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Yu vs.

Orchard Golf and Country Club

FACTS:
The events leading to these consolidated cases began with a game of golf.
Yu and Yuhico were set to play golf at the Orchard Golf and Country Club with one more member of the
club. Unfortunately, this other member cancelled at the last minute. Because of the Club’s policy, which prohibited
“twosomes” from teeing off on weekends and public holidays before 1pm, petitioners requested management to look
for another player to join them. When a third player could not be found, petitioners requested that they be allowed to
play. The Club refused, but they played anyway, in violation of the Club’s rules. As a result, an incident report was
filed with the Club’s Board of Directors. The Board resolved to suspend both members for 3 months.
Petitioners filed complaints with the Securities Investigation and Clearing Department of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, at that time the tribunal vested by law with jurisdiction to hear and decide intra-corporate
controversies. The SICD-SEC issued a TRO effective for 20 days, restraining the Club from implementing the
suspension. 2 days before the TRO would lapse, however, the SEC issued guidelines wherein parties would be
allowed to file their cases before August 8, 2000 but any provisional remedies the SEC granted them were to be
effective only until that date. On August 7, 2000, the SIDC-SEC issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
respondents from implementing the suspensions.
Two months later, the Board resolved it was going to implement the suspension as the August 8 cut-off had
already lapsed. Petitioners filed a petition for indirect contempt with the RTC of Dasmariñas, Cavite. The RTC
restored the writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents appealed with the CA, which reversed the RTC’s decision
and the petitioner’s suspension was finally implemented.
Meanwhile petitioners filed a motion ad cautelam1 in the RTC of Imus, Cavite, praying for the issuance of
a TRO and/or writ of injunction to enjoin respondents from implementing the suspension orders. The RTC issued the
TRO. It was after this issuance that the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration with the CA. The CA denied
the motion and thus the first case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
The respondents questioned the order of the Imus RTC with a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC
denied. The respondents turned to the CA, which issued a TRO that enjoined the RTC from implementing the writ of
preliminary injunction. The petitioners then filed the second case with the Supreme Court, questioning the CA’s
TRO.

ISSUES:
1. Did the SEC guidelines shorten the life span of the writs of preliminary injunction issued by the SEC–
SICD, thereby making them effective only until August 8, 2000?
2. Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction by issuing a TRO against
the Imus, Cavite RTC and enjoining the implementation of its writ of preliminary injunction against
respondents?

HELD:
1. YES.
Petitioners contend that the guidelines could not have possibly limited the effectivity of their writs for two
reasons: (1) the intention of the guidelines was to cover applications for such writs and provisional
remedies made on or after August 1, 2000 and (2) in any event, the guidelines were void for lack of
publication. The petitioners’ contentions have no merit. The guidelines were clear and categorical, such that
there simply was no need for petitioners’ extended interpretation. Under the guidelines, the parties were
allowed to file their cases before August 8, 2000 but any provisional remedies the SEC granted them were
to be effective only until that date. On the 2nd contention, the court ruled that interpretative regulations and
those merely internal in nature regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public need not be published. The guidelines were clear that they were meant for the information of the
officers of the SEC only. No doubt, the guidelines were meant to serve as an advisory to all SEC officers to
refrain from accepting new cases because of the impending transfer of jurisdiction to the regular courts.
The issuance or recall of a preliminary writ of injunction is an interlocutory matter that remains at all times
within the control of the court or quasi-judicial body that issued it. Thus, petitioners could not rightfully
claim a vested right to an injunctive writ.

1
As a precautionary measure to protect the party’s remedies, http://famli.blogspot.com/2011/12/ad-cautelam-court-jurisdiction.html (I have no
idea if this source is reliable, use at own risk)
2. “The TRO issued by the CA on March 26, 2002 has long lapsed, its lifetime under Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court being only 60 days. Respondents themselves admit that the CA allowed its TRO to lapse. Because
there is nothing that will now stop the Imus, Cavite RTC from implementing its writ of preliminary
injunction against respondents, there is no need for us to issue any order enjoining respondents from
implementing petitioners’ suspension. This petition, as a result, has become moot and academic.”

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