LUISA MARCOS* v. HEIRS OF LATE DR.

ANDRES NAVARRO
GR No. 198240, Jul 03, 2013

FACTS:
Sps. Andres, Sr. & Concepcion Navarro died and left several parcels of land
including the subject lot located in Cayabon, Milagros, Masbate.

The spouses were survived by daughters Luisa and Lydia, and the heirs of their only
son Andres, Jr. Sisters discovered the heirs claim exclusive ownership of the subject
lot which they based on an Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property where Sr. donated
to Andres, Jr.

Believing it is forgery, the sisters requested a handwriting examination. Handwriting

expert PO2 Mary Grace Alvarez found Andres, Sr.'s signature on the affidavit and
the submitted standard signatures of Andres, Sr. were not written by one and the
same person. Sisters sued for annulment of the deed before the RTC.

After the pre-trial, the heirs moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness. They
argued that presenting PO2 Alvarez as a witness will violate their constitutional right
to due process since no notice was given to them before the examination was
conducted.

RTC disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a witness and ruled that her supposed testimony
would be hearsay as she has no personal knowledge of the alleged handwriting of
Andres, Sr. Also, there is no need for PO2 Alvarez to be presented, if she is to be
presented as an expert witness, because her testimony is not yet needed.

Sisters filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, and likewise denied their MR.
The CA refused to take judicial notice of the decision of another Division which
reinstated Civil Case No. 5215. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
W/N CA erred in not ruling that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying PO2 Alvarez as a witness.

HELD:
SC held in favor of Luisa. We agree that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in disqualifying PO2 Alvarez as a witness. A witness must only possess all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in the Rules of
Court. Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence provides:

SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in the next succeeding
section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their
perception to others, may be witnesses.

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a

crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.
Specific rules of witness disqualification are provided under Sections 21 to 24, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence. Section 21 disqualifies a witness by reason of mental
incapacity or immaturity. Section 22 disqualifies a witness by reason of
marriage. Section 23 disqualifies a witness by reason of death or insanity of the
adverse party. Section 24 disqualifies a witness by reason of privileged
communication.

The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the

operation of causes of disability other than those mentioned in the
Rules. The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception not
embodied therein.

SC DENY heirs' motion to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness. She has the
qualifications of witness and possess none of the disqualifications under the
Rules. The Rules allow the opinion of an expert witness to be received as evidence.

DISQUALIFICATION: MENTAL INCAPACITY OR IMMATURITY

PEOPLE vs. GOLIMLIM

FACTS:
Private complainant Evelyn Canchela is a mental retardate. When her mother, Amparo
Hachero left for Singapore to work as a DH, she entrusted Evelyn to the care and custody of
her (Amparo) sister Jovita Guban and her husband Salvador Golimlim, in Sorsogon.

Sometime in 1996, Jovita left home to meet someone, leaving Evelyn and Golimlim. Taking
advantage of the situation, Golimlim instructed Evelyn to sleep and soon after she laid
down, he kissed her and took off her clothes. As he poked at her an object which to Evelyn
felt like a knife, he proceeded to insert his penis into her vagina. His lust satisfied, appellant
fell asleep. When Jovita arrived, Evelyn told her about what appellant did to her. Jovita,
however, did not believe her and in fact she scolded her.

Evelyn’s half-sister, Lorna, received a letter from their mother Amparo instructing her to
fetch Evelyn from Sorsogon and allow her to stay in QC. Lorna fetched Evelyn and brought
her home with her in Manila. A week after she brought Evelyn to stay with her, Lorna
suspected that her sister was pregnant as she noticed her growing belly. Upon doctor’s
check-up and ultrasound examination, it was revealed that Evelyn was indeed pregnant.

Lorna thus asked her sister how she became pregnant, to which Evelyn replied that
Golimlim had sex with her while holding a knife. The RTC of Sorsogon convicted Golimlim
for the crime of rape and on appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Evelyn is disqualified as a witness because she is feebleminded.
HELD:
No. A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from being a
witness, her mental condition not being a vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally
accepted that intellectual weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a valid
objection to the competency of a witness so long as the latter can still give a fairly
intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter testified to.

In the present case, no cogent reason can be appreciated to warrant a departure from the
findings of the trial court with respect to the assessment of Evelyn‘s testimony. It is settled
that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate constitutes statutory rape
which does not require proof that the accused used force or intimidation in having carnal
knowledge of the victim for conviction.

The fact of Evelyn‘s mental retardation was not, however, alleged in the Information and,
therefore, cannot be the basis for conviction. Such notwithstanding, that force and
intimidation attended the commission of the crime, the mode of commission alleged in the
Information, was adequately proven. It bears stating herein that the mental faculties of a
retardate being different from those of a normal person, the degree of force needed to
overwhelm him or her is less. Hence, a quantum of force which may not suffice when the
victim is a normal person may be more than enough when employed against an imbecile.

ALVAREZ vs. RAMIREZ

GR No.143439 October 14, 2005

FACTS:
Respondent Susan Ramirez was the complaining witness in a criminal case or arson pending
before the RTC. The accused was petitioner Maximo Alvarez, stranged husband of
Esperanza Alvarez, sister of respondent. On June 21, 1999, Esperanza Alvarez was called to
the witness stand as the first witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner filed a
motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court on marital disqualification.
Respondent filed an opposition to the motion. Pending resolution of the motion, the trial
court directed the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of the other witnesses. On
September 2, 1999, the trial court issued the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza
Alvarez from further testifying and deleting her testimony from the records. The
prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in the other assailed Order
dated October 19, 1999. This prompted respondent to file with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order. On May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and setting
aside the assailed Orders issued by the trial court. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not Esperanza can testify over the objection of her estranged husband
on the ground of marital privilege.
HELD: Yes, Esperanza may testify over the objection of her husband. The disqualification of
a witness by reason of marriage under Sec. 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court has
its exceptions as where the marital relations are so strained that there is no more harmony
to be preserved. The acts of the petitioner stamp out all major aspects of marital life. On
the other hand, the State has an interest in punishing the guilty and exonerating the
innocent, and must have the right to offer the testimony of Esperanza over the objection of
her husband.

PEOPLE VS CASTAÑEDA

With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim of the
crime and the person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a third
person but the wife herself.

FACTS:

Victoria Manaloto charged her husband, private respondent Benjamin Manaloto with
Falsification of Public Document alleging that the latter feloniously counterfeited and
forged her signature in a deed of sale (involved the sale of a house and lot belonging to the
conjugal partnership) executed by him in favor of PoncianoLacsmana, to make it appear
that she gave her marital consent to the said sale when in fact she did not.

At the trial, the prosecution called the complaint-wife to the witness stand but the
defense moved to disqualify her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules Of Court which provides:

SEC. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship — The following

persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly or
indirectly as herein enumerated.

xxxxxxxxx

(b) A husband can not be examined for or at his wife without her consent;
nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent, except in a civil
case by one against the other or in a criminal case for a crime committed by
one against the other.

Nonetheless, the prosecution opposed said motion to disqualify on the ground that
the case falls under the exception to the rule, contending that it is a "criminal case for a
crime committed by one against the other." Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent
Judge granted the motion, disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or against her
husband. A motion for reconsideration was filed but it was denied.Hence, this petition for
certiorari file by the office of the Provincial Fiscal, on behalf of the People of the Philippines,
seeking set aside the order of the respondent Judge.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public Document filed against private
respondent Benjamin F. Manaloto may be considered as a criminal case for a crime
committed by a husband against his wife and, therefore, an exception to the rule on marital
disqualification.

RULING:
YES. The Court held that the case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule, as a
criminal case for a crime committed by the accused-husband against the witness-wife.
 The act complained of as constituting the crime of Falsification of Public Document is the
forgery by the accused of his wife's signature in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear
therein that said wife consented to the sale of a house and lot belonging to their
conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth she did not. It must be noted that had the
sale of the said house and lot, and the signing of the wife's name by her husband in the
deed of sale, been made with the consent of the wife, no crime could have been
charged against said husband.Clearly, therefore, it is the husband's breach of his wife's
confidence which gave rise to the offense charged. And it is this same breach of trust
which prompted the wife to make the necessary complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly, filed the aforesaid criminal case with the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga. To rule, therefore, that such criminal case is not one for a
crime committed by one spouse against the other is to advance a conclusion which
completely disregards the factual antecedents of the instant case.
 The Court gave a criterion that was cited in Cargill v. State:

The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the is too narrow; and
the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic within the
exception is too broad. The better rule is that, WHEN AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY
ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT
COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION to the statute that one shall not be a witness
against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one
against the other.

 With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim of
the crime and the person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsification is
not a third person but the wife herself. And it is undeniable that the act comp of had
the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. This is apparent not only
in the act Of the wife in personally lodging her complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts in connection with the instant petition,
 which seeks to set aside the order disqualified her from testifying against her husband.
Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife underscore the fact that the
martial and domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become so
strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved said nor peace and tranquility
which may be disturbed. 3. Finally, overriding considerations of public policy demand
that the wife should not be disqualified from testifying against her husband in the
instant case.
 Too espouse the contrary view would spawn the dangerous precedent of a husband
committing as many falsifications against his wife as he could conjure, seeking shelter in
the anti-marital privilege as a license to injure and prejudice her in secret — all with
unabashed and complete impunity.

ENRIQUE RAZON v. IAC and VICENTE CHUIDIAN

[Administrator of Juan Chuidian's estate] +

CHUIDIAN v. IAC, RAZON, and E. RAZON, INC.

1992 / Gutierrez, Jr. / Relative incompetencies > Dead Man's Statute

The main issue in these consolidated petitions is the ownership of 1,500 shares of stock in
E. Razon, Inc. covered by Stock Certificate No. 003 issued on April 23, 1966 and registered
under the name of Juan Chuidian.

FACTS

1962 - Enrique Razon organized E. Razon, Inc. (Purpose: bidding for arrastre services in
South Harbor, MLA)

1966 - Stock Certificate No. 003 for 1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon was issued in Juan
Chuidian's name.

Juan and Vicente Chuidian were elected as E. Razon's, Inc. directors and they were
compensated as such.

From 1966 to 1971, Enrique Razon had not questioned Juan Chuidian's ownership of the
shares, nor did Enrique bring any action to have the certificate of stock over the shares
cancelled.

On the possession of the certificate of stock

Vicente Chuidian's allegation:

The certificate of stock was in the possession of Enrique Razon, who refused to deliver the
shares to Vicente Chuidian, until the same was surrendered by Enrique Razon and
deposited in a Philippine Bank of Commerce safety box.

IMPORTANT: THIS WAS THE ORAL TESTIMONY OF ENRIQUE RAZON WHICH WAS EXCLUDED
BY IAC

The stock certificate was personally delivered by Juan Chuidian to the corporate secretary
of Atty. De Leon [an associate of the Chuidian Law Office).

The delivery was made because it was Enrique who paid for all the subscription on the
shares.

The agreement was that Enrique Razon was the owner of the shares and he would have
possession thereof until such time that he was paid therefor by the other nominal
incorporators or stockholders.

Since then, Enrique Razon was in possession of the stock certificate. By agreement of the
parties, it was delivered for deposit with the bank under the joint custody of the parties.

Vicente Chuidian filed a complaint against Razon, E. Razon, Inc., et al. These were included
in his prayer:

An order to have the defendants deliver stock certificate representing Juan Chuidian's share
in E. Razon's Inc.

Issuance of an order restraining the defendants from disposing of said shares

Issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against defendants’ properties having

possession of the shares. Receivership of the properties of E. Razon's Inc.

The defendants, in their answer alleged the following:

All shares of stock in the name of stockholders of record were fully paid by Razon

Said shares are subject to the agreement between the defendants and incorporators

The shares were actually owned by and remained in the possession of Razon

Neither Juan nor his son Vicente paid any amount for the shares in question
The Razons allege that after organizing the corporation, Enrique Razon distributed shares
previously placed in the names of the withdrawing nominal incorporators to some friends,
including Juan Chuidian.

CFI

- Enrique Razon owns the shares of stock.

IAC - Juan Chuidian (deceased father of Vicente Chuidian) owns the shares of stock.

The dead man's statute rule is applicable in this case

IAC excluded Enrique Razon's testimony (see above)

IAC rulings on the parties' respective MRs

Razon's MR (asking for reversal of IAC decision) DENIED

Chuidian's MR (asking for delivery of all cash and stock dividends and all the pre-emptive
rights accruing to the 1,500 shares of stock) DENIED.

Razon says that contrary to IAC's ruling, the dead man's statute is NOT applicable.

Chuidian did not object to his oral testimony regarding the oral agreement between him
and Juan Chuidian that the ownership of the shares of stock was actually vested in Razon,
unless Juan opted to pay the same

Razon was subjected to a rigid cross examination regarding such testimony

ISSUES & HOLDING

WON Razon's testimony is within the prohibition of the dead man's statute.

NO. The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon
claims against the estate.

[The case was filed by the administrator Vicente Chuidian to recover the shares of stock.]

Therefore, Razon's testimony is ADMISSIBLE.

WON Razon's oral testimony as regards the true nature of his agreement with the late Juan
Chuidian is sufficient to prove his ownership over the said 1,500 shares of stock.

NO. Who is the owner of the shares of stock? Juan Chuidian.

He gets the cash and stock dividends plus pre-emptive rights (as prayed for in the MR at
IAC).

G.R. No. 143340 August 15, 2001

LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA vs. LAMBERTO T. CHUA

FACTS

Lamberto Chua alleged that in 1977, he verbally entered into a partnership with
Jacinto in the distribution of Shellane LPG. For business convenience, Lamberto and Jacinto
allegedly agreed to register the business name of their partnership, SHELLITE GAS
APPLIANCE CENTER, under the name of Jacinto as a sole proprietorship. Both Lamberto
and Jacinto contributed P100,000.00 to the partnership, with the intention that the profits
would be equally divided between them

The partnership allegedly had Jacinto as manager, assisted by Josephine Sy, sister-in-law of
Lamberto. Upon Jacinto’s death in the later part of 1989, his daughter, Lilibeth took over
the operations of Shellite without Lamberto’s consent. Despite Lamberto’s repeated
demands for accounting, she failed to comply.

On June 22m 1992, Lamberto filed a complaint against Lilibeth with the RTC. RTC decided
in favor of Lamberto. Lilibeth questions the correctness of the finding that a partnership
existed between Lamberto and Jacinto. In the absence of any written document to show
such partnership between Lamberto and Jacinto, Lilibeth argues that these courts were
proscribed from hearing the testimonies of Lamberto and his witness, Josephine, to prove
the alleged partnership three (3) years after Jacinto’s death.

To support the argument, Lilibeth invokes the “DEAD MAN’S STATUTE OR SURVIVORSHIP
RULE” under Sec. 23, Rule 130. Lilibeth thus implores this Court to rule that the testimonies
of Lamberto and his alter ego, Josephine, should not have been admitted to prove certain
claims against a deceased person (Jacinto).

ISSUE

Whether or not the “DEAD MAN’S STATUTE” applies to this case so as to render
inadmissible Lamberto’s testimony and that if his witness, Josephine.

HELD

No. The “Dead Man’s Statute” provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is
precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party
is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own contradicted and unexplained
account of the transaction.

Lilibeth filed a compulsory counterclaim against Lamberto in their answer before the RTC,
and with the filing of their counterclaim, Lilibeth herself effectively removed this case from
the ambit of the “Dead Man’s Statute”. Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the
executor or administrator or representatives of the estate that sets up the counterclaim,
Lamberto, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the
counterclaim. Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, Lamberto is not disqualified
from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of the deceased, said action
not having been bought against but by the estate or representatives of the deceased.

The testimony of Josephine is not covered by the “Dead Man’s Statute” for the simple
reason that she is not “a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a
case is prosecuted”. Lamberto offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the
existence of the partnership between Lamberto and Jacinto. Lilibeth’s insistence that
Josephine is the alter ego of Lamberto does not make her an assignor because of the term
“assignor” of a party means “assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the
assignor of a right assigned before any cause of action has arisen”. Plainly then, Josephine
is merely a witness of Lamberto, latter being the plaintiff.

Lilibeth’s reliance alone on the “Dead Man’s Statue” to defeat Lamberto’s claim cannot
prevail over the factual findings that a partnership was established between Lamberto and
Jacinto. Based not only on the testimonial evidence, but the documentary evidence as well,
they considered the evidence for Lamberto as sufficient to prove the formation of a
partnership, albeit an informal one.

Testimonial Evidence (Disqualification: Death or Insanity – Dead Man’s Statute)

BORDALBA vs. CA

G.R. No. 112443 January 25, 2002

Petitioner: TeresitaBordalba
Respondents: CA
Heirs of Nicanor Jayme (Candida Flores, Emmanuel Jayme, Dina Jayme Dejoras,
Evelia Jayme, Gesila Jayme)
Heirs of Asuncion Jayme-Baclay(Angelo Jayme-Baclay, Carmen Jayme-Daclan,
EleonoraBaclay

FACTS:
Lot No. 1242 located in Barrio Looc, Mandaue City is part of a parcel of land originally
owned by the late spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme. In 1947, an
extra-judicial partition was executed and disposing the same parcel of land as follows:

1. 1/3 in favor of (a) their grandchild Nicanor Jayme, the deceased spouse of
respondent Candida Flores and the father of respondents Emmanuel, Dina, Evelia
and Geslia, all surnamed Jayme; and (b) their grandchild Asuncion Jayme-Baclay,
whose heirs are private respondents Angelo Baclay, EleonoraBaclay and Carmen
Jayme-Daclan;

2. 1/3 to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, mother of petitioner

TeresitaBordalba; and

3. 1/3 to an unidentified party.

In July 1964, Elena Jayme filed with the RTC an amended application for the registration of
the lot. Elena alleged that the lot sought to be registered was originally part of a land
owned by her late parents, Carmeno and Margarita; and that 1/3 of said land was
adjudicated to her in an extra-judicial partition. She further stated that a portion of the lot
for which title is applied for is occupied by Nicanor with her permission.

Nicanor and Asuncion filed their opposition contending that said application included the
1/3 portion inherited by them in the 1947 extra-judicial partition. The case was dismissed
for lack of interest of the parties. Subsequently, petitioner Bordalba filed with the Bureau of
Lands an application for the issuance of a Free Patent over the same lot and the same was
granted.

Upon learning of the issuance in favor of petitioner of the aforesaid patent and original
certificate of title, private respondents filed a complaint against petitioner and spouses
GenaroCabahug, Rita Capala (purchasers of portion of subject lot), and Rural Bank of
Mandaue (mortgagee of portion of subject lot).

Bordalba averred that Lot 1242 was acquired by her through purchase from her mother
who was in possession of the lot in the concept of an owner since 1947.

The RTC, finding that fraud was employed by petitioner, declared the patent and title void
and ordered its cancellation. However, Sps. Genaro and Rita Cabahug as well as the Rural
Bank of Mandaue were declared purchasers and mortgagee in good faith, respectively; thus
upheld as valid the sale. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Petitioner filed the instant petition for review, contending that the testimonies given by the
witnesses for private respondents which touched on matters occurring prior to the death of
her mother should not have been admitted by the trial court, as the same violated the dead
man’s statute.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of the dead man’s statute.

HELD:
No. The dead man’s statute does not operate to close the mouth of a witness as to any
matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other way than through personal dealings
with the deceased person, or communication made by the deceased to the witness.

Since the claim of the private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses in the
present case based, inter alia, on the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and other
documents and not on dealings and communications with the deceased, the questioned
testimonies were properly admitted by the trial court.

Likewise untenable is the claim of petitioner that private respondents are not legal heirs of
Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay. Other than their bare allegations to dispute
their heirship, no hard evidence was presented by them to substantiate their
allegations. Besides, in order that an heir may assert his right to the property of a deceased,
no previous judicial declaration of heirship is necessary.

The Decision of the CA was affirmed.

Chan vs. Chan

Facts:

Petitioner wife filed against respondent husband a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, with the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of
custody of their children to her, claiming that respondent husband failed to care for and
support his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to
incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs.

Respondent husband claims that it was the wife who failed in her duties. And that he initially
agreed to marriage counseling to save their marriage, but upon arriving at the hospital, two
men forcibly held him by both arms while another gave him an injection. He attached a
Philhealth Claim Form to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the
rehabilitation unit of a hospital. However, that same form carried a physician's handwritten
note that the husband suffered from methamphetamine and alcohol abuse.

Based on the physician's handwritten statement, petitioner wife requested for the issuance of
a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical City, for the production of the Husband's
medical records. The husband opposed, arguing that the medical records were covered by
physician-patient privilege. The request of the wife was denied by the trial court. CA
affirmed.

Issue:
Did the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a subpoena
duces tecum covering the husband's hospital records on the ground that these are covered by
the privileged character of the physician-patient communication?

Held:

No. The issuance of a subpoena duces tecum is premature. Petitioner wife made the request
before trial started. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering her husband's hospital records. It is when those
records are produced for examination at the trial, that the husband may opt to object, not just
to their admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure.

It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
covering the hospital records as a motion for production of documents, a discovery
procedure available to a litigant prior to trial. Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure provides: x x x
But the above right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the documents
to be disclosed are “not privileged.”

Petitioner wife, of course, claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not
privileged since it is the “testimonial” evidence of the physician that may be regarded as
privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician “cannot in a civil case, without
the consent of the patient, be examined” regarding their professional conversation. The
privilege, according to her, does not cover the hospital records, but only the examination of
the physician at the trial.

To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records—the
results of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the
advice or treatment he gave him— would be to allow access to evidence that is
inadmissible without the patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these information in
the patient’s records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to
testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s
prior consent. (Chan vs. Chan, G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013)

Lacurom vs. Jacoba

Facts:

The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R. Veneracion

("Veneracion") in a civil case for unlawful detainer against defendant Federico Barrientos
("Barrientos"). The Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan City rendered judgment in favor of
Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The case was raffled to
Branch 30 where Judge Lacurom was sitting as pairing judge.Judge Lacurom issued a
Resolution ("Resolution") reversing the earlier judgments rendered in favor of Veneracion.

Veneracion’s counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Request for Inhibition) dated
30 July 2001 which contains words and phrases: abhorrent nullity, legal
monstrosity, horrendous mistake, horrible error, boner, and an insult to the judiciary and an
anachronism in the judicial process, which are in utter disrespect to the Court.

Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and explain why she
should not be held in contempt of court for the "very disrespectful, insulting and
humiliating" contents of the 30 July 2001 motion. In her Explanation, Comments and
Answer,Velasco-Jacoba claimed that "His Honor knows beforehand who actually prepared
the subject Motion, that it was her husband who prepared the same; and that records will
show that the undersigned counsel did not actually or actively participate in this case." She
recounted that on her way out of the house for an afternoon hearing, Atty. Ellis Jacoba
("Jacoba") stopped her and said "O, pirmahan mo na ito kasi last day na, baka mahuli."She
signed the pleading handed to her without reading it, in "trusting blind faith" on her
husband of 35 years with whom she "entrusted her whole life and future." This pleading
turned out to be the 30 July 2001 motion which Jacoba drafted but could not sign because
of his then suspension from the practice of law.

Atty. Jacoba asserts the inadmissibility of Atty. Velasco-Jacoba’s statement pointing to him
as the author of the motion in view of the marital privilege rule in evidence.

ISSUE:

WON the statement of Atty. Velasco-Jacobo is admisibble as evidence against her husband.

HELD:

Yes. The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the
claimant to object timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as
implied consent. This waiver applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30
July 2001 motion.

Atty. Jacoba’s answer with Second Motion for Inhibition did not contain a denial of his
wife’s account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the motion by stating that
he "trained his guns and fired at the errors which he perceived and believed to be gigantic
and monumental”.

3. Testimonial Evidence c. disqualifications iv. privileged communications

Almonte v. Vasquez

G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995

This case concerns the power of the Office of the Ombudsman to obtain evidence in
connection with an investigation conducted by it vis-à-vis the claim of privilege of an agency
of the Government.

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul the subpoena
duces tecum and orders issued by Ombudsman Vasquez, requiring petitioners Rogado and
Rivera, as chief accountant and record custodian of the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce “all documents relating to Personal Services Funds
for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the plantilla of EIIB for
1988” and to enjoin his orders. The subpoena duces tecum was issued in connection with
his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that the funds representing savings from
unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed.

Petitioners Almonte (former Commissioner of the EIIB) and Perez (Chief of the EIIB’s
Budget and Fiscal Management Division) denied the anomalous activities that circulate the
EIIB office and they also moved to quash the subpoena and the subpoena duces tecum.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating to

personal services and salary vouchers of EIIB employers.

HELD:

YES. At common law a government privilege against disclosure is recognized with

respect to state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is
based upon public interest of such paramount importance as in and of itself transcending
the individual interests of a private citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof, the
plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights.

In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be
disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, the
EIIB’s function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information
regarding “illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to,
economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting.” Consequently, while in cases
which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the
case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military
matters without compelling production, no similar excuse can be made for a privilege
resting on other considerations.

Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O.
464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive
Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes”. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and
void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees,
conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials
and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government
Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine
National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to
appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive
election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called “Gloriagate
Scandal”.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464,
Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.

ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?

RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The
doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of
necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an
exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of
such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of
legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so
assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for
information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the
mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
is frustrated.
NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication
(DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment
(ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network
(NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos).
The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18,
2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and
power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by
the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He
appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he
admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his
approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo
about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project,
petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to
answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate
averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the
jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of
respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that
he would appear and give his testimony.

ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege

The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide
by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case
of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.),
does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this
concept has Constitutional underpinnings.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of
inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President,
such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President
is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic
powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating
to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications
privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power.”
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor
of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
“operational proximity” with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be

overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely
contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege
on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under
conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary
in “her executive and policy decision-making process” and, that “the information sought
to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the
People’s Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases are presidential communications
privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited
by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege.
First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the
President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This
authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence
of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under
the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a
compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of

executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention
if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to
them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours.
Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from
the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive
privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of
Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.