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Case: 17-55404, 01/17/2018, ID: 10728222, DktEntry: 32, Page 1 of 22

Case  No.  17-­‐‑55404  

 
UNITED  STATES  COURT  OF  APPEALS  
FOR  THE  NINTH  CIRCUIT  

JEFFREY  GRAY  THOMAS,  


Plaintiff  and  Appellant,  
 
v.  
 
LAURIE  ZELON;  DENNIS  PERLUSS;  HUGH  JOHN  GIBSON;    
HOPE  PARK  2001-­‐‑02910056  LLC;    
ROSARIO  PERRY;  NORMAN  SOLOMON,  
Defendants  and  Appellees.  
 
Appeal  From  The  United  States  District  Court  
for  the  Central  District  of  California  
Case  No.  2:16-­‐‑cv-­‐‑06544-­‐‑JAK-­‐‑AJW  
John  A.  Kronstadt,  United  States  District  Judge,  Presiding    
 
BRIEF  OF  APPELLEE  ROSARIO  PERRY  
 

ROSARIO  PERRY,  A  PROFESSIONAL  LAW  CORPORATION  


Rosario  Perry  (SBN  55061)  
Steven  Coard  (SBN  277540)  
312  Pico  Blvd.  
Santa  Monica,  California  90405  
Telephone:    310  394-­‐‑9831  
 
Attorney  for  Defendant  and  Appellee  
ROSARIO  PERRY  
Case: 17-55404, 01/17/2018, ID: 10728222, DktEntry: 32, Page 2 of 22

 
 
 
 
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TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  


 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION                                1  

II. STATEMENT  OF  THE  CASE                            2  

III. THOMAS’S  CIVIL  RIGHTS  CLAIMS  FAIL  TO  STATE  A  CAUSE  OF  

ACTION  AGAINST  PERRY  UNDER  FRCP  12(b)(6)                    12  

IV. CONCLUSION                                    16  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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TABLE  OF  AUTHORITIES  
 
Federal  Case  Law  
 
Ashelman  v.  Pope,  793  F.2d  1072  (9th  Cir.  1986).………………………..page  13  

Dennis  v.  Sparks,  449  U.S.  24  (1980)……..……………………………….page    12  

Haldane  v.  Chagnon,  345  F.2d  601,  604  (9th  Cir.  1965)…………….........page    13  

Haldane  v.  Ruppe,  435  F.2d  647  (9th  Cir.  1970)………………………….page  13  

Moore  v.  Brewster,  96  F.  3d  1240,  1243  (9th  Cir.  1996)…………………..page  13  

Mullis  v.  Bankruptcy  Court  for  the  District  of  Nevada,  828  F.2d  1385  1394  (9th  Cir.  

1987)……………………………………………………………………..…page  13  

Reddy  v.  Superior  &  Mun.  Court  of  Cal.,  No.  SA  CV  97-­‐‑923  AHS  (SH),  1998  U.S.  

Dist.  LEXIS  24102,  (C.D.  Cal.,  Oct.  26,  1998)…………………………...page  15  

Federal  Statutes  

42  U.S.C.  §  1983…………………………………………………...……..pages  12-­‐‑15  

Federal  Rules  of  Civil  Procedure  

Rules  12(b)(6)………………………………………………………...........page  12


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I. INTRODUCTION.  

Plaintiff-­‐‑Appellant   Jeffrey   Gray   Thomas   (Thomas),   an   attorney,   was  

sanctioned   $58,650   by   the   California   Court   of   Appeal,   for   what   the   court  

described  as  “frivolous”  and  “outrageous”  conduct  “intended  to  harass  an  

opposing  party.”    The  California  Court  of  Appeal  also  ordered  the  clerk  of  the  

court  to  report  the  matter  to  the  State  Bar  of  California.    Thomas  then  filed  a  

convoluted  lawsuit  against  the  justices  who  had  sanctioned  him,  and  against  

the  opposing  counsel  and  opposing  parties  that  were  involved  in  Thomas’s  

frivolous  appeal.    Thomas’s  lawsuit  alleged  that  these  parties  and  attorneys  

“conspired”  to  deprive  Thomas  of  his  civil  rights.      The  lawsuit  also  included  

two   state   claims   against   opposing   counsel   and   opposing   parties   for   good  

measure.    The  federal  district  court  dismissed  the  entire  lawsuit  against  all  

parties,  pursuant  to  the  Rooker-­‐‑Feldman  doctrine.  

Appellee  Rosario  Perry  (“Perry”)  was  one  of  the  parties  in  Thomas’s  

frivolous  appeal,  and  is  one  of  the  defendants  in  this  federal  lawsuit.    The  

other  appellees  in  the  instant  appeal  before  the  9th  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals,  

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have   thoroughly   briefed   and   discussed   the   facts   of   the   case,     and   have  

thoroughly  analyzed  the  law,  and  their  arguments  apply  with  equal  force  to  

Perry.    Indeed,  the  legal  and  factual  basis  for  Perry’s  inclusion  as  a  defendant  

in  Thomas’s  Complaint  is  vague  and  unintelligible,    apart  from  the  allegation  

that  Perry    “conspired”  to  “support”  the  motion  for  sanctions  against  Thomas,  

whatever  that  means.    In  the  interest  of  judicial  economy  and  efficiency,  Perry  

will  not  further  belabor  and  regurgitate  the  points  set  forth  by  the  other  non-­‐‑

judicial  appellees,  who  stand  in  the  same  position  as  Perry,  nor  will  Perry  

repeat  the  arguments  set  forth  by  the  Judicial  appellees.    Perry  will  instead  

add  only  one  particular  issue  to  the  legal  discussion.        

II. STATEMENT  OF  THE  CASE.  

As  set  out  in  the  April  27,  2015  opinion  of  the  state  Court  of  Appeal  the  

underlying  state  court  action  was  an  interpleader  proceeding.  1130  LLC  filed  

that   interpleader   proceeding   in   the   state   trial   court   (Los   Angeles   County  

Superior  Court  Case  #  BC466413)  to  resolve  competing  claims  to  the  proceeds  

of   sale   of   property   located   at   1130   South   Hope   Street,   in   downtown   Los  

Angeles.  ER  126.  The  defendants  named  in  the  interpleader  complaint  were  

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Hope  Park,  Norman  Solomon,  Ray  Haiem  (Mr.  Thomas’s  client  in  the  trial  

court  and  state  court  appellate  proceedings),  Rosario  Perry,  Rosario  Perry’s  

law  offices  and  certain  other  defendants  later  dismissed  by  plaintiff.      

Mr.  Haiem  filed  a  cross-­‐‑complaint  in  the  interpleader  proceedings.  By  

October  3,  2012  Mr.  Thomas  had  substituted  in  as  Mr.  Thomas’s  counsel  (ER  

127).    Mr.  Haiem  was  ordered  several  times  to  complete  service  of  that  cross-­‐‑

complaint  on  all  named  cross-­‐‑defendants  but  failed  to  do  so  (ER  127-­‐‑128).    On  

November  9,  2012  the  state  trial  court  dismissed  Mr.  Haiem’s  cross-­‐‑complaint  

for   failure   to   complete   that   service   on   all   cross-­‐‑defendants   (ER   128).     Mr.  

Haiem   then   filed   several   motions   to   amend   his   (now   non-­‐‑existent)   cross-­‐‑

complaint,  all  of  which  were  denied.      (ER128-­‐‑130).  On  February  11,  2013,  1130  

LLC  dismissed  Mr.  Haiem  as  a  defendant  in  the  interpleader  proceedings  (ER  

130).  As  a  result  he  was  no  longer  a  party  to  those  proceedings.      

The  state  trial  court  then  on  May  22,  2013  held  a  hearing  on  the  issue  of  

distribution  of  the  remaining  funds  which  had  been  interpleaded  and  made  

orders   relating   to   distribution   of   the   remaining   funds   which   had   been  

interpleaded,  allocating  them  to  Hope  Park  and  to  Rosario  Perry  (ER  107-­‐‑108).    

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That  order  was  made  over  the  vociferous  objection  of  Mr.  Thomas,  on  behalf  

of  his  client.      

On  May  14,  2013,  more  than  six  months  after  the  state  trial  court  had  

dismissed  Mr.  Haiem’s  cross-­‐‑complaint  for  failure  to  complete  service,  Mr.  

Thomas  filed  a  motion  under  California  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  §  473,  asking  

that   the   court   vacate   its   November   9,   2013   order   dismissing   Mr.   Haiem’s  

cross-­‐‑complaint.    That  motion  was  heard  on  December  4,  2013  (ER  131).    Hope  

Park  pointed  out  that  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  §  473  stated  and  states  that  an  

application   for   relief   under   that   code   section   was   required   to   be   made  

“..within   a   reasonable   time,   in   no   case   exceeding   six   months,   after   the  

judgment,  dismissal,  order  or  proceeding  was  taken”  and  that  this  time  limit  

was  jurisdictional.      At  that  December  4,  2013  hearing  the  trial  court  denied  

Mr.  Haiem’s  motion  on  the  grounds  that  it  had  no  jurisdiction  to  grant  the  

motion,  because  it  had  not  been  filed  within  the  six  month  jurisdictional  time  

limit  of  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  §  473  (ER  131-­‐‑132)  i.e.  had  not  been  filed  

within  six  months  after  November  9,  2012.      

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On  January  31,  2014  Mr.  Thomas,  as  Mr.  Haiem’s  lawyer,  filed  a  Notice  

of  Appeal  stating  that  the  appeal  was  taken  as  to  orders  filed  on  “12/4/13  and  

5/22/13  (taken  together)”  and  as  to  orders  filed  on  “2/1/13  and  3/29/13  and  

12/4/13  (taken  together)”  (ER  132).      Hope  Park  moved  to  dismiss  the  appeal  

as  to  the  order  made  on  February  1,  2013  on  grounds  it  was  untimely  and  as  to  

the  order  made  on  May  22,  2013  on  the  ground  that  Mr.  Haiem  was  by  that  

time   not   a   party   to   the   trial   court   proceedings   and   so   had   no   standing   to  

appeal  the  order  made  that  date  (ER  132).  Both  motions  were  granted  (ER  

132).  The  appeal  filed  on  January  31,  2014  of  the  March  29,  2013  order  was  

likewise  untimely,  so  that  the  only  validly  appealable  order  was  the  order  

made  on  December  4,  2013  (ER  132).  

The  state  Court  of  Appeal  in  its  opinion  dated  April  27,  2015  affirmed  

the  ruling  of  the  trial  court    (ER  125-­‐‑146).  It  noted  that  California  case  law  is  

very  clear  that  the  six  month  period  for  seeking  relief  under  section  473  is  

jurisdictional,  and  that  the  trigger  date  for  the  CCP  §  473  “six  month  period”  

is  triggered  by  entry  of  the  order  in  question  rather  than  by  service  of  notice  of  

entry.  (ER  134-­‐‑135.)  The  Court  of  Appeal  also  rejected  as  without  any  basis  the  

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argument  made  by  Mr.  Thomas  argument  that  the  six  month  period  should  be  

extended  by  the  five-­‐‑day  mail  period  under  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  section  

1013.  (ER  136-­‐‑137.)  

On  October  24,  2014  (i.e.  while  that  state  court  appeal  was  pending,  and  

almost  six  months  before  oral  argument  on  that  appeal  took  place)  Hope  Park  

filed  its  motion  for  sanctions  against  Mr.  Thomas  and  Mr.  Haiem  (ER  118).    

On  November  6,  2014  the  state  Court  of  Appeal  ordered  that  “Respondents'ʹ  

motion  for  sanctions  will  be  considered  in  conjunction  with  the  appeal.”  (ER  

118-­‐‑119).    On  March  9,  2015  the  state  Court  of  Appeal  further  ordered  (ER  120)  

that  

“Good  cause  appearing,  appellant  Ray  Haiem  and  his  attorney  Jeffrey  

G.  Thomas  are  hereby  ordered  to  show  cause  before  this  court,  when  the  

matter  is  on  calendar  for  oral  argument,  why  monetary  sanctions  should  

not  be  imposed  for  prosecuting  a  frivolous  appeal.  (Code  Civ.  Proc.,  §  

907;  Cal.  Rules  of  Court,  rule  8.276(a);  see  In  re  Marriage  of  Flaherty  

(1982)  31  Cal.3d  637,  650-­‐‑651.)  Pursuant  to  California  Rules  of  Court,  

rule   8.276(d),   appellant   and   counsel   may   serve   and   file   a   written  

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opposition   within   10   calendar   days   of   the   date   of   this   order.   Oral  

argument  on  the  issue  of  sanctions  and  the  amount,  if  any,  of  sanctions,  

will  be  held  at  the  time  of  oral  argument  on  the  merits  of  the  appeal.  

(Cal.  Rules  of  Court,  rule  8.276(e).)”  

Oral  argument  took  place  on  April  9,  2015  (ER  121).    That  date  was  close  

to   six   months   from   the   date   that   Hope   Park   had   served   its   motion   for  

sanctions  (October  24,  2014)  and  more  than  five  months  after  the  state  Court  

of  Appeal  had  ordered  that    

“Respondents'ʹ  motion  for  sanctions  will  be  considered  in  conjunction  

with  the  appeal.”  (ER  118-­‐‑119).  

At  no  time  during  the  period  between  notice  of  motion  for  sanctions  and  

oral  argument  on  same  (or  even  after  that  point)  did  Mr.  Thomas  file  any  

opposition  to  the  motion  for  sanctions  or  the  order  to  show  cause.  The  state  

Court  of  Appeal  issued  its  opinion  and  order  some  weeks  later,  on  April  27,  

2015.  (ER  125-­‐‑146).    It  ordered  Mr.  Thomas  (but  not  his  client)  to  pay  $58,650  

to  Hope  Park  (ER  146)  as  sanctions  for  bringing  a  frivolous  appeal  motivated  

by  a  desire  to  harass  Hope  Park.    The  appellate  court  found  that  "ʺThomas’s  

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approach  toward  this  appeal  and  his  unprofessional  and  at  times  outrageous  

conduct  toward  counsel  for  Hope  Park  show  not  only  that  this  appeal  was  

frivolous  but  that  it  was  intended  to  harass  Hope  Park  and  to  drive  up  its  

litigation  costs."ʺ  (ER  139-­‐‑146.)  The  Court  of  Appeal  found  that  Mr.  Thomas’s  

appeal  demonstrated  a  “high  degree  of  objective  frivolousness"ʺ  (ER  144)  and  

that  it  was  prosecuted  for  an  improper  motive-­‐‑-­‐‑to  harass  Hope  Park  and  to  

increase  its  litigation  costs.  (ER  143.)  

Mr.  Thomas  thereafter  sought  a  rehearing  in  the  Court  of  Appeal  and  

review   by   the   California   Supreme   Court   (ER   121).   On   May   15,   2015,   his  

Petition  for  a  Rehearing  was  denied  (ER  121).  His  Petition  for  Review  in  the  

California  Supreme  Court  was  rejected  as  untimely.  (AOB  23).    

Mr.  Thomas  then  filed  a  Petition  for  Certiorari  with  the  United  States  

Supreme  Court.    That  Petition  was  “rejected  because  the  petition  lacked  an  

order  of  the  state  supreme  court  denying  review  on  the  merits."ʺ  (AOB  23.)  

On  August  31,  2016,  Mr.  Thomas  filed  the  underlying  federal  district  

court   complaint   against   Honorable   Laurie   Zelon   and   Honorable   Dennis  

Perluss   (two   of   the   three   Justices   of   the   appellate   panel   which   had  

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unanimously  issued  the  sanctions  order),  and  against  Hope  Park,  Norman  

Solomon  and  Rosario  Perry  –  ER  212-­‐‑302.    

His   major   contention   appears   to   be   that   1130   LLC,   which   was   the  

plaintiff  in  the  underlying  interpleader  proceedings,  was  a  "ʺzombie"ʺ  plaintiff  

i.e.  he  asserts  that  1130  LLC  did  not  exist  at  the  time  that  the  state  court  action  

was  filed,  and  that  as  a  result  the  state  courts,  including  the  state  Court  of  

Appeal,  had  no  power  to  enter  any  of  the  orders  which  they  made,  including  

the  order  awarding  sanctions  against  him.    

Mr.   Thomas’s   complaint   classifies   the   named   defendants   into   two  

classes:    (a)  judicial  defendants  and  (b)  conspiring  defendants.        His  complaint  

then   asserts   claims     under   42   USC   §   1983   based   on   claims   of   (1)   denial   of  

substantive  due  process;  (2)  denial  of  access  to  the  courts;  (3)  denial  of  the  

right  to  free  speech;  (4)  denial  of  equal  protection;  and  (5)  taking  property  

without  just  compensation  in  violation  of  the  Fifth  Amendment.  (ER  212-­‐‑302).    

His  complaint  further  makes  state  law  claims  for  unfair  and  fraudulent  

business  practices  in  violation  of  California  Business  and  Professions  Code  

section  17200  against  defendants  Gibson,  Perry,  Solomon,  and  Hope  Park  and  

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makes  state  law  claims  seeking  asking  that  the  sanctions  order  of  the  state  

Court  of  Appeal  be  declared  void  and  that  the  federal  courts  issue  an  order  

enjoining  enforcement  of  the  sanctions  order  (ER  212-­‐‑302).  

Defendants  Zelon,  Perluss,  Perry  and  Gibson  responded  to  the  federal  

court  complaint  by  filing  motions  to  dismiss  under  Rules  12(b)(1)  and  (6)  of  

the  Federal  Rules  of  Civil  Procedure  on  the  grounds  that  the  court  lacked  

subject   matter   jurisdiction   under   the   Rooker-­‐‑Feldman   doctrine   and   that   the  

Noerr-­‐‑Pennington  doctrine  and  (in  the  case  of  Perry  and  Gibson)  that  California  

Civil  Code  section  47(b)  barred  the  action  (see  ER  318    item  37).  Defendant  

Gibson   also   filed   a   special   motion   to   strike   under   California'ʹs   anti-­‐‑SLAPP  

statute.      

The  state  Court  of  Appeal  had  already  determined  in  its  judgment,  now  

long   since   final,   that   Mr.   Thomas’s   conduct   revealed   “Thomas’s   intent   to  

harass   Hope   Park   and   to   drive   up   its   costs   in   the   hope   of   a   settlement.”  

(Opinion  page  19,  ER  299).      

On  January  17,  2017,  Magistrate  Judge  Andrew  J.  Wistrich  issued  his  17-­‐‑

page  Report  and  Recommendation  to  grant  the  motions  to  dismiss  –  ER  192-­‐‑

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211.   The   Report   and   Recommendation   concluded   that   the   Rooker-­‐‑Feldman  

doctrine  barred  subject  matter  jurisdiction  over  Mr.  Thomas’s  federal  claims  

against  all  defendants.  Magistrate  Judge  Wistrich  concluded  that  the  Rooker-­‐‑

Feldman   doctrine   applied   because   Mr.   Thomas’s   claims   amounted   to   an  

impermissible  collateral  attack  on  the  prior  state  Court  of  Appeal  decision  and  

the  District  Court  complaint  was  a  "ʺde  facto  appeal"ʺ  forbidden  by  the  Rooker  

Feldman  doctrine.  Given  that  conclusion  the  Magistrate  Judge  in  his  report  also  

recommended  that  supplemental  jurisdiction  over  plaintiff'ʹs  state  law  claims  

be  declined.  

Judge   Kronstadt   accepted   the   Report   and   Recommendation   and   on  

February   9,   2017   entered   judgment   dismissing   the   complaint   without  

prejudice  (ER  3).    Mr.  Thomas  had  in  fact  filed  timely  objections  to  the  Report  

of     Magistrate   Judge   Wistrich.   Hence   Judge   Kronstadt,     realizing   that   Mr.  

Thomas  had  filed  timely  objections,  reviewed  the  entire  record  in  the  case,  

including  the  Report  and  Recommendations  of  Magistrate-­‐‑Judge  Wistrich,  

and  issued  an  amended  order  on  February  23,  2017,  which  again  accepted  the  

Report  and  Recommendation  of    Magistrate  Judge  Wistrich    (ER  2).    

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III. THOMAS’S  CIVIL  RIGHTS  CLAIMS  FAIL  TO  STATE  A  CAUSE  

OF  ACTION  AGAINST  PERRY  UNDER  FRCP  12(b)(6)  

Quite   apart   from   the   fatal   jurisdictional   problems   with   Thomas’s  

lawsuit,  the  five  civil  rights  claims  fail  to  state  a  cause  of  action  against  Perry.    

As   the   California   Court   of   Appeal   justices   that   were   sued   by   Thomas   are  

protected  by  immunity,  there  can  be  no  state  action  by  Perry,  and  thus  no  

section  1983  liability  for  Perry  under  the  Civil  Rights  act  of  1871.      This  issue  

was  briefed  by  Perry  below  in  Perry’s  Motion  to  Dismiss,  but  the  trial  court  

did  not  need  to  reach  this  issue,  because  the  trial  court  dismissed  the  entire  

action  against  Perry  on  jurisdictional  grounds.      

All   five   Section   1983   claims   against   Perry   fail   to   state   a   cause   action  

under  Rule  12(b)(6)  of  the  Federal  Rules  of  Civil  Procedure.    The  five  claims  

for  damages  under  Section  1983  against  the  justices  would  fail  because  the  

defendant  justices  are  absolutely  immune  from  suits  for  money  damages  for  

acts  performed  in  their  official  capacities.  Mireles  v.  Waco,  502  U.S.  9,  9,  112  S.  

Ct.  286,  116  L.  Ed.  2d  9  (1991)  (per  curiam);  Dennis  v.  Sparks,  449  U.S.  24,  27,  

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101  S.  Ct.  183,  66  L.  Ed.  2d  185  (1980);  Ashelman  v.  Pope,  793  F.2d  1072,  1075  

(9th  Cir.  1986)  (en  banc).      

Additionally,   "ʺ[t]he   judicial   or   quasi-­‐‑judicial   immunity   available   to  

[judicial]  officers  is  not  limited  to  immunity  from  damages,  but  extends  to  

actions   for   declaratory,   injunctive   and   other   equitable   relief."ʺ   Moore   v.  

Brewster,  96  F.  3d  1240,  1243  (9th  Cir.  1996),  quoting  Mullis  v.  Bankruptcy  Court  

for  the  District  of  Nevada,  828  F.2d  1385,  1394  (9th  Cir.  1987),  cert  denied,  486  

U.S.  1040,  108  S.  Ct.  2031,  100  L.  Ed.  2d  616  (1988).      

Thomas   makes   no   factual   allegation   supporting   any   contention   that  

Perry  was  a  state  actor,  or  that  he  acted  under  color  of  law,  so  all  of  Perry’s  

alleged  liability  under  Section  1983  hinges  on  the  alleged  “conspiracy”  with  

the  justices  from  Court  of  Appeal  to  have  sanctions  entered  against  Plaintiff.      

(Complaint  ¶¶  13,  25  &  38).      

But  with  the  elimination  of  the  defendant  justices  from  this  case  due  to  

their  immunity,  plaintiff'ʹs  conspiracy  claims  against  Perry  could  not  stand  

independently  under  the  Civil  Rights  Act  of  1871.    Haldane  v.  Chagnon,  345  

F.2d  601,  604  (9th  Cir.  1965);  see  also  Haldane  v.  Ruppe,  435  F.2d  647  (9th  Cir.  

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1970).    Perry  is  not  alleged  to  be  a  state  officer  acting  under  color  of  law,  and  

he  did  not  act  in  conspiracy  with  any  state  officers  (i.e.,  the  justices)  against  

whom  plaintiff  Thomas  could  state  a  valid  claim,  due  to  their  immunity.  (Id.)        

With   the   justices   removed   from   the   equation,   all   that   Thomas’s  

Complaint   (and   the   exhibits   attached   to   his   complaint)   allege   is   that  

Defendant  Perry  was  an  opposing  litigant  in  Thomas’s  frivolous  appeal,  and  

that   Perry   “agreed   to   support”   a   successful   motion   for   sanctions   against  

Thomas   based   on   that   frivolous   appeal.     Thomas   cites   no   case   in   which   a  

litigant’s  conduct  in  resisting  an  appeal,  and  then  “agreeing  to  support”  a  

motion  for  sanctions  against  the  attorney  prosecuting  that  frivolous  appeal,  

has  been  held  to  convert  that  litigant  into  a  “state  actor”  for  the  purposes  of  a  

section  1983  claim.      

Indeed,   holding   that   Perry   was   a   “state   actor”   for   the   purposes   of  

section   1983   liability   would   render   all   litigants   in   the   United   States   “state  

actors”  for  the  purposes  of  section  1983  liability.    Perry  is  not  alleged  to  be  a  

state  officer  acting  under  color  of  law—it  is  undisputed  that  he  was  merely  a  

party  in  an  interpleader  action-­‐‑-­‐‑-­‐‑and  he  did  not  act  in  conspiracy  with  any  

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state  officers  (i.e.,  the  justices)  against  whom  plaintiff  Thomas  could  state  a  

valid  claim.      The  untenable  nature  of  Plaintiff’s  section  1983  conspiracy  claims  

were  also  discussed  extensively  by  the  Central  District  of  California  in  Reddy  

v.  Superior  &  Mun.  Court  of  Cal.,  No.  SA  CV  97-­‐‑923  AHS  (SH),  1998  U.S.  Dist.  

LEXIS  24102,  at  *  11-­‐‑13  (C.D.  Cal.,  Oct.  26,  1998).    The  five  Section  1983  claims  

against  Rosario  Perry  must  fail  for  failure  to  state  a  cause  of  action,  and  must  

be  dismissed  in  any  event,  regardless  of  the  jurisdictional  problems  with  those  

five  claims.  

XIV. CONCLUSION  

The  trial  court’s  order  dismissing  Thomas’s  action  should  be  affirmed.    

   
 
DATE:  January  16,  2018              /s/  Rosario  Perry  
    Rosario  Perry    
 
Rosario  Perry,  a  Professional  Law  Corporation  
Attorney  for  Defendant  and  Appellees  
Rosario  Perry  
 

   

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CERTIFICATION  OF  COMPLIANCE  WITH  FEDERAL  RULE  OF  


APPELLATE  PROCEDURE  27(d)(2)(A)  AND  NINTH  CIRCUIT  RULE  27-­‐‑
1(1)(d)  

In  compliance  with  Federal  Rule  of  Appellate  Procedure  27(d)(2)(A)  and  

Ninth   Circuit   Rule   27-­‐‑1(1)(d),   I   certify   that   this  brief   of   Rosario   Perry   was  

prepared  in  a  proportionally  spaced  14-­‐‑point  font,  that  the  brief  was  produced  

using  a  word  processing  program  (Microsoft  Word),  and  that  the  WordCount  

feature  of  that    program  stated  that  the  brief  contains  3,675  words.  

DATED:  January  16,  2018    


 
 
           /s/  Rosario  Perry  
    Rosario  Perry  
Attorneys  for  Defendant  and  Appellee    
Rosario  Perry  

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CERTIFICATE  OF  SERVICE  

UNITED  STATES  COURT  OF  APPEALS  DOCKET  NO.  17-­‐‑55404  

I  hereby  certify  that  I  electronically  filed  the  foregoing  with  the  Clerk  of  

the   Court   for   the   United   States   Court   of   Appeals   for   the   Ninth   Circuit   by  

using  the  appellate  CM/ECF  system  on  January  _17_,  2018.  

Participants  in  the  case  who  are  registered  CM/ECF  users  will  be  served  

by  the  appellate  CM/ECF  system.  

I  further  certify  my  understanding  that  appellant  Jeffrey  Gray  Thomas  is  

not  registered  as  a  CM/ECF  user.  I  have  mailed  the  foregoing  document  to  Mr.  

Thomas  at  his  address  stated  below  by  First-­‐‑Class  Mail,  postage  prepaid  

Jeffrey  G.  Thomas    Esq.    


201  Wilshire  Boulevard,  Second  Floor  
Santa  Monica,  Ca.  90401  
 
 

  /s/  Rosario  Perry      


Rosario  Perry  
 

 
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