 139). Its application comes in many different
shapes and sizes, sometimes ‘banal’.

[E]nergy security policies remain non-specific as security policies. If market failure is the key
problem for energy security, then the solution is the application of generic policies designed
to improve market functionality. Similarly, if terrorist attacks against energy infrastructure are
the problem, then energy security policy is not about energy but about terrorism, (Ciuta 2010,
134)

In the UK Government’s discourses on energy policy the meaning of energy security varies to
include a lack of generating capacity, too much imported natural gas, volatile energy prices,
even the need to reduce carbon emissions (Hendry 2012). Nevertheless, as appears in the
later analysis, energy policy in the UK became securitised in so far as new policies
(particularly a new emphasis on nuclear power) were supported on the basis of increasing
threats to the UK. The objective of having secure energy has always been an axiom of British
policy, but it has been perceived (by the Government) as being actively threatened since
around 2005 with potentially damaging consequences for the British state. In this sense
energy policy has become ‘securitised’ in that at least some aspects of the very existence of
Britain or its survival could be under threat. The dangers are described as increasing reliance
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on imported natural gas and rising prices (Department of Trade and Industry 2006,4),
underlying which are fears that one day we could be reliant on gas from unstable Middle
Eastern countries or Russia opening the door even to political blackmail (Chatham House
Commission 2008, 53-54). On other occasions threats to the ability of the country to ‘keep
the lights on’ implies also a looming threat to the physical well-being of the country if basic
services collapse (DECC 2011a: 60).
Both the definition and consequences of energy securitisation are subject to different
interpretations, something that becomes more apparent when comparisons with European
continental countries are made. These states may be subject to similar needs for new capacity
and even more acute problems of natural gas supply (as the UK) but the majority are not
providing incentives for new nuclear power stations. Indeed Germany is doing precisely the
opposite given its commitment to phase out nuclear power. In Germany nuclear power is seen
as being a threat to security, while in the UK Government storylines see at as part of a
solution to energy security problems.

Securitisation theory itself is criticised for being too focused on discourse and textual
analysis. Others signal the importance of looking at context and the interests involved that
have attempted to utilise discourses of securitisation to their advantage (McDonald 2003,
2008, Floyd 2010). ‘Why then, and in that context, did a particular actor represent an issue as
an existential threat, and more importantly why was that actor supported in that securitization
by a particular constituency?’ (Mcdonald 2008, 76) In this study, nuclear power is an interest
which is associated with, and benefits from, the securitisation of energy policy.

Other authors have talked about expanded versions of security, expanded that is beyond the
normal confines of state and military security, to encompass notions of ‘human’ security,
which can include concepts such as environmental security and security from poverty and
disease (Detraz and Betsill 2009, Dodds and Pippard 2005). Floyd (2010) applies
securitisation theory specifically to environmental issues (which centrally concerns this
study) and stresses analysis of the interests of the actors who attempt to securitise an issue. A
lesson flowing from this study is that, in contrast to other accounts of securitisation, the
struggle is not just between ‘securitisation’ and ‘de-securitisation’; there is also a battle for
hegemony of different conceptions of securitisation.

We can see elements of this in this study as some interests, usually environmental groups,
have characterised the allegedly dangerous nature of nuclear power itself as a threat to
security. Groups like Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace attack nuclear power for its alleged
threats to security through vulnerability to terrorist attacks and the dangers of nuclear
accidents. Pro-nuclear interests emphasise nuclear’s role in helping protect energy security
through helping to avoid blackouts and reducing imports of natural gas.

Method – Discourse and interests

This analysis links the theory and method by analysing text. Key associations between
different signifiers are identified, as well as storylines. These associations and storylines are
analysed for changes. The storylines are linked to interest groups. Hajer (1995) articulated an
especially influential type of discourse analysis in environmental policy using the notion of
‘storylines’. ‘Storylines frame issues by arguing how they should be understood and tackled:
they represent intentional mobilisations of discourse’ (Smith and Kern 2009, 79). This type of
discourse analysis looks at how storylines emerge and influence policy. Particular points of
study are the storylines themselves, actors and coalitions of actors who mobilise under the
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umbrella of such storylines, and the institutions who can build the influence, perhaps
dominance, of the storylines (discourse coalitions). In this study there is also analysis of
dominant storylines, as expressed in Government policy texts, as means of incorporating
different interests as well as conditioning the interests themselves. Some analysts see
discourses as competing with each other (Dryzek 1997). However, as Foucault observed, in
practice hegemonic discourses emerge and change by incorporating elements from different
discourses in order to retain hegemony (Foucault 1998, 100-101).

The empirical section discusses changing Government policy storylines and also changing
discursive relationships between key signifiers such as competitive markets, security, climate
change and nuclear power. Key non-discursive elements, such as changes in conditions for
making investments in energy generation, are also analysed.

In the analysis of the storylines, nuclear power is not linked to energy security and climate
change between 2003 and 2005. Then in a second phase from 2005, nuclear power is linked
to energy security and climate change as the Government gives a rhetorical justification for
nuclear power without significantly compromising the neo-liberal attachment to competitive
markets. In the third phase, from 2010, the Government evolves a perceived interest of
balancing market intervention with manifesto commitments not to subsidise nuclear power. It
establishes a storyline of intervening to establish a ‘decarbonisation’ strategy, that is offering
subsidies to low carbon sources in general rather than being seen to offer specific subsidies to
nuclear power.

Hajer (1995) argued that discourses rather than interest should be the central point of analysis
of environmental policy outcomes in his notion of discourse coalitions. However, Szarka
argues that analysis of interests can help understand how discourses change and have effects.
‘Bringing interests back in, and exploring their interaction with ideas, can improve the
understanding of causation at the coalition and the subsystem levels (Szarka 2010, 840)’.
Certainly, there may not be sufficient resources to examine the multitude of discourses in
which interests are involved, so it may be a useful short cut to assume that interests exist for
the purposes, regardless of the analyst’s ontological leanings (Schmidt 2008, 319). This study
assumes that though dominant discourses, neoliberalism for example, may influence
perception of actor self-interest, perceptions of self interest also shape dominant
governmental discourses on energy. Key interests include not only energy interests but also
party political interests.

In this case study, explanation is aided by studying the relationship of the changing storylines
to the interests of nuclear power and the changing interests of Government. Pro-nuclear
interests have promoted nuclear power by linking it to both energy security and climate
change and attempting to secure commitments from Government to underpin such discourses
with commitments to greater financial incentives being made available to the nuclear industry
(Helm 2007). Government’s perceived interests have changed according to changing balances
between pro- and sceptical or anti-nuclear lobbies, and of course, according to the parties in
power. Gradually, in the three phases discussed above, the balance has tilted towards nuclear
interests, with consequential shifts in discourse.

A key method of research has been discourse analysis of Government policy statements as
expressed through White Papers. The analysis has been aided by use of ‘nvivo’ software
which has helped to categorise statements and quantify changing associations of use of
language. In particular there has been analysis of associations between energy interests,
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energy security, climate change and promotion of competitive markets. The 2003-2011 period
has been selected in order to capture the period immediately before ‘securitising’ influences
have appeared to take serious effect, and then up to the time of writing. Although a number of
policy statements have been produced by the Government over these years, the need to use
resources effectively and also the need to focus on the most comprehensive statements of
Government policy has led to a focus on final versions of five major Energy White Papers, in
2003, 2006, 2008 and 2011. The 2011 White Paper addressed the subject of ‘electricity
market reform’, but given that electricity policy has been the most controversial and the one
that directly affects nuclear power, this has been included in the list, whilst noting its more
focused nature compared to the three Energy White Papers which it succeeds.
This analysis has been supplemented by analysis of stakeholder submissions to White paper
consultations, relevant Select Committees Reports, and Parliamentary statements. Interviews
with relevant actors, e.g. former or serving politicians or civil servants/administrators and
NGO representatives have also been utilised. The modus operandi, following on from the
discussion above, is to utilise analysis of texts in the White Papers to look at changes in
storylines and associations between different words and phrases.

The perceived interests of the Governments (Labour and Coalition) include attempting to
reconcile sectoral policy objectives (e.g. in energy) with broader neoliberal narratives,
including the need for market based solutions. Government also has to attempt to reconcile,
as far as is possible, its policies with its (e.g. 2010 election) manifesto objectives. These can
be complex in the case of the Coalition which involves two parties, one of whom (Liberal
Democrats) had an election manifesto commitment opposing new nuclear power stations.

Privatisation and nuclear decline

Three distinct phases of energy policy can be seen in analysis of the White Paper policy
documents; one, including the 2003 White Paper when there was no Government policy to
promote new nuclear build, a second phase from 2005 when the Government promoted new
nuclear build but with limited interventionist means to achieve this, and then from 2010 when
the Government set out new incentive structures to promote nuclear construction.
The context to these phases needs to be traced back to the privatisation of the gas industry in
1987 and then the electricity industry in 1990. These privatisations were also accompanied by
market liberalisation and competition in the gas and electricity generation and retail sectors.
Indeed, in keeping with the theory of neoliberalism and the ‘hollowed out state’ (Rhodes
2007) decisions were devolved either directly to the markets or, in the case of decisions about
electricity market rules, to a network consisting of the Electricity Regulator and the main
stakeholders (Littlechild, 30/10/2010). Initially, wholesale electricity market trading operated
through a ‘pool price’ system where generators made bids to generate power to a system
operator, with capacity payments also available. Then, in 2001 under the ‘New Electricity
Trading Arrangements’ (NETA), the pool price and capacity payments system was abolished
in favour of a decentralised system of ‘bilateral trading’. In practice, however, there has been
little trading outside of the vertically integrated six major electricity companies.
This neoliberalising process benefited the construction of a large amount of gas powered
electricity generating plant called combined cycle gas turbines (CCGTs) which, under the
new liberalised arrangements, were adjudged to be cheaper options compared to coal and
nuclear power. The difficulty about nuclear power is that the main cost is in capital, which
meant that in a liberalised market where the electricity companies cannot be guaranteed to
recover the costs from electricity consumers, nuclear power is seen as a risky option (Thomas
2006a: 590-591, Newbery 2010, 6). There is no guarantee that the large capital costs will be
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profitably reclaimed by sufficiently high electricity prices. In fact, electricity prices fell
throughout the 1990s and into the new century. In the UK this decline in electricity prices
may have been seen to vindicate the efficacy of the neoliberal discourse and the competitive
practices introduced through the programme of privatisation of the energy industries.
However oil prices continued to decline from their high points in the early 1980s throughout
this period which is likely to have accounted for much of the decline in electricity and gas
prices. Indeed electricity wholesale prices fell so much that in 2002 British Energy, the (now
also privatised) company that owned nuclear power stations, had to be saved from bankruptcy
as the income from the nuclear power stations failed to exceed the power stations operating
costs by a sufficient margin.

Although the Thatcher Conservative Government had a programme of building at least 4

nuclear power stations under the nationalised Central Electricity Generating Board. This
programme survived the impact of the Chernobyl accident in 1986, but then three of these
reactors were cancelled during the privatisation process after the newly privatised electricity
generators indicated they would not fund them. The Government reviewed policy on nuclear
energy in 1995, but concluded that there was no case for subsidising a new programme of
nuclear construction (Department of Trade and Industry 1995). However, by the time of the
new century pressures from the nuclear industry were pointing out that the nuclear fleet was
ageing and concern was raised about the rising use of natural gas in the UK compared to UK
gas supplies. A review of energy policy was carried out by the Labour Government with the
role of nuclear power in mind. Meanwhile renewable energy was now the subject of
ambitious targets for expansion under the Renewables Obligation (RO), which started
operating in 2003 with an obligation on electricity suppliers to procure 10 per cent of
electricity from renewables by 2010. The RO offered guarantees of a long term market for
renewable electricity, something that did not exist for nuclear power. Yet the 2003 White
Paper (Department of Trade and Industry 2003) contained the storyline here that it was
unnecessary and uneconomic for the Government to actively promote the building of new
nuclear power stations. Renewable energy and energy efficiency were the methods that were
being actively promoted and incentivised to achieve the Government’s climate change
objectives.

Nuclear power is currently an important source of carbon-free electricity. However, its

current economics make it an unattractive option for new, carbon-free generating capacity
and there are also important issues of nuclear waste to be resolved. (Department of Trade and
Industry 2003, 12)

It has been argued that an alliance of nuclear-sceptical Scottish Labour MPs and ministers
such as Michael Meacher and John Prescott helped to block efforts led by the pro-nuclear
Energy Minister Brian Wilson for a commitment to build more nuclear power stations
(Roche, 17/12/2010). Certainly there were numerous sceptics within the cabinet, with Patricia
Hewitt, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry herself among them (Roche,
17/12/2010).

Analysis of the 2003 Energy White Paper (EWP) reveals that there was a great emphasis on
promotion of, or positive attitudes towards, competitive energy markets with frequently
repeated assertions in such directions, as can be seen in Table 1. When it came to pursuing
environmental objectives, neo-liberal language prevailed:
because a well-designed, transparent and open energy market is the best way of achieving
efficient outcomes, we will wherever possible use market instruments to achieve our goals. In
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particular, emissions trading will be at the centre of our energy markets from 2005 onwards
(Department of Trade and Industry 2003: 16)

The Renewables Obligation was established as an explicitly market based instrument where
prices would be set by the market through competition rather than prices being set by
Government (Department of Trade and Industry 2000). The 2003 EWP advocated the
‘aspiration’ of extending the Renewables Obligation target to 20 per cent of UK electricity
supply, something that was turned a requirement on electricity suppliers after the 2006 EWP.

The EWP did not see any immediate threats to energy security, stressing the need to ‘monitor’
the situation. Analysis of the number of positive and negative statements regarding renewable
energy and nuclear power to climate change and energy security implies that renewable
energy was seen as being positive to combating climate change and also in dealing with
energy security, whilst nuclear power was not seen as being helpful, on balance, either to
combat climate change or energy security (see Table 1).

Table 1 near here

Blair proposes nuclear

By 2005 energy prices were rising on the back of increases in global oil prices. Indeed
according to the UK Government index of domestic gas prices rose from an index of 85 in
2003 to over 140 in early 2007, and, after a brief fall, up to 175 in early 2009 (DECC 2011b).
During this period energy issues became significant matters of concern among the British
public (Eurobarometer 2008).

Alan Johnson replaced Patricia Hewitt as Secretary of State for Trade and Industry in May
2005. In November 2005 Tony Blair announced a new review of energy policy with the aim
of revisiting the nuclear power option. The need to replace ageing nuclear power and coal
fired plant were cited as part of the justification for building new nuclear power stations, as
well as the challenge of increasing reliance on imported natural gas. Tony Blair’s introduction
to the resulting EWP (Department of Trade and Industry 2006) stated that:

we now face two immense challenges as a country – energy security and

climate change……………….. neither renewable energy nor greater energy
efficiency can provide the complete solution to the (energy) shortfall we face.
This will depend on securing energy supplies from abroad, in new nuclear
power stations to replace those becoming obsolete and replacing older coal-
fired stations with cleaner, more efficient technology (Department of Trade
and Industry 2006, 4-5)

As can be seen from the numbers of associations between nuclear power and energy security
and climate change in Table 1 the discourse linked nuclear power to both energy security and
climate change much more compared to the discourse in the 2003 White Paper. However,
while the storyline changed to advocating new nuclear power stations, this coincided with a
strong association with a continued emphasis on the importance of competitive markets.
Following the publication of the 2006 EWP the Government were successfully challenged in
court by Greenpeace to the effect that the Government had not carried out a sufficiently full
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economic justification for new nuclear construction. The Government then undertook another
consultation in 2007 which paved the way for a White Paper on nuclear power in 2008
(DBERR 2008). This (much shorter) document shows, again in Table 1, a strengthened
association between nuclear power, climate change and energy security. However, again the
support for nuclear power coincides with the intention that this will come about in the context
of competitive markets. The 2008 EWP said (merely) that ‘it would be in the public interest
to allow energy companies the option of investing in new nuclear power stations’ (DBERR
2008, 7). The Government did promote the enactment of new planning laws which were
aimed to speed up processes for giving planning consent to large power stations such as
nuclear power. However, there was an absence of significant new financial incentives to
promote nuclear construction.

Nuclear advocates such as Helm (2007) complained that: ‘What remains to be done in the
nuclear case is, however, considerable. There is as yet no permanent solution to the nuclear
waste problem, there is no long-term price of carbon, and there are no longer term contracts
or obligations’ (Helm 2007, 32).

The Labour Government did little for the rest of its term in office to respond to such
criticisms. Indeed, despite Tony Blair’s strident advocacy of nuclear power, there remained
some mixed signals within Labour. According to O’Brien, for instance, the former Minister of
State for Energy at the newly established department of Energy and Climate Change; ‘My
view was that this (investment in nuclear power stations) was a business proposition for
(electricity) companies and if they were going to do it either they were going to invest in
wind turbines on a massive scale or they were going to do it in relation to nuclear’. The point
here was that there was a Renewables Obligation to support wind power, but no similar
mechanism to support nuclear power.

Pressures for action on climate change rose up the agenda, and the Climate Change Act,
passed in 2008, instituted an obligation to reduce 1990 UK carbon emissions by 80 per cent
by 2050. The prospect of, and the passage of, the 2009 EU Renewables Directive provided
the background to increased commitments to support renewable energy. The UK renewable
target was increased up to an ‘aspiration’ to achieve 30 per cent of electricity from
renewables by 2020 (DECC 2009, 13). In 2008 it was decided to establish a feed-in tariff for
renewable projects under 5 MW in size and a large offshore wind power programme was
prepared.

Electricity Market Reform

Shortly before the 2010 election the Conservatives introduced a new policy document
announcing a drive to ‘fast-track’ nuclear power stations. They accused the Labour
Government of inaction over nuclear (Conservative Party 2010). A keystone for the policy
was the proposal to institute a floor price for carbon so that if the price of carbon under the
EU Emissions Trading Scheme fell below a benchmark amount, UK fossil fuels would be
taxed according to their carbon content. As a result fossil fuel consumers would have to pay
the equivalent of a floor price. However, a rider to the proposal was the statement that ‘we
agree with the nuclear industry that taxpayer and consumer subsidies should not and will not
be provided – in particular there must be no public underwriting of construction cost
overruns’ (Conservative Party 2010, 18).

Both Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition partners had stated in their pre-election
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manifestos that there would be no public subsidies given to nuclear power. Yet the proposals
the coalition published were perceived as doing precisely that (Select Committee on Energy
and Climate Change 2011). The Conservatives insisted that there would be no public subsidy
for nuclear power, and this ‘no subsidy’ pledge was incorporated in the Coalition agreement
with the Liberal Democrats (with an agreement for Liberal Democrats to abstain on nuclear
power). A key attraction of the minimum carbon floor price formulation for nuclear advocates
was that it would support nuclear power without subsidies allocated for this purpose.

Hence when the New Government proposed its ‘Electricity Market Reform’ (by consultation
in December 2010 and the White Paper in July 2011) the storyline was now that both
renewable and nuclear power had access to the same incentives, that is the carbon price
support, as part of a ‘decarbonisation’ strategy. In fact however, nuclear (and renewable)
investment could not be guaranteed through carbon floor price support since this does not
constitute a legally enforceable contract guaranteeing a specified premium future price to be
paid for the nuclear (or renewable) generation. So, the plan was to make such contracts
available through a system of ‘feed-in tariffs’ available to all low carbon generators. The
White Paper argued that:

Without action, we face a significantly increased risk of being unable to meet

our energy needs, resulting in voltage reductions and blackouts as capacity
margins tighten from around the end of this decade. (DECC 2011a, 60)…..At
the heart of our strategy is a framework that will offer reliable contracts,
administered through delivery arrangements that are trusted by investors….
(DECC 2011A, 8) …….and that to meet our decarbonisation targets the
majority of this new investment must be in a diverse range of low-carbon
generation such as renewables, gas and coal Carbon Capture and Storage
(CCS), and nuclear (DECC 2011a, 18).

In addition the White Paper set out a system of ‘capacity payments’ designed to ensure there
was enough reserve power stations and other techniques available to quickly respond to peaks
in demand. The system of ‘feed-in tariffs’ (awarded through the ‘reliable contracts’) for
nuclear power and renewables was to be integrated into the electricity market trading system
through a ‘contracts for differences’ mechanism. This market intervention was to be kept
within a neoliberal ‘competitive’ discourse, rather as during the 2009 EU Renewables
Directive the European Commission redefined feed-in tariffs as ‘market based instruments’
Lauber and Schenner (2011, 523). Supporters of feed-in tariffs have always argued that they
are ‘market based’. It was just that the (usually) utility opponents of this instrument denied
feed-in tariffs ‘market’ status. Certainly the feed-in tariffs may be little more than a more
efficient version of an existing policy to promote renewable energy (the Renewables
Obligation). The proposals for capacity payments may not revolutionary since a system of
capacity payments did exist in the 1990s before a reform of the liberalised arrangements.
Indeed, the only genuinely innovative major policy initiative in the 2011 White Paper was the
proposed feed-in tariff for nuclear power (which, as discussed later, may not actually
engender much, if any, nuclear power).

As can be seen in Table 1 there is much less positive association with ‘competitive markets’
compared to the three other White Papers analysed. Paradoxically, also, there is much less
rhetorical linkage of nuclear power to energy security and climate change compared to the
2006 and 2007 White Papers. This may be associated with a wish, for party political
purposes, to play down the now significant financial incentives being given for new nuclear
11

power plants. Certainly, the Select Committee on Energy and Climate Change published a
report in May 2011 calling on the Government to ‘be upfront’ about its intention to give
subsidies to nuclear power (Select Committee on Climate Change 2011).

Such admissions could weaken the support base for the nuclear programme, especially
among the Liberal Democrats, whose own Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change,
Chris Huhne, had (prior to the General Election) been associated with a Party position that
was strongly against building new nuclear power stations. Indeed in a 2010 poll of around
600 Liberal Democrat members, whilst 68 per cent said that nuclear power should be part of
the energy mix, only 25 per cent supported nuclear power if public subsidies were necessary
(Tall 2010). General public opinion has been much more consistently favourable towards
renewable energy compared to nuclear power, with a 2010 academic survey recording 34 per
cent of people favourable towards nuclear power while over 80 per cent were favourable
towards solar power and wind power (Corner et al 2011).

An additional issue that may have influenced the Government to construct the proposed
incentive regime as not involving subsidies for nuclear power is EU state aid rules (Europa
2012). Although EU state aid rules do allow subsidies to be given for environmental purposes
(including support for renewable energy) there is no similar exemption for nuclear power.
Hence there is an incentive for the Government to present Electricity Market Reform as
involving no subsidies in the sense that the incentives are said to be available for all
generators provided they are classified as ‘low carbon’.

Renewable trade associations said that the ‘feed-in tariff’ system was workable for renewable
energy (albeit with improvements in the design of the Government’s scheme). However, the
City’s assessment of plans for new nuclear power stations was pessimistic, given the risks
that are attendant on building nuclear power plants (Chestney 2011, Macalister 2011). The
problem for the Government was that uncertainties about nuclear construction costs,
especially in the light of cost overruns on plants being built in Finland and France
(Carrington 2011), meant that utilities (the major electricity companies) may be reluctant to
invest in nuclear power without even stronger measures of support than were apparent in the
White Paper. Normally banks provide the bulk of investments in large power plant projects
on the basis that there is reasonable certainty about the costs of the projects. However banks
are wary of lending to nuclear power plant because of the risks of delay and spiralling costs.
The utilities can still invest, but their ‘balance sheets’ are thus exposed to risk with attendant
fears of falls in profits, share prices and bad reports from credit rating agencies.

Hence despite the proposed interventions into the market, the fact that the energy system was
privately owned, privately financed and that the main electricity utilities were still in
competition (and thus could not guarantee selling their electricity) meant that there were still
question marks over the extent, and even the existence of the planned nuclear power
construction programme. There is always the possibility that the Government could introduce
further measures to incentivise nuclear power. Yet this requires expenditure of further
political resources in order to gain Parliamentary acceptance, and also the political problem
of being perceived as favouring nuclear power more than renewables. Under the pre-
neoliberal nationalised regime this was unnecessary as the technological selection, whether
for nuclear or anything else chosen, was achieved through administrative fiat, and consumers
had to pay because of the supply of electricity was a monopoly.

Conclusion
12

One observation concerning the use of securitisation theory arising from this case is that it
should not be assumed that the establishment always utilises state-centric notions of security
whilst ‘critical forces’ use human security. In this case the role may sometimes be reversed
since the attack on nuclear power is often focussed on its alleged inherent security dangers
while nuclear proponents focus on the maintenance of human and economic security.
A further observation is that the use of storylines by the Government in its White Papers is
concerned not merely with instrumentalising policy but also represents an amalgam of
different discursive elements designed to meet its party political needs. The Labour
Government employed pro-nuclear rhetoric in the context of doing, in practice, relatively
little to instrumentalise this policy – perhaps as means of making its own internal
disagreements appear consistent. By contrast the Coalition Government, which did have a
more recognisable instrumental agenda in terms of deploying nuclear power, nevertheless
employed a ‘decarbonisation’ discourse at least partly as a means of smoothing political
demands for there to be the appearance of no subsidies for nuclear power. So, the Coalition
entered into a subtly different discourse in which the position of ‘nuclear’ was repositioned.
This has consequences for a discourse-analytical method since the analyst must take care to
note changes in political context before making analytical conclusions drawn from
comparisons of different documents from different times.

An especially significant point, which may be advanced as a sensitising hypothesis for further
studies, is that ‘securitisation’ strategies may not be sufficient to overcome the discourse and
embedded practices of neoliberalism. In the days before privatisation and market
liberalisation it may have been sufficient for a Government to make a policy decision, such as
favouring nuclear power stations being built, and then being confident that the nationalised
utility would sort out the details. Nationalised companies could borrow cheaply using
Government terms and they could be assured of recovering their costs from consumers
through their retail monopolies. However, under neoliberalism this situation is more
problematic. As can be seen with the Labour Government’s ‘securitising’ policy favouring
nuclear power, a dominant ‘securitising’ storyline, even when associated with climate change
strategies, is insufficient to overcome the neoliberal paradigm, that is unless accompanied by
major interventionist practices. Such practices favouring nuclear power have been signalled
by the Coalition Government, who has attempted to situate support for nuclear power in a
wider ‘decarbonisation’ strategy to counter climate change. Yet the extent to which such
stratagems will succeed in overcoming the barriers inherent in the neoliberal system is still
very unclear. Other reforms that have been proposed are not revolutionary, and may be little
more than reformulations of policies that have been previously applied under liberalised
market arrangements.

The UK Government has, since at least 2005, been able to intervene in the market sufficiently
to achieve a renewable energy deployment programme. However, two points need to be
observed here. First, the renewable energy programme was launched as an integral part of
neoliberalism, and, as has been discussed, before energy security was constructed as a key
problem. Second, whilst renewable energy is generally well supported by public opinion,
nuclear power’s public support has been relatively weaker, especially in the aftermath of
Fukushima. Nevertheless since 2006 there has been a dominant securitising discourse
inherent in Government policy that has been associated with nuclear power. However unless
the interest that seeks to gain from this discourse, that is nuclear power, has sufficient
political support, then it may well fail to secure sufficiently strong market intervention to
assure a large (or indeed any) new nuclear programme.
13

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17

Comparison of frequency of selected statements in four UK White Papers on Energy

Policy
Selected 2003 2006 2008 2011 (50600
statements (56400 (84000 (14300 words long)
words long) words long) words long)
Promotion of, or 18 9 3 1 (historical)
positive towards,
competitive energy
markets
Present electricity 2 1 0 4
markets negative
to energy security
Climate change 0 7 11 1
linked to energy
security
Coal positive for 1 5 1 1
energy security
Gas positive for 2 -4 -1 2
energy security
Renewable energy 5 3 1 3
positive for energy
security
Nuclear power -2 2 12 0
positive for
security
Energy efficiency 2 8 2 2
positive for energy
security
Gas or Gas CCS 0 0 1 1
positive to combat (decarbonisation)
climate change
Coal CCS positive 0 0 1 1(decarbonisation)
to combat climate
change
Renewables 3 3 1 1
positive to combat (decarbonisation)
climate change
Nuclear power 0 6 14 1
positive to combat (decarbonisation)
climate change
Energy efficiency 2 6 1 1
positive to combat (decarbonisation)
climate change