G.R. No.
156809 March 4, 2009 In an Order8 dated 30 October 2000, the RTC denied respondents’
ESTATE OF FELOMINA G. MACADANGDANG, represented by
Court Appointed Administrator ATTY. OSWALDO
MACADANGDANG, Petitioner,
vs.
LUCIA GAVIOLA, AGAPITO ROMERO, CRISTINA
QUIÑONES, BOY LAURENTE,AGUSTINA TUNA, SOTERO
TAPON, BUENAVENTURA MURING, SR., ROGELIO PASAJE,
FE TUBORO, ESTANISLAO PEN, PABLO NAVALES, and JOSE
DAGATAN, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 26 July 2002
Decision1 and the 10 December 2002 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62002.
The Antecedent Facts
On 18 January 2000, Atty. Oswaldo Macadangdang (Atty.
Macadangdang), acting as administrator of the Estate of Felomina G.
Macadangdang (petitioner), filed an action for Unlawful Detainer with
Damages against Lucia Gaviola, Agapito Romero, Cristina Quiñones,
Boy Laurente, Agustina Tuna, Sotero Tapon, Buenaventura Muring, Sr.,
Rogelio Pasaje, Fe Tuboro, Estanislao Pen, Pablo Navales, and Jose
Dagatan (respondents). Respondents were occupying, by mere
tolerance, portions of four parcels of land in the name of the late
Felomina G. Macadangdang, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. T-6084, T-6085, T-6086, and T-6087, all in the Registry of Deeds
of Davao City.
In a Decision3 dated 27 June 2000, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Branch 4, Davao City, ruled in favor of petitioner, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants
and all the persons claiming rights under them to:
a) vacate their respective possession over the subject
premises, and remove their structures built therein at their
expense;
b) pay plaintiff the sum of ₱500.00 a month, for each
defendant, for the use and occupation of the said premises
commencing the date of this decision until they vacate the
same;
c) pay plaintiff the sum of ₱5,000.00, each defendant, as
attorney’s fee; and
d) cost of suit.
Defendants’ counterclaims being compulsory are dismissed.
SO ORDERED.4
Respondents appealed from the MTCC’s Decision.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order5 dated 14 September 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Davao City dismissed the appeal for respondents’ failure to file an
appeal memorandum.
On petitioner’s motion, the RTC remanded the case to the MTCC for
execution of judgment in its Order6 dated 22 September 2000.
On 3 October 2000, respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration/New Trial.
In an Order7 dated 16 October 2000, the MTCC ordered the issuance of
a writ of execution after payment of the execution fee.
motion for reconsideration. The RTC ruled that it no longer had
jurisdiction over the motion after the dismissal of respondents’ appeal.
Respondents filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals
assailing the RTC’s 14 September 2000 Order.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision promulgated on 26 July 2002, the Court of Appeals set
aside the 14 September 2000 Order and remanded the case to the RTC.
The Court of Appeals ruled that as a matter of policy, the dismissal of
an appeal on purely technical grounds is frowned upon. The Court of
Appeals ruled that rules of procedure are intended to promote and not
defeat substantial justice and should not be applied in a very rigid and
technical sense. The Court of Appeals further ruled that litigants should
be afforded every opportunity to establish the merits of their cases
without the constraints of technicalities.
The Court of Appeals ruled that a distinction should be made between
failure to file a notice of appeal within the reglementary period and
failure to file the appeal memorandum within the period granted by the
appellate court. The Court of Appeals ruled that failure to file a notice
of appeal within the reglementary period would result to failure of the
appellate court to obtain jurisdiction over the appealed decision. Thus,
the assailed decision would become final and executory upon failure to
move for reconsideration. On the other hand, failure to file the appeal
memorandum within the period granted by the appellate court would
only result to abandonment of appeal, which could lead to its dismissal
upon failure to move for its reconsideration. Thus, the RTC erred in
denying respondents’ motion for reconsideration on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction.
Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that while the negligence of counsel
binds the client, the rule is not without exceptions such as when its
application would result to outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or
property, or when a client would suffer due to the counsel’s gross or
palpable mistake or negligence.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals.
In its 10 December 2002 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the
motion for lack of merit.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
reversing the RTC’s dismissal of respondents’ appeal for failure to file
an appeal memorandum.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred when it allowed the
filing of a motion for reconsideration before the RTC. Petitioners allege
that the case stemmed from an unlawful detainer case where the Rules
on Summary Procedure apply. Petitioners allege that under the Rules on
Summary Procedure, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited
pleading. Petitioners also allege that due to the mandatory character of
Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the RTC
correctly dismissed the appeal. Petitioners also pointed out that
respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration/New Trial was neither
verified nor accompanied by affidavits of merit as required under
Section 2, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Applicability of the Rules on Summary Procedure
Jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases falls on the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.9 Since
the case before the the MTCC was an unlawful detainer case, it was
governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure. The purpose of the
Rules on Summary Procedure is to prevent undue delays in the
disposition of cases and to achieve this, the filing of certain pleadings is
prohibited,10 including the filing of a motion for reconsideration.11
However, the motion for reconsideration that petitioners allege to be a
prohibited pleading was filed before the RTC acting as an appellate
court. The appeal before the RTC is no longer covered by the Rules on
Summary Procedure. The Rules on Summary Procedure apply before
the appeal to the RTC. Hence, respondents’ motion for reconsideration
filed with the RTC is not a prohibited pleading.
Procedure on Appeal
Section 7, Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Sec. 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court. -
(a) Upon receipt of the complete records or the record on
appeal, the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court shall
notify the parties of such fact.
(b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the
duty of the appellant to submit a memorandum which shall
briefly discuss the errors imputed to the lower court, a copy
of which shall be furnished by him to the adverse party.
Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the appellant’s
memorandum, the appellee may file his
memorandum. Failure of the appellant to file a
memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of the
appeal.
(c) Upon the filing of the memorandum of the appellee, or the
expiration of the period to do so, the case shall be considered
submitted for decision. The Regional Trial Court shall decide
the case on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings
had in the court of origin and such memoranda as are filed.
(Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the RTC dismissed respondents’ appeal for their failure to
file an appeal memorandum in accordance with Section 7(b), Rule 40 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals reversed the
RTC’s dismissal of the appeal.1avvphi1
The Court of Appeals ruled that while the negligence of counsel binds
the client, the circumstances in this case warrant a departure from this
general rule. The Court of Appeals ruled that respondents’ counsel only
realized his failure to submit the appeal memorandum when he received
a copy of the dismissal of the appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that
exceptions to the general rule are recognized to accord relief to a client
who suffered by reason of the counsel’s gross or palpable mistake or
negligence.
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals.
The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of
his counsel in the realm of procedural technique.12 There are exceptions
to this rule, such as when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel
deprives the client of due process of law, or when the application of the
general rule results in the outright deprivation of one’s property through
a technicality. 13
In this case, respondents’ counsel advanced this reason for his failure to
submit the appeal memorandum:
c. That there was a delay in the filing of defendants-appellants[’] appeal
memorandum due to the heavy backlog of legal paperwork piled on the
table of the undersigned counsel, and he realized his failure to submit
defendants[’] appeal memorandum when he received a copy of the
dismissal of the case. This is to consider that he is the only lawyer in his
law office doing a herculean task.14
We find no reason to exempt respondents from the general rule. The
cause of the delay in the filing of the appeal memorandum, as explained
by respondents’ counsel, was not due to gross negligence. It could have
been prevented by respondents’ counsel if he only acted with ordinary
diligence and prudence in handling the case. For a claim of gross
negligence of counsel to prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment of
the client’s cause must be shown.15 In one case, the Court ruled that
failure to file appellant’s brief can qualify as simple negligence but it
does not amount to gross neglience to justify the annulment of the
proceedings below.16
Finally, respondents were not deprived of due process of law. The right
to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process. 17 It is merely a
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of the law.18 The Court notes that in their
memoranda,19 respondents admitted that they signed an agreement that
they would vacate the land they occupy not later than 28 February 1998.
They refused to vacate the land only because they were not relocated as
promised by the owner. Respondents claimed that the land was later
declared alienable and disposable, and the decision was affirmed by this
Court. Hence, respondents alleged that petitioner no longer had the right
to drive them out of the land. However, respondents did not even
indicate the case number and title, as well as the date of promulgation
of the alleged Supreme Court decision, in their memoranda.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 26
July 2002 Decision and the 10 December 2002 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62002.
G.R. No. 194880 June 20, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION, both represented by the PRIVATIZATION
MANAGEMENT OFFICE, Petitioners,
vs.
SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Rule 45 Petition questioning the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, which ordered the dismissal of the
Complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners herein with the
Metropolitan Trial Court.
Petitioners Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and National Power
Corporation (NPC) are registered co-owners of several parcels of land
located along Pasong Tamo Extension and Vito Cruz in Makati City,
and covered by four Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs). 1 The main
subject matter of the instant Petition is one of these four parcels of land
covered by TCT No. 458365, with an area of approximately 22,294
square meters (hereinafter, the subject property). Eighty percent (80%)
of the subject property is owned by petitioner Republic, while the
remaining twenty percent (20%) belongs to petitioner NPC.2 Petitioners
are being represented in this case by the Privatization Management
Office (PMO), which is the agency tasked with the administration and
disposal of government assets.3Meanwhile, respondent Sunvar Realty
Development Corporation (Sunvar) occupied the subject property by
virtue of sublease agreements, which had in the meantime expired.
The factual antecedents of the case are straightforward. On 26
December 1977,4 petitioners leased the four parcels of land, including
the subject property, to the Technology Resource Center Foundation,
Inc., (TRCFI) for a period of 25 years beginning 01 January 1978 and
ending on 31 December 2002.5 Under the Contract of Lease (the main
lease contract), petitioners granted TRCFI the right to sublease any
portion of the four parcels of land.6
Exercising its right, TRCFI consequently subleased a majority of the
subject property to respondent Sunvar through several sublease
agreements (the sublease agreements).7 Although these agreements
commenced on different dates, all of them contained common
provisions on the terms of the sublease and were altogether set to expire
on 31 December 2002, the expiration date of TRCFI’s main lease
contract with petitioners, but subject to renewal at the option of
respondent:8
The term of the sublease shall be for an initial period of [variable] years
and [variable] months commencing on [variable], renewable for another
twenty-five (25) years at SUNVAR’s exclusive option.9
According to petitioners, in all the sublease agreements, respondent
Sunvar agreed "to return or surrender the subleased land, without any
delay whatsoever upon the termination or expiration of the sublease
contract or any renewal or extension thereof."10
During the period of its sublease, respondent Sunvar introduced useful
improvements, consisting of several commercial buildings, and leased
out the spaces therein.11 It also profitably utilized the other open spaces
on the subject property as parking areas for customers and guests.12
In 1987, following a reorganization of the government, TRCFI was
dissolved. In its stead, the Philippine Development Alternatives
Foundation (PDAF) was created, assuming the functions previously
performed by TRCFI.13
On 26 April 2002, less than a year before the expiration of the main
lease contract and the sublease agreements, respondent Sunvar wrote to
PDAF as successor of TRCFI. Respondent expressed its desire to
exercise the option to renew the sublease over the subject property and
proposed an increased rental rate and a renewal period of another 25
years.14 On even date, it also wrote to the Office of the President,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources and petitioner NPC.
The letters expressed the same desire to renew the lease over the subject
property under the new rental rate and renewal period.15
On 10 May 2002, PDAF informed respondent that the notice of renewal
of the lease had already been sent to petitioners, but that it had yet to
receive a response.16 It further explained that the proposal of respondent
for the renewal of the sublease could not yet be acted upon, and neither
could the proposed rental payments be accepted.17 Respondent
acknowledged receipt of the letter and requested PDAF to apprise the
former of any specific actions undertaken with respect to the said lease
arrangement over the subject property.18
On 03 June 2002, six months before the main contract of lease was to
expire, petitioner NPC – through Atty. Rainer B. Butalid, Vice-
President and General Counsel – notified PDAF of the former’s decision
not to renew the contract of lease.19 In turn, PDAF notified respondent
of NPC’s decision.20
On the other hand, petitioner Republic through then Senior Deputy
Executive Secretary Waldo Q. Flores likewise notified PDAF of the
former’s decision not to renew the lease contract.21 The Republic
reasoned that the parties had earlier agreed to shorten the corporate life
of PDAF and to transfer the latter’s assets to the former for the purpose
of selling them to raise funds.22 On 25 June 2002, PDAF duly informed
respondent Sunvar of petitioner Republic’s decision not to renew the
lease and quoted the Memorandum of Senior Deputy Executive
Secretary Flores.23
On 31 December 2002, the main lease contract with PDAF, as well as
its sublease agreements with respondent Sunvar, all expired. Hence,
petitioners recovered from PDAF all the rights over the subject property
and the three other parcels of land. Thereafter, petitioner Republic
transferred the subject property to the PMO for disposition.
Nevertheless, respondent Sunvar continued to occupy the property.
On 22 February 2008, or six years after the main lease contract expired,
petitioner Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
advised respondent Sunvar to completely vacate the subject property
within thirty (30) days.24 The latter duly received the Notice from the
OSG through registered mail,25 but failed to vacate and remained on the
property.26
On 03 February 2009, respondent Sunvar received from respondent
OSG a final notice to vacate within 15 days.27When the period lapsed,
respondent Sunvar again refused to vacate the property and continued
to occupy it.
On 02 April 2009, the PMO issued an Inspection and Appraisal Report
to determine the fair rental value of the subject property and petitioners’
lost income – a loss arising from the refusal of respondent Sunvar to
vacate the property after the expiration of the main lease contract and
sublease agreements.28 Using the market comparison approach, the
PMO determined that the fair rental value of the subject property was ₱
10,364,000 per month, and that respondent Sunvar owed petitioners a
total of ₱ 630,123,700 from 01 January 2002 to 31 March 2009.29
On 23 July 2009, petitioners filed the Complaint dated 26 May 2009 for
unlawful detainer with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati
City. Petitioners prayed that respondent Sunvar be ordered to vacate the
subject property and to pay damages for the illegal use and lost income
owing to them:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully
prayed that after proper proceedings, judgment be rendered:
1. Ordering defendant SUNVAR REALTY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and all persons, natural
and juridical, claiming rights under it, to vacate the subject
property and peacefully surrender the same, with the useful
improvements therein, to the plaintiffs or to their authorized
representative; and
2. Ordering defendant SUNVAR REALTY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION to pay plaintiffs
damages in the amount of SIX HUNDRED THIRTY
MILLION ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THREE
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED PESOS (₱
630,123,700.00) for the illegal and unauthorized use and
occupation of the subject property from January 1, 2003 to
March 31, 2009, and the amount of TEN MILLION THREE
HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (₱
10,364,000.00) per month from April 1, 2008 until the subject
property, together with its improvements, are completely
vacated and peacefully surrendered to the plaintiffs or to their
authorized representative.30
Respondent Sunvar moved to dismiss the Complaint and argued that the
allegations of petitioners in the Complaint did not constitute an action
for unlawful detainer, since no privity of contract existed between
them.31 In the alternative, it also argued that petitioners’ cause of action
was more properly an accion publiciana, which fell within the
jurisdiction of the RTC, and not the MeTC, considering that the
petitioners’ supposed dispossession of the subject property by
respondent had already lasted for more than one year.
In its Order dated 16 September 2009, the MeTC denied the Motion to
Dismiss and directed respondent Sunvar to file an answer to petitioners’
Complaint.32 The lower court likewise denied the Motion for
Reconsideration33 filed by respondent.34 Respondent later on filed its
Answer35 to the Complaint.36
Despite the filing of its Answer in the summary proceedings for
ejectment, respondent Sunvar filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari with
the RTC of Makati City to assail the denial by the MeTC of respondent’s
Motion to Dismiss.37
In answer to the Rule 65 Petition of respondent, petitioners placed in
issue the jurisdiction of the RTC and reasoned that the Rules on
Summary Procedure expressly prohibited the filing of a petition for
certiorari against the interlocutory orders of the MeTC.38 Hence, they
prayed for the outright dismissal of the certiorari Petition of respondent
Sunvar.
The RTC denied the motion for dismissal and ruled that extraordinary
circumstances called for an exception to the general rule on summary
proceedings.39 Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,40 which
was subsequently denied by the RTC.41 Hence, the hearing on the
certiorari Petition of respondent proceeded, and the parties filed their
respective Memoranda.42
In the assailed Order dated 01 December 2010, which discussed the
merits of the certiorari Petition, the RTC granted the Rule 65 Petition
and directed the MeTC to dismiss the Complaint for unlawful detainer
for lack of jurisdiction.43 The RTC reasoned that the one-year period for
the filing of an unlawful detainer case was reckoned from the expiration
of the main lease contract and the sublease agreements on 31 December
2002. Petitioners should have then filed an accion publiciana with the
RTC in 2009, instead of an unlawful detainer suit.
Hence, the instant Rule 45 Petition filed by petitioners.44
I
Petitioners’ Resort to a Rule 45 Petition
Before the Court proceeds with the legal questions in this case, there are
procedural issues that merit preliminary attention.
Respondent Sunvar argued that petitioners’ resort to a Rule 45 Petition
for Review on Certiorari before this Court is an improper mode of
review of the assailed RTC Decision. Allegedly, petitioners should have
availed themselves of a Rule 65 Petition instead, since the RTC
Decision was an order of dismissal of the Complaint, from which no
appeal can be taken except by a certiorari petition.
The Court is unconvinced of the arguments of respondent Sunvar and
holds that the resort by petitioners to the present Rule 45 Petition is
perfectly within the bounds of our procedural rules.
As respondent Sunvar explained, no appeal may be taken from an order
of the RTC dismissing an action without prejudice,45 but the aggrieved
party may file a certiorari petition under Rule 65.46 Nevertheless, the
Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition
with this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or
involved.47 This latter situation was one that petitioners found
themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions
of law.
In Republic v. Malabanan,48 the Court clarified the three modes of
appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or
appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered
in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby
judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal is taken to the
[Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and
law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of
fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of
appeal is elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of
law."49 (Emphasis supplied.)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented or of the
truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns
the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter.50 The
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the
given set of circumstances.51
In the instant case, petitioners raise only questions of law with respect
to the jurisdiction of the RTC to entertain a certiorari petition filed
against the interlocutory order of the MeTC in an unlawful detainer suit.
At issue in the present case is the correct application of the Rules on
Summary Procedure; or, more specifically, whether the RTC violated
the Rules when it took cognizance and granted the certiorari petition
against the denial by the MeTC of the Motion to Dismiss filed by
respondent Sunvar. This is clearly a question of law that involves the
proper interpretation of the Rules on Summary Procedure. Therefore,
the instant Rule 45 Petition has been properly lodged with this Court.
II
Propriety of a Rule 65 Petition in Summary Proceedings
Proceeding now to determine that very question of law, the Court finds
that it was erroneous for the RTC to have taken cognizance of the Rule
65 Petition of respondent Sunvar, since the Rules on Summary
Procedure expressly prohibit this relief for unfavorable interlocutory
orders of the MeTC. Consequently, the assailed RTC Decision is
annulled.
Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a certiorari petition under Rule
65 against an interlocutory order issued by the court in a summary
proceeding is a prohibited pleading.52 The prohibition is plain enough,
and its further exposition is unnecessary verbiage.53 The RTC should
have dismissed outright respondent Sunvar’s Rule 65 Petition,
considering that it is a prohibited pleading. Petitioners have already
alerted the RTC of this legal bar and immediately prayed for the
dismissal of the certiorari Petition.54 Yet, the RTC not only refused to
dismiss the certiorari Petition,55 but even proceeded to hear the Rule 65
Petition on the merits.
Respondent Sunvar’s reliance on Bayog v. Natino 56 and Go v. Court of
Appeals57 to justify a certiorari review by the RTC owing to
"extraordinary circumstances" is misplaced. In both cases, there were
peculiar and specific circumstances that justified the filing of the
mentioned prohibited pleadings under the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure – conditions that are not availing in the case of respondent
Sunvar.
In Bayog, Alejandro Bayog filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Patnongon-Bugasong-Valderama, Antique an ejectment
case against Alberto Magdato, an agricultural tenant-lessee who had
built a house over his property. When Magdato, an illiterate farmer,
received the Summons from the MCTC to file his answer within 10
days, he was stricken with pulmonary tuberculosis and was able to
consult a lawyer in San Jose, Antique only after the reglementary period.
Hence, when the Answer of Magdato was filed three days after the lapse
of the 10-day period, the MCTC ruled that it could no longer take
cognizance of his Answer and, hence, ordered his ejectment from
Bayog’s land. When his house was demolished in January 1994,
Magdato filed a Petition for Relief with the RTC-San Jose, Antique,
claiming that he was a duly instituted tenant in the agricultural property,
and that he was deprived of due process. Bayog, the landowner, moved
to dismiss the Petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part
of the RTC, since a petition for relief from judgment covering a
summary proceeding was a prohibited pleading. The RTC, however,
denied his Motion to Dismiss and remanded the case to the MCTC for
proper disposal.
In resolving the Rule 65 Petition, we ruled that although a petition for
relief from judgment was a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rules
on Summary Procedure, the Court nevertheless allowed the filing of the
Petition pro hac vice, since Magdato would otherwise suffer grave
injustice and irreparable injury:
We disagree with the RTC’s holding that a petition for relief from
judgment (Civil Case No. 2708) is not prohibited under the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure, in light of the Jakihaca ruling. When
Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure bars a petition
for relief from judgment, or a petition for certiorari, mandamus, or
prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court, it has in
mind no other than Section 1, Rule 38 regarding petitions for relief from
judgment, and Rule 65 regarding petitions for certiorari, mandamus, or
prohibition, of the Rules of Court, respectively. These petitions are
cognizable by Regional Trial Courts, and not by Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. If
Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and Rules 38
and 65 of the Rules of Court are juxtaposed, the conclusion is inevitable
that no petition for relief from judgment nor a special civil action of
certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus arising from cases covered by the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure may be filed with a superior court.
This is but consistent with the mandate of Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129
to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases
subject of summary procedure.
Nevertheless, in view of the unusual and peculiar circumstances of this
case, unless some form of relief is made available to MAGDATO, the
grave injustice and irreparable injury that visited him through no fault
or negligence on his part will only be perpetuated. Thus, the petition for
relief from judgment which he filed may be allowed or treated, pro hac
vice, either as an exception to the rule, or a regular appeal to the RTC,
or even an action to annul the order (decision) of the MCTC of 20
September 1993. As an exception, the RTC correctly held that the
circumstances alleged therein and the justification pleaded worked in
favor of MAGDATO, and that the motion to dismiss Civil Case No.
2708 was without merit. xxx 58 (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, in Go v. Court of Appeals, the Court was confronted
with a procedural void in the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure that
justified the resort to a Rule 65 Petition in the RTC. In that case, the
preliminary conference in the subject ejectment suit was held in
abeyance by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City
until after the case for specific performance involving the same parties
shall have been finally decided by the RTC. The affected party appealed
the suspension order to the RTC. In response, the adverse party moved
to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it concerned an interlocutory
order in a summary proceeding that was not the subject of an appeal.
The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and subsequently directed the
MTCC to proceed with the hearing of the ejectment suit, a ruling that
was upheld by the appellate court.
In affirming the Decisions of the RTC and CA, the Supreme Court
allowed the filing of a petition for certiorari against an interlocutory
order in an ejectment suit, considering that the affected party was
deprived of any recourse to the MTCC’s erroneous suspension of a
summary proceeding. Retired Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban
eloquently explained the procedural void in this wise:
Indisputably, the appealed [suspension] order is interlocutory, for "it
does not dispose of the case but leaves something else to be done by the
trial court on the merits of the case." It is axiomatic that an interlocutory
order cannot be challenged by an appeal. Thus, it has been held that "the
proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse
judgment on the merits incorporating in said appeal the grounds for
assailing the interlocutory order. Allowing appeals from interlocutory
orders would result in the ‘sorry spectacle’ of a case being subject of a
counterproductive ping-pong to and from the appellate court as often as
a trial court is perceived to have made an error in any of its interlocutory
rulings. However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently
erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and
expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress."
Clearly, private respondent cannot appeal the order, being interlocutory.
But neither can it file a petition for certiorari, because ejectment suits
fall under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, Section 19(g) of
which considers petitions for certiorari prohibited pleadings:
xxx xxx xxx
Based on the foregoing, private respondent was literally caught
"between Scylla and Charybdis" in the procedural void observed by the
Court of Appeals and the RTC. Under these extraordinary
circumstances, the Court is constrained to provide it with a remedy
consistent with the objective of speedy resolution of cases.
As correctly held by Respondent Court of Appeals, "the purpose of the
Rules on Summary Procedure is ‘to achieve an expeditious and
inexpensive determination of cases without regard to technical rules.’
(Section 36, Chapter III, BP Blg. 129)" Pursuant to this objective, the
Rules prohibit petitions for certiorari, like a number of other pleadings,
in order to prevent unnecessary delays and to expedite the disposition
of cases. In this case, however, private respondent challenged the
MTCC order delaying the ejectment suit, precisely to avoid the mischief
envisioned by the Rules.
Thus, this Court holds that in situations wherein a summary proceeding
is suspended indefinitely, a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse
of discretion may be allowed. Because of the extraordinary
circumstances in this case, a petition for certiorari, in fact, gives spirit
and life to the Rules on Summary Procedure. A contrary ruling would
unduly delay the disposition of the case and negate the rationale of the
said Rules.59 (Emphasis supplied.)
Contrary to the assertion of respondent Sunvar, the factual
circumstances in these two cases are not comparable with respondents’
situation, and our rulings therein are inapplicable to its cause of action
in the present suit. As this Court explained in Bayog, the general rule is
that no special civil action for certiorari may be filed with a superior
court from cases covered by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
Respondent Sunvar filed a certiorari Petition in an ejectment suit
pending before the MeTC. Worse, the subject matter of the Petition was
the denial of respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, which was necessarily an
interlocutory order, which is generally not the subject of an appeal. No
circumstances similar to the situation of the agricultural tenant-lessee in
Bayog are present to support the relaxation of the general rule in the
instant case. Respondent cannot claim to have been deprived of
reasonable opportunities to argue its case before a summary judicial
proceeding.
Moreover, there exists no procedural void akin to that in Go v. Court of
Appeals that would justify respondent’s resort to a certiorari Petition
before the RTC. When confronted with the MeTC’s adverse denial of
its Motion to Dismiss in the ejectment case, the expeditious and proper
remedy for respondent should have been to proceed with the summary
hearings and to file its answer. Indeed, its resort to a certiorari Petition
in the RTC over an interlocutory order in a summary ejectment
proceeding was not only prohibited. The certiorari Petition was already
a superfluity on account of respondent’s having already taken advantage
of a speedy and available remedy by filing an Answer with the MeTC.
Respondent Sunvar failed to substantiate its claim of extraordinary
circumstances that would constrain this Court to apply the exceptions
obtaining in Bayog and Go. The Court hesitates to liberally dispense the
benefits of these two judicial precedents to litigants in summary
proceedings, lest these exceptions be regularly abused and freely availed
of to defeat the very goal of an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of an unlawful detainer suit. If the Court were to relax the
interpretation of the prohibition against the filing of certiorari petitions
under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the RTCs may be
inundated with similar prayers from adversely affected parties
questioning every order of the lower court and completely dispensing
with the goal of summary proceedings in forcible entry or unlawful
detainer suits.
III
Reckoning the One-Year Period in Unlawful Detainer Cases
We now come to another legal issue underlying the present Petition –
whether the Complaint filed by petitioners is properly an action for
unlawful detainer within the jurisdiction of the MeTC or an accion
publiciana lodged with the RTC. At the heart of the controversy is the
reckoning period of the one-year requirement for unlawful detainer
suits.
Whether or not petitioners’ action for unlawful detainer was brought
within one year after the unlawful withholding of possession will
determine whether it was properly filed with the MeTC. If, as petitioners
argue, the one-year period should be counted from respondent Sunvar’s
receipt on 03 February 2009 of the Final Notice to Vacate, then their
Complaint was timely filed within the one-year period and appropriately
taken cognizance of by the MeTC. However, if the reckoning period is
pegged from the expiration of the main lease contract and/or sublease
agreement, then petitioners’ proper remedy should have been an accion
publiciana to be filed with the RTC.
The Court finds that petitioners correctly availed themselves of an
action for unlawful detainer and, hence, reverses the ruling of the RTC.
Under the Rules of Court, lessors against whom possession of any land
is unlawfully withheld after the expiration of the right to hold possession
may – by virtue of any express or implied contract, and within one year
after the unlawful deprivation – bring an action in the municipal trial
court against the person unlawfully withholding possession, for
restitution of possession with damages and costs.60 Unless otherwise
stipulated, the action of the lessor shall commence only after a demand
to pay or to comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is
made upon the lessee; or after a written notice of that demand is served
upon the person found on the premises, and the lessee fails to comply
therewith within 15 days in the case of land or 5 days in the case of
buildings.61
In Delos Reyes v. Spouses Odenes,62 the Court recently defined the
nature and scope of an unlawful detainer suit, as follows:
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property
from one who illegally withholds possession after the expiration or
termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express
or implied. The possession by the defendant in unlawful detainer is
originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination
of the right to possess. The proceeding is summary in nature,
jurisdiction over which lies with the proper MTC or metropolitan trial
court. The action must be brought up within one year from the date of
last demand, and the issue in the case must be the right to physical
possession. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful
detainer if it states the following elements:
1. Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant
was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff.
2. Eventually, the possession became illegal upon the
plaintiff’s notice to the defendant of the termination of the
latter’s right of possession.
3. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the
property and deprived the plaintiff of the latter’s enjoyment.
4. Within one year from the making of the last demand on the
defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
Complaint for ejectment.63
"On the other hand, accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover
the right of possession which should be brought in the proper regional
trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an
ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of
realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing
of the complaint, more than one year had elapsed since defendant had
turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had become
illegal, the action will be, not one of forcible entry or illegal detainer,
but an accion publiciana."64
There are no substantial disagreements with respect to the first three
requisites for an action for unlawful detainer. Respondent Sunvar
initially derived its right to possess the subject property from its
sublease agreements with TRCFI and later on with PDAF. However,
with the expiration of the lease agreements on 31 December 2002,
respondent lost possessory rights over the subject property.
Nevertheless, it continued occupying the property for almost seven
years thereafter. It was only on 03 February 2009 that petitioners made
a final demand upon respondent Sunvar to turn over the property. What
is disputed, however, is the fourth requisite of an unlawful detainer suit.
The Court rules that the final requisite is likewise availing in this case,
and that the one-year period should be counted from the final demand
made on 03 February 2009.
Contrary to the reasoning of the RTC,65 the one-year period to file an
unlawful detainer case is not counted from the expiration of the lease
contract on 31 December 2002. Indeed, the last demand for petitioners
to vacate is the reckoning period for determining the one-year period in
an action for unlawful detainer. "Such one year period should be
counted from the date of plaintiff’s last demand on defendant to vacate
the real property, because only upon the lapse of that period does the
possession become unlawful."66
In case several demands to vacate are made, the period is reckoned from
the date of the last demand.67 In Leonin v. Court of Appeals,68 the Court,
speaking through Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, reckoned the one-
year period to file the unlawful detainer Complaint – filed on 25
February 1997 – from the latest demand letter dated 24 October 1996,
and not from the earlier demand letter dated 03 July 1995:
Prospero Leonin (Prospero) and five others were co-owners of a 400-
square meter property located at K-J Street, East Kamias, Quezon City
whereon was constructed a two-storey house and a three-door apartment
identified as No. 1-A, B, and C.
Prospero and his co-owners allowed his siblings, herein petitioners, to
occupy Apartment C without paying any rentals.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners further contend that respondent’s remedy is accion
publiciana because their possession is not de facto, they having been
authorized by the true and lawful owners of the property; and that one
year had elapsed from respondent’s demand given on "July 3, 1995"
when the unlawful detainer complaint was filed.
The petition fails.
Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the allegations in the complaint
make out a case for unlawful detainer. Thus, respondent alleged, inter
alia, that she is the registered owner of the property and that petitioners,
who are tenants by tolerance, refused to vacate the premises despite the
notice to vacate sent to them.
Likewise, contrary to petitioners’ contention, the one-year period for
filing a complaint for unlawful detainer is reckoned from the date of the
last demand, in this case October 24, 1996, the reason being that the
lessor has the right to waive his right of action based on previous
demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in the premises. Thus, the
filing of the complaint on February 25, 1997 was well within the one
year reglementary period.69(Emphasis supplied.)
From the time that the main lease contract and sublease agreements
expired (01 January 2003), respondent Sunvar no longer had any
possessory right over the subject property. Absent any express
contractual renewal of the sublease agreement or any separate lease
contract, it illegally occupied the land or, at best, was allowed to do so
by mere tolerance of the registered owners – petitioners herein. Thus,
respondent Sunvar’s possession became unlawful upon service of the
final notice on 03 February 2009. Hence, as an unlawful occupant of the
land of petitioners, and without any contract between them, respondent
is "necessarily bound by an implied promise" that it "will vacate upon
demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against them."70 Upon service of the final notice of demand,
respondent Sunvar should have vacated the property and, consequently,
petitioners had one year or until 02 February 2010 in which to resort to
the summary action for unlawful detainer. In the instant case, their
Complaint was filed with the MeTC on 23 July 2009, which was well
within the one-year period.
The Court is aware that petitioners had earlier served a Notice to Vacate
on 22 February 2008, which could have possibly tolled the one-year
period for filing an unlawful detainer suit. Nevertheless, they can be
deemed to have waived their right of action against respondent Sunvar
and continued to tolerate its occupation of the subject property. That
they sent a final Notice to Vacate almost a year later gave respondent
another opportunity to comply with their implied promise as occupants
by mere tolerance. Consequently, the one-year period for filing a
summary action for unlawful detainer with the MeTC must be reckoned
from the latest demand to vacate.
In the past, the Court ruled that subsequent demands that are merely in
the nature of reminders of the original demand do not operate to renew
the one-year period within which to commence an ejectment suit,
considering that the period will still be reckoned from the date of the
original demand.71 If the subsequent demands were merely in the nature
of reminders of the original demand, the one-year period to commence
an ejectment suit would be counted from the first demand.72 However,
respondent failed to raise in any of the proceedings below this question
of fact as to the nature of the second demand issued by the OSG. It is
now too late in the proceedings for them to argue that the 2009 Notice
to Vacate was a mere reiteration or reminder of the 2008 Notice to
Vacate. In any event, this factual determination is beyond the scope of
the present Rule 45 Petition, which is limited to resolving questions of
law.
The Court notes that respondent Sunvar has continued to occupy the
subject property since the expiration of its sublease on 31 December
2002. The factual issue of whether respondent has paid rentals to
petitioners from the expiration of the sublease to the present was never
raised or sufficiently argued before this Court. Nevertheless, it has not
escaped the Court’s attention that almost a decade has passed without
any resolution of this controversy regarding respondent’s possession of
the subject property, contrary to the aim of expeditious proceedings
under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. With the grant of the
instant Petition and the remand of the case to the MeTC for continued
hearing, the Court emphasizes the duty of the lower court to speedily
resolve this matter once and for all, especially since this case involves a
prime property of the government located in the country’s business
district and the various opportunities for petitioners to gain public
revenues from the property.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition for Review on
Certiorari dated 14 February 2011, filed by petitioners Republic and
National Power Corporation, which are represented here by the
Privatization Management Office. The assailed Decision dated 01
December 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134,
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 63, is DIRECTED to proceed with the summary
proceedings for the unlawful detainer case in Civil Case No. 98708.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 217694
FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
ARTURO LOO PO, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 seeking to reverse and set
aside the October 31, 2014 Decision2 and the March 6, 2015
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 134701
which affirmed the September 16, 2013 Decision4 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 67 (RTC) in SCA Case No. 3831. The RTC
decision, in turn, sustained the March 21, 2013 Decision 5 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 72, Pasig City (MeTC), which
dismissed the unlawful detainer case filed by petitioner Fairland
Knitcraft Corporation (Fairland) against respondent Arturo Loo
Po (Po) for failure to prove its case by preponderance of evidence.
The Antecedents
In a complaint6 for unlawful detainer, docketed as Civil Case No.
19429, filed before the MeTC, Fairland alleged that it was the owner of
Condominium Unit No. 205 in Cedar Mansion II on Ma. Escriba Street,
Pasig City. The said unit was leased by Fairland to Po by verbal
agreement, with a rental fee of P20,000.00 a month, to be paid by Po at
the beginning of each month. From March 2011, Po had continuously
failed to pay rent. For said reason, Fairland opted not to renew the lease
agreement anymore.
On January 30, 2012, Fairland sent a formal letter7
to Po demanding that
he pay the amount of P220,000.00, representing the rental arrears, and
that he vacate the leased premises within fifteen (15) days from the
receipt of the letter. Despite receipt of the demand letter and the lapse
of the said 15-day period to comply, Po neither tendered payment for
the unpaid rent nor vacated the premises. Thus, on December 12, 2012,
Fairland was constrained to file the complaint for unlawful detainer
before the MeTC. Po had until January 7, 2013 to file his answer but he
failed to do so. Hence, on February 6, 2013, Fairland filed a motion to
render judgment.8
In its February 21, 2013 Order,9 the MeTC considered the case
submitted for decision.
On March 1, 2013, Po’s counsel filed his Entry of Appearance with
Motion for Leave of Court to file Comment/Opposition to Motion to
Render Judgment.10 In the attached Comment/Opposition, Po denied
the allegations against him and commented that there was no supporting
document that would show that Fairland owned the property; that there
was no lease contract between them; that there were no documents
attached to the complaint which would show that previous demands had
been made and received by him; that the alleged unpaid rental was
P220,000.00, but the amount of damages being prayed for was
P440,000.00; that the issue in the case was one of ownership; and that
it was the RTC which had jurisdiction over the case.
The MeTC treated the comment/opposition as Po’s answer to the
complaint. Considering, however, that the case fell under the Rules of
Summary Procedure, the same was deemed filed out of time. Hence, the
motion was denied.11
The Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court
In its March 21, 2013 Decision, the MeTC dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit due to Fairland’s failure to prove its claim by
preponderance of evidence. The MeTC explained that although the
complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action, Fairland failed to prove
that it was entitled to the possession of the subject property. There was
no evidence presented to support its claim against Po either.
Aggrieved, Fairland seasonably filed its appeal before the RTC under
Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. Being an appealed case, the RTC required
the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
In its memorandum,12 Fairland argued that an unlawful detainer case
was a special civil action governed by summary procedure. In cases
where a defendant failed to file his answer, there was no need for a
declaration of default. Fairland claimed that the Rules stated that in such
cases, judgment should be based on the “facts alleged in the
complaint,”13 and that there was no requirement that judgment must be
based on facts proved by preponderance of evidence. Considering that
the presentation of evidence was not required when a defendant in an
ejectment case failed to appear in a preliminary conference, the same
should be applied when no answer had been filed.
Fairland continued that the failure to file an answer in an ejectment case
was tantamount to an admission by the defendant of all the ultimate facts
alleged in the complaint. There was no more need for evidence in such
a situation as every allegation of ultimate facts in the complaint was
deemed established by the defendant’s acquiescence.
On July 18, 2013, Po filed his memorandum14 and countered that there
was no merit in Fairland’s insistence that evidence was unnecessary
when no answer had been filed. The facts stated in the complaint did not
warrant a rendition of judgment in the plaintiff’s favor. The court had
the discretion to rule on the pleadings based on its evaluation of the
allegation of facts.
Further, all the statements in the complaint were mere allegations which
were not substantiated by any competent evidence. Po asserted that
there was no proof presented to show that the subject property was
indeed owned by Fairland; that there was no lease contract between the
parties; that he never received the demand letter, dated January 30,
2012; and that the amount stated in the prayer of the complaint did not
coincide with the amount of unpaid rent. Po also reiterated that the case
involved an issue of ownership over the condominium unit he was
occupying.
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On September 16, 2013, the RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling and agreed
that Fairland failed to establish its case by preponderance of evidence.
There was nothing on record that would establish Fairland’s right over
the property subject of the complaint. Though it had been consistently
ruled that the only issue for resolution in an ejectment case was the
physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of
any claim of ownership by any of the party-litigants, the court may go
beyond the question of physical possession provisionally. The RTC
concluded that even assuming that Po was not the lawful owner, his
actual physical possession of the subject property created the
presumption that he was entitled to its possession thereof.
Fairland filed a motion for reconsideration15 attaching its condominium
certificate of title16 over the subject property, but it was denied by the
RTC in its Order,17 dated February 24, 2014.
Undaunted, Fairland filed a petition for review18 under Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court before the CA.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In the assailed Decision, dated October 31, 2014, the CA dismissed the
petition and ruled that an action for unlawful detainer would not lie
against Po. Notwithstanding the abbreviated proceeding it ordained and
the limited pleadings it allowed, the Rules on Summary Procedure did
not relax the rules on evidence. In order for an action for recovery of
possession to prosper, it was indispensable that he who brought the
action should prove not only his ownership but also the identity of the
property claimed. The CA concluded, however, that Fairland failed to
discharge such bounden duty.
Fairland filed its motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the
CA in its assailed Resolution, dated March 6, 2015.
Hence, this petition.
ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSIONS
I
IN AN EJECTMENT CASE WHEREIN NO ANSWER WAS
SEASONABLY FILED, IT IS AN ERROR OF LAW TO BASE
JUDGMENT ON PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE
II
HOLDING THAT EVIDENCE IN AN EJECTMENT CASE
SHOULD HAVE BEEN ATTACHED TO THE COMPLAINT IS
AN ERROR OF LAW.19
Fairland argues that in ejectment cases, presentation of evidence was
undertaken through the submission of position papers but the same was
dispensed with when the defendant failed to file an answer or when
either party failed to appear during the preliminary conference. In an
ejectment case, the scope of inquiry should be limited to the sufficiency
of the cause of action stated in the complaint when no seasonable answer
was filed. The attachment of documentary evidence to the Complaint
was not a requirement and was even proscribed by law.
In his Comment,20 Po countered that the present petition raised a
question of fact. Although couched in different words, the issues raised
here were substantially the same as the issues raised before the CA.
There was no legal basis in Fairland’s assertion that evidence was
dispensed with when no answer to the complaint had been filed. Such
argument would undermine the inherent authority of the courts to
resolve legal issues based on the facts of the case and on the rules on
evidence. Contrary to Fairland’s position, the court decided the case on
the basis of the complaint which was found wanting in preponderance
of evidence.
In its Reply,21 Fairland posited that the petition did not raise mere
questions of fact but one of law as what was being sought for review
was the erroneous dismissal of the ejectment case for lack of
preponderance of evidence. Since no answer was filed and the
complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action for unlawful detainer, it
became the duty of the MeTC to decide the case in its favor.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Complaint has a valid cause of action for Unlawful Detainer
Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court lays down the requirements
for filing a complaint for unlawful detainer, to wit:
Section 1. – Who may institute proceedings, and when. –
Subject to the provision of the next succeeding section, a
person deprived of the possession of any land or building by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession
of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by
virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee,
or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after
such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring
an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the
person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for
the restitution of such possession, together with damages and
costs.1âwphi1
Stated differently, unlawful detainer is a summary action for the
recovery of possession of real property. This action may be filed by a
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person from whom the possession of
any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract,
express or implied. The possession of the defendant was originally legal,
as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express
or implied contract between them. The defendant’s possession,
however, became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that the defendant
vacate the subject property due to the expiration or termination of the
right to possess under the contract, and the defendant refused to heed
such demand. A case for unlawful detainer must be instituted one year
from the unlawful withholding of possession.22
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer
if it recites the following: (1) initially, possession of the property by the
defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2)
eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff
to the defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession; (3)
thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property, and
deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one (1)
year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.23
There is no question that the complaint filed by Fairland adequately
alleged a cause of action for unlawful detainer. The pertinent portion of
the said complaint reads:
xxx
3. Plaintiff is the owner of, and had been leasing to the
defendant, the premises mentioned above as the residence of
the latter;
4. There is no current written lease contract between plaintiff
and the defendant, but the latter agreed to pay the former the
amount of Php20,000.00 as rent at the beginning of each
month. Thus, the term of the lease agreement is renewable on
a month-to-month basis;
5. Since March 2011, defendant has not been paying the
aforesaid rent despite plaintiff’s repeated demands;
6. Due to defendant’s continuous failure to pay rent, plaintiff
reached a decision not to renew the lease agreement. It sent a
formal letter, x x x demanding defendant to pay the amount of
Php220,000.00, representing defendant’s twelve month rental
arrears beginning January 2011, and to vacate the leased
premises, both within fifteen (15) days from receipt of said
letter;
7. Despite receipt of the aforesaid demand letter and lapse of
the fifteen day period given to comply with plaintiff’s
demand, defendant neither tendered payment for the unpaid
rent nor vacated the leased premises. Worse, defendant has
not been paying rent up to now;
x x x24
The above-cited portions of the complaint sufficiently alleged that
Fairland was the owner of the subject property being leased to Po by
virtue of an oral agreement. There was a demand by Fairland for Po to
pay rent and vacate before the complaint for unlawful detainer was
instituted. The complaint was seasonably filed within the one-year
period prescribed by law. With all the elements present, there was
clearly a cause of action in the complaint for unlawful detainer.
Under the Rules of Summary Procedure, the weight of evidence is not
considered when a judgment is rendered based on the complaint
The question now is whether the MeTC correctly dismissed the case for
lack of preponderance of evidence. Fairland posits that judgment should
have been rendered in its favor on the basis of the complaint itself and
not on its failure to adduce proof of ownership over the subject property.
The Court agrees with Fairland’s position.
The summons, together with the complaint and its annexes, was served
upon Po on December 28, 2012. This presupposes that the MeTC found
no ground to dismiss the action for unlawful detainer.25 Nevertheless,
Po failed to file his answer on time and the MeTC had the option to
render judgment motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff. In relation
thereto, Sections 5 and 6 of the Rules on Summary Procedure provide:
Sec. 5. Answer. – Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the
defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof
on the plaintiff. Affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded therein
shall be deemed waived, except for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims not asserted in the
answer shall be considered barred. The answer to counterclaims or
cross-claims shall be filed and served within ten (10) days from service
of the answer in which they are pleaded.
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. – Should the defendant fail to answer
the complaint within the period above provided, the court, motu proprio
or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what
is prayed for therein. The court may in its discretion reduce the amount
of damages and attorney’s fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise
unconscionable, without prejudice to the applicability of Section 4, Rule
18 of the Rules of Court, if there are two or more defendants.
[Emphasis Supplied]
Section 6 is clear that in case the defendant failed to file his answer, the
court shall render judgment, either motu proprio or upon plaintiff’s
motion, based solely on the facts alleged in the complaint and
limited to what is prayed for. The failure of the defendant to timely
file his answer and to controvert the claim against him constitutes his
acquiescence to every allegation stated in the complaint. Logically,
there is nothing to be done in this situation26except to render judgment
as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint. 27
Similarly, under Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which governs
the rules for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, if the defendant fails
to answer the complaint within the period provided, the court has no
authority to declare the defendant in default. Instead, the court, motu
proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is
prayed for.28
This has been enunciated in the case of Don Tino Realty and
Development Corporation v. Florentino,29 citing Bayog v.
Natino,30 where the Court held that there was no provision for an entry
of default under the Rules of Summary Procedure if the defendant failed
to file his answer.
In this case, Po failed to file his answer to the complaint despite proper
service of summons. He also failed to provide a sufficient justification
to excuse his lapses.1âwphi1 Thus, as no answer was filed, judgment
must be rendered by the court as may be warranted by the facts alleged
in the complaint.
Failure to attach annexes is not fatal if the complaint alleges a sufficient
cause of action; evidence need not be attached to the complaint
The lower courts erroneously dismissed the complaint of Fairland
simply on the ground that it failed to establish by preponderance of
evidence its ownership over the subject property. As can be gleaned
above, the rules do not compel the plaintiff to attach his evidence to the
complaint because, at this inception stage, he only has to file his
complaint to establish his cause of action. Here, the court was only
tasked to determine whether the complaint of Fairland alleged a
sufficient cause of action and to render judgment thereon.
Also, there was no need to attach proof of ownership in the complaint
because the allegations therein constituted a sufficient cause of action
for unlawful detainer. Only when the allegations in the complaint are
insufficient to form a cause of action shall the attachment become
material in the determination thereof. Even under Section 4 of the Rules
of Summary Procedure,31 it is not mandatory to attach annexes to the
complaint.
In the case of Lazaro v. Brewmaster32 (Lazaro), where judgment was
rendered based on the complaint due to the failure of the defendant to
file an answer under the Rules of Summary Procedure, it was written
that:
xxx To determine whether the complaint states a cause of action, all
documents attached thereto may, in fact, be considered, particularly
when referred to in the complaint. We emphasize, however, that the
inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material
allegations in the complaint. Thus, consideration of the annexed
documents should only be taken in the context of ascertaining the
sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint.
[Emphasis Supplied]
In Lazaro, the assailed invalid invoices attached to the complaint were
not considered because the complaint already alleged a sufficient cause
of action for collection of sum of money. Those assailed documents
were not the bases of the plaintiff’s action for sum of money, but were
only attached to the complaint to provide evidentiary details on the
alleged transactions.
Similarly, in the case at bench, there was no need for documentary
attachments to prove Fairland’s ownership over the subject
property. First, the present action is an action for unlawful detainer
wherein only de facto or material possession is required to be alleged.
Evidently, the attachment of any deed of ownership to the complaint is
not indispensable because an action for unlawful detainer does not
entirely depend on ownership.
Second, Fairland sufficiently alleged ownership and superior right of
possession over the subject property. These allegations were evidently
manifest in the complaint as Fairland claimed to have orally agreed to
lease the property to Po. The Court is of the view that these allegations
were clear and unequivocal and did not need supporting attachments to
be considered as having sufficiently established its cause of action. Even
the MeTC conceded that the complaint of Fairland stated a valid cause
of action for unlawful detainer.33 It must be stressed that inquiry into the
attached documents in the complaint is for the sufficiency, not the
veracity, of the material allegations in the complaint.
Third, considering that Po failed to file an answer within the prescribed
period, he was deemed to have admitted all the allegations in the
complaint including Fairland’s claim of ownership. To reiterate, the
failure of the defendant to timely file his answer and controvert the
claim against him constituted his acquiescence to every allegation stated
in the complaint.
In the Entry of Appearance with Motion for Leave of Court to file
Comment/Opposition to Motion to Render Judgment, which was
belatedly filed and so was denied by the MeTC, Po merely denied the
allegations against him without even bothering to aver why he claimed
to have a superior right of possession of the subject property.34
Fourth, it is only at the later stage of the summary procedure when the
affidavits of witnesses and other evidence on factual issues shall be
presented before the court. Sections 8 and 9 of the Rules on Summary
Procedure state:
Sec. 8. Record of preliminary conference. – Within five (5) days after
the termination of the preliminary conference, the court shall issue an
order stating the matters taken up therein, x x x
Sec. 9. Submission of affidavits and position papers. – Within ten (10)
days from receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding section,
the parties shall submit the affidavits of their witnesses and other
evidence on the factual issues defined in the order, together with their
position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them.
[Emphasis Supplied]
Again, it is worth stressing that these provisions are exactly Sections 9
and 10 under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
Accordingly, it is only at this part of the proceedings that the parties will
be required to present and offer their evidence before the court to
establish their causes and defenses. Before the issuance of the record of
preliminary conference, the parties are not yet required to present their
respective evidence.
These specific provisions under the Rules of Summary Procedure which
are also reflected in Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, serve their purpose
to immediately settle ejectment proceedings. “Forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings designed to provide
for an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to
possession of the property involved. It does not admit of a delay in the
determination thereof. It is a ‘time procedure’ designed to remedy the
situation.35 Thus, as a consequence of the defendant’s failure to file an
answer, the court is simply tasked to render judgment as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is
prayed for therein.
As the complaint contains a valid cause of action, a judgment can
already be rendered
In order to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of
unlawful detainer cases, a remand of this case to the lower courts is no
longer necessary and the case can be determined on its merits by the
Court.
To recapitulate, as Po failed to file his answer on time, judgment shall
be rendered based only on the complaint of Fairland without the need to
consider the weight of evidence. As discussed above, the complaint of
Fairland had a valid cause of action for unlawful detainer.
Consequently, there is no more need to present evidence to establish the
allegation of Fairland of its ownership and superior right of possession
over the subject property. Po’s failure to file an answer constitutes an
admission of his illegal occupation due to his non-payment of rentals,
and of Fairland’s rightful claim of material possession. Thus, judgment
must be rendered finding that Fairland has the right to eject Po from the
subject property.
The Judicial Affidavit Rule
On a final note, the Court deems it proper to discuss the relevance of the
Judicial Affidavit Rule or A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC, where documentary or
object evidence are required to be attached. To begin with, the rule is
not applicable because such evidence are required to be attached to a
judicial affidavit, not to a complaint. Moreover, as the rule took effect
only on January 1, 2013, it cannot be required in this case because this
was earlier filed on December 12, 2012.
Granting that it can be applied retroactively, the rule being essentially
remedial, still it has no bearing on the ruling of this Court.
In the Judicial Affidavit Rule, the attachments of documentary or object
evidence to the affidavits is required when there would be a pre-trial
or preliminary conference or the scheduled hearing. As stated
earlier, where a defendant fails to file an answer, the court shall render
judgment, either motu proprio or upon plaintiff’s motion, based solely
on the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for.
Thus, where there is no answer, there is no need for a pre-trial,
preliminary conference or hearing. Section 2 of the Judicial Affidavit
Rule reads:
Section 2. Submission of Judicial Affidavits and Exhibits in lieu of
direct testimonies. - (a) The parties shall file with the court and serve on
the adverse party, personally or by licensed courier service, not later
than five days before pre-trial or preliminary conference or the
scheduled hearing with respect to motions and incidents, the following:
(1) The judicial affidavits of their witnesses, which shall take
the place of such witnesses' direct testimonies; and
(2) The parties' docun1entary or object evidence, if any,
which shall be attached to the judicial affidavits and marked
as Exhibits A, B, C, and so on in the case of the complainant
or the plaintiff, and as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and so on in the case
of the respondent or the defendant.
(b) Should a party or a witness desire to keep the original document or
object evidence in his possession, he may, after the same has been
identified, marked as exhibit, and authenticated, warrant in his judicial
affidavit that the copy or reproduction attached to such affidavit is a
faithful copy or reproduction of that original. In addition, the party or
witness shall bring the original document or object evidence for
comparison during the preliminary conference with the attached copy,
reproduction, or pictures, failing which the latter shall not be admitted.
This is without prejudice to the introduction of secondary evidence in
place of the original when allowed by existing rules.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The October 31, 2014
Decision and the March 6, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CAG. R. SP No. 134701 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent Arturo Loo Po is ORDERED TO
VACATE Condominium Unit No. 205 located in Cedar Mansion II on
Ma. Escriba Street, Pasig City.
Respondent Po is further ORDERED TO PAY the rentals-in-arrears,
as well as the rentals accruing in the interim until he vacates the
property. The unpaid rentals shall incur a legal interest of six percent
(6%) per annum from January 30, 2012, when the demand to pay and to
vacate was made, up to the finality of this decision. Thereafter, an
interest of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on the total
amount due until full payment is made.
G.R. No. 160239 November 25, 2009
ANGELINA SORIENTE and ALL OTHER PERSONS
CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER HER, Petitioners,
vs.
THE ESTATE OF THE LATE ARSENIO E. CONCEPCION,
represented by NENITA S. CONCEPCION,Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 of the Order2 dated October
3, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213,
National Capital Judicial Region in Civil Case No. MC-03-407-A,
which affirmed the Decision dated April 8, 2003 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 59 in Civil Case No. 17973,
ordering petitioner to vacate the property, subject matter of this
unlawful detainer case, and surrender the possession thereof to
respondent.
The facts, as stated by the trial court,3 are as follows:
Respondent Nenita S. Concepcion established that she was the
registered owner of the lot occupied by petitioner Angelina Soriente at
No. 637 Cavo F. Sanchez Street, Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila. The
lot, with an area of 295 square meters, is covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 128924 issued by the Register of Deeds of Metro
Manila, District II.
During the lifetime of Arsenio E. Concepcion, who acquired the lot in
1978, he allowed and tolerated the occupancy of the lot by petitioner,
who was already staying on the property. Petitioner was allowed to stay
on the lot for free, but on a temporary basis until such time that
Concepcion and/or his family needed to develop the lot.
After Arsenio E. Concepcion died on December 27, 1989, his family
initiated steps to develop the lot, but petitioner’s occupancy of the lot
prevented them from pursuing their plan.
Verbal demands to vacate the lot was made on petitioner. Petitioner
pleaded for time to transfer to another place, but she never left.
In June 2000, Elizabeth Concepcion-Dela Cruz, daughter of respondent,
filed a complaint for conciliation proceedings before the barangay at the
instance of respondent. However, the parties did not reach a settlement,
which resulted in the issuance of a Certificate to File Action 5 dated
February 17, 2001 by the Barangay Captain of Barangay Hagdan Bato
Itaas, Mandaluyong City.
Respondent sent petitioner a demand letter dated September 22, 2000
by registered mail, demanding that she peacefully surrender the property
and extending financial assistance for her relocation. Despite receipt of
the demand letter, petitioner did not vacate the premises.
On April 27, 2001, respondent filed against petitioner a Complaint 6 for
unlawful detainer with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong
City, Branch 59 (trial court). The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case
No. 17973. The Complaint alleged that respondent was the registered
owner of the subject property, while petitioner had no title to the
property and her free occupancy thereof was merely tolerated by
respondent. Moreover, petitioner was occupying the premises together
with her family, and she had maintained boarders for a fee. Respondent
prayed that petitioner be ordered to vacate the lot, surrender the
possession thereof to respondent, pay monthly rent of ₱5,000.00 from
June 2000 until she vacates the premises, and pay actual, moral and
exemplary damages, as well as litigation expenses.
It appears from the records of the case that petitioner Soriente, as a
defendant in the lower court, did not file a separate Answer, but affixed
her signature to the Answer filed by defendant Alfredo Caballero in
another ejectment case, docketed as Civil Case No. 17974, which was
filed by respondent against Caballero. Hence, respondent, through
counsel, filed a Motion to Render Judgment7 under Section 7, Rule 70
of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure for Soriente’s failure to
file an Answer to the Complaint. Petitioner filed an Opposition to the
Motion to Render Judgment.8
In an Order9 dated December 5, 2001, the trial court denied the Motion
to Render Judgment. It stated that the allegations of the Complaint in
Civil Case No. 17973 and 17974 are similar, the only substantial
difference being the time when defendants occupied the subject
property allegedly through the tolerance of Arsenio Concepcion. The
trial court believed that in signing the Answer filed in Civil Case No.
17974, Soriente intended to adopt the same as her own, as both
defendants Caballero and Soriente had a common defense against
plaintiff’s (respondent’s) separate claim against them. The trial court
denied the Motion to Render Judgment in the interest of justice and
considered that the two cases, including Civil Case No. 17932 against
Severina Sadol, had been consolidated.
Pursuant to Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure,
the trial court set a preliminary conference on October 9, 2001 at 8:30
a.m. The preliminary conference was reset to November 15, 2001, and
then to December 18, 2001 because the Motion to Render Judgment was
still pending resolution. On December 18, 2001, the preliminary
conference was reset to January 24, 2002 as prayed for by defendants
on the ground that their common counsel was absent despite proper
notice, and plaintiff (respondent) did not object to the resetting. 10
On January 24, 2002, the scheduled preliminary conference was again
reset to March 5, 2002 because no notice was sent to defendants’
counsel, and plaintiff (respondent) and her counsel were both absent
despite proper notice.
On March 5, 2002, the trial court reset the preliminary conference to
April 16, 2002 on the ground that there was no notice sent to defendants’
counsel.
In the scheduled preliminary conference held on February 18, 2003,
only plaintiff’s (respondent’s) counsel and defendants Severina Sadol
and Alfredo Caballero were present. Plaintiff’s (respondent’s) counsel
submitted a secretary’s certificate attesting to the existence of a board
resolution authorizing him to enter into a compromise agreement. A
representative of defendant (petitioner) Angelina Soriente appeared, but
failed to submit a Special Power of Attorney authorizing her to enter
into a compromise agreement. Counsel for defendants was not in court,
and there was no proof of service on her for the hearing. However,
defendants Sadol and Caballero informed the court that they informed
their counsel of the hearing scheduled that day. In view of the absence
of defendant Angelina Soriente or her authorized representative,
plaintiff’s (respondent’s) counsel moved that the case be submitted for
decision, and that he be given 15 days within which to submit his
position paper.11
In its Order12 dated February 18, 2003, the trial court granted the motion
of plaintiff’s (respondent’s) counsel and considered the case against
defendant (petitioner) Angelina Soriente submitted for decision in
accordance with Section 7 of the Rules on Summary Procedure.13
On April 8, 2003, the trial court rendered a Decision 14 holding that
respondent established by preponderance of evidence that she was
entitled to the relief prayed for. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant
Angelina Soriente and all other persons claiming rights under her to:
1. Vacate the subject premises and surrender the possession
thereof to plaintiff;
2. Pay the amount of PESOS: FIVE THOUSAND
(₱5,000.00) per month as reasonable compensation for use
and occupation of the premises as of June 2000 until she
finally vacates the subject premises;
3. Pay the amount [of] PESOS: THREE THOUSAND
(₱3,000.00) as attorney’s fees; and
4. Pay the litigation expenses and cost of suit.15
Petitioner appealed the trial court’s Decision to the RTC of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 213, raising the following issues:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the plaintiff was able
to establish that she is the registered owner of the lot occupied
by the defendant-appellant instead of dismissing the
complaint outright for lack of legal capacity to sue.
2. The lower court erred in holding that the plaintiff was able
to establish by preponderance of evidence that she is entitled
to the relief prayed for despite lack of jurisdiction.
3. The lower court erred in holding that this instant case
subject of this appeal be decided in accordance with Section
7 of the Rules on Summary Procedure.16
In an Order17 dated October 3, 2003, the RTC affirmed the trial court’s
Decision, disposing thus:
PRESCINDING FROM THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS,
judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING IN TOTO the decision dated
April 8, 2003 rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 59,
Mandaluyong City.18
The RTC held:
Case records readily disclosed that the ownership of the subject lot
belongs to the late Arsenio E. Concepcion, married to herein Plaintiff-
Appellee Nenita S. Concepcion, as evidenced by the Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 12892 (Annex "A" in the complaint for Unlawful
Detainer). This Certificate of Title shall be received as evidence in all
courts of the Philippines and shall be conclusive as to all matters
contained therein principally, the identity of the owner of the land
covered thereby except as provided in the Land Registration Act. Said
title can be attacked only for fraud within one year after the date of the
issuance of the decree of registration. Such attack must be direct and not
by a collateral proceeding. The title represented by the certificate cannot
be changed, altered, modified, enlarged or diminished in a collateral
proceeding such as this instant appeal from the decision rendered by the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City in an ejectment case. As
should be known by Appellant Soriente through counsel, no title to
registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Prescription is
unavailing not only against the registered owner Arsenio E. Concepcion
but also against his hereditary successors because the latter merely steps
into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law and are merely the
continuation of the personalities of their predecessors-in-interest
(Barcelona v. Barcelona, 100 Phil 251; PD 1529, Sec. 47). x x x
xxxx
Noteworthy to mention in the case at bar is the ruling laid down in
Calubayan v. Pascual, 21 SCRA 146, where the Supreme Court [held]
that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance
or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound
by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against [him]. x x
x19
Petitioner filed this petition raising the following issues:
I
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT IN HOLDING THAT THE
PLAINTIFF WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT SHE IS THE
REGISTERED OWNER OF THE LOT OCCUPIED BY THE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT INSTEAD OF DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT OUTRIGHT FOR LACK OF LEGAL CAPACITY TO
SUE.
II
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT IN HOLDING THAT THE
PLAINTIFF WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH BY PREPONDERANCE
OF EVIDENCE THAT SHE IS ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF
PRAYED FOR DESPITE LACK OF JURISDICTION.
III
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THIS INSTANT CASE SUBJECT OF THIS APPEAL BE DECIDED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 7 OF THE RULES ON
SUMMARY PROCEDURE.20
Petitioner appealed from the RTC’s decision directly to this Court on
pure questions of law. There is a question of law in a given case when
the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as
to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts.21
Moreover, Republic v. Sandiganbayan22 ruled:
x x x A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns
the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts;
or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted.
A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the
truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the
whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the
existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well
as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of
the situation.23
The Court notes that petitioner raised both questions of fact and law in
her petition. The Court shall resolve only the pertinent questions of law
raised.
First, petitioner questioned respondent Nenita Concepcion’s capacity to
sue as a representative of the Estate of her husband, Arsenio
Concepcion, alleging absence of proof of the issuance of the requisite
letters testamentary or letters of administration evidencing her legal
capacity to sue in behalf of the Estate of Arsenio Concepcion in
contravention of Section 4, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
thus:
Sec. 4. Capacity. — Facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be
sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized
association of persons that is made a party, must be averred. A party
desiring to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party or the
capacity of any party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, shall
do so by specific denial, which shall include such supporting particulars
as are peculiarly within the pleader’s knowledge.
Petitioner asserts that lack of legal capacity to sue is a ground for
dismissal under Section 1 (d) of Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court,
and considering that a motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading under
the summary procedure, the trial court failed to exercise its duty to order
the outright dismissal of the complaint as mandated under Section 424 of
the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
Petitioner’s contention lacks merit.
Section 4, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Sec. 4. Capacity. – x x x A party desiring to raise an issue as to the legal
existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued in a
representative capacity, shall do so by specific denial, which shall
include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader’s
knowledge.25
Based on the provision cited above, the RTC correctly ruled:
The argument is not tenable. This court, upon cursory reading of the
provisions of Rule 8, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, in relation to the
Rules on Summary Procedure, finds it relevant to note x x x that
although a Motion to Dismiss or a Motion for Bill of Particulars cannot
be availed of to challenge the capacity of the party under the Rules on
Summary Procedure, the Defendant–Appellant should have at least
SPECIFICALLY DENIED such capacity of the party in the Answer,
which should have included such supporting particulars as are
peculiarly within the pleader’s knowledge. The case records clearly
disclosed that no such specific denial was made by the appellant and
this court believes that the lower court had carefully and dutifully taken
into account the applicable rules particularly Section 4 of the Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure, in relation to Section 4, Rule 8 of the
Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence, before rendering the
assailed decision dated April 8, 2003. The presumption of the regular
performance of duties applies in this case and the same shall prevail over
mere allegations of the herein Defendant-Appellant.26
Further, as the successor-in-interest of the late Arsenio E. Concepcion
and co-owner of the subject property, respondent Nenita S. Concepcion
is entitled to prosecute the ejectment case not only in a representative
capacity, but as a real party-in-interest. Article 487 of the Civil Code
states, "Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment."
Hence, assuming that respondent failed to submit the proper documents
showing her capacity to sue in a representative capacity for the estate of
her deceased husband, the Court, in the interest of speedy disposition of
cases, may deem her capacitated to prosecute the ejectment case as a
real party-in-interest being a co-owner of the subject property
considering that the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter
and has also acquired jurisdiction over the parties, including respondent
Nenita S. Concepcion.
Second, petitioner questions whether respondent has established by a
preponderance of evidence that she is entitled to the relief prayed for,
which is the ejectment of petitioner from the subject property. Petitioner
contends that respondent admitted in her Complaint that her right to the
subject property arose only in 1978, when the late Arsenio E.
Concepcion acquired the same. Petitioner alleges that to the contrary,
substantial evidence exists that she and her predecessors-in-interest
have continuously and openly occupied and possessed, in the concept
of owner, the subject property since time immemorial.
The Court holds that the RTC correctly affirmed the ejectment of
petitioner from the property.
To make out a case of unlawful detainer under Section 1, 27 Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court, the Complaint must allege that the defendant is
unlawfully withholding from the plaintiff the possession of certain real
property after the expiration or termination of the former’s right to hold
possession by virtue of a contract, express or implied, and that the action
is being brought within one year from the time the defendant’s
possession became unlawful.28
The Complaint alleged that petitioner occupied the subject property by
tolerance of the late Arsenio Concepcion. While tolerance is lawful,
such possession becomes illegal upon demand to vacate by the owner
and the possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with such
demand.29 Respondent sent petitioner a demand letter dated September
22, 2000 to vacate the subject property, but petitioner did not comply
with the demand. A person who occupies the land of another at the
latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is
necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon
demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against him.30 Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,
the one-year period within which a complaint for unlawful detainer can
be filed should be counted from the date of demand, because only upon
the lapse of that period does the possession become
unlawful.31 Respondent filed the ejectment case against petitioner on
April 27, 2001, which was less than a year from the date of formal
demand. Clearly, therefore, the action was filed within the one-year
period prescribed for filing an ejectment or unlawful detainer case.
The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or
material possession.32 All that the trial court can do is to make an initial
determination of who is the owner of the property, so that it can resolve
who is entitled to its possession absent other evidence to resolve
ownership.33 Courts in ejectment cases decide questions of ownership
only it is necessary to decide the question of possession.34 The reason
for this rule is to prevent the defendant from trifling with the summary
nature of an ejectment suit by the simple expedient of asserting
ownership over the disputed property.35
In this case, the trial court found that respondent owns the property on
the basis of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12892,36 which was "issued
in the name of Arsenio E. Concepcion, x x x married to Nenita L.
Songco." It is settled rule that the person who has a Torrens title over a
land is entitled to possession thereof.37 Hence, as the registered owner
of the subject property, respondent is preferred to possess it. 38
The validity of respondent’s certificate of title cannot be attacked by
petitioner in this case for ejectment. Under Section 48 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack.39 It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct
proceeding for that purpose in accordance with law.40 The issue of the
validity of the title of the respondents can only be assailed in an action
expressly instituted for that purpose.41Whether or not the petitioner has
the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of
the trial court to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.42
Although petitioner alleges that substantial evidence exists that she and
her predecessors-in-interest had continuously and openly occupied and
possessed, in the concept of owner, the subject property since time
immemorial, petitioner failed to present evidence to substantiate her
allegation. Whereas respondent holds a Torrens title over the subject
property; hence, she is entitled to the possession of the property.43
The court's adjudication of ownership in an ejectment case is merely
provisional, and affirmance of the trial court’s decision would not bar
or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the
property, if and when such action is brought seasonably before the
proper forum.44
Lastly, petitioner contends that the lower court erred in deciding this
case in accordance with Section 7 of the Rules on Summary Procedure,
thus:
SEC. 7. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. – Not later than
thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, a preliminary conference
shall be held. The rules on pre-trial in ordinary cases shall be applicable
to the preliminary conference unless inconsistent with the provisions of
this Rule.
The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference shall
be a cause for the dismissal of his complaint. The defendant who appears
in the absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment on his
counterclaim in accordance with Section 6 hereof. All cross-claims shall
be dismissed.
If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall be entitled to
judgment in accordance with Section 6 hereof. This Rule shall not apply
where one of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of
action who had pleaded a common defense shall appear at the
preliminary conference.45
Section 6 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, which is
referred to by Section 7 above, states:
SEC. 6. Effect of failure to answer. – Should the defendant fail to answer
the complaint within the period above provided, the court, motu proprio,
or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted
by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for
therein: Provided, however, That the court may in its discretion reduce
the amount of damages and attorney’s fees claimed for being excessive
or otherwise unconscionable. This is without prejudice to the
applicability of Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, if there are two
or more defendants.
Petitioner asserts that considering that the cases against her, defendants
Caballero and Sadol were consolidated, and she and defendant
Caballero signed and filed one common Answer to the Complaint, thus,
pleading a common defense, the trial court should not have rendered
judgment on her case based on Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure when she failed to appear in the preliminary
conference.
The contention lacks merit.
The Court notes that the ejectment case filed by respondent against
petitioner was docketed in the trial court as Civil Case No. 17973, the
case against Alfredo Caballero was docketed as Civil Case No. 17974,
while the case against Severina Sadol was docketed as Civil Case No.
17932. These cases were consolidated by the trial court.
Under Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, if
a sole defendant shall fail to appear in the preliminary conference, the
plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in accordance with Section 6 of
the Rule, that is, the court shall render judgment as may be warranted
by the facts alleged in the Complaint and limited to what is prayed for
therein. However, "[t]his Rule (Sec. 7) shall not apply where one of two
or more defendants sued under a common cause of action, who had
pleaded a common defense, shall appear at the preliminary conference."
Petitioner claims that the preceding provision applies to her as a
defendant, since the ejectment cases were consolidated by the trial court,
and she and Caballero filed the same Answer to the Complaint; hence,
the trial court should not have rendered judgment against her when she
failed to appear in the preliminary conference.46
The Court holds that the italicized provision above does not apply in the
case of petitioner, since she and Caballero were not co-defendants in the
same case. The ejectment case filed against petitioner was distinct from
that of Caballero, even if the trial court consolidated the cases and, in
the interest of justice, considered the Answer filed by Caballero in Civil
Case No. 17974 as the Answer also of petitioner since she affixed her
signature thereto.
Considering that petitioner was sued in a separate case for ejectment
from that of Caballero and Sadol, petitioner’s failure to appear in the
preliminary conference entitled respondent to the rendition of judgment
by the trial court on the ejectment case filed against petitioner, docketed
as Civil Case No. 17973, in accordance with Section 7 of the 1991
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated October 3,
2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213,
National Capital Judicial Region in Civil Case No. MC-03-407-A is
AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 152131 April 29, 2009
FLORAIDA TERAÑA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO DE SAGUN, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XIV, NASUGBU, BATANGAS AND
ANTONIO B. SIMUANGCO, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
The petitioner Floraida Terana (petitioner) asks us to reverse and set
aside, through this Petition for Review on Certiorari,1 the September 7,
2001 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its subsequent
Resolution3 denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
THE FACTS
The respondent Antonio Simuangco (respondent) owned a house and lot
at 138 J.P. Laurel St., Nasugbu, Batangas, which he leased to the
petitioner.4 Sometime in 1996, the petitioner demolished the leased
house and erected a new one in its place.5 The respondent alleged that
this was done without his consent.6 The Contract of Lease7defining the
respective rights and obligations of the parties contained the following
provisions, which the petitioner allegedly violated:
3. That the lessee obligated herself with the Lessor by virtue of this
Lease, to do the following, to wit:
a) xxx
b) To keep the leased property in such repair and condition as
it was in the commencement of the Lease with the exception
of portions or parts which may be impaired due to reasonable
wear and tear;
c) xxx
d) Not to make any alterations in the Leased property without
the knowledge and consent of the Lessor; x x x
The petitioner allegedly also gave the materials from the demolished
house to her sister, who built a house adjacent to the respondent’s
property.8 When the respondent discovered what the petitioner did, he
immediately confronted her and advised her to vacate the
premises.9 She refused. On February 3, 1997, the respondent sent a
letter demanding the petitioner to vacate the leased property.10 Despite
this letter of demand, which the petitioner received on February
10,11 she still refused to vacate the said property.
The respondent thus filed a complaint for unlawful detainer12 against
the petitioner on April 16, 1997 on the ground of the petitioner’s
violation of the terms of the Contract of Lease.13 The respondent prayed
for the petitioner’s ejectment of the leased property, and for the award
of ₱70,000.00, representing the cost of the materials from the
demolished house, attorney’s fees, and costs.14
The presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Nasugbu,
Batangas, Hon. Herminia Lucas, inhibited from the case on the ground
that she is related to the respondent.15
The petitioner denied allegations of the complaint in her "Sagot."16 She
claimed that she demolished the old building and built a new one with
the knowledge and consent of the respondent; that the original house
was old and was on the verge of collapsing;17 that without the timely
repairs made by the petitioner, the house’s collapse would have caused
the death of the petitioner and her family. The petitioner prayed for the
court to: 1) dismiss the ejectment case against her; and 2) award in her
favor: a) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages, b) ₱200,000.00 as
reimbursement for the expenses incurred in building the new house, c)
₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and d) ₱10,000.00 as costs incurred in
relation to the suit.18
The trial court called for a preliminary conference under Section 7 of
the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure (RSP) and Section 8 of Rule
70 of the Rules of Court, and required the parties to file their position
papers and affidavits of their witnesses after they failed to reach an
amicable settlement.19 Instead of filing their position papers, both
parties moved for an extension of time to file the necessary pleadings.
The trial court denied both motions on the ground that the RSP and the
Rules of Court, particularly Rule 70, Section 13(5), prohibit the filing
of a motion for extension of time.20
The MTC framed the issues in the case as follows:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the contract of lease
when the old house was demolished and a new house was
constructed by the defendant; and
2. Whether or not defendant is entitled to be reimbursed for
her expenses in the construction of the new house.21
THE MTC’S DECISION22
The MTC rendered its decision on November 5, 199723 despite the
parties’ failure to timely file their respective position papers. 24 The
decision stated that: according to the parties’ Contract of Lease, the
consent of the respondent must be obtained before any alteration or
repair could be done on the leased property; that the petitioner failed to
produce any evidence that the respondent had given her prior permission
to demolish the leased house and construct a new one; that even in her
answer, she failed to give specific details about the consent given to her;
that in demolishing the old structure and constructing the new one, the
petitioner violated the Contract of Lease; that this violation of the terms
of the lease was a ground for judicial ejectment under Article 1673(3)
of the Civil Code; and that since the demolition and construction of the
new house was without the consent of the respondent, there was no basis
to order the respondent to reimburse the petitioner.
The MTC thus ruled:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff Antonio B. Simuangco and against the defendant
Aida Terana as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant Aida Terana and all persons
claiming right under her to vacate and surrender possession of
the subject house to the plaintiff;
2. Ordering the said defendant to pay the amount of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as Attorney’s fees; and
3. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.25
Unaware that a decision had already been rendered, the petitioner filed
a letter entitled Kahilingan,26 to which she attached her position paper
and the affidavits of her witnesses.27 The submission was essentially a
motion for reconsideration of the denial of motion for extension of time.
On November 6, 1977, the MTC denied the petitioner’s Kahilingan as
follows:
Defendant Aida Terania’s "KAHILINGAN" dated November 5, 1997
is DENIED for being moot and academic on account of the decision on
the merits rendered by this court dated November 4, 1997 relative to the
instant case.
SO ORDERED.28
Petitioner then filed a Notice of Appeal on November 12, 1997. 29 The
records of the case were ordered elevated to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 439.
THE RTC’S DECISION30
The RTC rendered judgment affirming the decision of the MTC on
February 26, 1998. The RTC ruled that: 1) the ruling of the MTC was
supported by the facts on record; 2) although the respondent failed to
submit his position paper and the affidavits of his witnesses, the MTC
correctly rendered its decision on the basis of the pleadings submitted
by the parties, as well as the evidence on record; 3) the petitioner failed
to show enough reason to reverse the MTC’s decision. The court further
declared that its decision was immediately executory, without prejudice
to any appeal the parties may take.
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or for New Trial
on March 3, 1998.31 The petitioner argued that the appealed MTC
decision was not supported by any evidence, and that the respondent
failed to substantiate the allegations of his complaint and to discharge
the burden of proving these allegations after the petitioner denied them
in her Sagot. In effect, the petitioner argued that the allegations of the
complaint should not have been the sole basis for the judgment since
she filed an answer and denied the allegations in the complaint; the RTC
should have also appreciated her position paper and the affidavit of her
witnesses that, although filed late, were nevertheless not expunged from
the records.
In her motion for a new trial, the petitioner argued that her failure to
submit her position paper and the affidavits of her witnesses within the
10-day period was due to excusable negligence. She explained that she
incurred delay because of the distance of some of her witnesses’
residence. The petitioner alleged that she had a good and meritorious
claim against the respondent, and that aside from her position paper and
the affidavits of her witnesses, she would adduce receipts and other
pieces of documentary evidence to establish the costs incurred in the
demolition of the old house and the construction of the new one.
On April 28, 1998, the RTC granted the motion for reconsideration, and
thus reversed its February 26, 1998 judgment, as well as the November
5, 1997 decision of the MTC. It noted that: 1) the MTC rendered its
decision before the petitioner was able to file her position paper and the
affidavit of her witnesses; 2) the rule on the timeliness of filing
pleadings may be relaxed on equitable considerations; and 3) the denial
of the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and/or new trial will result
to a miscarriage of justice. Thus, believing that it was equitable to relax
the rules on the timeliness of the filing of pleadings, the RTC remanded
the case to the MTC for further proceedings, after giving the respondent
the opportunity to submit his position paper and the affidavits of his
witnesses. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, on considerations of equity and substantial justice, and
in the light of Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court, the judgment
of this Court dated February 26, 1998, as well as the Decision dated
November 4, 1997 of the Lower Court in Civil Case No. 1305, are
hereby both set aside. The lower court to which the records were
heretofore remanded is hereby ordered to conduct further proceedings
in this case, after giving the plaintiff-appellee an opportunity to file his
position paper and affidavits of witnesses as required by Section 10,
Rule 70, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. [Underscoring supplied.]
SO ORDERED.
On May 9, 1998, the petitioner challenged the order of remand through
another motion for reconsideration.32 The petitioner argued that since
the original action for unlawful detainer had already been elevated from
the MTC to the RTC, the RSP no longer governed the disposal of the
case. Before the RTC, the applicable rule is the Rules of Court,
particularly Section 6 of Rule 37, which reads:
Sec. 6. Effect of granting of motion for new trial. – If a new trial is
granted in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, the original
judgment or final order shall be vacated, and the action shall stand for
trial de novo; but the recorded evidence taken upon the former trial, in
so far as the same is material and competent to establish the issues, shall
be used at the new trial without retaking the same.
Thus, the RTC should have conducted a trial de novo instead of
remanding the case to the MTC. The petitioner further argued that a
remand to the court a quo may only be ordered under Section 8, Rule
4033 of the Rules of Court.
The RTC denied the motion noting that the petitioner missed the whole
point of the reversal of the decision. First, the reversal was made in the
interest of substantial justice and the RTC hewed more to the "spirit that
vivifieth than to the letter that killeth,"34 and that "a lawsuit is best
resolved on its full merits, unfettered by the stringent technicalities of
procedure." The RTC further emphasized that a remand is not prohibited
under the Rules of Court and that Section 6 of Rule 135 allows it:
Sec. 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect – When by law jurisdiction
is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes
and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by
such court or officer, and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise
of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these
rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which
appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules.
Second, Rule 40 governs appeals from the MTC to the RTC. Nowhere
in Rule 40 is there a provision similar to Section 6 of Rule 37.
Third, Section 6 of Rule 37 contemplates a motion for new trial and for
reconsideration filed before a trial court a quo. The RTC in this case was
acting as an appellate court; the petitioner’s motion for new trial and
reconsideration was directed against the appellate judgment of the RTC,
not the original judgment of the trial court.
Fourth, after Republic Act No. 6031 mandated municipal trial courts to
record their proceedings, a trial de novo at the appellate level may no
longer be conducted. The appellate courts may instead review the
evidence and records transmitted to it by the trial court. Since the
petitioner is asking the court to review the records of the MTC, inclusive
of her position paper and the affidavits of her witnesses, it is also
important to give the respondent an opportunity to file his position paper
and the affidavits of his witnesses before the MTC renders a judgment.
It is the MTC or the trial court that has the jurisdiction to do that.
THE CA’S DECISION
The CA affirmed the RTC in a decision promulgated on September 7,
2001.35 The CA noted that the RTC’s order of remand was not just based
on equity and substantial justice, but was also based on law, specifically
Section 6 of Rule 135. Thus, the CA ruled that the RTC did not err in
remanding the case to the MTC and ordering the conduct of further
proceedings after giving the respondent an opportunity to present his
position paper and the affidavits of his witnesses. This ruling did not
satisfy petitioner, giving way to the present petition.
THE PETITION
Before this Court, the petitioner alleges: 1) that the respondent made a
request for the petitioner to vacate the subject property because his
nearest of kin needed it; 2) that she was only going to vacate the
premises if she were reimbursed the actual cost incurred in building the
said house;36 3) that the case be decided on the basis of the entire record
of the proceedings in the court of origin, including memoranda and
briefs submitted by the parties, instead of being remanded to the MTC.
In his Comment37 and Memorandum,38 the respondent joins the
petitioner’s prayer for a ruling based on the records instead of
remanding the case to the MTC. He prays that, as the MTC ruled, the
petitioner be ordered to vacate the leased property, and that the
petitioner’s claim for reimbursement be denied. The respondent argues
that the MTC correctly ruled on the basis of the parties’ pleadings, the
stipulation of facts during the preliminary conference, and the records
of the proceedings.
ISSUES
The petitioner submits the following as the issue to be decided:
[W]hether under the Rules of Summary Procedure, the Regional Trial
Court, as well as the Court of Appeals, may order the case remanded to
the MTC after the plaintiff, herein respondent, failed to submit evidence
in support of his complaint because his Position Paper, affidavit of
witnesses and evidence, were not submitted on time and the extension
of time to file the same was denied because it is prohibited under the
Rules on Summary Procedure.39
which we break down into the following sub-issues: 1) whether a
remand is proper; 2) whether the Court should appreciate the
petitioner’s position paper and the affidavits of her witnesses; and 3)
whether the complaint for unlawful detainer should be dismissed.
THE COURT’S RULING
The petition is partly meritorious.
Remand Not Necessary
We find that a remand of the case to the lower courts is no longer
necessary, given the pleadings and submissions filed, and the records of
the proceedings below. A remand would delay the overdue resolution
of this case (originally filed with the MTC on April 16, 1997), and
would run counter to the spirit and intent of the RSP. 40
Petitioner’s Position Paper and the Affidavits of Her Witnesses Cannot
Be Admitted
Should the Court admit the petitioner’s position paper and the affidavits
of her witnesses attached to her Kahilingan?
The intent and terms of the RSP both speak against the liberality that
the petitioner sees. By its express terms, the purpose of the RSP is to
"achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination" of the cases
they cover, among them, forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases.41 To achieve this objective, the RSP expressly prohibit certain
motions and pleadings that could cause delay, among them, a motion
for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper. If
the extension for the filing of these submissions cannot be allowed, we
believe it illogical and incongruous to admit a pleading that is already
filed late. Effectively, we would then allow indirectly what we prohibit
to be done directly. It is for this reason that in Don Tino Realty
Development Corporation v. Florentino,42albeit on the issue of late
filing of an answer in a summary proceeding, we stated that "[t]o admit
a late answer is to put a premium on dilatory measures, the very mischief
that the rules seek to redress."
The strict adherence to the reglementary period prescribed by the RSP
is due to the essence and purpose of these rules. The law looks with
compassion upon a party who has been illegally dispossessed of his
property. Due to the urgency presented by this situation, the RSP
provides for an expeditious and inexpensive means of reinstating the
rightful possessor to the enjoyment of the subject property.43 This
fulfills the need to resolve the ejectment case quickly. Thus, we cannot
reward the petitioner’s late filing of her position paper and the affidavits
of her witnesses by admitting them now.
The failure of one party to submit his position paper does not bar at all
the MTC from issuing a judgment on the ejectment complaint. Section
10 of the RSP states:
Section 10. Rendition of judgment. – Within thirty (30) days after
receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the
period for filing the same, the court shall render judgment.
[Underscoring supplied.]
However, should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material
facts, it may, during the said period, issue an order specifying the
matters to be clarified, and require the parties to submit affidavits or
other evidence on the said matters within ten (10) days from receipt of
said order. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the
receipt of the last affidavit or the expiration of the period for filing the
same.
The court shall not resort to the foregoing procedure just to gain time
for the rendition of the judgment.
Thus, the situation obtaining in the present case has been duly provided
for by the Rules; it was correct to render a judgment, as the MTC did,
after one party failed to file their position paper and supporting
affidavits.
That a position paper is not indispensable to the court’s authority to
render judgment is further evident from what the RSP provides
regarding a preliminary conference: "on the basis of the pleadings and
the stipulations and admissions made by the parties, judgment may be
rendered without the need for further proceedings, in which event the
judgment shall be rendered within 30 days from the issuance of the
order."44 Thus, the proceedings may stop at that point, without need for
the submission of position papers. In such a case, what would be extant
in the record and the bases for the judgment would be the complaint,
answer, and the record of the preliminary conference.
Unlawful detainer
The special civil action for unlawful detainer has the following essential
requisites:
 1) the fact of lease by virtue of a contract, express or implied;
2) the expiration or termination of the possessor's right to hold
possession;
3) withholding by the lessee of possession of the land or
building after the expiration or termination of the right to
possess;
4) letter of demand upon lessee to pay the rental or comply
with the terms of the lease and vacate the premises; and
5) the filing of the action within one year from the date of the
last demand received by the defendant.45
Requisites 1, 4, and 5 have been duly established. The presence of the
Contract of Lease is undisputed; the letter of demand was sent on
February 3, 1997, and received by the petitioner on February 10, 1997;
and the action was filed on April 16, 1997, well within the one-year
period from the letter of demand. For our determination is whether the
petitioner’s right to possess the subject property may be terminated by
virtue of her violation of the terms of the contract. If we answer in the
affirmative, her continued detention of the property is illegal.
Section 1673(3) of the Civil Code answers this question by providing
that the lessor may terminate the lease contract for violation of any of
the conditions or terms agreed upon,46 and may judicially eject the
lessee.47 One of the stipulated terms of the parties’ Contract of Lease, as
narrated above, is that no alterations may be made on the leased property
without the knowledge and consent of the lessor. The issue in this case
is beyond the fact of alteration since it is not disputed that the petitioner
demolished the house under lease and built a new one. The crucial issue
is whether the demolition was with or without the knowledge and
consent of the respondent.
The petitioner contends that the Court should not give credence to the
respondent’s claim that he neither had knowledge of nor gave his
consent to her acts. She argued that the respondent had the burden of
proving this allegation with positive evidence after she frontally denied
it in her answer. Since the respondent failed to discharge this burden,
she argues that she no longer needed to prove her defense that the
demolition and construction were done with the respondent’s
knowledge and consent.48
The petitioner’s contention is misplaced.
First, the material allegations in a complaint must be specifically denied
by the defendant in his answer. Section 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of
Court, provides:
A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of
which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the
substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial.
Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall
specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny the
remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in
the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial.
Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court likewise provides that material
allegations in the complaint which are not specifically denied, other than
the amount of unliquidated damages, are deemed admitted. A denial
made without setting forth the substance of the matters relied upon in
support of the denial, even when to do so is practicable, does not amount
to a specific denial.49
The petitioner’s denial in her answer consists of the following:
1. Maliban sa personal na katangian at tirahan ng
nasasakdal, ay walang katotuhanan ang mga isinasakdal ng
nagsasakdal;
2. Na hindi lumabag sa kasunduan ng upahan ang
nasasakdal;
3. Na, ang pagpapagawa ng bahay na inuupahan ng
nasasakdal ay sa kaalaman at kapahintulutan ng nagsasakdal
at higit na gumanda at tumibay ang bahay ng nagsasakdal sa
pamamagitan ng pagpapagawa ng nasasakdal; xxx50
We do not find this denial to be specific as the petitioner failed to set
forth the substance of the matters in which she relied upon to support
her denial. The petitioner merely alleged that consent was given; how
and why, she did not say. If indeed consent were given, it would have
been easy to fill in the details. She could have stated in her pleadings
that she verbally informed the respondent of the need for the repairs, or
wrote him a letter. She could have stated his response, and how it was
conveyed, whether verbally or in writing. She could have stated when
the consent was solicited and procured. These, she failed to
do. Ergo, the petitioner is deemed to have admitted the material
allegations in the complaint.
Second, both parties failed to present evidence other than the allegations
in their pleadings. Thus, the court may weigh the parties’ allegations
against each other. The petitioner presented a general denial, while the
respondent set forth an affirmative assertion. This Court has time and
again said that a general denial cannot be given more weight than an
affirmative assertion.51
Damages recoverable in an unlawful detainer action are limited to
rentals or reasonable compensation for the use of the property
This Court has no jurisdiction to award the reimbursement prayed for
by both parties. Both parties seek damages other than rentals or
reasonable compensation for the use of the property, which are the only
forms of damages that may be recovered in an unlawful detainer
case.52 Rule 70, Section 17 of the Rules of Court authorizes the trial
court to order the award of an amount representing arrears of rent or
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises if
it finds that the allegations of the complaint are true. 531avvphil.zw+
The rationale for limiting the kind of damages recoverable in an
unlawful detainer case was explained in Araos v. Court of
Appeals,54 wherein the Court held that:
The rule is settled that in forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases, the
only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased
property. The reason for this is that in such cases, the only issue raised
in ejectment cases is that of rightful possession; hence, the damages
which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have
sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and
occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may have
suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material
possession.
An action for reimbursement or for recovery of damages may not be
properly joined with the action for ejectment. The former is an ordinary
civil action requiring a full-blown trial, while an action for unlawful
detainer is a special civil action which requires a summary procedure.
The joinder of the two actions is specifically enjoined by Section 5 of
Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. – A party may in one pleading
assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he
may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with
the rules on joinder of parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or
actions governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties
but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder
may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of
the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court
and the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally
for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be
the test of jurisdiction. [Underscoring supplied.]
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-48534
is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The petitioner FLORAIDA
TERANA and all persons claiming right under her are ordered to vacate
and surrender possession of the subject property to the respondent
ANTONIO SIMUANGCO. No costs.