represent the government to the exclusion of others.
" Brushing aside PEZA’s
a. Government Lawyers
Lawyers Authorized to Represent the Government
Republic v. Heirs of Cuizon, G.R. No. 191531, March 6, 2013
Facts:
The counsel of Cecilio and Moises Cuizon (the Cuizons) wrote PEZA Director
General Lilia B. De Lima, offering said agency the priority to buy Lot Nos.
4522 and 4525 of the Opon Cadastre. Although presently situated within the
Mactan Economic Zone (MEZ), the subject lots were previously registered in
the names of the Cuizons’ predecessors-in-interest, the Spouses Pedro and
Eugenia Tunacao. By means of a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale
executed by the Heirs of the Spouses, it appears that the subject parcels were
transferred in favor of the Cuizons, in whose names the same were
subsequently registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 42755
and 50430. PEZA declined the offer on the ground that, in 1958, the same lots
were sold by Eugenia Tunacao in favor of the then Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA), the predecessor of the Bureau of Air Transportation
(BAT) and the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA). The
Cuizons, in turn, called PEZA’s attention to the fact, among other matters, that
BAT was considered to have abandoned its opposition to the reconstitution of
said Original Certificate of Titles. Upon insistence of the PEZA of the
government’s ownership to the lots, the Cuizon’s wrote a letter to the Office
of the President, and the Office of the President rendered a decision directing
PEZA to recognize respondents’ rights over the subject parcels and to
negotiate for the just compensation.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in representation of PEZA, filed
with the CA a motion for an extension but instead of the OSG, however, it was
the lawyers from PEZA’s Legal Affairs Group who filed the petition for
review. The respondents moved for the denial of the petition on the ground
that PEZA’s lawyers failed to state the material dates and to secure
authorization from the OSG as the "principal law officer and legal defender of
the government." In reply, however, PEZA asserted, that as members of its
Legal Affairs Group, its lawyers not only had legal authority to file the petition
but were constrained to do so on account of the "different position taken by
the handling OSG lawyers." The CA dismissed PEZA’s petition and ruled that,
as "the statutory counsel of the government, its agencies and officials who are
in the performance of their official functions, the OSG is the only law firm,
save those for the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, who can
claim of a stand contrary to that taken by the OSG, the CA likewise enunciated
that the OSG is "endowed with broad perspective that spans the legal interest
of virtually the entire government officialdom" and "may transcend the
parochial concerns of a particular client agency and instead, promote and
protect the public weal."
Issue:
Whether or not PEZA’s lawyers have legal authority to handle the case in place
of the OSG.
Ruling:
No. The functions of the OSG includes:
SECTION 35. Powers and Functions.—The Office of the Solicitor General
shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. When authorized by
the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent
government-owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor
General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall
discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall have the following
specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all
civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer
thereof in his official capacity is a party.
8) Deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies and
offices to assist the Solicitor General and appear or represent the Government
in cases involving their respective offices, brought before the courts, and
exercise supervision and control over such legal Officers with respect to such
cases." (Italics supplied)
Unlike a practicing lawyer who can decline employment, it has been ruled that
the Solicitor General cannot refuse to perform his duty to represent the
government, its agencies, instrumentalities, officials and agents without a just
and valid reason. Considering that only the Solicitor General can bring or
defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, the rule is settled
that actions filed in the name of the latter not initiated by the OSG are
susceptible to summary dismissal. However exceptions occur when "First,
there must be an express authorization by the Office of the Solicitor General,
naming therein the legal officers who are being deputized. Second, the cases
must involve the respective offices of the deputized legal officers. And finally,
despite such deputization, the OSG should retain supervision and control over
such legal officers with respect to the cases." Another exception is also
recognized when the OSG takes a position different from that of the agency it
is duty bound to represent. As an independent office, after all, the OSG is "not
shackled by the cause of its client agency" and has, for its primordial concern,
the "best interest of the government" which, in its perception, can run counter
to its client agency’s position in certain instances.
In fine, the Solicitor General is the government officer mandated to "represent
the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in
which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party."
Absent showing of authority under the PEZA and or proper deputation from
the OSG, we find that the petition for review filed by the lawyers from PEZA's
Legal Affairs Group was correctly dismissed by the CA. The fact that the OSG
and PEZA differed with respect to the choice of remedy to be pursued in the
premises automatically excused the former's non-involvement in the case nor
authorize the latter to pursue the same on its own. Even if it differs with its
client-agency anent the substance of case or the procedure to be taken with
respect thereto, the OSG is nevertheless duty bound to present its position to
the Court as an officer thereof and in compliance with its ineluctable mandate.
Santayana v. Alampay, A.C. No. 5878, March 21, 2005
FACTS:
In 1999, NEA (NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATIOON ADMINISTRATION), a
government owned and controlled corporation, conducted a public bidding for
the purchase of poles and cross arms. In December 2000, Nerwin Industries
Corporation (Nerwin) was declared the lowest bidder. Hence, the NEA Board
of Administrators passed Resolution No. 32 approving the award to Nerwin of
fifty percent (50%) of the IPB 80 project requirements. However, NEA
disqualified Nerwin and instead granted the award to a losing bidder. Seeking
a legal justification for its action, NEA twice asked the opinion of the Office
of the Government Corporation Counsel (OGCC). In both instances, the
OGCC pointed out that NEAs action is in violation of the law.
Respondent, despite his knowledge that NEA is represented by legal counsel
specifically provided by law, had his law firm Alampay, Gatchalian, Mawis &
Alampay rendered a legal opinion adverse to that of the OGCC. As a result,
NEA nullified the award to Nerwin, prompting the latter to file with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). Respondents law firm entered its appearance as
counsel for NEA. Nerwin filed a motion for the disqualification of
respondent’s law firm as counsel for NEA. This was opposed by respondent.
Respondent also averred that Resolution No. 38 dated October 11, 2001 of the
NEA Board of Administrators authorized his law firm Alampay, Gatchalian,
Mawis, and Alampay to represent NEA in Civil Case No. 01-102000 sans
attorney’s fees. Since the OGCC took a stance adverse to that of NEA with
respect to IBP 80 Project, the latter could engage the services of other counsel.
Moreover, the NEA Charter does not prohibit its engagement of other
counsel.’
The IBP Board of Governors recommended that respondent be meted the
administrative penalty of reprimand with a warning that similar actions in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alampay, Gatchalian, Mawis & Alampay law firm can
represent a GOCC in a proceeding.
HELD: No.
The laws provide that NEA shall be represented in all judicial proceedings by
the following legal counsel: (1) the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel (OGCC); (2) the Chief or any lawyer of the NEA Legal Division; and
(3) the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
Thus, NEA shall be represented by the chief or any attorney of its Legal
Division or the OGCC. However, for special reasons and where the NEA
Board of Administrators requests in writing, it shall be the duty of the Solicitor
General to represent NEA. NEA can hire or employ a private lawyer or law
firm only in exceptional cases with (1) the conformity and acquiescence in
writing of the Solicitor General or the OGCC; and (2) with the written
concurrence of the Commission on Audit.
In this case, nothing therein indicates that the written conformity of the
Solicitor General or the OGCC has been obtained nor is there any written
concurrence by the Commission on Audit. Hence, there can be no other
conclusion than that respondents law firm, including himself, willfully
appeared as counsel for NEA in the said case without authority to do so.
However, there is no indication in the records that respondent acted in bad
faith. In fact, his law firms services for NEA were pro bono.
Thus, Atty. Eliseo B. Alampay was fined PhP 5,000.0000 for appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so and WARNED that a
repetition of similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Judiciary, Quasi-Judicial Agencies, Executive Branch, Legislative
Branch
Abella v. Cruzabra, A.C. No. 5688, June 4, 2009
FACTS:
Herein respondent was charged in a complaint filed by petitioner Abella for
alleged violation of the Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees.
Petitioner contends, and the same was proven, that respondent appointed as
the Deputy Register of Deeds of GenEral Santos City is also commission and
engaged in the private practice as a notary public.
Respondent, on her defense, says that she has the permission/ Authorization
of her superior, the Register of Deeds..
Issue: whether or not a public official (an attorney in this case) can engage in
the private practice of their profession.
Ruling: YES. (With condition).
Sec. 7 (b)(2) of RA 7163 provides that engagement in the private practice of
the profession of public officials and employees are prohibited UNLESS it is
authorized by the Constitution or laws.
Said authorization was provided by Memorandum Circular No. 1. The same
provides that there shall be a written permission from the Department head
before such engagement shall be allowed.
In this case, the respondent Cruzaba did not obtain the written permission
from the Secretary of the Department of Justice. Instead, she obtained
permission from the Register of Deeds who does not have the proper
authority.
Respondent, although only a neophyte lawyer, cannot also claim ignorance
of the law or good faith because she filed her petition for commission as a
notary public after Memorandum Circular No. 17 was issued.
Hence, she was reprimanded in engaging as a notary public.
Prohibition or disqualification of former government attorneys
Olazo v. Tinga, A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC, December 7, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner in this case was a beneficiary of Fort Bonifacio’s land which was
declared open for disposition located in lower bicutan in Taguig. While
respondents is a former congressman of then Taguig-Pateros. The government
in effort to dispose the land created a Committee on Awards and one of the
compulsory members of it is the congressman of Taguig-Pateros. The
petitioner alleged that hat the respondent after his term of office as a
congressman violated Section 7(b) (2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713
since he engaged in the practice of law, within the one-year prohibition period,
when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez
before the Committee on Awards. But the respondents argued that he cannot
be held liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility since
the provision applies to lawyers in the government service who are allowed by
law to engage in private law practice and to those who, though prohibited from
engaging in the practice of law, have friends, former associates and relatives
who are in the active practice of law. In this regard, the respondent had already
completed his third term in Congress and his stint in the Committee on Awards
when he represented Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez on May 24, 1999.
Issue:
Whether or Not, respondent violated the code of ethical standards when he was
no longer a public official, but a private lawyer who represented a client before
the office he was previously connected with within the ban period?
Ruling:
No.
According to, R.A. No. 6713 and Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which impose certain restrictions on government lawyers to
engage in private practice after their separation from the service. As a rule,
government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their
profession during their incumbency. By way of exception, a government
lawyer can engage in the practice of his or her profession under the following
conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the
law; and second, the practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or
her official functions. The last paragraph of Section 7 provides an exception
to the exception. In case of lawyers separated from the government service
who are covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a
one-year prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection with any matter
before the office he used to be with.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction
and prohibits lawyers, after leaving the government service, to accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in the said service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is the term "intervene" which we previously
interpreted to include an act of a person who has the power to influence the
proceedings.
In this case, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously
interfered with the sales application covering Manuel’s land when the former
was still a member of the Committee on Awards. The complainant, too, failed
to sufficiently establish that the respondent was engaged in the practice of law.
At face value, the legal service rendered by the respondent was limited only in
the preparation of a single document
Catu v. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738, February 19, 2008
FACTS:
This case started when the mother and brother of the petitioner
contested the possession of Elizabeth Diaz-Catu and Antonio Pastor of one
unit in the lot and building which the herein petitioner co-owns. They brought
the issue before the Lupong Tagapamayapa for conciliation but they were not
able to reconcile with each other. Hence, Barangay Chairman Rellosa
recommended that the matter be brought to the court and even issued
certification for it. However, when the petitioners brought the matter to the
court they found out that Rellosa was the counsel of the other party. Because
of this, his actions were brought to the attention of the Integrated Bar of The
Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not while being a Barangay Chairman, the respondent may
validly exercise his profession without asking for permission first.
HELD:
NO, although a barangay chairman is not prohibited from exercising his
profession, he should have asked for permission first. Section 12, Rule XVIII
of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides: “No officer or employee shall
engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of the
Department…” In this case, in acting as counsel for a party without first
securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a
breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for not
living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical
standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. In view of the foregoing, the
respondent cannot validly exercise his profession while being a barangay
chairman and thereby found to be guilty of professional misconduct.
Attorney's Fees
Doy Mercantile, Inc. v. AMA Computer College, 426 SCRA 682
FACTS:
Atty. Gabriel Jr. was the counsel of petitioner in their complaint against
AMA Computer College with regard to cancellation of the Deed of
Conditional Sale executed by Dionisio Yap, one of DOY’s director, without
proper authorization. The case was dismissed due to mootness in light with
the compromise agreement entered by the parties.
However, DOY refused to satisfy Atty. Gabriel’s attorney’s fees, prompting
the lawyer to file to RTC a motion to Allow Commensurate fees and to
Annotate Attorney’s Lien on the subject lot in the case.
RTC fixed Atty. Gabriel’s fees at P200, 000.00 and ordered that a lien be
annotated on the subject Transfer Certificate Titles. A writ of execution was
issued by the trial court in favour of Atty. Gabriel.
Upon his motion for consideration, RTC increased his fees to P500, 000.00.
Another writ of execution was issued to enforce new award but denied the
motion to annotate the award at the back of the TCTs.
DOY filed several petitions with CA to set aside RTC’s orders.CA rendered
a decision fixing Atty. Gabriel’s fee at P200,00.00 and affirming not to
annotate such award on the TCTs.
Hence this petition of DOY contending that the decision is not consistent
with the guidelines prescribed by Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
and Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ISSUE: Whether the CA correctly fixed the award of attorney’s fees?
RULING:
Yes. Although Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Rule 20.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility list several other factors in setting such fees,
these are mere guides in ascertaining the real value of the lawyers’ service.
Courts are not bound to consider all these factors in fixing attorney’s fees.
While a lawyer should charge only fair and reasonable fees, no hard and fast
rule maybe set in the determination of what a reasonable fee is, or what is
not. That must be established from the facts in each case.
In this case, CA take into account the time spent and the extent of the
services rendered by Atty. Gabriel. The assailed decision of CA even
contains an enumeration of the pleadings filed by counsel in behalf of his
client. Also, CA considered the amount involved in the controversy and the
benefits resulting to the client from the service of Atty. Gabriel.
Therefore, the decision of CA was affirmed. It correctly fixed the award of
attorney’s fees.
 Tanhueco v. De Dumo, A.M. No. 1437, April 25, 1989
Rilloraza v. Eastern Telecommunication Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 104600, July
2, 1999
FACTS:
Eastern Telecommunications, Phils., Inc. (ETPI) represented by the claw
firm SAGA, filed with the Regional Trial court a complaint for the recovery
or revenue shares against PLDT. Atty. Rilloraza, a partner of the firm,
appeared for ETPI.
After ETPI rested its case, it paid SAGA the billed amount. The latter was
dissolved and four junior partners formed RADA, which took over as counsel
in the case for ETPI. ETPI signed a retainer agreement with counsel wherein
it was stated that incases of collection or judicial action, “our attorney’s fees
shall be 15% of the amounts collected or the value of the property acquired or
liability saved.” However, said agreement was consequently terminated in
1988. RADA then filed a notice of attorney’s lien. In its notice, RADA
informed the court that there were negotiations toward a compromise between
ETPI and PLDT. In 1990, the parties arrived at an amicable settlement and the
same was entered as a judgment. The petitioner (RADA) filed a motion for the
enforcement of attorney’s lien.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to recover attorney's fees
(P26,350,779.91) for handling the case for ETPI, though its services were
terminated in midstream and the client directly compromised the case with the
adverse party.
HELD:
Yes, RADA is entitled to attorney’s fees.
Atty. Rilloraza handled the case from its inception until ETPI terminated
the law firm’s services in 1988. Petitioner’s claim for attorney’s fees hinges
on two grounds: first, the fact that Atty. Rilloraza personally handled the case
when he was working for SAGA, and second, the retainer agreement.
However, when a client employs the services of a law firm, he does not employ
the services of the lawyer who is assigned to personally handle the case.
Rather, he employs the entire law firm. In the event that the counsel appearing
for the client resigns, the firm is bound to provide a replacement. Thus, RADA
could not claim to have initiated the filing of the complaint considering that
ETPI hired SAGA. The latter assigned one of its associates, Atty. Rilloraza, to
handle the case for the firm. Although he handled the case personally, he did
so for and in behalf of SAGA.
In this case, we ignore the fact that an attorney-client relationship between
petitioner and respondent no longer existed during its culmination by amicable
agreement. To award the attorneys' fees amounting to the demand pf the
petitioners would be too unconscionable. However, whether there is an
agreement or not, the courts shall fix a reasonable compensation which lawyers
may receive for their professional services.” “A lawyer has the right to be paid
for the legal services he has extended to his client, which compensation must
be reasonable,” thus, he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his
service and the amount must be determined on a quantum meruit* basis.
Yes, RADA is entitled to attorney’s fees but the Supreme Court, however,
is not convinced with the petitioner's arguments that the services RADA
rendered merit the amount they are claiming. Hence, it remanded the case to
the court of origin for the determination of the amount of attorney’s fees to
which the petitioner is entitled.
 * - 'as much as he deserved' is used as a basis for determining the lawyer's
professional fees in the absence of a contract but recoverable by him from his
client. Recovery of attorney's fees on the basis of quantum meruit is authorized
when (1) there is no express contract for payment of attorney's fees agreed
upon between the lawyer and the client; (2) when although there is a formal
contract for attorney's fees, the fees stipulated are found unconscionable or
unreasonable by the court; and (3) when the contract for attorney's fee's is void
due to purely formal defects of execution; (4) when the counsel, for
justifiable cause, was not able to finish the case to its conclusion; (5) when
lawyer and client disregard the contract for attorney's fees
Bautista v. Gonzales, A.M. No. 1625, February 12, 1990
FACTS:
In a verified complaint of Angel L. Bautista alleging the respondent, Atty.
Gonzales of malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer’s
oath. In his answer, respondent file a motion for a bill of particulars asking
the court to order complainant to amend his complaint by making charges
more definite. The latter submitted her amended complaint alleging that
respondent committed the following acts:
1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely Alfaro,
Nestor and Editha Fortunado to pay all expenses, including court
fees, for a contingent fee of fifty percent of the value of the property
in litigation.
2. Acting as counsel for Fortunados wherein Eusebio Lopez is one of
the defendants and without said case being terminated, acting as
counsel for Lopez.
3. Transferring to himself ½ of the subject property of the Fortunados
while the case was pending.
4. Inducing complainant (his former client) to enter into a contract with
him on august 30, 1971 for the development into a residential
subdivision knowing that said property was already sold at a public
auction on june 30, 1971.
5. Submitting to the Court of First Instance a falsified documents
purporting to be true copies of “Addendum to the Land Development
Agreement dated August 30, 1971” and submitting the same to the
Fiscal’s Office, in connection with the complaint for estafa filed by
respondent against complainant.
6. Deliberately misleading the CFI and Fiscal’s Office by making false
facts in his pleadings.
The Court referred the case to the OSG for investigation which
recommended that Atyy. Gonzales be suspended for 6 mos. for committing
the acts stated above (Nos. 1, 4, 5 & 8). Upon the recommendation of the
OSG, respondent filed a motion to refer the case to the IBP for investigation
and disposition pursuant to Article 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court to
submit more evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent committed a serious misconduct subject to
disciplinary actions.
RULING:
Yes. Under the very first Canon of a new code states that “a lawyer shall
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and legal process.” Moreover, Rule 138 Sec 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
requires “every lawyer to take an oath and to obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities the rein.” And for any violation of the
oath, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred by the SC. Also, persons
mentioned under Art. 1491 of the civil code are prohibited from purchasing
the property and rights in litigation because of his fiduciary relationship with
such property and right, as well as with the client. Furthermore, Canon 17
states that “a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him” while Canon 16 provides
that “a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that
may come into his possession.” In this case, it is evident that the respondent
has violated all of this provisions. The court held that a purchase by a lawyer
of his client’s property or interest in litigation is a breach of professional ethics
and constitutes malpractice. In allegation no. 2, respondent has proved that an
affidavit was executed by the Fortunados which states their consent to the
acceptance of Atty. Gonzales on the case of Lopez. Third, such agreements are
against public policy pursuant to Canon 42 and Rule 16.04. Fourth, even if the
complainant was not a former client of the lawyer, still, the latter is expected
to act with honesty and fairness even in his private dealings. Fifth and sixth,
such conduct of misleading the court constitutes willful disregard of his
solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth.
A lawyer should never seek to mislead the court by an artifice or false
statement of fact or law pursuant to section 20 (d), Rule 138, Revised Rules of
Court; Canon 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code
of Professional Responsibility. Therefore, Atty. Gonzales is held liable for his
misconduct and be suspended for 6 mos. Petitioner Carbonell and respondent Fernandez were the official counsel of
the ten employees which are members of the Amalgated Laborers
 Perez v. Scottish Union, 76 Phil. 320 (1946 Association in an action before the Court of Industrial Relations for unfair
labor practices. The said action was decided awarding the employees a total
Fernandez v. Hon. Bello, 107 Phil. 1140 (1960) amount of P79,755.22 representing the total net back wages due to the ten
Atty. Manuel Fernandez won a civil case for Florentino Perreyras however,
employees.
Florentino died without paying Fernandez. Fernandez then assisted the eldest
child of Perreyras in a guardianship proceeding so that the eldest may properly
Subsequently, atty. Leonardo Fernandez, in the same action/case pending
dispose of their property in order to pay their father’s indebtedness.
before the CIR filed a Notice of Attorney’s Lien equivalent to 25% of the
Eventually, Florentino’s nipa land was sold for P1,000.00. Thereafter, P200.00
whatever money claims that may be adjudicated. He further contends that,
was paid to Atty. Fernandez for his legal services both for Florentino and his
the initial agreement was 30% but due to the request of the head of the union
heirs. Judge Bello found out about said payment and so directed Fernandez to
Amalgamated, the same was reduced to 25%. The 5% of the 30% to be
explain (because under the guardianship, proceeds of any sale must first be
awarded to Atty. Carbonell, who according to fernandez rendered also
accounted for and no payment to creditors shall be made without prior
services, though insignificant.
authorization from the court).
In the course of the proceeding however, Judge Bello stated that Fernandez
The CIR, granted the 25% lien requested by Fernandez. Hence, this petition.
does not deserve the P200.00 attorney’s fees because Fernandez is a “below
average standard of a lawyer.” Fernandez then responded with strong language
Issue: whether Fernandez may claim the 25% lien.
(which were not specified).
Ruling : NO. According to the court, a contingent fee contract specifying the
ISSUE: Whether or not the strong language used by Fernandez against the
percentage of recovery an attorney is to receive in a suit "should be
judge is proper.
reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, including the risk and
uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the
HELD: The Supreme Court seem to say yes. The Supreme Court stated that
supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness."
the strong language used by Fernandez must have been impelled by the same
In the instant case, the stipulated 30% attorneys' fee is held by the
language used by Bello in characterizing the act of Fernandez as “anomalous
court to be excessive and unconscionable. With the exception of Arsenio
and unbecoming” and in charging him of obtaining his fee “through maneuvers
Reyes who receives a monthly salary of P175, the other successful
of documents from the guardian-petitioner.” If anyone is to blame for the
complainants were mere wage earners paid a daily rate of P4.20 to P5.00.
language used by Fernandez, it is Bello himself who has made insulting
Considering the long period of time that they were illegally and arbitrarily
remarks in his orders, which must have provoked Fernandez.. If a judge desires
deprived of their just pay, these laborers looked up to the favorable money
not to be insulted he should start using temperate language himself; he who
judgment as a serum to their pitiful economic malaise. A thirty per cent
sows the wind will reap a storm.
(30%) slice therefrom immensely dilutes the palliative ingredient of this
On the issue of attorney’s fees, the opinion of a judge as to the capacity of a
judicial antidote.
lawyer is not the basis of the right to a lawyer’s fee. It is the contract between
Hence, Fernandez cannot stake claim on the full amount of the 25%
the lawyer and client and the nature of the services rendered.
lien. The court remanded the case to the CIR to determine the proper division
of the lien between the two lawyers.
Amalgamated Laborer's Association v. Court of Industrial Relations, 22
SCRA 1266
FACTS: