G.R. No.

L-49705-09 February 8, 1979

TOMATIC ARATUC, SERGIO TOCAO, CISCOLARIO DIAZ, FRED TAMULA, MANGONTAWAR GURO and BONIFACIO LEGASPI, petitioners,
vs.
The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REGIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS for Region XII (Central Mindanao), ABDULLAH DIMAPORO, JESUS
AMPARO, ANACLETO BADOY, et al., respondents.

BARREDO, J.:

Petition in G. R. Nos. L-49705-09 for certiorari with restraining order and preliminary injunction filed by six (6) independent candidates for
representatives to tile Interim Batasang Pambansa who had joined together under the banner of the Kunsensiya ng Bayan which,
however, was not registered as a political party or group under the 1976 Election Code, P.D. No. 1296, namely Tomatic Aratuc, Sorgio
Tocao, Ciscolario Diaz, Fred Tamula, Mangontawar Guro and Bonifacio Legaspi her referred to as petitioners, to review the decision of the
respondent Commission on Election (Comelec) resolving their appeal from the Of the respondent Regional Board of Canvasses for Region
XII regarding the canvass of the results of the election in said region for representatives to the I.B.P. held on April 7, 1978. Similar petition
in G.R. Nos. L49717-21, for certiorari with restraining order and preliminary injunction filed by Linang Mandangan, abo a candidate for
representative in the same election in that region, to review the decision of the Comelec declaring respondent Ernesto Roldan as entitled
to be proclaimed as one of the eight winners in said election.

The instant proceedings are sequels of Our decision in G.R. No. L- 48097, wherein Tomatic Aratuc et al. sought the suspension of the
canvass then being undertaken by respondent dent Board in Cotabato city and in which canvass, the returns in 1966 out of a total of
4,107 voting centers in the whole region had already been canvassed showing partial results as follows:

NAMES OF CANDIDATES

NO. OF VOTES

1. Roldan, Ernesto (KB) 225,674

2. Valdez, Estanislao (KBL) 217,789

3. Dimporo, Abdullah (KBL) 199,244

4. Tocao, Sergio (KB) 199,062

5. Badoy, Anacleto (KBL) 198,966

6. Amparo, Jesus (KBL) 184,764

7. Pangandaman, Sambolayan (KBL) 183,646

8. Sinsuat, Datu Blah (KBL) 182,457

9. Baga, Tomas (KBL) 171,656

10. Aratuc, Tomatic (KB) 165,796

11. Mandangan, Linang(KB) 165,032

12. Diaz, Ciscolario (KB) 159,977

13. Tamalu, Fred (KB) 153,734

14. Legaspi Bonifacio (KB) 148,200

15. Guro, Mangontawar (KB) 139,386

16. Loma, Nemesio (KB)107,455

17. Macapeges, Malamama (Independent)101,350

(Votes Of the independent candidates who actually were not in contention omitted)" (Page 6, Record, L-49705-09.)

A supervening panel headed by Commissioner of Elections, Hon- Venancio S. Duque, had conducted of the complaints of the petitioners
therein of alleged irregularities in the election records in all the voting centers in the whole province of Lanao del Sur, the whole City of
Marawi, eight (8) towns of Lanao del Norte, namely, Baloi, Karomatan, Matungao, Munai, Nunungan, Pantao Ragat, Tagoloan and
Tangcal, seven (7) towns in Maguindanao, namely, Barrira, Datu Piang, Dinaig, Matanog Parang, South Upi and Upi, ten (10) towns in
North Cotabato, namely, Carmen, Kabacan, Kidapwan, Magpet, Matalam Midsayap, Pigcawayan, Pikit, Pres. Roxas and Tulonan, and
eleven (11) towns in Sultan Kudarat, namely, Bagumbayan, Columbia Don Mariano Marcos, Esperanza, Isulan, Kalamansig, Lebak,
Lutayan, Palimbang, President Quirino and Tacurong, by reason for which, petitioners had asked that the returns from said voting centers
be excluded from the canvass. Before the start of the hearings, the canvass was suspended but after the supervisory panel presented its
report, on May 15, 1978, the Comelec lifted its order of suspension and directed the resumption of the canvass to be done in Manila. This
order was the one assailed in this Court. We issued a restraining order.

After hearing the parties, the Court allowed the resumption of the canvass but issued the following guidelines to be observed thereat:

1. That the resumption of said canvass shall be held in the Comelec main office in Manila starting not later than June 1, 1978;

2. That in preparation therefor, respondent Commission on Elections shall see to it that all the material election paragraph
corresponding to all the voting center involved in Election Nos. 78-8, 78-9, 78-10, 78-11 and 78-12 are taken to its main office in Manila,
more particularly, the ballot boxes, with the contents, used during the said elections, the books of voters or records of voting and the lists
or records of registered voters, on or before May 31, 1978;

3. That as soon as the corresponding records are available, petitioners and their counsel shall be allowed to examine the same
under such security measures as the respondent Board may determine, except the contents of the ballot boxes which shall be opened
only upon orders of either the respondent Board or respondent Commission, after the need therefor has become evident, the purpose of
such examination being to enable petitioners, and their counsel to expeditiously determine which of them they would wish to be
scrutinized and passed upon by the Board as supporting their charges of election frauds and anomalies, petitioners and their counsel
being admonished in this connection, that no dilatory tactics should be in by them and that only such records substantial objections
should be offered by them for the scrutiny by the Board;

4. That none of the election returns reffered to in the petition herein shall be canvassed without first giving the herein petitioners
ample opportunity to make their specific objections thereto, if they have any, and to show sufficient basis for the rejection of any of the
returns, and, in this connection, the respondent Regional Board of Canvassers should give due consideration to the points raised in the
memorandum filed by said petitioners with the Commission on Election in the above cases dated April 26, 1978;

5. That should it appear to the board upon summary scrutiny of the records to be offered by petitioners indication that in the
voting center actually held and/or that election returns were prepared either before the day of the election returns or at any other time,
without regard thereto or that there has been massive substitution of voters, or that ballots and/or returns were prepared by the same
groups of persons or individuals or outside of the voting centers, the Board should exclude the corresponding returns from the canvass;

6. That appeals to the commission on Election of the Board may be made only after all the returns in question in all the above, the
above five cases shall have been passed upon by the Board and, accordingly, no proclamation made until after the Commission shall have
finally resolved the appeal without prejudice to recourse to this court, if warranted as provided by the Code and the Constitution, giving
the parties reasonable time therefor;

7. That the copies of the election returns found in the corresponding ballot boxes shall be the one used in the canvass;

8. That the canvass shall be conducted with utmost dispatch, to the end that a proclamation, if feasible, may be made not later
than June 10, 1978; thus, the canvass may be terminated as soon as it is evident that the possible number of votes in the still
uncanvassed returns with no longer affect the general results of the elections here in controversy;

9. That respondent Commission shall promulgate such other directive not inconsistent with this resolution y necessary to expedite
the proceedings herein contemplated and to accomplish the purposes herein intended. (Pp. 8-9, Record.
On June 1, 1978, upon proper motion, said guidelines were modified:

... in the sense that the ballot boxes for the voting centers just referred to need not be taken to Manila, EXCEPT those of the particular
voting centers as to which the petitioners have the right to demand that the corresponding ballot boxes be opened in order that the
votes therein may be counted because said ballots unlike the election returns, have not been tampered with or substituted, which
instances the results of the counting shall be specified and made known by petitioners to the Regional Board of Canvassers not later than
June 3, 1978; it being understood, that for the purposes of the canvass, the petitioners shall not be allowed to invoke any objection not
already alleged in or comprehend within the allegations in their complaint in the election cases above- mentioned. (Page 8, Id.)

Thus respondent Board proceeded with the canvass, with the herein petitioners presenting objections, most of them supported by the
report of handwriting and finger print experts who had examined the voting records and lists of voters in 878 voting centers, out of 2,700
which they specified in their complaints or petitions in Election Cases 78-8, 78-9, 78-10, 78-11 and 7812 in the Comelec. In regard to 501
voting centers, the records cf. which, consisting of the voters lists and voting records were not available- and could not be brought to
Manila, petitions asked that the results therein be completely excluded from the canvass. On July 11, 1978, respondent Board terminated
its canvass and declared the result of the voting to be as follows:

NAME OF CANDIDATE

VOTES OBTAIN

VALDEZ, Estanislao 436,069

DIMAPORO, Abdullah429,351

PANGANDAMAN, Sambolayan 406,106

SINSUAT, Blah 403,445

AMPARO, Jesus 399,997

MANDANGAN, Linang 387,025

BAGA, Tomas 386,393

BADOY,Anacleto 374,933

ROLDAN, Ernesto 275,141

TOCAO, Sergio 239,914

ARATUC, Tomatic 205,829

GURO, Mangontawar 190,489

DIAZ, Ciscolario 90,077

TAMULA, Fred 180,280

LEGASPI, Bonifacio 174,396

MACAPEGES, Malamana 160,271

(Pp. 11-12, Record.)

Without loss of time, the petitioners brought the resolution of respondent Board to the Comelec. Hearing was held on April 25, 1978,
after which , the case was declared submitted for decision. However, on August 30,1978, the Comelec issued a resolution stating inter
alia that :

In order to enable the Commission to decide the appeal properly :

a. It will have to go deeper into the examination of the voting records and registration records and in the case of voting centers
whose voting and registration records which have not yet been submitted for the Commission to decide to open the ballot boxes; and

b. To interview and get statements under oath of impartial and disinterested persons from the area to determine whether actual
voting took place on April 7, 1978, as well as those of the military authorities in the areas affects (Page 12). Record, L-49705-09 .)

On December 11, 1978, the Comelec required the parties "to file their respective written comments on the reports they shall periodically
receive from the NBI-Comelec team of finger-print and signature experts within the inextendible period of seven (7) days from their
receipt thereof". According to counsel for Aratuc, et al., "Petitioners submitted their various comments on the report 4, the principal gist
of which was that it would appear uniformly in all the reports submitted by the Comelec-NBI experts that the registered voters were not
the ones who voted as shown by the fact that the thumbprints appearing in Form 1 were different from the thumbprints of the voters in
Form 5. " But the Comelec denied a motion of petitioners asking that the ballot boxes corresponding to the voting centers the record of
which are not available be opened and that a date be set when the statements of witnesses referred to in the August 30, 1978 resolution
would be taken, on the ground that in its opinion, it was no longer necessary to proceed with such opening of ballot boxes and taking of
statements.

For his part, counsel for petitioner M in G.R. No. L-49717-21 filed with Comelec on December 19,1978 a Memorandum. To quote from
the petition:

On December 19, 1978, the KBL, through counsel, filed a Memorandum for the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) Candidates on the
Comelec's Resolution of December 11, 1978, a xerox copy of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof as Annex 2, wherein they
discussed the following topics: (I) Brief History of the President Case; (II) Summary of Our Position and Submission Before the Honorable
commission; and (III) KBL's Appeal Ad Cautelam. And the fourth topic, because of its relevance to the case now before this Honorable
Court, we hereby quote for ready reference:

IV

OUR POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE

ESOLUTION OF THE HONORABLE

COMMISSION OF DECEMBER 11, 1978

We respectfully submit that the Resolution of this case by this Honorable Commission should be limited to the precincts and
municipalities involved in the KB'S Petitions in Cases Nos. 78-8 to 78-12, on which evidence had been submitted by the parties, and on
which the KB submitted the reports of their handwriting-print. Furthermore, it should be limited by the appeal of the KB. For under the
Supreme Court Resolution of May 23, 1978, original jurisdiction was given to the Board, with appeal to this Honorable Commission-
Considerations of other matters beyond these would be, in our humble opinion, without jurisdiction.

For the present, we beg to inform this Honorable Commission that we stand by the reports and findings of the COMELEC/NBI experts as
submitted by them to the Regional Board of Canvassers and as confirmed by the said Regional Board of Canvassers in its Resolution of
July 11, 1978, giving the 8 KBL candidates the majorities we have already above mentioned. The Board did more than make a summary
scrutiny of the records' required by the Supreme Court Resolution, Guideline No. 5, of May 23, 1978. Hence, if for lack of material time
we cannot file any Memorandum within the non-extendible period of seven (7) days, we would just stand by said COMELEC/NBI experts'
reports to the Regional Board, as confirmed by the Board (subject to our appeal ad cautelam).

The COMELEC sent to the parties copies of the reports of the NBI-COMELEC experts. For lack of material time due to the voluminous
reports and number of voting centers involved, the Christmas holidays, and our impression that the COMELEC will exercise only its
appellate jurisdiction, specially as per resolution of this Honorable Court of May 23, 1978 (in G.R. No. L-48097), we, the KBL, did not
comment any more on said reports. (Pp. 5-6, Record, L-49717-21.)
On January 13, 1979, the Comelec rendered its resolution being assailed in these cases, declaring the final result of the canvass to be as
follows:

CANDIDATES

VOTES

VALDEZ, Estanislao 319,514

DIMAPORO, Abdullah 289.751

AMPARO, Jesus 286,180

BADOY, Anacleto 285,985

BAGA, Tomas 271,473

PANGANDAMAN, Sambolayan 271,393

SINSUAT, Blah 269,905

ROLDAN, Ernesto 268,287

MANDANGAN, Linang 251,226

TACAO, Sergio 229,124

DIAZ, Ciscolario 187,986

ARATUC, Tomatic 183,316

LEGASPI, Bonifacio 178,564

TAMULA, Fred 177,270

GURO, Mangontawar 163,449

LOMA, Nemesio 129,450

(Page 14, Record, L-49705-09.)

It is alleged in the Aratuc petition that:

The Comelec committee grave abuse of dicretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction:

1. In not pursuing further the examination of the registration records and voting records from the other voting centers questioned
by petitioners after it found proof of massive substitute voting in all of the voting records and registration records examined by Comelec
and NBI experts;

2. In including in the canvass returns from the voting centers whose book of voters and voting records could not be recovered by
the Commission in spite of its repeated efforts to retrieve said records;

3. In not excluding from the canvass returns from voting centers showing a very high percentage of voting and in not considering
that high percentage of voting, coupled with massive substitution of voters is proof of manufacturing of election returns;
4. In denying petitioners' petition for the opening of the ballot boxes from voting centers whose records are not available for
examination to determine whether or not there had been voting in said voting centers;

5. In not Identifying the ballot boxes that had no padlocks and especially those that were found to be empty while they were
shipped to Manila pursuant to the directive of the Commission in compliance with the guidelines of this Honorable Court;

6. In not excluding from the canvass returns where the results of examination of the voting records and registration records show
that the thumbprints of the voters in CE Form 5 did not correspond to those of the registered voters as shown in CE Form 1;

7. In giving more credence to the affidavits of chairmen and members of the voting centers, municipal treasurers and other
election officials in the voting centers where irregularities had been committed and not giving credence to the affidavits of watchers of
petitioners;

8. In not including among those questioned before the Board by petitioners those included among the returns questioned by
them in their Memorandum filed with the Commission on April 26, 1978, which Memorandum was attached as Annex 'I' to their petition
filed with this Honorable Court G.R. No. L-48097 and which the Supreme Court said in its Guidelines should be considered by the Board in
the course of the canvass (Guidelines No. 4). (Pp. 15-16, Record, Id.)

On the other hand, the Mandangan petition submits that the Comelec comitted the following errors:

1. In erroneously applying the earlier case of Diaz vs. Commission on Elections (November 29, 1971; 42 SCRA 426), and particularly
the highly restrictive criterion that when the votes obtained by the candidates with the highest number of votes exceed the total number
of highest possible valid votes, the COMELEC ruled to exclude from the canvass the election return reflecting such rests, under which the
COMELEC excluded 1,004 election returns, involving around 100,000 votes, 95 % of which are for KBL candidates, particularly the
petitioner Linang Mandangan, and which rule is so patently unfair, unjust and oppressive.

2. In not holding that the real doctrine in the Diaz Case is not the total exclusion of election returns simply because the total
number of votes exceed the total number of highest possible valid votes, but 'even if all the votes cast by persons Identified as registered
voters were added to the votes cast by persons who can not be definitely ascertained as registered or not, and granting, ad arguendo,
that all of them voted for respondent Daoas, still the resulting total is much below the number of votes credited to the latter in returns
for Sagada, 'and that 'of the 2,188 ballots cast in Sagada, nearly one-half (1,012) were cast by persons definitely Identified as not
registered therein or still more than 40 % of substitute voting which was the rule followed in the later case of Bashier/Basman (Diaz Case,
November 19,1971,42 SCRA 426,432).

3. In not applying the rule and formula in the later case of Bashier and Basman vs. Commission on Election (February 24, 1972, 43
SCRA 238) which was the one followed by the Regional Board of Canvassers, to wit:

In Basman vs Comelec (L-33728, Feb. 24, 1972) the Supreme Court upheld the Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Commission
setting the standard of 40 % excess votes to justify the exclusion of election returns. In line with the above ruling, the Board of Canvassers
may likewise set aside election returns with 40 % substitute votes. Likewise, where excess voting occured and the excess was such as to
destroy the presumption of innocent mistake, the returns was excluded.

(COMELEC'S Resolution, Annex I hereof, p. 22), which this Honorable Court must have meant when its Resolution of May 23, 1978 (G.R.
No. 7), it referred to "massive substitution of voters.

4. In examining, through the NBI/COMELEC experts, the records in more than 878 voting centers examined by the KB experts and
passed upon by the Regional Board of Canvassers which was all that was within its appellate jurisdiction is examination of more election
records to make a total of 1,085 voting centers (COMELEC'S Resolution, Annex 1 hereof, p. 100), being beyond its jurisdiction and a denial
of due process as far as the KBL, particularly the petitioner Mandangan, were concerned because they were informed of it only on
December, 1978, long after the case has been submitted for decision in September, 1978; and the statement that the KBL acquiesced to
the same is absolutely without foundation.

5. In excluding election returns from areas where the conditions of peace and order were allegedly unsettled or where there was
a military operation going on immediately before and during election and where the voter turn out was high (90 % to 100 %), and where
the people had been asked to evacuate, as a ruling without jurisdiction and in violation of due process because no evidence was at all
submitted by the parties before the Regional Board of Canvasssers. (Pp. 23-25, Record, L-47917-21.)
Now before discussing the merits of the foregoing contentions, it is necessary to clarify first the nature and extent of the Supreme Court's
power of review in the premises. The Aratuc petition is expressly predicated on the ground that respondent Comelec "committed grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction" in eight specifications. On the other hand, the Mandangan petition raises pure
questions of law and jurisdiction. In other words, both petitions invoked the Court's certiorari jurisdiction, not its appellate authority of
review.

This is as it should be. While under the Constitution of 1935, "the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission shall be subject to
review by the Supreme Court" (Sec. 2, first paragraph, Article X) and pursuant to the Rules of Court, the petition for "certiorari or review"
shall be on the ground that the Commission "has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, or
has decided it in a way not in accord with law or the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court" (Sec. 3. Rule 43), and such provisions
refer not only to election contests but even to pre-proclamation proceedings, the 1973 Constitution provides somewhat differently thus:
"Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
days from his receipt of a copy thereof" (Section 11, Article XII c), even as it ordains that the Commission shall "be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and city
official" (Section 2(2).)

Correspondingly, the ElectionCode of 1978, which is the first legislative constructionof the pertinent constitutional provisions, makes the
Commission also the "sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies" and further provides that "any of its decisions, orders or rulings
(in such contoversies) shall be final and executory", just as in election contests, "the decision of the Commission shall be final, and
executory and inappealable." (Section 193)

It is at once evident from these constitutional and statutory modifications that there is a definite tendency to enhance and invigorate the
role of the Commission on Elections as the independent constitutinal body charged with the safeguarding of free, peaceful and honest
elections. The framers of the new Constitution must be presumed ot have definite knowledge of what it means to make the decisions,
orders and rulings of the Commission "subject to review by the Supreme Court". And since instead of maintaining that provision intact, it
ordained that the Commission's actuations be instead "brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari", We cannot insist that there was no
intent to change the nature of the remedy, considering that the limited scope of certiorari, compared to a review, is well known in
remedial law.

Withal, as already stated, the legislative construction of the modified peritinent constitutional provision is to the effect that the
actuations of the Commission are final, executory and even inappealable. While such construction does not exclude the general certiorari
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court which inheres in it as the final guardian of the Constitution, particularly, of its imperious due process
mandate, it correspondingly narrows down the scope and extent of the inquiry the Court is supposed to undertake to what is strictly the
office of certiorari as distinguished from review. We are of the considered opinion that the statutory modifications are consistent with
the apparent new constitional intent. Indeed, it is obvious that to say that actuations of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari technically connotes something less than saying that the same "shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court",
when it comes to the measure of the Court's reviewing authority or prerogative in the premises.

A review includes digging into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment, while certiorari deals exclusively with grave abuse of
discretion, which may not exist even when the decision is otherwise erroneous. certiorari implies an indifferent disregard of the law,
arbitrariness and caprice, an omission to weight pertinent considerations, a decision arrived at without rational deliberation. While the
effecdts of an error of judgment may not differ from that of an indiscretion, as a matter of policy, there are matters taht by their nature
ought to be left for final determination to the sound discretion of certain officers or entities, reserving it to the Supreme Court to insure
the faithful observance of due process only in cases of patent arbitrariness.

Such, to Our mind, is the constitutional scheme relative to the Commission on Elections. Conceived by the charter as the effective
instrument to preserve the sanctity of popular suffrage, endowed with independence and all the needed concommittant powers, it is but
proper that the Court should accord the greatest measure of presumption of regularity to its course of action and choice of means in
performing its duties, to the end that it may achieve its designed place in the democratic fabric of our government. Ideally, its members
should be free from all suspicions of partisan inclinations, but the fact that actually some of them have had stints in the arena of politics
should not, unless the contrary is shown, serve as basis for denying to its actuations the respect and consideration that the Constitution
contemplates should be accorded to it, in the same manner that the Supreme Court itself which from time to time may have members
drawn from the political ranks or even from military is at all times deemed insulated from every degree or form of external pressure and
influence as well as improper internal motivations that could arise from such background or orientation.

We hold, therefore that under the existing constitution and statutory provisions, the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court over orders, and
decisions of the Comelec is not as broad as it used to be and should be confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
patent and substantial denial of due process. Accordingly, it is in this light that We the opposing contentions of the parties in this cases.
THE MANDANGAN CASE

Being more simple in Our view, We shall deal with the petition in G.R. No. L-49717-21 first.

The errors assigned in this petition boil down to two main propositions, namely, (1) that it was an error of law on the part of respondent
Comelec to have applied to the extant circumstances hereof the ruling of this Court in Diaz vs. Comelec 42 SCRA 426 instead of that of
Bashier vs. Comelec 43 SCRA 238; and (2) that respondent Comelec exceeded its jurisdiction and denied due process to petitioner
Mandangan in extending its inquiry beyond the election records of "the 878 voting centers examined by the KB experts and passed upon
by the Regional Board of Canvassers" and in excluding from the canvass the returns showing 90 to 100 % voting, from voting centers
where military operations were by the Army to be going on, to the extent that said voting centers had to be transferred to the
poblaciones the same being by evidence.

Anent the first proposition, it must be made clear that the Diaz and Bashier rulings are not mutually exclusive of each other, each being
an outgrowth of the basic rationale of statistical improbability laid down in Lagumbay vs. Comelec and , 16 SCRA 175. Whether they be
apply together or separately or which of them be applied depends on the situation on hand. In the factual milieu of the instant case as
found by the Comelec, We see no cogent reason, and petitioner has not shown any, why returns in voting centers showing that the votes
of the candidate obtaining highest number of votes of the candidate obtaining the highest number of votes exceeds the highest possible
number of valid votes cast therein should not be deemed as spurious and manufactured just because the total number of excess votes in
said voting centers were not more than 40 %. Surely, this is not the occasion, consider the historical antecedents relative to the highly
questionable manner in which elections have been bad in the past in the provinces herein involved, of which the Court has judicial notice
as attested by its numerous decisions in cases involving practically every such election, of the Court to move a whit back from the
standards it has enunciated in those decisions.

In regard to the jurisdictional and due process points raised by herein petitioner, it is of decisive importance to bear in mind that under
Section 168 of the Revised Election Code of 1978, "the Commission (on Elections) shall have direct control and supervision on over the
board of canvassers" and that relatedly, Section 175 of the same Code provides that it "shall be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation
controversies." While nominally, the procedure of bringing to the Commission objections to the actuations of boards of canvassers has
been quite loosely referred to in certain quarters, even by the Commission and by this Court, such as in the guidelines of May 23,1978
quoted earlier in this opinion, as an appeal, the fact of the matter is that the authority of the Commission in reviewing such actuations
does not spring from any appellate jurisdiction conferred by any specific provision of law, for there is none such provision anywhere in
the Election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control and supervision endowed to it by the above-quoted provisions of
Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too well settled postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a superior body or
office having supervision and control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done.

Consequently, anything said in Lucman vs. Dimaporo, 33 SCRA 387, cited by petitioner, to the contrary notwithstanding, We cannot fault
respondent Comelec for its having extended its inquiry beyond that undertaken by the Board of Canvass On the contrary, it must be
stated that Comelec correctly and commendably asserted its statutory authority born of its envisaged constitutional duties vis-a-vis the
preservation of the purity of elections and electoral processes and p in doing what petitioner it should not have done. Incidentally, it
cannot be said that Comelec went further than even what Aratuc et al. have asked, since said complaints had impugned from the outset
not only the returns from the 878 voting centers examined by their experts but all those mentioned in their complaints in the election
cases filed originally with the Comelec enumerated in the opening statements hereof, hence respondent Comelec had that much field to
work on.

The same principle should apply in respect to the ruling of the Commission regarding the voting centers affected by military operations. It
took cognizance of the fact, not considered by the board of canvass, that said voting centers had been transferred to the poblaciones.
And, if only for purposes of pre-proclamation proceedings, We are persuaded it did not constitute a denial of due process for the
Commission to have taken into account, without the need or presentation of evidence by the parties, a matter so publicly notorious as
the unsettled situation of peace and order in localities in the provinces herein involved that their may perhaps be taken judicial notice of,
the same being capable of unquestionable demonstration. (See 1, Rule 129)

In this connection, We may as well perhaps, say here as later that regrettably We cannot, however, go along with the view, expressed in
the dissent of our respected Chief Justice, that from the fact that some of the voting centers had been transferred to the poblaciones
there is already sufficient basis for Us to rule that the Commission should have also subjected all the returns from the other voting
centers of the some municipalities, if not provinces, to the same degree of scrutiny as in the former. The majority of the Court feels that
had the Commission done so, it would have fallen into the error by petitioner Mandangan about denial of due process, for it is relatively
unsafe to draw adverse conclusions as to the exact conditions of peace and order in those other voting centers without at list some prima
facie evidence to rely on considering that there is no allegation, much less any showing at all that the voting centers in question are so
close to those excluded by the Comelec on as to warrant the inescapable conclusion that the relevant circumstances by the Comelec as
obtaining in the latter were Identical to those in the former.

Premises considered the petition in G.R. Nos. L-49717-21 is hereby dismiss for lack of merit.

THE ARATUC ET AL. PETITION

Of the eight errors assigned by herein petitioners earlier adverted to, the seventh and the sight do not require any extended disquisition.
As to the issue of whether the elections in the voting centers concerned were held on April 7, 1978, the date designated by law, or
earlier, to which the seventh alleged error is addressed, We note that apparently petitioners are not seriously pressing on it anymore, as
evidenced by the complete absence of any reference thereto during the oral argument of their counsel and the practically cavalier
discussion thereof in the petition. In any event, We are satisfied from a careful review of the analysis by the Comelec in its resolution now
before Us that it took pains to consider as meticulously as the nature of the evidence presented by both parties would permit all the
contentions of petitioners relative to the weight that should be given to such evidence. The detailed discussion of said evidence is
contained in not less than nineteen pages (pp. 70-89) of the resolution. In these premises, We are not prepared to hold that Comelec
acted wantonly and arbitrarily in drawing its conclusions adverse to petitioners' position. If errors there are in any of those conclusions,
they are errors of judgment which are not reviewable in certiorari, so long as they are founded on substantial evidence.

As to eighth assigned error. the thrust of respondents, comment is that the results in the voting centers mentioned in this assignment of
error had already been canvassed at the regional canvass center in Cotabato City. Again, We cannot say that in sustaining the board of
canvassers in this regard, Comelec gravely abused its discretion, if only because in the guidelines set by this Court, what appears to have
been referred to is, rightly or wrongly, the resumption only of the canvass, which does not necessarily include the setting aside and
repetition of the canvass already made in Cotabato City.

The second and fourth assignments of error concern the voting centers the corresponding voters' record (C.E. Form 1) and record of
voting, (C.E. Form 5) of which have never been brought to Manila because they, were not available The is not clear as to how many are
these voting centers. According to petitioners they are 501, but in the Comelec resolution in question, the number mentioned is only 408,
and this number is directly challenged in the petition. Under the second assignment, it is contended that the Comelec gravely abused its
discretion in including in the canvass the election returns from these voting centers and, somewhat alternatively, it is alleged as fourth
assignment that the petitioners motion for the opening of the ballot boxes pertaining to said voting centers was arbitraly denied by
respondent Comelec.

The resolution under scrutiny explains the situation that confronted the Commission in regard to the 408 voting centers reffered to as
follows :

The Commission had the option of excluding from the canvass the election returns under category. By deciding to exclude, the
Commission would be summarily disenfranchising the voters registered in the voting centers affected without any basis. The Commission
could also order the inclusion in the canvass of these elections returns under the injunction of the Supreme Court that extremes caution
must be exercised in rejecting returns unless these are palpably irregular. The Commission chose to give prima facie validity to the
election returns mentioned and uphold the votes cast by the voters in those areas. The Commission held the view that the failure of
some election officials to comply with Commission orders(to submit the records) should not parties to such official disobedience. In the
case of Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 39 Phil. 208, the Supreme Court ruled that when voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should
not be nullified because the officers appointed under the law to direct the election and guard the purity of the ballot have not complied
with their duty. (cited in Laurel on Elections, p. 24)

On page 14 of the comment of the Solicitor General, however, it is stated that:

At all events, the returns corresponding to these voting centers were examined by the Comelec and 141 of such returns were excluded,
as follows:

(Page 301, Record.)

This assertion has not been denied by petitioners.

Thus, it appears that precisely use of the absence or unavailability of the CE Forms 1 and 5 corresponding to the more than 400 voting
centers concerned in our present discussion the Comelec examined the returns from said voting centers to determine their
trustworthiness by scrutinizing the purported relevant data appearing on their faces, believing that such was the next best thing that
could be done to avoid total disenfranchisement of the voters in all of them On the Other hand, Petitioners' insist that the right thing to
do was to order the opening of the ballot boxes involved.

In connection with such opposing contentions, Comelec's explanation in its resolution is:

... The commission had it seen fit to so order, could have directed the opening of the ballot boxes. But the Commission did not see the
necessity of going to such length in a that was in nature and decided that there was sufficient bases for the revolution of the appeal. That
the Commission has discretion to determine when the ballot boxes should be opened is implicit in the guidelines set by the Supreme
Court which states that '. . . the ballot bones [which] shall be opened only upon orders of either the respondent Board or respondent
Commission, after the need therefor has become evident ... ' (guideline No. 3; emphasissupplied). Furthermore, the Court on June 1,
1978, amended the guidelines that the "ballot boxes for the voting centers ... need not be taken to Manila EXCEPT those of the centers as
to which the petitioners have the right to demand that the corresponding ballot boxes be opened ... provided that the voting centers
concerned shall be specified and made known by petitioners to the Regional Board of Canvassers not later than June 3,1978 ... '
(Emphasis supplied). The KB, candidates did not take advantage of the option granted them under these guidelines.( Pp 106-107, Record.)

Considering that Comelec, if it had wished to do so, had the facilities to Identify on its own the voting centers without CE Forms I and 5,
thereby precluding the need for the petitioners having to specify them, and under the circumstances the need for opening the ballot
boxes in question should have appeared to it to be quite apparent, it may be contended that Comelec would have done greater service to
the public interest had it proceeded to order such opening, as it had announced it had thoughts of doing in its resolution of August 30,
1978. On the other hand, We cannot really blame the Commission too much, since the exacting tenor of the guidelines issued by Us left it
with very little elbow room, so to speak, to use its own discretion independently of what We had ordered. What could have saved
matters altogether would have been a timely move on the part of petitioners on or before June 3, 1978, as contemplated in Our
resolution. After all come to think of it, that the possible outcome of the opening of the ballot boxes would favor the petitioners was not
a certainty — the contents them could conceivably boomerang against them, such as, for example, if the ballots therein had been found
to be regular and preponderantly for their opponents. Having in mind that significantly, petitioners filed their motion for only on January
9, 1979, practically on the eve of the promulgation of the resolution, We hold that by having adhered to Our guidelines of June 1, 1978,
Comelec certainly cannot be held to be guilty of having gravely abused its discretion, in examining and passing on the returns from the
voting centers reffered to in the second and fourth assignments of error in the canvass or in denying petitioners' motion for the of the
ballot boxes concerned.

The first, third and sixth assignment of involve related matters and maybe discussed together. They all deal with the inclusion in or
exclusion from the canvass of returns on the basis of the percentage of voting in specified voting centers and the corresponding findings
of the Comelec on the extent of substitute voting therein as indicated by the result of either the technical examination by experts of the
signatures and thumb-prints of the voters threat.

To begin with, petitioners' complaint that the Comelec did not examine and study 1,694 of the records in an the 2,775 voting centers
questioned by them is hardly accurate. To be more exact, the Commission excluded a total of 1,267 returns coming under four categories
namely: 1,001 under the Diaz, supra, ruling, 79 because of 90-100 % turnout of voters despite military operations, 105 palpably
manufactured owe and 82 returns excluded by the board of canvass on other grounds. Thus, 45.45 % of the of the petitioners were
sustained by the Comelec. In contrast, in the board of canvassers, only 453 returns were excluded. The board was reversed as to 6 of
these, and 821 returns were excluded by Comelec over and above those excluded by the board. In other words, the Comelec almost
doubled the exclusions by the board.

Petitioners would give the impression by their third assignment of error that Comelec refused to consider high percentage of voting,
coupled with mass substitute voting, as proof that the pertinent returns had been manufactured. That such was not the case is already
shown in the above specifications. To add more, it can be gleaned from the resolution that in t to the 1,065 voting centers in Lanao del
Sur and Marawi City where a high percentage of voting appeared, the returns from the 867 voting centers were excluded by the Comelec
and only 198 were included a ratio of roughly 78 % to 22 %. The following tabulation drawn from the figures in the resolution shows how
the Comelec went over those returns center by center and acted on them individually:

90% — 100% VOTING

MARAWI CITY AND LANAO DEL SUR

NO. OF V/C THAT V/C WITH 90% to 100%

MUNICIPALITIES FUNCTIONED VOTING
 N Excl Incl
o ude ude
. d d
o
f
V
/
C

Marawi 151 1 107 5

City 1
2

Bacolod 28 2 27 1
Grande 8

Balabaga 53 5 49 4
n 3

Balindon 22 2 15 7
g 2

Bayang 29 2 13 7
0

Binidaya 37 3 29 4
n 3

Buadipos 41 1 10 0
o Bunton 0

Bubong 24 2 21 2
3

Bumbara 21
n (All
excl
ude
d)

Butig 35 3 32 1
3

Calanoga 23 2 21 0
s 1

Ditsaan- 42 3 38 1
Ramain 9

Ganassi 39 3 23 15
8

Lumba 64 6 47 16
Bayabao 3

Lumbata 30 2 17 11
n 8

Lumbaya 37 3 28 5
nague 3

Madalu 14 1 6 7
m 3

Madamb 20 2 5 15
a 0

Maguing 57 5 53 2
5

Malaban 59 4 5 42
g 7

Maranta 79 6 41 22
o 3

Marugon 37 3 32 3
g 5

Masiu 27 2 24 2
6

Pagayaw 15 1 9 4
an 3

Piagapo 39 3 36 3
9

Poona- 44 4 42 2
Bayabao 4

Pualas 23 2 20 0
0

Saguiara 36 3 21 11
n 2

Sultan 35 3 31 0
Gumand 1
er

Tampara 24 2 15 6
n 1

Taraka 31 3 31 0
1
 Tubaran 23 1 19 0
9

TOTALS:
Marawi
&

Lanao 1,21 1 867 198

del Sur 8 ,
0
6
5

We are convinced, apart from presuming regularity in the performance of its duties, that there is enough showing in the record that it did
examine and study the returns and pertinent records corresponding to all the 2775 voting centers subject of petitioners' complaints
below. In one part of its resolution the Comelec states:

The Commission as earlier stated examined on its own the Books of Voters (Comelec Form No. 1) and the Voters Rewards Comelec Form
No. 5) to determine for itself which of these elections form needed further examination by the COMELEC-NBI experts. The Commission,
aware of the nature of this pre-proclamation controversy, believes that it can decide, using common sense and perception, whether the
election forms in controversy needed further examination by the experts based on the presence or absence of patent signs of irregularity.
(Pp. 137-138, Record.)

In the face of this categorical assertion of fact of the Commission, the bare charge of petitioners that the records pertaining to the 1,694
voting centers assailed by them should not create any ripple of serious doubt. As We view this point under discussion, what is more
factually accurate is that those records complained of were not examined with the aid of experts and that Comelec passed upon the
returns concerned "using common sense and perception only." And there is nothing basically objectionable in this. The defunct
Presidential Senate and House Electoral Tribunals examine passed upon and voided millions of votes in several national elections without
the assistance of experts and "using" only common sense and perception". No one ever raised any eyebrows about such procedure.
Withal, what we discern from the resolution is that Comelec preliminary screened the records and whatever it could not properly pass
upon by "using common sense and perception" it left to the experts to work on. We might disagree with he Comelec as to which voting
center should be excluded or included, were We to go over the same records Ourselves, but still a case of grave abuse of discretion would
not come out, considering that Comelec cannot be said to have acted whimsically or capriciously or without any rational basis,
particularly if it is considered that in many respects and from the very nature of our respective functions, becoming candor would dictate
to Us to concede that the Commission is in a better position to appreciate and assess the vital circumstances closely and accurately. By
and large, therefore, the first, third and sixth assignments of error of the petitioners are not well taken.

The fifth assignment of error is in Our view moot and academic. The Identification of the ballot boxes in defective condition, in some
instances open and allegedly empty, is at best of secondary import because, as already discussed, the records related thereto were after
all examined, studied and passed upon. If at all, deeper inquiry into this point would be of real value in an electoral protest.

CONCLUSION

Before closing, it may not be amiss to state here that the Court had initially agreed to dispose of the cases in a minute resolution, without
prejudice to an extended or reasoned out opinion later, so that the Court's decision may be known earlier. Considering, however, that no
less than the Honorable Chief Justice has expressed misgivings as to the propriety of yielding to the conclusions of respondent
Commission because in his view there are strong considerations warranting farther meticulous inquiry of what he deems to be earmarks
of seemingly traditional faults in the manner elections are held in the municipalities and provinces herein involved, and he is joined in this
pose by two other distinguished colleagues of Ours, the majority opted to ask for more time to put down at least some of the important
considerations that impelled Us to see the matters in dispute the other way, just as the minority bidded for the opportunity to record
their points of view. In this manner, all concerned will perhaps have ample basis to place their respective reactions in proper perspective.

In this connection, the majority feels it is but meet to advert to the following portion of the ratiocination of respondent Board of
Canvassers adopted by respondent Commission with approval in its resolution under question:

First of all this Board was guided by the legal doctrine that canvassing boards must exercise "extreme caution" in rejecting returns and
they may do so only when the returns are palpably irregular. A conclusion that an election return is obviously manufactured or false and
consequently should be disregarded in the canvass must be approached with extreme caution, and only upon the most convincing proof.
Any plausible explanation one which is acceptable to a reasonable man in the light of experience and of the probabilities of the situation,
should suffice to avoid outright nullification, with the resulting t of those who exercised their right of suffrage. (Anni vs. Isquierdo et at L-
35918, Jude 28,1974; Villavon v. Comelec L-32008, August 31,1970; Tagoranao v. Comelec 22 SCRA 978). In the absence of strong
evidence establishing the spuriousness of the return, the basis rule of their being accorded prima facie status as bona fide reports of the
results of the count of the votes for canvassing and proclamation purposes must be applied, without prejudice to the question being tried
on the merits with the presentation of evidence, testimonial and real in the corresponding electoral protest. (Bashier vs. Comelec L-
33692, 33699, 33728, 43 SCRA 238, February 24, 1972). The decisive factor is that where it has been duly de ed after investigation and
examination of the voting and registration records hat actual voting and election by the registered voters had taken place in the
questioned voting centers, the election returns cannot be disregarded and excluded with the resting disenfranchisement of the voters,
but must be accorded prima facie status as bona fide reports of the results of the voting for canvassing and registration purposes. Where
the grievances relied upon is the commission of irregularities and violation of the Election Law the proper remedy is election protest.
(Anni vs. Isquierdo et al. Supra). (P. 69, Record, L-49705-09).

The writer of this opinion has taken care to personally check on the citations to be doubly sure they were not taken out of context,
considering that most, if not all of them arose from similar situations in the very venues of the actual milieu of the instant cases, and We
are satisfied they do fit our chosen posture. More importantly, they actually came from the pens of different members of the Court,
already retired or still with Us, distinguished by their perspicacity and their perceptive prowess. In the context of the constitutional and
legislative intent expounded at the outset of this opinion and evident in the modifications of the duties and responsibilities of the
Commission on Elections vis-a-vis the matters that have concerned Us herein, particularly the elevation of the Commission as the "sole
judge of pre-proclamation controversies" as well as of all electoral contests, We find the afore-quoted doctrines compelling as they reveal
through the clouds of existing jurisprudence the pole star by which the future should be guided in delineating and circumscribing
separate spheres of action of the Commission as it functions in its equally important dual role just indicated bearing as they do on the
purity and sanctity of elections in this country.

In conclusion, the Court finds insufficient merit in the petition to warrant its being given due course. Petition dismissed, without
pronouncement as to costs. Justices Fernando, Antonio and Guerrero who are presently on official missions abroad voted for such
dismissal.

Fernando, Antonio, Concepcion Jr., Santos Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J. took no part.

Aquino and Abad Santos, Jr., took no part.

G.R. No. 96266 July 18, 1991

ERNESTO M. MACEDA, petitioner,

vs.
ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, CALTEX (Philippines), INC., PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION AND PETRON
CORPORATION, respondents.

, CALTEX (Philippines), INC., PILIPINAS SHELL, INC. AND PETROPHIL CORPORATION, respondents.

RESOLUTION

MEDIALDEA, J.:p

In G.R. No. 96266, petitioner Maceda seeks nullification of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) Orders dated December 5 and 6, 1990 on
the ground that the hearings conducted on the second provisional increase in oil prices did not allow him substantial cross-examination,
in effect, allegedly, a denial of due process.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Upon the outbreak of the Persian Gulf conflict on August 2, 1990, private respondents oil companies filed with the ERB their respective
applications on oil price increases (docketed as ERB Case Nos. 90-106, 90-382 and 90-384, respectively).

On September 21, 1990, the ERB issued an order granting a provisional increase of P1.42 per liter. Petitioner Maceda filed a petition for
Prohibition on September 26, 1990 (E. Maceda v. ERB, et al., G.R. No. 95203), seeking to nullify the provisional increase. We dismissed
the petition on December 18, 1990, reaffirming ERB's authority to grant provisional increase even without prior hearing, pursuant to Sec.
8 of E.O. No. 172, clarifying as follows:

What must be stressed is that while under Executive Order No. 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude
the Board from ordering, ex-parte, a provisional increase, as it did here, subject to its final disposition of whether or
not: (1) to make it permanent; (2) to reduce or increase it further; or (3) to deny the application. Section 3, paragraph
(e) is akin to a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary attachment issued by the courts, which are
given ex-parte and which are subject to the resolution of the main case.

Section 3, paragraph (e) and Section 8 do not negate each other, or otherwise, operate exclusively of the other, in
that the Board may resort to one but not to both at the same time. Section 3(e) outlines the jurisdiction of the Board
and the grounds for which it may decree a price adjustment, subject to the requirements of notice and hearing.
Pending that, however, it may order, under Section 8, an authority to increase provisionally, without need of a
hearing, subject to the final outcome of the proceeding. The Board, of course, is not prevented from conducting a
hearing on the grant of provisional authority-which is of course, the better procedure — however, it cannot be
stigmatized later if it failed to conduct one. (pp. 129-130, Rollo) (Emphasis supplied)

In the same order of September 21, 1990, authorizing provisional increase, the ERB set the applications for hearing with due notice to all
interested parties on October 16, 1990. Petitioner Maceda failed to appear at said hearing as well as on the second hearing on October
17, 1990.

To afford registered oppositors the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, the ERB set the continuation of the hearing to October
24, 1990. This was postponed to November 5, 1990, on written notice of petitioner Maceda.

On November 5, 1990, the three oil companies filed their respective motions for leave to file or admit amended/supplemental
applications to further increase the prices of petroleum products.
The ERB admitted the respective supplemental/amended petitions on November 6, 1990 at the same time requiring applicants to publish
the corresponding Notices of Public Hearing in two newspapers of general circulation (p. 4,Rollo and Annexes "F" and "G," pp. 60 and
62, Rollo).

Hearing for the presentation of the evidence-in-chief commenced on November 21, 1990 with ERB ruling that testimonies of witnesses
were to be in the form of Affidavits (p. 6, Rollo). ERB subsequently outlined the procedure to be observed in the reception of evidence, as
follows:

CHAIRMAN FERNANDO:

Well, at the last hearing, applicant Caltex presented its evidence-in-chief and there is an understanding or it is the
Board's wish that for purposes of good order in the presentation of the evidence considering that these are being
heard together, we will defer the cross-examination of applicant Caltex's witness and ask the other applicants to
present their evidence-in-chief so that the oppositors win have a better Idea of what an of these will lead to because
as I mentioned earlier, it has been traditional and it is the intention of the Board to act on these applications on an
industry-wide basis, whether to accept, reject, modify or whatever, the Board win do it on an industry wide basis, so,
the best way to have (sic) the oppositors and the Board a clear picture of what the applicants are asking for is to have
all the evidence-in-chief to be placed on record first and then the examination will come later, the cross-examination
will come later. . . . (pp. 5-6, tsn., November 23, 1990, ERB Cases Nos. 90-106, 90382 and 90-384). (p. 162, Rollo)

Petitioner Maceda maintains that this order of proof deprived him of his right to finish his cross-examination of Petron's
witnesses and denied him his right to cross-examine each of the witnesses of Caltex and Shell. He points out that this relaxed
procedure resulted in the denial of due process.

We disagree. The Solicitor General has pointed out:

. . . The order of testimony both with respect to the examination of the particular witness and to the general course of
the trial is within the discretion of the court and the exercise of this discretion in permitting to be introduced out of
the order prescribed by the rules is not improper (88 C.J.S. 206-207).

Such a relaxed procedure is especially true in administrative bodies, such as the ERB which in matters of rate or price
fixing is considered as exercising a quasi-legislative, not quasi-judicial, function As such administrative agency, it is not
bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence governing court proceedings (Sec. 29, Public Service Act; Dickenson
v. United States, 346, U.S. 389, 98 L. ed. 132, 74 S. St. 152). (Emphasis supplied)

In fact, Section 2, Rule I of the Rules of Practice and Procedure Governing Hearings Before the ERB provides that —

These Rules shall govern pleadings, practice and procedure before the Energy Regulatory Board in all matters of
inquiry, study, hearing, investigation and/or any other proceedings within the jurisdiction of the Board. However, in
the broader interest of justice, the Board may, in any particular matter, except itself from these rules and apply such
suitable procedure as shall promote the objectives of the Order.

(pp. 163-164, Rollo)

Petitioner Maceda also claims that there is no substantial evidence on record to support the provisional relief.

We have, in G.R. Nos. 95203-05, previously taken judicial notice of matters and events related to the oil industry, as follows:

. . . (1) as of June 30, 1990, the OPSF has incurred a deficit of P6.1 Billion; (2) the exchange rate has fallen to P28.00 to
$1.00; (3) the country's balance of payments is expected to reach $1 Billion; (4) our trade deficit is at P2.855 Billion as
of the first nine months of the year.

. . . (p. 150, Rollo)

The Solicitor General likewise commented:

Among the pieces of evidence considered by ERB in the grant of the contested provisional relief were: (1) certified
copies of bins of lading issued by crude oil suppliers to the private respondents; (2) reports of the Bankers Association
of the Philippines on the peso-dollar exchange rate at the BAP oil pit; and (3) OPSF status reports of the Office of
Energy Affairs. The ERB was likewise guided in the determination of international crude oil prices by traditional
authoritative sources of information on crude oil and petroleum products, such as Platt's Oilgram and Petroleum
Intelligence Weekly. (p. 158,Rollo)

Thus, We concede ERB's authority to grant the provisional increase in oil price, as We note that the Order of December 5, 1990 explicitly
stated:

in the light, therefore, of the rise in crude oil importation costs, which as earlier mentioned, reached an average of
$30.3318 per barrel at $25.551/US $ in September-October 1990; the huge OPSF deficit which, as reported by the
Office of Energy Affairs, has amounted to P5.7 Billion (based on filed claims only and net of the P5 Billion OPSF) as of
September 30, 1990, and is estimated to further increase to over P10 Billion by end December 1990; the decision of
the government to discontinue subsidizing oil prices in view of inflationary pressures; the apparent inadequacy of the
proposed additional P5.1 Billion government appropriation for the OPSF and the sharp drop in the value of the peso
in relation to the US dollar to P28/US $, this Board is left with no other recourse but to grant applicants oil companies
further relief by increasing the prices of petroleum products sold by them. (p. 161, Rollo)

Petitioner Maceda together with petitioner Original (G.R. No. 96349) also claim that the provisional increase involved amounts over and
above that sought by the petitioning oil companies.

The Solicitor General has pointed out that aside from the increase in crude oil prices, all the applications of the respondent oil companies
filed with the ERB covered claims from the OPSF.

We shall thus respect the ERB's Order of December 5, 1990 granting a provisional price increase on petroleum products premised on the
oil companies' OPSF claims, crude cost peso differentials, forex risk for a subsidy on sale to NPC (p. 167, Rollo), since the oil companies
are "entitled to as much relief as the fact alleged constituting the course of action may warrant," (Javellana v. D.O. Plaza Enterprises, Inc.,
G.R. No. L-28297, March 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 261 citing Rosales v. Reyes, 25 Phil. 495; Aguilar v. Rubiato, 40 Phil. 470) as follows:

Per Liter

Weighted

Petron Shell Caltex Average

Crude Cost P3.11 P3.6047 P2.9248 P3.1523

Peso Cost

Diffn'l 2.1747 1.5203 1.5669 1.8123

Forex Risk

Fee -0.1089 -0,0719 -0.0790 -0.0896

Subsidy on

Sales to NPC 0.1955 0.0685 0.0590 0.1203

Total Price
 Increase

Applied for P59.3713 P5.1216 P4.4717 P4.9954

Less: September 21 Price

Relief

Actual Price Increase P1.42

Actual Tax Reduction:

Ad Valorem Tax

(per Sept. 1, 1990

price build-up) P1.3333

Specific Tax (per

Oct. 5, 1990 price

build-up) .6264 .7069 2.1269

Net Price Increase

Applied for 2.8685

Nonetheless, it is relevant to point out that on December 10, 1990, the ERB, in response to the President's appeal, brought back the
increases in Premium and Regular gasoline to the levels mandated by the December 5, 1990 Order (P6.9600 and P6.3900, respectively),
as follows:

Product In Pesos Per Liter

OPSF

Premium Gasoline 6.9600

Regular Gasoline 6.3900

Avturbo 4.9950

Kerosene 1.4100

Diesel Oil 1.4100

Fuel Oil/Feedstock 0.2405

LPG 1.2200

Asphalt 2.5000
 Thinner 2.5000

In G.R. No. 96349, petitioner Original additionally claims that if the price increase will be used to augment the OPSF this will constitute
illegal taxation. In the Maceda case, (G.R. Nos. 95203-05, supra) this Court has already ruled that "the Board Order authorizing the
proceeds generated by the increase to be deposited to the OPSF is not an act of taxation but is authorized by Presidential Decree No.
1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137.

The petitions of E.O. Original et al. (G.R. No. 96349) and C.S. Povedas, Jr. (G.R. No. 96284), insofar as they question the ERB's authority
under Sec. 8 of E.O. 172, have become moot and academic.

We lament Our helplessness over this second provisional increase in oil price. We have stated that this "is a question best judged by the
political leadership" (G.R. Nos. 95203-05, G.R. Nos. 95119-21, supra). We wish to reiterate Our previous pronouncements therein that
while the government is able to justify a provisional increase, these findings "are not final, and it is up to petitioners to demonstrate that
the present economic picture does not warrant a permanent increase."

In this regard, We also note the Solicitor General's comments that "the ERB is not averse to the idea of a presidential review of its
decision," except that there is no law at present authorizing the same. Perhaps, as pointed out by Justice Padilla, our lawmakers may see
the wisdom of allowing presidential review of the decisions of the ERB since, despite its being a quasi-judicial body, it is still "an
administrative body under the Office of the President whose decisions should be appealed to the President under the established
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies," especially on a matter as transcendental as oil price increases which affect the lives
of almost an Filipinos.

ACCORDINGLY, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 86695. September 3, 1992.]

MARIA ELENA MALAGA, doing business under the name B.E. CONSTRUCTION; JOSIELEEN NAJARRO, doing business under the name
BEST BUILT CONSTRUCTION; JOSE N. OCCEÑA, doing business under the name THE FIRM OF JOSE N. OCCEÑA; and the ILOILO BUILDERS
CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. MANUEL R. PENACHOS, JR., ALFREDO MATANGGA, ENRICO TICAR AND TERESITA VILLANUEVA, in their
respective capacities as Chairman and Members of the Pre-qualification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC)-BENIGNO PANISTANTE, in
his capacity as President of Iloilo State College of Fisheries, as well as in their respective personal capacities; and HON. LODRIGIO L.
LEBAQUIN, Respondents.

Salas, Villareal & Velasco, for Petitioners.

Virgilio A. Sindico for Respondents.

DECISION

CRUZ, J.:

This controversy involves the extent and applicability of P.D. 1818, which prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving
infrastructure projects of the government.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

The facts are not disputed.

The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (henceforth ISCOF) through its Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee (henceforth PBAC)
caused the publication in the November 25, 26, 28, 1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of
the Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the last day for the submission of pre-qualification requirements (PRE
C-1) ** was December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received and opened on December 12, 1988, 3 o’clock in the afternoon. 1

Petitioners Maria Elena Malaga and Josieleen Najarro, respectively doing business under the name of the B.E. Construction and Best Built
Construction, submitted their pre-qualification documents at two o’clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Jose Occeña
submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of them were not allowed to participate in the bidding because their
documents were considered late, having been submitted after the cut-off time of ten o’clock in the morning of December 2, 1988.

On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo against the chairman and members of
PBAC in their official and personal capacities. The plaintiffs claimed that although they had submitted their PRE-C1 on time, the PBAC
refused without just cause to accept them. As a result, they were not included in the list of pre-qualified bidders, could not secure the
needed plans and other documents, and were unable to participate in the scheduled bidding.

In their prayer, they sought the resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of their PRE-C1 documents. They also
asked that if the bidding had already been conducted, the defendants be directed not to award the project pending resolution of their
complaint.

On the same date, Judge Lodrigio L. Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and awarding the
project. 2

On December 16, 1988, the defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the Court was prohibited from
issued restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and preliminary mandatory injunctions by P.D. 1818.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The decree reads pertinently as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Section 1. No Court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary
infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest or other natural resource development project of the government, or any public utility
operated by the government, including among others public utilities for the transport of the goods and commodities, stevedoring and
arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or
implementation of any such project, or the operation of such public utility, or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution,
implementation or operation.

The movants also contended that the question of the propriety of a preliminary injunction had become moot and academic because the
restraining order was received late, at 2 o’clock in the afternoon of December 12, 1988, after the bidding had been conducted and closed
at eleven thirty in the morning of that date.

In their opposition of the motion, the plaintiffs argued against the applicability of P.D. 1818, pointing out that while ISCOF was a state
college, it had its own charter and separate existence and was not part of the national government or of any local political subdivision.
Even if P.D. 1818 were applicable, the prohibition presumed a valid and legal government project, not one tainted with anomalies like the
project at bar.

They also cited Filipinas Marble Corp. v. IAC, 3 where the Court allowed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction despite a similar
prohibition found in P.D. 385. The Court therein stated that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The government, however, is bound by basic principles of fairness and decency under the due process clauses of the Bill of Rights. P.D.
385 was never meant to protect officials of government-lending institutions who take over the management of a borrower corporation,
lead that corporation to bankruptcy through mismanagement or misappropriation of its funds, and who, after ruining it, use the
mandatory provisions of the decree to avoid the consequences of their misleads (p. 188, Emphasis supplied).

On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the
building sought to be construed at the ISCOF was an infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of P.D. 1818.
Even if it were not, the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction would still fail because the sheriff’s return showed that
PBAC was served a copy of the restraining order after the bidding sought to be restrained had already been held. Furthermore, the
members of the PBAC could not be restrained from awarding the project because the authority to do so was lodged in the President of
the ISCOF, who was not a party to the case. 4

In the petition now before us, it is reiterated that P.D. 1818 does not cover the ISCOF because of its separate and distinct corporate
personality. It is also stressed again that the prohibition under P.D. 1818 could not apply to the present controversy because the project
was vitiated with irregularities, to wit:chanrobles.com : virtual law library

1. The invitation to bid as published fixed the deadline of submission of pre-qualification document on December 2, 1988 without
indicating any time, yet after 10:00 o’clock of the given late, the PBAC already refused to accept petitioners’ documents.

2. The time and date of bidding was published as December 12, 1988 at 3:00 p.m. yet it was held at 10:00 o’clock in the morning.

3. Private respondents, for the purpose of inviting bidders to participate, issued a mimeographed "Invitation to Bid" form, which by law
(P.D. 1594 and Implementing Rules, Exh. B-1) is to contain the particulars of the project subject of bidding for the purpose of.

(i) enabling bidders to make an intelligent and accurate bids;

(ii) for PBAC to have a uniform basis for evaluating the bids;

(iii) to prevent collusion between a bidder and the PBAC, by opening to all the particulars of a project.

Additionally, the Invitation to Bid prepared by the respondents and the Itemized Bill of Quantities therein were left blank. 5 And although
the project in question was a "Construction," the private respondents used an Invitation to Bid form for "Materials." 6

The petitioners also point out that the validity of the writ of preliminary injunction had not yet become moot and academic because even
if the bids had been opened before the restraining order was issued, the project itself had not yet been awarded. The ISCOF president
was not an indispensable party because the signing of the award was merely a ministerial function which he could perform only upon the
recommendation of the Award Committee. At any rate, the complaint had already been duly amended to include him as a party
defendant.

In their Comment, the private respondents maintain that since the members of the board of trustees of the ISCOF are all government
officials under Section 7 of P.D. 1523 and since the operations and maintenance of the ISCOF are provided for in the General
Appropriations Law, it is should be considered a government institution whose infrastructure project is covered by P.D. 1818.

Regarding the schedule for pre-qualification, the private respondents insist that PBAC posted on the ISCOF bulletin board an
announcement that the deadline for the submission of pre-qualifications documents was at 10 o’clock of December 2, 1988, and the
opening of bids would be held at 1 o’clock in the afternoon of December 12, 1988. As of ten o’clock in the morning of December 2, 1988,
B.E. construction and Best Built construction had filed only their letters of intent. At two o’clock in the afternoon, B.E., and Best Built filed
through their common representative, Nenette Garuello, their pre-qualification documents which were admitted but stamped
"submitted late." The petitioners were informed of their disqualification on the same date, and the disqualification became final on
December 6, 1988. Having failed to take immediate action to compel PBAC to pre-qualify them despite their notice of disqualification,
they cannot now come to this Court to question the binding proper in which they had not participated.

In the petitioners’ Reply, they raise as an additional irregularity the violation of the rule that where the estimate project cost is from P1M
to P5M, the issuance of plans, specifications and proposal book forms should made thirty days before the date of bidding. 7 They point
out that these forms were issued only on December 2, 1988, and not at the latest on November 12, 1988, the beginning of the 30-day
period prior to the scheduled bidding.

In their Rejoinder, the private respondents aver that the documents of B.E. and Best Built were received although filed late and were
reviewed by the Award Committee, which discovered that the contractors had expired licenses. B.E.’s temporary certificate of Renewal of
Contractor’s License was valid only until September 30, 1988, while Best Built’s license was valid only up to June 30, 1988.chanrobles
lawlibrary : rednad

The Court has considered the arguments of the parties in light of their testimonial and documentary evidence and the applicable laws
and jurisprudence. It finds for the petitioners.

The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special
functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled
corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).

The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Chartered institution — refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to
specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the
state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions).

It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by P.D. 1818.

There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First, it was created in pursuance of the integrated
fisheries development policy of the State, a priority program of the government of effect the socio-economic life of the nation. Second,
the Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its accounts and expenses to be
audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National
Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the president of the state college, such apparatus, equipment, or
supplies and even the services of such employees as can be spared without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional
amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that the funds
and maintenance of the state college would henceforth be included in the General Appropriations Law. 8

Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree.

In the case of Datiles and Co. v. Sucaldito, 9 this Court interpreted a similar prohibition contained in P.D. 605, the law after which P.D.
1818 was patterned. It was there declared that the prohibition pertained to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders by courts
against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. The Court observed that to
allow the courts to judge these matters would disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery. Justice Teodoro Padilla
made it clear, however, that on issues definitely outside of this dimension and involving questions of law, courts could not be prevented
by P.D. No. 605 from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.

We see no reason why the above ruling should not apply to P.D. 1818.
There are at least two irregularities committed by PBAC that justified injunction of the bidding and the award of the project.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

First, PBAC set deadlines for the filing of the PRE-C1 and the opening of bids and then changed these deadlines without prior notice to
prospective participants.

Under the Rules Implementing P.D. 1594, prescribing policies and guidelines for government infrastructure contracts, PBAC shall provide
prospective bidders with the Notice of Pre-qualification and other relevant information regarding the proposed work. Prospective
contractors shall be required to file their ARC-Contractors Confidential Application for Registration & Classifications & the PRE-C2
Confidential Pre-qualification Statement for the Project (prior to the amendment of the rules, this was referred to as PRE-C1) not later
than the deadline set in the published Invitation to Bid, after which date no PRE-C2 shall be submitted and received. Invitations to Bid
shall be advertised for at least three times within a reasonable period but in no case less than two weeks in at least two newspapers of
general circulations. 10

PBAC advertised the pre-qualification deadline as December 2, 1988, without stating the hour thereof, and announced that the opening
of bids would be at 3 o’clock in the afternoon of December 12, 1988. This schedule was changed and a notice of such change was merely
posted at the ISCOF bulletin board. The notice advanced the cut-off time for the submission of pre-qualification documents to 10 o’clock
in the morning of December 2, 1988, and the opening of bids to 1 o’clock in the afternoon of December 12, 1988.

The new schedule caused the pre-disqualification of the petitioners as recorded in the minutes of the PBAC meeting held on December 6,
1988. While it may be true that there were fourteen contractors who were pre-qualified despite the change in schedule, this fact did not
cure the defect of the irregular notice. Notably, the petitioners were disqualified because they failed to meet the new deadline and not
because of their expired licenses. ***

We have held that where the law requires a previous advertisement before government contracts can be awarded, non-compliance with
the requirement will, as a general rule, render the same void and of no effect 11 The facts that an invitation for bids has been
communicated to a number of possible bidders is not necessarily sufficient to establish compliance with the requirements of the law if it
is shown that other public bidders have not been similarly notified. 12

Second, PBAC was required to issue to pre-qualified applicants the plans, specifications and proposal book forms for the project to be bid
thirty days before the date of bidding if the estimate project cost was between P1M and P5M. PBAC has not denied that these forms
were issued only on December 2, 1988, or only ten days before the bidding scheduled for December 12, 1988. At the very latest, PBAC
should have issued them on November 12, 1988, or 30 days before the scheduled bidding.

It is apparent that the present controversy did not arise from the discretionary acts of the administrative body nor does it involve merely
technical matters. What is involved here is non-compliance with the procedural rules on bidding which required strict observance. The
purpose of the rules implementing P.D. 1594 is to secure competitive bidding and to prevent favoritism, collusion and fraud in the award
of these contracts to the detriment of the public. This purpose was defeated by the irregularities committed by PBAC.chanrobles law
library : red

It has been held that the three principles in public bidding are the offer to the public, an opportunity for competition and a basis for exact
comparison of bids. A regulation of the matter which excludes any of these factors destroys the distinctive character of the system and
thwarts and purpose of its adoption. 13

In the case at bar, it was the lack of proper notice regarding the pre-qualification requirement and the bidding that caused the
elimination of petitioners B.E. and Best Built. It was not because of their expired licenses, as private respondents now claim. Moreover,
the plans and specifications which are the contractors’ guide to an intelligent bid, were not issued on time, thus defeating the guaranty
that contractors be placed on equal footing when they submit their bids. The purpose of competitive bidding is negated if some
contractors are informed ahead of their rivals of the plans and specifications that are to be the subject of their bids.

P.D. 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed by administrative agencies such as the anomalies
above described. Hence, the challenged restraining order was not improperly issued by the respondent judge and the writ of preliminary
injunction should not have been denied. We note from Annex Q of the private respondent’s memorandum, however, that the subject
project has already been "100% completed as to the Engineering Standard." This fait accompli has made the petition for a writ of
preliminary injunction moot and academic.

We come now to the liabilities of the private respondents.

It has been held in a long line of cases that a contract granted without the competitive bidding required by law is void, and the party to
whom it is awarded cannot benefit from it. 14 It has not been shown that the irregularities committed by PBAC were induced by or
participated in by any of the contractors. Hence, liability shall attach only to the private respondents for the prejudice sustained by the
petitioners as a result of the anomalies described above.

As there is no evidence of the actual loss suffered by the petitioners, compensatory damage may not be awarded to them. Moral
damages do not appear to be due either. Even so, the Court cannot close its eyes to the evident bad faith that characterized the conduct
of the private respondents, including the irregularities in the announcement of the bidding and their efforts to persuade the ISCOF
president to award the project after two days from receipt of the restraining order and before they moved to lift such order. For such
questionable acts, they are liable in nominal damages at least in accordance with Article 2221 of the Civil Code, which
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant
may be vindicated or, recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.

These damages are to assessed against the private respondents in the amount of P10,000.00 each, to be paid separately for each of
petitioners B.E. Construction and Best Built Construction. The other petitioner, Occeña Builders, is not entitled to relief because it
admittedly submitted its pre-qualification documents on December 5, 1988, or three days after the deadline.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: a) upholding the restraining order dated December 12, 1988, as not covered by the
prohibition in P.D. 1818; b) ordering the chairman and the members of the PBAC board of trustees, namely Manuel R. Penachos, Jr.,
Alfredo Matangga, Enrico Ticar, and Teresita Villanueva, to each pay separately to petitioners Maria Elena Malaga and Josieleen Najarro
nominal damages P10,000.00 each; and c) removing the said chairman and members from the PBAC board of trustees, or whoever
among them is still incumbent therein, for their malfeasance in office. Costs against PBAC.

Let a copy of this decision be sent to the Office of the Ombudsman.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 97149 March 31, 1992

FIDENCIO Y. BEJA, SR., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE REINERIO O. REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications; COMMODORE ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity as General Manager of the Philippine Ports Authority; DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION BOARD; and JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, in his capacity as
Chairman of the Administrative Action Board, DOTC, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

The instant petition for certiorari questions the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC) and/or its Administrative Action Board (AAB) over administrative cases involving personnel below the rank of Assistant General
Manager of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), an agency attached to the said Department.

Petitioner Fidencio Y. Beja, Sr. 1 was first employed by the PPA as arrastre supervisor in 1975. He became Assistant Port Operations
Officer in 1976 and Port Operations Officer in 1977. In February 1988, as a result of the reorganization of the PPA, he was appointed
Terminal Supervisor.

On October 21, 1988, the PPA General Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan, filed Administrative Case No. 11-04-88 against petitioner Beja and
Hernando G. Villaluz for grave dishonesty, grave misconduct, willful violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Beja and Villaluz allegedly erroneously assessed storage fees resulting in the loss of
P38,150.77 on the part of the PPA. Consequently, they were preventively suspended for the charges. After a preliminary investigation
conducted by the district attorney for Region X, Administrative Case No. 11-04-88 was "considered closed for lack of merit."

On December 13, 1988, another charge sheet, docketed as Administrative Case No. 12-01-88, was filed against Beja by the PPA General
Manager also for dishonesty, grave misconduct, violation of reasonable office rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and for being notoriously undesirable. The charge consisted of six (6) different specifications of administrative
offenses including fraud against the PPA in the total amount of P218,000.00. Beja was also placed under preventive suspension pursuant
to Sec. 41 of P.D. No. 807.

The case was redocketed as Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and thereafter, the PPA general manager indorsed it to the AAB
for "appropriate action." At the scheduled hearing, Beja asked for continuance on the ground that he needed time to study the charges
against him. The AAB proceeded to hear the case and gave Beja an opportunity to present evidence. However, on February 20, 1989, Beja
filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental. 2 Two days later, he filed
with the AAB a manifestation and motion to suspend the hearing of Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 on account of the
pendency of the certiorari proceeding before the court. AAB denied the motion and continued with the hearing of the administrative
case.

Thereafter, Beja moved for the dismissal of the certiorari case below and proceeded to file before this Court a petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 87352 captioned "Fidencio Y. Beja v. Hon.
Reinerio 0. Reyes, etc., et al." In the en banc resolution of March 30, 1989, this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for
"appropriate action." 3 G.R. No. 87352 was docketed in the Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. SP No. 17270.

Meanwhile, a decision was rendered by the AAB in Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-049-89. Its dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, adjudging the following, namely:

a) That respondents Geronimo Beja, Jr. and Hernando Villaluz are exonerated from the charge against them;

b) That respondent Fidencio Y. Beja be dismissed from the service;

c) That his leave credits and retirement benefits are declared forfeited;

d) That he be disqualified from re-employment in the government service;

e) That his eligibility is recommended to be cancelled.

Pasig, Metro Manila, February 28, 1989.

On December 10, 1990, after appropriate proceedings, the Court of Appeals also rendered a decision 4 in CA-G.R. SP No. 17270
dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. Hence, Beja elevated the case back to this Court through an "appeal by certiorari
with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order."

We find the pleadings filed in this case to be sufficient bases for arriving at a decision and hence, the filing of memoranda has been
dispensed with.

In his petition, Beja assails the Court of Appeals for having "decided questions of substance in a way probably not in accord with law or
with the applicable decisions" of this Court. 5 Specifically, Beja contends that the Court of Appeals failed to declare that: (a) he was
denied due process; (b) the PPA general manager has no power to issue a preventive suspension order without the necessary approval of
the PPA board of directors; (c) the PPA general manager has no power to refer the administrative case filed against him to the DOTC-AAB,
and (d) the DOTC Secretary, the Chairman of the DOTC-AAB and DOTC-AAB itself as an adjudicatory body, have no jurisdiction to try the
administrative case against him. Simply put, Beja challenges the legality of the preventive suspension and the jurisdiction of the DOTC
Secretary and/or the AAB to initiate and hear administrative cases against PPA personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager.

Petitioner anchors his contention that the PPA general manager cannot subject him to a preventive suspension on the following provision
of Sec. 8, Art. V of Presidential Decree No. 857 reorganizing the PPA:

(d) the General Manager shall, subject to the approval of the Board, appoint and remove personnel below the rank of Assistant
General Manager. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner contends that under this provision, the PPA Board of Directors and not the PPA General Manager is the "proper disciplining
authority. 6

As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the petitioner erroneously equates "preventive suspension" as a remedial measure with
"suspension" as a penalty for administrative dereliction. The imposition of preventive suspension on a government employee charged
with an administrative offense is subject to the following provision of the Civil Service Law, P.D. No. 807:

Sec. 41. Preventive Suspension. — The proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee
under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would
warrant his removal from the service.

Imposed during the pendency of an administrative investigation, preventive suspension is not a penalty in itself. It is merely a measure of
precaution so that the employee who is charged may be separated, for obvious reasons, from the scene of his alleged misfeasance while
the same is being investigated. 7 Thus, preventive suspension is distinct from the administrative penalty of removal from office such as
the one mentioned in Sec. 8(d) of P.D. No 857. While the former may be imposed on a respondent during the investigation of the charges
against him, the latter is the penalty which may only be meted upon him at the termination of the investigation or the final disposition of
the case.

The PPA general manager is the disciplining authority who may, by himself and without the approval of the PPA Board of Directors,
subject a respondent in an administrative case to preventive suspension. His disciplinary powers are sanctioned, not only by Sec. 8 of P.D.
No. 857 aforequoted, but also by Sec. 37 of P.D. No. 807 granting heads of agencies the "jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary actions against officers and employees" in the PPA.

Parenthetically, the period of preventive suspension is limited. It may be lifted even if the disciplining authority has not finally decided the
administrative case provided the ninety-day period from the effectivity of the preventive suspension has been exhausted. The employee
concerned may then be reinstated. 8 However, the said ninety-day period may be interrupted. Section 42 of P.D. No. 807 also mandates
that any fault, negligence or petition of a suspended employee may not be considered in the computation of the said period. Thus, when
a suspended employee obtains from a court of justice a restraining order or a preliminary injunction inhibiting proceedings in an
administrative case, the lifespan of such court order should be excluded in the reckoning of the permissible period of the preventive
suspension. 9
With respect to the issue of whether or not the DOTC Secretary and/or the AAB may initiate and hear administrative cases against PPA
Personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager, the Court qualifiedly rules in favor of petitioner.

The PPA was created through P.D. No. 505 dated July 11, 1974. Under that Law, the corporate powers of the PPA were vested in a
governing Board of Directors known as the Philippine Port Authority Council. Sec. 5(i) of the same decree gave the Council the power "to
appoint, discipline and remove, and determine the composition of the technical staff of the Authority and other personnel."

On December 23, 1975, P.D. No. 505 was substituted by P.D. No. 857, See. 4(a) thereof created the Philippine Ports Authority which
would be "attached" to the then Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communication. When Executive Order No. 125 dated
January 30, 1987 reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communications was issued, the PPA retained its "attached" status. 10
Even Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 classified the PPA as an agency "attached" to the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC). Sec. 24 of Book IV, Title XV, Chapter 6 of the same Code provides that the agencies attached
to the DOTC "shall continue to operate and function in accordance with the respective charters or laws creating them, except when they
conflict with this Code."

Attachment of an agency to a Department is one of the three administrative relationships mentioned in Book IV, Chapter 7 of the
Administrative Code of 1987, the other two being supervision and control and administrative supervision. "Attachment" is defined in Sec.
38 thereof as follows:

(3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the Department or its equivalent and the attached agency or
corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination. The coordination shall be accomplished by having the department
represented in the governing board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without voting
rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic reporting which
shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide general policies through its
representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the attached corporation or agency;

(b) Matters of day-to-day administration or all those pertaining to internal operations shall he left to the discretion or judgment of
the executive officer of the agency or corporation. In the event that the Secretary and the head of the board or the attached agency or
corporation strongly disagree on the interpretation and application of policies, and the Secretary is unable to resolve the disagreement,
he shall bring the matter to the President for resolution and direction;

(c) Government-owned or controlled corporations attached to a department shall submit to the Secretary concerned their audited
financial statements within sixty (60) days after the close of the fiscal year; and

(d) Pending submission of the required financial statements, the corporation shall continue to operate on the basis of the
preceding year's budget until the financial statements shall have been submitted. Should any government-owned or controlled
corporation incur an operation deficit at the close of its fiscal year, it shall be subject to administrative supervision of the department;
and the corporation's operating and capital budget shall be subject to the department's examination, review, modification and approval.
(emphasis supplied.)

An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department to which it is attached than one which is under
departmental supervision and control or administrative supervision. This is borne out by the "lateral relationship" between the
Department and the attached agency. The attachment is merely for "policy and program coordination." With respect to administrative
matters, the independence of an attached agency from Departmental control and supervision is further reinforced by the fact that even
an agency under a Department's administrative supervision is free from Departmental interference with respect to appointments and
other personnel actions "in accordance with the decentralization of personnel functions" under the Administrative Code of 1987. 11
Moreover, the Administrative Code explicitly provides that Chapter 8 of Book IV on supervision and control shall not apply to chartered
institutions attached to a Department. 12

Hence, the inescapable conclusion is that with respect to the management of personnel, an attached agency is, to a certain extent, free
from Departmental interference and control. This is more explicitly shown by P.D. No. 857 which provides:

Sec. 8. Management and Staff. — a) The President shall, upon the recommendation of the Board, appoint the General Manager and
the Assistant General Managers.

(b) All other officials and employees of the Authority shall be selected and appointed on the basis of merit and fitness based on a
comprehensive and progressive merit system to be established by the Authority immediately upon its organization and consistent with
Civil Service rules and regulations. The recruitment, transfer, promotion, and dismissal of all personnel of the Authority, including
temporary workers, shall be governed by such merit system.

(c) The General Manager shall, subject to the approval of the Board, determine the staffing pattern and the number of personnel
of the Authority, define their duties and responsibilities, and fix their salaries and emoluments. For professional and technical positions,
the General Manager shall recommend salaries and emoluments that are comparable to those of similar positions in other government-
owned corporations, the provisions of existing rules and regulations on wage and position classification notwithstanding.

(d) The General Manager shall, subject to the approval by the Board, appoint and remove personnel below the rank of Assistant
General Manager.

xxx xxx xxx

(emphasis supplied.)

Although the foregoing section does not expressly provide for a mechanism for an administrative investigation of personnel, by vesting
the power to remove erring employees on the General Manager, with the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, the law impliedly
grants said officials the power to investigate its personnel below the rank of Assistant Manager who may be charged with an
administrative offense. During such investigation, the PPA General Manager, as earlier stated, may subject the employee concerned to
preventive suspension. The investigation should be conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of P.D. No. 807. 13
Only after gathering sufficient facts may the PPA General Manager impose the proper penalty in accordance with law. It is the latter
action which requires the approval of the PPA Board of Directors. 14

From an adverse decision of the PPA General Manager and the Board of Directors, the employee concerned may elevate the matter to
the Department Head or Secretary. Otherwise, he may appeal directly to the Civil Service Commission. The permissive recourse to the
Department Secretary is sanctioned by the Civil Service Law (P.D. No. 807) under the following provisions:

Sec. 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. — (a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the
imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or
salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a
government official or employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official or
group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with
recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.

(b) The heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. The decisions shall be
final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days' salary. In
case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the
department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which
case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the department head.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied.)

It is, therefore, clear that the transmittal of the complaint by the PPA General Manager to the AAB was premature. The PPA General
Manager should have first conducted an investigation, made the proper recommendation for the imposable penalty and sought its
approval by the PPA Board of Directors. It was discretionary on the part of the herein petitioner to elevate the case to the then DOTC
Secretary Reyes. Only then could the AAB take jurisdiction of the case.

The AAB, which was created during the tenure of Secretary Reyes under Office Order No. 88-318 dated July 1, 1988, was designed to act,
decide and recommend to him "all cases of administrative malfeasance, irregularities, grafts and acts of corruption in the Department."
Composed of a Chairman and two (2) members, the AAB came into being pursuant to Administrative Order No. 25 issued by the
President on May 25, 1987. 15 Its special nature as a quasi-judicial administrative body notwithstanding, the AAB is not exempt from the
observance of due process in its proceedings. 16 We are not satisfied that it did so in this case the respondents protestation that
petitioner waived his right to be heard notwithstanding. It should be observed that petitioner was precisely questioning the AAB's
jurisdiction when it sought judicial recourse.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it upholds the power of the PPA General Manager to subject
petitioner to preventive suspension and REVERSED insofar as it validates the jurisdiction of the DOTC and/or the AAB to act on
Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and rules that due process has been accorded the petitioner.

The AAB decision in said case is hereby declared NULL and VOID and the case in REMANDED to the PPA whose General Manager shall
conduct with dispatch its reinvestigation.

The preventive suspension of petitioner shall continue unless after a determination of its duration, it is found that he had served the total
of ninety (90) days in which case he shall be reinstated immediately.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 115863 March 31, 1995

AIDA D. EUGENIO, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. & HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR., respondents.

PUNO, J.:

The power of the Civil Service Commission to abolish the Career Executive Service Board is challenged in this petition for certiorari and
prohibition.

First the facts. Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for a Career Executive Service
(CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank on August 2, 1993, she was given a CES eligibility. On September 15, 1993, she was recommended to the
President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board. 1

All was not to turn well for petitioner. On October 1, 1993, respondent Civil Service Commission 2 passed Resolution No. 93-4359, viz:

RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359

WHEREAS, Section 1(1) of Article IX-B provides that Civil Service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission, . . .;

WHEREAS, Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that "The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel
agency of the government, is mandated to establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, progresiveness and courtesy in the civil service, . . .";

WHEREAS, Section 12 (1), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 grants the Commission the power, among others,
to administer and enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit system for all levels and ranks in the Civil Service;

WHEREAS, Section 7, Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 Provides, among others, that The Career Service shall
be characterized by (1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination, or based
highly technical qualifications; (2) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) security of tenure;

WHEREAS, Section 8 (c), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the administrative Code of 1987 provides that "The third level shall cover Positions in
the Career Executive Service";

WHEREAS, the Commission recognizes the imperative need to consolidate, integrate and unify the administration of all levels of positions
in the career service.

WHEREAS, the provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 confers on the Commission the
power and authority to effect changes in its organization as the need arises.

WHEREAS, Section 5, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that the Civil Service Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy and the
necessary implications thereof;

NOW THEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Civil Service Commission hereby resolves to streamline reorganize and effect
changes in its organizational structure. Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known as the Office for Career
Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget, properties and equipment of the Career
Executive Service Board shall now form part of the Office for Career Executive Service.

The above resolution became an impediment. to the appointment of petitioner as Civil Service Officer, Rank IV. In a letter to petitioner,
dated June 7, 1994, the Honorable Antonio T. Carpio, Chief Presidential legal Counsel, stated:

xxx xxx xxx

On 1 October 1993 the Civil Service Commission issued CSC Resolution No. 93-4359 which abolished the Career Executive Service Board.
Several legal issues have arisen as a result of the issuance of CSC Resolution No. 93-4359, including whether the Civil Service Commission
has authority to abolish the Career Executive Service Board. Because these issues remain unresolved, the Office of the President has
refrained from considering appointments of career service eligibles to career executive ranks.

xxx xxx xxx

You may, however, bring a case before the appropriate court to settle the legal issues arising from issuance by the Civil Service
Commission of CSC Resolution No. 93-4359, for guidance of all concerned.

Thank You.

Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service Board which recommended her CESO Rank IV has
been abolished, petitioner filed the petition at bench to annul, among others, resolution No. 93-4359. The petition is anchored on the
following arguments:

A. IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RESPONDENT COMMISSION USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF CONGRESS WHEN IT
ABOLISHED THE CESB, AN OFFICE CREATED BY LAW, THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF CSC: RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359;

B. ALSO IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RESPONDENT CSC USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF CONGRESS WHEN IT
ILLEGALLY AUTHORIZED THE TRANSFER OF PUBLIC MONEY, THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF CSC RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359.

Required to file its Comment, the Solicitor General agreed with the contentions of petitioner. Respondent Commission, however, chose
to defend its ground. It posited the following position:

ARGUMENTS FOR PUBLIC RESPONDENT-CSC

I. THE INSTANT PETITION STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT-CSC.

II. THE RECOMMENDATION SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT FOR APPOINTMENT TO A CESO RANK OF PETITIONER EUGENIO WAS A
VALID ACT OF THE CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND IT DOES NOT HAVE ANY DEFECT.

III. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE VALIDITY OF THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE CESB IN
FAVOR OF PETITIONER EUGENIO SINCE THE PRESIDENT HAS PREVIOUSLY APPOINTED TO CESO RANK FOUR (4) OFFICIALS SIMILARLY
SITUATED AS SAID PETITIONER. FURTHERMORE, LACK OF MEMBERS TO CONSTITUTE A QUORUM. ASSUMING THERE WAS NO QUORUM,
IS NOT THE FAULT OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION BUT OF THE PRESIDENT WHO HAS THE POWER TO APPOINT THE
OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CESB.

IV. THE INTEGRATION OF THE CESB INTO THE COMMISSION IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW (Sec. 12 (1), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the
Administrative Code of the 1987). THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE HAD ALREADY BEEN SETTLED WHEN THE HONORABLE COURT DISMISSED THE
PETITION FILED BY THE HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, NAMELY: SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, FELICIANO R.
BELMONTE, JR., RENATO V. DIAZ, AND MANUEL M. GARCIA IN G.R. NO. 114380. THE AFOREMENTIONED PETITIONERS ALSO QUESTIONED
THE INTEGRATION OF THE CESB WITH THE COMMISSION.

We find merit in the petition. 3

The controlling fact is that the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) was created in the Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1 on September 1,
1974 4 which adopted the Integrated Plan. Article IV, Chapter I, Part of the III of the said Plan provides:

Article IV — Career Executive Service

1. A Career Executive Service is created to form a continuing pool of well-selected and development oriented career
administrators who shall provide competent and faithful service.

2. A Career Executive Service hereinafter referred to in this Chapter as the Board, is created to serve as the governing body of the
Career Executive Service. The Board shall consist of the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission as presiding officer, the Executive
Secretary and the Commissioner of the Budget as ex-officio members and two other members from the private sector and/or the
academic community who are familiar with the principles and methods of personnel administration.
xxx xxx xxx

5. The Board shall promulgate rules, standards and procedures on the selection, classification, compensation and career
development of members of the Career Executive Service. The Board shall set up the organization and operation of the service. (Emphasis
supplied)

It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. This follows an
unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function. As aptly summed up in AM
JUR 2d on Public Officers and
Employees, 5 viz:

Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the creation of public offices is primarily a legislative function. In so far as the
legislative power in this respect is not restricted by constitutional provisions, it supreme, and the legislature may decide for itself what
offices are suitable, necessary, or convenient. When in the exigencies of government it is necessary to create and define duties, the
legislative department has the discretion to determine whether additional offices shall be created, or whether these duties shall be
attached to and become ex-officio duties of existing offices. An office created by the legislature is wholly within the power of that body,
and it may prescribe the mode of filling the office and the powers and duties of the incumbent, and if it sees fit, abolish the office.

In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the CESB. On the contrary, in all the General
Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the operation of CESB. Respondent Commission, however,
invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the CESB.
Section 17 provides:

Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. — Each office of the Commission shall be headed by a Director with at least one Assistant Director,
and may have such divisions as are necessary independent constitutional body, the Commission may effect changes in the organization as
the need arises.

But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together with Section 16 of the said Code which
enumerates the offices under the respondent Commission, viz:

Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. — The Commission shall have the following offices:

(1) The Office of the Executive Director headed by an Executive Director, with a Deputy Executive Director shall implement policies,
standards, rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission; coordinate the programs of the offices of the Commission and render
periodic reports on their operations, and perform such other functions as may be assigned by the Commission.

(2) The Merit System Protection Board composed of a Chairman and two (2) members shall have the following functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) The Office of Legal Affairs shall provide the Chairman with legal advice and assistance; render counselling services; undertake
legal studies and researches; prepare opinions and ruling in the interpretation and application of the Civil Service law, rules and
regulations; prosecute violations of such law, rules and regulations; and represent the Commission before any court or tribunal.

(4) The Office of Planning and Management shall formulate development plans, programs and projects; undertake research and
studies on the different aspects of public personnel management; administer management improvement programs; and provide fiscal
and budgetary services.

(5) The Central Administrative Office shall provide the Commission with personnel, financial, logistics and other basic support
services.

(6) The Office of Central Personnel Records shall formulate and implement policies, standards, rules and regulations pertaining to
personnel records maintenance, security, control and disposal; provide storage and extension services; and provide and maintain library
services.

(7) The Office of Position Classification and Compensation shall formulate and implement policies, standards, rules and regulations
relative to the administration of position classification and compensation.
(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and Placement shall provide leadership and assistance in developing and implementing
the overall Commission programs relating to recruitment, execution and placement, and formulate policies, standards, rules and
regulations for the proper implementation of the Commission's examination and placement programs.

(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards shall provide leadership and assistance in the formulation and evaluation of
personnel systems and standards relative to performance appraisal, merit promotion, and employee incentive benefit and awards.

(10) The Office of Human Resource Development shall provide leadership and assistance in the development and retention of
qualified and efficient work force in the Civil Service; formulate standards for training and staff development; administer service-wide
scholarship programs; develop training literature and materials; coordinate and integrate all training activities and evaluate training
programs.

(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit shall develop policies, standards, rules and regulations for the effective conduct or
inspection and audit personnel and personnel management programs and the exercise of delegated authority; provide technical and
advisory services to Civil Service Regional Offices and government agencies in the implementation of their personnel programs and
evaluation systems.

(12) The Office of Personnel Relations shall provide leadership and assistance in the development and implementation of policies,
standards, rules and regulations in the accreditation of employee associations or organizations and in the adjustment and settlement of
employee grievances and management of employee disputes.

(13) The Office of Corporate Affairs shall formulate and implement policies, standards, rules and regulations governing corporate
officials and employees in the areas of recruitment, examination, placement, career development, merit and awards systems, position
classification and compensation, performing appraisal, employee welfare and benefit, discipline and other aspects of personnel
management on the basis of comparable industry practices.

(14) The Office of Retirement Administration shall be responsible for the enforcement of the constitutional and statutory provisions,
relative to retirement and the regulation for the effective implementation of the retirement of government officials and employees.

(15) The Regional and Field Offices. — The Commission shall have not less than thirteen (13) Regional offices each to be headed by a
Director, and such field offices as may be needed, each to be headed by an official with at least the rank of an Assistant Director.

As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commission's power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control
as enumerated in Section 16, supra. From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively
attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee "the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected
to view the problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a broad and positive outlook." 6 The essential
autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made
to fall within the control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally
inter-related government agency to another is to attain "policy and program coordination." This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3),
Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit:

(3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its equivalent and attached agency or
corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by having the department
represented in the governing board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without voting
rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic reporting which
shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide general policies through its
representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the attached corporation or agency.

Respondent Commission also relies on the case of Datumanong, et al., vs. Civil Service Commission, G. R. No. 114380 where the petition
assailing the abolition of the CESB was dismissed for lack of cause of action. Suffice to state that the reliance is misplaced considering that
the cited case was dismissed for lack of standing of the petitioner, hence, the lack of cause of action.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Resolution No. 93-4359 of the respondent Commission is hereby annulled and set aside.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 83578 March 16, 1989

THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE TEOFILO L, GUADIZ, JR.,Presiding Judge, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 147: NCR
(MAKATI), and KARAMFIL IMPORT-EXPORT CO., INC., respondents.

K. V. Faylona & Associates for respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

The petitioner, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, the President's arm assigned to investigate and prosecute so-called "dollar
salting" activities in the country (per Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002), asks the Court to hold as
null and void two Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated September 24, 1987 1 and May 20, 1988, 2 reversing its Decision, dated
October 24, 1986. 3 The Decision set aside an Order, dated April 16, 1985, of the Regional Trial Court, 4 as well as its Order, dated August
21, 1985. The Resolution, dated September 24, 1987 disposed of, and granted, the private respondent Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc.'s
motion for reconsideration of the October 24, 1986 Decision; the Resolution dated May 20, 1988, in turn, denied the petitioner's own
motion for reconsideration.

The facts are not in controversy. We quote:

On March 12, 1985, State Prosecutor Jose B. Rosales, who is assigned with the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force hereinafter
referred to as PADS Task Force for purposes of convenience, issued search warrants Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160 and 161 against the
petitioners Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc., P & B Enterprises Co., Inc., Philippine Veterans Corporation, Philippine Veterans
Development Corporation, Philippine Construction Development Corporation, Philippine Lauan Industries Corporation, Inter-trade
Development (Alvin Aquino), Amelili U. Malaquiok Enterprises and Jaime P. Lucman Enterprises.

The application for the issuance of said search warrants was filed by Atty. Napoleon Gatmaytan of the Bureau of Customs who is a
deputized member of the PADS Task Force. Attached to the said application is the affidavit of Josefin M. Castro who is an operative and
investigator of the PADS Task Force. Said Josefin M. Castro is likewise the sole deponent in the purported deposition to support the
application for the issuance of the six (6) search warrants involved in this case. The application filed by Atty. Gatmaytan, the affidavit and
deposition of Josefin M. Castro are all dated March 12, 1985. 5

Shortly thereafter, the private respondent (the petitioner below) went to the Regional Trial Court on a petition to enjoin the
implementation of the search warrants in question. 6 On March 13, 1985, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order [effective
"for a period of five (5) days notice " 7 ] and set the case for hearing on March 18, 1985.

In disposing of the petition, the said court found the material issues to be:

1) Competency of this Court to act on petition filed by the petitioners;

2) Validity of the search warrants issued by respondent State Prosecutor;

3) Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic because all the search warrants sought to be quashed had already
been implemented and executed. 8

On April 16, 1985, the lower court issued the first of its challenged Orders, and held:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby declares Search Warrant Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, and 161 to be null and
void. Accordingly, the respondents are hereby ordered to return and surrender immediately all the personal properties and documents
seized by them from the petitioners by virtue of the aforementioned search warrants.

SO ORDERED. 9

On August 21, 1985, the trial court denied reconsideration.

On April 4, 1986, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force went to the respondent Court of Appeals to contest, on certiorari, the
twin Order(s) of the lower court.

In ruling initially for the Task Force, the Appellate Court held:

Herein petitioner is a special quasi-judicial body with express powers enumerated under PD 1936 to prosecute foreign exchange
violations defined and punished under P.D. No. 1883.

The petitioner, in exercising its quasi-judicial powers, ranks with the Regional Trial Courts, and the latter in the case at bar had no
jurisdiction to declare the search warrants in question null and void.

Besides as correctly pointed out by the Assistant Solicitor General the decision of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is
appealable to the Office of the President.10

On November 12, 1986, Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc. sought a reconsideration, on the question primarily of whether or not the
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is "such other responsible officer' countenanced by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants of
search and seizure.

As we have indicated, the Court of Appeals, on Karamfil's motion, reversed itself and issued its Resolution, dated September 1987, and
subsequently, its Resolution, dated May 20, 1988, denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

In its petition to this Court, the petitioner alleges that in so issuing the Resolution(s) above-mentioned, the respondent Court of Appeals
"committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted in excess of its appellate jurisdiction," 11 specifically:

a) In deviating from the settled policy and rulings of the Supreme Court that no Regional Trial Courts may countermand or restrain
the enforcement of lawful writs or decrees issued by a quasi-judicial body of equal and coordinate rank, like the PADS Task Force;

b) For resorting to judicial legislation to arrive at its erroneous basis for reconsidering its previous Decision dated October 24, 1986
(see Annex "I") and thus promulgated the questioned Resolutions (Annexes "A" and "B"), which violated the constitutional doctrine on
separation of powers;

c) In not resolving directly the other important issues raised by the petitioner in its Petition in CA-G.R. No. 08622-SP despite the
fact that petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently and convincingly that respondent RTC, in issuing the questioned Orders in Special
Proceeding No. M-624 (see Annexes "C" and 'D"), committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted in excess of jurisdiction:

1. In ruling that (a) the description of the things to be seized as stated in the contested search warrant were too general which
allegedly render the search warrants null and void; (b) the applications for the contested search warrants actually charged two offenses
in contravention of the 2nd paragraph, Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court; and (c) this case has not become moot and academic,
even if the contested search warrants had already been fully implemented with positive results; and

2. In ruling that the petitioner PADS Task Force has not been granted under PD 1936 'judicial or quasi-judicial jurisdiction. 12

We find, upon the foregoing facts, that the essential questions that confront us are- (i) is the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force a
quasi-judicial body, and one co-equal in rank and standing with the Regional Trial Court, and accordingly, beyond the latter's jurisdiction;
and (ii) may the said presidential body be said to be "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" to issue search warrants
under the 1973 Constitution questions we take up seriatim.**

In submitting that it is a quasi-judicial entity, the petitioner states that it is endowed with "express powers and functions under PD No.
1936, to prosecute foreign exchange violations as defined and punished under PD No. 1883." 13 "By the very nature of its express powers
as conferred by the laws," so it is contended, "which are decidedly quasi-judicial or discretionary function, such as to conduct preliminary
investigation on the charges of foreign exchange violations, issue search warrants or warrants of arrest, hold departure orders, among
others, and depending upon the evidence presented, to dismiss the charges or to file the corresponding information in court of Executive
Order No. 934, PD No. 1936 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations effective August 26, 1984), petitioner exercises quasi-judicial
power or the power of adjudication ." 14

The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution now assailed, 15 was of the opinion that "[t]he grant of quasi-judicial powers to petitioner did not
diminish the regular courts' judicial power of interpretation. The right to interpret a law and, if necessary to declare one unconstitutional,
exclusively pertains to the judiciary. In assuming this function, courts do not proceed on the theory that the judiciary is superior to the
two other coordinate branches of the government, but solely on the theory that they are required to declare the law in every case which
come before them." 16

This Court finds the Appellate Court to be in error, since what the petitioner puts to question is the Regional Trial Court's act of assuming
jurisdiction over the private respondent's petition below and its subsequent countermand of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task
Force's orders of search and seizure, for the reason that the presidential body, as an entity (allegedly) coordinate and co-equal with the
Regional Trial Court, was (is) not vested with such a jurisdiction. An examination of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's
petition shows indeed its recognition of judicial review (of the acts of Government) as a basic privilege of the courts. Its objection,
precisely, is whether it is the Regional Trial Court, or the superior courts, that may undertake such a review.

Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, 17 the Court of Appeals exercises:

(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Court and
quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4)
of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. 18

xxx xxx xxx

Under the present Constitution, with respect to its provisions on Constitutional Commissions, it is provided, in part that:

... Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. 19

On the other hand, Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction:

(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. 20

xxx xxx xxx

Likewise:

... The Supreme Court may designate certain branches of the Regional Trial Court to handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and
domestic relations cases, agrarian case, urban land reform cases which do not fall under the jurisdiction of quasi- judicial bodies and
agencies and/or such other special cases as the Supreme Court may determine in the interest of a speedy and efficient administration of
justice. 21

xxx xxx xxx

Under our Resolution dated January 11, 1983: 22

... The appeals to the Intermediate Appellate Court [now, Court of Appeals] from quasi-judicial bodies shall continue to be governed by
the provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 insofar as the same is not inconsistent with the provisions of B.P. Blg. 129. 23

The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 are as follows:

SECTION 1. Appeals from specified agencies.— Any provision of existing law or Rule of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, parties
aggrieved by a final ruling, award, order, decision, or judgment of the Court of Agrarian Relations; the Secretary of Labor under Section 7
of Republic Act Numbered Six hundred and two, also known as the "Minimum Wage Law"; the Department of Labor under Section 23 of
Republic Act Numbered Eight hundred seventy-five, also known as the "Industrial Peace Act"; the Land Registration Commission; the
Securities and Exchange Commission; the Social Security Commission; the Civil Aeronautics Board; the Patent Office and the Agricultural
Inventions Board, may appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeals, within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the
appeal involves questions of fact, mixed questions of fact and law, or questions of law, or all three kinds of questions. From final
judgments or decisions of the Court of Appeals, the aggrieved party may appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court as provided in Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. 24
Because of subsequent amendments, including the abolition of various special courts, 25 jurisdiction over quasi-judicial bodies has to be,
consequently, determined by the corresponding amendatory statutes. Under the Labor Code, decisions and awards of the National Labor
Relations Commission are final and executory, but, nevertheless, 'reviewable by this Court through a petition for certiorari and not by
way of appeal." 26

Under the Property Registration Decree, decisions of the Commission of Land Registration, en consults, are appealable to the Court of
Appeals. 27

The decisions of the Securities and Exchange Commission are likewise appealable to the Appellate Court, 28 and so are decisions of the
Social Security Commission.29

As a rule, where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain administrative bodies to the Court of Appeals, it means that
such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts, in terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter.

As we have observed, the question is whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is, in the first place, a quasi-judicial
body, and one whose decisions may not be challenged before the regular courts, other than the higher tribunals the Court of Appeals and
this Court.

A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the
rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule making." 30 The most common types of such bodies have been listed as
follows:

(1) Agencies created to function in situations wherein the government is offering some gratuity, grant, or special privilege, like the
defunct Philippine Veterans Board, Board on Pensions for Veterans, and NARRA, and Philippine Veterans Administration.

(2) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to carry on certain government functions, like the
Bureau of Immigration, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Board of Special Inquiry and Board of Commissioners, the Civil Service
Commission, the Central Bank of the Philippines.

(3) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is performing some business service for the public, like the
Bureau of Posts, the Postal Savings Bank, Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage Authority, Philippine National Railways, the Civil
Aeronautics Administration.

(4) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to regulate business affected with public interest,
like the Fiber Inspections Board, the Philippine Patent Office, Office of the Insurance Commissioner.

(5) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking under the police power to regulate private business
and individuals, like the Securities & Exchange Commission, Board of Food Inspectors, the Board of Review for Moving Pictures, and the
Professional Regulation Commission.

(6) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to adjust individual controversies because of some
strong social policy involved, such as the National Labor Relations Commission, the Court of Agrarian Relations, the Regional Offices of
the Ministry of Labor, the Social Security Commission, Bureau of Labor Standards, Women and Minors Bureau. 31

As may be seen, it is the basic function of these bodies to adjudicate claims and/or to determine rights, and unless its decision are
seasonably appealed to the proper reviewing authorities, the same attain finality and become executory. A perusal of the Presidential
Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's organic act, Presidential Decree No. 1936, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, convinces the
Court that the Task Force was not meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions, that is, to try and decide claims and execute its judgments.
As the President's arm called upon to combat the vice of "dollar salting" or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange, 32 it is
tasked alone by the Decree to handle the prosecution of such activities, but nothing more. We quote:

SECTION 1. Powers of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force.-The Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, hereinafter referred
to as Task Force, shall have the following powers and authority:

a) Motu proprio or upon complaint, to investigate and prosecute all dollar salting activities, including the overvaluation of imports
and the undervaluation of exports;
b) To administer oaths, summon persons or issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the
production of such books, papers, contracts, records, statements of accounts, agreements, and other as may be necessary in the conduct
of investigation;

c) To appoint or designate experts, consultants, state prosecutors or fiscals, investigators and hearing officers to assist the Task
Force in the discharge of its duties and responsibilities; gather data, information or documents; conduct hearings, receive evidence, both
oral and documentary, in all cases involving violation of foreign exchange laws or regulations; and submit reports containing findings and
recommendations for consideration of appropriate authorities;

d) To punish direct and indirect contempts with the appropriate penalties therefor under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court; and to
adopt such measures and take such actions as may be necessary to implement this Decree.

xxx xxx xxx

f. After due investigation but prior to the filing of the appropriate criminal charges with the fiscal's office or the courts as the case may be,
to impose a fine and/or administrative sanctions as the circumstances warrant, upon any person found committing or to have committed
acts constituting blackmarketing or salting abroad of foreign exchange, provided said person voluntarily admits the facts and
circumstances constituting the offense and presents proof that the foreign exchange retained abroad has already been brought into the
country.

Thereafter, no further civil or criminal action may be instituted against said person before any other judicial regulatory or administrative
body for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1883.

The amount of the fine shall be determined by the Chairman of the Presidential Anti- Dollar Salting Task Force and paid in Pesos taking
into consideration the amount of foreign exchange retained abroad, the exchange rate differentials, uncollected taxes and duties
thereon, undeclared profits, interest rates and such other relevant factors.

The fine shall be paid to the Task Force which shall retain Twenty percent (20 %) thereof. The informer, if any, shall be entitled to Twenty
percent (20 %) of the fine. Should there be no informer, the Task Force shall be entitle to retain Forty percent (40 %) of the fine and the
balance shall accrue to the general funds of the National government. The amount of the fine to be retained by the Task Force shall form
part of its Confidential Fund and be utilized for the operations of the Task Force . 33

The Court sees nothing in the aforequoted provisions (except with respect to the Task Force's powers to issue search warrants) that will
reveal a legislative intendment to confer it with quasi-judicial responsibilities relative to offenses punished by Presidential Decree No.
1883. Its undertaking, as we said, is simply, to determine whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the filing of charges with the
proper court, meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry preliminary to a judicial recourse, and to recommend action "of appropriate
authorities". It is not unlike a fiscal's office that conducts a preliminary investigation to determine whether or not prima facie evidence
exists to justify haling the respondent to court, and yet, while it makes that determination, it cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court.
For it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.

It is not unlike the Presidential Commission on Good Government either, the executive body appointed to investigate and prosecute
cases involving "ill-gotten wealth". It had been vested with enormous powers, like the issuance of writs of sequestration, freeze orders,
and similar processes, but that did not, on account thereof alone, make it a quasi-judicial entity as defined by recognized authorities. It
cannot pronounce judgement of the accused's culpability, the jurisdiction to do which is exclusive upon the Sandiganbayan. 34

If the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is not, hence, a quasi-judicial body, it cannot be said to be co-equal or coordinate with
the Regional Trial Court. There is nothing in its enabling statutes that would demonstrate its standing at par with the said court.

In that respect, we do not find error in the respondent Court of Appeal's resolution sustaining the assumption of jurisdiction by the court
a quo.

It will not do to say that the fact that the Presidential Task Force has been empowered to issue warrants of arrest, search, and seizure,
makes it, ergo, a "semi-court". Precisely, it is the objection interposed by the private respondent, whether or not it can under the 1973
Charter, issue such kinds of processes.

It must be observed that under the present Constitution, the powers of arrest and search are exclusive upon judges. 35 To that extent,
the case has become moot and academic. Nevertheless, since the question has been specifically put to the Court, we find it unavoidable
to resolve it as the final arbiter of legal controversies, pursuant to the provisions of the 1973 Constitution during whose regime the case
was commenced.

Since the 1973 Constitution took force and effect and until it was so unceremoniously discarded in 1986, its provisions conferring the
power to issue arrest and search warrants upon an officer, other than a judge, by fiat of legislation have been at best controversial. In Lim
v. Ponce de Leon, 36 a 1975 decision, this Court ruled that a fiscal has no authority to issue search warrants, but held in the same vein
that, by virtue of the responsible officer" clause of the 1973 Bill of Rights, "any lawful officer authorized by law can issue a search warrant
or warrant of arrest.37 Authorities, however, have continued to express reservations whether or not fiscals may, by statute, be given
such a power. 38

Less than a year later, we promulgated Collector of Customs v. Villaluz, 39 in which we categorically averred: Until now only the judge can
issue the warrant of arrest." 40 "No law or presidential decree has been enacted or promulgated vesting the same authority in a
particular responsible officer ." 41

Apparently, Villaluz had settled the debate, but the same question persisted following this Courts subsequent rulings upholding the
President's alleged emergency arrest powers .42 [Mr. Justice Hugo Gutierrez would hold, however, that a Presidential Commitment Order
(PCO) is (was) not a species of "arrest" in its technical sense, and that the (deposed) Chief Executive, in issuing one, does not do so in his
capacity as a "responsible officer" under the 1973 Charter, but rather, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in times of
emergency, or in order to carry out the deportation of undesirable aliens.43 In the distinguished Justice's opinion then, these are acts
that can be done without need of judicial intervention because they are not, precisely, judicial but Presidential actions.]

In Ponsica v. Ignalaga,44 however, we held that the mayor has been made a "responsible officer' by the Local Government Code, 45 but
had ceased to be one with the approval of the 1987 Constitution according judges sole authority to issue arrest and search warrants. But
in the same breath, we did not rule the grant under the Code unconstitutional based on the provisions of the former Constitution. We
were agreed, though, that the "responsible officer" referred to by the fundamental law should be one capable of approximating "the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge." 46

In striking down Presidential Decree No. 1936 the respondent Court relied on American jurisprudence, notably, Katz v. United States, 47
Johnson v. United States, 48 and Coolidge v. New Hampshire 49 in which the American Supreme Court ruled that prosecutors (like the
petitioner) cannot be given such powers because of their incapacity for a "detached scrutiny" 50 of the cases before them. We affirm the
Appellate Court.

We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that
ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or
search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his office "is to see that justice is done
and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused," 51 he stands, invariably, as the accused's adversary and his accuser.
To permit him to issue search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when he is
neither. That makes, to our mind and to that extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002,
unconstitutional.

It is our ruling, thus, that when the 1973 Constitution spoke of "responsible officer" to whom the authority to issue arrest and search
warrants may be delegated by legislation, it did not furnish the legislator with the license to give that authority to whomsoever it pleased.
It is to be noted that the Charter itself makes the qualification that the officer himself must be "responsible". We are not saying, of
course, that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force (or any similar prosecutor) is or has been irresponsible in discharging its duty.
Rather, we take "responsibility", as used by the Constitution, to mean not only skill and competence but more significantly, neutrality and
independence comparable to the impartiality presumed of a judicial officer. A prosecutor can in no manner be said to be possessed of the
latter qualities.

According to the Court of Appeals, the implied exclusion of prosecutors under the 1973 Constitution was founded on the requirements of
due process, notably, the assurance to the respondent of an unbiased inquiry of the charges against him prior to the arrest of his person
or seizure of his property. We add that the exclusion is also demanded by the principle of separation of powers on which our republican
structure rests. Prosecutors exercise essentially an executive function (the petitioner itself is chaired by the Minister, now Secretary, of
Trade and Industry), since under the Constitution, the President has pledged to execute the laws. 52 As such, they cannot be made to
issue judicial processes without unlawfully impinging the prerogative of the courts.

At any rate, Ponsica v. Ignalaga should foreclose all questions on the matter, although the Court hopes that this disposition has clarified a
controversy that had generated often bitter debates and bickerings.
The Court joins the Government in its campaign against the scourge of "dollar- salting", a pernicious practice that has substantially
drained the nation's coffers and has seriously threatened its economy. We recognize the menace it has posed (and continues to pose)
unto the very stability of the country, the urgency for tough measures designed to contain if not eradicate it, and foremost, the need for
cooperation from the citizenry in an all-out campaign. But while we support the State's efforts, we do so not at the expense of
fundamental rights and liberties and constitutional safeguards against arbitrary and unreasonable acts of Government. If in the event
that as a result of this ruling, we prove to be an "obstacle" to the vital endeavour of stamping out the blackmarketing of valuable foreign
exchange, we do not relish it and certainly, do not mean it. The Constitution simply does not leave us much choice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982

GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court of Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS,
BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C. ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO AGUILLON
AGUILA, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman, Commission on Audit, and RICARDO PUNO, Minister of Justice,
Respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

This Court, pursuant to its grave responsibility of passing upon the validity of any executive or legislative act in an appropriate cases, has
to resolve the crucial issue of the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating
Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes." The task of judicial review, aptly characterized as exacting and delicate, is never more so than
when a conceded legislative power, that of judicial reorganization, 1 may possibly collide with the time-honored principle of the
independence of the judiciary 2 as protected and safeguarded by this constitutional provision: "The Members of the Supreme Court and
judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at
least eight Members, order their dismissal." 3 For the assailed legislation mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the
Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed
to the inferior courts established by such Act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency
that for petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has
been ignored and disregarded,

That is the fundamental issue raised in this proceeding, erroneously entitled Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition 4
considered by this Court as an action for prohibited petition, seeking to enjoin respondent Minister of the Budget, respondent Chairman
of the Commission on Audit, and respondent Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Petitioners 5 sought to bolster their claim by imputing lack of good faith in its enactment and characterizing as an undue delegation of
legislative power to the President his authority to fix the compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed
and the determination of the date when the reorganization shall be deemed completed. In the very comprehensive and scholarly Answer
of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 6 it was pointed out that there is no valid justification for the attack on the constitutionality of
this statute, it being a legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the allegations of
absence of good faith as well as the attack on the independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and devoid of any support in law. A
Supplemental Answer was likewise filed on October 8, 1981, followed by a Reply of petitioners on October 13. After the hearing in the
morning and afternoon of October 15, in which not only petitioners and respondents were heard through counsel but also the amici
curiae, 7 and thereafter submission of the minutes of the proceeding on the debate on Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, this petition was
deemed submitted for decision.

The importance of the crucial question raised called for intensive and rigorous study of all the legal aspects of the case. After such
exhaustive deliberation in several sessions, the exchange of views being supplemented by memoranda from the members of the Court, it
is our opinion and so hold that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional.

1. The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as Judge de la Llana is concerned, he certainly
falls within the principle set forth in Justice Laurel's opinion in People v. Vera. 8 Thus: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement." 9 The other petitioners as members of the bar and officers of the court cannot be considered
as devoid of "any personal and substantial interest" on the matter. There is relevance to this excerpt from a separate opinion in Aquino,
Jr. v. Commission on Elections: 10 "Then there is the attack on the standing of petitioners, as vindicating at most what they consider a
public right and not protecting their rights as individuals. This is to conjure the specter of the public right dogma as an inhibition to parties
intent on keeping public officials staying on the path of constitutionalism. As was so well put by Jaffe: 'The protection of private rights is
an essential constituent of public interest and, conversely, without a well-ordered state there could be no enforcement of private rights.
Private and public interests are, both in substantive and procedural sense, aspects of the totality of the legal order.' Moreover,
petitioners have convincingly shown that in their capacity as taxpayers, their standing to sue has been amply demonstrated. There would
be a retreat from the liberal approach followed in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, foreshadowed by the very decision of People v.
Vera where the doctrine was first fully discussed, if we act differently now. I do not think we are prepared to take that step. Respondents,
however, would hark back to the American Supreme Court doctrine in Mellon v. Frothingham with their claim that what petitioners
possess 'is an interest which is shared in common by other people and is comparatively so minute and indeterminate as to afford any
basis and assurance that the judicial process can act on it.' That is to speak in the language of a bygone era even in the United States. For
as Chief Justice Warren clearly pointed out in the later case of Flast v. Cohen, the barrier thus set up if not breached has definitely been
lowered." 11

2. The imputation of arbitrariness to the legislative body in the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 to demonstrate lack of
good faith does manifest violence to the facts. Petitioners should have exercised greater care in informing themselves as to its
antecedents. They had laid themselves open to the accusation of reckless disregard for the truth, On August 7, 1980, a Presidential
Committee on Judicial Reorganization was organized. 12 This Executive Order was later amended by Executive Order No. 619-A., dated
September 5 of that year. It clearly specified the task assigned to it: "1. The Committee shall formulate plans on the reorganization of the
Judiciary which shall be submitted within seventy (70) days from August 7, 1980 to provide the President sufficient options for the
reorganization of the entire Judiciary which shall embrace all lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the
City and Municipal Courts, and all Special Courts, but excluding the Sandigan Bayan." 13 On October 17, 1980, a Report was submitted by
such Committee on Judicial Reorganization. It began with this paragraph: "The Committee on Judicial Reorganization has the honor to
submit the following Report. It expresses at the outset its appreciation for the opportunity accorded it to study ways and means for what
today is a basic and urgent need, nothing less than the restructuring of the judicial system. There are problems, both grave and pressing,
that call for remedial measures. The felt necessities of the time, to borrow a phrase from Holmes, admit of no delay, for if no step be
taken and at the earliest opportunity, it is not too much to say that the people's faith in the administration of justice could be shaken. It is
imperative that there be a greater efficiency in the disposition of cases and that litigants, especially those of modest means — much
more so, the poorest and the humblest — can vindicate their rights in an expeditious and inexpensive manner. The rectitude and the
fairness in the way the courts operate must be manifest to all members of the community and particularly to those whose interests are
affected by the exercise of their functions. It is to that task that the Committee addresses itself and hopes that the plans submitted could
be a starting point for an institutional reform in the Philippine judiciary. The experience of the Supreme Court, which since 1973 has been
empowered to supervise inferior courts, from the Court of Appeals to the municipal courts, has proven that reliance on improved court
management as well as training of judges for more efficient administration does not suffice. I hence, to repeat, there is need for a major
reform in the judicial so stem it is worth noting that it will be the first of its kind since the Judiciary Act became effective on June 16,
1901." 14 I t went to say: "I t does not admit of doubt that the last two decades of this century are likely to be attended with problems of
even greater complexity and delicacy. New social interests are pressing for recognition in the courts. Groups long inarticulate, primarily
those economically underprivileged, have found legal spokesmen and are asserting grievances previously ignored. Fortunately, the
judicially has not proved inattentive. Its task has thus become even more formidable. For so much grist is added to the mills of justice.
Moreover, they are likewise to be quite novel. The need for an innovative approach is thus apparent. The national leadership, as is well-
known, has been constantly on the search for solutions that will prove to be both acceptable and satisfactory. Only thus may there be
continued national progress." 15 After which comes: "To be less abstract, the thrust is on development. That has been repeatedly
stressed — and rightly so. All efforts are geared to its realization. Nor, unlike in the past, was it to b "considered as simply the movement
towards economic progress and growth measured in terms of sustained increases in per capita income and Gross National Product (GNP).
16 For the New Society, its implication goes further than economic advance, extending to "the sharing, or more appropriately, the
democratization of social and economic opportunities, the substantiation of the true meaning of social justice." 17 This process of
modernization and change compels the government to extend its field of activity and its scope of operations. The efforts towards
reducing the gap between the wealthy and the poor elements in the nation call for more regulatory legislation. That way the social justice
and protection to labor mandates of the Constitution could be effectively implemented." 18 There is likelihood then "that some measures
deemed inimical by interests adversely affected would be challenged in court on grounds of validity. Even if the question does not go that
far, suits may be filed concerning their interpretation and application. ... There could be pleas for injunction or restraining orders. Lack of
success of such moves would not, even so, result in their prompt final disposition. Thus delay in the execution of the policies embodied in
law could thus be reasonably expected. That is not conducive to progress in development." 19 For, as mentioned in such Report, equally
of vital concern is the problem of clogged dockets, which "as is well known, is one of the utmost gravity. Notwithstanding the most
determined efforts exerted by the Supreme Court, through the leadership of both retired Chief Justice Querube Makalintal and the late
Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, from the time supervision of the courts was vested in it under the 1973 Constitution, the trend towards
more and more cases has continued." 20 It is understandable why. With the accelerated economic development, the growth of
population, the increasing urbanization, and other similar factors, the judiciary is called upon much oftener to resolve controversies. Thus
confronted with what appears to be a crisis situation that calls for a remedy, the Batasang Pambansa had no choice. It had to act, before
the ailment became even worse. Time was of the essence, and yet it did not hesitate to be duly mindful, as it ought to be, of the extent of
its coverage before enacting Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

3. There is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional reforms," characterized in the Report as "both pressing and urgent."
21 It is worth noting, likewise, as therein pointed out, that a major reorganization of such scope, if it were to take place, would be the
most thorough after four generations. 22 The reference was to the basic Judiciary Act generations . enacted in June of 1901, 23 amended
in a significant way, only twice previous to the Commonwealth. There was, of course, the creation of the Court of Appeals in 1935,
originally composed "of a Presiding Judge and ten appellate Judges, who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, 24 It could "sit en banc, but it may sit in two divisions, one of six
and another of five Judges, to transact business, and the two divisions may sit at the same time." 25 Two years after the establishment of
independence of the Republic of the Philippines, the Judiciary Act of 1948 26 was passed. It continued the existing system of regular
inferior courts, namely, the Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, 27 the Municipal Courts, at present the City Courts, and the Justice
of the Peace Courts, now the Municipal Circuit Courts and Municipal Courts. The membership of the Court of Appeals has been
continuously increased. 28 Under a 1978 Presidential Decree, there would be forty-five members, a Presiding Justice and forty-four
Associate Justices, with fifteen divisions. 29 Special courts were likewise created. The first was the Court of Tax Appeals in 1954, 30 next
came the Court of Agrarian Relations in 1955, 31 and then in the same year a Court of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations for Manila in
1955, 32 subsequently followed by the creation of two other such courts for Iloilo and Quezon City in 1966. 33 In 1967, Circuit Criminal
Courts were established, with the Judges having the same qualifications, rank, compensation, and privileges as judges of Courts of First
Instance. 34

4. After the submission of such Report, Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became the basis of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was
introduced. After setting forth the background as above narrated, its Explanatory Note continues: "Pursuant to the President's
instructions, this proposed legislation has been drafted in accordance with the guidelines of that report with particular attention to
certain objectives of the reorganization, to wit, the attainment of more efficiency in disposal of cases, a reallocation of jurisdiction, and a
revision of procedures which do not tend to the proper meeting out of justice. In consultation with, and upon a consensus of, the
governmental and parliamentary leadership, however, it was felt that some options set forth in the Report be not availed of. Instead of
the proposal to confine the jurisdiction of the intermediate appellate court merely to appellate adjudication, the preference has been
opted to increase rather than diminish its jurisdiction in order to enable it to effectively assist the Supreme Court. This preference has
been translated into one of the innovations in the proposed Bill." 35 In accordance with the parliamentary procedure, the Bill was
sponsored by the Chairman of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to which it was referred. Thereafter,
Committee Report No. 225 was submitted by such Committee to the Batasang Pambansa recommending the approval with some
amendments. In the sponsorship speech of Minister Ricardo C. Puno, there was reference to the Presidential Committee on Judicial
Reorganization. Thus: "On October 17, 1980, the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization submitted its report to the President
which contained the 'Proposed Guidelines for Judicial Reorganization.' Cabinet Bill No. 42 was drafted substantially in accordance with
the options presented by these guidelines. Some options set forth in the aforesaid report were not availed of upon consultation with and
upon consensus of the government and parliamentary leadership. Moreover, some amendments to the bill were adopted by the
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government, to which The bill was referred, following the public hearings on the bill held
in December of 1980. The hearings consisted of dialogues with the distinguished members of the bench and the bar who had submitted
written proposals, suggestions, and position papers on the bill upon the invitation of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government." 36 Stress was laid by the sponsor that the enactment of such Cabinet Bill would, firstly, result in the attainment of more
efficiency in the disposal of cases. Secondly, the improvement in the quality of justice dispensed by the courts is expected as a necessary
consequence of the easing of the court's dockets. Thirdly, the structural changes introduced in the bill, together with the reallocation of
jurisdiction and the revision of the rules of procedure, are designated to suit the court system to the exigencies of the present day
Philippine society, and hopefully, of the foreseeable future." 37 it may be observed that the volume containing the minutes of the
proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa show that 590 pages were devoted to its discussion. It is quite obvious that it took considerable
time and effort as well as exhaustive study before the act was signed by the President on August 14, 1981. With such a background, it
becomes quite manifest how lacking in factual basis is the allegation that its enactment is tainted by the vice of arbitrariness. What
appears undoubted and undeniable is the good faith that characterized its enactment from its inception to the affixing of the Presidential
signature.

5. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in
good faith suffers from no infirmity. The ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr. 38 reiterated such a doctrine: "We find
this point urged by respondents, to be without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners from the service is here involved, but the
validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue that is for the Courts to decide. It is well-known rule also that valid abolition of
offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. ... And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to
have ceased to hold office. The preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to the merits of the case. As well-settled as the rule that the
abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must
be made in good faith." 39 The above excerpt was quoted with approval in Bendanillo, Sr. v. Provincial Governor, 40 two earlier cases
enunciating a similar doctrine having preceded it. 41 As with the offices in the other branches of the government, so it is with the
judiciary. The test remains whether the abolition is in good faith. As that element is conspicuously present in the enactment of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, then the lack of merit of this petition becomes even more apparent. The concurring opinion of Justice Laurel in
Zandueta v. De la Costa 42 cannot be any clearer. This is a quo warranto proceeding filed by petitioner, claiming that he, and not
respondent, was entitled to he office of judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila. There was a Judicial
Reorganization Act in 1936, 43 a year after the inauguration of the Commonwealth, amending the Administrative Code to organize courts
of original jurisdiction known as the Courts of First Instance Prior to such statute, petitioner was the incumbent of such branch.
Thereafter, he received an ad interim appointment, this time to the Fourth Judicial District, under the new legislation. Unfortunately for
him, the Commission on Appointments of then National Assembly disapproved the same, with respondent being appointed in his place.
He contested the validity of the Act insofar as it resulted in his being forced to vacate his position This Court did not rule squarely on the
matter. His petition was dismissed on the ground of estoppel. Nonetheless, the separate concurrence of Justice Laurel in the result
reached, to repeat, reaffirms in no uncertain terms the standard of good faith to preclude any doubt as to the abolition of an inferior
court, with due recognition of the security of tenure guarantee. Thus: " I am of the opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 145 in so far as it
reorganizes, among other judicial districts, the Ninth Judicial District, and establishes an entirely new district comprising Manila and the
provinces of Rizal and Palawan, is valid and constitutional. This conclusion flows from the fundamental proposition that the legislature
may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new
appointments and commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to define, prescribe
and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to certain limitations in the case of the Supreme Court. It is admitted that
section 9 of the same article of the Constitution provides for the security of tenure of all the judges. The principles embodied in these two
sections of the same article of the Constitution must be coordinated and harmonized. A mere enunciation of a principle will not decide
actual cases and controversies of every sort. (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New York, 198 U.S., 45; 49 Law. ed; 937)" 44 justice Laurel
continued: "I am not insensible to the argument that the National Assembly may abuse its power and move deliberately to defeat the
constitutional provision guaranteeing security of tenure to all judges, But, is this the case? One need not share the view of Story, Miller
and Tucker on the one hand, or the opinion of Cooley, Watson and Baldwin on the other, to realize that the application of a legal or
constitutional principle is necessarily factual and circumstantial and that fixity of principle is the rigidity of the dead and the
unprogressive. I do say, and emphatically, however, that cases may arise where the violation of the constitutional provision regarding
security of tenure is palpable and plain, and that legislative power of reorganization may be sought to cloak an unconstitutional and evil
purpose. When a case of that kind arises, it will be the time to make the hammer fall and heavily. But not until then. I am satisfied that, as
to the particular point here discussed, the purpose was the fulfillment of what was considered a great public need by the legislative
department and that Commonwealth Act No. 145 was not enacted purposely to affect adversely the tenure of judges or of any particular
judge. Under these circumstances, I am for sustaining the power of the legislative department under the Constitution. To be sure, there
was greater necessity for reorganization consequent upon the establishment of the new government than at the time Acts Nos. 2347 and
4007 were approved by the defunct Philippine Legislature, and although in the case of these two Acts there was an express provision
providing for the vacation by the judges of their offices whereas in the case of Commonwealth Act No. 145 doubt is engendered by its
silence, this doubt should be resolved in favor of the valid exercise of the legislative power." 45

6. A few more words on the question of abolition. In the above-cited opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta, reference was made to
Act No. 2347 46 on the reorganization of the Courts of First Instance and to Act No. 4007 47 on the reorganization of all branches of the
government, including the courts of first instance. In both of them, the then Courts of First Instance were replaced by new courts with the
same appellation. As Justice Laurel pointed out, there was no question as to the fact of abolition. He was equally categorical as to
Commonwealth Act No. 145, where also the system of the courts of first instance was provided for expressly. It was pointed out by
Justice Laurel that the mere creation of an entirely new district of the same court is valid and constitutional. such conclusion flowing
"from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize
them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions." 48 The challenged statute creates an
intermediate appellate court, 49 regional trial courts, 50 metropolitan trial courts of the national capital region, 51 and other
metropolitan trial courts, 52 municipal trial courts in cities, 53 as well as in municipalities, 54 and municipal circuit trial courts. 55 There is
even less reason then to doubt the fact that existing inferior courts were abolished. For the Batasang Pambansa, the establishment of
such new inferior courts was the appropriate response to the grave and urgent problems that pressed for solution. Certainly, there could
be differences of opinion as to the appropriate remedy. The choice, however, was for the Batasan to make, not for this Court, which deals
only with the question of power. It bears mentioning that in Brillo v. Eñage 56 this Court, in an unanimous opinion penned by the late
Justice Diokno, citing Zandueta v. De la Costa, ruled: "La segunda question que el recurrrido plantea es que la Carta de Tacloban ha
abolido el puesto. Si efectivamente ha sido abolido el cargo, entonces ha quedado extinguido el derecho de recurente a ocuparlo y a
cobrar el salario correspodiente. Mc Culley vs. State, 46 LRA, 567. El derecho de un juez de desempenarlo hasta los 70 años de edad o se
incapacite no priva al Congreso de su facultad de abolir, fusionar o reorganizar juzgados no constitucionales." 57 Nonetheless, such well-
established principle was not held applicable to the situation there obtaining, the Charter of Tacloban City creating a city court in place of
the former justice of the peace court. Thus: "Pero en el caso de autos el Juzgado de Tacloban no ha sido abolido. Solo se le ha cambiado
el nombre con el cambio de forma del gobierno local." 58 The present case is anything but that. Petitioners did not and could not prove
that the challenged statute was not within the bounds of legislative authority.

7. This opinion then could very well stop at this point. The implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, concededly a task
incumbent on the Executive, may give rise, however, to questions affecting a judiciary that should be kept independent. The all-
embracing scope of the assailed legislation as far as all inferior courts from the Courts of Appeals to municipal courts are concerned, with
the exception solely of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals 59 gave rise, and understandably so, to misgivings as to its effect
on such cherished Ideal. The first paragraph of the section on the transitory provision reads: "The provisions of this Act shall be
immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President. The Court of Appeals, the Courts of First
Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the
Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall continue to function as presently constituted and organized, until the completion
of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed
automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold the office." 60 There is all the more reason then why this Court
has no choice but to inquire further into the allegation by petitioners that the security of tenure provision, an assurance of a judiciary free
from extraneous influences, is thereby reduced to a barren form of words. The amended Constitution adheres even more clearly to the
long-established tradition of a strong executive that antedated the 1935 Charter. As noted in the work of former Vice-Governor Hayden,
a noted political scientist, President Claro M. Recto of the 1934 Convention, in his closing address, in stressing such a concept,
categorically spoke of providing "an executive power which, subject to the fiscalization of the Assembly, and of public opinion, will not
only know how to govern, but will actually govern, with a firm and steady hand, unembarrassed by vexatious interferences by other
departments, or by unholy alliances with this and that social group." 61 The above excerpt was cited with approval by Justice Laurel in
Planas v. Gil. 62 Moreover, under the 1981 Amendments, it may be affirmed that once again the principle of separation of powers, to
quote from the same jurist as ponente in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 "obtains not through express provision but by actual
division." 64 The president, under Article VII, shall be the head of state and chief executive of the Republic of the Philippines." 65
Moreover, it is equally therein expressly provided that all the powers he possessed under the 1935 Constitution are once again vested in
him unless the Batasang Pambansa provides otherwise." 66 Article VII of the 1935 Constitution speaks categorically: "The Executive
power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." 67 As originally framed, the 1973 Constitution created the position of President
as the "symbolic head of state." 68 In addition, there was a provision for a Prime Minister as the head of government exercising the
executive power with the assistance of the Cabinet 69 Clearly, a modified parliamentary system was established. In the light of the 1981
amendments though, this Court in Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor 70 could state: "The adoption of certain aspects of
a parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential character." 71 The retention, however, of
the position of the Prime Minister with the Cabinet, a majority of the members of which shall come from the regional representatives of
the Batasang Pambansa and the creation of an Executive Committee composed of the Prime Minister as Chairman and not more than
fourteen other members at least half of whom shall be members of the Batasang Pambansa, clearly indicate the evolving nature of the
system of government that is now operative. 72 What is equally apparent is that the strongest ties bind the executive and legislative
departments. It is likewise undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its full authority to enact whatever legislation may be
necessary to carry out national policy as usually formulated in a caucus of the majority party. It is understandable then why in Fortun v.
Labang 73 it was stressed that with the provision transferring to the Supreme Court administrative supervision over the Judiciary, there is
a greater need "to preserve unimpaired the independence of the judiciary, especially so at present, where to all intents and purposes,
there is a fusion between the executive and the legislative branches." 74

8. To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides with the security of tenure
enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution. There was a similar provision in the 1935
Constitution. It did not, however, go as far as conferring on this Tribunal the power to supervise administratively inferior courts. 75
Moreover, this Court is em powered "to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their
dismissal." 76 Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with
such power. 77 Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure
to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would
thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure
does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction
exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary.
In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional
construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest
consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render
advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action
taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in
issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in
the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power,
Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the
conceded power of reorganizing tulle inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or
disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernidble except to those
predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of
alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred. 78 There is an
obvious way to do so. The principle that the Constitution enters into and forms part of every act to avoid any constitutional taint must be
applied Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, 79 promulgated last January, has this relevant excerpt: "It is true that other Sections of the Decree
could have been so worded as to avoid any constitutional objection. As of now, however, no ruling is called for. The view is given
expression in the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar that in such a case to save the Decree from the direct fate of
invalidity, they must be construed in such a way as to preclude any possible erosion on the powers vested in this Court by the
Constitution. That is a proposition too plain to be committed. It commends itself for approval." 80 Nor would such a step be
unprecedented. The Presidential Decree constituting Municipal Courts into Municipal Circuit Courts, specifically provides: "The Supreme
Court shall carry out the provisions of this Decree through implementing orders, on a province-to-province basis." 81 It is true there is no
such provision in this Act, but the spirit that informs it should not be ignored in the Executive Order contemplated under its Section 44.
82 Thus Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 could stand the most rigorous test of constitutionality. 83

9. Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is called upon to reconcile or harmonize constitutional provisions. To
be specific, the Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the process to abolish
existing ones. As noted in the preceding paragraph, the termination of office of their occupants, as a necessary consequence of such
abolition, is hardly distinguishable from the practical standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in this Tribunal. It is of the
essence of constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is precluded from acting within the boundaries of its conceded competence.
That is why it has long been well-settled under the constitutional system we have adopted that this Court cannot, whenever appropriate,
avoid the task of reconciliation. As Justice Laurel put it so well in the previously cited Angara decision, while in the main, "the Constitution
has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of
the government, the overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it
hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins." 84 It is well to recall another classic utterance from the same jurist, even
more emphatic in its affirmation of such a view, moreover buttressed by one of those insights for which Holmes was so famous "The
classical separation of government powers, whether viewed in the light of the political philosophy of Aristotle, Locke, or Motesquieu or of
the postulations of Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a relative theory of government. There is more truism and actuality in
interdependence than in independence and separation of powers, for as observed by Justice Holmes in a case of Philippine origin, we
cannot lay down 'with mathematical precision and divide the branches into water-tight compartments' not only because 'the great
ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white but also because 'even the more specific of them are
found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other.'" 85 This too from Justice Tuazon, likewise
expressing with force and clarity why the need for reconciliation or balancing is well-nigh unavodiable under the fundamental principle of
separation of powers: "The constitutional structure is a complicated system, and overlappings of governmental functions are recognized,
unavoidable, and inherent necessities of governmental coordination." 86 In the same way that the academe has noted the existence in
constitutional litigation of right versus right, there are instances, and this is one of them, where, without this attempt at harmonizing the
provisions in question, there could be a case of power against power. That we should avoid.

10. There are other objections raised but they pose no difficulty. Petitioners would characterize as an undue delegation of
legislative power to the President the grant of authority to fix the compensation and the allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter
appointed. A more careful reading of the challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to have cautioned them against raising such an
issue. The language of the statute is quite clear. The questioned provisions reads as follows: "Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional
Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges, municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such receive such
compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the President along the guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597." 87 The existence of a standard is thus clear. The
basic postulate that underlies the doctrine of non-delegation is that it is the legislative body which is entrusted with the competence to
make laws and to alter and repeal them, the test being the completeness of the statue in all its terms and provisions when enacted. As
pointed out in Edu v. Ericta: 88 "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that
the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication
may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency
to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative
purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation
objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose
of the act considered as a whole." 89 The undeniably strong links that bind the executive and legislative departments under the amended
Constitution assure that the framing of policies as well as their implementation can be accomplished with unity, promptitude, and
efficiency. There is accuracy, therefore, to this observation in the Free Telephone Workers Union decision: "There is accordingly more
receptivity to laws leaving to administrative and executive agencies the adoption of such means as may be necessary to effectuate a valid
legislative purpose. It is worth noting that a highly-respected legal scholar, Professor Jaffe, as early as 1947, could speak of delegation as
the 'dynamo of modern government.'" 90 He warned against a "restrictive approach" which could be "a deterrent factor to much-needed
legislation." 91 Further on this point from the same opinion" "The spectre of the non-delegation concept need not haunt, therefore, party
caucuses, cabinet sessions or legislative chambers." 92 Another objection based on the absence in the statue of what petitioners refer to
as a "definite time frame limitation" is equally bereft of merit. They ignore the categorical language of this provision: "The Supreme Court
shall submit to the President, within thirty (30) days from the date of the effectivity of this act, a staffing pattern for all courts constituted
pursuant to this Act which shall be the basis of the implementing order to be issued by the President in accordance with the immediately
succeeding section." 93 The first sentence of the next section is even more categorical: "The provisions of this Act shall be immediately
carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President." 94 Certainly petitioners cannot be heard to argue that
the President is insensible to his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 95 In the meanwhile, the existing
inferior courts affected continue functioning as before, "until the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the
President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to
hold office." 96 There is no ambiguity. The incumbents of the courts thus automatically abolished "shall cease to hold office." No fear
need be entertained by incumbents whose length of service, quality of performance, and clean record justify their being named anew, 97
in legal contemplation without any interruption in the continuity of their service. 98 It is equally reasonable to assume that from the
ranks of lawyers, either in the government service, private practice, or law professors will come the new appointees. In the event that in
certain cases a little more time is necessary in the appraisal of whether or not certain incumbents deserve reappointment, it is not from
their standpoint undesirable. Rather, it would be a reaffirmation of the good faith that will characterize its implementation by the
Executive. There is pertinence to this observation of Justice Holmes that even acceptance of the generalization that courts ordinarily
should not supply omissions in a law, a generalization qualified as earlier shown by the principle that to save a statute that could be done,
"there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." 99 Where then is the
unconstitutional flaw

11. On the morning of the hearing of this petition on September 8, 1981, petitioners sought to have the writer of this opinion and
Justices Ramon C. Aquino and Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera disqualified because the first-named was the chairman and the other two,
members of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization. At the hearing, the motion was denied. It was made clear then and there that not
one of the three members of the Court had any hand in the framing or in the discussion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. They were not
consulted. They did not testify. The challenged legislation is entirely the product of the efforts of the legislative body. 100 Their work was
limited, as set forth in the Executive Order, to submitting alternative plan for reorganization. That is more in the nature of scholarly
studies. That the undertook. There could be no possible objection to such activity. Ever since 1973, this Tribunal has had administrative
supervision over interior courts. It has had the opportunity to inform itself as to the way judicial business is conducted and how it may be
improved. Even prior to the 1973 Constitution, it is the recollection of the writer of this opinion that either the then Chairman or
members of the Committee on Justice of the then Senate of the Philippines 101 consulted members of the Court in drafting proposed
legislation affecting the judiciary. It is not inappropriate to cite this excerpt from an article in the 1975 Supreme Court Review: "In the
twentieth century the Chief Justice of the United States has played a leading part in judicial reform. A variety of conditions have been
responsible for the development of this role, and foremost among them has been the creation of explicit institutional structures designed
to facilitate reform." 102 Also: "Thus the Chief Justice cannot avoid exposure to and direct involvement in judicial reform at the federal
level and, to the extent issues of judicial federalism arise, at the state level as well." 103

12. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are endowed with rights, to secure which a
government is instituted. Acting as it does through public officials, it has to grant them either expressly or impliedly certain powers.
Those they exercise not for their own benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak in the language of ambiguity: "A
public office is a public trust." 104 That is more than a moral adjuration It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a public official certain
rights. It does so to enable them to perform his functions and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint that the
security of tenure provision to assure judicial independence is to be viewed. It is an added guarantee that justices and judges can
administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisal or untoward consequence. Their judgments then are even more likely to be inspired
solely by their knowledge of the law and the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting influence of base or unworthy motives.
The independence of which they are assured is impressed with a significance transcending that of a purely personal right. As thus viewed,
it is not solely for their welfare. The challenged legislation Thus subject d to the most rigorous scrutiny by this Tribunal, lest by lack of due
care and circumspection, it allow the erosion of that Ideal so firmly embedded in the national consciousness There is this farther thought
to consider. independence in thought and action necessarily is rooted in one's mind and heart. As emphasized by former Chief Justice
Paras in Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, 105 there is no surer guarantee of judicial independence than the God-given character and
fitness of those appointed to the Bench. The judges may be guaranteed a fixed tenure of office during good behavior, but if they are of
such stuff as allows them to be subservient to one administration after another, or to cater to the wishes of one litigant after another, the
independence of the judiciary will be nothing more than a myth or an empty Ideal. Our judges, we are confident, can be of the type of
Lord Coke, regardless or in spite of the power of Congress — we do not say unlimited but as herein exercised — to reorganize inferior
courts." 106 That is to recall one of the greatest Common Law jurists, who at the cost of his office made clear that he would not just
blindly obey the King's order but "will do what becomes [him] as a judge." So it was pointed out in the first leading case stressing the
independence of the judiciary, Borromeo v. Mariano, 107 The ponencia of Justice Malcolm Identified good judges with "men who have a
mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the office
undeterred by outside influence, and who are independent and self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal and coordinate to
the other two departments of government." 108 There is no reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 would be attended with deleterious consequences to the administration of justice. It does not follow that the abolition in good faith
of the existing inferior courts except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in a
judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with independence its solemn duty or one recreant to the trust reposed in it. Nor should there
be any fear that less than good faith will attend the exercise be of the appointing power vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that
an independent and efficient judiciary is something to the credit of any administration. Well and truly has it been said that the
fundamental principle of separation of powers assumes, and justifiably so, that the three departments are as one in their determination
to pursue the Ideals and aspirations and to fulfilling the hopes of the sovereign people as expressed in the Constitution. There is wisdom
as well as validity to this pronouncement of Justice Malcolm in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Company, 109 a decision
promulgated almost half a century ago: "Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction
usurpations by any other department or the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers
expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act." 110 To that basic postulate underlying our constitutional system, this
Court remains committed.

WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been shown, this petition is dismissed. No costs.
G.R. No. L-27811 November 17, 1967

LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
JOSE PAÑO, HON. JUAN PAJO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. JUAN DE G. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, defendants-appellees.

Leopoldo M. Abellera for plaintiff-appellant.

Victorio Advincula for defendant Jose Paño.
Office of the Solicitor General for defendant Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Executive Secretary.

SANCHEZ, J.:

The question — May the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, reverse a decision of the Director of Lands that had
been affirmed by the Executive Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources — yielded an affirmative answer from the lower court.1

Hence, this appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals upon the provisions of Sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948,
as amended.

The undisputed controlling facts are:

In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture land situated in Tamlangon, Municipality of
Bansalan, Province of Davao.

On January 9, 1953, Magallanes ceded his rights and interests to a portion (392,7569 hectares) of the above public land to plaintiff.

On April 13, 1954, the portion Magallanes ceded to plaintiff was officially released from the forest zone as pasture land and declared
agricultural land.

On January 26, 1955, Jose Paño and nineteen other claimants2 applied for the purchase of ninety hectares of the released area.

On March 29, 1955, plaintiff corporation in turn filed its own sales application covering the entire released area. This was protested by
Jose Paño and his nineteen companions upon the averment that they are actual occupants of the part thereof covered by their own sales
application.

The Director of Lands, following an investigation of the conflict, rendered a decision on July 31, 1956 giving due course to the application
of plaintiff corporation, and dismissing the claim of Jose Paño and his companions. A move to reconsider failed.

On July 5, 1957, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources — on appeal by Jose Paño for himself and his companions — held
that the appeal was without merit and dismissed the same.

The case was elevated to the President of the Philippines.

On June 25, 1958, Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, "[b]y authority of the President" decided the controversy, modified the decision of the
Director of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and (1) declared that "it would be for the public
interest that appellants, who are mostly landless farmers who depend on the land for their existence, be allocated that portion on which
they have made improvements;" and (2) directed that the controverted land (northern portion of Block I, LC Map 1749, Project No. 27, of
Bansalan, Davao, with Latian River as the dividing line) "should be subdivided into lots of convenient sizes and allocated to actual
occupants, without prejudice to the corporation's right to reimbursement for the cost of surveying this portion." It may be well to state,
at this point, that the decision just mentioned, signed by the Executive Secretary, was planted upon the facts as found in said decision.

Plaintiff corporation took the foregoing decision to the Court of First Instance praying that judgment be rendered declaring: (1) that the
decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has full force and effect; and (2) that the decision of the Executive
Secretary is contrary to law and of no legal force and effect.

And now subject of this appeal is the judgment of the court a quo dismissing plaintiff's case.
1. Plaintiff's mainstay is Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 141. The precept there is that decisions of the Director of Lands "as to
questions of facts shall be conclusive when approved" by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Plaintiff's trenchment claim
is that this statute is controlling not only upon courts but also upon the President.

Plaintiff's position is incorrect. The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin.3 So, too, is his control of all executive
departments.4 Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to
dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse
the action taken by his department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a
decision of a department secretary.

Particularly in reference to the decisions of the Director of Lands, as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the
standard practice is to allow appeals from such decisions to the Office of the President.5 This Court has recognized this practice in several
cases. In one, the decision of the Lands Director as approved by the Secretary was considered superseded by that of the President's
appeal.6 In other cases, failure to pursue or resort to this last remedy of appeal was considered a fatal defect, warranting dismissal of the
case, for non-exhaustion of all administrative remedies.7

Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes upon the President's power of control over the
executive departments.8 And control simply means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."9

This unquestionably negates the assertion that the President cannot undo an act of his department secretary.

2. Plaintiff next submits that the decision of the Executive Secretary herein is an undue delegation of power. The Constitution,
petitioner asserts, does not contain any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive
Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the matter.

It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which the President must exercise in person.10 Not as correct, however, is it so
say that the Chief Executive may not delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not command that he perform
in person.11 Reason is not wanting for this view. The President is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and
administrative functions. The Office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus
gained recognition is that "under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the
President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order" that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.12

3. But plaintiff underscores the fact that the Executive Secretary is equal in rank to the other department heads, no higher than
anyone of them. From this, plaintiff carves the argument that one department head, on the pretext that he is an alter ego of the
President, cannot intrude into the zone of action allocated to another department secretary. This argument betrays lack of appreciation
of the fact that where, as in this case, the Executive Secretary acts "[b]y authority of the President," his decision is that of the President's.
Such decision is to be given full faith and credit by our courts. The assumed authority of the Executive Secretary is to be accepted. For,
only the President may rightfully say that the Executive Secretary is not authorized to do so. Therefore, unless the action taken is
"disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,"13 that remains the act of the Chief Executive, and cannot be successfully assailed.14
No such disapproval or reprobation is even intimated in the record of this case.

For the reasons given, the judgment under review is hereby affirmed. Costs against plaintiff. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

The learned opinion of Justice Sanchez possesses merit and inspires assent. A further observation may not be amiss concerning that
portion thereof which speaks of "the standard practice" allowing appeals from [decisions of Secretary of Natural Resources affirming the
action taken by the Director of Lands] to the Office of the President. That for me is more than a "standard practice." It is sound law. The
constitutional grant to the President of the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices yields that implication.1
If this were all, there would be no need for an additional expression of my views. I feel constrained to do so however in order to
emphasize that the opinion of the Court appears to me to reflect with greater fidelity the constitutional intent as embodied in the above
provision vesting the power of control in the Presidency.

The question asked in the opening paragraph of the opinion — "May the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, reverse
a decision of the Director of Lands that had been affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources [?]" — merits but one
answer. It must be in the unqualified affirmative. So the Court holds. That is as it should be. Any other view would be highly unorthodox.

Nonetheless, the thought seems to lurk in the opinion of a respectable number of members of the bar that a provision as that found in
the Public Land Act to the effect that decisions of Director of Lands on questions of facts shall be conclusive when approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources2 constitute a limitation of such power of control. This view might have gained plausibility
in the light of Ang-Angco vs. Castillo,3 where the procedure set forth in the Civil Service Act in 1959 was held binding in so far as the
President is concerned in the case of disciplinary action taken against non-presidential appointees.

The argument that what the then Executive Secretary acting for the President did was justified by the constitutional grant of control
elicited no favorable response. The Court apparently was not receptive to a more expansive view of such executive prerogative. This is
not to say that what was there decided was entirely lacking in justification. It is merely to suggest that it may contain implications not in
conformity with the broad grant of authority constitutionally conferred on the President.

It is well-worth emphasizing that the President unlike any other official in the Executive Department is vested with both "constitutional
and legal authority"4 as Justice Laurel noted. Care is to be taken then lest by a too narrow interpretation what could reasonably be
included in such competence recognized by the Constitution be unduly restricted. If my reading of the opinion of Justice Sanchez is
correct, then there is a more hospitable scope accorded such power of control. For me this is more in keeping with the fundamental law.
Moreover there would be a greater awareness on the part of all of the broad range of authority the President possesses by virtue of such
a provision.

Reference to the words of Justice Laurel, who was himself one of the leading framers of the Constitution and thereafter, as a member of
this Court, one of its most authoritative expounders in the leading case of Villena vs. Secretary of Interior,5 is not inappropriate. Their
reverberating clang, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, should drown all weaker sounds. Thus: "After serious reflection, we have decided to
sustain the contention of the government in this case on the broad proposition, albeit not suggested, that under the presidential type of
government which we have adopted and considering the departmental organization established and continued in force by paragraph 1,
section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and
the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. (Runkle vs. United States [1887], 122 U.S., 543; 30 Law.
ed., 1167; 7 Sup. St. Rep. 1141; see also U.S. vs. Eliason [1839], 16 Pet., 291; 10 Law. ed., 968; Jones vs. U.S. [1890], 137 U.S. 202; 34 Law.
ed., 691; 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 80; Wolsey vs. Chapman [1880], 101 U.S. 775; 25 Law. ed. 915; Wilcox vs. Jackson [1836], 13 Pet. 498; 10 Law.
ed. 264.)"

The opinion of Justice Laurel continues: "Fear is expressed by more than one member of this court that the acceptance of the principle of
qualified political agency in this and similar cases would result in the assumption of responsibility by the President of the Philippines for
acts of any member of his cabinet, however illegal, irregular or improper may be these acts. The implications, it is said, are serious. Fear,
however, is no valid argument against the system once adopted, established and operated. Familiarity with the essential background of
the type of govenment established under our Constitution, in the light of certain well-known principles and practices that go with the
system, should offer the necessary explanation. With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose
which is crystal clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is, the establishment of a single, not
plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begin with the enunciation of
the principle that 'The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines.' This means that the President of the Philippines
is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive departments occupy political positions
and hold office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, 'should be of the President's bosom confidence' (7
Writings, Ford ed., 498), and, in the language of Attorney-General Cushing, (7 Op., Attorney-General, 453), 'are subject to the direction of
the President.' Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the
projection of that of the President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the
United States, 'each head of a department is, and must be the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the
President is required by law to exercise authority' (Myers vs. United States, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 21 at 30; 272 U.S. 52 at 133; 71 Law. ed.,
160). Secretaries of departments, of course, exercise certain powers under the law but the law cannot impair or in any way affect the
constitutional power of control and direction of the President. As a matter of executive policy, they may be granted departmental
autonomy as to certain matters but this is by mere concession of the executive, in the absence of valid legislation in the particular field. If
the President, then, is the authority in the Executive Department, he assumes the corresponding responsibility. The head of a department
is a man of his confidence; he controls and directs his acts; he appoints him and can remove him at pleasure; he is the executive, not any
of his secretaries. It is therefore logical that he, the President, should be answerable for the acts of administration of the entire Executive
Department before his own conscience no less than before that undefined power of public opinion which, in the language of Daniel
Webster, is the last repository of popular government. These are the necessary corollaries of the American presidential type of
government, and if there is any defect, it is attributable to the system itself. We cannot modify the system unless we modify the
Constitution, and we cannot modify the Constitution by any subtle process of judicial interpretation or construction."

Concepcion, C.J. and Castro, J., concur.