Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT,
x--------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
A PETITION for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an equitable
remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases when there is no other available or adequate remedy. It
may be availed of only after a judgment, final order, or other proceeding was taken against petitioner in
any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.[1]
Before Us is a petition for relief from judgment[2] filed by Julio B. Purcon, seeking to set aside Our July
16, 2007 Resolution,[3] which denied his petition for review, as well as the October 9, 2007 Entry of
Judgment.[4] He pleads for the Courts leniency on account of the negligence and inefficiency of his
counsel, which resulted in the late filing of the petition and in filing defective pleadings within this Court.
The Antecedents
The case stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioner for reimbursement of medical expenses, sickness
allowance and permanent disability benefits with prayer for compensatory, moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC).
In his verified position paper, petitioner alleged that on January 28, 2002, respondent MRM Philippines,
Inc. hired him as a seaman on board the vessel M/T SARABELLE 2. He signed a contract for three (3)
months with a monthly salary of $584.00. According to petitioner, his work involved a day-to-day activity
that required exertion of strenuous effort, and that he often worked overtime due to the pressure of his
work. His contract was extended for another three (3) months. On the second week of June 2002, he felt
an excruciating pain in his left testicle. After being examined by a doctor at the port of France, he was
diagnosed with hernia. On June 26, 2002, he was repatriated due to his ailment.
Upon petitioners return to the Philippines, he was examined by Dr. Alegre, the company physician, who
prescribed certain medication. On July 24, 2002, Dr. Alegre declared that he was fit to resume work.
When he reported to MRM Philippines, Inc. hoping to be re-hired for another contract, he was told that
there was no vacancy for him.
On September 17, 2003, he consulted Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo, an internist-cardiologist of Philippine Heart
Center. On March 3, 2004, after a thorough medical examination and evaluation, he was diagnosed with
EPIDIDYMITIS, LEFT; UPPER RESPIRATORY TRACT INFACTION WITH INPEDIMENT GRADE XIV.
Respondents, on the other hand, countered that since petitioners ailment, hernia, is not work-related,
he is not entitled to disability benefit and related claims. In fact, he was declared fit to resume work on
July 23, 2002 by the company-designated physician. Respondents likewise argued that his ailment is not
to be considered a permanent disability as this is easily correctable by simple surgery. More importantly,
petitioner signed a Quitclaim and Release which was notarized.
On March 31, 2005, Labor Arbiter Donato G. Quinto, Jr. rendered its decision[5] dismissing the complaint
for utter lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter explained that petitioner was fit to resume work as a seafarer as
of July 23, 2002 as his hernia was already cured or non-existent. In fact, petitioner was ready to resume
work. Unfortunately, he was not accommodated due to lack of vacancy. The fact that he was not re-hired
by respondent did not mean that he was suffering from disability.
On May 5, 2005, complainant-appellant (petitioner) filed a memorandum of appeal with the NLRC Third
Division.
On September 30, 2005, the NLRC Third Division issued a resolution[6] as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed decision dated March 31, 2005
is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[7]
On December 20, 2005, the motion for reconsideration was dismissed for lack of merit. On January 27,
2006, the NLRC resolution became final and executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of
Judgments.
On March 2, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
with the Court of Appeals (CA). However, on June 7, 2006, the CA dismissed the case due to formal
infirmities. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. On September 29, 2006, the CA resolution
became final and executory.
On May 9, 2007, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the June 7, 2006 and September 5, 2006 Resolutions of the CA,
which dismissed his petition for certiorari.
In Our Resolution[8] dated July 16, 2007, We denied the petition for the following reasons: (1) the
petition was filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days fixed in Section 2, Rule 45 in
relation to Section 5(a), Rule 56, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended; (2) failure to pay on time
docket and other fees and deposit for costs in violation of Section 3, Rule 45, in relation to Section 5(c) of
Rule 56; and (3) insufficient or defective verification under Section 4, Rule 7.
We likewise held that petitioner failed to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error in
the challenged resolutions as to
warrant the exercise of this Courts discretionary appellate jurisdiction. He was not able to convince this
Court why the actions of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA, which have passed upon the same
issue, should be reversed. Consequently, on October 9, 2007, an Entry of Judgment was issued.
On May 6, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition for relief from judgment interposing the following
grounds:
I. The Honorable Labor Arbiter committed a GROSS MISTAKE when he based his decision on the fit to
work certification issued by the company-designated physician and on the Quitclaim and Release
executed by the complainant;
II. The Honorable Labor Arbiter further committed a GROSS MISTAKE when he adopted the irrelevant
jurisprudence cited by the respondents and by adopting it in his decision;
III. The Honorable NLRC Third Division also committed a GROSS MISTAKE when it affirms the ERRONEOUS
decision of the Honorable Labor Arbiter;
IV. The factual findings of the Honorable Labor Arbiter, and the Honorable NLRC Third Division, are not
based on substantial evidence and that their decisions are contrary to the applicable law and
jurisprudence; and
V. The collaborating counsel of the petitioner committed a GROSS MISTAKE in filing defective pleadings
to the prejudice of the herein petitioner.[9]
The threshold issue before Us is Can petitioner avail of a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure from Our resolution denying his petition for review?
We answer in the negative. A petition for relief from judgment is not an available remedy in the Supreme
Court.
First, although Section 1 of Rule 38 states that when a judgment or final order is entered through fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, a party in any court may file a petition for relief from
judgment, this rule must be interpreted in harmony with Rule 56, which enumerates the original cases
cognizable by the Supreme Court, thus:
Section 1. Original cases cognizable. Only petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus, disciplinary proceedings against members of the judiciary and attorneys, and cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls may be filed originally in the Supreme Court.
A petition for relief from judgment is not included in the list of Rule 56 cases originally cognizable by this
Court.
In Dela Cruz v. Andres,[10] We reiterated Our pronouncement in Mesina v. Meer,[11] that a petition for
relief from judgment is not an available remedy in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. The
Court explained that under the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition for relief must be filed
within sixty (60) days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other proceeding to be set
aside and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting petitioners good and substantial cause of action or
defense, as the case may be. Most importantly, it should be filed with the same court which rendered
the decision, viz.:
Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. When a judgment or final order
is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case
praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.[12] (Underscoring supplied)
Second, while Rule 38 uses the phrase any court, it refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional
Trial Courts.
As revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the previous rule as it now allows the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Court which decided the case or issued the order to hear the petition for relief. Under the
old rule, a petition for relief from the judgment or final order of Municipal Trial Courts should be filed
with the Regional Trial Court, viz.:
Section 1. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment of inferior court. When a judgment
is rendered by an inferior court on a case, and a party thereto by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, has been unjustly deprived of a hearing therein, or has been prevented from taking an
appeal, he may file a petition in the Court of First Instance of the province in which the original judgment
was rendered, praying that such judgment be set aside and the case tried upon its merits.
Section 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from the judgment or other proceeding thereof.
When a judgment order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken against a party in a Court of First
Instance through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court
and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
The procedural change in Rule 38 is in line with Rule 5, prescribing uniform procedure for Municipal and
Regional Trial Courts[13] and designation of Municipal/Metropolitan Trial Courts as courts of record.[14]
Third, the procedure in the CA and the Supreme Court are governed by separate provisions of the Rules
of Court.[15] It may, from time to time, be supplemented by additional rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court through resolutions or circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised
Internal Rules of the CA[16] allows the remedy of petition for relief in the CA.
There is no provision in the Rules of Court making the petition for relief applicable in the CA or this
Court. The procedure in the CA from Rules 44 to 55, with the exception of Rule 45 which pertains to the
Supreme Court, identifies the remedies available before said Court such as annulment of judgments or
final orders or resolutions (Rule 47), motion for reconsideration (Rule 52), and new trial (Rule 53).
Nowhere is a petition for relief under Rule 38 mentioned.
If a petition for relief from judgment is not among the remedies available in the CA, with more reason
that this remedy cannot be availed of in the Supreme Court. This Court entertains only questions of law.
A petition for relief raises questions of facts on fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, which
are beyond the concerns of this Court.
Nevertheless, even if We delve into the merits of the petition, the same must still be dismissed. The late
filing of the petition for review does not amount to excusable negligence. Petitioners lack of devotion in
discharging his duty, without demonstrating fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, cannot be
a basis for judicial relief. For a claim of counsels gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear
abandonment of the clients cause must be shown.
The relief afforded by Rule 38 will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of
the judgment when the loss of the remedy of law was due to his own negligence, or mistaken mode of
procedure for that matter; otherwise the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of
appeal which has already been lost, either because of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake of
procedure by counsel.
In exceptional cases, when the mistake of counsel is so palpable that it amounts to gross negligence, this
Court affords a party a second opportunity to vindicate his right. But this opportunity is unavailing in the
instant case, especially since petitioner has squandered the various opportunities available to him at the
different stages of this case. Public interest demands an end to every litigation and a belated effort to
reopen a case that has already attained finality will serve no purpose other than to delay the
administration of justice.
Finally, it is a settled rule that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the
effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken
mode of procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal
which has already been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to mistaken mode of
procedure by counsel.[17]
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Dela Cruz v. Andres, G.R. No. 161864, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA 585.
[13] Section 1. Uniform procedure. The procedure in the Municipal Trial Courts shall be the same as in
the Regional Trial Court, except (a) where a particular provision expressly or impliedly applies only to
either of said courts, or (b) in civil cases governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
[14] See Republic Act No. 7691 (1994); Regalado, F.D., Remedial Law Compendium (2002), Vol. 1, p. 400.
[16] As amended by Supreme Court Resolutions dated October 20, 1988, November 3, 1988, February
27, 1991, April 1, 1992, November 24, 1992, and June 14, 1993.
[17] Espinosa v. Yatco, G.R. No. L-16435, January 31, 1963, 7 SCRA 78.
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 80610,
which reversed the decision and resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), and reinstated the Labor Arbiters decision, as well as the CA
Resolution[2]denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
Virgilio boarded ship on May 20, 1999.[5] He became ill while on board.
On March 3, 2000, the Marine Medical Unit at New
Orleans, Louisiana, USA diagnosed him to be suffering from umbilical hernia. The
attending physician advised Virgilio to avoid tasks involving heavy lifting and to
undergo surgical repair.[6] He was later repatriated.
Almost eight (8) months later, on February 13, 2001, Virgilio was brought to the
Philippine General Hospital (PGH). His HBT ultrasonography (of the liver and
gallbladder) revealed massive ascites, liver cirrhosis, thickening of the gallbladder
wall (probably reactive) and splenomegaly, while his chest ultrasonography
revealed left massive pleural effusion.[18] On electrocardiogram, he was discovered
to have sinus tachycardia and left axis deviation.[19] His roentgenological report
further revealed an atherosclerotic aorta which confirmed the earlier finding of
pleural effusion.[20] On March 13, 2001, he was confined at the PGH for acidosis
secondary to liver cirrhosis probably secondary to alcoholic liver disease;
hepatocellular carcinoma and left pleural effusion, probably malignant.[21] Virgilio
died on March 18, 2001. The immediate cause of death was cardiopulmonary
arrest 2 metabolic acidosis r/o fatal arrhythmia, with acute renal failure as the
antecedent cause, and hepatocellular carcinoma as the underlying cause.[22]
On June 5, 2001, Emerlinda, Virgilios wife,[23] and Rene, their son[24] (respondents),
filed a complaint[25] against ZSIL and PSMC for payment of death compensation,
illness allowance, reimbursement of medical expenses, damages and attorneys fees
before the Labor Arbitration Branch of the
NLRC. The case was docketed as NLRC-NCR-OFW- Case No. (M)-01-06-1049-
00.
Petitioners countered that respondents were not entitled to death benefits because
Virgilio died long after his employment had been terminated. This was in
accordance with Section 18 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract.
Petitioners argued that they were not insurers of the lives of seamen and they were
only liable for death benefits for the results of illnesses contracted during
employment. They pointed out that respondents were already given residual
benefits from Virgilios repatriation due to illness, and as such, the former were
already released from any obligation to the heirs of the deceased. They likewise
averred that death benefits are awarded only if the seaman dies of the same illness
for which he was repatriated. In this case, he was repatriated due to umbilical
hernia which is not a deadly illness; in fact, Virgilios condition had already been
corrected by umbilical herniorrhapy from which he recuperated fully. Furthermore,
he was later on declared fit to work. Petitioners stressed that the deceased was in
good health when he was repatriated. Finally, they claim that they are not liable for
damages because they acted in good faith. They rejected the claims of the
respondents on the honest belief that they were not entitled thereto under the
POEA Standard Employment Contract.
SO ORDERED.[27]
The Labor Arbiter further held that a claim arising from employer-employee
relationship does not necessarily infer that the relationship should exist at the time
the claim is presented. Although the employment may have ceased, the origin of
the claim is not altered. According to the Labor Arbiter, the fact that Virgilios
employment had already been terminated when the complaint was filed is of no
consequence. He cited this Courts rulings in Martin v. Court of Appeals,
[28]
and Star Security & Detective Investigation Agency v. Secretary of Labor.[29]
Petitioners appealed the decision to the NLRC, wherein they averred that:
SECOND, the Honorable Arbiter adopted a version of the facts that is at best
speculative and baseless, and at worse, contrary to the evidence presented; and
THIRD, the deceased seaman died long after his employment of a disease
which did not manifest during such employment, and which is a known fatal and
fast acting illness, such that the respondents cannot be held liable for death
benefits and damages including attorneys fees arising therefrom.[30]
On May 26, 2003, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and
dismissed the complaint.[31] According to the NLRC, death and burial benefits
could not be awarded to respondents. Under the POEA Standard Employment
Contract, these benefits are given if the seafarer died during the term of his
contract. Since the seafarer passed away one year after his repatriation (i.e., his
contract was already terminated), respondents were not entitled to death benefits.
The NLRC, likewise, ruled that respondents were not entitled to sickness
allowance because they did not pray for such relief in their position paper. In fact,
petitioners attached to their appeal memorandum evidence that sickness allowance
had been paid to respondents. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED, and the
instant case DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[32]
On October 26, 2004, the appellate court rendered judgment granting the
petition.[38] It declared that the cause of Virgilios death was traceable to his
cirrhosis, which he presumably acquired while he was in petitioners
employ. Virgilio worked in the engine room where he was necessarily exposed to
chemicals. Also, his strenuous work as an oiler might have weakened his state of
health; his having skipped meals to attend to his work might have rendered him
susceptible to malnutrition. It stressed that hepatocellular carcinoma may arise as a
complication of cirrhosis. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the assailed decision and
resolution of the NLRC must be, as they hereby are, REVERSED, and the June
21, 2002 judgment of Labor Arbiter Salimathar V. Nambi REINSTATED in toto.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.[39]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration [40] which the appellate court
denied in its January 6, 2005 Resolution.[41]
Petitioners thus filed the instant petition assailing the ruling of the appellate
court on the following grounds:
I. The appellate court disregarded the terms and conditions of the POEA Standard
Employment Contract when it rendered petitioners liable for the seamans death
which occurred after (sic) long after the POEA Contract had been terminated.
II. The appellate court erred in ruling that deceased Sta. Ritas illness which
caused his death allegedly occurred during his employment and/or the risk of
contracting the disease was increased or aggravated by his employment since
there was no evidence in this respect.
III. The appellate court erred in ruling for the respondents despite clear proof that
the cause of death was entirely different from the illness with which the deceased
was repatriated.[42]
The threshold issue is whether or not respondents are entitled to death and sickness
benefits from petitioners on account of Virgilios death on March 18, 2001.
Petitioners aver that, for respondents to be entitled to the death benefits in the
POEA Standard Employment Contract, the death of the seafarer must occur during
the term of the contract. When the seafarer dies after the termination of his
employment but was suffering from an injury or illness during the term of his
contract, the heirs would be entitled only to the compensation and benefits under
Section 20(B) of the Contract. The cause of Virgilios death which was
cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to metabolic acidosis, acute renal failure and
hepatocellular carcinoma, had no connection with umbilical hernia for which he
was repatriated in March 2000. Petitioners stress that the cause of Virgilios death
was entirely different from the illness for which he was repatriated. His death
further occurred long after the termination of his contract due to repatriation, after
his successful operation and after he had been declared fit to resume his duties.
Moreover, the illnesses that caused his demise were in no way related to hernia,
nor were these aggravated by his work as an oiler. Even his cirrhosis was not
caused by the nature of his work, as his own doctor opined that this was due to
alcoholic liver disease caused by excessive alcohol intake which developed over a
long period of time. The mere fact that Virgilio was found fit to work during his
pre-employment medical examination does not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that the illness that caused his death was acquired during the course of
employment. There is, likewise, no evidence on record to prove that Virgilio was
exposed to chemicals or that he skipped meals while working. Since there was no
basis for the CA to conclude a work-connection or work-aggravation, petitioners
should not be held liable for death and funeral benefits. Also, they should not be
made to pay sickness allowance, as this was already given to Virgilio, nor damages
and attorneys fees, for petitioners faithfully complied with their obligation when
the deceased became ill while on board. No premium should further be placed on
the right to litigate.
In their comment on the petition, respondents averred that the issues raised by
petitioners are factual, which are improper in a petition for review
on certiorari. Respondents reiterated that even if Virgilio died after his
employment with respondents had already been terminated, petitioners are
nevertheless liable for the death benefits. This is in accordance with the ruling of
this Court in Wallem Maritime Services, Inc., et al. v. National Labor Relations
Commission.[43] Respondents, likewise, maintained that the decision of the CA is in
accord with law and the evidence on record.
Respondents contend that there is a causal relationship between Virgilios
death and his employment with petitioners. In several cases decided by the court,
death compensation was awarded despite the fact that the death of the seaman
occurred after the expiration of his employment contract. While Virgilio was
indeed repatriated due to hernia, he was also diagnosed to be ill of liver cirrhosis.
The existence of such a disease during the term of his contract entitles respondents
to compensation for death benefits. They insisted that Virgilios exposure to
chemicals and toxins as an oiler contributed to the development or aggravation of
his illness. Respondents claim that in compensation proceedings, the ultimate
degree of certainty is not required to establish the claim. It is enough that the
theory in which the claimants anchor their claim is probable, considering the
circumstances surrounding the case. Respondents are not duty bound to prove
work-connection since the 1996 POEA Standard Employment Contract does not
require that the illness must be work-related to be compensable. The unjustified
refusal of petitioners to pay their claim amounted to bad faith and malice, thus,
they are liable for damages and attorneys fees.
Section 20(A)(1) and (4) (A, B and C) of the POEA Standard Employment
Contract provides:
1. In case of death of the seafarer during the term of his contract, the employer
shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of
Fifty Thousand US dollars (US$50,000) and an additional amount of Seven
Thousand US dollars (US$7,000) to each child under the age of twenty-one (21)
but not exceeding four (4) children, at the exchange rate prevailing during the
time of payment.
xxxx
4. The other liabilities of the employer when the seafarer dies as a result of injury
or illness during the term of employment are as follows:
b. The employer shall transport the remains and personal effects of the
seafarer to the Philippines at employers expense except if the death
occurred in a port where local government laws or regulations do not
permit the transport of such remains. In case death occurs at sea, the
disposition of the remains shall be handled or dealt with in accordance
with the masters best judgment. In all cases, the employer/master shall
communicate with the manning agency to advice for disposition of
seafarers remains.
c. The employer shall pay the beneficiaries of the seafarer the Philippine
currency equivalent to the amount of One Thousand US dollars
(US$1,000) for burial expenses at the exchange rate prevailing during the
time of payment.
In the present case, Virgilio was repatriated for medical reasons; he arrived
in the Philippines on March 8, 2000 for surgical repair after he was diagnosed with
umbilical hernia. Virgilios employment was thus terminated upon his repatriation
on March 8, 2000. Consequently, when he died on March 18, 2001, his
employment with petitioners had long been terminated. Hence, respondents are not
entitled to receive death benefits under the Contract from petitioners.[47]
Neither are petitioners liable for sickness allowance since it appears from the
records that these had already been paid to respondents in June and September
2000, and January 2001.[48]
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I FI CAT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao, with Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin and Vicente S.E.
Veloso, concurring; rollo, pp. 41-53.
[2]
Rollo, p. 55.
[3]
Records, p. 22.
[4]
Id.
[5]
Id. at 10.
[6]
Id. at 24.
[7]
Id. at 26.
[8]
Id. at 44.
[9]
Id. at 46.
[10]
Id. at 44.
[11]
Id. at 46.
[12]
Id. at 48.
[13]
Id. at 45.
[14]
Id. at 44.
[15]
Id. at 31.
[16]
Id.
[17]
Id. at 100-102.
[18]
Id. at 51.
[19]
Id. at 49.
[20]
Id. at 50.
[21]
Id. at 55.
[22]
Id. at 56.
[23]
Id. at 57.
[24]
Id. at 59.
[25]
Id. at 2.
[26]
Id. at 68-77.
[27]
Id. at 76-77.
[28]
G.R. No. 82248, January 30, 1992, 205 SCRA 591.
[29]
G.R. No. 82607, July 12, 1990, 187 SCRA 358.
[30]
CA rollo, p. 95.
[31]
Id. at 126-131.
[32]
Id. at 130.
[33]
Records, pp. 186-197.
[34]
Id. at 198-199.
[35]
CA rollo, pp. 2-13.
[36]
Id. at 7.
[37]
372 Phil. 9, 19 (1999).
[38]
CA rollo, pp. 199-211.
[39]
Id. at 210-211.
[40]
Id. at 212-222.
[41]
Id. at 230.
[42]
Rollo, p. 20.
[43]
376 Phil. 738, 747 (1999).
[44]
Gau Sheng Phils., Inc. v. Joaquin, G.R. No. 144665, September 8, 2004, 437 SCRA 608, 616.
[45]
NFD International Manning Agents v. National Labor Relations Commission, 348 Phil. 264, 273 (1998).
[46]
Hermogenes v. Osco Shipping Services, Inc., G.R. No. 141505, August 28, 2005, 467 SCRA 301, 307.
[47]
Hermogenes v. Osco Shipping Lines, Inc., supra.
[48]
Rollo, pp. 100-102.
01 AUG 2004
and disabilities
How can one reduce medical repatriation and disability? So far as loss prevention is concerned,
the first step may be to identify the major illnesses and injuries. Back injuries appear to be
topping the list.
A five-year study of the causes of medical repatriation among Filipino seamen has recently been
concluded by Dr Nicomedes Cruz, a Manila-based surgeon.1 We thank Dr Cruz for allowing
Gard News to publish the findings of his study.2
Illnesses
Out of the 5,315 seafarers studied, 64 per cent were repatriated due to illnesses, and 36 per cent
due to injuries. Not surprisingly, most of the seafarers were found fit to work again, a percentage
of approximately 87 per cent. The rest, 13 per cent, were declared permanently disabled.
The top 10 illnesses causing repatriation were:
1. Appendicitis
2. Urinary tract stones
3. Hypertension
4. Gastritis
5. Inguinal hernia
6. Cardiovascular disease
7. Gall stones
8. Haemorrhoids
9. Diabetes mellitus
10. Cerebrovascular disease
Recommendations for pre-employment checks
Dr Cruz believes that a significant number of the primary causes of repatriation due to illness
should be able to be discovered during the pre-employment medical examination (PEME).3 That
goes for illnesses like hernia, hypertension, subcutaneous tumour and haemorrhoids.
Dr Cruz recommends including a two-hour post blood sugar test to be done to detect diabetes
mellitus, noting that this illness is ranked number nine in the total number of repatriations due to
illness and number seven in the leading causes of disability.
Injuries
When it comes to injuries, 64 per cent of the total number of injuries were soft tissue or ligament
injuries, disc herniation being on top of the list. Lumbosacral strain and lacerated wound were in
second and third place.
Looking at fractures, which account for 36 per cent of all injuries, the top five fracture sites are
clear:
the hand is most exposed, the next being the forearm, foot, leg, and ribs, consisting of
approximately 75 per cent of all fracture cases in this study.
Disabilities
You will recall that 13 per cent were declared disabled. Of this group, approximately 56 per cent
were declared to be partially permanently disabled, 44 per cent being found totally permanently
disabled.
The top ten reasons for disability are:
1. Disc herniation
2. Fracture
3. Cardiovascular disease
4. Traumatic amputation
5. Cerebrovascular disease
6. Malignancy
7. Diabetes mellitus
8. Burns
9. Ligament tear
10. Hearing loss
More details
The full text of the study can be found at www.gard.no under “News/News from
Correspondents/Repatriation of Filipino seafarers”.
1 The article “A statistical study of the medical causes for repatriation among Filipino seamen” in
issue No. 161 of Gard News reproduced a compilation put together by Dr Cruz of a two-year
study of illness and injury in the seamen he has treated.
2 See also the article “A crew claims statistical analysis” elsewhere in this issue of Gard News.
3 See article “Philippines – Pre-employment medical examination for seafarers” in Gard News
issue No. 165.
Any comments to this article can be e-mailed to the Gard News Editor.