FREEDOM OF RELIGION

1.) GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner,

vs.
JUAN RUIZ, respondent.

Vicente Sotto for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for respondent.

LAUREL, J.:

The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of
prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International
Eucharistic Congress.

In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the
celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner,
in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter
to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the
United States the designs of the postage stamps for printing as follows:

"In the center is chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The stamps are blue, green, brown, cardinal red, violet and orange,
1 inch by 1,094 inches. The denominations are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36 and 50 centavos." The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the
greater part thereof, to this day, remains unsold. The further sale of the stamps is sought to be prevented by the petitioner herein.

The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper legal remedy in the instant case, although he admits that the writ
may properly restrain ministerial functions. While, generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain or control the
performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C. J., 6580, its issuance and enforcement are regulated by statute and in this
jurisdiction may issue to . . . inferior tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons, whether excercising functions judicial or ministerial, which are
without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person, . . . ." (Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.) The
terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with reference to "functions" in the statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and include the challenged
act of the respondent Director of Posts in the present case, which act because alleged to be violative of the Constitution is a fortiorari "without
or in excess of . . . jurisdiction." The statutory rule, therefore, in the jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confined exclusively to courts
or tribunals to keep them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to prevent them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals,
but will issue, in appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority. Not infrequently, "the writ is
granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or
vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1923], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)

The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions
of section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as follows:

No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
church, denomination, secretarian, institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other
religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal
institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.

The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and state. Without the necessity of adverting to
the historical background of this principle in our country, it is sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught
us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for ocassions might arise when the estate will use the church, and the church the
state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their recognized this principle of separation of church and state in the early stages of our constitutional
development; it was inserted in the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain of December 10, 1898, reiterated in President McKinley's
Instructions of the Philippine Commission, reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, and finally
embodied in the constitution of the Philippines as the supreme expression of the Filipino people. It is almost trite to say now that in this country
we enjoy both religious and civil freedom. All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to support and
defend the constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent limitations
and recognized implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration.

Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in
human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it
instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the
preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals,
conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men
and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are
indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively
to religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. 4, Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment
Law, sec. 344, par. [c]. Adm. Code). Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as
such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium 9 sec. 13, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the
Philippines). Optional religious instruction in the public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the
Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Adm. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays and made
legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the secular idea that their observance is conclusive to beneficial moral results. The law allows
divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against religious worship are considered crimes against the fundamental laws of
the state (see arts. 132 and 133, Revised Penal Code).

In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the provisions of Act No. 4052
of the Philippine Legislature. This Act is as follows:

No. 4052. — AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS AND MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE
INSULAR TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature assembled and by the authority of the same:

SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated and made immediately available out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not
otherwise appropriated, for the costs of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs, and other expenses incident thereto.

SEC. 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is hereby authorized to dispose of the
whole or any portion of the amount herein appropriated in the manner indicated and as often as may be deemed advantageous to the
Government.

SEC. 3. This amount or any portion thereof not otherwise expended shall not revert to the Treasury.

SEC. 4. This act shall take effect on its approval.

Approved, February 21, 1933.

It will be seen that the Act appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the costs of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs
and other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the
Government". The printing and issuance of the postage stamps in question appears to have been approved by authority of the President of the
Philippines in a letter dated September 1, 1936, made part of the respondent's memorandum as Exhibit A. The respondent alleges that the
Government of the Philippines would suffer losses if the writ prayed for is granted. He estimates the revenue to be derived from the sale of the
postage stamps in question at P1,618,17.10 and states that there still remain to be sold stamps worth P1,402,279.02.

Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the
issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government"
does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for
the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the
Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian denomination. The stamps were not
issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the
contrary, it appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only
purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned
merely, took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people" (Letter of the
Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications to the President of the Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's complaint). It is
significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned,
contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic
Congress, Feb. 3-7,1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that
congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious
character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are
of the opinion that the Government should not be embarassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in
character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be
frustrated by its subordinate to mere incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44
Law. ed., 168.)

We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to maintain inviolate the complete separation of church and
state and curb any attempt to infringe by indirection a constitutional inhibition. Indeed, in the Philippines, once the scene of religious intolerance
and prescription, care should be taken that at this stage of our political development nothing is done by the Government or its officials that may
lead to the belief that the Government is taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect or institution. But, upon very serious reflection,
examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that there has been no constitutional
infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
discretion to misuse postage stamps with new designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government." Even if we were to
assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner
would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to
be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition.

The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
2.) Garces v estenzo
This case is about the constitutionality of four resolutions of the barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City, regarding the acquisition of the
wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebration of his annual feast day. That issue was spawned by the controversy as to
whether the parish priest or a layman should have the custody of the image.

On March 23, 1976, the said barangay council adopted Resolution No. 5, "reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of
April "of the feast day of Señor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia".

That resolution designated the members of nine committees who would take charge of the 1976 festivity. lt provided for (1) the acquisition of
the image of San Vicente Ferrer and (2) the construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's projects. Funds for the two projects would be
obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations " (Exh A or 6).

On March 26, 1976, the barangay council passed Resolution No. 6 which specified that, in accordance with the practice in Eastern Leyte,
Councilman Tomas Cabatingan, the Chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta, would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and
that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor as chairman of the next feast day.

It was further provided in the resolution that the image would be made available to the Catholic parish church during the celebration of the
saint's feast day (Exh. B or 7).

Resolutions Nos. 5 and 6 were submitted to a plebiscite and were duly ratified by the barangay general assembly on March 26, 1976. Two
hundred seventy-two voters ratified the two resolutions (Exh. 2 and 5).

Funds were raised by means of solicitations0 and cash donations of the barangay residents and those of the neighboring places of Valencia. With
those funds, the waiting shed was constructed and the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired in Cebu City by the barangay council
for four hundred pesos (Exh. F-l, 3 and 4).

On April 5, 1976, the image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic church of Barangay Valencia so that the devotees could worship
the saint during the mass for the fiesta.

A controversy arose after the mass when the parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return that image to the barangay council
on the pretext that it was the property of the church because church funds were used for its acquisition.

Several days after the fiesta or on April 11, 1976, on the occasion of his sermon during a mass, Father Osmeña allegedly uttered defamatory
remarks against the barangay captain, Manuel C. Veloso, apparently in connection with the disputed image. That incident provoked Veloso to
file against Father Osmeña in the city court of Ormoc City a charge for grave oral defamation.

Father Osmeña retaliated by filing administrative complaints against Veloso with the city mayor's office and the Department of Local Government
and Community Development on the grounds of immorality, grave abuse of authority, acts unbecoming a public official and ignorance of the
law.

Meanwhile, the image of San Vicente Ferrer remained in the Catholic church of Valencia. Because Father Osmeña did not accede to the request
of Cabatingan to have custody of the image and "maliciously ignored" the council's Resolution No. 6, the council enacted on May 12, 1976
Resolution No. 10, authorizing the hiring of a lawyer to file a replevin case against Father Osmeña for the recovery of the image (Exh. C or 8). On
June 14, 1976, the barangay council passed Resolution No. 12, appointing Veloso as its representative in the replevin case (Exh. D or 9).

The replevin case was filed in the city court of Ormoc City against Father Osmeña and Bishop Cipriano Urgel (Exh. F). After the barangay council
had posted a cash bond of eight hundred pesos, Father Osmeña turned over the image to the council (p. 10, Rollo). ln his answer to the complaint
for replevin, he assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions (Exh. F-1).

Later, he and three other persons, Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, and two Catholic laymen, Jesus Edullantes and Nicetas
Dagar, filed against the barangay council and its members (excluding two members) a complaint in the Court of First Instance at Ormoc City,
praying for the annulment of the said resolutions (Civil Case No. 1680-0).

The lower court dismissed the complaint. lt upheld the validity of the resolutions. The petitioners appealed under Republic Act No. 5440. The
petitioners contend that the barangay council was not duly constituted because lsidoro M. Mañago, Jr., the chairman of the kabataang barangay,
was not allowed to participate in its sessions.

Barangays used to be known as citizens assemblies (Presidential Decrees Nos. 86 and 86-A). Presidential Decree No. 557, which took effect on
September 21, 1974, 70 O.G. 8450-L, directed that all barrios should be known as barangays and adopted the Revised Barrio Charter as the
Barangay Charter.

Barrios are units of municipalities or municipal districts in which they are situated. They are quasi-municipal corporations endowed with such
powers" as are provided by law "for the performance of particular government functions, to be exercised by and through their respective barrio
governments in conformity with law" (Sec. 2, Revised Barrio Charter, R.A. No. 3590).
The barrio assembly consists of all persons who are residents of the barrio for at least six months, eighteen years of age or over and Filipino
citizens duly registered in the list kept by the barrio secretary (Sec. 4, Ibid).

The barrio council, now barangay council, is composed of the barangay captain and six councilmen (Sec. 7, Ibid). Section 3 of Presidential Decree
No. 684, which took effect on April 15, 1975, provides that "the barangay youth chairman shall be an ex-officio member of the barangay council",
having the same powers and functions as a barangay councilman.

In this case, Mañago, the barangay youth chairman, was notified of the sessions of the barangay council to be held on March 23 and 26, 1976
but he was not able to attend those sessions because he was working with a construction company based at Ipil, Ormoc City (Par. 2[d] Exh. 1).

Mañago's absence from the sessions of the barangay council did not render the said resolutions void. There was a quorum when the said
resolutions were passed.

The other contention of the petitioners is that the resolutions contravene the constitutional provisions that "no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion" and that "no public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the
use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any
priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such. except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to
the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium (Sec. 8, Article IV and sec. 18[2], Article VIII, Constitution).

That contention is glaringly devoid of merit. The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious
liberty, nor appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds,
not with tax money. The construction of a waiting shed is entirely a secular matter.

Manifestly puerile and flimsy is Petitioners argument that the barangay council favored the Catholic religion by using the funds raised by
solicitations and donations for the purchase of the patron saint's wooden image and making the image available to the Catholic church.

The preposterousness of that argument is rendered more evident by the fact that counsel advanced that argument in behalf of the petitioner,
Father Osmeña the parish priest.

The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not
for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights
of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated.

If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate
the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal.

As noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta
relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses.

The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of the wooden image in order to forestall any suspicion that it is favoring the Catholic
church. A more practical reason for that arrangement would be that the image, if placed in a layman's custody, could easily be made available
to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novenas.

The contradictory positions of the petitioners are shown in their affidavits. Petitioner Garces swore that the said resolutions favored the Catholic
church. On the other hand, petitioners Dagar and Edullantes swore that the resolutions prejudiced the Catholics because they could see the
image in the church only once a year or during the fiesta (Exh. H and J).

We find that the momentous issues of separation of church and state, freedom of religion annd the use of public money to favor any sect or
church are not involved at all in this case even remotely or indirectly. lt is not a microcosmic test case on those issues.

This case is a petty quarrel over the custody of a saint's image. lt would never have arisen if the parties had been more diplomatic and tactful
and if Father Osmeña had taken the trouble of causing contributions to be solicited from his own parishioners for the purchase of another image
of San Vicente Ferrer to be installed in his church.

There can be no question that the image in question belongs to the barangay council. Father Osmeña claim that it belongs to his church is wrong.
The barangay council, as owner of the image, has the right to determine who should have custody thereof.

If it chooses to change its mind and decides to give the image to the Catholic church. that action would not violate the Constitution because the
image was acquired with private funds and is its private property.

The council has the right to take measures to recover possession of the image by enacting Resolutions Nos. 10 and 12.

Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional
provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property.
In Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201, what was involved was Act No. 4052 which appropriated sixty thousand pesos for the cost of plates and the
printing of postage stamps with new designs. Under the law, the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Department Head and the President
of the Philippines, issued in 1936 postage stamps to commemorate the celebration in Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress
sponsored by the Catholic Church.

The purpose of the stamps was to raise revenue and advertise the Philippines. The design of the stamps showed a map of the Philippines and
nothing about the Catholic Church. No religious purpose was intended.

Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the founder and head of the Philippine Independent Church, sought to enjoin the sale of those commemorative
postage stamps.

It was held that the issuance of the stamps, while linked inseparably with an event of a religious character, was not designed as a propaganda
for the Catholic Church. Aglipay's prohibition suit was dismissed.

The instant case is easily distinguishable from Verzosa vs. Fernandez, 49 Phil., 627 and 55 Phil. 307, where a religious brotherhood, La
Archicofradia del Santisimo Sacramento, organized for the purpose of raising funds to meet the expenses for the annual fiesta in honor of the
Most Holy Sacrament and the Virgin Lady of Guadalupe, was held accountable for the funds which it held as trustee. 0

Finding that the petitioners have no cause of action for the annulment of the barangay resolutions, the lower court's judgment dismissing their
amended petition is affirmed. No costs.

3.) INC v CA

This is a petition for review of the Decision dated March 24, 1995 of the respondent Court of Appeals affirming the action of the respondent
Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television which x-rated the TV Program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.
Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly organized religious organization, has a television program entitled Ang Iglesia ni Cristo aired on Channel 2 every
Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioners religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often
times in comparative studies with other religions.
Sometime in the months of September, October and November 1992, petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Motion
Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as X or not for public
viewing on the ground that they offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law.
Petitioner pursued two (2) courses of action against the respondent Board. On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the Office of the President
the classification of its TV Series No. 128.It succeeded in its appeal for on December 18, 1992, the Office of the President reversed the decision
of the respondent Board. Forthwith, the Board allowed Series No. 128 to be publicly telecast.
On December 14, 1992, petitioner also filed against the respondent Board Civil Case No. Q-92-14280, with the RTC, NCR, Quezon
City.[1] Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit
the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their Answer, respondent
Board invoked its power under P.D. No. 1986 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code.
On January 4, 1993, the trial court held a hearing on petitioners prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. The parties orally argued and then
marked their documentary evidence.Petitioner submitted the following as its exhibits, viz.:
(1) Exhibit A, respondent Boards Voting Slip for Television showing its September 9, 1992 action on petitioners Series No. 115 as follows:[2]
REMARKS:
There are some inconsistencies in the particular program as it is very surprising for this program to show series of Catholic ceremonies and also
some religious sects and using it in their discussion about the bible. There are remarks which are direct criticism which affect other religions.
Need more opinions for this particular program. Please subject to more opinions.
(2) Exhibit A-1, respondent Boards Voting Slip for Television showing its September 11, 1992 subsequent action on petitioners Series No. 115 as
follows:[3]
REMARKS:
This program is criticizing different religions, based on their own interpretation of the Bible.
We suggest that the program should delve on explaining their own faith and beliefs and avoid attacks on other faith.
(3) Exhibit B, respondent Boards Voting Slip for Television showing its October 9, 1992 action on petitioners Series No. 119, as follows:[4]
REMARKS:
The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says that our (Catholic) veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned
because nowhere it is found in the bible that we should do so.
This is intolerance and robs off all sects of freedom of choice, worship and decision.
(4) Exhibit C, respondent Boards Voting Slip for Television showing its October 20, 1992 action on petitioners Series No. 121 as follows:[5]
REMARKS:
I refuse to approve the telecast of this episode for reasons of the attacks, they do on, specifically, the Catholic religion.
I refuse to admit that they can tell, dictate any other religion that they are right and the rest are wrong, which they clearly present in this episode.
(5) Exhibit D, respondent Boards Voting Slip for Television showing its November 20, 1992 action on petitioners Series No. 128 as follows: [6]
REMARKS:
The episode presented criticizes the religious beliefs of the Catholic and Protestants beliefs.
We suggest a second review.
(6) Exhibits E, E-1, petitioners block time contract with ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation dated September 1, 1992.[7]
(7) Exhibit F, petitioners Airtime Contract with Island Broadcasting Corporation.[8]
(8) Exhibit G, letter dated December 18, 1992 of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed to Henrietta S. Mendez reversing
the decision of the respondent Board which x-rated the showing of petitioners Series No. 129. The letter reads in part:
xxx xxx xxx
The television episode in question is protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression under Article III, Section 4 of the
1987 Constitution.
We have viewed a tape of the television episode in question, as well as studied the passages found by MTRCB to be objectionable and we find
no indication that the episode poses any clear and present danger sufficient to limit the said constitutional guarantee.
(9) Exhibits H, H-1, letter dated November 26, 1992 of Teofilo C. Ramos, Sr., addressed to President Fidel V. Ramos appealing the action of the
respondent Board x-rating petitioners Series No. 128.
On its part, respondent Board submitted the following exhibits, viz.:
(1) Exhibit 1, Permit Certificate for Television Exhibition No. 15181 dated December 18, 1992 allowing the showing of Series No. 128 under
parental guidance.
(2) Exhibit 2, which is Exhibit G of petitioner.
(3) Exhibit 3, letter dated October 12, 1992 of Henrietta S. Mendez, addressed to the Christian Era Broadcasting Service which reads in part:
xxx
In the matter of your television show Ang Iglesia ni Cristo Series No. 119, please be informed that the Board was constrained to deny your show
a permit to exhibit. The material involved constitute an attack against another religion which is expressly prohibited by law. Please be guided in
the submission of future shows.
After evaluating the evidence of the parties, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction on petitioners bond of P10,000.00.
The trial court set the pre-trial of the case and the parties submitted their pre-trial briefs.[9] The pre-trial briefs show that the parties evidence is
basically the evidence they submitted in the hearing of the issue of preliminary injunction. The trial of the case was set and reset several times
as the parties tried to reach an amicable accord. Their efforts failed and the records show that after submission of memoranda, the trial court
rendered a Judgment,[10] on December 15, 1993, the dispositive portion of which reads:
xxx
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television (BRMPT) to grant petitioner
Iglesia ni Cristo the necessary permit for all the series of Ang Iglesia ni Cristo program.
Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, however, is directed to refrain from offending and attacking other existing religions in showing Ang Iglesia ni Cristo
program.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration[11] praying: (a) for the deletion of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the Decision, and (b)
for the Board to be perpetually enjoined from requiring petitioner to submit for review the tapes of its program. The respondent Board opposed
the motion.[12] On March 7, 1993, the trial court granted petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. It ordered:[13]
xxx
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is granted. The second portion of the Courts Order dated December 15, 1993, directing petitioner
to refrain from offending and attacking other existing religions in showing Ang Iglesia ni Cristo program is hereby deleted and set
aside. Respondents are further prohibited from requiring petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo to submit for review VTR tapes of its religious program Ang
Iglesia ni Cristo.
Respondent Board appealed to the Court of Appeals after its motion for reconsideration was denied. [14]
On March 5, 1995, the respondent Court of Appeals[15] reversed the trial court. It ruled that: (1) the respondent board has jurisdiction and power
to review the TV program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo, and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit
for the exhibition on TV of the three series of Ang Iglesia ni Cristo on the ground that the materials constitute an attack against another religion. It
also found the series indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs.
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner raises the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ANG IGLESIA NI CRISTO PROGRAM IS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED AS A FORM OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISE AND EXPRESSION.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT BEING AN EXERCISE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, THE ANG
IGLESIA NI CRISTO PROGRAM IS SUBJECT TO THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE ONLY IN THE EXTREME CASE THAT IT POSES A CLEAR AND
PRESENT DANGER.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MTRCB IS VESTED WITH THE POWER TO CENSOR
RELIGIOUS PROGRAMS.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ANG IGLESIA NI CRISTO, A PURELY RELIGIOUS PROGRAM
IS INDECENT AND CONTRARY TO LAW AND GOOD CUSTOMS.
The basic issues can be reduced into two: (1) first, whether the respondent Board has the power to review petitioners TV program Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo, and (2) second, assuming it has the power, whether it gravely abused its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioners religious
program, series Nos. 115, 119 and 121, for the reason that they constitute an attack against other religions and that they are indecent, contrary
to law and good customs.
The first issue can be resolved by examining the powers of the Board under P.D. No. 1986. Its Section 3 pertinently provides:
Sec. 3 Powers and Functions. The BOARD shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
xxx xxx xxx
b) To screen, review and examine all motion pictures as herein defined, television programs, including publicity materials such as
advertisements, trailers and stills, whether such motion pictures and publicity materials be for theatrical or non-theatrical distribution for
television broadcast or for general viewing, imported or produced in the Philippines and in the latter case, whether they be for local viewing or
for export.
c) To approve, delete objectionable portion from and/or prohibit the importation, exportation, production, copying, distribution, sale,
lease, exhibition and/or television broadcast of the motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials, subject of the preceding
paragraph, which, in the judgment of the BOARD applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard, are objectionable for
being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines and its people, or
with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime, such as but not limited to:
i) Those which tend to incite subversion, insurrection, rebellion or sedition against the State, or otherwise threaten the economic and/or political
stability of the State;
ii) Those which tend to undermine the faith and confidence of the people, their government and/or duly constituted authorities;
iii) Those which glorify criminals or condone crimes;
iv) Those which serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence or pornography;
v) Those which tend to abet the traffic in and use of prohibited drugs;
vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good name and reputation of any person, whether living or dead;
vii) Those which may constitute contempt of court or of any quasi-judicial tribunal, or pertain to matters which are sub-judice in nature (emphasis
ours).
The law gives the Board the power to screen, review and examine all television programs. By the clear terms of the law, the Board has the power
to approve, delete x x x and/or prohibit the x x x exhibition and/or television broadcast of x x x television programs x x x. The law also directs the
Board to apply contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard to determine those which are objectionable for being immoral, indecent,
contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous tendency
to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime.
Petitioner contends that the term television program should not include religious programs like its program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo. A contrary
interpretation, it is urged, will contravene Section 5, Article III of the Constitution which guarantees that no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.
We reject petitioners submission which need not set us adrift in a constitutional voyage towards an uncharted sea. Freedom of religion has been
accorded a preferred status by the framers of our fundamental laws, past and present. We have affirmed this preferred status well aware that
it is designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs,
and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good.[16] We have also laboriously defined
in our jurisprudence the intersecting umbras and penumbras of the right to religious profession and worship. To quote the summation of Mr.
Justice Isagani Cruz, our well-known constitutionalist:[17]
Religious Profession and Worship
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on ones beliefs. The first is
absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought.The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into
external acts that affect the public welfare.
(1) Freedom to Believe
The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the hereafter. He may indulge his own theories about life and death;
worship any god he chooses, or none at all; embrace or reject any religion; acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being that appeals to his
reverence; recognize or deny the immortality of his soul in fact, cherish any religious conviction as he and he alone sees fit.However absurd his
beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile and heretical to the majority, he has full freedom to believe as he pleases. He may not be
required to prove his beliefs. He may not be punished for his inability to do so. Religion, after all, is a matter of faith. Men may believe what they
cannot prove. Every one has a right to his beliefs and he may not be called to account because he cannot prove what he believes.
(2) Freedom to Act on Ones Beliefs
But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do so becomes subject to the
authority of the State. As great as this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all the other rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can be enjoyed
only with a proper regard for the rights of others. It is error to think that the mere invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the State and
render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The inherent police power can be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to
society. And this is true even if such practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not merely for the purpose of evading the
reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the law.
Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: The constitutional provision on religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It
gave religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law
because of religious dogma.
Accordingly, while one has full freedom to believe in Satan, he may not offer the object of his piety a human sacrifice, as this would be
murder. Those who literally interpret the Biblical command to go forth and multiply are nevertheless not allowed to contract plural marriages
in violation of the laws against bigamy. A person cannot refuse to pay taxes on the ground that it would be against his religious tenets to recognize
any authority except that of God alone. An atheist cannot express his disbelief in acts of derision that wound the feelings of the faithful.The
police power can be validly asserted against the Indian practice of the suttee born of deep religious conviction, that calls on the widow to
immolate herself at the funeral pile of her husband.
We thus reject petitioners postulate that its religious program is per se beyond review by the respondent Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its
religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court
iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of
some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public
morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court
against its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country today. Across the sea and in our shore, the
bloodiest and bitterest wars fought by men were caused by irreconcilable religious differences. Our country is still not safe from the recurrence
of this stultifying strife considering our warring religious beliefs and the fanaticism with which some of us cling and claw to these beliefs. Even
now, we have yet to settle the near century old strife in Mindanao, the roots of which have been nourished by the mistrust and misunderstanding
between our Christian and Muslim brothers and sisters. The bewildering rise of weird religious cults espousing violence as an article of faith also
proves the wisdom of our rule rejecting a strict let alone policy on the exercise of religion. For sure, we shall continue to subject any act pinching
the space for the free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of man. For
when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still.
It is also petitioners submission that the respondent appellate court gravely erred when it affirmed the ruling of the respondent Board x-rating
its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. The records show that the respondent Board disallowed the program series for attacking other
religions. Thus, Exhibits A, A-1, (respondent Boards Voting Slip for Television) reveal that its reviewing members x-rated Series 115 for x x x
criticizing different religions, based on their own interpretation of the Bible. They suggested that the program should only explain petitioners x
x x own faith and beliefs and avoid attacks on other faiths. Exhibit B shows that Series No. 119 was x-rated because the Iglesia ni Cristo insists
on the literal translation of the bible and says that our Catholic veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found
in the bible that we should do so. This is intolerance x x x. Exhibit C shows that Series No. 121 was x-rated x x x for reasons of the attacks, they
do on, specifically, the Catholic religion. x x x (T)hey can not tell, dictate any other religion that they are right and the rest are wrong x x x. Exhibit
D also shows that Series No. 128 was not favorably recommended because it x x x outrages Catholic and Protestants beliefs. On second review,
it was x-rated because of its unbalanced interpretations of some parts of the Bible. [18] In sum, the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV
program series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128 because of petitioners controversial biblical interpretations and its attacks against contrary religious
beliefs. The respondent appellate court agreed and even held that the said attacks are indecent, contrary to law and good customs.
We reverse the ruling of the appellate court.
First. Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against all prior restraints on speech, including religious speech. Hence, any act
that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. [19] It is the burden of the
respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case
at bar.
Second. The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for attacking other religions, especially the Catholic
church. An examination of the evidence, especially Exhibits A, A-1, B, C, and D will show that the so-called attacks are mere criticisms of some
of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they were not presented
as evidence. Yet they were considered by the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from
public viewing under Section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioners freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free
exercise of religion. It misappreciates the essence of freedom to differ as delineated in the benchmark case of Cantwell v. Connecticut,[20] viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields, the tenets of one man may seem the rankest
error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of
men who have been, or are prominent in church or state or even to false statements. But the people of this nation have ordained in the light of
history that inspite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right
conduct on the part of the citizens of democracy.
The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms,
however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an
attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics,
the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Vis-a-vis religious differences, the State
enjoys no banquet of options. Neutrality alone is its fixed and immovable stance. In fine, respondent board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner
Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. In a State
where there ought to be no difference between the appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better
theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. When
the luxury of time permits, the marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spark of opposite speech,
the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth.
Third. The respondents cannot also rely on the ground attacks against another religion in x-rating the religious program of petitioner. Even a
sideglance at Section 3 of PD 1986 will reveal that it is not among the grounds to justify an order prohibiting the broadcast of petitioners television
program. The ground attack against another religion was merely added by the respondent Board in its Rules.[21] This rule is void for it runs smack
against the hoary doctrine that administrative rules and regulations cannot expand the letter and spirit of the law they seek to enforce.
It is opined that the respondent board can still utilize attack against any religion as a ground allegedly x x x because Section 3 (c) of PD 1986
prohibits the showing of motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials which are contrary to law and Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the
Revised Penal Code punishes anyone who exhibits shows which offend any race or religion. We respectfully disagree for it is plain that the word
attack is not synonymous with the word offend. Moreover, Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code should be invoked to justify
the subsequent punishment of a show which offends any religion. It cannot be utilized to justify prior censorship of speech. It must be
emphasized that E.O. 876, the law prior to PD 1986, included attack against any religion as a ground for censorship. The ground was not, however,
carried over by PD 1986. Its deletion is a decree to disuse it. There can be no other intent. Indeed, even the Executive Department espouses this
view. Thus, in an Opinion dated November 28, 1985 then Minister of Justice, now President of the Senate, Neptali Gonzales explained:
xxx
However, the question whether the BRMPT (now MTRCB) may preview and censor the subject television program of INC should be viewed in
the light of the provision of Section 3, paragraph (c) of PD 1986, which is substantially the same as the provision of Section 3, paragraph (c) of
E.O. No. 876-A, which prescribes the standards of censorship, to wit: immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the
prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people or with dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence, or of a wrong as
determined by the Board, applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard. As stated, the intention of the Board to subject the INCs
television program to previewing and censorship is prompted by the fact that its religious program makes mention of beliefs and practices of
other religion. On the face of the law itself, there can conceivably be no basis for censorship of said program by the Board as much as the alleged
reason cited by the Board does not appear to be within the contemplation of the standards of censorship set by law. (Italics supplied)
Fourth. In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. In American Bible Society
v. City of Manila,[22] this Court held: The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with
it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can be justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the
ground that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.
In Victorianovs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union,[23] we further ruled that x x x it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate
and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest
extent necessary to avoid the danger.
The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of
facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing
whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on
speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which
has taken the life of a reality already on ground.
It is suggested that we re-examine the application of clear and present danger rule to the case at bar. In the United States, it is true that the clear
and present danger test has undergone permutations. It was Mr. Justice Holmes who formulated the test in Schenck v. US,[24] as follows: x x x
the question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. Admittedly, the test was originally designed
to determine the latitude which should be given to speech that espouses anti-government action. Bannered by Justices Holmes and Brandeis,
the test attained its full flowering in the decade of the forties, when its umbrella was used to protect speech other than subversive
speech.[25] Thus, for instance, the test was applied to annul a total ban on labor picketing.[26] The use of the test took a downswing in the 1950s
when the US Supreme Court decided Dennis v. United States involving communist conspiracy.[27] In Dennis, the components of the test were
altered as the High Court adopted Judge Learned Hands formulation that x x x in each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the evil,
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger. The imminence requirement of the test
was thus diminished and to that extent, the protection of the rule was weakened. In 1969, however, the strength of the test was reinstated
in Brandenburg v. Ohio,[28] when the High Court restored in the test the imminence requirement, and even added an intent requirement which
according to a noted commentator ensured that only speech directed at inciting lawlessness could be punished. [29] Presently in the United States,
the clear and present danger test is not applied to protect low value speeches such as obscene speech, commercial speech and defamation. Be
that as it may, the test is still applied to four types of speech: speech that advocates dangerous ideas, speech that provokes a hostile audience
reaction, out of court contempt and release of information that endangers a fair trial. [30] Hence, even following the drift of American
jurisprudence, there is reason to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar which concerns speech that attacks other religions
and could readily provoke hostile audience reaction. It cannot be doubted that religious truths disturb and disturb terribly.
It is also opined that it is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar because the issue involves the content of
speech and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the causal
connection between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be established.The contention overlooks the fact that the case at bar involves
videotapes that are pre-taped and hence, their speech content is known and not an X quantity. Given the specific content of the speech, it is not
unreasonable to assume that the respondent Board, with its expertise, can determine whether its sulphur will bring about the substantive evil
feared by the law.
Finally, it is also opined by Mr. Justice Kapunan that x x x the determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration
or fabrication falls within or lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be arrogated by
an administrative body such as a Board of Censors. He submits that a system of prior restraint may only be validly administered by judges and
not left to administrative agencies. The same submission is made by Mr. Justice Mendoza.
This thoughtful thesis is an attempt to transplant another American rule in our jurisdiction. Its seedbed was laid down by Mr. Justice Brennan in
his concurring opinion in the 1962 case of Manual Enterprise v. Day.[31] By 1965, the US Supreme Court in Freedman v. Maryland[32] was ready
to hold that the teaching of cases is that, because only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to
freedom of expression, only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint.[33]
While the thesis has a lot to commend itself, we are not ready to hold that it is unconstitutional for Congress to grant an administrative body
quasi-judicial power to preview and classify TV programs and enforce its decision subject to review by our courts. As far back as 1921, we upheld
this set-up in Sotto vs. Ruiz,[34] viz.:
The use of the mails by private persons is in the nature of a privilege which can be regulated in order to avoid its abuse. Persons possess no
absolute right to put into the mail anything they please, regardless of its character.
On the other hand, the exclusion of newspaper and other publications from the mails, in the exercise of executive power, is extremely delicate
in nature and can only be justified where the statute is unequivocably applicable to the supposed objectionable publication. In excluding any
publication for the mails, the object should be not to interfere with the freedom of the press or with any other fundamental right of the
people. This is the more true with reference to articles supposedly libelous than to other particulars of the law, since whether an article is or is
not libelous, is fundamentally a legal question. In order for there to be due process of law, the action of the Director of Posts must be subject
to revision by the courts in case he had abused his discretion or exceeded his authority. (Ex-parte Jackson [1878], 96 U.S., 727; Public Clearing
House vs. Coyne [1903], 194 U.S., 497; Post Publishing Co. vs. Murray[1916], 23-Fed., 773)
As has been said, the performance of the duty of determining whether a publication contains printed matter of a libelous character rests with
the Director of Posts and involves the exercise of his judgment and discretion. Every intendment of the law is in favor of the correctness of his
action. The rule is (and we go only to those cases coming from the United States Supreme Court and pertaining to the United States Postmaster-
General), that the courts will not interfere with the decision of the Director of Posts unless clearly of opinion that it was wrong. (Bates & Guilid
Co. vs. Payne [1904], 194 U.S., 106; Smith vs. Hitchcock [1912], 226 U.S., 63; Masses Pub. Co. vs. Patten [1917], 246 Fed., 24. But see David vs.
Brown[1900], 103 Fed., 909, announcing a somewhat different doctrine and relied upon by the Attorney-General).
To be sure, legal scholars in the United States are still debating the proposition whether or not courts alone are competent to decide whether
speech is constitutionally protected.[35]The issue involves highly arguable policy considerations and can be better addressed by our legislators.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated March 24, 1995 is affirmed insofar as it sustained the jurisdiction of
the respondent MTRCB to review petitioners TV program entitled Ang Iglesia ni Cristo, and is reversed and set aside insofar as it sustained the
action of the respondent MTRCB x-rating petitioners TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

4.) Islamic d/wah Council v Exec Sec.

Before us is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP) praying for the declaration of nullity
of Executive Order (EO) 46, s. 2001 and the prohibition of herein respondents Office of the Executive Secretary and Office of Muslim Affairs
(OMA) from implementing the subject EO.
Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates under Department of Social Welfare and Development License No. SB-01-085, is a non-governmental
organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. It claims to be a federation of national
Islamic organizations and an active member of international organizations such as the Regional Islamic Dawah Council of Southeast Asia and the
Pacific (RISEAP)[1] and The World Assembly of Muslim Youth. The RISEAP accredited petitioner to issue halal[2] certifications in the
Philippines. Thus, among the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal
certifications to qualified products and manufacturers.
Petitioner alleges that, on account of the actual need to certify food products as halal and also due to halal food producers request, petitioner
formulated in 1995 internal rules and procedures based on the Quran[3] and the Sunnah[4] for the analysis of food, inspection thereof and
issuance of halal certifications. In that same year, petitioner began to issue, for a fee, certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers.
Petitioner even adopted for use on its halal certificates a distinct sign or logo registered in the Philippine Patent Office under Patent No. 4-2000-
03664.
On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46[5] creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and
designating respondent OMA to oversee its implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal
certificates and perform other related regulatory activities.
On May 8, 2002, a news article entitled OMA Warns NGOs Issuing Illegal Halal Certification was published in the Manila Bulletin, a newspaper of
general circulation. In said article, OMA warned Muslim consumers to buy only products with its official halal certification since those without
said certification had not been subjected to careful analysis and therefore could contain pork or its derivatives. Respondent OMA also sent letters
to food manufacturers asking them to secure the halal certification only from OMA lest they violate EO 46 and RA 4109. [6]As a result, petitioner
lost revenues after food manufacturers stopped securing certifications from it.
Hence, this petition for prohibition.
Petitioner contends that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.[7] It is unconstitutional for
the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious
organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims. According to petitioner, a food product becomes halal only
after the performance of Islamic religious ritual and prayer. Thus, only practicing Muslims are qualified to slaughter animals for food. A
government agency like herein respondent OMA cannot therefore perform a religious function like certifying qualified food products as halal.
Petitioner also maintains that the respondents violated Section 10, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that (n)o law impairing the
obligation of contracts, shall be passed. After the subject EO was implemented, food manufacturers with existing contracts with petitioner
ceased to obtain certifications from the latter.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the subject EO violates Sections 15 and 16 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution which respectively provide:
ROLE AND RIGHTS OF PEOPLES ORGANIZATIONS
Sec. 15. The State shall respect the role of independent peoples organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic
framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means.
Peoples organizations are bona fide associations of citizens with demonstrated capacity to promote the public interest and with identifiable
leadership, membership, and structure.
Sec. 16. The rights of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic
decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate, the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms.
According to petitioner, the subject EO was issued with utter haste and without even consulting Muslim peoples organizations like petitioner
before it became effective.
We grant the petition.
OMA was created in 1981 through Executive Order No. 697 (EO 697) to ensure the integration of Muslim Filipinos into the mainstream of Filipino
society with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions, and institutions.[8] OMA deals with the societal, legal, political and economic
concerns of the Muslim community as a national cultural community and not as a religious group. Thus, bearing in mind the constitutional barrier
between the Church and State, the latter must make sure that OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate the non-
establishment clause and the free exercise of religion provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution.[9]
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred
status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience
directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. [10]
Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Quran and Islamic
beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations
like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task
of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah on halal food.
To justify EO 46s intrusion into the subject religious activity, the Solicitor General argues that the freedom of religion is subservient to the police
power of the State. By delegating to OMA the authority to issue halal certifications, the government allegedly seeks to protect and promote the
muslim Filipinos right to health, and to instill health consciousness in them.
We disagree.
Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious
freedom.[11] If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a
society with a democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to
exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity.
In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious
right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the
exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos right to health are already provided for in
existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human
consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims.
Section 48(4) of the Administrative Code of 1987 gives to the National Meat Inspection Commission (NMIC) of the Department of Agriculture
(DOA) the power to inspect slaughtered animals intended for human consumption to ensure the safety of the meat released in the
market. Another law, RA 7394, otherwise known as The Consumer Act of 1992, gives to certain government departments the duty to protect
the interests of the consumer, promote his general welfare and to establish standards of conduct for business and industry. [12] To this end, a
food product, before its distribution to the market, is required to secure the Philippine Standard Certification Mark after the concerned
department inspects and certifies its compliance with quality and safety standards.[13]
One such government agency designated by RA 7394 is the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFD) of the Department of Health (DOH). Under Article
22 of said law, BFD has the duty to promulgate and enforce rules and regulations fixing and establishing a reasonable definition and standard of
identity, a standard of quality and a standard of fill of containers for food. The BFD also ensures that food products released in the market are
not adulterated.[14]
Furthermore, under Article 48 of RA 7394, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) is tasked to protect the consumer against deceptive,
unfair and unconscionable sales acts or practices as defined in Article 50.[15] DTI also enforces compulsory labeling and fair packaging to enable
the consumer to obtain accurate information as to the nature, quality and quantity of the contents of consumer products and to facilitate his
comparison of the value of such products.[16]
With these regulatory bodies given detailed functions on how to screen and check the quality and safety of food products, the perceived danger
against the health of Muslim and non-Muslim Filipinos alike is totally avoided. Of great help are the provisions on labeling of food products
(Articles 74 to 85)[17] of RA 7394. In fact, through these labeling provisions, the State ably informs the consuming public of the contents of food
products released in the market. Stiff sanctions are imposed on violators of said labeling requirements.
Through the laws on food safety and quality, therefore, the State indirectly aids Muslim consumers in differentiating food from non-food
products. The NMIC guarantees that the meat sold in the market has been thoroughly inspected and fit for consumption. Meanwhile, BFD
ensures that food products are properly categorized and have passed safety and quality standards. Then, through the labeling provisions
enforced by the DTI, Muslim consumers are adequately apprised of the products that contain substances or ingredients that, according to their
Islamic beliefs, are not fit for human intake. These are the non-secular steps put in place by the State to ensure that the Muslim consumers right
to health is protected. The halal certifications issued by petitioner and similar organizations come forward as the official religious approval of a
food product fit for Muslim consumption.
We do not share respondents apprehension that the absence of a central administrative body to regulate halal certifications might give rise to
schemers who, for profit, will issue certifications for products that are not actually halal. Aside from the fact that Muslim consumers can actually
verify through the labels whether a product contains non-food substances, we believe that they are discerning enough to know who the reliable
and competent certifying organizations in their community are. Before purchasing a product, they can easily avert this perceived evil by a diligent
inquiry on the reliability of the concerned certifying organization.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Executive Order 46, s. 2001, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID. Consequently, respondents are
prohibited from enforcing the same.
SO ORDERED.

5.) American Bible society v City of manila

Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly registered and doing business in the Philippines
through its Philippine agency established in Manila in November, 1898, with its principal office at 636 Isaac Peral in said City. The defendant
appellee is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be exercised in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila.
In the course of its ministry, plaintiff's Philippine agency has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof (except during
the Japanese occupation) throughout the Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialects. On May 29 1953, the acting City
Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general merchandise since November, 1945, without
providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos.
2529, 3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff to secure, within three days, the corresponding permit and license fees, together with compromise
covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45 (Annex A).
Plaintiff protested against this requirement, but the City Treasurer demanded that plaintiff deposit and pay under protest the sum of P5,891.45,
if suit was to be taken in court regarding the same (Annex B). To avoid the closing of its business as well as further fines and penalties in the
premises on October 24, 1953, plaintiff paid to the defendant under protest the said permit and license fees in the aforementioned amount,
giving at the same time notice to the City Treasurer that suit would be taken in court to question the legality of the ordinances under which, the
said fees were being collected (Annex C), which was done on the same date by filing the complaint that gave rise to this action. In its complaint
plaintiff prays that judgment be rendered declaring the said Municipal Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and
3364 illegal and unconstitutional, and that the defendant be ordered to refund to the plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 paid under protest, together
with legal interest thereon, and the costs, plaintiff further praying for such other relief and remedy as the court may deem just equitable.
Defendant answered the complaint, maintaining in turn that said ordinances were enacted by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila by virtue
of the power granted to it by section 2444, subsection (m-2) of the Revised Administrative Code, superseded on June 18, 1949, by section 18,
subsection (1) of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, and praying that the complaint be dismissed, with
costs against plaintiff. This answer was replied by the plaintiff reiterating the unconstitutionality of the often-repeated ordinances.
Before trial the parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:
COME NOW the parties in the above-entitled case, thru their undersigned attorneys and respectfully submit the following stipulation of facts:
1. That the plaintiff sold for the use of the purchasers at its principal office at 636 Isaac Peral, Manila, Bibles, New Testaments, bible portions
and bible concordance in English and other foreign languages imported by it from the United States as well as Bibles, New Testaments and bible
portions in the local dialects imported and/or purchased locally; that from the fourth quarter of 1945 to the first quarter of 1953 inclusive the
sales made by the plaintiff were as follows:
Quarter Amount of Sales

4th quarter 1945 P1,244.21

1st quarter 1946 2,206.85

2nd quarter 1946 1,950.38

3rd quarter 1946 2,235.99

4th quarter 1946 3,256.04

1st quarter 1947 13,241.07

2nd quarter 1947 15,774.55

3rd quarter 1947 14,654.13

4th quarter 1947 12,590.94

 1st quarter 1948 11,143.90

2nd quarter 1948 14,715.26

3rd quarter 1948 38,333.83

4th quarter 1948 16,179.90

1st quarter 1949 23,975.10

2nd quarter 1949 17,802.08

3rd quarter 1949 16,640.79

4th quarter 1949 15,961.38

1st quarter 1950 18,562.46

2nd quarter 1950 21,816.32

3rd quarter 1950 25,004.55

4th quarter 1950 45,287.92

1st quarter 1951 37,841.21

2nd quarter 1951 29,103.98

3rd quarter 1951 20,181.10

4th quarter 1951 22,968.91

1st quarter 1952 23,002.65

2nd quarter 1952 17,626.96

3rd quarter 1952 17,921.01

4th quarter 1952 24,180.72

1st quarter 1953 29,516.21

2. That the parties hereby reserve the right to present evidence of other facts not herein stipulated.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this case be set for hearing so that the parties may present further evidence on their behalf. (Record
on Appeal, pp. 15-16).
When the case was set for hearing, plaintiff proved, among other things, that it has been in existence in the Philippines since 1899, and that its
parent society is in New York, United States of America; that its, contiguous real properties located at Isaac Peral are exempt from real estate
taxes; and that it was never required to pay any municipal license fee or tax before the war, nor does the American Bible Society in the United
States pay any license fee or sales tax for the sale of bible therein. Plaintiff further tried to establish that it never made any profit from the sale
of its bibles, which are disposed of for as low as one third of the cost, and that in order to maintain its operating cost it obtains substantial
remittances from its New York office and voluntary contributions and gifts from certain churches, both in the United States and in the Philippines,
which are interested in its missionary work. Regarding plaintiff's contention of lack of profit in the sale of bibles, defendant retorts that the
admissions of plaintiff-appellant's lone witness who testified on cross-examination that bibles bearing the price of 70 cents each from plaintiff-
appellant's New York office are sold here by plaintiff-appellant at P1.30 each; those bearing the price of $4.50 each are sold here at P10 each;
those bearing the price of $7 each are sold here at P15 each; and those bearing the price of $11 each are sold here at P22 each, clearly show
that plaintiff's contention that it never makes any profit from the sale of its bible, is evidently untenable.
After hearing the Court rendered judgment, the last part of which is as follows:
As may be seen from the repealed section (m-2) of the Revised Administrative Code and the repealing portions (o) of section 18 of Republic Act
No. 409, although they seemingly differ in the way the legislative intent is expressed, yet their meaning is practically the same for the purpose
of taxing the merchandise mentioned in said legal provisions, and that the taxes to be levied by said ordinances is in the nature of percentage
graduated taxes (Sec. 3 of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Sec. 1, Group 2, of Ordinance No. 2529, as amended by Ordinance No. 3364).
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this Court is of the opinion and so holds that this case should be dismissed, as it is hereby
dismissed, for lack of merits, with costs against the plaintiff.
Not satisfied with this verdict plaintiff took up the matter to the Court of Appeals which certified the case to Us for the reason that the errors
assigned to the lower Court involved only questions of law.
Appellant contends that the lower Court erred:
1. In holding that Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, as respectively amended, are not unconstitutional;
2. In holding that subsection m-2 of Section 2444 of the Revised Administrative Code under which Ordinances Nos. 2592 and 3000 were
promulgated, was not repealed by Section 18 of Republic Act No. 409;
3. In not holding that an ordinance providing for taxes based on gross sales or receipts, in order to be valid under the new Charter of the City of
Manila, must first be approved by the President of the Philippines; and
4. In holding that, as the sales made by the plaintiff-appellant have assumed commercial proportions, it cannot escape from the operation of
said municipal ordinances under the cloak of religious privilege.
The issues. — As may be seen from the proceeding statement of the case, the issues involved in the present controversy may be reduced to the
following: (1) whether or not the ordinances of the City of Manila, Nos. 3000, as amended, and 2529, 3028 and 3364, are constitutional and
valid; and (2) whether the provisions of said ordinances are applicable or not to the case at bar.
Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, provides that:
(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religion test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.
Predicated on this constitutional mandate, plaintiff-appellant contends that Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, as respectively amended, are
unconstitutional and illegal in so far as its society is concerned, because they provide for religious censorship and restrain the free exercise and
enjoyment of its religious profession, to wit: the distribution and sale of bibles and other religious literature to the people of the Philippines.
Before entering into a discussion of the constitutional aspect of the case, We shall first consider the provisions of the questioned ordinances in
relation to their application to the sale of bibles, etc. by appellant. The records, show that by letter of May 29, 1953 (Annex A), the City Treasurer
required plaintiff to secure a Mayor's permit in connection with the society's alleged business of distributing and selling bibles, etc. and to pay
permit dues in the sum of P35 for the period covered in this litigation, plus the sum of P35 for compromise on account of plaintiff's failure to
secure the permit required by Ordinance No. 3000 of the City of Manila, as amended. This Ordinance is of general application and not particularly
directed against institutions like the plaintiff, and it does not contain any provisions whatever prescribing religious censorship nor restraining
the free exercise and enjoyment of any religious profession. Section 1 of Ordinance No. 3000 reads as follows:
SEC. 1. PERMITS NECESSARY. — It shall be unlawful for any person or entity to conduct or engage in any of the businesses, trades, or
occupations enumerated in Section 3 of this Ordinance or other businesses, trades, or occupations for which a permit is required for the proper
supervision and enforcement of existing laws and ordinances governing the sanitation, security, and welfare of the public and the health of the
employees engaged in the business specified in said section 3 hereof, WITHOUT FIRST HAVING OBTAINED A PERMIT THEREFOR FROM THE MAYOR
AND THE NECESSARY LICENSE FROM THE CITY TREASURER.
The business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff involved in this case is not particularly mentioned in Section 3 of the Ordinance, and the record
does not show that a permit is required therefor under existing laws and ordinances for the proper supervision and enforcement of their
provisions governing the sanitation, security and welfare of the public and the health of the employees engaged in the business of the plaintiff.
However, sections 3 of Ordinance 3000 contains item No. 79, which reads as follows:
79. All other businesses, trades or occupations not
mentioned in this Ordinance, except those upon which the
City is not empowered to license or to tax P5.00
Therefore, the necessity of the permit is made to depend upon the power of the City to license or tax said business, trade or occupation.
As to the license fees that the Treasurer of the City of Manila required the society to pay from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 1st quarter of 1953
in the sum of P5,821.45, including the sum of P50 as compromise, Ordinance No. 2529, as amended by Ordinances Nos. 2779, 2821 and 3028
prescribes the following:
SEC. 1. FEES. — Subject to the provisions of section 578 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila, as amended, there shall be paid to the
City Treasurer for engaging in any of the businesses or occupations below enumerated, quarterly, license fees based on gross sales or receipts
realized during the preceding quarter in accordance with the rates herein prescribed: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That a person engaged in any
businesses or occupation for the first time shall pay the initial license fee based on the probable gross sales or receipts for the first quarter
beginning from the date of the opening of the business as indicated herein for the corresponding business or occupation.
xxx xxx xxx
GROUP 2. — Retail dealers in new (not yet used) merchandise, which dealers are not yet subject to the payment of any municipal tax, such as
(1) retail dealers in general merchandise; (2) retail dealers exclusively engaged in the sale of . . . books, including stationery.
xxx xxx xxx
As may be seen, the license fees required to be paid quarterly in Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, are not imposed directly
upon any religious institution but upon those engaged in any of the business or occupations therein enumerated, such as retail "dealers in
general merchandise" which, it is alleged, cover the business or occupation of selling bibles, books, etc.
Chapter 60 of the Revised Administrative Code which includes section 2444, subsection (m-2) of said legal body, as amended by Act No.
3659, approved on December 8, 1929, empowers the Municipal Board of the City of Manila:
(M-2) To tax and fix the license fee on (a) dealers in new automobiles or accessories or both, and (b) retail dealers in new (not yet used)
merchandise, which dealers are not yet subject to the payment of any municipal tax.
For the purpose of taxation, these retail dealers shall be classified as (1) retail dealers in general merchandise, and (2) retail dealers exclusively
engaged in the sale of (a) textiles . . . (e) books, including stationery, paper and office supplies, . . .: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That the combined
total tax of any debtor or manufacturer, or both, enumerated under these subsections (m-1) and (m-2), whether dealing in one or all of the articles
mentioned herein, SHALL NOT BE IN EXCESS OF FIVE HUNDRED PESOS PER ANNUM.
and appellee's counsel maintains that City Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, as amended, were enacted in virtue of the power that said Act No.
3669 conferred upon the City of Manila. Appellant, however, contends that said ordinances are longer in force and effect as the law under which
they were promulgated has been expressly repealed by Section 102 of Republic Act No. 409 passed on June 18, 1949, known as the Revised
Manila Charter.
Passing upon this point the lower Court categorically stated that Republic Act No. 409 expressly repealed the provisions of Chapter 60 of the
Revised Administrative Code but in the opinion of the trial Judge, although Section 2444 (m-2) of the former Manila Charter and section 18 (o)
of the new seemingly differ in the way the legislative intent was expressed, yet their meaning is practically the same for the purpose of taxing
the merchandise mentioned in both legal provisions and, consequently, Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, as amended, are to be considered as
still in full force and effect uninterruptedly up to the present.
Often the legislature, instead of simply amending the pre-existing statute, will repeal the old statute in its entirety and by the same enactment
re-enact all or certain portions of the preexisting law. Of course, the problem created by this sort of legislative action involves mainly the effect
of the repeal upon rights and liabilities which accrued under the original statute. Are those rights and liabilities destroyed or preserved? The
authorities are divided as to the effect of simultaneous repeals and re-enactments. Some adhere to the view that the rights and liabilities accrued
under the repealed act are destroyed, since the statutes from which they sprang are actually terminated, even though for only a very short
period of time. Others, and they seem to be in the majority, refuse to accept this view of the situation, and consequently maintain that all rights
an liabilities which have accrued under the original statute are preserved and may be enforced, since the re-enactment neutralizes the repeal,
therefore, continuing the law in force without interruption. (Crawford-Statutory Construction, Sec. 322).
Appellant's counsel states that section 18 (o) of Republic Act No, 409 introduces a new and wider concept of taxation and is different from the
provisions of Section 2444(m-2) that the former cannot be considered as a substantial re-enactment of the provisions of the latter. We have
quoted above the provisions of section 2444(m-2) of the Revised Administrative Code and We shall now copy hereunder the provisions of Section
18, subdivision (o) of Republic Act No. 409, which reads as follows:
(o) To tax and fix the license fee on dealers in general merchandise, including importers and indentors, except those dealers who may be
expressly subject to the payment of some other municipal tax under the provisions of this section.
Dealers in general merchandise shall be classified as (a) wholesale dealers and (b) retail dealers. For purposes of the tax on retail dealers, general
merchandise shall be classified into four main classes: namely (1) luxury articles, (2) semi-luxury articles, (3) essential commodities, and (4)
miscellaneous articles. A separate license shall be prescribed for each class but where commodities of different classes are sold in the same
establishment, it shall not be compulsory for the owner to secure more than one license if he pays the higher or highest rate of tax prescribed
by ordinance. Wholesale dealers shall pay the license tax as such, as may be provided by ordinance.
For purposes of this section, the term "General merchandise" shall include poultry and livestock, agricultural products, fish and other allied
products.
The only essential difference that We find between these two provisions that may have any bearing on the case at bar, is that, while subsection
(m-2) prescribes that the combined total tax of any dealer or manufacturer, or both, enumerated under subsections (m-1) and (m-2), whether
dealing in one or all of the articles mentioned therein, shall not be in excess of P500 per annum, the corresponding section 18, subsection (o) of
Republic Act No. 409, does not contain any limitation as to the amount of tax or license fee that the retail dealer has to pay per annum. Hence,
and in accordance with the weight of the authorities above referred to that maintain that "all rights and liabilities which have accrued under the
original statute are preserved and may be enforced, since the reenactment neutralizes the repeal, therefore continuing the law in force without
interruption", We hold that the questioned ordinances of the City of Manila are still in force and effect.
Plaintiff, however, argues that the questioned ordinances, to be valid, must first be approved by the President of the Philippines as per section
18, subsection (ii) of Republic Act No. 409, which reads as follows:
(ii) To tax, license and regulate any business, trade or occupation being conducted within the City of Manila, not otherwise enumerated in the
preceding subsections, including percentage taxes based on gross sales or receipts, subject to the approval of the PRESIDENT, except amusement
taxes.
but this requirement of the President's approval was not contained in section 2444 of the former Charter of the City of Manila under which
Ordinance No. 2529 was promulgated. Anyway, as stated by appellee's counsel, the business of "retail dealers in general merchandise" is
expressly enumerated in subsection (o), section 18 of Republic Act No. 409; hence, an ordinance prescribing a municipal tax on said business
does not have to be approved by the President to be effective, as it is not among those referred to in said subsection (ii). Moreover, the
questioned ordinances are still in force, having been promulgated by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila under the authority granted to it
by law.
The question that now remains to be determined is whether said ordinances are inapplicable, invalid or unconstitutional if applied to the alleged
business of distribution and sale of bibles to the people of the Philippines by a religious corporation like the American Bible Society, plaintiff
herein.
With regard to Ordinance No. 2529, as amended by Ordinances Nos. 2779, 2821 and 3028, appellant contends that it is unconstitutional and
illegal because it restrains the free exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of appellant.
Article III, section 1, clause (7) of the Constitution of the Philippines aforequoted, guarantees the freedom of religious profession and worship.
"Religion has been spoken of as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to its Creator" (Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil.,
201).It has reference to one's views of his relations to His Creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence to His being and character,
and obedience to His Will (Davis vs. Beason, 133 U.S., 342). The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraints of such right can only be justified like other restraints of
freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent".
(Tañada and Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 4th ed., p. 297). In the case at bar the license fee herein involved is imposed
upon appellant for its distribution and sale of bibles and other religious literature:
In the case of Murdock vs. Pennsylvania, it was held that an ordinance requiring that a license be obtained before a person could canvass or
solicit orders for goods, paintings, pictures, wares or merchandise cannot be made to apply to members of Jehovah's Witnesses who went about
from door to door distributing literature and soliciting people to "purchase" certain religious books and pamphlets, all published by the Watch
Tower Bible & Tract Society. The "price" of the books was twenty-five cents each, the "price" of the pamphlets five cents each. It was shown that
in making the solicitations there was a request for additional "contribution" of twenty-five cents each for the books and five cents each for the
pamphlets. Lesser sum were accepted, however, and books were even donated in case interested persons were without funds.
On the above facts the Supreme Court held that it could not be said that petitioners were engaged in commercial rather than a religious venture.
Their activities could not be described as embraced in the occupation of selling books and pamphlets. Then the Court continued:
"We do not mean to say that religious groups and the press are free from all financial burdens of government. See Grosjean vs. American Press
Co., 297 U.S., 233, 250, 80 L. ed. 660, 668, 56 S. Ct. 444. We have here something quite different, for example, from a tax on the income of one
who engages in religious activities or a tax on property used or employed in connection with activities. It is one thing to impose a tax on the
income or property of a preacher. It is quite another to exact a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon. The tax imposed by the City
of Jeannette is a flat license tax, payment of which is a condition of the exercise of these constitutional privileges. The power to tax the exercise
of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. . . . Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make its exercise
so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in this form of missionary
evangelism can close all its doors to all those who do not have a full purse. Spreading religious beliefs in this ancient and honorable manner
would thus be denied the needy. . . .
It is contended however that the fact that the license tax can suppress or control this activity is unimportant if it does not do so. But that is to
disregard the nature of this tax. It is a license tax — a flat tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights . . . The power
to impose a license tax on the exercise of these freedom is indeed as potent as the power of censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck
down. . . . It is not a nominal fee imposed as a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing the activities in question. It is in no way
apportioned. It is flat license tax levied and collected as a condition to the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the
constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise. That is almost uniformly recognized as the inherent
vice and evil of this flat license tax."
Nor could dissemination of religious information be conditioned upon the approval of an official or manager even if the town were owned by a
corporation as held in the case of Marsh vs. State of Alabama (326 U.S. 501), or by the United States itself as held in the case of Tucker vs. Texas
(326 U.S. 517). In the former case the Supreme Court expressed the opinion that the right to enjoy freedom of the press and religion occupies a
preferred position as against the constitutional right of property owners.
"When we balance the constitutional rights of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must
here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position. . . . In our view the circumstance that the property rights to the
premises where the deprivation of property here involved, took place, were held by others than the public, is not sufficient to justify the State's
permitting a corporation to govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties and the enforcement of such restraint by
the application of a State statute." (Tañada and Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 4th ed., p. 304-306).
Section 27 of Commonwealth Act No. 466, otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code, provides:
SEC. 27. EXEMPTIONS FROM TAX ON CORPORATIONS. — The following organizations shall not be taxed under this Title in respect to income
received by them as such —
(e) Corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, . . . or educational purposes, . . .: Provided, however,
That the income of whatever kind and character from any of its properties, real or personal, or from any activity conducted for profit, regardless
of the disposition made of such income, shall be liable to the tax imposed under this Code;
Appellant's counsel claims that the Collector of Internal Revenue has exempted the plaintiff from this tax and says that such exemption clearly
indicates that the act of distributing and selling bibles, etc. is purely religious and does not fall under the above legal provisions.
It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than
the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for
profit. For this reason We believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in
doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious
beliefs.
With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, which requires the obtention the Mayor's permit before any person can engage in any of the
businesses, trades or occupations enumerated therein, We do not find that it imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the
Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices. In the case of Coleman vs. City of Griffin, 189 S.E. 427, this point was elucidated as follows:
An ordinance by the City of Griffin, declaring that the practice of distributing either by hand or otherwise, circulars, handbooks, advertising, or
literature of any kind, whether said articles are being delivered free, or whether same are being sold within the city limits of the City of Griffin,
without first obtaining written permission from the city manager of the City of Griffin, shall be deemed a nuisance and punishable as an offense
against the City of Griffin, does not deprive defendant of his constitutional right of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, even though it prohibits him from introducing and carrying out a scheme or purpose which he sees fit to claim as a part of his religious
system.
It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff Society. But as Ordinance
No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is not applicable to plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellee is powerless to license or tax the
business of plaintiff Society involved herein for, as stated before, it would impair plaintiff's right to the free exercise and enjoyment of its religious
profession and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs, We find that Ordinance No. 3000, as amended is also inapplicable
to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff.
Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations, We hereby reverse the decision appealed from, sentencing defendant return
to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected from it. Without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

6.) Ebralinag v Division Superintendent

These two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were consolidated because they raise essentially the same issue:
whether school children who are members or a religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and
private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the
Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.
In G.R. No. 95770 "Roel Ebralinag, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and Manuel F. Biongcog, Cebu District Supervisor," the
petitioners are 43 high school and elementary school students in the towns of Daan Bantayan, Pinamungajan, Carcar, and Taburan Cebu
province. All minors, they are assisted by their parents who belong to the religious group known as Jehovah's Witnesses which claims some
100,000 "baptized publishers" in the Philippines.
In G.R. No. 95887, "May Amolo, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and Antonio A. Sangutan," the petitioners are 25 high school
and grade school students enrolled in public schools in Asturias, Cebu, whose parents are Jehovah's Witnesses. Both petitions were prepared by
the same counsel, Attorney Felino M. Ganal.
All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing
the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 of July 11, 1955, and by Department Order No. 8 dated
July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.
Republic Act No. 1265 provides:
Sec. 1. All educational institutions shall henceforth observe daily flag ceremony, which shall be simple and dignified and shall include the playing
or singing of the Philippine National anthem.
Sec. 2. The Secretary of Education is hereby authorized and directed to issue or cause to be issued rules and regulations for the proper conduct
of the flag ceremony herein provided.
Sec. 3. Failure or refusal to observe the flag ceremony provided by this Act and in accordance with rules and regulations issued by the Secretary
of Education, after proper notice and hearing, shall subject the educational institution concerned and its head to public censure as an
administrative punishment which shall be published at least once in a newspaper of general circulation.
In case of failure to observe for the second time the flag-ceremony provided by this Act, the Secretary of Education, after proper notice and
hearing, shall cause the cancellation of the recognition or permit of the private educational institution responsible for such failure.
The implementing rules and regulations in Department Order No. 8 provide:
RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR CONDUCTING THE FLAG CEREMONY IN ALL EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS.
1. The Filipino Flag shall be displayed by all educational institutions, public and private, every school day throughout the year. It shall be raised
at sunrise and lowered at sunset. The flag-staff must be straight, slightly and gently tapering at the end, and of such height as would give the
Flag a commanding position in front of the building or within the compound.
2. Every public and private educational institution shall hold a flag-raising ceremony every morning except when it is raining, in which event the
ceremony may be conducted indoors in the best way possible. A retreat shall be held in the afternoon of the same day. The flag-raising ceremony
in the morning shall be conducted in the following manner:
a. Pupils and teachers or students and faculty members who are in school and its premises shall assemble in formation facing the flag. At
command, books shall be put away or held in the left hand and everybody shall come to attention. Those with hats shall uncover. No one shall
enter or leave the school grounds during the ceremony.
b. The assembly shall sing the Philippine National Anthem accompanied by the school band or without the accompaniment if it has none; or the
anthem may be played by the school band alone. At the first note of the Anthem, the flag shall be raised briskly. While the flag is being raised, all
persons present shall stand at attention and execute a salute. Boys and men with hats shall salute by placing the hat over the heart. Those
without hat may stand with their arms and hands down and straight at the sides. Those in military or Boy Scout uniform shall give the salute
prescribed by their regulations. The salute shall be started as the Flag rises, and completed upon last note of the anthem.
c. Immediately following the singing of the Anthem, the assembly shall recite in unison the following patriotic pledge (English or vernacular
version), which may bring the ceremony to a close. This is required of all public schools and of private schools which are intended for Filipino
students or whose population is predominantly Filipino.
English Version
I love the Philippines.
It is the land of my birth;
It is the home of my people.
It protects me and helps me to be, strong, happy and useful.
In return, I will heed the counsel of my parents;
I will obey the rules of my school;
I will perform the duties of a patriotic, law-abiding citizen;
I will serve my country unselfishly and faithfully;
I will be a true, Filipino in thought, in word, in deed.
xxx xxx xxx
Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they
believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion" (p. 10, Rollo) which they "cannot conscientiously give . . . to anyone or anything
except God" (p. 8, Rollo). They feel bound by the Bible's command to "guard ourselves from
idols — 1 John 5:21" (p. 9, Rollo). They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State (p. 10, Rollo). They think the action of the
local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of
the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against official control (p. 10, Rollo).
This is not the first time that the question, of whether the children of Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from school for disobedience of R.A.
No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8, series of 1955, has been raised before this Court.
The same issue was raised in 1959 in Gerona, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 106 Phil. 2 (1959) and Balbuna, et al. vs. Secretary of
Education, 110 Phil. 150 (1960). This Court in the Gerona case upheld the expulsion of the students, thus:
The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and
of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Under a system of complete separation of church and state in the
government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag does not involve any religious ceremony. The flag salute is
no more a religious ceremony than the taking of an oath of office by a public official or by a candidate for admission to the bar.
In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State thru the Secretary of Education is not imposing a religion or religious belief
or a religious test on said students. It is merely enforcing a
non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all alike whether Christian, Moslem, Protestant or Jehovah's Witness. The State is merely
carrying out the duty imposed upon it by the Constitution which charges it with supervision over and regulation of all educational institutions,
to establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public education, and see to it that all schools aim to develop, among other things,
civic conscience and teach the duties of citizenship.
The children of Jehovah's Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the flag ceremony. They have no valid right to such exemption.
Moreover, exemption to the requirement will disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population which by far constitutes
the great majority.
The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable
and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority. (pp. 2-3).
Gerona was reiterated in Balbuna, as follows:
The Secretary of Education was duly authorized by the Legislature thru Republic Act 1265 to promulgate said Department Order, and its
provisions requiring the observance of the flag salute, not being a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance and pledge
of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for, does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of religion. (Balbuna, et al. vs.
Secretary of Education, et al., 110 Phil. 150).
Republic Act No. 1265 and the ruling in Gerona have been incorporated in Section 28, Title VI, Chapter 9 of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292) which took effect on September 21, 1988 (one year after its publication in the Official Gazette, Vol. 63, No. 38 of
September 21, 1987). Paragraph 5 of Section 28 gives legislative cachet to the ruling in Gerona, thus:
5. Any teacher or student or pupil who refuses to join or participate in the flag ceremony may be dismissed after due investigation.
However, the petitioners herein have not raised in issue the constitutionality of the above provision of the new Administrative Code of 1987.
They have targeted only Republic Act No. 1265 and the implementing orders of the DECS.
In 1989, the DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to the Jehovah's Witnesses, and enrolled in
various public and private schools, who refused to sing the Philippine national anthem, salute the Philippine flag and recite the patriotic pledge.
Division Superintendent of Schools, Susana B. Cabahug of the Cebu Division of DECS, and Dr. Atty. Marcelo M. Bacalso, Assistant Division
Superintendent, recalling this Court's decision in Gerona, issued Division Memorandum No. 108, dated November 17, 1989 (pp. 147-148, Rollo of
G.R. No. 95770) directing District Supervisors, High School Principals and Heads of Private Educational institutions as follows:
1. Reports reaching this Office disclose that there are a number of teachers, pupils, students, and school employees in public schools who refuse
to salute the Philippine flag or participate in the daily flag ceremony because of some religious belief.
2. Such refusal not only undermines Republic Act No. 1265 and the DECS Department Order No. 8, Series of 1955 (Implementing Rules and
Regulations) but also strikes at the heart of the DECS sustained effort to inculcate patriotism and nationalism.
3. Let it be stressed that any belief that considers the flag as an image is not in any manner whatever a justification for not saluting the Philippine
flag or not participating in flag ceremony. Thus, the Supreme Court of the Philippine says:
The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and
freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. (Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of Education, et al., 106 Phil. 11.)
4. As regards the claim for freedom of belief, which an objectionist may advance, the Supreme Court asserts:
But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. If the exercise of said religious belief
clashes with the established institutions of society and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the latter. (Gerona, et al. vs.
Sec. of Education, et al., 106 Phil. 11.)
5. Accordingly, teachers and school employees who choose not to participate in the daily flag ceremony or to obey the flag salute regulation
spelled out in Department Order No. 8, Series of 1955, shall be considered removed from the service after due process.
6. In strong language about pupils and students who do the same the Supreme Court has this to say:
If they choose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained at the expense of their
fellow Citizens, nothing more. According to a popular expression, they could take it or leave it! Having elected not to comply with the regulation
about the flag salute they forfeited their right to attend public schools. (Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of Education, et al., 106 Phil. 15.)
7. School administrators shall therefore submit to this Office a report on those who choose not to participate in flag ceremony or salute the
Philippine flag. (pp. 147-148, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770; Emphasis supplied).
Cebu school officials resorted to a number of ways to persuade the children of Jehovah's Witnesses to obey the memorandum. In the Buenavista
Elementary School, the children were asked to sign an Agreement (Kasabutan) in the Cebuano dialect promising to sing the national anthem,
place their right hand on their breast until the end of the song and recite the pledge of allegiance to the flag (Annex D, p. 46, Rollo of G.R. No.
95770 and p. 48, Rollo of G.R. No. 95887), but they refused to sign the "Kasabutan" (p. 20, Rolloof G.R. No. 95770).
In Tubigmanok Elementary School, the Teacher-In-Charge, Antonio A. Sangutan, met with the Jehovah's Witnesses' parents, as disclosed in his
letter of October 17, 1990, excerpts from which reveal the following:
After two (2) fruitless confrontation meetings with the Jehovah's Witnesses' parents on October 2, 1990 and yesterday due to their firm stand
not to salute the flag of the Republic of the Philippines during Flag Ceremony and other occasions, as mandated by law specifically Republic Act
No. 1265, this Office hereby orders the dropping from the list in the School Register (BPS Form I) of all teachers, all Jehovah Witness pupils from
Grade I up to Grade VI effective today.
xxx xxx xxx
This order is in compliance with Division Memorandum No. 108 s. 1989 dated November 17, 1989 by virtue of Department Order No. 8 s. 1955
dated July 21, 1955 in accordance with Republic Act No. 1265 and Supreme Court Decision of a case "Genaro Gerona, et al., Petitioners and
Appellants vs. The Honorable Secretary of Education, et al., Respondents and Appellees' dated August 12, 1959 against their favor. (p.
149, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770.)
In the Daan Bantayan District, the District Supervisor, Manuel F. Biongcog, ordered the "dropping from the rolls" of students who "opted to
follow their religious belief which is against the Flag Salute Law" on the theory that "they forfeited their right to attend public schools." (p.
47, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770.)
1st Indorsement
DAANBANTAYAN DISTRICT II
Daanbantayan, Cebu, July 24, 1990.
Respectfully returned to Mrs. Alicia A. Diaz, School In Charge [sic], Agujo Elementary School with the information that this office is sad to order
the dropping of Jeremias Diamos and Jeaneth Diamos, Grades III and IV pupils respectively from the roll since they opted to follow their
religious belief which is against the Flag Salute Law (R.A. 1265) and DECS Order No. 8, series of 1955, having elected not to comply with the
regulation about the flag salute they forfeited their right to attend public schools (Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of Education, et al., 106 Philippines
15). However, should they change their mind to respect and follow the Flag Salute Law they may be re-accepted.
(Sgd.) MANUEL F. BIONGCOG
District Supervisor
(p. 47, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770.)
The expulsion as of October 23, 1990 of the 43 petitioning students of the Daanbantayan National High School, Agujo Elementary School, Calape
Barangay National High School, Pinamungajan Provincial High School, Tabuelan Central School, Canasojan Elementary School, Liboron
Elementary School, Tagaytay Primary School, San Juan Primary School and Northern Central Elementary School of San Fernando, Cebu, upon
order of then Acting Division Superintendent Marcelo Bacalso, prompted some Jehovah's Witnesses in Cebu to appeal to the Secretary of
Education Isidro Cariño but the latter did not answer their letter. (p. 21, Rollo.)
The petition in G.R. No. 95887 was filed by 25 students who were similarly expelled because Dr. Pablo Antopina, who succeeded Susana Cabahug
as Division Superintendent of Schools, would not recall the expulsion orders of his predecessor. Instead, he verbally caused the expulsion of
some more children of Jehovah's Witnesses.
On October 31, 1990, the students and their parents filed these special civil actions for Mandamus, Certiorari and Prohibition alleging that the
public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion — (1) in ordering their expulsion without
prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their right to due process, their right to free public education, and their right to freedom of speech,
religion and worship (p. 23, Rollo). The petitioners pray that:
c. Judgment be rendered:
i. declaring null and void the expulsion or dropping from the rolls of herein petitioners from their respective schools;
ii. prohibiting and enjoining respondent from further barring the petitioners from their classes or otherwise implementing the expulsion ordered
on petitioners; and
iii. compelling the respondent and all persons acting for him to admit and order the re-admission of petitioners to their respective schools. (p.
41, Rollo.)
and that pending the determination of the merits of these cases, a temporary restraining order be issued enjoining the respondents from
enforcing the expulsion of the petitioners and to re-admit them to their respective classes.
On November 27, 1990, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the
respondents to immediately re-admit the petitioners to their respective classes until further orders from this Court (p. 57, Rollo).
The Court also ordered the Secretary of Education and Cebu District Supervisor Manuel F. Biongcog to be impleaded as respondents in these
cases.
On May 13, 1991, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the petitions (p. 98, Rollo) defending the expulsion orders issued by the
public respondents on the grounds that:
1. Bizarre religious practices of the Jehovah's Witnesses produce rebellious and anti-social school children and consequently disloyal and mutant
Filipino citizens.
2. There are no new and valid grounds to sustain the charges of the Jehovah's Witnesses that the DECS' rules and regulations on the flag salute
ceremonies are violative of their freedom of religion and worship.
3. The flag salute is devoid of any religious significance; instead, it inculcates respect and love of country, for which the flag stands.
4. The State's compelling interests being pursued by the DECS' lawful regulations in question do not warrant exemption of the school children
of the Jehovah's Witnesses from the flag salute ceremonies on the basis of their own self-perceived religious convictions.
5. The issue is not freedom of speech but enforcement of law and jurisprudence.
6. State's power to regulate repressive and unlawful religious practices justified, besides having scriptural basis.
7. The penalty of expulsion is legal and valid, more so with the enactment of Executive Order No. 292 (The Administrative Code of 1987).
Our task here is extremely difficult, for the 30-year old decision of this court in Gerona upholding the flag salute law and approving the expulsion
of students who refuse to obey it, is not lightly to be trifled with.
It is somewhat ironic however, that after the Gerona ruling had received legislative cachet by its in corporation in the Administrative Code of
1987, the present Court believes that the time has come to re-examine it. The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge, during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one's job or of being expelled from school, is
alien to the conscience of the present generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of Rights which guarantees their rights to free
speech ** and the free exercise of religious profession and worship (Sec. 5, Article III, 1987 Constitution; Article IV, Section 8, 1973 Constitution;
Article III, Section 1[7], 1935 Constitution).
Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves
the relationship of man to his Creator (Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando's separate opinion in German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 530-531).
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is
absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into
external acts that affect the public welfare (J. Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1991 Ed., pp. 176-177).
Petitioners stress, however, that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior
that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly
stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings
(Annex F, Rollo of G.R. No. 95887, p. 50 and Rollo of G.R. No. 95770, p. 48). Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant
for their expulsion.
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom (according to the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee
in his dissenting opinion in German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517) is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave
and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right
(and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified.
The situation that the Court directly predicted in Gerona that:
The flag ceremony will become a thing of the past or perhaps conducted with very few participants, and the time will come when we would have
citizens untaught and uninculcated in and not imbued with reverence for the flag and love of country, admiration for national heroes, and
patriotism — a pathetic, even tragic situation, and all because a small portion of the school population imposed its will, demanded and was
granted an exemption. (Gerona, p. 24.)
has not come to pass. We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and
reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group which admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school population" will shake up our part of
the globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country
and admiration for national heroes" (Gerona vs. Sec. of Education, 106 Phil. 2, 24). After all, what the petitioners seek only is exemption from
the flag ceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where they may study the Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of
government, and learn not only the arts, sciences, Philippine history and culture but also receive training for a vocation of profession and be
taught the virtues of "patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral and
spiritual values (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the curricula. Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will
bring about the very situation that this Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to
participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for dully constituted
authorities.
As Mr. Justice Jackson remarked in West Virginia vs. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943):
. . . To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make
an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds. . . . When they [diversity] are so harmless to others or to the State as
those we deal with here, the price is not too great. But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere
shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.
Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country, . . . — assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained
through coercion — is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. A desirable end cannot be promoted by
prohibited means. (Meyer vs. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 67 L. ed. 1042, 1046.)
Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine
citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the State to "protect and promote the right of all citizens to
quality education . . . and to make such education accessible to all (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).
In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54, 72-75, we upheld the exemption of members of the Iglesia ni Cristo, from the
coverage of a closed shop agreement between their employer and a union because it would violate the teaching of their church not to join any
labor group:
. . . It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the laws of the land; but when general laws conflict with scruples of
conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some "compelling state interests" intervenes. (Sherbert vs. Berner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L. Ed.
2d 965, 970, 83 S. Ct. 1790.)
We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect
for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony
does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited by this Court in Non vs. Dames II, 185 SCRA 523,
535, while the highest regard must be afforded their right to the free exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to mean that school
authorities are powerless to discipline them" if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious
and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag,
sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and
present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right
(and duty) to prevent (German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517).
Before we close this decision, it is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our country in 1942-1944 when every Filipino, regardless of
religious persuasion, in fear of the invader, saluted the Japanese flag and bowed before every Japanese soldier. Perhaps, if petitioners had lived
through that dark period of our history, they would not quibble now about saluting the Philippine flag. For when liberation came in 1944 and
our own flag was proudly hoisted aloft again, it was a beautiful sight to behold that made our hearts pound with pride and joy over the newly-
regained freedom and sovereignty of our nation.
Although the Court upholds in this decision the petitioners' right under our Constitution to refuse to salute the Philippine flag on account of their
religious beliefs, we hope, nevertheless, that another foreign invasion of our country will not be necessary in order for our countrymen to
appreciate and cherish the Philippine flag.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The expulsion orders issued by the public respondents against the
petitioners are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order which was issued by this Court is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.

7.) Gerona v Sec. of EDUCATION

Petitioners are Appealing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Masbate dismissing their complaint. Acting upon the "Urgent Motion for
Writ of Preliminary Injunction" filed on behalf of petitioners of December 12, 1958, and without objection on the part of the Solicitor General,
by resolution of this Court of December 16, we issued the corresponding writ of preliminary injunction restraining respondents from excluding
or banning petitioners-appellants, their children and all other of Jehovah's Witnesses for whom this action has been brought, from admission to
public schools, particularly the Buenavista Community School, solely on account of their refusal to salute the flag or preventing their return to
school should they have already been banned, until further orders from this Court.
The facts involved are not disputed. On June 11, 1955, Republic Act No. 1265 was approved and went into effect. Acting upon section 2 of said
Act authorizing and directing the Secretary of Education to issue or cause to be issued rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag
ceremony, said Secretary issued Department Order No. 8, series of 1955 on July 21, 1955 which Department Order quoting Republic Act No.
1265 in its entirety, we reproduce below for purpose of reference:
"Republic of the Philippines
Department of Education
Office of the Secretary
Manila
Department Order
No. 8, s. 1955
July 21, 1955

COMPULSORY DAILY FLAG CEREMONY IN ALL PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS

To the Director of Public Schools and the Director of Private Schools:
1. Quoted below is Republic Act No. 1265 entitled "An Act making Flag Ceremony Compulsory in all Educational Institutions," which is self-
explanatory.
SECTION 1. All educational institutions henceforth observe daily flag ceremony, which shall be simple and dignified and shall include the playing
or singing of the Philippine National Anthem.
SECTION 2. The Secretary of Education is hereby authorized and directed to issue or cause to be issued rules and regulations for the proper
conduct of the flag ceremony herein provided.
SECTION 3. Failure of refusal to observe the flag ceremony provided by this Act and in accordance with rules and regulations issued by the
Secretary of Education, after proper notice and hearing, shall subject the educational institution concerned and its head to public censure as an
administrative punishment which shall be published at least once in a newspaper of general circulation.
In case of failure to observe for the second time the flag ceremony provided by this Act, the Secretary of Education, after proper notice and
hearing, shall cause the cancellation of the recognition or permit of the private educational institution responsible for such failure.
SECTION 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, June 11, 1955.
2. As provided in Section 2 of the Act, the rules and regulations governing the proper conduct of the required flag ceremony, given in the in
closure to this Order, are hereby promulgated. These rules and regulations should be made known to all teachers and school officials, public and
private. The patriotic objective or significance of the Act should be explained to all pupils and students in the schools and to all communities
through the purok organizations and community assemblies.
(Sgd.) G. HERNANDEZ, JR.
Secretary of Education
Incl.:
As stated
(Inclosure of Department order No. 8, s. 1955)
RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR CONDUCTING THE FLAG CEREMONY IN ALL EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
1. The Filipino Flag shall be displayed by all educational institutions, public and private, every school day throughout the year. It shall be raised
at sunrise and lowered at sunset. The flag staff must be straight, slightly and gently tapering at the end, and of such height as would give the
Flag a commanding position in front of the building or within the compound.
2. Every public and private educational institution shall hold a flag-raising ceremony every morning except when it is raining, in which event the
ceremony may be conducted indoors in the best way possible. A retreat shall be held in the afternoon of the same day.
The flag-raising ceremony in the morning shall be conducted in the following manner:
a. Pupils and teachers or students and faculty members who are in school and its premises shall assemble in formation facing the flag. At
command, books shall be put away or held in the left hand and everybody shall come to attention. Those with hats shall uncover. No one shall
enter or leave the school grounds during the ceremony.
b. The assembly shall sing the Philippine National Anthem accompanied by the school band or without the accompaniment if it has none; or the
anthem may be played by the school band alone. At the first note of the Anthem, the flag shall be raised briskly. While the flag is being raised,
all persons present shall stand at attention and execute a salute. Boys and men with hats shall salute by placing that hat over the heart. Those
without hats may stand with their arms and hands downed and straight at the sides. Those in military or Boy Scout uniform shall give the salute
prescribed by their regulations. The salute shall be started as the Flag rises, and completed upon last note of the anthem.
c. Immediately following the singing of the Anthem, the assembly shall recite in unison of following patriotic pledge (English or vernacular version
0, which may bring the ceremony to a close. This is required of all public schools and of private schools which are intended for Filipino students
or whose population is predominantly Filipino.
ENGLISH VERSION
I Love the Philippines.
It is the land of my birth,
It is the home of my people.
It protects me and helps me to be strong, happy and useful.
In return, I will heed the counsel of my parents;
I will obey the rules of my school;
I will perform the duties of a patriotic, law-abiding citizen;
I will serve my country unselfishly and faithfully;
I will be a true Filipino in thought, in word, in deed.
3. The retreat shall be observed as follows:
a. Teachers and pupils or faculty members and students whose classes and after the last school period in the afternoon before sun down shall
assemble facing the flag. At command, the Philippine National Anthem shall be sung with accompaniment of the school band. If the school has
no band, the assembly will only sing the Anthem. Boys who have been taking part in preparatory military training or Boy Scout activities shall
attend the retreat in formation and execute the salute prescribed for them. Others shall execute the same salute and observe the same
deportment as required of them in the flag-raising ceremony. The flag should be lowered slowly so that it will be in the hands of the color detail
at the sound of the last note of the Anthem.
b. If the school so prefers, it may have its bugle corp play "To the Colors", instead of the singing of the National Anthem, for the retreat. At the
sound of the first note, the assembly shall stand at attention facing the flag and observe the same deportment as required in the flag-raising
ceremony. Or, it may have its bugle corp play "To the Colors" and at the sound of the first note everybody within hearing distance shall stand at
attention, face the flag, and observe the same deportment as required in the flag-raising ceremony.
4. The flag should be handled reverently in raising or lowering it and not allowed to touch the ground. This can be insured by having one pupil
hold the flag while another pupil fastening it to or unfasten it from the halyard.
5. To display the National Flag at half-mast when necessary, it must be hoisted to full-mast, allowing it to fly there for a moment, and then
brought down to half-mast. To lower the flag, it must again be hoisted to full-mast before bringing it down."
In his turn the Director of Public Schools issued Circular No. 22, series of 1955, on July 30, 1955 addressed to Division Superintendents of Schools,
enclosing a copy of Department Order No. 8, series of 1955 and enjoining strict compliance therewith.
It would appear that pursuant to the Department Order in question, the flag ceremony contemplated therein was held daily in every school,
public and private. Petitioners' children attending the Buenavista Community School, Uson, Masbate, refused to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem and recite the patriotic pledge contrary to the requirement of Department Order No. 8; as a result they were expelled from school
sometime in September, 1955. It is said that other children similarly situated who refused or failed to comply with the requirement about saluting
the flag are under threats of being also expelled from all public schools in the Philippines.
Petitioners thru counsel wrote to the Secretary of Education petitioning that in the implementation of this flag ceremony, they and their children
attending school be allowed to remain silent and stand at attention with their arms and hands down and straight at the sides and that they be
exempted from executing the formal salute, singing of the National Anthem and the reciting of the patriotic pledge, giving their reason for the
same. On December 16, 1955 the Secretary of Education wrote to counsel for petitioner denying the petition, making it clear that the denial was
the final and absolute stand of the Department of Education on the matter and that counsel may thereafter feel free to seek a judicial
determination of the constitutionality or interpretation of Republic Act No. 1265 as construed and applied to Jehovah's Witnesses. The letter
also informed petitioners' counsel that with reference to his letter of December 1, 1955 relative to the request for reinstatement of petitioners'
children who had been expelled from school for non-compliance with Department Order No. 8, no favorable action could be taken thereon. So,
on March 27, 1957 petitioners commenced the present action asking that a writ of preliminary injunction issue to restrain the Secretary of
Education and the Director of Public Schools from enforcing Department Order No. 8 "as applied to petitioners and all others of Jehovah's
Witnesses for whom this action is brought and to restrain them from excluding from the public schools the children of the petitioners on account
of their refusal to execute a formal salute to the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, and that after hearing, the trial
court declare Department Order No. 8 invalid and contrary to the Bill of Rights and that the preliminary injunction prayed for be made
permanent.
Petitioners-appellants belong to what is called the JEHOVAH'S WITNESS, an unincorporated body teaching that the obligation imposed by law of
God is superior to that of laws enacted by the State. Their religious beliefs include a literal version of Exodus, Chapter 20, verses 4 and 5, which
say: "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or
that is in the water under the earth; thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them." They consider that the flag is an "image within
this command. For this reason they refuse to salute it.
To further make clear the stand of petitioners as to the relative position and priority of religious teaching on the one hand and laws promulgated
by the State on the other, we quote from appellant's brief on page 50 thereof:
In Halter vs. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 41, 27 S. Ct. 419, 51 L. Ed. 696 (1907), the United States Supreme Court held that the flag `is an emblem of
National sovereignty,
To many persons the saluting of a national flag means nothing. To a sincere person who believed in God and the Bible as his Word, and who is
in a covenant with Almighty God to do his will exclusively, it means much. To such person "sovereignty" means the supreme authority or power.
Many believe that "the higher powers," mentioned in the Bible at Romans 13:1, means the "sovereign state"; but to the Christian this means
Jehovah God and his son, Christ Jesus, Jehovah's anointed King. They, Father and Son are the higher powers, to whom all must be subject and
joyfully obey. (Emphasis supplied)
The question involved in this appeal is a highly important one. We are called upon to determine the right of a citizen as guaranteed by the
Constitution about freedom of religious belief and the right to practice it as against the power and authority of the State to limit or restrain the
same. Our task is lessened by the fact that petitioners do not challenge the legality or constitutionality of Republic Act 1265. All that they question
is the legality or constitutionality of Department Order No. 8, series of 1955 of the Department of Education implementing said Republic Act.
The realm of belief and creed is infinitive and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and though. So is the freedom of belief, including
religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may
appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and the
exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established institutions of
society and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the latter. The Government steps in and either restrains said exercise or
even prosecutes the one exercising it.
One may believe in polygamy because it is permitted by his religious, but the moment he translates said religious belief into an overt act, such
as engaging or practising plural marriages, he may be prosecuted for bigamy and he may not plead or involve his religious belief as a defense or
as matter of exemption from the operation of the law.
In the case of Reynolds vs. U.S. (98 U.S. 145) the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of a law prohibiting and punishing polygamy even as
against the claim of religious belief of the Mormons. Said the Court:
So here, as a law of the organization of society under the exclusive dominion of the United States, it is provided that plural marriages shall not
be allowed. Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines
of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only
in name under such circumstance. (emphasis supplied)
Again, one may not believe in the payment of taxes because he may claim that according to his religious belief, the payment of taxes means
service to one other than God. As long as he confines himself to mere belief, well and good. But when he puts said belief into practice and he
actually refuses to pay taxes on his property or on his business, then the States steps in, compels payment, and enforces it either by court action
or levy and distraint.
One of the important questions to determine here is the true meaning and significance of the Filipino flag. Petitioners believe and maintain that
it is an image and therefore to salute the same is to go against their religious belief. "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven . . . thou shalt
not bow down thyself to them or serve them." They also claim that the flag salute is a religious ceremony, participation in which is forbidden by
their religious belief. We disagree. Appellants themselves (page 51 of their brief) concede that the flag is a symbol of the State. They give the
meaning of the word "image" on page 51 of their brief as follows:
Under the word "image" this comment is given by Webster: "Image, in modern usage, commonly suggests religious veneration." (Emphasis
supplied)
The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and
of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the complete separation of church and state in our
system of governments, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag consequently does not involve any religious
ceremony. The flag salute, particularly the recital of the pledge of loyalty is no more a religious ceremony than the taking of an oath of office by
a public official or by a candidate for admission to the bar. In said oath, taken while his right hand is raised, he swears allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines, promise to defend the Constitution and even invokes the help of God; and it is to be doubted whether a member of Jehovah's
Witness who is a candidate for admission to the Philippine Bar would object to taking the oath on the ground that is religious ceremony.
After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest with the courts. It cannot be left to a a religious
group or sect, much less to a follower of said group or sect; otherwise, there would be confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as
many interpretations and meaning to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or sects or followers, all depending
upon the meaning which they, though in all sincerity and good faith, may want to give to such ritual or ceremony.
We understand that petitioners, during the flag ceremony, are willing to remain silent and stand at attention with their arms and hands down
straight at the sides, and they agree that boys, members of Jehovah's Witness who have been taking part in military training or Boy Scout
activities, and are in uniform, may execute the salute to the flag prescribed by the Circular for them. So, the requirement contained in
Department Order No. 8 that during the flag ceremony those without hats may stand with their arms and hands down and straight at the sides,
including the formal salute by boys in military and boy Scout uniform, meets with the conformity of petitioners. Of course, there is the other
requirement that boys and men with hats shall salute the flag by placing their hats over the heart, but petitioners and other members of the
Jehovah's Witness could well solve this requirements or avoid it by putting away their hats just as pupils books, may put them away, at command
(Rules and Regulations, Sec. 2, par. [a]). Consequently, the opposition of petitioners to the flag salute may be reduced to their objection to
singing the National Anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge.
After a careful and conscientious examination of the patriotic pledge as reproduced at the beginning of this decision, frankly we find nothing,
absolutely nothing, objectionable, even from the point of view of religious belief. The school child or student is simply made to say that he loves
the Philippines because it is the land of his birth and the home of his people; that because it protects him, in return he will heed the counsel of
his parents, obey the rules and regulations of his school, perform the duties of a patriotic and law-abiding citizen; and serve his country unselfishly
and faithly, and that he would be a true Filipino in thought, in word, and in deed. He is not even made to pledge allegiance to the flag or to the
Republic for which it stands. So that even if we assume for a moment that the flag were an image, connoting religious and veneration instead of
a mere symbol of the State and of national unity, the religious scruples of appellants against bowing to and venerating an image are not interfered
with or otherwise jeopardized.
And as to the singing of the National Anthem, which we reproduce below:
Land of the morning,
Child of the sun returning.
With fervor burning,
Thee do our souls adore.
Land dear and holy,
Cradle of noble heroes,
Ne'er shall invaders,
Trample thy sacred shores.
Ever within thy skies and thy clouds,
 and o'er thy hills and sea,
Do we behold the radiance, feel the throb
of glorious liberty.
Thy banner, dear to all our hearts,
Its sun and stars alight.
O—never shall its shining field
Be dimmed by tyrant's might.
Beautiful land of love,
O—land—of—light,
In thine embrace `tis rapture to lie.
But is glory ever, when thou art wronged,
For us, they sons to suffer and die.
the same thing may be said; that it speaks only of love of country, of patriotism, liberty and the glory of suffering and dying for it. It does not
even speak of resorting to force and engaging in military service or duty to defend the country, which service might meet with objection on the
part of conscientious objectors. Surely, petitioners do not disclaim or disavow these noble and sacred feelings of patriotism, respect, even
veneration for the flag and love of coutnry for which the flag stands.
Men may differ and do differ on religous beliefs and creeds, government policies, the wisdom and legality of laws, even the correctness of judicial
decisions and decrees; but in the field of love of country, reverence for the flag, national unity and patriotism, they can hardly afford to differ,
for these are matters in which they are mutually and viatlly interested, for to them, they mean national existence and survival as a nation or
national extinction.
In enforcing the flag salute on the petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion involved, and for their failure or refusal to obey school
regulations about the flag salute they were not being persecuted. Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sacntion.
If they chose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained at the expense of their
fellow citizens, nothing more. According to a popular expression, they could take it or leave it. Having elected not to comply with the regulations
about the flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend public schools.
In the case of Hamilton vs. University of California, 293 U.S. 243, 79 L. ed. 343, quite similar to the present case, appellants therein were taxpayers
and citizens of the United States and of California. The University of California received endowment and support from the State legislature under
certain conditions such as that any resident of California of the age of 14 years or upward of approved moral character shall have the right to
enter the University as a student and receive instructions therein. The University as part of its cirriculum and instruction required military science
and tactics in the Reserve Officers Training Corps. Appellants conformed to all requirements of the University except taking the course in military
science and tactics and for this the regents of the University suspended them. Appellants were members of the Methodist Espiscopal Church
and of the Epworth League. For many years their fathers have been ordained ministers of that church. They believed that war and preparation
for war is a violation of their religious belief. In other words, they were conscientious objectors to war. They believed that war, training for war,
and military training were immoral, wrong and contrary to the letter and spirit of the teaching of God and precepts of the Christian religion. They
petitioned for exemption from the military science and tactics course but the regents refused to make military training optional or to exempt
them and they were suspended. So they initiated court action with a California Supreme Court to compel the regents of the University to admit
them. In that action they assailed the validity of the State law providing for military training in the University. The petition was denied by the
State Supreme Court. In affirming the decision of the State Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of the United States held that:
. . . California has not drafted or called them to attend the University. They are seeking education offered by the State and at the same time
insisting that they be excluded from the prescribed course solely upon grounds of their religious beliefs and consicientious objections to war,
preparation for war and military education. Taken on the basis of the facts alleged in the petition, appellants' contentions amount to no more
than an assertion that the due process clause of the Fourtheenth Amendment as a safeguard of liberty' confers the right to be students in the
state university free from obligation to take military training as one of the conditions of attendance.
Viewed in the light of our decisions that proposition must at once be put aside as untenable . . .
In United States vs. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 75 L. ed. 1302, 51 S. Ct. 570, a later naturalization case, the applicant was unwilling, because of
conscientious objections, to take unqualifiedly the statutory oath of allegiance which contains this statement: "That he will support and defend
the constitution and laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear true faith and allegiance to the same." U.S.C.
title 8, Sec. 381. His petition stated that he was willing if necessary to take up arms in defense of this country, "but I should want to be free to
judge of the necessity." In amplification he said: "I do not undertake to support "my country, right or wrong" in any dispute which may arise,
and I am not willing to poromise beforehand, and without knowing the cause for which my country may go to war, either that I will or that I will
not "take up arms in defense of this country," however "necessary" the war may seem to be to the government of the day." The opinion of this
court quotes from petitioner's brief a statement to the effect that it is a fixed principle of our Constitution, zealously guarded by our laws, that
a citizen cannot be forced and need not bear arms in a war if he has conscientious religious scruples against doing so." And, referring to that part
of the argument in behalf of the applicant this court said (p. 623): "This, if it means what it seems to say, is an astonishing statement. Of course,
there is no such principle of the Constitution, fixed or otherwise. The conscientious objector is relieved from the obligation to bear arms in
obedience to no constitutional provision, express or implied; but because, and only because, it has accorded with the policy of Congress thus to
relieve him . . . The previlege of the native-born conscientious objector to avoid bearing arms comes not from the Constitution but from the acts
of Congress. That body may grant or withhold the exemption as in its wisdom it sees fit; and if it be withheld, the native-born conscientious
objector cannot successfully assert the privilege. No other conclusion is compatible with the well-nigh limitless extent of the war power as above
illustrated, which include by necessary implication, the power, inthe last extremity, to compel armed serviced of any citizen in the land, without
regard to his objections or his views in respect of the justice or morality of the particular war or of war in general. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11, 29, 49 L. ed. 643, 651, 25 S. Ct. 358, 3 Ann. Cas, 765, this Court (upholding a state compulsory vaccination law) speaking of the
liberties guaranteed to the individual by the Fourteenth Amendment, said: "... and yet he may be compelled, by force if need be, against his will
and without regard to his personal wishes or his pecuniary intersts, or even his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of
the army of his country and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense.
And see University of Maryland v. Coale, 165 Md. 224, 167 A. 54, a case, similar to that now before us, decided against the contention of a
student in the University of Maryland who on conscientious grounds objected to military training there required. His appeal to this Court was
dismissed for the want of a substantial federal questions. 290 U.S. 597, 78 L. ed. 525, 54 S. Ct. 131.
Plainly there is no ground for the contention that the regents' order, requiring able-bodied male students under the age of twenty-four as a
condition of their enrollment to take the prescribed instruction in military science and tactics, transgresses any constitutional right asserted by
these appellants.
Mr. Justice Cardozo in his concurring opinion said:
I assume for present purposes that religious liberty protected by the First Amendment against invasion by the nation is protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment against invasion by the states.
Accepting that premise, I cannot find in the respondents' ordinance an obstruction by the state to "the free exercise" of religion as the phrase
was understood by the foundrs of hte nation, and by the generations that have followed. Davis vs. Beasin, 133 U.S. 333, 342, 33 L. ed. 637, 10
s.Ct. 299.
There is no occasion at this time to mark the limits of governmental power in the exaction of military service when the nation is at peace. The
petitioners have not been required to bear arms for any hostile purpose, offensive or defensive, either now or in the future. They have not even
been required in any absolute or peremptory way to join courses of instruction that will fit them to bear arms. If they elect to resort to an
institution for higher education maintained with the state's moneys, then they are comanded to follow courses of instruction believed by the
state to be vital to its welfare. This may be condemned by some unwise or illiberal or unfair when there is violence to conscientious scruples,
either religious or merely ethical. More must be shown to set the ordinance at naught. In controversies of this order courts do not concern
themselves with matters of legislative policy, unrelated to privileges or liberties secured by the organic law. The first Amendment, if it be read
into the Fourteenth, makes invalid any state law `respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.' Instruction in
military science is not instruction in the practice or tenets of a religion. Neither directly nor indirectly is government establishing a state religion
when it insists upon such training. Instruction in military science, unaccompanied here by any pledge of military service, is not an interference
by the state with the free exercise of religion when the liberties of the constitution are read in the light of a century and a half of history during
days of peace and war . . .
Manifestly a different doctrine would carry us to lengths that have never yet been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were
to be thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of a war, whether for attack or for defense, or in furtherance of any other
end, condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has never yet been so exalted above the powers and
the compulsion of the agencies of government. One who is a martyr to a principle—which may turn out in the end to be a delusion or an error—
does not prove by his martyrdom that he has kept within the law."
We are not unmindful of the decision of the United States Federal Supreme Court on similar set of facts. In the case of Minersville School
District vs. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 84 L. ed. 1375, two Jehovah Witnesses children were expelled from the public school of Minersville for refusing
to salute the national flag in accordance with the regulations poromulgated by the school board for the daily flag ceremony. Their father Gobitsi
on behalf of his two children and in his own behalf brought suit to enjoin the school authorities from continuing to exact the execution of the
flag ceremony as a condition of his children's admittance in school. After trial, the District Court gave him relief and this decree was affirmed by
the Circuit Court of Appeals. On appeal to the Federal Supreme Court, the decrees of both the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals
were reversed with the lone dissent of Chief Justice Stone, on the ground that the requirement of participation of all pupils in the public schools
in the flag ceremony did not infringe the due process law and liberty guaranteed by the Constitution, particularly the one referring to religious
freedom and belief. Three years later, that is, on June 14, 1943, the ruling laid down in the Minersville School District vs. Gobitis case, was in the
case of West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Bernette, 319 U.S. 624-671 reversed by a sharply divided court, the majority opinion being
penned by Mr. Justice Jackson in which Justice Black, Douglas and Murphy concurred; while Mr. Justice Frankfurter who wrote the opinion in
the Gobitis case, filed a long dissenting opinion, and Justices Roberts and Reed adhered to the views expressed in the Gobitis case.
Neither attempting to justify the ruling laid down in the Minersville vs. Gobitis case nor desiring to criticize the doctrine of the West
Virginia vs. Barnette case, frankly, we are more inclined to favor the former as more in keeping with the spirit of our Constitution and the
government policy as laid down in Republic Act No. 1265 entitles "An Act Making Flag Ceremony Compulsory In All Educational Institutions".
We cannot help thinking that one reason that may have possibly influenced the decision in the West Virginia State Board of
Education vs. Barnette case, was that the children involved in said case and their parents found themselves in a serious dilemma for refusing to
salute the flag as required by the regulations of the School Board. They were expelled by the School Board and their absence was considered
unlawful and because of the law of compulsory school atendance of all children of school age, they were considered as truants and the school
officials threatened to send them to reformatories maintained for criminially inclinded juveniles. Parents of such children have been prosecuted
or were threatened with prosecution for cause such as alleged delinquency and if convicted, were subject to fine not exceeding $50.00 and a jail
term not exceeding 30 days. That is why in the majority opinion it was stated:
. . . The sole conflict is between authority and rights of the individual. The state asserts power to conditions access to public education on making
a prescribed sign and profession and at the same time to coerce attendance by punishing both parent and child . . .
Such a grave and embarrassing situation, however, does not obtain in the Philippines. True, we have a law (Republic Act 896) requiring
compulsory enrollment of children of shcool age, but said law contains so many exceptions and exemptions that it can be said that a child of
school age is very seldom compelled to attend school, let alone the fact that almost invariably, there is school crisis every year wherein the pupils
applying for admission in public schools could not be accommodated, and what is equally important is that there is no punishment or penal
sanction either for the pupil who fail to attend school or is expelled for failure to comply with school regulations such as the compulsory flag
salute ceremony, or his parents.
In the case of re Summers, 325 U.S. 561-578, decided on June 11, 1945, that is, two years after the decision in the case of West Virginia, the
Supreme Court of the United States affirmed a decision of the Illinois Supreme Court refusing admission of petitioner Clyde Wilson Summers to
the Illinois Bar. Summers had complied with tall the prerequisites to admission to the Bar of that state, but he was a conscientious objector who
did not believe in the use of force or war because of his religious belief. He described this attitude of his as follows:
The so-called "misconduct" for which petitioner could be reproached for is his taking the New Testament too seriously. Instead of merely reading
or preaching the Sermon on the Mount, he tries to practice it. The only fault of the petitioner consists in his attempt to act as a good Christian
in accordance with his interpreation of the Bible, and according to the dictates of his conscience. We respectfully submit that the profession of
law does nt shut its gates to persons who have qualified in all other respects even when they follow in the footsteps of that Great Teacher of
mankind who delivered the Sermon on the Mount. We respectfully submit that under our Constitutional guarantees even good Christians who
have met all the requirements for the admission to the bar may be admitted to practice law
The Constitution of Illinois required service in the militia in time of war of men of petitioner's age group. The Federal Supreme Court defined the
position of Summers as a conscientious objector in the following words:
. . . without detailing petitioner's testimony before the Committee or his subsequent statments in the record, his position may be compendiously
stated as one of non-violence. Petitioner will not serve in the armed forces. While he recognizes a difference between the military and police
forces, he would not act in the latter to coerce threatened violations. Petitioner would not use force to meet aggression against himself or his
family, no matter how aggravated or whether or not carrying a danger of bodily harm to himself or others. He is a believer in passive resistance.
We need to consider only his attitude toward service in the armed forces.
It was not denied that Summers was unwilling to serve in the militia of Illinois because of his religious belief. In affirming the decision of the
Illinois Supreme Court excluding Summers from the practice of law in that state, the Federal Supreme Court held that the action of the State
Supreme Court did not violate the principle of religious freedom contained in the Constitution.
If a man lived, say on an island, alone and all by himself without neighbors, he would normally have complete and absolute rights as to the way
he lives, his religion, incuding the manners he practices his religious beliefs. There would be no laws to obey, no rules and regulations to follow.
He would be subject only to Nature's physical laws. But man iis gregarious by nature and instinct and he gravitates toward community life, to
receive and enjoy the benefits of society and of social and political organization. The moment he does this and he becomes a member of a
community or nation, he has to give rights for the benefit of his fellow citizens and for the general welfare, just as his fellow men and companions
also agree to a limitation of their rights in his favor. So, with his religion. He may retain retain his freedom or religious belief, but as to practising
the same, he would have to give up some of those practices repugnant to the general welfare and subordinate them to the laws and sovereignty
of the State. In order words, the practice of religion or religious belief is subject to reasonable and non-discrminatory laws and regulations by
the state.
In the case of Prince vs. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 88 L. ed. 645, the United States Supreme Court affirmed a decision convicting Sarah
Prince of a violation of the Child Labor Law of Massachusetts. Mr. Justice Rutledge who wrote the opinion tersely described the case thus:
The case brings for review another episode in the conflict between Jehovah's Witneses and state authority. This time Sarah Prince appeals from
convictions for violating Massachusetts' child labor laws, by acts said to be a rightful exercise of her religious convictions.
When the offenses where committed she was the aunt and custodian of Betty M. Simmons, a girl nine years of age. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
The defendant in this case allowed Betty, under here legal cutody who was at the same time niece, to distribute religious pamphlets intended
to propagate the religion of Johovah Wiitness. The question involved was whether or not the law in question contravened the Fourtheenth
Amendment by denying appellant freedom of religion and denying to her the equal protection of the law. Defendant claimed that the child was
exercising her God given right and her constitutional right to preach the gospel and that no preacher of God's commands shold be interfered
with. She rested her case squarely on freedom of religion. In affirming the judgment of conviction and upholding the law as agains the claiim of
relgion and the exercise of religious belief, the court said:
. . . And neither rights of religion nor lights of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well-being, the
state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring shcool attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor, and in many
other ways. Its authority is not nullified merely because the parent grounds his claim to control the child's course of conduct on religion or
conscience. Thus, he cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on relgious grounds. The right to
practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.
. . . It is too late now to doubt that legislation appropriately designed to reach such evils is withinthe state's police power, whether against the
parent's claim to control of the child or one that religious scruples dictate contrary action.
Incidentally, it must be noted that this case was decided after that of West Virginia vs. Barnette, supra.
In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State thru the Secretary of Education was not imposing a religion or religious belief
or a religious test on said students. It was merely enforcing a non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all alike whether Christian,
Moslem, Protestant or Jehovah's Witness. The State was merely carrying out the duty imposed upon it by the Constitution which charges it with
supervision over and regulation of all educational institutions, to establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public education,
and see to it that all schools aim to develop among other things, civic conscience and teach the duties of citizenship. (Art. XIV, section 5 of the
Constitution). It does nothing more than try to inculcate in the minds of the school population during the formative period of their life, love of
country and love of the flag, all of which make for united and patriotic citizenry, so that later in after years they may be ready and willing to
serve, fight, even die for it. It is well known that whatever is taught to the youth during this period, such as love of God, of parents, respect for
elders, love of the truth, loyalty, honoring one's word and respecting the rights of other, becomes a habit or second nature that will remain with
them always. School children of kingdoms and empires are taught early to respect and love the king or the emperor for these rulers and
sovereigns symbolize the nation, and the children as future citizens or subjects will come to love their country.
Petitioners do not question the right of public schools to conduct the flag salute ceremony regularly but they do "question the attempt to compel
conscientious objectors guided by the word of God to salute the flag or participate in the ceremony to specific commandment of Jehovah God.
It is perfectly proper and lawful for one nt bound by a covenant with Jehovah to salute the flag when that person desires to salute it. It is entirely
wrong to interfere with that right or prevent such one from saluting the flag. Conversely, it is also true that it is wrong and illegal to compel one
who, for concience' sake, cannot participate in the ceremony." (p. 85, Appellant's Brief)
The trouble with exempting petitioners from participation in the flag ceremony aside from the fact that they have no valid right to such
exemption is that the latter would disrupt shcool discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population which by far constitutes the great
majority. If the children of Jehovah Witnesses are exempted, then the other pupils, especially the young ones seeing no reason for such
exemption, would naturlly ask for the same privilege because they might want to do something else such as play or study, instead of standing at
attention saluting the flag and singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, all of which consume considerable time; and if to
avoid odions discrimination this exemption is extended to others, then the flag ceremony would soon be a thing of the past or perhaps conducted
with very few participants, and the time will come when we would have citizens untaught and uninculcated in and not imbued with reverence
for the flag and love of country, admiration for national heroes, and patriotism — a pathetic, even tragic situation, and all because a small portion
of the shcool population imposed its will, demanded and was granted an exemption. In a way that might be regarded as tyranny of the minority,
and a small minority at that.
In a few cases, such exemptions in a limited way have been afforded members of a religious group. Conscientious objectors in the United States
who because of their religion were unwilling to serve in the war particularly as regards actual fighting or field duty, were allowed to do some
work in relation to the war, but not involving combat duty or the use of force. But that was by special legislation. If that is possible here as
regards exemption from participation in the flag ceremony, then petitioners would have to look to the Legislature, not the courts for relief.
The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption form or non-compliance with reasonable
and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority. As was said by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in h is dissent in
West Virginia vs. Barnette, supra:
The constitutional protection of religious freedom ... gave religious equality, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to
religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma. Religious loyalties may be exercised without hindrance from
the State, not the State may not exercise that which except by leave of religious loyalties is within the domain of temporal power. Otherwise,
each individual could set up his own censor against obedience to laws conscientiously deemed for the public good by those whose business it is
to make laws. (West Virginia State Board vs. Barnette, supra, at p. 653; emphasis supplied)
In conclusion we find and hold that the Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather it is symbol of the Republic of the
Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity; that the flag salute is nt a religious ceremony but an act and
profession of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for; that by authority of the legislature, the
Secretary of Education was duly authorized to promulgate Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that the requirement of observance of the
flag ceremony or salute provided for in said Department Order No. 8, does not violate the Constitutional provision about freedom of religion
and exercise of religion; that compliance with the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations and school disicipline, including
observance of the flag ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in public schools; and that for failure and refusal to participate in the flag
ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed from the public shcool they were attending.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is affirmed. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is ordered dissolved. No costs.

8. Tolentino v SEC of Financne

These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing the petitions filed in these cases for the declaration of unconstitutionality
of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. The motions, of which there are 10 in all, have been filed by the
several petitioners in these cases, with the exception of the Philippine Educational Publishers Association, Inc. and the Association of Philippine
Booksellers, petitioners in G.R. No. 115931.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, filed a consolidated comment, to which the Philippine Airlines, Inc., petitioner in G.R. No.
115852, and the Philippine Press Institute, Inc., petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, and Juan T. David, petitioner in G.R. No. 115525, each filed a reply.
In turn the Solicitor General filed on June 1, 1995 a rejoinder to the PPI's reply.

On June 27, 1995 the matter was submitted for resolution.

I. Power of the Senate to propose amendments to revenue bills. Some of the petitioners (Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc., Philippine Airlines
(PAL), Roco, and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA)) reiterate previous claims made by them that R.A. No. 7716 did not
"originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, §24 of the Constitution. Although they admit that H. No. 11197
was filed in the House of Representatives where it passed three readings and that afterward it was sent to the Senate where after first reading
it was referred to the Senate Ways and Means Committee, they complain that the Senate did not pass it on second and third readings. Instead
what the Senate did was to pass its own version (S. No. 1630) which it approved on May 24, 1994. Petitioner Tolentino adds that what the Senate
committee should have done was to amend H. No. 11197 by striking out the text of the bill and substituting it with the text of S. No. 1630. That
way, it is said, "the bill remains a House bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the House bill."

The contention has no merit.

The enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which the Senate proposed an amendment to a House revenue bill by enacting its own
version of a revenue bill. On at least two occasions during the Eighth Congress, the Senate passed its own version of revenue bills, which, in
consolidation with House bills earlier passed, became the enrolled bills. These were:
R.A. No. 7369 (AN ACT TO AMEND THE OMNIBUS INVESTMENTS CODE OF 1987 BY EXTENDING FROM FIVE (5) YEARS TO TEN YEARS THE PERIOD
FOR TAX AND DUTY EXEMPTION AND TAX CREDIT ON CAPITAL EQUIPMENT) which was approved by the President on April 10, 1992. This Act is
actually a consolidation of H. No. 34254, which was approved by the House on January 29, 1992, and S. No. 1920, which was approved by the
Senate on February 3, 1992.

R.A. No. 7549 (AN ACT GRANTING TAX EXEMPTIONS TO WHOEVER SHALL GIVE REWARD TO ANY FILIPINO ATHLETE WINNING A MEDAL IN
OLYMPIC GAMES) which was approved by the President on May 22, 1992. This Act is a consolidation of H. No. 22232, which was approved by
the House of Representatives on August 2, 1989, and S. No. 807, which was approved by the Senate on October 21, 1991.

On the other hand, the Ninth Congress passed revenue laws which were also the result of the consolidation of House and Senate bills. These are
the following, with indications of the dates on which the laws were approved by the President and dates the separate bills of the two chambers
of Congress were respectively passed:

1. R.A. NO. 7642

AN ACT INCREASING THE PENALTIES FOR TAX EVASION, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE THE PERTINENT SECTIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE (December 28, 1992).

House Bill No. 2165, October 5, 1992

Senate Bill No. 32, December 7, 1992

2. R.A. NO. 7643

AN ACT TO EMPOWER THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE TO REQUIRE THE PAYMENT OF THE VALUE-ADDED TAX EVERY MONTH AND
TO ALLOW LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS TO SHARE IN VAT REVENUE, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE CERTAIN SECTIONS OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (December 28, 1992)

House Bill No. 1503, September 3, 1992

Senate Bill No. 968, December 7, 1992

3. R.A. NO. 7646

AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE TO PRESCRIBE THE PLACE FOR PAYMENT OF INTERNAL REVENUE TAXES BY
LARGE TAXPAYERS, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED (February
24, 1993)

House Bill No. 1470, October 20, 1992

Senate Bill No. 35, November 19, 1992

4. R.A. NO. 7649

AN ACT REQUIRING THE GOVERNMENT OR ANY OF ITS POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS, INSTRUMENTALITIES OR AGENCIES INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-
OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS (GOCCS) TO DEDUCT AND WITHHOLD THE VALUE-ADDED TAX DUE AT THE RATE OF THREE PERCENT
(3%) ON GROSS PAYMENT FOR THE PURCHASE OF GOODS AND SIX PERCENT (6%) ON GROSS RECEIPTS FOR SERVICES RENDERED BY
CONTRACTORS (April 6, 1993)

House Bill No. 5260, January 26, 1993

Senate Bill No. 1141, March 30, 1993

5. R.A. NO. 7656

AN ACT REQUIRING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO DECLARE DIVIDENDS UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS TO THE
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (November 9, 1993)

House Bill No. 11024, November 3, 1993

Senate Bill No. 1168, November 3, 1993

6. R.A. NO. 7660

AN ACT RATIONALIZING FURTHER THE STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAX, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, ALLOCATING FUNDS FOR SPECIFIC PROGRAMS, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES (December 23, 1993)

House Bill No. 7789, May 31, 1993

Senate Bill No. 1330, November 18, 1993

7. R.A. NO. 7717

AN ACT IMPOSING A TAX ON THE SALE, BARTER OR EXCHANGE OF SHARES OF STOCK LISTED AND TRADED THROUGH THE LOCAL STOCK
EXCHANGE OR THROUGH INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED,
BY INSERTING A NEW SECTION AND REPEALING CERTAIN SUBSECTIONS THEREOF (May 5, 1994)

House Bill No. 9187, November 3, 1993

Senate Bill No. 1127, March 23, 1994

Thus, the enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which the Senate, in the exercise of its power to propose amendments to bills
required to originate in the House, passed its own version of a House revenue measure. It is noteworthy that, in the particular case of S. No.
1630, petitioners Tolentino and Roco, as members of the Senate, voted to approve it on second and third readings.

On the other hand, amendment by substitution, in the manner urged by petitioner Tolentino, concerns a mere matter of form. Petitioner has
not shown what substantial difference it would make if, as the Senate actually did in this case, a separate bill like S. No. 1630 is instead enacted
as a substitute measure, "taking into Consideration . . . H.B. 11197."

Indeed, so far as pertinent, the Rules of the Senate only provide:

RULE XXIX

AMENDMENTS

xxx xxx xxx

§68. Not more than one amendment to the original amendment shall be considered.

No amendment by substitution shall be entertained unless the text thereof is submitted in writing.

Any of said amendments may be withdrawn before a vote is taken thereon.

§69. No amendment which seeks the inclusion of a legislative provision foreign to the subject matter of a bill (rider) shall be entertained.

xxx xxx xxx

§70-A. A bill or resolution shall not be amended by substituting it with another which covers a subject distinct from that proposed in the
original bill or resolution. (emphasis added).

Nor is there merit in petitioners' contention that, with regard to revenue bills, the Philippine Senate possesses less power than the U.S. Senate
because of textual differences between constitutional provisions giving them the power to propose or concur with amendments.

Art. I, §7, cl. 1 of the U.S. Constitution reads:

All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other
Bills.

Art. VI, §24 of our Constitution reads:

All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

The addition of the word "exclusively" in the Philippine Constitution and the decision to drop the phrase "as on other Bills" in the American
version, according to petitioners, shows the intention of the framers of our Constitution to restrict the Senate's power to propose amendments
to revenue bills. Petitioner Tolentino contends that the word "exclusively" was inserted to modify "originate" and "the words 'as in any other
bills' (sic) were eliminated so as to show that these bills were not to be like other bills but must be treated as a special kind."

The history of this provision does not support this contention. The supposed indicia of constitutional intent are nothing but the relics of an
unsuccessful attempt to limit the power of the Senate. It will be recalled that the 1935 Constitution originally provided for a unicameral National
Assembly. When it was decided in 1939 to change to a bicameral legislature, it became necessary to provide for the procedure for lawmaking
by the Senate and the House of Representatives. The work of proposing amendments to the Constitution was done by the National Assembly,
acting as a constituent assembly, some of whose members, jealous of preserving the Assembly's lawmaking powers, sought to curtail the powers
of the proposed Senate. Accordingly they proposed the following provision:

All bills appropriating public funds, revenue or tariff bills, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the Assembly,
but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. In case of disapproval by the Senate of any such bills, the Assembly may repass the
same by a two-thirds vote of all its members, and thereupon, the bill so repassed shall be deemed enacted and may be submitted to the President
for corresponding action. In the event that the Senate should fail to finally act on any such bills, the Assembly may, after thirty days from the
opening of the next regular session of the same legislative term, reapprove the same with a vote of two-thirds of all the members of the
Assembly. And upon such reapproval, the bill shall be deemed enacted and may be submitted to the President for corresponding action.

The special committee on the revision of laws of the Second National Assembly vetoed the proposal. It deleted everything after the first sentence.
As rewritten, the proposal was approved by the National Assembly and embodied in Resolution No. 38, as amended by Resolution No. 73. (J.
ARUEGO, KNOW YOUR CONSTITUTION 65-66 (1950)). The proposed amendment was submitted to the people and ratified by them in the
elections held on June 18, 1940.

This is the history of Art. VI, §18 (2) of the 1935 Constitution, from which Art. VI, §24 of the present Constitution was derived. It explains why
the word "exclusively" was added to the American text from which the framers of the Philippine Constitution borrowed and why the phrase "as
on other Bills" was not copied. Considering the defeat of the proposal, the power of the Senate to propose amendments must be understood to
be full, plenary and complete "as on other Bills." Thus, because revenue bills are required to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives,
the Senate cannot enact revenue measures of its own without such bills. After a revenue bill is passed and sent over to it by the House, however,
the Senate certainly can pass its own version on the same subject matter. This follows from the coequality of the two chambers of Congress.

That this is also the understanding of book authors of the scope of the Senate's power to concur is clear from the following commentaries:

The power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments is apparently without restriction. It would seem that by virtue of this power,
the Senate can practically re-write a bill required to come from the House and leave only a trace of the original bill. For example, a general
revenue bill passed by the lower house of the United States Congress contained provisions for the imposition of an inheritance tax . This was
changed by the Senate into a corporation tax. The amending authority of the Senate was declared by the United States Supreme Court to be
sufficiently broad to enable it to make the alteration. [Flint v. Stone Tracy Company, 220 U.S. 107, 55 L. ed. 389].

(L. TAÑADA AND F. CARREON, POLITICAL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES 247 (1961))

The above-mentioned bills are supposed to be initiated by the House of Representatives because it is more numerous in membership and
therefore also more representative of the people. Moreover, its members are presumed to be more familiar with the needs of the country in
regard to the enactment of the legislation involved.

The Senate is, however, allowed much leeway in the exercise of its power to propose or concur with amendments to the bills initiated by the
House of Representatives. Thus, in one case, a bill introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives was changed by the Senate to make a
proposed inheritance tax a corporation tax. It is also accepted practice for the Senate to introduce what is known as an amendment by
substitution, which may entirely replace the bill initiated in the House of Representatives.

(I. CRUZ, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 144-145 (1993)).

In sum, while Art. VI, §24 provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills must "originate exclusively in the House of Representatives," it also adds, "but the Senate may propose or concur
with amendments." In the exercise of this power, the Senate may propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure. As petitioner Tolentino
states in a high school text, a committee to which a bill is referred may do any of the following:

(1) to endorse the bill without changes; (2) to make changes in the bill omitting or adding sections or altering its language; (3) to make
and endorse an entirely new bill as a substitute, in which case it will be known as a committee bill; or (4) to make no report at all.

(A. TOLENTINO, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES 258 (1950))

To except from this procedure the amendment of bills which are required to originate in the House by prescribing that the number of the House
bill and its other parts up to the enacting clause must be preserved although the text of the Senate amendment may be incorporated in place of
the original body of the bill is to insist on a mere technicality. At any rate there is no rule prescribing this form. S. No. 1630, as a substitute
measure, is therefore as much an amendment of H. No. 11197 as any which the Senate could have made.

II. S. No. 1630 a mere amendment of H. No. 11197. Petitioners' basic error is that they assume that S. No. 1630 is an independent and
distinct bill. Hence their repeated references to its certification that it was passed by the Senate "in substitution of S.B. No. 1129, taking into
consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197," implying that there is something substantially different between the reference to S. No.
1129 and the reference to H. No. 11197. From this premise, they conclude that R.A. No. 7716 originated both in the House and in the Senate
and that it is the product of two "half-baked bills because neither H. No. 11197 nor S. No. 1630 was passed by both houses of Congress."

In point of fact, in several instances the provisions of S. No. 1630, clearly appear to be mere amendments of the corresponding provisions of H.
No. 11197. The very tabular comparison of the provisions of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 attached as Supplement A to the basic petition of
petitioner Tolentino, while showing differences between the two bills, at the same time indicates that the provisions of the Senate bill were
precisely intended to be amendments to the House bill.

Without H. No. 11197, the Senate could not have enacted S. No. 1630. Because the Senate bill was a mere amendment of the House bill, H. No.
11197 in its original form did not have to pass the Senate on second and three readings. It was enough that after it was passed on first reading
it was referred to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means. Neither was it required that S. No. 1630 be passed by the House of Representatives
before the two bills could be referred to the Conference Committee.

There is legislative precedent for what was done in the case of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. When the House bill and Senate bill, which became
R.A. No. 1405 (Act prohibiting the disclosure of bank deposits), were referred to a conference committee, the question was raised whether the
two bills could be the subject of such conference, considering that the bill from one house had not been passed by the other and vice versa. As
Congressman Duran put the question:

MR. DURAN. Therefore, I raise this question of order as to procedure: If a House bill is passed by the House but not passed by the Senate,
and a Senate bill of a similar nature is passed in the Senate but never passed in the House, can the two bills be the subject of a conference, and
can a law be enacted from these two bills? I understand that the Senate bill in this particular instance does not refer to investments in
government securities, whereas the bill in the House, which was introduced by the Speaker, covers two subject matters: not only investigation
of deposits in banks but also investigation of investments in government securities. Now, since the two bills differ in their subject matter, I
believe that no law can be enacted.

Ruling on the point of order raised, the chair (Speaker Jose B. Laurel, Jr.) said:

THE SPEAKER. The report of the conference committee is in order. It is precisely in cases like this where a conference should be had. If the
House bill had been approved by the Senate, there would have been no need of a conference; but precisely because the Senate passed another
bill on the same subject matter, the conference committee had to be created, and we are now considering the report of that committee.

(2 CONG. REC. NO. 13, July 27, 1955, pp. 3841-42 (emphasis added))

III. The President's certification. The fallacy in thinking that H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 are distinct and unrelated measures also accounts
for the petitioners' (Kilosbayan's and PAL's) contention that because the President separately certified to the need for the immediate enactment
of these measures, his certification was ineffectual and void. The certification had to be made of the version of the same revenue bill which at
the moment was being considered. Otherwise, to follow petitioners' theory, it would be necessary for the President to certify as many bills as
are presented in a house of Congress even though the bills are merely versions of the bill he has already certified. It is enough that he certifies
the bill which, at the time he makes the certification, is under consideration. Since on March 22, 1994 the Senate was considering S. No. 1630,
it was that bill which had to be certified. For that matter on June 1, 1993 the President had earlier certified H. No. 9210 for immediate enactment
because it was the one which at that time was being considered by the House. This bill was later substituted, together with other bills, by H. No.
11197.

As to what Presidential certification can accomplish, we have already explained in the main decision that the phrase "except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, §26 (2) qualifies not only the requirement that "printed copies [of a bill] in
its final form [must be] distributed to the members three days before its passage" but also the requirement that before a bill can become a law
it must have passed "three readings on separate days." There is not only textual support for such construction but historical basis as well.

Art. VI, §21 (2) of the 1935 Constitution originally provided:

(2) No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof in its final form furnished its Members at
least three calendar days prior to its passage, except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon
the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereof shall be allowed and the question upon its passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered on the Journal.

When the 1973 Constitution was adopted, it was provided in Art. VIII, §19 (2):

(2) No bill shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to the Members three days before its passage, except when the Prime Minister certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment
to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

This provision of the 1973 document, with slight modification, was adopted in Art. VI, §26 (2) of the present Constitution, thus:

(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in
its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the
vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

The exception is based on the prudential consideration that if in all cases three readings on separate days are required and a bill has to be printed
in final form before it can be passed, the need for a law may be rendered academic by the occurrence of the very emergency or public calamity
which it is meant to address.

Petitioners further contend that a "growing budget deficit" is not an emergency, especially in a country like the Philippines where budget deficit
is a chronic condition. Even if this were the case, an enormous budget deficit does not make the need for R.A. No. 7716 any less urgent or the
situation calling for its enactment any less an emergency.

Apparently, the members of the Senate (including some of the petitioners in these cases) believed that there was an urgent need for
consideration of S. No. 1630, because they responded to the call of the President by voting on the bill on second and third readings on the same
day. While the judicial department is not bound by the Senate's acceptance of the President's certification, the respect due coequal departments
of the government in matters committed to them by the Constitution and the absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion caution a
stay of the judicial hand.

At any rate, we are satisfied that S. No. 1630 received thorough consideration in the Senate where it was discussed for six days. Only its
distribution in advance in its final printed form was actually dispensed with by holding the voting on second and third readings on the same day
(March 24, 1994). Otherwise, sufficient time between the submission of the bill on February 8, 1994 on second reading and its approval on
March 24, 1994 elapsed before it was finally voted on by the Senate on third reading.

The purpose for which three readings on separate days is required is said to be two-fold: (1) to inform the members of Congress of what they
must vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure is progressing through the enacting process, thus enabling them and others interested
in the measure to prepare their positions with reference to it. (1 J. G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §10.04, p. 282
(1972)). These purposes were substantially achieved in the case of R.A. No. 7716.

IV. Power of Conference Committee. It is contended (principally by Kilosbayan, Inc. and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood,
Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI)) that in violation of the constitutional policy of full public disclosure and the people's right to know (Art.
II, §28 and Art. III, §7) the Conference Committee met for two days in executive session with only the conferees present.

As pointed out in our main decision, even in the United States it was customary to hold such sessions with only the conferees and their staffs in
attendance and it was only in 1975 when a new rule was adopted requiring open sessions. Unlike its American counterpart, the Philippine
Congress has not adopted a rule prescribing open hearings for conference committees.

It is nevertheless claimed that in the United States, before the adoption of the rule in 1975, at least staff members were present. These were
staff members of the Senators and Congressmen, however, who may be presumed to be their confidential men, not stenographers as in this
case who on the last two days of the conference were excluded. There is no showing that the conferees themselves did not take notes of their
proceedings so as to give petitioner Kilosbayan basis for claiming that even in secret diplomatic negotiations involving state interests, conferees
keep notes of their meetings. Above all, the public's right to know was fully served because the Conference Committee in this case submitted a
report showing the changes made on the differing versions of the House and the Senate.

Petitioners cite the rules of both houses which provide that conference committee reports must contain "a detailed, sufficiently explicit
statement of the changes in or other amendments." These changes are shown in the bill attached to the Conference Committee Report. The
members of both houses could thus ascertain what changes had been made in the original bills without the need of a statement detailing the
changes.

The same question now presented was raised when the bill which became R.A. No. 1400 (Land Reform Act of 1955) was reported by the
Conference Committee. Congressman Bengzon raised a point of order. He said:

MR. BENGZON. My point of order is that it is out of order to consider the report of the conference committee regarding House Bill No. 2557
by reason of the provision of Section 11, Article XII, of the Rules of this House which provides specifically that the conference report must be
accompanied by a detailed statement of the effects of the amendment on the bill of the House. This conference committee report is not
accompanied by that detailed statement, Mr. Speaker. Therefore it is out of order to consider it.

Petitioner Tolentino, then the Majority Floor Leader, answered:

MR. TOLENTINO. Mr. Speaker, I should just like to say a few words in connection with the point of order raised by the gentleman from
Pangasinan.

There is no question about the provision of the Rule cited by the gentleman from Pangasinan, but this provision applies to those cases where
only portions of the bill have been amended. In this case before us an entire bill is presented; therefore, it can be easily seen from the reading
of the bill what the provisions are. Besides, this procedure has been an established practice.

After some interruption, he continued:

MR. TOLENTINO. As I was saying, Mr. Speaker, we have to look into the reason for the provisions of the Rules, and the reason for the
requirement in the provision cited by the gentleman from Pangasinan is when there are only certain words or phrases inserted in or deleted
from the provisions of the bill included in the conference report, and we cannot understand what those words and phrases mean and their
relation to the bill. In that case, it is necessary to make a detailed statement on how those words and phrases will affect the bill as a whole; but
when the entire bill itself is copied verbatim in the conference report, that is not necessary. So when the reason for the Rule does not exist, the
Rule does not exist.

(2 CONG. REC. NO. 2, p. 4056. (emphasis added))

Congressman Tolentino was sustained by the chair. The record shows that when the ruling was appealed, it was upheld by viva voce and when
a division of the House was called, it was sustained by a vote of 48 to 5. (Id.,
p. 4058)

Nor is there any doubt about the power of a conference committee to insert new provisions as long as these are germane to the subject of the
conference. As this Court held in Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703 (1993), in an opinion written by then Justice Cruz, the
jurisdiction of the conference committee is not limited to resolving differences between the Senate and the House. It may propose an entirely
new provision. What is important is that its report is subsequently approved by the respective houses of Congress. This Court ruled that it would
not entertain allegations that, because new provisions had been added by the conference committee, there was thereby a violation of the
constitutional injunction that "upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed."

Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill
that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both
the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the
Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a
becoming courtesy.

(Id. at 710. (emphasis added))

It is interesting to note the following description of conference committees in the Philippines in a 1979 study:

Conference committees may be of two types: free or instructed. These committees may be given instructions by their parent bodies or they may
be left without instructions. Normally the conference committees are without instructions, and this is why they are often critically referred to
as "the little legislatures." Once bills have been sent to them, the conferees have almost unlimited authority to change the clauses of the bills
and in fact sometimes introduce new measures that were not in the original legislation. No minutes are kept, and members' activities on
conference committees are difficult to determine. One congressman known for his idealism put it this way: "I killed a bill on export incentives
for my interest group [copra] in the conference committee but I could not have done so anywhere else." The conference committee submits a
report to both houses, and usually it is accepted. If the report is not accepted, then the committee is discharged and new members are appointed.

(R. Jackson, Committees in the Philippine Congress, in COMMITTEES AND LEGISLATURES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 163 (J. D. LEES AND M.
SHAW, eds.)).

In citing this study, we pass no judgment on the methods of conference committees. We cite it only to say that conference committees here are
no different from their counterparts in the United States whose vast powers we noted in Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, supra. At all
events, under Art. VI, §16(3) each house has the power "to determine the rules of its proceedings," including those of its committees. Any
meaningful change in the method and procedures of Congress or its committees must therefore be sought in that body itself.

V. The titles of S. No. 1630 and H. No. 11197. PAL maintains that R.A. No. 7716 violates Art. VI, §26 (1) of the Constitution which provides
that "Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." PAL contends that the
amendment of its franchise by the withdrawal of its exemption from the VAT is not expressed in the title of the law.

Pursuant to §13 of P.D. No. 1590, PAL pays a franchise tax of 2% on its gross revenue "in lieu of all other taxes, duties, royalties, registration,
license and other fees and charges of any kind, nature, or description, imposed, levied, established, assessed or collected by any municipal, city,
provincial or national authority or government agency, now or in the future."

PAL was exempted from the payment of the VAT along with other entities by §103 of the National Internal Revenue Code, which provides as
follows:

§103. Exempt transactions. — The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:

xxx xxx xxx

(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws or international agreements to which the Philippines is a signatory.

R.A. No. 7716 seeks to withdraw certain exemptions, including that granted to PAL, by amending §103, as follows:

§103. Exempt transactions. — The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:

xxx xxx xxx

(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws, except those granted under Presidential Decree Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491, 1590. . . .

The amendment of §103 is expressed in the title of R.A. No. 7716 which reads:

AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR
THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

By stating that R.A. No. 7716 seeks to "[RESTRUCTURE] THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM [BY] WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING
ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," Congress thereby clearly expresses its intention to amend any provision of the NIRC
which stands in the way of accomplishing the purpose of the law.

PAL asserts that the amendment of its franchise must be reflected in the title of the law by specific reference to P.D. No. 1590. It is unnecessary
to do this in order to comply with the constitutional requirement, since it is already stated in the title that the law seeks to amend the pertinent
provisions of the NIRC, among which is §103(q), in order to widen the base of the VAT. Actually, it is the bill which becomes a law that is required
to express in its title the subject of legislation. The titles of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 in fact specifically referred to §103 of the NIRC as among
the provisions sought to be amended. We are satisfied that sufficient notice had been given of the pendency of these bills in Congress before
they were enacted into what is now R.A.
No. 7716.

In Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, supra, a similar argument as that now made by PAL was rejected. R.A. No. 7354 is entitled AN ACT
CREATING THE PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORPORATION, DEFINING ITS POWERS, FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, PROVIDING FOR REGULATION
OF THE INDUSTRY AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES CONNECTED THEREWITH. It contained a provision repealing all franking privileges. It was
contended that the withdrawal of franking privileges was not expressed in the title of the law. In holding that there was sufficient description of
the subject of the law in its title, including the repeal of franking privileges, this Court held:

To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to be expressed in its title would not
only be unreasonable but would actually render legislation impossible. [Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., p. 297] As has been correctly
explained:

The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter germane to the subject as expressed in the title, and adopted
to the accomplishment of the object in view, may properly be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the same act the machinery by
which the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its infraction, and to remove obstacles in the way of its execution. If such matters
are properly connected with the subject as expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that they should also have special mention in the title.
(Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725)

(227 SCRA at 707-708)

VI. Claims of press freedom and religious liberty. We have held that, as a general proposition, the press is not exempt from the taxing
power of the State and that what the constitutional guarantee of free press prohibits are laws which single out the press or target a group
belonging to the press for special treatment or which in any way discriminate against the press on the basis of the content of the publication,
and R.A. No. 7716 is none of these.

Now it is contended by the PPI that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law
discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred, "even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is
unconstitutional."

With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the law granted the press a privilege, the law could take back the privilege
anytime without offense to the Constitution. The reason is simple: by granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its
sovereign prerogative.

Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the same tax burden to which other businesses have long ago been
subject. It is thus different from the tax involved in the cases invoked by the PPI. The license tax in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233,
80 L. Ed. 660 (1936) was found to be discriminatory because it was laid on the gross advertising receipts only of newspapers whose weekly
circulation was over 20,000, with the result that the tax applied only to 13 out of 124 publishers in Louisiana. These large papers were critical of
Senator Huey Long who controlled the state legislature which enacted the license tax. The censorial motivation for the law was thus evident.

On the other hand, in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 75 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1983), the tax was found
to be discriminatory because although it could have been made liable for the sales tax or, in lieu thereof, for the use tax on the privilege of using,
storing or consuming tangible goods, the press was not. Instead, the press was exempted from both taxes. It was, however, later made to pay a
special use tax on the cost of paper and ink which made these items "the only items subject to the use tax that were component of goods to be
sold at retail." The U.S. Supreme Court held that the differential treatment of the press "suggests that the goal of regulation is not related to
suppression of expression, and such goal is presumptively unconstitutional." It would therefore appear that even a law that favors the press is
constitutionally suspect. (See the dissent of Rehnquist, J. in that case)

Nor is it true that only two exemptions previously granted by E.O. No. 273 are withdrawn "absolutely and unqualifiedly" by R.A. No. 7716. Other
exemptions from the VAT, such as those previously granted to PAL, petroleum concessionaires, enterprises registered with the Export Processing
Zone Authority, and many more are likewise totally withdrawn, in addition to exemptions which are partially withdrawn, in an effort to broaden
the base of the tax.

The PPI says that the discriminatory treatment of the press is highlighted by the fact that transactions, which are profit oriented, continue to
enjoy exemption under R.A. No. 7716. An enumeration of some of these transactions will suffice to show that by and large this is not so and that
the exemptions are granted for a purpose. As the Solicitor General says, such exemptions are granted, in some cases, to encourage agricultural
production and, in other cases, for the personal benefit of the end-user rather than for profit. The exempt transactions are:

(a) Goods for consumption or use which are in their original state (agricultural, marine and forest products, cotton seeds in their original
state, fertilizers, seeds, seedlings, fingerlings, fish, prawn livestock and poultry feeds) and goods or services to enhance agriculture (milling of
palay, corn, sugar cane and raw sugar, livestock, poultry feeds, fertilizer, ingredients used for the manufacture of feeds).

(b) Goods used for personal consumption or use (household and personal effects of citizens returning to the Philippines) or for professional
use, like professional instruments and implements, by persons coming to the Philippines to settle here.

(c) Goods subject to excise tax such as petroleum products or to be used for manufacture of petroleum products subject to excise tax and
services subject to percentage tax.

(d) Educational services, medical, dental, hospital and veterinary services, and services rendered under employer-employee relationship.

(e) Works of art and similar creations sold by the artist himself.

(f) Transactions exempted under special laws, or international agreements.

(g) Export-sales by persons not VAT-registered.

(h) Goods or services with gross annual sale or receipt not exceeding P500,000.00.

(Respondents' Consolidated Comment on the Motions for Reconsideration, pp. 58-60)

The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the law does not discriminate against the press because "even nondiscriminatory taxation on
constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional." PPI cites in support of this assertion the following statement in Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 87 L. Ed. 1292 (1943):

The fact that the ordinance is "nondiscriminatory" is immaterial. The protection afforded by the First Amendment is not so restricted. A license
tax certainly does not acquire constitutional validity because it classifies the privileges protected by the First Amendment along with the wares
and merchandise of hucksters and peddlers and treats them all alike. Such equality in treatment does not save the ordinance. Freedom of press,
freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in preferred position.

The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press is
unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right. Hence, although its application to others, such those selling goods,
is valid, its application to the press or to religious groups, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, in connection with the latter's sale of religious books
and pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, "it is one thing to impose a tax on income or property of a preacher. It is
quite another thing to exact a tax on him for delivering a sermon."

A similar ruling was made by this Court in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 (1957) which invalidated a city ordinance
requiring a business license fee on those engaged in the sale of general merchandise. It was held that the tax could not be imposed on the sale
of bibles by the American Bible Society without restraining the free exercise of its right to propagate.

The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed
on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue
purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject
it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.

Additionally, the Philippine Bible Society, Inc. claims that although it sells bibles, the proceeds derived from the sales are used to subsidize the
cost of printing copies which are given free to those who cannot afford to pay so that to tax the sales would be to increase the price, while
reducing the volume of sale. Granting that to be the case, the resulting burden on the exercise of religious freedom is so incidental as to make
it difficult to differentiate it from any other economic imposition that might make the right to disseminate religious doctrines costly. Otherwise,
to follow the petitioner's argument, to increase the tax on the sale of vestments would be to lay an impermissible burden on the right of the
preacher to make a sermon.

On the other hand the registration fee of P1,000.00 imposed by §107 of the NIRC, as amended by §7 of R.A. No. 7716, although fixed in amount,
is really just to pay for the expenses of registration and enforcement of provisions such as those relating to accounting in §108 of the NIRC. That
the PBS distributes free bibles and therefore is not liable to pay the VAT does not excuse it from the payment of this fee because it also sells
some copies. At any rate whether the PBS is liable for the VAT must be decided in concrete cases, in the event it is assessed this tax by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

VII. Alleged violations of the due process, equal protection and contract clauses and the rule on taxation. CREBA asserts that R.A. No. 7716
(1) impairs the obligations of contracts, (2) classifies transactions as covered or exempt without reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule that
taxes should be uniform and equitable and that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation."

With respect to the first contention, it is claimed that the application of the tax to existing contracts of the sale of real property by installment
or on deferred payment basis would result in substantial increases in the monthly amortizations to be paid because of the 10% VAT. The
additional amount, it is pointed out, is something that the buyer did not anticipate at the time he entered into the contract.

The short answer to this is the one given by this Court in an early case: "Authorities from numerous sources are cited by the plaintiffs, but none
of them show that a lawful tax on a new subject, or an increased tax on an old one, interferes with a contract or impairs its obligation, within
the meaning of the Constitution. Even though such taxation may affect particular contracts, as it may increase the debt of one person and lessen
the security of another, or may impose additional burdens upon one class and release the burdens of another, still the tax must be paid unless
prohibited by the Constitution, nor can it be said that it impairs the obligation of any existing contract in its true legal sense." (La Insular v.
Machuca Go-Tauco and Nubla Co-Siong, 39 Phil. 567, 574 (1919)). Indeed not only existing laws but also "the reservation of the essential
attributes of sovereignty, is . . . read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order." (Philippine-American Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor General, 22
SCRA 135, 147 (1968)) Contracts must be understood as having been made in reference to the possible exercise of the rightful authority of the
government and no obligation of contract can extend to the defeat of that authority. (Norman v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 79 L. Ed. 885 (1935)).

It is next pointed out that while §4 of R.A. No. 7716 exempts such transactions as the sale of agricultural products, food items, petroleum, and
medical and veterinary services, it grants no exemption on the sale of real property which is equally essential. The sale of real property for
socialized and low-cost housing is exempted from the tax, but CREBA claims that real estate transactions of "the less poor," i.e., the middle class,
who are equally homeless, should likewise be exempted.

The sale of food items, petroleum, medical and veterinary services, etc., which are essential goods and services was already exempt under §103,
pars. (b) (d) (1) of the NIRC before the enactment of R.A. No. 7716. Petitioner is in error in claiming that R.A. No. 7716 granted exemption to
these transactions, while subjecting those of petitioner to the payment of the VAT. Moreover, there is a difference between the "homeless poor"
and the "homeless less poor" in the example given by petitioner, because the second group or middle class can afford to rent houses in the
meantime that they cannot yet buy their own homes. The two social classes are thus differently situated in life. "It is inherent in the power to
tax that the State be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that 'inequalities which result from a singling out of
one particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.'" (Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148, 153 (1955). Accord, City of
Baguio v. De Leon, 134 Phil. 912 (1968); Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654, 663 (1984); Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng
Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371 (1988)).

Finally, it is contended, for the reasons already noted, that R.A. No. 7716 also violates Art. VI, §28(1) which provides that "The rule of taxation
shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation."

Equality and uniformity of taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class be taxed at the same rate. The taxing
power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation. To satisfy this requirement it is enough that the
statute or ordinance applies equally to all persons, forms and corporations placed in similar situation. (City of Baguio v. De Leon, supra; Sison, Jr.
v. Ancheta, supra)

Indeed, the VAT was already provided in E.O. No. 273 long before R.A. No. 7716 was enacted. R.A. No. 7716 merely expands the base of the tax.
The validity of the original VAT Law was questioned in Kapatiran ng Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 383 (1988) on
grounds similar to those made in these cases, namely, that the law was "oppressive, discriminatory, unjust and regressive in violation of Art. VI,
§28(1) of the Constitution." (At 382) Rejecting the challenge to the law, this Court held:

As the Court sees it, EO 273 satisfies all the requirements of a valid tax. It is uniform. . . .

The sales tax adopted in EO 273 is applied similarly on all goods and services sold to the public, which are not exempt, at the constant rate of 0%
or 10%.

The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is imposed only on sales of goods or services by persons engaged in business with an aggregate gross
annual sales exceeding P200,000.00. Small corner sari-sari stores are consequently exempt from its application. Likewise exempt from the tax
are sales of farm and marine products, so that the costs of basic food and other necessities, spared as they are from the incidence of the VAT,
are expected to be relatively lower and within the reach of the general public.

(At 382-383)

The CREBA claims that the VAT is regressive. A similar claim is made by the Cooperative Union of the Philippines, Inc. (CUP), while petitioner
Juan T. David argues that the law contravenes the mandate of Congress to provide for a progressive system of taxation because the law imposes
a flat rate of 10% and thus places the tax burden on all taxpayers without regard to their ability to pay.

The Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like the VAT, are regressive. What it simply provides is that
Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation." The constitutional provision has been interpreted to mean simply that "direct taxes are
. . . to be preferred [and] as much as possible, indirect taxes should be minimized." (E. FERNANDO, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 221
(Second ed. (1977)). Indeed, the mandate to Congress is not to prescribe, but to evolve, a progressive tax system. Otherwise, sales taxes, which
perhaps are the oldest form of indirect taxes, would have been prohibited with the proclamation of Art. VIII, §17(1) of the 1973 Constitution
from which the present Art. VI, §28(1) was taken. Sales taxes are also regressive.

Resort to indirect taxes should be minimized but not avoided entirely because it is difficult, if not impossible, to avoid them by imposing such
taxes according to the taxpayers' ability to pay. In the case of the VAT, the law minimizes the regressive effects of this imposition by providing
for zero rating of certain transactions (R.A. No. 7716, §3, amending §102 (b) of the NIRC), while granting exemptions to other transactions. (R.A.
No. 7716, §4, amending §103 of the NIRC).

Thus, the following transactions involving basic and essential goods and services are exempted from the VAT:

(a) Goods for consumption or use which are in their original state (agricultural, marine and forest products, cotton seeds in their original
state, fertilizers, seeds, seedlings, fingerlings, fish, prawn livestock and poultry feeds) and goods or services to enhance agriculture (milling of
palay, corn sugar cane and raw sugar, livestock, poultry feeds, fertilizer, ingredients used for the manufacture of feeds).

(b) Goods used for personal consumption or use (household and personal effects of citizens returning to the Philippines) and or
professional use, like professional instruments and implements, by persons coming to the Philippines to settle here.

(c) Goods subject to excise tax such as petroleum products or to be used for manufacture of petroleum products subject to excise tax and
services subject to percentage tax.

(d) Educational services, medical, dental, hospital and veterinary services, and services rendered under employer-employee relationship.

(e) Works of art and similar creations sold by the artist himself.

(f) Transactions exempted under special laws, or international agreements.

(g) Export-sales by persons not VAT-registered.

(h) Goods or services with gross annual sale or receipt not exceeding P500,000.00.

(Respondents' Consolidated Comment on the Motions for Reconsideration, pp. 58-60)

On the other hand, the transactions which are subject to the VAT are those which involve goods and services which are used or availed of mainly
by higher income groups. These include real properties held primarily for sale to customers or for lease in the ordinary course of trade or
business, the right or privilege to use patent, copyright, and other similar property or right, the right or privilege to use industrial, commercial or
scientific equipment, motion picture films, tapes and discs, radio, television, satellite transmission and cable television time, hotels, restaurants
and similar places, securities, lending investments, taxicabs, utility cars for rent, tourist buses, and other common carriers, services of franchise
grantees of telephone and telegraph.

The problem with CREBA's petition is that it presents broad claims of constitutional violations by tendering issues not at retail but at wholesale
and in the abstract. There is no fully developed record which can impart to adjudication the impact of actuality. There is no factual foundation
to show in the concrete the application of the law to actual contracts and exemplify its effect on property rights. For the fact is that petitioner's
members have not even been assessed the VAT. Petitioner's case is not made concrete by a series of hypothetical questions asked which are no
different from those dealt with in advisory opinions.

The difficulty confronting petitioner is thus apparent. He alleges arbitrariness. A mere allegation, as here, does not suffice. There must be a
factual foundation of such unconstitutional taint. Considering that petitioner here would condemn such a provision as void on its face, he has
not made out a case. This is merely to adhere to the authoritative doctrine that where the due process and equal protection clauses are invoked,
considering that they are not fixed rules but rather broad standards, there is a need for proof of such persuasive character as would lead to such
a conclusion. Absent such a showing, the presumption of validity must prevail.

(Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA at 661)

Adjudication of these broad claims must await the development of a concrete case. It may be that postponement of adjudication would result
in a multiplicity of suits. This need not be the case, however. Enforcement of the law may give rise to such a case. A test case, provided it is an
actual case and not an abstract or hypothetical one, may thus be presented.

Nor is hardship to taxpayers alone an adequate justification for adjudicating abstract issues. Otherwise, adjudication would be no different from
the giving of advisory opinion that does not really settle legal issues.

We are told that it is our duty under Art. VIII, §1, ¶2 to decide whenever a claim is made that "there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This duty can only arise if an actual
case or controversy is before us. Under Art . VIII, §5 our jurisdiction is defined in terms of "cases" and all that Art. VIII, §1, ¶2 can plausibly mean
is that in the exercise of that jurisdiction we have the judicial power to determine questions of grave abuse of discretion by any branch or
instrumentality of the government.

Put in another way, what is granted in Art. VIII, §1, ¶2 is "judicial power," which is "the power of a court to hear and decide cases pending
between parties who have the right to sue and be sued in the courts of law and equity" (Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456, 559 (1912)), as distinguished
from legislative and executive power. This power cannot be directly appropriated until it is apportioned among several courts either by the
Constitution, as in the case of Art. VIII, §5, or by statute, as in the case of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. No. 296) and the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129). The power thus apportioned constitutes the court's "jurisdiction," defined as "the power conferred by law upon a
court or judge to take cognizance of a case, to the exclusion of all others." (United States v. Arceo, 6 Phil. 29 (1906)) Without an actual case
coming within its jurisdiction, this Court cannot inquire into any allegation of grave abuse of discretion by the other departments of the
government.

VIII. Alleged violation of policy towards cooperatives. On the other hand, the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP), after briefly
surveying the course of legislation, argues that it was to adopt a definite policy of granting tax exemption to cooperatives that the present
Constitution embodies provisions on cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT would therefore be to infringe a constitutional policy.
Petitioner claims that in 1973, P.D. No. 175 was promulgated exempting cooperatives from the payment of income taxes and sales taxes but in
1984, because of the crisis which menaced the national economy, this exemption was withdrawn by P.D. No. 1955; that in 1986, P.D. No. 2008
again granted cooperatives exemption from income and sales taxes until December 31, 1991, but, in the same year, E.O. No. 93 revoked the
exemption; and that finally in 1987 the framers of the Constitution "repudiated the previous actions of the government adverse to the interests
of the cooperatives, that is, the repeated revocation of the tax exemption to cooperatives and instead upheld the policy of strengthening the
cooperatives by way of the grant of tax exemptions," by providing the following in Art. XII:

§1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the
amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the
quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged.

The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries
that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the
State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.

In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. Private
enterprises, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall be encouraged to broaden the base of their
ownership.

§15. The Congress shall create an agency to promote the viability and growth of cooperatives as instruments for social justice and economic
development.

Petitioner's contention has no merit. In the first place, it is not true that P.D. No. 1955 singled out cooperatives by withdrawing their exemption
from income and sales taxes under P.D. No. 175, §5. What P.D. No. 1955, §1 did was to withdraw the exemptions and preferential treatments
theretofore granted to private business enterprises in general, in view of the economic crisis which then beset the nation. It is true that after
P.D. No. 2008, §2 had restored the tax exemptions of cooperatives in 1986, the exemption was again repealed by E.O. No. 93, §1, but then again
cooperatives were not the only ones whose exemptions were withdrawn. The withdrawal of tax incentives applied to all, including government
and private entities. In the second place, the Constitution does not really require that cooperatives be granted tax exemptions in order to
promote their growth and viability. Hence, there is no basis for petitioner's assertion that the government's policy toward cooperatives had been
one of vacillation, as far as the grant of tax privileges was concerned, and that it was to put an end to this indecision that the constitutional
provisions cited were adopted. Perhaps as a matter of policy cooperatives should be granted tax exemptions, but that is left to the discretion of
Congress. If Congress does not grant exemption and there is no discrimination to cooperatives, no violation of any constitutional policy can be
charged.

Indeed, petitioner's theory amounts to saying that under the Constitution cooperatives are exempt from taxation. Such theory is contrary to the
Constitution under which only the following are exempt from taxation: charitable institutions, churches and parsonages, by reason of Art. VI,
§28 (3), and non-stock, non-profit educational institutions by reason of Art. XIV, §4 (3).

CUP's further ground for seeking the invalidation of R.A. No. 7716 is that it denies cooperatives the equal protection of the law because electric
cooperatives are exempted from the VAT. The classification between electric and other cooperatives (farmers cooperatives, producers
cooperatives, marketing cooperatives, etc.) apparently rests on a congressional determination that there is greater need to provide cheaper
electric power to as many people as possible, especially those living in the rural areas, than there is to provide them with other necessities in
life. We cannot say that such classification is unreasonable.

We have carefully read the various arguments raised against the constitutional validity of R.A. No. 7716. We have in fact taken the extraordinary
step of enjoining its enforcement pending resolution of these cases. We have now come to the conclusion that the law suffers from none of the
infirmities attributed to it by petitioners and that its enactment by the other branches of the government does not constitute a grave abuse of
discretion. Any question as to its necessity, desirability or expediency must be addressed to Congress as the body which is electorally responsible,
remembering that, as Justice Holmes has said, "legislators are the ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great
a degree as are the courts." (Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270, 48 L. Ed. 971, 973 (1904)). It is not right, as petitioner
in G.R. No. 115543 does in arguing that we should enforce the public accountability of legislators, that those who took part in passing the law in
question by voting for it in Congress should later thrust to the courts the burden of reviewing measures in the flush of enactment. This Court
does not sit as a third branch of the legislature, much less exercise a veto power over legislation.

WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality and the temporary restraining order previously issued is hereby lifted.

SO ORDERED.

9.) Estrada v Escritor

The facts of the case will determine whether respondent will prevail in her plea of religious freedom. It is necessary therefore to lay down the
facts in detail, careful not to omit the essentials.

In a sworn letter-complaint dated July 27, 2000, complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of Branch
253, Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said
court, is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old. Estrada is not personally related either
to Escritor or her partner and is a resident not of Las Pias City but of Bacoor, Cavite. Nevertheless, he filed the charge against Escritor as he
believes that she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein
as it might appear that the court condones her act.[5]

Judge Caoibes referred the letter to Escritor who stated that there is no truth as to the veracity of the allegation and challenged Estrada to
appear in the open and prove his allegation in the proper forum.[6] Judge Caoibes set a preliminary conference on October 12, 2000. Escritor
moved for the inhibition of Judge Caoibes from hearing her case to avoid suspicion and bias as she previously filed an administrative complaint
against him and said case was still pending in the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). Escritors motion was denied. The preliminary
conference proceeded with both Estrada and Escritor in attendance. Estrada confirmed that he filed the letter-complaint for immorality against
Escritor because in his frequent visits to the Hall of Justice of Las Pias City, he learned from conversations therein that Escritor was living with a
man not her husband and that she had an eighteen to twenty-year old son by this man. This prompted him to write to Judge Caoibes as he
believed that employees of the judiciary should be respectable and Escritors live-in arrangement did not command respect.[7]

Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999,[8] she was already a widow, her husband having died in 1998.[9] She
admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for twenty years and that they have a son. But as a
member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in
conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness, viz:

II. Issue

Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of gross and immoral conduct. To resolve this issue, it is necessary
to determine the sub-issue of whether or not respondents right to religious freedom should carve out an exception from the prevailing
jurisprudence on illicit relations for which government employees are held administratively liable.

VII. Religion Clauses in the Philippines

A. History

Before our country fell under American rule, the blanket of Catholicism covered the archipelago. There was a union of church and state and
Catholicism was the state religion under the Spanish Constitution of 1876. Civil authorities exercised religious functions and the friars exercised
civil powers.[294] Catholics alone enjoyed the right of engaging in public ceremonies of worship.[295] Although the Spanish Constitution itself
was not extended to the Philippines, Catholicism was also the established church in our country under the Spanish rule. Catholicism was in fact
protected by the Spanish Penal Code of 1884 which was in effect in the Philippines. Some of the offenses in chapter six of the Penal Code entitled
Crimes against Religion and Worship referred to crimes against the state religion.[296] The coming of the Americans to our country, however,
changed this state-church scheme for with the advent of this regime, the unique American experiment of separation of church and state was
transported to Philippine soil.

Even as early as the conclusion of the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain on December 10, 1898, the American guarantee of
religious freedom had been extended to the Philippines. The Treaty provided that the inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes
or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of religion.[297] Even the Filipinos themselves guaranteed religious freedom a
month later or on January 22, 1899 upon the adoption of the Malolos Constitution of the Philippine Republic under General Emilio Aguinaldo. It
provided that the State recognizes the liberty and equality of all religion (de todos los cultos) in the same manner as the separation of the Church
and State. But the Malolos Constitution and government was short-lived as the Americans took over the reigns of government.[298]

With the Philippines under the American regime, President McKinley issued Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission, the body created
to take over the civil government in the Philippines in 1900. The Instructions guaranteed religious freedom, viz:

That no law shall be made respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed ... that no form of religion and no
minister of religion shall be forced upon the community or upon any citizen of the Islands, that, on the other hand, no minister of religion shall
be interfered with or molested in following his calling.[299]

This provision was based on the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Likewise, the Instructions declared that (t)he separation
between State and Church shall be real, entire and absolute.[300]

Thereafter, every organic act of the Philippines contained a provision on freedom of religion. Similar to the religious freedom clause in the
Instructions, the Philippine Bill of 1902 provided that:

No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that free exercise and enjoyment of
religious worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.

In U.S. v. Balcorta,[301] the Court stated that the Philippine Bill of 1902 caused the complete separation of church and state, and the abolition
of all special privileges and all restrictions theretofor conferred or imposed upon any particular religious sect.[302]

The Jones Law of 1916 carried the same provision, but expanded it with a restriction against using public money or property for religious
purposes, viz:

That no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed; and no religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights. No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, donated, or used, directly
or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit
or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teachers or dignitary as such.

This was followed by the Philippine Independence Law or Tydings-McDuffie Law of 1934 which guaranteed independence to the Philippines and
authorized the drafting of a Philippine constitution. It enjoined Filipinos to include freedom of religion in drafting their constitution preparatory
to the grant of independence. The law prescribed that (a)bsolute toleration of religious sentiment shall be secured and no inhabitant or religious
organization shall be molested in person or property on account of religious belief or mode of worship.[303]

The Constitutional Convention then began working on the 1935 Constitution. In their proceedings, Delegate Jose P. Laurel as Chairman of the
Committee on Bill of Rights acknowledged that (i)t was the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, which first introduced religious toleration in
our country. President McKinleys Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission reasserted this right which later was incorporated into the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the Jones Law.[304] In accordance with the Tydings-McDuffie Law, the 1935 Constitution provided in the Bill of
Rights, Article IV, Section 7, viz:

Sec. 7. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.

This provision, borrowed from the Jones Law, was readily approved by the Convention.[305] In his speech as Chairman of the Committee on Bill
of Rights, Delegate Laurel said that modifications in phraseology of the Bill of Rights in the Jones Law were avoided whenever possible because
the principles must remain couched in a language expressive of their historical background, nature, extent and limitations as construed and
interpreted by the great statesmen and jurists that vitalized them.[306]

The 1973 Constitution which superseded the 1935 Constitution contained an almost identical provision on religious freedom in the Bill of Rights
in Article IV, Section 8, viz:
Sec. 8. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.

This time, however, the General Provisions in Article XV added in Section 15 that (t)he separation of church and state shall be inviolable.

Without discussion by the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the 1973 religious clauses were reproduced in the 1987 Constitution under the Bill
of Rights in Article III, Section 5.[307] Likewise, the provision on separation of church and state was included verbatim in the 1987 Constitution,
but this time as a principle in Section 6, Article II entitled Declaration of Principles and State Policies.

Considering the American origin of the Philippine religion clauses and the intent to adopt the historical background, nature, extent and limitations
of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution when it was included in the 1935 Bill of Rights, it is not surprising that nearly all the major
Philippine cases involving the religion clauses turn to U.S. jurisprudence in explaining the nature, extent and limitations of these clauses.
However, a close scrutiny of these cases would also reveal that while U.S. jurisprudence on religion clauses flows into two main streams of
interpretation - separation and benevolent neutrality - the well-spring of Philippine jurisprudence on this subject is for the most part, benevolent
neutrality which gives room for accommodation.

B. Jurisprudence

In revisiting the landscape of Philippine jurisprudence on the religion clauses, we begin with the definition of religion. Religion is derived from
the Middle English religioun, from Old French religion, from Latin religio, vaguely referring to a bond between man and the gods.[308] This pre-
Christian term for the cult and rituals of pagan Rome was first Christianized in the Latin translation of the Bible.[309] While the U.S. Supreme
Court has had to take up the challenge of defining the parameters and contours of religion to determine whether a non-theistic belief or act is
covered by the religion clauses, this Court has not been confronted with the same issue. In Philippine jurisprudence, religion, for purposes of the
religion clauses, has thus far been interpreted as theistic. In 1937, the Philippine case of Aglipay v. Ruiz[310] involving the Establishment Clause,
defined religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator. Twenty years later, the Court cited the
Aglipay definition in American Bible Society v. City of Manila,[311] a case involving the Free Exercise clause. The latter also cited the American
case of Davis in defining religion, viz: (i)t has reference to ones views of his relations to His Creator and to the obligations they impose of
reverence to His being and character and obedience to His Will. The Beason definition, however, has been expanded in U.S. jurisprudence to
include non-theistic beliefs.

1. Free Exercise Clause

Freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or
indirect, in the practice of ones religion. The Free Exercise Clause principally guarantees voluntarism, although the Establishment Clause also
assures voluntarism by placing the burden of the advancement of religious groups on their intrinsic merits and not on the support of the
state.[312]

In interpreting the Free Exercise Clause, the realm of belief poses no difficulty. The early case of Gerona v. Secretary of Education[313] is
instructive on the matter, viz:

The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by ones imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including
religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may
appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and the
exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel.[314]

The difficulty in interpretation sets in when belief is externalized into speech and action.

Religious speech comes within the pale of the Free Exercise Clause as illustrated in the American Bible Society case. In that case, plaintiff
American Bible Society was a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious missionary corporation which sold bibles and gospel portions of the bible
in the course of its ministry. The defendant City of Manila required plaintiff to secure a mayors permit and a municipal license as ordinarily
required of those engaged in the business of general merchandise under the citys ordinances. Plaintiff argued that this amounted to religious
censorship and restrained the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession, to wit: the distribution and sale of bibles and other religious
literature to the people of the Philippines.

After defining religion, the Court, citing Tanada and Fernando, made this statement, viz:

The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate
religious information. Any restraint of such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is
a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. (Tanada and Fernando on the Constitution of the
Philippines, vol. 1, 4th ed., p. 297) (emphasis supplied)

This was the Courts maiden unequivocal affirmation of the clear and present danger rule in the religious freedom area, and in Philippine
jurisprudence, for that matter.[315] The case did not clearly show, however, whether the Court proceeded to apply the test to the facts and
issues of the case, i.e., it did not identify the secular value the government regulation sought to protect, whether the religious speech posed a
clear and present danger to this or other secular value protected by government, or whether there was danger but it could not be characterized
as clear and present. It is one thing to apply the test and find that there is no clear and present danger, and quite another not to apply the test
altogether.
Instead, the Court categorically held that the questioned ordinances were not applicable to plaintiff as it was not engaged in the business or
occupation of selling said merchandise for profit. To add, the Court, citing Murdock v. Pennsylvania,[316] ruled that applying the ordinance
requiring it to secure a license and pay a license fee or tax would impair its free exercise of religious profession and worship and its right of
dissemination of religious beliefs as the power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. Thus, in
American Bible Society, the clear and present danger rule was laid down but it was not clearly applied.

In the much later case of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[317] also involving the sale of religious books, the Court distinguished the American
Bible Society case from the facts and issues in Tolentino and did not apply the American Bible Society ruling. In Tolentino, the Philippine Bible
Society challenged the validity of the registration provisions of the Value Added Tax (VAT) Law as a prior restraint. The Court held, however, that
the fixed amount of registration fee was not imposed for the exercise of a privilege like a license tax which American Bible Society ruled was
violative of religious freedom. Rather, the registration fee was merely an administrative fee to defray part of the cost of registration which was
a central feature of the VAT system. Citing Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization,[318] the Court also declared prefatorily that the
Free Exercise of Religion Clause does not prohibit imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the sale of religious materials by a religious
organization. In the Courts resolution of the motion for reconsideration of the Tolentino decision, the Court noted that the burden on religious
freedom caused by the tax was just similar to any other economic imposition that might make the right to disseminate religious doctrines costly.

Two years after American Bible Society came the 1959 case of Gerona v. Secretary of Education,[319] this time involving conduct expressive of
religious belief colliding with a rule prescribed in accordance with law. In this case, petitioners were members of the Jehovahs Witnesses. They
challenged a Department Order issued by the Secretary of Education implementing Republic Act No. 1265 which prescribed compulsory flag
ceremonies in all public schools. In violation of the Order, petitioners children refused to salute the Philippine flag, sing the national anthem, or
recite the patriotic pledge, hence they were expelled from school. Seeking protection under the Free Exercise Clause, petitioners claimed that
their refusal was on account of their religious belief that the Philippine flag is an image and saluting the same is contrary to their religious belief.
The Court stated, viz:

. . . If the exercise of religious belief clashes with the established institutions of society and with the law, then the former must yield to the latter.
The Government steps in and either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes the one exercising it. (emphasis supplied)[320]

The Court then proceeded to determine if the acts involved constituted a religious ceremony in conflict with the beliefs of the petitioners with
the following justification:

After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest with the courts. It cannot be left to a religious
group or sect, much less to a follower of said group or sect; otherwise, there would be confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as
many interpretations and meaning to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or sects or followers, all depending
upon the meaning which they, though in all sincerity and good faith, may want to give to such ritual or ceremony.[321]

It was held that the flag was not an image, the flag salute was not a religious ceremony, and there was nothing objectionable about the singing
of the national anthem as it speaks only of love of country, patriotism, liberty and the glory of suffering and dying for it. The Court upheld the
questioned Order and the expulsion of petitioners children, stressing that:

Men may differ and do differ on religious beliefs and creeds, government policies, the wisdom and legality of laws, even the correctness of
judicial decisions and decrees; but in the field of love of country, reverence for the flag, national unity and patriotism, they can hardly afford to
differ, for these are matters in which they are mutually and vitally interested, for to them, they mean national existence and survival as a nation
or national extinction.[322]

In support of its ruling, the Court cited Justice Frankfurters dissent in the Barnette case, viz:

The constitutional protection of religious freedom x x x gave religious equality, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to
religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma.[323]

It stated in categorical terms, viz:

The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable
and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority.[324]

Thus, the religious freedom doctrines one can derive from Gerona are: (1) it is incumbent upon the Court to determine whether a certain ritual
is religious or not; (2) religious freedom will not be upheld if it clashes with the established institutions of society and with the law such that
when a law of general applicability (in this case the Department Order) incidentally burdens the exercise of ones religion, ones right to religious
freedom cannot justify exemption from compliance with the law. The Gerona ruling was reiterated in Balbuna, et al. v. Secretary of Education,
et al.[325]

Fifteen years after Gerona came the 1974 case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union.[326] In this unanimously decided en banc case,
Victoriano was a member of the Iglesia ni Cristo which prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor organization. He worked in the
Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. and was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers Union which had with the company a closed shop provision pursuant
to Republic Act No. 875 allowing closed shop arrangements. Subsequently, Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted exempting from the application
and coverage of a closed shop agreement employees belonging to any religious sect which prohibits affiliation of their members with any labor
organization. Victoriano resigned from the union after Republic Act No. 3350 took effect. The union notified the company of Victorianos
resignation, which in turn notified Victoriano that unless he could make a satisfactory arrangement with the union, the company would be
constrained to dismiss him from the service. Victoriano sought to enjoin the company and the union from dismissing him. The court having
granted the injunction, the union came to this Court on questions of law, among which was whether Republic Act No. 3350 was unconstitutional
for impairing the obligation of contracts and for granting an exemption offensive of the Establishment Clause. With respect to the first issue, the
Court ruled, viz:

Religious freedom, although not unlimited, is a fundamental personal right and liberty (Schneider v. Irgington, 308 U.S. 147, 161, 84 L.ed.155,
164, 60 S.Ct. 146) and has a preferred position in the hierarchy of values. Contractual rights, therefore, must yield to freedom of religion. It is
only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement
of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary.[327] (emphasis supplied)

As regards the Establishment Clause issue, the Court after citing the constitutional provision on establishment and free exercise of religion,
declared, viz:

The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus
forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148,
1153), but also assures the free exercise of ones chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion
clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience
directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good.
(footnote omitted). Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously
between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10
L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to
advance the states secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its
purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 L ed. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
444-5 and 449)[328] (emphasis supplied)

Quoting Aglipay v. Ruiz,[329] the Court held that government is not precluded from pursuing valid objectives secular in character even if the
incidental result would be favorable to a religion or sect. It also cited Board of Education v. Allen,[330] which held that in order to withstand the
strictures of constitutional prohibition, a statute must have a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion. Using these criteria in upholding Republic Act No. 3350, the Court pointed out, viz:

(Republic Act No. 3350) was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by
averting that certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to
pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security agreements. . . . The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop
agreements in favor of members of religious sects that prohibit their members from affiliating with a labor organization, is the protection of said
employees against the aggregate force of the collective bargaining agreement, and relieving certain citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs,
and . . . eliminating to a certain extent economic insecurity due to unemployment.[331]

The Court stressed that (a)lthough the exemption may benefit those who are members of religious sects that prohibit their members from joining
labor unions, the benefit upon the religious sects is merely incidental and indirect.[332] In enacting Republic Act No. 3350, Congress merely
relieved the exercise of religion by certain persons of a burden imposed by union security agreements which Congress itself also imposed through
the Industrial Peace Act. The Court concluded the issue of exemption by citing Sherbert which laid down the rule that when general laws conflict
with scruples of conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some compelling state interest intervenes. The Court then abruptly added
that (i)n the instant case, We see no compelling state interest to withhold exemption.[333]

A close look at Victoriano would show that the Court mentioned several tests in determining when religious freedom may be validly limited.
First, the Court mentioned the test of immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community and infringement of religious
freedom only to the smallest extent necessary to justify limitation of religious freedom. Second, religious exercise may be indirectly burdened
by a general law which has for its purpose and effect the advancement of the states secular goals, provided that there is no other means by
which the state can accomplish this purpose without imposing such burden. Third, the Court referred to the compelling state interest test which
grants exemptions when general laws conflict with religious exercise, unless a compelling state interest intervenes.

It is worth noting, however, that the first two tests were mentioned only for the purpose of highlighting the importance of the protection of
religious freedom as the secular purpose of Republic Act No. 3350. Upholding religious freedom was a secular purpose insofar as it relieved the
burden on religious freedom caused by another law, i.e, the Industrial Peace Act providing for union shop agreements. The first two tests were
only mentioned in Victoriano but were not applied by the Court to the facts and issues of the case. The third, the compelling state interest test
was employed by the Court to determine whether the exemption provided by Republic Act No. 3350 was not unconstitutional. It upheld the
exemption, stating that there was no compelling state interest to strike it down. However, after careful consideration of the Sherbert case from
which Victoriano borrowed this test, the inevitable conclusion is that the compelling state interest test was not appropriate and could not find
application in the Victoriano case. In Sherbert, appellant Sherbert invoked religious freedom in seeking exemption from the provisions of the
South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act which disqualified her from claiming unemployment benefits. It was the appellees, members
of the South Carolina Employment Commission, a government agency, who propounded the state interest to justify overriding Sherberts claim
of religious freedom. The U.S. Supreme Court, considering Sherberts and the Commissions arguments, found that the state interest was not
sufficiently compelling to prevail over Sherberts free exercise claim. This situation did not obtain in the Victoriano case where it was the
government itself, through Congress, which provided the exemption in Republic Act No. 3350 to allow Victorianos exercise of religion. Thus, the
government could not argue against the exemption on the basis of a compelling state interest as it would be arguing against itself; while
Victoriano would not seek exemption from the questioned law to allow the free exercose of religion as the law in fact provides such an
exemption. In sum, although Victoriano involved a religious belief and conduct, it did not involve a free exercise issue where the Free Exercise
Clause is invoked to exempt him from the burden imposed by a law on his religious freedom.

Victoriano was reiterated in several cases involving the Iglesia ni Cristo, namely Basa, et al. v. Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera y
Otros Trabajadores de Filipinas,[334] Anucension v. National Labor Union, et al.,[335] and Gonzales, et al. v. Central Azucarera de Tarlac Labor
Union.[336]
Then came German v. Barangan in 1985 at the height of the anti-administration rallies. Petitioners were walking to St. Jude Church within the
Malacanang security area to pray for an end to violence when they were barred by the police. Invoking their constitutional freedom of religious
worship and locomotion, they came to the Court on a petition for mandamus to allow them to enter and pray inside the St. Jude Chapel. The
Court was divided on the issue. The slim majority of six recognized their freedom of religion but noted their absence of good faith and concluded
that they were using their religious liberty to express their opposition to the government. Citing Cantwell, the Court distinguished between
freedom to believe and freedom to act on matters of religion, viz:

. . . Thus the (First) amendment embraces two concepts - freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things,
the second cannot be.[337]

The Court reiterated the Gerona ruling, viz:

In the case at bar, petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner by which
they had attempted to translate the same to action. This curtailment is in accord with the pronouncement of this Court in Gerona v. Secretary
of Education (106 Phil. 2), thus:

. . . But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. If the exercise of said religious
belief clashes with the established institutions of society and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the latter. The government
steps in and either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes the one exercising it. (italics supplied)

The majority found that the restriction imposed upon petitioners was necessary to maintain the smooth functioning of the executive branch of
the government, which petitioners mass action would certainly disrupt[338] and denied the petition. Thus, without considering the tests
mentioned in Victoriano, German went back to the Gerona rule that religious freedom will not be upheld if it clashes with the established
institutions of society and the law.

Then Associate Justice Teehankee registered a dissent which in subsequent jurisprudence would be cited as a test in religious freedom cases.
His dissent stated in relevant part, viz:

A brief restatement of the applicable constitutional principles as set forth in the landmark case of J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing (125 SCRA 553[1983])
should guide us in resolving the issues.

1. The right to freely exercise ones religion is guaranteed in Section 8 of our Bill of Rights. (footnote omitted) Freedom of worship, alongside with
freedom of expression and speech and peaceable assembly along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of
constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary - even more so than on the other departments - rests the grave and
delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course,
dispense with what has been so felicitously termed by Justice Holmes as the sovereign prerogative of judgment. Nonetheless, the presumption
must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy. (J.B.L. Reyes, 125
SCRA at pp. 569-570)

2. In the free exercise of such preferred rights, there is to be no prior restraint although there may be subsequent punishment of any illegal acts
committed during the exercise of such basic rights. The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of these basic rights is
the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public
health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent (Idem, at pp. 560-561).[339] (emphasis supplied)

The J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing case from which this portion of Justice Teehankees dissent was taken involved the rights to free speech and
assembly, and not the exercise of religious freedom. At issue in that case was a permit sought by retired Justice J.B.L. Reyes, on behalf of the
Anti-Bases Coalition, from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally from the Luneta to the gates of the U.S. Embassy. Nevertheless
Bagatsing was used by Justice Teehankee in his dissent which had overtones of petitioner German and his companions right to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances.[340]

In 1993, the issue on the Jehovahs Witnesses participation in the flag ceremony again came before the Court in Ebralinag v. The Division
Superintendent of Schools.[341] A unanimous Court overturned the Gerona ruling after three decades. Similar to Gerona, this case involved
several Jehovahs Witnesses who were expelled from school for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic
pledge, in violation of the Administrative Code of 1987. In resolving the same religious freedom issue as in Gerona, the Court this time
transported the grave and imminent danger test laid down in Justice Teehankees dissent in German, viz:

The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom (according to the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee
in his dissenting opinion in German v. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517) is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave
and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right
(and duty) to prevent. Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified.[342] (emphasis
supplied)

The Court added, viz:

We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovahs Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic
pledge, this religious group which admittedly comprises a small portion of the school population will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly
produce a nation untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for national
heroes (Gerona v. Secretary of Education, 106 Phil. 224). After all, what the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not
exclusion from the public schools where they may study the Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of government, and learn not only
the arts, sciences, Philippine history and culture but also receive training for a vocation or profession and be taught the virtues of patriotism,
respect for human rights, appreciation of national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral and spiritual values (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV,
1987 Constitution) as part of the curricula. Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation that
this Court has feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their
religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities.[343]

Barnette also found its way to the opinion, viz:

Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country, x x x- assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained
through coercion- is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. A desirable end cannot be promoted by
prohibited means. (Meyer vs. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 67 L. ed. 1042, 1046).[344]

Towards the end of the decision, the Court also cited the Victoriano case and its use of the compelling state interest test in according exemption
to the Jehovahs Witnesses, viz:

In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54, 72-75, we upheld the exemption of members of the Iglesia ni Cristo, from the coverage
of a closed shop agreement between their employer and a union because it would violate the teaching of their church not to join any group:

x x x It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the laws of the land; but when general laws conflict with scruples of
conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some compelling state interest intervenes. (Sherbert vs. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L. Ed. 2d
965, 970, 83 S.Ct. 1790)

We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehovahs Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect
for their religious beliefs, however bizarre those beliefs may seem to others.[345]

The Court annulled the orders expelling petitioners from school.

Thus, the grave and imminent danger test laid down in a dissenting opinion in German which involved prior restraint of religious worship with
overtones of the right to free speech and assembly, was transported to Ebralinag which did not involve prior restraint of religious worship,
speech or assembly. Although, it might be observed that the Court faintly implied that Ebralinag also involved the right to free speech when in
its preliminary remarks, the Court stated that compelling petitioners to participate in the flag ceremony is alien to the conscience of the present
generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of Rights which guarantees their rights to free speech and the free exercise of religious
profession and worship; the Court then stated in a footnote that the flag salute, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge
are all forms of utterances.[346]

The compelling state interest test was not fully applied by the Court in Ebralinag. In the Solicitor Generals consolidated comment, one of the
grounds cited to defend the expulsion orders issued by the public respondents was that (t)he States compelling interests being pursued by the
DECs lawful regulations in question do not warrant exemption of the school children of the Jehovahs Witnesses from the flag salute ceremonies
on the basis of their own self-perceived religious convictions.[347] The Court, however, referred to the test only towards the end of the decision
and did not even mention what the Solicitor General argued as the compelling state interest, much less did the Court explain why the interest
was not sufficiently compelling to override petitioners religious freedom.

Three years after Ebralinag, the Court decided the 1996 case of Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, et al.[348] Although there was a dissent with
respect to the applicability of the clear and present danger test in this case, the majority opinion in unequivocal terms applied the clear and
present danger test to religious speech. This case involved the television program, Ang Iglesia ni Cristo, regularly aired over the television. Upon
petitioner Iglesia ni Cristos submission of the VTR tapes of some of its episodes, respondent Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television
classified these as X or not for public viewing on the ground that they offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly
prohibited by law. Invoking religious freedom, petitioner alleged that the Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
requiring it to submit the VTR tapes of its television program and x-rating them. While upholding the Boards power to review the Iglesia television
show, the Court was emphatic about the preferred status of religious freedom. Quoting Justice Cruz commentary on the constitution, the Court
held that freedom to believe is absolute but freedom to act on ones belief, where it affects the public, is subject to the authority of the state.
The commentary quoted Justice Frankfurters dissent in Barnette which was quoted in Gerona, viz: (t)he constitutional provision on religious
freedom terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from
conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma.[349] Nevertheless, the Court was quick to add
the criteria by which the state can regulate the exercise of religious freedom, that is, when the exercise will bring about the clear and present
danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health,
public morals, or public welfare.[350]

In annulling the x-rating of the shows, the Court stressed that the Constitution is hostile to all prior restraints on speech, including religious
speech and the x-rating was a suppression of petitioners freedom of speech as much as it was an interference with its right to free exercise of
religion. Citing Cantwell, the Court recognized that the different religions may criticize one another and their tenets may collide, but the
Establishment Clause prohibits the state from protecting any religion from this kind of attack.

The Court then called to mind the clear and present danger test first laid down in the American Bible Society case and the test of immediate and
grave danger with infringement only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid danger in Victoriano and pointed out that the reviewing board
failed to apply the clear and present danger test. Applying the test, the Court noted, viz:

The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts
to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing whatsoever
of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including
religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of
a reality already on ground.

Replying to the challenge on the applicability of the clear and present danger test to the case, the Court acknowledged the permutations that
the test has undergone, but stressed that the test is still applied to four types of speech: speech that advocates dangerous ideas, speech that
provokes a hostile audience reaction, out of court contempt and release of information that endangers a fair trial[351] and ruled, viz:

. . . even allowing the drift of American jurisprudence, there is reason to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar which concerns
speech that attacks other religions and could readily provoke hostile audience reaction. It cannot be doubted that religious truths disturb and
disturb terribly.[352]

In Iglesia therefore, the Court went back to Gerona insofar as holding that religious freedom cannot be invoked to seek exemption from
compliance with a law that burdens ones religious exercise. It also reiterated the clear and present danger test in American Bible Society and
the grave and imminent danger in Victoriano, but this time clearly justifying its applicability and showing how the test was applied to the case.

In sum, the Philippine Supreme Court has adopted a posture of not invalidating a law offensive to religious freedom, but carving out an exception
or upholding an exception to accommodate religious exercise where it is justified.[353]

2. Establishment Clause

In Philippine jurisdiction, there is substantial agreement on the values sought to be protected by the Establishment Clause, namely, voluntarism
and insulation of the political process from interfaith dissension. The first, voluntarism, has both a personal and a social dimension. As a personal
value, it refers to the inviolability of the human conscience which, as discussed above, is also protected by the free exercise clause. From the
religious perspective, religion requires voluntarism because compulsory faith lacks religious efficacy. Compelled religion is a contradiction in
terms.[354] As a social value, it means that the growth of a religious sect as a social force must come from the voluntary support of its members
because of the belief that both spiritual and secular society will benefit if religions are allowed to compete on their own intrinsic merit without
benefit of official patronage. Such voluntarism cannot be achieved unless the political process is insulated from religion and unless religion is
insulated from politics.[355] Non-establishment thus calls for government neutrality in religious matters to uphold voluntarism and avoid
breeding interfaith dissension.[356]

The neutrality principle was applied in the first significant non-establishment case under the 1935 Constitution. In the 1937 case of Aglipay v.
Ruiz,[357] the Philippine Independent Church challenged the issuance and sale of postage stamps commemorating the Thirty-Third International
Eucharistic Congress of the Catholic Church on the ground that the constitutional prohibition against the use of public money for religious
purposes has been violated. It appears that the Director of Posts issued the questioned stamps under the provisions of Act No. 4052[358] which
appropriated a sum for the cost of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs and authorized the Director of Posts to dispose of
the sum in a manner and frequency advantageous to the Government. The printing and issuance of the postage stamps in question appears to
have been approved by authority of the President. Justice Laurel, speaking for the Court, took pains explaining religious freedom and the role of
religion in society, and in conclusion, found no constitutional infirmity in the issuance and sale of the stamps, viz:

The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and state. Without the necessity of adverting to
the historical background of this principle in our country, it is sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught
us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for occasions might arise when the state will use the church, and the church the
state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their respective ends and aims . . . It is almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy both religious
and civil freedom. All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to support and defend the Constitution,
bind themselves to recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent limitations and recognized
implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere toleration.

Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence
in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it
instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the
preamble of their Constitution, implored the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve
and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy, they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and placed unfaltering
reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as
elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations. . .[359]

xxx xxx xxx

It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character,
the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion
that the Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the
purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its
subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U.S. 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168)[360]
(emphases supplied)

In so deciding the case, the Court, citing U.S. jurisprudence, laid down the doctrine that a law or government action with a legitimate secular
purpose does not offend the Establishment Clause even if it incidentally aids a particular religion.

Almost forty-five years after Aglipay came Garces v. Estenzo.[361] Although the Court found that the separation of church and state was not at
issue as the controversy was over who should have custody of a saints image, it nevertheless made pronouncements on the separation of church
and state along the same line as the Aglipay ruling. The Court held that there was nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having
a patron saint for the barrio. It adhered to the barrio resolutions of the barangay involved in the case stating that the barrio fiesta is a socio-
religious affair, the celebration of which is an ingrained tradition in rural communities that relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of
the masses. Corollarily, the Court found nothing illegal about any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint such as the
acquisition and display of his image bought with funds obtained through solicitation from the barrio residents. The Court pointed out that the
image of the patron saint was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer,
and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. Citing the
Aglipay ruling, the Court declared, viz:

Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional
provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property.

Then came the 1978 case of Pamil v. Teleron, et al.[362] which presented a novel issue involving the religion clauses. In this case, Section 2175
of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 disqualifying ecclesiastics from appointment or election as municipal officer was challenged. After
protracted deliberation, the Court was sharply divided on the issue. Seven members of the Court, one short of the number necessary to declare
a law unconstitutional, approached the problem from a free exercise perspective and considered the law a religious test offensive of the
constitution. They were Justices Fernando, Teehankee, Muoz-Palma, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero. Then Associate Justice
Fernando, the ponente, stated, viz: The challenged Administrative Code provision, certainly insofar as it declares ineligible ecclesiastics to any
elective or appointive office, is, on its face, inconsistent with the religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. Citing Torcaso v.
Watkins,[363] the ponencia held, viz:

Torcaso v. Watkins, an American Supreme Court decision, has persuasive weight. What was there involved was the validity of a provision in the
Maryland Constitution prescribing that no religious test ought ever to be required as a disqualification for any office or profit or trust in this
State, other than a declaration of belief in the existence of God ***. Such a constitutional requirement was assailed as contrary to the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution by an appointee to the office of notary public in Maryland, who was refused a commission as he
would not declare a belief in God. He failed in the Maryland Court of Appeals but prevailed in the United States Supreme Court, which reversed
the state court decision. It could not have been otherwise. As emphatically declared by Justice Black: this Maryland religious test for public office
unconstitutionally invades the appellants freedom of belief and religion and therefore cannot be enforced against him.

The analogy appears to be obvious. In that case, it was lack of belief in God that was a disqualification. Here being an ecclesiastic and therefore
professing a religious faith suffices to disqualify for a public office. There is thus an incompatibility between the Administrative Code provision
relied upon by petitioner and an express constitutional mandate.[364]

On the other hand, the prevailing five other members of the Court - Chief Justice Castro, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Aquino -
approached the case from a non-establishment perspective and upheld the law as a safeguard against the constant threat of union of church
and state that has marked Philippine history. Justice Makasiar stated: To allow an ecclesiastic to head the executive department of a municipality
is to permit the erosion of the principle of separation of Church and State and thus open the floodgates for the violation of the cherished liberty
of religion which the constitutional provision seeks to enforce and protect. Consequently, the Court upheld the validity of Section 2175 of the
Revised Administrative Code and declared respondent priest ineligible for the office of municipal mayor.

Another type of cases interpreting the establishment clause deals with intramural religious disputes. Fonacier v. Court of Appeals[365] is the
leading case. The issue therein was the right of control over certain properties of the Philippine Independent Church, the resolution of which
necessitated the determination of who was the legitimate bishop of the church. The Court cited American Jurisprudence,[366] viz:

Where, however, a decision of an ecclesiastical court plainly violates the law it professes to administer, or is in conflict with the law of the land,
it will not be followed by the civil courts. . . In some instances, not only have the civil courts the right to inquire into the jurisdiction of the
religious tribunals and the regularity of their procedure, but they have subjected their decisions to the test of fairness or to the test furnished
by the constitution and the law of the church. . .[367]

The Court then ruled that petitioner Fonacier was legitimately ousted and respondent de los Reyes was the duly elected head of the Church,
based on their internal laws. To finally dispose of the property issue, the Court, citing Watson v. Jones,[368] declared that the rule in property
controversies within religious congregations strictly independent of any other superior ecclesiastical association (such as the Philippine
Independent Church) is that the rules for resolving such controversies should be those of any voluntary association. If the congregation adopts
the majority rule then the majority should prevail; if it adopts adherence to duly constituted authorities within the congregation, then that
should be followed. Applying these rules, Fonacier lost the case. While the Court exercised jurisdiction over the case, it nevertheless refused to
touch doctrinal and disciplinary differences raised, viz:

The amendments of the constitution, restatement of articles of religion and abandonment of faith or abjuration alleged by appellant, having to
do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church and having reference to the power of excluding
from the church those allegedly unworthy of membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil
courts.[369]

VIII. Free Exercise Clause vis--vis Establishment Clause

In both Philippine and U.S. jurisdiction, it is recognized that there is a tension between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause in
their application. There is a natural antagonism between a command not to establish religion and a command not to inhibit its practice; this
tension between the religion clauses often leaves the courts with a choice between competing values in religion cases.[370]

One set of facts, for instance, can be differently viewed from the Establishment Clause perspective and the Free Exercise Clause point of view,
and decided in opposite directions. In Pamil, the majority gave more weight to the religious liberty of the priest in holding that the prohibition
of ecclesiastics to assume elective or appointive government positions was violative of the Free Exercise Clause. On the other hand, the prevailing
five justices gave importance to the Establishment Clause in stating that the principle of separation of church and state justified the prohibition.

Tension is also apparent when a case is decided to uphold the Free Exercise Clause and consequently exemptions from a law of general
applicability are afforded by the Court to the person claiming religious freedom; the question arises whether the exemption does not amount
to support of the religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. This was the case in the Free Exercise Clause case of Sherbert where the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled, viz:

In holding as we do, plainly we are not fostering the establishment of the Seventh-day Adventist religion in South Carolina, for the extension of
unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in common with Sunday worshippers reflects nothing more than the governmental obligation of
neutrality in the face of religious differences, and does not represent that involvement of religious with secular institutions which it is the object
of the Establishment Clause to forestall.[371] (emphasis supplied)

Tension also exists when a law of general application provides exemption in order to uphold free exercise as in the Walz case where the appellant
argued that the exemption granted to religious organizations, in effect, required him to contribute to religious bodies in violation of the
Establishment Clause. But the Court held that the exemption was not a case of establishing religion but merely upholding the Free Exercise
Clause by sparing the exercise of religion from the burden of property taxation levied on private profit institutions. Justice Burger wrote, viz:

(t)he Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the two religion clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which,
if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other.[372]

Similarly, the Philippine Supreme Court in the Victoriano case held that the exemption afforded by law to religious sects who prohibit their
members from joining unions did not offend the Establishment Clause. We ruled, viz:

We believe that in enacting Republic Act No. 3350, Congress acted consistently with the spirit of the constitutional provision. It acted merely to
relieve the exercise of religion, by certain persons, of a burden that is imposed by union security agreements.[373] (emphasis supplied)

Finally, in some cases, a practice is obviously violative of the Establishment Clause but the Court nevertheless upholds it. In Schempp, Justice
Brennan stated: (t)here are certain practices, conceivably violative of the Establishment Clause, the striking down of which might seriously
interfere with certain religious liberties also protected by the First Amendment.

How the tension between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause will be resolved is a question for determination in the actual
cases that come to the Court. In cases involving both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, the two clauses should be balanced
against each other. The courts must review all the relevant facts and determine whether there is a sufficiently strong free exercise right that
should prevail over the Establishment Clause problem. In the United States, it has been proposed that in balancing, the free exercise claim must
be given an edge not only because of abundant historical evidence in the colonial and early national period of the United States that the free
exercise principle long antedated any broad-based support of disestablishment, but also because an Establishment Clause concern raised by
merely accommodating a citizens free exercise of religion seems far less dangerous to the republic than pure establishment cases. Each time the
courts side with the Establishment Clause in cases involving tension between the two religion clauses, the courts convey a message of hostility
to the religion that in that case cannot be freely exercised.[374] American professor of constitutional law, Laurence Tribe, similarly suggests that
the free exercise principle should be dominant in any conflict with the anti-establishment principle. This dominance would be the result of
commitment to religious tolerance instead of thwarting at all costs even the faintest appearance of establishment.[375] In our jurisdiction, Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, S.J. asserts that a literal interpretation of the religion clauses does not suffice. Modern society is characterized by the expanding
regulatory arm of government that reaches a variety of areas of human conduct and an expanding concept of religion. To adequately meet the
demands of this modern society, the societal values the religion clauses are intended to protect must be considered in their interpretation and
resolution of the tension. This, in fact, has been the approach followed by the Philippine Court.[376]

IX. Philippine Religion Clauses: Nature, Purpose, Tests

Based on Philippine and American Religion Clause History,

Law and Jurisprudence

The history of the religion clauses in the 1987 Constitution shows that these clauses were largely adopted from the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. The religion clauses in the First Amendment were contained in every organic Act of the Philippines under the American regime.
When the delegates of the 1934 Constitutional Convention adopted a Bill of Rights in the 1935 Constitution, they purposely retained the
phraseology of the religion clauses in the First Amendment as contained in the Jones Law in order to adopt its historical background, nature,
extent and limitations. At that time, there were not too many religion clause cases in the United States as the U.S. Supreme Court decided an
Establishment Clause issue only in the 1947 Everson case. The Free Exercise Clause cases were also scarce then. Over the years, however, with
the expanding reach of government regulation to a whole gamut of human actions and the growing plurality and activities of religions, the
number of religion clause cases in the U.S. exponentially increased. With this increase came an expansion of the interpretation of the religion
clauses, at times reinforcing prevailing case law, at other times modifying it, and still at other times creating contradictions so that two main
streams of jurisprudence had become identifiable. The first stream employs separation while the second employs benevolent neutrality in
interpreting the religious clauses. Alongside this change in the landscape of U.S. religion clause jurisprudence, the Philippines continued to adopt
the 1935 Constitution religion clauses in the 1973 Constitution and later, the 1987 Constitution. Philippine jurisprudence and commentaries on
the religious clauses also continued to borrow authorities from U.S. jurisprudence without articulating the stark distinction between the two
streams of U.S. jurisprudence. One might simply conclude that the Philippine Constitutions and jurisprudence also inherited the disarray of U.S.
religion clause jurisprudence and the two identifiable streams; thus, when a religion clause case comes before the Court, a separationist
approach or a benevolent neutrality approach might be adopted and each will have U.S. authorities to support it. Or, one might conclude that
as the history of the First Amendment as narrated by the Court in Everson supports the separationist approach, Philippine jurisprudence should
also follow this approach in light of the Philippine religion clauses history. As a result, in a case where the party claims religious liberty in the face
of a general law that inadvertently burdens his religious exercise, he faces an almost insurmountable wall in convincing the Court that the wall
of separation would not be breached if the Court grants him an exemption. These conclusions, however, are not and were never warranted by
the 1987, 1973 and 1935 Constitutions as shown by other provisions on religion in all three constitutions. It is a cardinal rule in constitutional
construction that the constitution must be interpreted as a whole and apparently conflicting provisions should be reconciled and harmonized in
a manner that will give to all of them full force and effect.[377] From this construction, it will be ascertained that the intent of the framers was
to adopt a benevolent neutrality approach in interpreting the religious clauses in the Philippine constitutions, and the enforcement of this intent
is the goal of construing the constitution.[378]

We first apply the hermeneutical scalpel to dissect the 1935 Constitution. At the same time that the 1935 Constitution provided for an
Establishment Clause, it also provided for tax exemption of church property in Article VI, Section 22, par. 3(b), viz:

(3) Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents, appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for
religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.

Before the advent of the 1935 Constitution, Section 344 of the Administrative Code provided for a similar exemption. To the same effect, the
Tydings-McDuffie Law contained a limitation on the taxing power of the Philippine government during the Commonwealth period.[379] The
original draft of the Constitution placed this provision in an ordinance to be appended to the Constitution because this was among the provisions
prescribed by the Tydings-McDuffie Law. However, in order to have a constitutional guarantee for such an exemption even beyond the
Commonwealth period, the provision was introduced in the body of the Constitution on the rationale that if churches, convents [rectories or
parsonages] and their accessories are always necessary for facilitating the exercise of such [religious] freedom, it would also be natural that their
existence be also guaranteed by exempting them from taxation.[380] The amendment was readily approved with 83 affirmative votes against
15 negative votes.[381]

The Philippine constitutional provision on tax exemption is not found in the U.S. Constitution. In the U.S. case of Walz, the Court struggled to
justify this kind of exemption to withstand Establishment Clause scrutiny by stating that church property was not singled out but was exempt
along with property owned by non-profit, quasi-public corporations because the state upheld the secular policy that considers these groups as
beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life and finds this classification useful, desirable, and in the public interest. The Court also
stated that the exemption was meant to relieve the burden on free exercise imposed by property taxation. At the same time, however, the Court
acknowledged that the exemption was an exercise of benevolent neutrality to accommodate a long-standing tradition of exemption. With the
inclusion of the church property tax exemption in the body of the 1935 Constitution and not merely as an ordinance appended to the
Constitution, the benevolent neutrality referred to in the Walz case was given constitutional imprimatur under the regime of the 1935
Constitution. The provision, as stated in the deliberations, was an acknowledgment of the necessity of the exempt institutions to the exercise of
religious liberty, thereby evincing benevolence towards religious exercise.

Similarly, the 1935 Constitution provides in Article VI, Section 23(3), viz:

(3) No public money, or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
church, denomination, sectarian institution or system of religion, for the use, benefit or support of any priest, preacher, ministers or other
religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal
institution, orphanage, or leprosarium. (emphasis supplied)

The original draft of this provision was a reproduction of a portion of section 3 of the Jones Law which did not contain the above exception, viz:

No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
church denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary
as such[382]

In the deliberations of this draft provision, an amendment was proposed to strike down everything after church denomination.[383] The proposal
intended to imitate the silence of the U.S. Constitution on the subject of support for priests and ministers. It was also an imitation of the silence
of the Malolos Constitution to restore the situation under the Malolos Constitution and prior to the Jones Law, when chaplains of the
revolutionary army received pay from public funds with no doubt about its legality. It was pointed out, however, that even with the prohibition
under the Jones Law, appropriations were made to chaplains of the national penitentiary and the Auditor General upheld its validity on the basis
of a similar United States practice. But it was also pointed out that the U.S. Constitution did not contain a prohibition on appropriations similar
to the Jones Law.[384] To settle the question on the constitutionality of payment of salaries of religious officers in certain government institutions
and to avoid the feared situation where the enumerated government institutions could not employ religious officials with compensation, the
exception in the 1935 provision was introduced and approved. The provision garnered 74 affirmative votes against 34 negative votes.[385] As
pointed out in the deliberations, the U.S. Constitution does not provide for this exemption. However, the U.S. Supreme Court in Cruz v. Beto,
apparently taking a benevolent neutrality approach, implicitly approved the state of Texas payment of prison chaplains salaries as reasonably
necessary to permit inmates to practice their religion. Also, in the Marsh case, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the long-standing tradition of
beginning legislative sessions with prayers offered by legislative chaplains retained at taxpayers expense. The constitutional provision exempting
religious officers in government institutions affirms the departure of the Philippine Constitution from the U.S. Constitution in its adoption of
benevolent neutrality in Philippine jurisdiction. While the provision prohibiting aid to religion protects the wall of separation between church
and state, the provision at the same time gives constitutional sanction to a breach in the wall.

To further buttress the thesis that benevolent neutrality is contemplated in the Philippine Establishment Clause, the 1935 Constitution provides
for optional religious instruction in public schools in Article XIII, Section 5, viz:

. . . Optional religious instruction shall be maintained in the public schools as now authorized by law. . .
The law then applicable was Section 928 of the Administrative Code, viz:

It shall be lawful, however, for the priest or minister of any church established in the town where a public school is situated, either in person or
by a designated teacher of religion, to teach religion for one-half hour three times a week, in the school building, to those public-school pupils
whose parents or guardians desire it and express their desire therefor in writing filed with the principal of the school . . .

During the debates of the Constitutional Convention, there were three positions on the issue of religious instruction in public schools. The first
held that the teaching of religion in public schools should be prohibited as this was a violation of the principle of separation of church and state
and the prohibition against the use of public funds for religious purposes. The second favored the proposed optional religious instruction as
authorized by the Administrative Code and recognized that the actual practice of allowing religious instruction in the public schools was sufficient
proof that religious instruction was not and would not be a source of religious discord in the schools.[386] The third wanted religion to be
included as a course in the curriculum of the public schools but would only be taken by pupils at the option of their parents or guardians. After
several rounds of debate, the second camp prevailed, thus raising to constitutional stature the optional teaching of religion in public schools,
despite the opposition to the provision on the ground of separation of church and state.[387] As in the provisions on church property tax
exemption and compensation of religious officers in government institutions, the U.S. Constitution does not provide for optional religious
instruction in public schools. In fact, in the McCollum case, the Court, using strict neutrality, prohibited this kind of religious instruction where
the religion teachers would conduct class within the school premises. The constitutional provision on optional religious instruction shows that
Philippine jurisdiction rejects the strict neutrality approach which does not allow such accommodation of religion.

Finally, to make certain the Constitutions benevolence to religion, the Filipino people implored (ing) the aid of Divine Providence (,) in order to
establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and
secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty, and democracy, (in) ordain(ing) and
promulgat(ing) this Constitution. A preamble is a key to open the mind of the authors of the constitution as to the evil sought to be prevented
and the objects sought to be accomplished by the provisions thereof.[388] There was no debate on the inclusion of a Divine Providence in the
preamble. In Aglipay, Justice Laurel noted that when the Filipino people implored the aid of Divine Providence, (t)hey thereby manifested their
intense religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations.[389] The 1935 Constitutions
religion clauses, understood alongside the other provisions on religion in the Constitution, indubitably shows not hostility, but benevolence, to
religion.[390]

The 1973 Constitution contained in Article VI, Section 22(3) a provision similar to Article VI, Section 22, par. 3(b) of the 1935 Constitution on
exemption of church property from taxation, with the modification that the property should not only be used directly, but also actually and
exclusively for religious or charitable purposes. Parallel to Article VI, Section 23(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the 1973 Constitution also contained
a similar provision on salaries of religious officials employed in the enumerated government institutions. Article XIII, Section 5 of the 1935
Constitution on optional religious instruction was also carried to the 1973 Constitution in Article XV, Section 8(8) with the modification that
optional religious instruction shall be conducted as may be provided by law and not as now authorized by law as stated in the 1935 Constitution.
The 1973 counterpart, however, made explicit in the constitution that the religious instruction in public elementary and high schools shall be
done (a)t the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians, and without cost to them and the government. With the adoption of these
provisions in the 1973 Constitution, the benevolent neutrality approach continued to enjoy constitutional sanction. In Article XV, Section 15 of
the General Provisions of the 1973 Constitution this provision made its maiden appearance: (t)he separation of church and state shall be
inviolable. The 1973 Constitution retained the portion of the preamble imploring the aid of Divine Providence.

In the Report of the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on Goals, Principles and Problems of the Committee on Church and State of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, the question arose as to whether the absolute separation of Church and State as enunciated in the Everson case and reiterated in
Schempp - i.e., neutrality not only as between one religion and another but even as between religion and non-religion - is embodied in the
Philippine Constitution. The sub-committees answer was that it did not seem so. Citing the Aglipay case where Justice Laurel recognized the
elevating influence of religion in human society and the Filipinos imploring of Divine Providence in the 1935 Constitution, the sub-committee
asserted that the state may not prefer or aid one religion over another, but may aid all religions equally or the cause of religion in general.[391]
Among the position papers submitted to the Committee on Church on State was a background paper for reconsideration of the religion provisions
of the constitution by Fr. Bernas, S.J. He stated therein that the Philippine Constitution is not hostile to religion and in fact recognizes the value
of religion and accommodates religious values.[392] Stated otherwise, the Establishment Clause contemplates not a strict neutrality but
benevolent neutrality. While the Committee introduced the provision on separation of church and state in the General Provisions of the 1973
Constitution, this was nothing new as according to it, this principle was implied in the 1935 Constitution even in the absence of a similar
provision.[393]

Then came the 1987 Constitution. The 1973 Constitutional provision on tax exemption of church property was retained with minor modification
in Article VI, Section 28(3) of the 1987 Constitution. The same is true with respect to the prohibition on the use of public money and property
for religious purposes and the salaries of religious officers serving in the enumerated government institutions, now contained in Article VI,
Section 29(2). Commissioner Bacani, however, probed into the possibility of allowing the government to spend public money for purposes which
might have religious connections but which would benefit the public generally. Citing the Aglipay case, Commissioner Rodrigo explained that if
a public expenditure would benefit the government directly, such expense would be constitutional even if it results to an incidental benefit to
religion. With that explanation, Commissioner Bacani no longer pursued his proposal.[394]

The provision on optional religious instruction was also adopted in the 1987 Constitution in Article XIV, Section 3(3) with the modification that
it was expressly provided that optional instruction shall be conducted within the regular class hours and without additional cost to the
government. There were protracted debates on what additional cost meant, i.e., cost over and above what is needed for normal operations such
as wear and tear, electricity, janitorial services,[395] and when during the day instruction would be conducted.[396] In deliberating on the phrase
within the regular class hours, Commissioner Aquino expressed her reservations to this proposal as this would violate the time-honored principle
of separation of church and state. She cited the McCullom case where religious instruction during regular school hours was stricken down as
unconstitutional and also cited what she considered the most liberal interpretation of separation of church and state in Surach v. Clauson where
the U.S. Supreme Court allowed only release time for religious instruction. Fr. Bernas replied, viz:
. . . the whole purpose of the provision was to provide for an exception to the rule on non-establishment of religion, because if it were not
necessary to make this exception for purposes of allowing religious instruction, then we could just drop the amendment. But, as a matter of fact,
this is necessary because we are trying to introduce something here which is contrary to American practices.[397] (emphasis supplied)

(W)ithin regular class hours was approved.

The provision on the separation of church and state was retained but placed under the Principles in the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies in Article II, Section 6. In opting to retain the wording of the provision, Fr. Bernas stated, viz:

. . . It is true, I maintain, that as a legal statement the sentence The separation of Church and State is inviolable, is almost a useless statement;
but at the same time it is a harmless statement. Hence, I am willing to tolerate it there, because, in the end, if we look at the jurisprudence on
Church and State, arguments are based not on the statement of separation of church and state but on the non-establishment clause in the Bill
of Rights.[398]

The preamble changed Divine Providence in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions to Almighty God. There was considerable debate on whether to
use Almighty God which Commissioner Bacani said was more reflective of Filipino religiosity, but Commissioner Rodrigo recalled that a number
of atheistic delegates in the 1971 Constitutional Convention objected to reference to a personal God.[399] God of History, Lord of History and
God were also proposed, but the phrase Almighty God prevailed. Similar to the 1935 and 1971 Constitutions, it is obvious that the 1987
Constitution is not hostile nor indifferent to religion;[400] its wall of separation is not a wall of hostility or indifference.[401]

The provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions on tax exemption of church property, salary of religious officers in government
institutions, optional religious instruction and the preamble all reveal without doubt that the Filipino people, in adopting these constitutions,
did not intend to erect a high and impregnable wall of separation between the church and state.[402] The strict neutrality approach which
examines only whether government action is for a secular purpose and does not consider inadvertent burden on religious exercise protects such
a rigid barrier. By adopting the above constitutional provisions on religion, the Filipinos manifested their adherence to the benevolent neutrality
approach in interpreting the religion clauses, an approach that looks further than the secular purposes of government action and examines the
effect of these actions on religious exercise. Benevolent neutrality recognizes the religious nature of the Filipino people and the elevating
influence of religion in society; at the same time, it acknowledges that government must pursue its secular goals. In pursuing these goals,
however, government might adopt laws or actions of general applicability which inadvertently burden religious exercise. Benevolent neutrality
gives room for accommodation of these religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. It allows these breaches in the wall of
separation to uphold religious liberty, which after all is the integral purpose of the religion clauses. The case at bar involves this first type of
accommodation where an exemption is sought from a law of general applicability that inadvertently burdens religious exercise.

Although our constitutional history and interpretation mandate benevolent neutrality, benevolent neutrality does not mean that the Court ought
to grant exemptions every time a free exercise claim comes before it. But it does mean that the Court will not look with hostility or act
indifferently towards religious beliefs and practices and that it will strive to accommodate them when it can within flexible constitutional limits;
it does mean that the Court will not simply dismiss a claim under the Free Exercise Clause because the conduct in question offends a law or the
orthodox view for this precisely is the protection afforded by the religion clauses of the Constitution, i.e., that in the absence of legislation
granting exemption from a law of general applicability, the Court can carve out an exception when the religion clauses justify it. While the Court
cannot adopt a doctrinal formulation that can eliminate the difficult questions of judgment in determining the degree of burden on religious
practice or importance of the state interest or the sufficiency of the means adopted by the state to pursue its interest, the Court can set a
doctrine on the ideal towards which religious clause jurisprudence should be directed.[403] We here lay down the doctrine that in Philippine
jurisdiction, we adopt the benevolent neutrality approach not only because of its merits as discussed above, but more importantly, because our
constitutional history and interpretation indubitably show that benevolent neutrality is the launching pad from which the Court should take off
in interpreting religion clause cases. The ideal towards which this approach is directed is the protection of religious liberty not only for a minority,
however small- not only for a majority, however large- but for each of us to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits.

Benevolent neutrality is manifest not only in the Constitution but has also been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence, albeit not expressly called
benevolent neutrality or accommodation. In Aglipay, the Court not only stressed the elevating influence of religion in human society but
acknowledged the Constitutional provisions on exemption from tax of church property, salary of religious officers in government institutions,
and optional religious instruction as well as the provisions of the Administrative Code making Thursday and Friday of the Holy Week, Christmas
Day and Sundays legal holidays. In Garces, the Court not only recognized the Constitutional provisions indiscriminately granting concessions to
religious sects and denominations, but also acknowledged that government participation in long-standing traditions which have acquired a social
character - the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair - does not offend the Establishment Clause. In Victoriano, the Court upheld the exemption
from closed shop provisions of members of religious sects who prohibited their members from joining unions upon the justification that the
exemption was not a violation of the Establishment Clause but was only meant to relieve the burden on free exercise of religion. In Ebralinag,
members of the Jehovahs Witnesses were exempt from saluting the flag as required by law, on the basis not of a statute granting exemption but
of the Free Exercise Clause without offending the Establishment Clause.

While the U.S. and Philippine religion clauses are similar in form and origin, Philippine constitutional law has departed from the U.S. jurisprudence
of employing a separationist or strict neutrality approach. The Philippine religion clauses have taken a life of their own, breathing the air of
benevolent neutrality and accommodation. Thus, the wall of separation in Philippine jurisdiction is not as high and impregnable as the wall
created by the U.S. Supreme Court in Everson.[404] While the religion clauses are a unique American experiment which understandably came
about as a result of Americas English background and colonization, the life that these clauses have taken in this jurisdiction is the Philippines
own experiment, reflective of the Filipinos own national soul, history and tradition. After all, the life of the law. . . has been experience.

But while history, constitutional construction, and earlier jurisprudence unmistakably show that benevolent neutrality is the lens with which the
Court ought to view religion clause cases, it must be stressed that the interest of the state should also be afforded utmost protection. To do this,
a test must be applied to draw the line between permissible and forbidden religious exercise. It is quite paradoxical that in order for the members
of a society to exercise their freedoms, including their religious liberty, the law must set a limit when their exercise offends the higher interest
of the state. To do otherwise is self-defeating for unlimited freedom would erode order in the state and foment anarchy, eventually destroying
the very state its members established to protect their freedoms. The very purpose of the social contract by which people establish the state is
for the state to protect their liberties; for this purpose, they give up a portion of these freedoms - including the natural right to free exercise - to
the state. It was certainly not the intention of the authors of the constitution that free exercise could be used to countenance actions that would
undo the constitutional order that guarantees free exercise.[405]

The all important question then is the test that should be used in ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom. Philippine
jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first case on the Free Exercise Clause, American Bible Society,
the Court mentioned the clear and present danger test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in subsequent cases
on religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates the established
institutions of society and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the immediate and grave danger test as well as the doctrine that a law of general
applicability may burden religious exercise provided the law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used,
albeit inappropriately, the compelling state interest test. After Victoriano, German went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the
grave and immediate danger test and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the clear and present
danger test in the maiden case of American Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed the clear and present danger or grave
and immediate danger test involved, in one form or another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom of expression. On
the other hand, the Gerona and German cases set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over established institutions of society and law.
Gerona, however, which was the authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which employed the grave and immediate danger
test. Victoriano was the only case that employed the compelling state interest test, but as explained previously, the use of the test was
inappropriate to the facts of the case.

The case at bar does not involve speech as in American Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the clear and present danger and
grave and immediate danger tests were appropriate as speech has easily discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and German doctrine,
aside from having been overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to
Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct arising from religious belief. The compelling state interest test is proper where conduct is
involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the states interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term
while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate
or delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a
fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights, in the words
of Jefferson.[406] This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional
order of limited government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty,[407] thus the Filipinos implore the aid of Almighty
God in order to build a just and humane society and establish a government. As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a right with just a colorable state interest is therefore
not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the
state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones
until they are destroyed.[408] In determining which shall prevail between the states interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the
guide.[409] The compelling state interest serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to the
paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the
compelling state interest test, by upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty
will not be preserved.

X. Application of the Religion Clauses to the Case at Bar

A. The Religion Clauses and Morality

In a catena of cases, the Court has ruled that government employees engaged in illicit relations are guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct for
which he/she may be held administratively liable.[410] In these cases, there was not one dissent to the majoritys ruling that their conduct was
immoral. The respondents themselves did not foist the defense that their conduct was not immoral, but instead sought to prove that they did
not commit the alleged act or have abated from committing the act. The facts of the 1975 case of De Dios v. Alejo[411] and the 1999 case of
Maguad v. De Guzman,[412] are similar to the case at bar - i.e., the complainant is a mere stranger and the legal wife has not registered any
objection to the illicit relation, there is no proof of scandal or offense to the moral sensibilities of the community in which the respondent and
the partner live and work, and the government employee is capacitated to marry while the partner is not capacitated but has long been separated
in fact. Still, the Court found the government employees administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct and only considered the
foregoing circumstances to mitigate the penalty. Respondent Escritor does not claim that there is error in the settled jurisprudence that an illicit
relation constitutes disgraceful and immoral conduct for which a government employee is held liable. Nor is there an allegation that the norms
of morality with respect to illicit relations have shifted towards leniency from the time these precedent cases were decided. The Court finds that
there is no such error or shift, thus we find no reason to deviate from these rulings that such illicit relationship constitutes disgraceful and
immoral conduct punishable under the Civil Service Law. Respondent having admitted the alleged immoral conduct, she, like the respondents in
the above-cited cases, could be held administratively liable. However, there is a distinguishing factor that sets the case at bar apart from the
cited precedents, i.e., as a defense, respondent invokes religious freedom since her religion, the Jehovahs Witnesses, has, after thorough
investigation, allowed her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio based on the churchs religious beliefs and practices. This distinguishing factor
compels the Court to apply the religious clauses to the case at bar.

Without holding that religious freedom is not in issue in the case at bar, both the dissenting opinion of Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago and the
separate opinion of Mr. Justice Vitug dwell more on the standards of morality than on the religion clauses in deciding the instant case. A
discussion on morality is in order.

At base, morality refers to, in Socrates words, how we ought to live and why. Any definition of morality beyond Socrates simple formulation is
bound to offend one or another of the many rival theories regarding what it means to live morally.[413] The answer to the question of how we
ought to live necessarily considers that man does not live in isolation, but in society. Devlin posits that a society is held together by a community
of ideas, made up not only of political ideas but also of ideas about the manner its members should behave and govern their lives. The latter are
their morals; they constitute the public morality. Each member of society has ideas about what is good and what is evil. If people try to create a
society wherein there is no fundamental agreement about good and evil, they will fail; if having established the society on common agreement,
the agreement collapses, the society will disintegrate. Society is kept together by the invisible bonds of common thought so that if the bonds
are too loose, the members would drift apart. A common morality is part of the bondage and the bondage is part of the price of society; and
mankind, which needs society, must pay its price.[414] This design is parallel with the social contract in the realm of politics: people give up a
portion of their liberties to the state to allow the state to protect their liberties. In a constitutional order, people make a fundamental agreement
about the powers of government and their liberties and embody this agreement in a constitution, hence referred to as the fundamental law of
the land. A complete break of this fundamental agreement such as by revolution destroys the old order and creates a new one.[415] Similarly,
in the realm of morality, the breakdown of the fundamental agreement about the manner a societys members should behave and govern their
lives would disintegrate society. Thus, society is justified in taking steps to preserve its moral code by law as it does to preserve its government
and other essential institutions.[416] From these propositions of Devlin, one cannot conclude that Devlin negates diversity in society for he is
merely saying that in the midst of this diversity, there should nevertheless be a fundamental agreement about good and evil that will govern
how people in a society ought to live. His propositions, in fact, presuppose diversity hence the need to come to an agreement; his position also
allows for change of morality from time to time which may be brought about by this diversity. In the same vein, a pluralistic society lays down
fundamental rights and principles in their constitution in establishing and maintaining their society, and these fundamental values and principles
are translated into legislation that governs the order of society, laws that may be amended from time to time. Harts argument propounded in
Mr. Justice Vitugs separate opinion that, Devlins view of people living in a single society as having common moral foundation (is) overly simplistic
because societies have always been diverse fails to recognize the necessity of Devlins proposition in a democracy. Without fundamental
agreement on political and moral ideas, society will fall into anarchy; the agreement is necessary to the existence and progress of society.

In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the public square. Where citizens are free, every opinion,
every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral discernment has access to the public square where people deliberate the order of their life
together. Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and these citizens have equal access to
the public square. In this representative democracy, the state is prohibited from determining which convictions and moral judgments may be
proposed for public deliberation. Through a constitutionally designed process, the people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary
principle in this democratic governance.[417] Thus, when public deliberation on moral judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will
largely reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or median groups.[418] Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting
and accepting a constitution and the limits it specifies -- including protection of religious freedom not only for a minority, however small- not
only for a majority, however large- but for each of us -- the majority imposes upon itself a self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do what it
otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the dissenting minorities.[419] In the realm of religious exercise, benevolent neutrality that gives
room for accommodation carries out this promise, provided the compelling interests of the state are not eroded for the preservation of the state
is necessary to the preservation of religious liberty. That is why benevolent neutrality is necessary in a pluralistic society such as the United States
and the Philippines to accommodate those minority religions which are politically powerless. It is not surprising that Smith is much criticized for
it blocks the judicial recourse of the minority for religious accommodations.

The laws enacted become expressions of public morality. As Justice Holmes put it, (t)he law is the witness and deposit of our moral life.[420] In
a liberal democracy, the law reflects social morality over a period of time.[421] Occasionally though, a disproportionate political influence might
cause a law to be enacted at odds with public morality or legislature might fail to repeal laws embodying outdated traditional moral views.[422]
Law has also been defined as something men create in their best moments to protect themselves in their worst moments.[423] Even then, laws
are subject to amendment or repeal just as judicial pronouncements are subject to modification and reversal to better reflect the public morals
of a society at a given time. After all, the life of the law...has been experience, in the words of Justice Holmes. This is not to say though that law
is all of morality. Law deals with the minimum standards of human conduct while morality is concerned with the maximum. A person who
regulates his conduct with the sole object of avoiding punishment under the law does not meet the higher moral standards set by society for
him to be called a morally upright person.[424] Law also serves as a helpful starting point for thinking about a proper or ideal public morality for
a society[425] in pursuit of moral progress.

In Magno v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[426] we articulated the relationship between law and public morality. We held that under the utilitarian
theory, the protective theory in criminal law, criminal law is founded upon the moral disapprobation x x x of actions which are immoral, i.e.,
which are detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society. This disapprobation
is inevitable to the extent that morality is generally founded and built upon a certain concurrence in the moral opinions of all. x x x That which
we call punishment is only an external means of emphasizing moral disapprobation: the method of punishment is in reality the amount of
punishment.[427] Stated otherwise, there are certain standards of behavior or moral principles which society requires to be observed and these
form the bases of criminal law. Their breach is an offense not only against the person injured but against society as a whole.[428] Thus, even if
all involved in the misdeed are consenting parties, such as in the case at bar, the injury done is to the public morals and the public interest in the
moral order.[429] Mr. Justice Vitug expresses concern on this point in his separate opinion. He observes that certain immoral acts which appear
private and not harmful to society such as sexual congress between a man and a prostitute, though consensual and private, and with no injured
third party, remains illegal in this country. His opinion asks whether these laws on private morality are justified or they constitute impingement
on ones freedom of belief. Discussion on private morality, however, is not material to the case at bar for whether respondents conduct, which
constitutes concubinage,[430] is private in the sense that there is no injured party or the offended spouse consents to the concubinage, the
inescapable fact is that the legislature has taken concubinage out of the sphere of private morals. The legislature included concubinage as a
crime under the Revised Penal Code and the constitutionality of this law is not being raised in the case at bar. In the definition of the crime of
concubinage, consent of the injured party, i.e., the legal spouse, does not alter or negate the crime unlike in rape[431] where consent of the
supposed victim negates the crime. If at all, the consent or pardon of the offended spouse in concubinage negates the prosecution of the
action,[432] but does not alter the legislatures characterization of the act as a moral disapprobation punishable by law. The separate opinion
states that, (t)he ponencia has taken pains to distinguish between secular and private morality, and reached the conclusion that the law, as an
instrument of the secular State should only concern itself with secular morality. The Court does not draw this distinction in the case at bar. The
distinction relevant to the case is not, as averred and discussed by the separate opinion, between secular and private morality, but between
public and secular morality on the one hand, and religious morality on the other, which will be subsequently discussed.
Not every moral wrong is foreseen and punished by law, criminal or otherwise. We recognized this reality in Velayo, et al. v. Shell Co. of the
Philippine Islands, et al., where we explained that for those wrongs which are not punishable by law, Articles 19 and 21 in Chapter 2 of the
Preliminary Title of the New Civil Code, dealing with Human Relations, provide for the recognition of the wrong and the concomitant punishment
in the form of damages. Articles 19 and 21 provide, viz:

Art. 19. Any person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith.

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage. (emphasis supplied)

We then cited in Velayo the Code Commissions comment on Article 21:

Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the foregoing rule is approved (as it was approved), would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold
numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes.

But, it may be asked, would this proposed article obliterate the boundary line between morality and law? The answer is that, in the last analysis,
every good law draws its breath of life from morals, from those principles which are written with words of fire in the conscience of man. If this
premise is admitted, then the proposed rule is a prudent earnest of justice in the face of the impossibility of enumerating, one by one, all wrongs
which cause damages. When it is reflected that while codes of law and statutes have changed from age to age, the conscience of man has
remained fixed to its ancient moorings, one can not but feel that it is safe and salutary to transmute, as far as may be, moral norms into legal
rules, thus imparting to every legal system that enduring quality which ought to be one of its superlative attributes.

Furthermore, there is no belief of more baneful consequence upon the social order than that a person may with impunity cause damage to his
fellow-men so long as he does not break any law of the State, though he may be defying the most sacred postulates of morality. What is more,
the victim loses faith in the ability of the government to afford him protection or relief.

A provision similar to the one under consideration is embodied in article 826 of the German Civil Code.[433] (emphases supplied)

The public morality expressed in the law is necessarily secular for in our constitutional order, the religion clauses prohibit the state from
establishing a religion, including the morality it sanctions. Religious morality proceeds from a persons views of his relations to His Creator and to
the obligations they impose of reverence to His being and character and obedience to His Will, in accordance with this Courts definition of
religion in American Bible Society citing Davis. Religion also dictates how we ought to live for the nature of religion is not just to know, but often,
to act in accordance with mans views of his relations to His Creator.[434] But the Establishment Clause puts a negative bar against establishment
of this morality arising from one religion or the other, and implies the affirmative establishment of a civil order for the resolution of public moral
disputes. This agreement on a secular mechanism is the price of ending the war of all sects against all; the establishment of a secular public
moral order is the social contract produced by religious truce.[435]

Thus, when the law speaks of immorality in the Civil Service Law or immoral in the Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers[436], or public
morals in the Revised Penal Code,[437] or morals in the New Civil Code,[438] or moral character in the Constitution,[439] the distinction between
public and secular morality on the one hand, and religious morality, on the other, should be kept in mind.[440] The morality referred to in the
law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. Religious teachings as expressed in public debate
may influence the civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms.[441] Otherwise, if
government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to
what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct
buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a compelled religion, anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon
religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that
would not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those
whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens. Expansive religious freedom therefore requires that government be neutral in matters
of religion; governmental reliance upon religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.[442]

In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular
purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct because it is detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the
existence and progress of human society and not because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although
admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might have a compelling influence on those engaged in public deliberations over what actions
would be considered a moral disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have religious
opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on them; the human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions
of society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven.[443] Succinctly put, a law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian
in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and discernible secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses.
Otherwise, if a law has an apparent secular purpose but upon closer examination shows a discriminatory and prohibitory religious purpose, the
law will be struck down for being offensive of the religion clauses as in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. where the U.S. Supreme Court
invalidated an ordinance prohibiting animal sacrifice of the Santeria. Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence
of religion in society, however, the Philippine constitutions religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent
neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the
greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality
could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
Mr. Justice Vitugs separate opinion embraces the benevolent neutrality approach when it states that in deciding the case at bar, the approach
should consider that, (a)s a rule . . . moral laws are justified only to the extent that they directly or indirectly serve to protect the interests of the
larger society. It is only where their rigid application would serve to obliterate the value which society seeks to uphold, or defeat the purpose
for which they are enacted would, a departure be justified. In religion clause parlance, the separate opinion holds that laws of general
applicability governing morals should have a secular purpose of directly or indirectly protecting the interests of the state. If the strict application
of these laws (which are the Civil Service Law and the laws on marriage) would erode the secular purposes of the law (which the separate opinion
identifies as upholding the sanctity of marriage and the family), then in a benevolent neutrality framework, an accommodation of the
unconventional religious belief and practice (which the separate opinion holds should be respected on the ground of freedom of belief) that
would promote the very same secular purpose of upholding the sanctity of marriage and family through the Declaration Pledging Faithfulness
that makes the union binding and honorable before God and men, is required by the Free Exercise Clause. The separate opinion then makes a
preliminary discussion of the values society seeks to protect in adhering to monogamous marriage, but concludes that these values and the
purposes of the applicable laws should be thoroughly examined and evidence in relation thereto presented in the OCA. The accommodation
approach in the case at bar would also require a similar discussion of these values and presentation of evidence before the OCA by the state that
seeks to protect its interest on marriage and opposes the accommodation of the unconventional religious belief and practice regarding marriage.

The distinction between public and secular morality as expressed - albeit not exclusively - in the law, on the one hand, and religious morality, on
the other, is important because the jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court
makes in the case at bar should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. More concretely, should the Court declare respondents
conduct as immoral and hold her administratively liable, the Court will be holding that in the realm of public morality, her conduct is
reprehensible or there are state interests overriding her religious freedom. For as long as her conduct is being judged within this realm, she will
be accountable to the state. But in so ruling, the Court does not and cannot say that her conduct should be made reprehensible in the realm of
her church where it is presently sanctioned and that she is answerable for her immorality to her Jehovah God nor that other religions prohibiting
her conduct are correct. On the other hand, should the Court declare her conduct permissible, the Court will be holding that under her unique
circumstances, public morality is not offended or that upholding her religious freedom is an interest higher than upholding public morality thus
her conduct should not be penalized. But the Court is not ruling that the tenets and practice of her religion are correct nor that other churches
which do not allow respondents conjugal arrangement should likewise allow such conjugal arrangement or should not find anything immoral
about it and therefore members of these churches are not answerable for immorality to their Supreme Being. The Court cannot speak more
than what it has authority to say. In Ballard, the U.S. Supreme Court held that courts cannot inquire about the truth of religious beliefs. Similarly,
in Fonacier, this Court declared that matters dealing with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a
churchare unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts.[444] But while the state, including the Court,
accords such deference to religious belief and exercise which enjoy protection under the religious clauses, the social contract and the
constitutional order are designed in such a way that when religious belief flows into speech and conduct that step out of the religious sphere
and overlap with the secular and public realm, the state has the power to regulate, prohibit and penalize these expressions and embodiments
of belief insofar as they affect the interests of the state. The states inroad on religion exercise in excess of this constitutional design is prohibited
by the religion clauses; the Old World, European and American history narrated above bears out the wisdom of this proscription.

Having distinguished between public and secular morality and religious morality, the more difficult task is determining which immoral acts under
this public and secular morality fall under the phrase disgraceful and immoral conduct for which a government employee may be held
administratively liable. The line is not easy to draw for it is like a line that divides land and sea, a coastline of irregularities and indentations.[445]
But the case at bar does not require us to comprehensively delineate between those immoral acts for which one may be held administratively
liable and those to which administrative liability does not attach. We need not concern ourselves in this case therefore whether laziness, gluttony,
vanity, selfishness, avarice and cowardice are immoral acts which constitute grounds for administrative liability. Nor need we expend too much
energy grappling with the propositions that not all immoral acts are illegal or not all illegal acts are immoral, or different jurisdictions have
different standards of morality as discussed by the dissents and separate opinions, although these observations and propositions are true and
correct. It is certainly a fallacious argument that because there are exceptions to the general rule that the law is the witness and deposit of our
moral life, then the rule is not true; in fact, that there are exceptions only affirms the truth of the rule. Likewise, the observation that morality is
relative in different jurisdictions only affirms the truth that there is morality in a particular jurisdiction; without, however, discounting the truth
that underneath the moral relativism are certain moral absolutes such as respect for life and truth-telling, without which no society will survive.
Only one conduct is in question before this Court, i.e., the conjugal arrangement of a government employee whose partner is legally married to
another which Philippine law and jurisprudence consider both immoral and illegal. Lest the Court inappropriately engage in the impossible task
of prescribing comprehensively how one ought to live, the Court must focus its attention upon the sole conduct in question before us.

In interpreting disgraceful and immoral conduct, the dissenting opinion of Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago groped for standards of morality and
stated that the ascertainment of what is moral or immoral calls for the discovery of contemporary community standards but did not articulate
how these standards are to be ascertained. Instead, it held that, (f)or those in the service of the Government, provisions of law and court
precedents . . . have to be considered. It identified the Civil Service Law and the laws on adultery and concubinage as laws which respondents
conduct has offended and cited a string of precedents where a government employee was found guilty of committing a disgraceful and immoral
conduct for maintaining illicit relations and was thereby penalized. As stated above, there is no dispute that under settled jurisprudence,
respondents conduct constitutes disgraceful and immoral conduct. However, the cases cited by the dissent do not involve the defense of religious
freedom which respondent in the case at bar invokes. Those cited cases cannot therefore serve as precedents in settling the issue in the case at
bar.

Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiagos dissent also cites Cleveland v. United States[446] in laying down the standard of morality, viz: (w)hether an act is
immoral within the meaning of the statute is not to be determined by respondents concept of morality. The law provides the standard; the
offense is complete if respondent intended to perform, and did in fact perform, the act which it condemns. The Mann Act under consideration
in the Cleveland case declares as an offense the transportation in interstate commerce of any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or
debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose.[447] The resolution of that case hinged on the interpretation of the phrase immoral purpose.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the petitioner Mormons act of transporting at least one plural wife whether for the purpose of cohabiting with
her, or for the purpose of aiding another member of their Mormon church in such a project, was covered by the phrase immoral purpose. In so
ruling, the Court relied on Reynolds which held that the Mormons practice of polygamy, in spite of their defense of religious freedom, was odious
among the northern and western nations of Europe,[448] a return to barbarism,[449] contrary to the spirit of Christianity and of the civilization
which Christianity has produced in the Western world,[450] and thus punishable by law.

The Cleveland standard, however, does not throw light to the issue in the case at bar. The pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme Court that
polygamy is intrinsically odious or barbaric do not apply in the Philippines where Muslims, by law, are allowed to practice polygamy. Unlike in
Cleveland, there is no jurisprudence in Philippine jurisdiction holding that the defense of religious freedom of a member of the Jehovahs
Witnesses under the same circumstances as respondent will not prevail over the laws on adultery, concubinage or some other law. We cannot
summarily conclude therefore that her conduct is likewise so odious and barbaric as to be immoral and punishable by law.

While positing the view that the resolution of the case at bar lies more on determining the applicable moral standards and less on religious
freedom, Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiagos dissent nevertheless discussed respondents plea of religious freedom and disposed of this defense by
stating that (a) clear and present danger of a substantive evil, destructive to public morals, is a ground for the reasonable regulation of the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession. (American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 [1957]). In addition to the destruction of
public morals, the substantive evil in this case is the tearing down of morality, good order, and discipline in the judiciary. However, the foregoing
discussion has shown that the clear and present danger test that is usually employed in cases involving freedom of expression is not appropriate
to the case at bar which involves purely religious conduct. The dissent also cites Reynolds in supporting its conclusion that respondent is guilty
of disgraceful and immoral conduct. The Reynolds ruling, however, was reached with a strict neutrality approach, which is not the approach
contemplated by the Philippine constitution. As discussed above, Philippine jurisdiction adopts benevolent neutrality in interpreting the religion
clauses.

In the same vein, Mr. Justice Carpios dissent which employs strict neutrality does not reflect the constitutional intent of employing benevolent
neutrality in interpreting the Philippine religion clauses. His dissent avers that respondent should be held administratively liable not for
disgraceful and immoral conduct but conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as she is a necessary co-accused of her partner in
concubinage. The dissent stresses that being a court employee, her open violation of the law is prejudicial to the administration of justice. Firstly,
the dissent offends due process as respondent was not given an opportunity to defend herself against the charge of conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service. In addition, there is no evidence of the alleged prejudice to the best interest of the service. Most importantly, the
dissent concludes that respondents plea of religious freedom cannot prevail without so much as employing a test that would balance
respondents religious freedom and the states interest at stake in the case at bar. The foregoing discussion on the doctrine of religious freedom,
however, shows that with benevolent neutrality as a framework, the Court cannot simply reject respondents plea of religious freedom without
even subjecting it to the compelling state interest test that would balance her freedom with the paramount interests of the state. The strict
neutrality employed in the cases the dissent cites -Reynolds, Smith and People v. Bitdu decided before the 1935 Constitution which unmistakably
shows adherence to benevolent neutrality - is not contemplated by our constitution.

Neither is Sulu Islamic Association of Masjid Lambayong v. Judge Nabdar J. Malik[451] cited in Mr. Justice Carpios dissent decisive of the
immorality issue in the case at bar. In that case, the Court dismissed the charge of immorality against a Tausug judge for engaging in an adulterous
relationship with another woman with whom he had three children because it (was) not immoral by Muslim standards for Judge Malik to marry
a second time while his first marriage (existed). Putting the quoted portion in its proper context would readily show that the Sulu Islamic case
does not provide a precedent to the case at bar. Immediately prior to the portion quoted by the dissent, the Court stressed, viz: (s)ince Art. 180
of P.D. No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, provides that the penal laws relative to the crime of
bigamy shall not apply to a person married x x x under Muslim Law, it is not immoral by Muslim standards for Judge Malik to marry a second
time while his first marriage exists.[452] It was by law, therefore, that the Muslim conduct in question was classified as an exception to the crime
of bigamy and thus an exception to the general standards of morality. The constitutionality of P.D. No. 1083 when measured against the
Establishment Clause was not raised as an issue in the Sulu Islamic case. Thus, the Court did not determine whether P.D. No. 1083 suffered from
a constitutional infirmity and instead relied on the provision excepting the challenged Muslim conduct from the crime of bigamy in holding that
the challenged act is not immoral by Muslim standards. In contradistinction, in the case at bar, there is no similar law which the Court can apply
as basis for treating respondents conduct as an exception to the prevailing jurisprudence on illicit relations of civil servants. Instead, the Free
Exercise Clause is being invoked to justify exemption.

B. Application of Benevolent Neutrality and the

Compelling State Interest Test to the Case at Bar

The case at bar being one of first impression, we now subject the respondents claim of religious freedom to the compelling state interest test
from a benevolent neutrality stance - i.e. entertaining the possibility that respondents claim to religious freedom would warrant carving out an
exception from the Civil Service Law; necessarily, her defense of religious freedom will be unavailing should the government succeed in
demonstrating a more compelling state interest.

In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether respondents right to religious freedom has been burdened. There is no doubt that choosing
between keeping her employment and abandoning her religious belief and practice and family on the one hand, and giving up her employment
and keeping her religious practice and family on the other hand, puts a burden on her free exercise of religion. In Sherbert, the Court found that
Sherberts religious exercise was burdened as the denial of unemployment benefits forces her to choose between following the precepts of her
religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.
The burden on respondent in the case at bar is even greater as the price she has to pay for her employment is not only her religious precept but
also her family which, by the Declaration Pledging Faithfulness, stands honorable before God and men.

The second step is to ascertain respondents sincerity in her religious belief. Respondent appears to be sincere in her religious belief and practice
and is not merely using the Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness to avoid punishment for immorality. She did not secure the Declaration only
after entering the judiciary where the moral standards are strict and defined, much less only after an administrative case for immorality was
filed against her. The Declaration was issued to her by her congregation after ten years of living together with her partner, Quilapio, and ten
years before she entered the judiciary. Ministers from her congregation testified on the authenticity of the Jehovahs Witnesses practice of
securing a Declaration and their doctrinal or scriptural basis for such a practice. As the ministers testified, the Declaration is not whimsically
issued to avoid legal punishment for illicit conduct but to make the union of their members under respondents circumstances honorable before
God and men. It is also worthy of notice that the Report and Recommendation of the investigating judge annexed letters[453] of the OCA to the
respondent regarding her request to be exempt from attending the flag ceremony after Circular No. 62-2001 was issued requiring attendance in
the flag ceremony. The OCAs letters were not submitted by respondent as evidence but annexed by the investigating judge in explaining that he
was caught in a dilemma whether to find respondent guilty of immorality because the Court Administrator and Deputy Court Administrator had
different positions regarding respondents request for exemption from the flag ceremony on the ground of the Jehovahs Witnesses contrary
belief and practice. Respondents request for exemption from the flag ceremony shows her sincerity in practicing the Jehovahs Witnesses beliefs
and not using them merely to escape punishment. She is a practicing member of the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Jehovah ministers testified
that she is a member in good standing. Nevertheless, should the government, thru the Solicitor General, want to further question the
respondents sincerity and the centrality of her practice in her faith, it should be given the opportunity to do so. The government has not been
represented in the case at bar from its incipience until this point.

In any event, even if the Court deems sufficient respondents evidence on the sincerity of her religious belief and its centrality in her faith, the
case at bar cannot still be decided using the compelling state interest test. The case at bar is one of first impression, thus the parties were not
aware of the burdens of proof they should discharge in the Courts use of the compelling state interest test. We note that the OCA found
respondents defense of religious freedom unavailing in the face of the Courts ruling in Dicdican v. Fernan, et al., viz:

It bears emphasis that the image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from
the judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court personnel have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in
their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice.

It is apparent from the OCAs reliance upon this ruling that the state interest it upholds is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by
maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality and decency. However, there is nothing in the OCAs memorandum to the Court that
demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should override respondents plea of religious freedom nor is it shown that the means
employed by the government in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondents religious exercise.

Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of
evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General. To properly settle the issue
in the case at bar, the government should be given the opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing
the respondents stance that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection.
Should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Courts action would be an
unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom.[454] We cannot therefore simply take a passing look at respondents claim of
religious freedom, but must instead apply the compelling state interest test. The government must be heard on the issue as it has not been given
an opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the states compelling interest which can override respondents religious belief and
practice. To repeat, this is a case of first impression where we are applying the compelling state interest test in a case involving purely religious
conduct. The careful application of the test is indispensable as how we will decide the case will make a decisive difference in the life of the
respondent who stands not only before the Court but before her Jehovah God.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case
where it will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of respondents claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to
present evidence on the states compelling interest to override respondents religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that the means the
state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondents religious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days
from the Office of the Court Administrators receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL

1.) Imelda Marcos v Sandiganbayan

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside as arbitrary and in grave abuse of discretion resolutions of the Sandiganbayan's First Division denying
petitioner's motion for leave to travel abroad for medical treatment.

Petitioner, former First Lady and widow of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, is the defendant in several criminal cases for violations of the
Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) now pending in the Sandiganbayan and in the regular courts. In two of these cases, i.e.,
Criminal Case Nos. 17450 and 17453, petitioner was found guilty by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan of violating § 3(g) of the Anti Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and was sentenced to suffer in each case imprisonment for an indeterminate period of 9 years and 1
day as minimum to 12 years and 10 days as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from public office. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, which is pending resolution in the Sandiganbayan.

After her conviction in the two cases petitioner filed on December 24, 1993 a "Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad" to seek diagnostic tests and
treatment by practitioners of oriental medicine in the People's Republic of China allegedly because of "a serious and life threatening medical
condition" requiring facilities not available in the Philippines. Petitioner's motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan for failure of petitioner to
give notice to the prosecution and because the time asked (December 29, 1993) was too close for the court to inform itself of the basis of the
motion.
On December 29, 1993, petitioner filed in another case (Criminal Case No. 18742)1 an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Permission to Travel Abroad"
to undergo diagnosis and treatment in China. The motion was supported by Ambulatory BP Reports, Nuclear Medicine Reports and Computed
Tomography Scan Results prepared by her physician and cardiologist, Dr. Roberto V. Anastacio, and other doctors at the Makati Medical Center.

On January 4, 1994, petitioner filed In Criminal Case Nos. 17450 and 17453 another "Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad," to places including the
United States and Europe, "if necessary," for treatment of "hypertensive heart disease, uncontrolled angina pectoris, and anterior myocardial
infarction." It was alleged that the tests needed were not available in the Philippines.

The Chairman of respondent court's First Division, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena, contacted Dr. Gregorio B. Patacsil, Officer-in-Charge
of the Philippine Heart Center, and later wrote him a letter,2 asking for "expert opinion on coronary medicine," particularly on the following
questions:

1. Is [petitioner's] condition life-threatening?

2. What are the "sophisticated biochemical tests" necessary (not merely desirable), if any are needed at all, to ascertain and remedy her
condition?

3. Are these tests available here?

4. Is the present level of expertise in the Philippines adequate to respond to her condition?

The Presidential Commission on Good Government filed a manifestation interposing no objection to petitioner's motions "primarily on
humanitarian grounds provided that the accused comply with the terms and conditions for travel as may be imposed" by respondent court. The
Office of the Special Prosecutor,3 on the other hand, opposed the motions, contending that:

1. the absolute necessity to go abroad was not demonstrated;

2. no statement was made by the accused that medical equipment and facilities here were "sorrily" inadequate for the needs of the
movant;

3. the conviction of the accused in Criminal Cases No. 17450 and No. 17453 might motivate her not to return if she were to be authorized
to leave the country.

On January 7, 1994 hearing was held on petitioner's motion, during which petitioner presented Dr. Roberto V. Anastacio. After the hearing, the
Sandiganbayan informed the parties that a copy of petitioner's first motion and its supporting documents had been sent to Dr. Patacsil for study
and comment by a committee of cardiologists.

After consulting Dr. Anastacio, petitioner's counsel asked the court to include among the questions to the committee the following: "Without
the Biochemical test, may proper treatment be administered to Mrs. Marcos?" Petitioner's counsel also asked the court to include the list of
medicine being taken by petitioner as part of the study. These requests were granted by the court.

Thereafter, a "Supplement to the Motion for Leave Abroad" was filed on January 17, 1994 together with additional documents, consisting of the
following:

(a) a faxed letter from Dr. Denton A. Cooley of the Texas Heart Institute dated January 11, 1994;

(b) a letter dated May 9, 1990 from David B. Case, M.D. addressed to lawyer Gerry Spence;

(c) a letter dated May 23, 1990 from Dr. Vincent De Quattro of the University of Southern California Hypertension Diagnostic Laboratory;

(d) two letters, both dated January 3, 1994 from China, one from the Tranjin Medical College, and another without letterhead from one
F.S. Tsui, both letters offering their facilities for diagnosis and treatment of hypertension and related illness through the "Classic Art of Chinese
Medical Technology."

On January 20, 1994, the Sandiganbayan received by FAX machine the report of the committee,4 containing findings which were contrary to the
conclusions of petitioner's physicians. The Presiding Justice immediately informed by phone petitioner's counsel, Attorneys Vicente D. Millora
and Manuel M. Lazaro, of the committee's report. Atty. Lazaro requested that a copy of the report be sent to him by FAX machine, while Atty.
Millora got his copy personally from the court.

On January 26, 1994, Dr. Ramon F. Abarquez, Jr. was heard by the court on his committee's report. Present at the hearing were the two lawyers
of petitioner and Dr. Anastacio.

On February 11, 1994, the court accepted petitioner's "Supplemental Motion to Travel Abroad" and heard the rebuttal testimony of Dr. Roberto
V. Anastacio, as well as the testimony of Dr. Jorge Garcia, heart surgeon from Washington, D.C., in support of petitioner's motion to travel
abroad.

On February 18, 1994 the court denied petitioner's motions. The dispositive portion of its resolution reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is the judgment of this Court that the imperative necessity of the accused to undertake a trip abroad for diagnosis
and treatment has not been established and for this reason DENIES the various motions of accused Imelda R. Marcos to leave for abroad.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a "Motion to Admit Clinical Summary and to Resolve Motion for Reconsideration." The Clinical
Summary was a recent medical report on petitioner's condition after she had undergone another medical examination at the Philippine Heart
Center5 Petitioner also filed a "Motion to Admit Recognizance in Support of, and to Resolve Soonest, the Motion for Reconsideration to Travel
Abroad." Attached to the motion were letters of Vice President Joseph E. Estrada offering to be guarantor for the return of petitioner and those
of twenty four members of the House of Representatives6 requesting the court to allow petitioner to travel abroad.

In a resolution dated April 19, 1994, respondent court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit even as it expressed
disapproval of the intervention of the Vice President and the twenty four congressmen and warned them and petitioner's counsel, Atty. Rodolfo
U. Jimenez, that "repetition of any attempt to influence the resolutions, decisions or orders or any judicial action of [respondent court] will be
responded to appropriately."

Hence, this petition for certiorari to set aside the resolutions dated February 18, 1994 and April 19, 1994 of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan
on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner claims that

1. [The Sandiganbayan] arbitrarily disregarded or misinterpreted the testimonies, medical findings and recommendations of petitioner's
attending physicians and relied on or substituted them with the academic views of Dr. Abarquez and the Committee, who never examined or
treated personally the petitioner, and erroneously concluded "that the necessity for trip abroad by the accused for diagnosis and treatment has
not been established";

2. It adopted an unusual and unorthodox conduct of trial as demonstrated by the following: (a) it motu propio contacted a third party
asking the latter to give an opinion on petitioner's motion and medical findings; (b) it unusually participated in the examination of petitioner's
witnesses; (c) thru its PJ, it presented as own witness; (d) it requested the formation of a committee to study the evidence presented; (e) it did
not decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented; (f) it decided on the basis of evidence (academic) it sought;

3. It failed to resolve that, in the clash between basic constitutional rights of the petitioner and the authority of the court over the
petitioner, the basic constitutional rights must prevail;

4(a). It considered the conviction of petitioner in two (2) criminal cases which are pending reconsideration as factors in denying the rights
of petitioner to life, health and liberty and depriving the penumbras of such right to give life and substance;

4(b). Respondent court violated the cluster of rights of "personhood", "privacy" or "personal liberty".

5. It perceived that there is no "imperative necessity" for petitioner to avail of medical examination and treatment abroad not
withstanding that such perception/conclusion cannot constitute a cause to deny or deprive petitioner of her constitutional rights, nor can it
refute the medical findings of petitioner's attending physicians.

Called upon to comment, the Solicitor General, in representation of the prosecution in the criminal cases, contends that respondent court acted
properly in seeking the advice of medical experts in regard to petitioner's motion to travel; that in any event petitioner is estopped from
questioning the referral of her medical condition to other experts by agreeing to submit additional questions for their consideration; and that
the right to life is not absolute but must be balanced by the State's right to prosecute and enforce the judgments of its courts, and that petitioner's
conviction in two cases is relevant along with "humanitarian and equity" considerations.

The question for decision is whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner's request to travel abroad for medical
treatment. After due consideration of the parties' arguments, we find that it did not.

Respondent court had to seek expert opinion because petitioner's motion was based on the advice of her physician. The court could not be
expected to just accept the opinion of petitioner's physician in resolving her request for permission to travel. The subject lay beyond its
competence and since the grant of the request depended on the verification of the claim that petitioner was suffering from a medical condition
that was alleged to be serious and life threatening, the respondent court, we think, followed the only prudent course available of seeking the
opinion of other specialists in the field.

Indeed, when even in their own field of expertise (law) courts are allowed to invite amici curiae to shed light on recondite points of law, there is
no reason for denying them assistance on other subjects. Presiding Justice Garchitorena's letter to Dr. Patacsil is notable in this regard for its
sedulous concern for "greater need for information and expert advise" to the end that respondent court may be able to determine "whether or
not it is necessary and urgent for petitioner to travel abroad."

What would be objectionable would be if respondent court obtained information without disclosing its source to the parties and used it in
deciding a case against them. Then the parties could justifiably complain that their right to due process has been violated. But, in this case,
everything was on the level, with the parties taking part in the proceedings of the court.

At all events if petitioner did not agree to the procedure adopted by the court, her counsel should have objected when informed by the court
on January 7, 1994 that it had referred Dr. Anastacio's report to the Philippine Heart Center for advice and opinion. Counsel did not object.
Instead, after consulting Dr. Anastacio, he requested the court to submit additional questions for referral to the Philippine Heart Center and
later took part in cross examining Dr. Abarquez, Jr. when the latter testified. Petitioner is thus estopped from questioning what she now calls
the "unusual and unorthodox" manner of resolving her request for permission to travel abroad.
Now, if the respondent court disregarded the findings and recommendations of petitioner's physician, it was because in light of the report of
the panel of experts which reviewed the findings and recommendations of petitioner's physicians, petitioner failed to prove the necessity for a
trip abroad. It should be emphasized that considering the fact that she is facing charges before the courts in several cases, in two of which she
was convicted although the decision is still pending reconsideration, petitioner did not have an absolute right to leave the country and the
burden was on her to prove that because of danger to health if not to her life there was necessity to seek medical treatment in foreign countries.7

Nor is there warrant for the claim that respondent court acted arbitrarily in disregarding the findings of petitioner's physicians and relying on
the opinion of specialists from the Philippine Heart Center because the latter did not personally examine her and for that reason their opinion is
allegedly "academic." The question raised by petitioner's motion was not whether petitioner was suffering from a serious and life threatening
medical condition. Rather the question before the Sandiganbayan was whether on the basis of reports attached to the motions for travel there
was evidence to show that she was suffering from such ailments (i.e., coronary artery disease and labile hypertension) and there was need for
diagnostic tests which could only be performed abroad. Consequently, it was unnecessary for the Philippine Heart Center's specialists to examine
the petitioner personally. Given the findings of petitioner's own physicians, they found that petitioner had not been shown to be suffering from
coronary artery disease and uncontrolled high blood pressure (labile hypertension).

The claim that petitioner is suffering from a life threatening medical condition is based on a letter dated November 4, 1993 of Dr. Roberto V.
Anastacio, cardiologist at the Makati Medical Center, to Dr. Jorge M. Garcia, heart surgeon of the Washington Heart Institute at Washington
D.C., recommending diagnostic tests abroad for petitioner. In his letter (marked Annex B of petitioner's first "Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad")
Dr. Anastacio claimed that petitioner complained of chest pains; that she had an uncontrolled high blood pressure with "a spread of 200/100-
100/70;" that the ambulatory blood pressure monitoring device showed her highest systolic BP to be from 184 to 204 mmHg at 6 P.M., 1:35
A.M. and 3 A.M., and her highest diastolic pressure to be 120 mmHg; that an Electrocardiogram indicated a myocardial infarction; that an
Exercise-HexaMibi Tc-99m myocardial perfusion imaging showed an "abnormal myorcardial injury in the anterior region." Dr. Anastacio
concluded:

Definitely, we have established that Mrs. Marcos is suffering from a dangerous level of rises in blood pressure provoked by high level of emotional
stress and now complicated with a strong evidence of myocardial injury.

Her significant family history of hypertension in her father and siblings (eldest sister and brother) and that indeed two of them have experienced
sudden cardiac death as complicating manifestations of uncontrolled high blood pressure of this type place this patient in the high risk category
of sudden cardiac death. (Emphasis added)

He recommended:

Definitely, Mrs. Marcos should undergo immediate studies [abroad] to define the following:

1. To investigate invasively (Coronary Arteriogram) to correlate the severity of coronary obstruction and the recent development of
myocardial infarction in relation to sudden cardiac death.

2. To do biochemical studies at the same time e.g. Continuous-Serial Vasopressine-Arginine and Catecholamine level determination in
relation with her uncontrolled high, dangerous level of high blood pressure not only in the stratification of her "Sudden Death" risk staging but
likewise, equally important is the control of her uncontrolled high blood pressure.

3. The observed sensitiveness to the drugs administered, makes drug therapy risky without a concomittant close monitoring of the
hemodynamic and biochemical parameters which will help avert a possible iatrogenic, fatal cardiovascular event.

Based on these findings, Dr. Roman F. Abarquez, Jr., Dr. Homobono B. Calleja and Dr. Romeo A. Divinagracia, however, found the diagnosis of
"definite coronary artery disease" to be "questionable" for the following reasons:

1) The location and character of the chest pain (sharp pain lasting for a few seconds left mid axillary and not related to effort) is not the
common presentation of pain due to coronary artery disease (angina pectoris).

2) The Stress Test done during the Thallium Scan was adequate (maximum predicted heart rate of 106%) and yet was negative for
ischemia.

3) The Thallium Myocardial imaging (Nuclear scan) showed only a small questionable perfusion defect on the anterior wall. It can also be
considered as a false positive finding due to soft tissue artifacts as mentioned in the report. (Emphasis added)

In fact the finding that petitioner did not have ischemia8 and that there was only a small perfusion defect on the anterior wall which could be
considered a "false positive finding" is based on petitioner's own nuclear medical report.9 prepared by the Makati Medical Center, which contains
the following conclusions:

CONCLUSIONS: ABNORMAL MYOCARDIAL PERFUSION IMAGING. EVIDENCE FOR PRIOR MYOCARDIAL INJURY IN THE ANTERIOR REGION.
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE FOR STRESS INDUCED MYOCARDIAL ISCHEMIA.

ALTHOUGH THESE FINDINGS ARE SUGGESTIVE OF CORONARY ARTERY DISEASE, PHOTON ATTENUATION SECONDARY TO SOFT TISSUE ARTIFACTS
CAN BE EXCLUDED.

As to the ambulatory blood pressure monitor reports, the Abarquez panel noted:
The diagnosis of hypertensive heart disease is questionable. Mrs. Marcos has transient (labile) hypertension. In the ambulatory BP monitoring
records — there were only 2 transient rises of elevated systolic pressure and 3 episodes of elevated diastolic pressure. 5 episodes of transient
systolic BP elevation and 5 episodes of transient elevated diastolic pressure occurred in the 2nd ambulatory recording. The patient did not submit
a diary during both occasions when her ambulatory BP recording was performed.

A patient is considered to have sustained hypertension if 30% or more of the recorded blood pressures on ambulatory monitoring are
hypertensive levels. The term hypertensive heart disease is used to denote heart involvement due to effects of long standing (chronic)
hypertension. There is no evidence in the medical brief to show that there is left ventricular hypertrophy or left ventricular dysfunction. In fact,
the previous echocardiogram was reported to be normal.

For this reason the committee questioned the need for petitioner to have biochemical tests abroad. Even without these tests, it noted, Dr.
Anastacio had "already been treating her with medicines that are used for hypertension and coronary heart disease."

With respect to Dr. Anastacio's claim that petitioner is in the high risk group of sudden cardiac death, the committee stated that a history of
sudden death in the family alone will not support such a conclusion:

The known direct determinants for sudden cardiac death are: (1) ventricular electrical instability (ventricular arrhytmias), (2) extensive coronary
artery narrowing, (3) abnormal left ventricular function, (4) electrocardiographic conduction and repolarization abnormalities.

In the absence of the above factors for sudden cardiac death, the presence of a family history of sudden cardiac death alone cannot stand as a
strong argument for a high risk of sudden cardiac death. Even the family history of sudden cardiac death in this case is still questionable since
we are not furnished with definite evidence that the said members of the family actually died of sudden death.

In summary, the evidence submitted do not confirm the allegation that Mrs. Marcos is in the high risk group for sudden cardiac death. (Emphases
added)

The group made the following conclusions and recommendations:

RECOMMENDED TESTS:

1) Coronary Angiography — to definitely establish the presence or absence of coronary artery obstruction and severity of the disease.

2) 2-D Echo Doppler Echocardlography — to demonstrate the presence of ventricular dysfunction or hypertrophy.

3) Ambulatory Holter Monitoring — to find out whether serious arrhythmias (irregularities of heart beat) are present or not.

CONCLUSIONS:

1) The diagnosis or significant coronary heart disease is not confirmed from the brief presented.

2) Marcos has transient elevation of blood pressure" which be reactive to situations but there is no evidence to indicate the presence of
hypertensive heart disease.

3) The tests we have recommended are available in the Philippines. Proper treatment can be given to Mrs. Marcos even in the absence
of the suggested biochemical tests. (Emphasis added)

4) The present facilities and expertise in the Philippines are more than adequate to diagnose and treat patients with hypertension and/or
coronary heart disease. (Emphasis added)

Dr. Abarquez, Jr. testified on January 26, 1994 on the report of his committee. Dr. Anastacio was present at that hearing, but he did not refute
Dr. Abarquez, Jr.'s conclusions. Instead it appears that he performed the tests recommended by the committee, namely:

1) Coronary Angiography — to definitely establish the presence or absence of coronary artery obstruction and severity of the disease.

2) 2-D Echo Doppler Echocardiography — to demonstrate the presence of ventricular dysfunction or hypertrophy.

3) Ambulatory Holter Monitoring — to find out whether serious arrhythmias (irregularities of heart beat) are present or not.

The results, as the Sandiganbayan said in its resolution, were:

Dr. Roberto Anastacio, accused Marcos' attending physician, appears to have subsequently subjected accused Marcos to another set of tests
during her latest confinement at the Makati Medical Center, principally the Echo Doppler Test and the Holter 24-hour monitoring test.

The 2-D Echo Doppler test, which the Committee of Cardiologists recommended was administered on February 1, 1994 (Exhibit "D-
Supplemental") and all findings read normal.

Dr. Anastacio said that the handwritten notes of Drs. Dy and Lapitan who had read the results of the Ambulatory Hotter Monitor, i.e., an ambulant
electrocardiogram, and the readings did not show that there was anything wrong with accused Marcos. In fact, the readings themselves said
that the average pulse rate was at 68 beats per minute (from 50 to 134) no blockages, no PVCs, no PACs, no indication of arrythmia.
It would appear that earlier on January 31, 1994, petitioner had also undergone electrocardiogram tests at the Makati Medical Center in which
cardiologists are rotated to do the readings. Dr. Esperanza Cabral found the electrocardiogram results to be "Normal." The results of the
echocardiogram were read by another cardiologist, Dr. Adoracion Nambuyan-Abad, and her finding was approved by Dr. Benjamin N. Alimurong.
The results were also "Normal."

Although Dr. Anastacio subsequently conducted another electrocardiogram test on petitioner and found the existence of myocardial infarction,
as the Sandiganbayan noted, Dr. Anastacio's finding was not read or concurred in by another cardiologist, contrary to the procedure followed at
the Makati Medical Center.10 It is, therefore, also questionable.

The evidence submitted to it, according to the Abarquez committee, "[did] not confirm the allegation that Mrs. Marcos is in the high risk group
of sudden cardiac death." Perhaps the best proof that she is not in the group is the fact that she ran in the last election for a seat in the House
of Representative and won. It may be assumed that she waged an arduous political campaign but apparently is none the worse for it.

Considering the foregoing we cannot say that respondent court trifled with petitioner's constitutionally guaranteed right to life, health and
liberty. What petitioner denounces as the "unusual and unorthodox conduct of the trial" by the court's Presiding Justice owed more, it would
seem, from the latter's robust and rather active personality rather than to any ill motive or hostility he entertained toward petitioner, the latter's
counsel or her witnesses. It is matter of record that on three different occasions, petitioner had been permitted to travel abroad. But her later
conviction in two cases dictated the need for greater caution. To be sure, conviction is not yet final view of a motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner. But a person's right to travel is subject to the usual contraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In
such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reason is a matter of the court's sound discretion.

The active intervention of respondent Presiding Justice in the trial the case was justified by the fact that the subject with which the court was
dealing was a highly technical one and he wanted to clarify for himself a number of medical question. That a judge has the power — if not indeed
a duty — to do this teaching of People v. Obngayan; 11

There are obviously certain rights to the trier of facts due to the nature of (a judge's) function. Among these is the right to question a witness
with a view to satisfying his mind upon a material point which present itself during the trial as to the credibility of such witness.

This Court quoted the following from Justice Labrador's opinion Ventura v. Judge Yatco: 12

While judges should as much as possible refrain from showing partiality to one party and hostility to another, it does not mean that a trial judge
should keep mum throughout the trial and allow parties to ask the questions that they desire, on issues which they think are the important
issues, when the former are improper and the latter, immaterial. If trials are to be expedited, judges must take a leading part therein, by directing
counsel to submit the evidence on the facts in the dispute by asking clarifying questions, and by showing an interest in a fast and fair trial. Judges
are not mere referees like those of a boxing bout, only to watch and decide the result of a game; they should have as much interest as counsel
in the orderly and expeditious presentation of evidence, calling attention of counsel to point at issue that are overlooked, directing them to ask
the question that would elicit the fact on the issues involved, clarifying ambiguous remarks by witnesses, etc. Unless they take an active part in
trials in the above form and manner, and allow counsel to ask questions whether pertinent or impertinent, material or immaterial, the speedy
administration of justice which is the aim of the Government and of the people cannot be attained. Counsel should, therefore, not resent any
interest that the judge takes in the conduct of the trial, they should be glad that a trial judge takes such interest and help in the determination
of truth.

The active participation of respondent court in examining petitioner's witnesses in the case merely indicated the court's deep concern with the
truth of petitioner's medical condition.

What perhaps should have been done was for petitioner to request an examination of her medical condition by a joint team of cardiologist and
other medical experts instead of having the findings of her physician reviewed by the other specialists. A joint investigation will have the
advantage of not being unduly adversarial since the purpose is the common objective of arriving at a consensus among the experts.

It is not late for the petitioner to ask for this. She can file another motion before the Sandiganbayan. This observation is made because after the
petitioner in the case had been filed, petitioner filed a motion for leave to travel, this time on the ground that she is suffering from a difficult
type of glaucoma which threatens to make her blind. Her motion is supported by a medical certificate of Dr. Manuel B. Agulto, opthalmologist
and glaucoma expert, who recommends that petitioner see Dr. Richard J. Simmons of Boston, Massachusetts, and avail herself of his
"internationally renowned expertise and recognized authority in this particularly difficult glaucoma type." 13 Dr. Agulto's certificate states:

This certifies that above patient has been treated by the undersigned by since 1980 for Low Tension Glaucoma which was initially diagnosed by
Richard J. Simmons, M.D. of Harvad Medical School and New England Glaucoma Research Foundation of Boston, Massachussetts.

Since then the patient has been monitored closely to prevent irreversible visual field and acuity loss. Lately we have noted a progression of her
visual field changes.

Latest pertinent clinical findings (as of April 19, 1994) include the following:

Corrected Vision: 20/20, Jaeger 1

Automated Visual field: positive paracentral depression, both eyes (April 11, 1994, copies of result appended)
Tensions: (Diurnal Range) 13-15mm Hg, right eye
13-16mm Hg, left eye
Disc: Cupping of 0.6-0.7, both eyes

Remarks:
We suggest that the patient see her primary eye physician in Boston so as to avail herself of his internationally renowned expertise and
recognized authority in this particularly difficult glaucoma type.

Considering the irreversible nature of glaucoma blindness and the documented progression of her field changes plus additional and strong clinical
evidence of the unrelenting course of visual loss as was recently documented in a younger brother and patient, Alfredo T. Romualdez, who was
recently declared legally blind from the same familial glaucoma, we urge Mrs. Marcos who is much older and therefore at greater risk, to consult
immediate Dr. Simmons so as to delay if not prevent the onset of very real and absolute blindness.

This motion should be addressed to the Sandiganbayan not only because whether petitioner should be allowed to leave the country is its primary
concern but also because the determination of petitioner's eye condition is question of fact to be made in the first instance by the Sandiganbayan.
The court should order a joint examination of petitioner's eye condition and resolve her motion accordingly.

WHEREFORE, the petitioner is DISMISSED without prejudice to the filling of another motion for leave to travel abroad, should petitioner still
desire, based on her heart condition. In such an event the determination of her medical condition should be made by joint panel of medical
specialists recommended by both the accused and the prosecution.

Petitioner's motion for leave to travel for medical treatment of her alleged failing eyesight is hereby referred to the Sandiganbayan with directive
to the latter to appoint a joint panel of eye specialists as outlined above.

SO ORDERED.

2.) Yap vs CA

The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside two resolutions of the Court of Appeals which
fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions on change of residence and travel abroad.

For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City[1] and
was sentenced to four years and two months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, in addition to
one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20) years.[2] He filed a notice of appeal,
and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings. The motion was denied by the trial
court in an order dated February 17, 1999.

After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed with the said court a Motion to Fix Bail For the Provisional
Liberty of Accused-Appellant Pending Appeal, invoking the last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. Asked to
comment on this motion, the Solicitor General opined that petitioner may be allowed to post bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 and be required
to secure a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be so
until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private complainant.[3] Petitioner
filed a Reply, contending that the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of his right against excessive bail.

The assailed resolution of the Court of Appeals[4], issued on October 6, 1999, upheld the recommendation of the Solicitor General; thus, its
dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Fix Bail For Provisional Liberty of Accused-Appellant Pending Appeal is hereby GRANTED.
Accused-appellant Francisco Yap, Jr., a.k.a. Edwin Yap is hereby ALLOWED TO POST BAIL in the amount of Five Million Five Hundred Thousand
(P5,500,000.00) Pesos, subject to the following conditions, viz.:

(1) He (accused-appellant) secures a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that
he will remain to be a resident therein until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court;

(2) The Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) is hereby directed to issue a hold departure order against accused-appellant; and

(3) The accused-appellant shall forthwith surrender his passport to the Division Clerk of Court for safekeeping until the court orders its return;

(4) Any violation of the aforesaid conditions shall cause the forfeiture of accused-appellants bail bond, the dismissal of appeal and his immediate
arrest and confinement in jail.

SO ORDERED.[5]

A motion for reconsideration was filed, seeking the reduction of the amount of bail fixed by respondent court, but was denied in a resolution
issued on November 25, 1999. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner sets out the following assignments of error:

The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in fixing the bail for the provisional liberty of petitioner pending appeal
in the amount of P5.5 million.

The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in basing the bail for the provisional liberty of the petitioner on his civil
liability.
The respondent Court of Appeals unduly restricted petitioners constitutional liberty of abode and travel in imposing the other conditions for the
grant of bail.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his right to bail. He challenges the
legal basis of respondent court for fixing bail at P5,500,000.00, which is equivalent to the amount of his civil liability to private complainant
Manila Mahogany Marketing Corporation, and argues that the Rules of Court never intended for the civil liability of the accused to be a guideline
or basis for determining the amount of bail. He prays that bail be reduced to at least P40,000.00, citing the maximum amount of bail that can be
posted for the crime of estafa under the 1996 Bail Bond Guide, or P20,000.00, equivalent to the amount of bail he posted during the trial of the
case.[6]

On the other hand, the Solicitor General maintains that no grave abuse of discretion could be ascribed to the Court of Appeals for fixing the
amount of bail at P5,500,000.00 considering the severity of the penalty imposed, the weight of the evidence against petitioner, and the gravity
of the offense of which petitioner was convicted by the RTC. He asserted that the P5,500,000.00 not only corresponded to civil liability but also
to the amount of fraud imputed to petitioner. The Solicitor General further pointed out the probability of flight in case petitioner is released on
bail, it having been established that petitioner was in possession of a valid passport and visa and had in fact left the country several times during
the course of the proceedings in the lower court. It was also shown that petitioner used different names in his business transactions and had
several abodes in different parts of the country.

As for the conditions imposed by the bail bond, the Solicitor General advanced that all that the Court of Appeals requires is notice in case of
change of address; it does not in any way impair petitioners right to change abode for as long as the court is apprised of his change of residence
during the pendency of the appeal.

Petitioners case falls within the provisions of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Rules of Court which states:

SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. --- Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail.

The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period to appeal subject
to the consent of the bondsman.

If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, but not more than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied bail,
or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:

(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration;

(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail
without valid justification;

(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit another crime.

The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on motion and with notice to the adverse party.[7]

There is no question that in the present case the Court of Appeals exercised its discretion in favor of allowing bail to petitioner on appeal.
Respondent court stated that it was doing so for humanitarian reasons, and despite a perceived high risk of flight, as by petitioners admission
he went out of the country several times during the pendency of the case, for which reason the court deemed it necessary to peg the amount
of bail at P5,500,000.00.

The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the Constitution.[8] The obvious rationale, as declared in the leading case of De
la Camara vs. Enage,[9] is that imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. Thus, in Villaseor vs. Abao,[10]
this Court made the pronouncement that it will not hesitate to exercise its supervisory powers over lower courts should the latter, after holding
the accused entitled to bail, effectively deny the same by imposing a prohibitory sum or exacting unreasonable conditions.

xxx There is grim irony in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but at the same time being required to post such an exorbitant sum.
What aggravates the situation is that the lower court judge would apparently yield to the command of the fundamental law. In reality, such a
sanctimonious avowal of respect for a mandate of the Constitution was on a purely verbal level. There is reason to believe that any person in
the position of petitioner would under the circumstances be unable to resist thoughts of escaping from confinement, reduced as he must have
been to a state of desperation. In the same breath as he was told he could be bailed out, the excessive amount required could only mean that
provisional liberty would be beyond his reach. It would have been more forthright if he were informed categorically that such a right could not
be availed of. There would have been no disappointment of expectations then. It does call to mind these words of Justice Jackson, a promise to
the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a paupers will. xxx[11]

At the same time, Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure advises courts to consider the following factors in the setting
of the amount of bail:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;

(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;

(c) Penalty for the offense charged;

(d) Character and reputation of the accused;

(e) Age and health of the accused;

(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;

(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;

(h) Forfeiture of other bail;

(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and

(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.

Thus, the court has wide latitude in fixing the amount of bail. Where it fears that the accused may jump bail, it is certainly not precluded from
installing devices to ensure against the same. Options may include increasing the bail bond to an appropriate level, or requiring the person to
report periodically to the court and to make an accounting of his movements.[12] In the present case, where petitioner was found to have left
the country several times while the case was pending, the Court of Appeals required the confiscation of his passport and the issuance of a hold-
departure order against him.

Under the circumstances of this case, we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight,
particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any change of residence and
of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, we find that the setting of the
amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of petitioners right to bail.

The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial,[13] or whenever so required by the court[14] The amount should
be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.[15] To
fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00) is to permit the impression that
the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of; this we cannot allow because bail is not intended as a
punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court.

At the same time, we cannot yield to petitioners submission that bail in the instant case be set at P40,000.00 based on the 1996 Bail Bond Guide.
(The current Bail Bond Guide, issued on August 29, 2000, maintains recommended bail at P40,000.00 for estafa where the amount of fraud is
P142,000.00 or over and the imposable penalty 20 years of reclusion temporal). True, the Court has held that the Bail Bond Guide, a circular of
the Department of Justice for the guidance of state prosecutors, although technically not binding upon the courts, merits attention, being in a
sense an expression of policy of the Executive Branch, through the Department of Justice, in the enforcement of criminal laws.[16] Thus, courts
are advised that they must not only be aware but should also consider the Bail Bond Guide due to its significance in the administration of criminal
justice.[17] This notwithstanding, the Court is not precluded from imposing in petitioners case an amount higher than P40,000.00 (based on the
Bail Bond Guide) where it perceives that an appropriate increase is dictated by the circumstances.

It militates emphasis that petitioner is seeking bail on appeal. Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear that although
the grant of bail on appeal in non-capital offenses is discretionary, when the penalty imposed on the convicted accused exceeds six years and
circumstances exist that point to the probability of flight if released on bail, then the accused must be denied bail, or his bail previously granted
should be cancelled.[18] In the same vein, the Court has held that the discretion to extend bail during the course of the appeal should be
exercised with grave caution and for strong reasons, considering that the accused had been in fact convicted by the trial court.[19] In an earlier
case, the Court adopted Senator Vicente J. Franciscos disquisition on why bail should be denied after judgment of conviction as a matter of wise
discretion; thus:

The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be granted only where it is uncertain whether the
accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit
to bail. After a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted,
and the burden is upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From another point of view it may be properly argued that the probability
of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than
before conviction. xxx [20]

Petitioner is seeking bail on appeal. He was in fact declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the RTC, and due to the serious amount of fraud
involved, sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years --- the maximum penalty for estafa by false pretenses or fraudulent acts allowed by the
Revised Penal Code. Although it cannot be controverted that the Court of Appeals, despite the foregoing considerations and the possibility of
flight still wielded its discretion to grant petitioner bail, the setting of bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 is unjustified as having no legal nor
factual basis. Guided by the penalty imposed by the lower court and the weight of the evidence against petitioner, we believe that the amount
of P200,000.00 is more reasonable.
Petitioner also contests the condition imposed by the Court of Appeals that he secure a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of
his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be a resident therein until final judgment is rendered or in case he
transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court, claiming that the same violates his liberty of abode and travel.

Notably, petitioner does not question the hold-departure order which prevents him from leaving the Philippines unless expressly permitted by
the court which issued the order.[21] In fact, the petition submits that the hold-departure order against petitioner is already sufficient guarantee
that he will not escape. Thus, to require him to inform the court every time he changed his residence is already unnecessary.[22]

The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are not absolute rights. Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Constitution states:

The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the above provision.[23] The
condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner
will make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at the questioned condition will show
that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely required to inform the court in case he does so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Petitioners bail pending appeal is reduced from P5,500,000.00 to P200,000.00. In all other
respects, the resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated October 6, 1999 and November 25, 1999, respectively, are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

3.) Marcos v Manglapus

In its decision dated September 15,1989, the Court, by a vote of eight (8) to seven (7), dismissed the petition, after finding that the President did
not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time
and under present circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On September
28, 1989, former President Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii. In a statement, President Aquino said:

In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility
of the state and order of society, the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to our country until such time as the
government, be it under this administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide. [Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1; Rollo, p, 443.]

On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners, raising the following major arguments:

1. to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines is to deny them not only the inherent right of citizens
to return to their country of birth but also the protection of the Constitution and all of the rights guaranteed to Filipinos under the Constitution;

2. the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had exercised it arbitrarily; and

3. there is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos. Thus, petitioners prayed that the Court reconsider its
decision, order respondents to issue the necessary travel documents to enable Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Irene M. Araneta,
Imee M. Manotoc, Tommy Manotoc and Gregorio Araneta to return to the Philippines, and enjoin respondents from implementing President
Aquino's decision to bar the return of the remains of Mr. Marcos, and the other petitioners, to the Philippines.

Commenting on the motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General argued that the motion for reconsideration is moot and academic as to
the deceased Mr. Marcos. Moreover, he asserts that "the 'formal' rights being invoked by the Marcoses under the label 'right to return', including
the label 'return of Marcos' remains, is in reality or substance a 'right' to destabilize the country, a 'right' to hide the Marcoses' incessant shadowy
orchestrated efforts at destabilization." [Comment, p. 29.] Thus, he prays that the Motion for Reconsideration be denied for lack of merit.

We deny the motion for reconsideration.

1. It must be emphasized that as in all motions for reconsideration, the burden is upon the movants, petitioner herein, to show that there
are compelling reasons to reconsider the decision of the Court.

2. After a thorough consideration of the matters raised in the motion for reconsideration, the Court is of the view that no compelling
reasons have been established by petitioners to warrant a reconsideration of the Court's decision.

The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has not changed the factual scenario under which the Court's
decision was rendered. The threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have
not been shown to have ceased. On the contrary, instead of erasing fears as to the destabilization that will be caused by the return of the
Marcoses, Mrs. Marcos reinforced the basis for the decision to bar their return when she called President Aquino "illegal," claiming that it is Mr.
Marcos, not Mrs. Aquino, who is the "legal" President of the Philippines, and declared that the matter "should be brought to all the courts of
the world." [Comment, p. 1; Philippine Star, October 4, 1989.]
3. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual
powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution.
The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered
provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit
the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of the
President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power.

That the President has powers other than those expressly stated in the Constitution is nothing new. This is recognized under the U.S. Constitution
from which we have patterned the distribution of governmental powers among three (3) separate branches.

Article II, [section] 1, provides that "The Executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." In Alexander Hamilton's
widely accepted view, this statement cannot be read as mere shorthand for the specific executive authorizations that follow it in [sections] 2
and 3. Hamilton stressed the difference between the sweeping language of article II, section 1, and the conditional language of article I, [section]
1: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . ." Hamilton submitted that "[t]he [article III
enumeration [in sections 2 and 31 ought therefore to be considered, as intended merely to specify the principal articles implied in the definition
of execution power; leaving the rest to flow from the general grant of that power, interpreted in confomity with other parts of the Constitution...

In Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court — accepted Hamilton's proposition, concluding that the federal executive, unlike the Congress,
could exercise power from sources not enumerated, so long as not forbidden by the constitutional text: the executive power was given in general
terms, strengthened by specific terms where emphasis was regarded as appropriate, and was limited by direct expressions where limitation was
needed. . ." The language of Chief Justice Taft in Myers makes clear that the constitutional concept of inherent power is not a synonym for power
without limit; rather, the concept suggests only that not all powers granted in the Constitution are themselves exhausted by internal
enumeration, so that, within a sphere properly regarded as one of "executive' power, authority is implied unless there or elsewhere expressly
limited. [TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 158-159 (1978).]

And neither can we subscribe to the view that a recognition of the President's implied or residual powers is tantamount to setting the stage for
another dictatorship. Despite petitioners' strained analogy, the residual powers of the President under the Constitution should not be confused
with the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate pursuant to Amendment No. 6 which provides:

Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the
interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment
requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, which shall form
part of the law of the land,

There is no similarity between the residual powers of the President under the 1987 Constitution and the power of the President under the 1973
Constitution pursuant to Amendment No. 6. First of all, Amendment No. 6 refers to an express grant of power. It is not implied. Then, Amendment
No. 6 refers to a grant to the President of the specific power of legislation.

4. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the
interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present
time and under present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she had acted with
arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit."

4.) Manotoc v CA

The issue posed for resolution in this petition for review may be stated thus: Does a person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally released
on bail have an unrestricted right to travel?

Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management, Inc. and the Manotoc Securities, Inc.,
a stock brokerage house. Having transferred the management of the latter into the hands of professional men, he holds no officer-position in
said business, but acts as president of the former corporation.

Following the "run" on stock brokerages caused by stock broker Santamaria's flight from this jurisdiction, petitioner, who was then in the United
States, came home, and together with his co-stockholders, filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the appointment of
a management committee, not only for Manotoc Securities, Inc., but likewise for Trans-Insular Management, Inc. The petition relative to the
Manotoc Securities, Inc., docketed as SEC Case No. 001826, entitled, "In the Matter of the Appointment of a Management Committee for
Manotoc Securities, Inc., Teodoro Kalaw, Jr., Ricardo Manotoc, Jr., Petitioners", was granted and a management committee was organized and
appointed.

Pending disposition of SEC Case No. 001826, the Securities and Exchange Commission requested the then Commissioner of Immigration,
Edmundo Reyes, not to clear petitioner for departure and a memorandum to this effect was issued by the Commissioner on February 4, 1980 to
the Chief of the Immigration Regulation Division.

When a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected to be a fake, six of its clients filed six separate criminal
complaints against petitioner and one Raul Leveriza, Jr., as president and vice-president, respectively, of Manotoc Securities, Inc. In due course,
corresponding criminal charges for estafa were filed by the investigating fiscal before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400, assigned to respondent Judge Camilon, and Criminal Cases Nos. 45542 to 45545, raffled off to Judge
Pronove. In all cases, petitioner has been admitted to bail in the total amount of P105,000.00, with FGU Instance Corporation as surety.

On March 1, 1982, petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating as
ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities."1 The prosecution opposed said
motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same. The order of Judge Camilon dated March 9, 1982, reads:

Accused Ricardo Manotoc Jr. desires to leave for the United States on the all embracing ground that his trip is ... relative to his business
transactions and opportunities.

The Court sees no urgency from this statement. No matter of any magnitude is discerned to warrant judicial imprimatur on the proposed trip.

In view thereof, permission to leave the country is denied Ricardo Manotoc, Jr. now or in the future until these two (2) cases are terminated .2

On the other hand, the order of Judge Pronove dated March 26, 1982, reads in part:

6.-Finally, there is also merit in the prosecution's contention that if the Court would allow the accused to leave the Philippines the surety
companies that filed the bail bonds in his behalf might claim that they could no longer be held liable in their undertakings because it was the
Court which allowed the accused to go outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippine Court, should the accused fail or decide not to return.

WHEREFORE, the motion of the accused is DENIED. 3

It appears that petitioner likewise wrote the Immigration Commissioner a letter requesting the recall or withdrawal of the latter's memorandum
dated February 4, 1980, but said request was also denied in a letter dated May 27, 1982.

Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals 4 seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and
26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as well as the communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner and
the Chief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure.

On October 5, 1982, the appellate court rendered a decision 5 dismissing the petition for lack of merit.

Dissatisfied with the appellate court's ruling, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari. Pending resolution of the petition to
which we gave due course on April 14, 1983 6 petitioner filed on August 15, 1984 a motion for leave to go abroad pendente lite.7 In his motion,
petitioner stated that his presence in Louisiana, U.S.A. is needed in connection "with the obtention of foreign investment in Manotoc Securities,
Inc."8 He attached the letter dated August 9, 1984 of the chief executive officer of the Exploration Company of Louisiana, Inc., Mr. Marsden W.
Miller9 requesting his presence in the United States to "meet the people and companies who would be involved in its investments." Petitioner,
likewise manifested that on August 1, 1984, Criminal Cases Nos. 4933 to 4936 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (formerly Nos. 45542-45545)
had been dismissed as to him "on motion of the prosecution on the ground that after verification of the records of the Securities and Exchange
Commission ... (he) was not in any way connected with the Manotoc Securities, Inc. as of the date of the commission of the offenses imputed to
him." 10 Criminal Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, however, remained pending as Judge Camilon, when notified
of the dismissal of the other cases against petitioner, instead of dismissing the cases before him, ordered merely the informations amended so
as to delete the allegation that petitioner was president and to substitute that he was "controlling/majority stockholder,'' 11 of Manotoc
Securities, Inc. On September 20, 1984, the Court in a resolution en banc denied petitioner's motion for leave to go abroad pendente lite. 12

Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor the Securities and
Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

Petitioner's contention is untenable.

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and
function of a bail bond.

Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the
law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.

Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put
the accused as much under the power of the court as if he were in custody of the proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the accused
so as to answer the call of the court and do what the law may require of him. 13

The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction on his right to travel. As we have held in People vs. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).

... the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower
court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be
nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have
no binding force outside of said jurisdiction.

Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.
The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or filed of record, and the prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer the custody
of the accused from the public officials who have him in their charge to keepers of his own selection. Such custody has been regarded merely as
a continuation of the original imprisonment. The sureties become invested with full authority over the person of the principal and have the right
to prevent the principal from leaving the state.14

If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state, more so then has the court from which the sureties merely derive
such right, and whose jurisdiction over the person of the principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter. In fact, this inherent
right of the court is recognized by petitioner himself, notwithstanding his allegation that he is at total liberty to leave the country, for he would
not have filed the motion for permission to leave the country in the first place, if it were otherwise.

To support his contention, petitioner places reliance upon the then Court of Appeals' ruling in People vs. Shepherd (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R,
February 13, 1980) particularly citing the following passage:

... The law obliges the bondsmen to produce the person of the appellants at the pleasure of the Court. ... The law does not limit such undertaking
of the bondsmen as demandable only when the appellants are in the territorial confines of the Philippines and not demandable if the appellants
are out of the country. Liberty, the most important consequence of bail, albeit provisional, is indivisible. If granted at all, liberty operates as fully
within as without the boundaries of the granting state. This principle perhaps accounts for the absence of any law or jurisprudence expressly
declaring that liberty under bail does not transcend the territorial boundaries of the country.

The faith reposed by petitioner on the above-quoted opinion of the appellate court is misplaced. The rather broad and generalized statement
suffers from a serious fallacy; for while there is, indeed, neither law nor jurisprudence expressly declaring that liberty under bail does not
transcend the territorial boundaries of the country, it is not for the reason suggested by the appellate court.

Also, petitioner's case is not on all fours with the Shepherd case. In the latter case, the accused was able to show the urgent necessity for her
travel abroad, the duration thereof and the conforme of her sureties to the proposed travel thereby satisfying the court that she would comply
with the conditions of her bail bond. in contrast, petitioner in this case has not satisfactorily shown any of the above. As aptly observed by the
Solicitor General in his comment:

A perusal of petitioner's 'Motion for Permission to Leave the Country' will show that it is solely predicated on petitioner's wish to travel to the
United States where he will, allegedly attend to some business transactions and search for business opportunities. From the tenor and import
of petitioner's motion, no urgent or compelling reason can be discerned to justify the grant of judicial imprimatur thereto. Petitioner has not
sufficiently shown that there is absolute necessity for him to travel abroad. Petitioner's motion bears no indication that the alleged business
transactions could not be undertaken by any other person in his behalf. Neither is there any hint that petitioner's absence from the United States
would absolutely preclude him from taking advantage of business opportunities therein, nor is there any showing that petitioner's non-presence
in the United States would cause him irreparable damage or prejudice. 15

Petitioner has not specified the duration of the proposed travel or shown that his surety has agreed to it. Petitioner merely alleges that his surety
has agreed to his plans as he had posted cash indemnities. The court cannot allow the accused to leave the country without the assent of the
surety because in accepting a bail bond or recognizance, the government impliedly agrees "that it will not take any proceedings with the principal
that will increase the risks of the sureties or affect their remedies against him. Under this rule, the surety on a bail bond or recognizance may be
discharged by a stipulation inconsistent with the conditions thereof, which is made without his assent. This result has been reached as to a
stipulation or agreement to postpone the trial until after the final disposition of other cases, or to permit the principal to leave the state or
country." 16 Thus, although the order of March 26, 1982 issued by Judge Pronove has been rendered moot and academic by the dismissal as to
petitioner of the criminal cases pending before said judge, We see the rationale behind said order.

As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts and the appellate court of the urgency of his travel, the duration thereof, as well as the consent
of his surety to the proposed travel, We find no abuse of judicial discretion in their having denied petitioner's motion for permission to leave the
country, in much the same way, albeit with contrary results, that We found no reversible error to have been committed by the appellate court
in allowing Shepherd to leave the country after it had satisfied itself that she would comply with the conditions of her bail bond.

The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution states:

The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or when necessary in the interest of national
security, public safety or public health.

To our mind, the order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the above-quoted
constitutional provision.

Finding the decision of the appellate court to be in accordance with law and jurisprudence, the Court finds that no gainful purpose will be served
in discussing the other issues raised by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

5.) Silverio v CA
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the Decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 15827, entitled "Ricardo C. Silverio vs. Hon. Benigno C. Gaviola, etc., et al.," dated 31 January 1990, as well as the Resolution of 29
June 1990 denying reconsideration, be set aside.

On 14 October 1985, Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act in Criminal Case No. CBU-6304 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional liberty.

On 26 January 1988, or more than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, respondent People of the Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte
Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-departure Order against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several
times without the necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings.

Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court, on 4 April 1988, issued an Order directing the Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioner's
passport or to deny his application therefor, and the Commission on Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the country. This order was
based primarily on the Trial Court's finding that since the filing of the Information on 14 October 1985, "the accused has not yet been arraigned
because he has never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused Ricardo C.
Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has gone abroad without the knowledge and permission of this Court" (Rollo, p. 45). Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration was denied on 28 July 1988.

Petitioner's Certiorari Petition before the Court of Appeals met a similar fate on 31 January 1990. Hence, this Petition for Review filed on 30 July
1990.

After the respective pleadings required by the Court were filed, we resolved to give due course and to decide the case.

Petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in issuing its Orders, dated 4 April and 28 July 1988, (1) on the basis of facts allegedly patently erroneous, claiming that the
scheduled arraignments could not be held because there was a pending Motion to Quash the Information; and (2) finding that the right to travel
can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other than the "interest of national security, public safety or public health."

We perceive no reversible error.

1) Although the date of the filing of the Motion to Quash has been omitted by Petitioner, it is apparent that it was filed long after the
filing of the Information in 1985 and only after several arraignments had already been scheduled and cancelled due to Petitioner's non-
appearance. In fact, said Motion to Quash was set for hearing only on 19 February 1988. Convincingly shown by the Trial Court and conformed
to by respondent Appellate Court is the concurrence of the following circumstances:

1. The records will show that the information was filed on October 14, 1985. Until this date (28 July 1988), the case had yet to be
arraigned. Several scheduled arraignments were cancelled and reset, mostly due to the failure of accused Silverio to appear. The reason for
accused Silverio's failure to appear had invariably been because he is abroad in the United States of America;

2. Since the information was filed, until this date, accused Silverio had never appeared in person before the Court;

3. The bond posted by accused Silverio had been cancelled twice and warrants of arrest had been issued against him all for the same
reason –– failure to appear at scheduled arraignments.

In all candidness, the Court makes the observation that it has given accused Silverio more than enough consideration. The limit had long been
reached (Order, 28 July 1988, Crim. Case No. CBU-6304, RTC, Cebu, p. 5; Rollo, p. 73).

Patently, therefore, the questioned RTC Orders, dated 4 April 1988 and 28 July 1988, were not based on erroneous facts, as Petitioner would
want this Court to believe. To all appearances, the pendency of a Motion to Quash came about only after several settings for arraignment had
been scheduled and cancelled by reason of Petitioner's non-appearance.

2) Petitioner's further submission is that respondent Appellate Court "glaringly erred" in finding that the right to travel can be impaired
upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other than the "interest of national security, public safety or public health."

To start with, and this has not been controverted by Petitioner, the bail bond he had posted had been cancelled and Warrants of Arrest had
been issued against him by reason, in both instances, of his failure to appear at scheduled arraignments. Warrants of Arrest having been issued
against him for violation of the conditions of his bail bond, he should be taken into custody. "Bail is the security given for the release of a person
in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any court when so required by the Court or the
Rules (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, Rule 114, Secs. 1 and 2).

The foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as
a valid restriction of his right to travel (Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. No. 62100, 30 May 1986, 142 SCRA 149). A person facing criminal
charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return (Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987
Edition, p. 138). So it is also that "An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart
from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd
par. ]).

Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of the Courts to curtail the liberty of abode within
the limits prescribed by law, it restricts the allowable impairment of the right to travel only on grounds of interest of national security, public
safety or public health, as compared to the provisions on freedom of movement in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the liberty of abode and of travel were treated under one provision.1âwphi1 Article III, Section 1(4) thereof reads:

The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired.

The 1973 Constitution altered the 1935 text by explicitly including the liberty of travel, thus:

The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court or when necessary in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health (Article IV, Section 5).

The 1987 Constitution has split the two freedoms into two distinct sentences and treats them differently, to wit:

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of
the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law.

Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can impair the right to travel only on the grounds of "national security, public
safety, or public health."

The submission is not well taken.

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court
Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can
impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which
did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the
1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing
Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso & Travel Processing
Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means
necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial
officer, all auxillary writs, process and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer (Rule 135, Section
6, Rules of Court).

Petitioner's argument that the ruling in Manotoc, Jr., v. Court of Appeals, et al. (supra), to the effect that the condition imposed upon an accused
admitted to bail to make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on the right to
travel no longer holds under the 1987 Constitution, is far from tenable. The nature and function of a bail bond has remained unchanged whether
under the 1935, the 1973, or the 1987 Constitution. Besides, the Manotoc ruling on that point was but a re-affirmation of that laid down long
before in People v. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).

Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has violated the conditions thereof by failing to appear before the Court when
required. Warrants for his arrest have been issued. Those orders and processes would be rendered nugatory if an accused were to be allowed
to leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the territorial confines of the country. Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of
the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be
dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that
criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times
to Court Orders and processes.

WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner, Ricardo C. Silverio.

SO ORDERED.

6.) DEFENSOR SANTIAGO v VASQUEZ

Filed directly with the Court, ostensibly as an incident in the present special civil action, is petitioner's so-called "Motion to Restrain the
Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction, with Motion to Set Pending Incident for Hearing." Despite the impropriety of the mode adopted in elevating the issue to us, as will
hereinafter be discussed, we will disregard the procedural gaffe in the interest of an early resolution hereof.

The chronology of events preceding the instant motion is best summarized to readily provide a clear understanding and perspective of our
disposition of this matter, thus:

1. On May 13, 1991, an information dated May 9, 1991 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 16698 was filed against petitioner with the
Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

2. On May 14, 1991, an order of arrest was issued in said case against herein petitioner by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena of the
Sandiganbayan, with bail for the release of the accused fixed at P15,000.00. 1
3. On even date, petitioner filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in Behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-
Santiago," 2 which pertinently states in part:

xxx xxx xxx

3. As a result of the vehicular collision, she suffered extensive physical injuries which required surgical intervention. As of this time, her
injuries, specifically in the jaw or gum area of the mouth, prevents her to speak (sic) because of extreme pain. Further, she cannot for an extended
period be on her feet because she is still in physical pain. . . . .

4. On the other hand, the accused Miriam Defensor Santiago seeks leave of this Honorable Court that she be considered as having placed
herself under the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings and further seeks leave of this
Honorable Court that the recommended bail bond of P15,000.00 that she is posting in cash be accepted.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted,
and that by this motion, she be considered as having placed herself under the custody of this Honorable Court and dispensing of her personal
appearance for now until such time she will (sic) have recovered sufficiently from her recent near fatal accident.

Further, on the above basis, it is also respectfully prayed that the warrant for her arrest be immediately recalled.

xxx xxx xxx

4. Also on the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution3 authorizing petitioner to post a cash bond for her provisional liberty
without need for her physical appearance until June 5, 1991 at the latest, unless by that time her condition does not yet permit her physical
appearance before said court. On May 15, 1991, petitioner filed a cash bond in the amount of P15,000.00, aside from the other legal fees.4

5. On May 21, 1991, respondent Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez filed with the Sandiganbayan a manifestation "that accused Miriam
Defensor-Santiago appeared in his office in the second floor of the Old NAWASA Building located in Arroceros Street, Ermita, Manila at around
3:30 o'clock in the afternoon of May 20, 1991. She was accompanied by a brother who represented himself to be Atty. Arthur Defensor and a
lady who is said to be a physician. She came and left unaided, after staying for about fifteen minutes. 5

6. Acting on said manifestation, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution also on May 21, 1991, setting the arraignment of the accused for
May 27, 1991, and setting aside the court's resolution of May 14, 1991 which ordered her appearance before the deputy clerk of the First Division
of said court on or before June 5, 1991.6

7. In a motion dated May 22, 1991, petitioner asked that her cash bond be cancelled and that she be allowed provisional liberty upon a
recognizance. She contended that for her to continue remaining under bail bond may imply to other people that she has intentions of fleeing,
an intention she would like to prove as baseless.7

8. Likewise on May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, and a
subsequent addendum thereto, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Manila from proceeding with Criminal Cases
Nos. 12298 (for violation of Section 3[e] of Republic Act No. 3019), 91-94555 (violation of Presidential Decree No. 46), and 91-94897 (for libel),
respectively. Consequently, a temporary restraining order was issued by this Court on May 24, 1991, enjoining the Sandiganbayan and the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 3, from proceeding with the criminal cases pending before them. This Court, in issuing said order, took
into consideration the fact that according to petitioner, her arraignment, originally set for June 5, 1991, was inexplicably advanced to May 27,
1991, hence the advisability of conserving and affording her the opportunity to avail herself of any remedial right to meet said contingency.

9. On May 27, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued an order deferring: (a) the arraignment of petitioner until further advice from the Supreme
Court; and (b) the consideration of herein petitioner's motion to cancel her cash bond until further initiative from her through counsel.8

10. On January 18, 1992, this Court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for certiorari and lifting and setting aside the temporary
restraining order previously issued. 9 The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was eventually denied with finality in this Court's
resolution dated September 10, 1992.

11. Meanwhile, in a resolution adopted on July 6, 1992, the Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner which reads
as follows:

Considering the information in media to the effect that accused Santiago intends to leave the country soon for an extended stay abroad for
study purposes, considering the recent decision of the Supreme Court dismissing her petition promulgated on January 13, 1992, although the
same is still subject of a Motion for Reconsideration from the accused, considering that the accused has not yet been arraigned, nor that she has
not (sic) even posted bail the same having been by reason of her earlier claim of being seriously indisposed, all of which were overtaken by a
restraining order issued by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 99289 and No. 99290 dated May 24, 1991, the accused is ordered not to leave the
country and the Commission on Immigration and Deportation is ordered not to allow the departure of the accused unless authorized from (sic)
this Court.10

The hold departure order was issued by reason of the announcement made by petitioner, which was widely publicized in both print and
broadcast media, that she would be leaving for the United States to accept a fellowship supposedly offered by the John F. Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard University. Petitioner likewise disclosed that she would be addressing Filipino communities in the United States in line
with her crusade against election fraud and other aspects of graft and corruption.
In the instant motion submitted for our resolution, petitioner argues that:

1. The Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the hold departure order
considering that it had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

2. The Sandiganbayan blatantly disregarded basic principles of judicial comity and due deference owing to a superior tribunal when it
issued the hold departure order despite the pendency of petitioner's motion for reconsideration with this Honorable Court.

3. The right to due process of law, the right to travel and the right to freedom of speech are preferred, pre-eminent rights enshrined not
only in the Constitution but also in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which can be validly impaired only under stringent criteria which
do not obtain in the instant case.

4. The hold departure order in the instant case was issued under disturbing circumstances which suggest political harassment and
persecution.

5. On the basis of petitioner's creditable career in the bench and bar and her characteristic transparency and candor, there is no
reasonable ground to fear that petitioner will surreptitiously flee the country to evade judicial processes.11

I. Petitioner initially postulates that respondent court never acquired jurisdiction over her person considering that she has neither been
arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that she has not validly posted bail since she never personally appeared before
said court. We reject her thesis for being factually and legally untenable.

It has been held that where after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and
the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the court or was duly arrested, the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.12 The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his
pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court's jurisdiction thereover,
appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of
the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest
or voluntary surrender.13

In the case at bar, it becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the person of herein
petitioner and, correlatively, whether there was a valid posting of bail bond.

We find and so hold that petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of respondent court upon the filing of her
aforequoted "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago" wherein she expressly
sought leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial
and other proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by
said motion "she be considered as having placed herself under the custody" of said court. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim otherwise
for, by her own representations, she is effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after she had earlier recognized the jurisdiction of the
court and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over the aforestated pleadings she filed therein.

It cannot be denied that petitioner has posted a cash bail bond of P15,000.00 for her provisional release as evidenced by Official Receipt No.
4292925 dated May 15, 1991 and which is even attached as Annex C-2 to her own motion now under consideration. This is further buttressed
by the fact that petitioner thereafter also filed a motion for the cancellation of said cash bond and for the court to allow her provisional liberty
upon the security of a recognizance. With the filing of the foregoing motions, petitioner should accordingly and necessarily admit her
acquiescence to and acknowledgment of the propriety of the cash bond she posted, instead of adopting a stance which ignores the injunction
for candor and sincerity in dealing with the courts of justice.

Petitioner would also like to make capital of the fact that she did not personally appear before respondent court to file her cash bond, thereby
rendering the same ineffectual. Suffice it to say that in this case, it was petitioner herself, in her motion for the acceptance of the cash bond,
who requested respondent court to dispense with her personal appearance until she shall have recovered sufficiently from her vehicular
accident. It is distressing that petitioner should now turn around and fault respondent court for taking a compassionate stand on the matter and
accommodating her own request for acceptance of the cash bond posted in her absence.

II. Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan disregarded the rule of judicial comity when it issued the hold departure order despite the
pendency of her motion for reconsideration of the decision of this Court which dismissed her petition. She claims that if the principle of judicial
comity applies to prevent a court from interfering with the proceedings undertaken by a coordinate court, with more reason should it operate
to prevent an inferior court, such as the Sandiganbayan, from interfering with the instant case where a motion for reconsideration was still
pending before this Court. She contends further that the hold departure order contravenes the temporary restraining order previously issued
by this court enjoining the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the criminal case pending before it.

It will be remembered that the Court rendered a decision in the present case on January 18, 1992 dismissing the petition for certiorari filed in
this case and lifting and setting aside the temporary restraining order it previously issued. It is petitioner's submission that the filing of her motion
for reconsideration stayed the lifting of the temporary restraining order, hence respondent court continued to be enjoined from acting on and
proceeding with the case during the pendency of the motion for reconsideration. We likewise reject this contention which is bereft of merit.

Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that, unless otherwise ordered by the court, a judgment in an action for injunction shall not be
stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal. And, the rule is that the execution of a judgment
decreeing the dissolution of a writ of preliminary injunction shall not be stayed before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal,14
and we see no reason why the foregoing considerations should not apply to a temporary restraining order. The rationale therefor is that even
in cases where an appeal is taken from a judgment dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does not suspend the judgment, hence the
general rule applies that a temporary injunction terminates automatically on the dismissal of the action.15

It has similarly been held that an order of dissolution of an injunction may be immediately effective, even though it is not final.16 A dismissal,
discontinuance, or non-suit of an action in which a restraining order or temporary injunction has been granted operates as a dissolution of the
restraining order or temporary injunction17 and no formal order of dissolution is necessary to effect such dissolution.18 Consequently, a special
order of the court is necessary for the reinstatement of an injunction.19 There must be a new exercise of .judicial power.20

The reason advanced in support of the general rule has long since been duly explained, to wit:

. . . The court of this State, relying upon the last of the two clauses quoted, held that an appeal from an order dissolving an injunction continued
the injunction in force. The evils which would result from such a holding are forcibly pointed out by Judge Mitchell in a dissenting opinion. He
said: "Although a plaintiff's papers are so insufficient on their face or so false in their allegations that if he should apply on notice for an injunction,
any court would, on a hearing, promptly refuse to grant one, yet, if he can find anywhere in the State a judge or court commissioner who will
improvidently grant one ex parte, which the court on the first and only hearing ever had dissolves, he can, by appealing and filing a bond, make
the ex parte injunction impervious to all judicial interference until the appeal is determined in this court." . . . Such a result is so unjust and so
utterly inconsistent with all known rules of equity practice that no court should adopt such a construction unless absolutely shut up to it by the
clear and unequivocal language of the statute. . . . .21

This ruling has remained undisturbed over the decades and was reiterated in a case squarely in point and of more recent vintage:

The SEC's orders dated June 27, 1989 and July 21, 1989 (directing the secretary of UDMC to call a stockholders' meeting, etc.) are not premature,
despite the petitioners then pending motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. The lifting by the Court of Appeals of its
writ of preliminary injunction in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 17435 cleared the way for the implementation by the SEC's en banc resolution in SEC EB Case
No. 191. The SEC need not wait for the Court of Appeals to resolve the petitioner's motion for reconsideration for a judgment decreeing the
dissolution of a preliminary injunction is immediately executory. It shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during
the pendency of an appeal. . . . .22

On the bases of the foregoing pronouncements, there is no question that with the dismissal of the petition for certiorari and the lifting of the
restraining order, nothing stood to hinder the Sandiganbayan from acting on and proceeding with the criminal cases filed against herein
petitioner. At any rate, as we have earlier mentioned, the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied with finality in our resolution
dated September 10, 1992.

Petitioner further posits, however, that the filing of the instant special civil action for certiorari divested the Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction
over the case therein. Whether generated by misconception or design, we shall address this proposition which, in the first place, had no reason
for being and should not hereafter be advanced under like or similar procedural scenarios.

The original and special civil action filed with this Court is, for all intents and purposes, an invocation for the exercise of its supervisory powers
over the lower courts. It does not have the effect of divesting the inferior courts of jurisdiction validly acquired over the case pending before
them. It is elementary that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari, commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower
court, does not even interrupt the course of the latter when there is no writ of injunction restraining it.23 The inevitable conclusion is that for
as long as no writ of injunction or restraining order is issued in the special civil action for certiorari, no impediment exists and there is nothing to
prevent the lower court from exercising its jurisdiction and proceeding with the case pending before it. And, even if such injunctive writ or order
is issued, the lower court nevertheless continues to retain its jurisdiction over the principal action.

III. It is further submitted by petitioner that the hold departure order violates her right to due process, right to travel and freedom of
speech.

First, it is averred that the hold departure order was issued without notice and hearing. Much is made by petitioner of the fact that there was
no showing that a motion to issue a hold departure order was filed by the prosecution and, instead, the same was issued ex mero motu by the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner is in error.

Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly
conferred on them.24 These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction;25 or
essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts,26 as well as to the due administration of justice;27 or are directly appropriate,
convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers;28 and include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it
effective in behalf of the litigants.29

Therefore, while a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the
absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws and
constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has the power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration
of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction. Hence, demands, matters, or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action,
and coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority
over the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters which, as original causes of action, would
not be within its cognizance.

Furthermore, a court has the inherent power to make interlocutory orders necessary to protect its jurisdiction.30 Such being the case, with more
reason may a party litigant be subjected to proper coercive measures where he disobeys a proper order, or commits a fraud on the court or the
opposing party, the result of which is that the jurisdiction of the court would be ineffectual. What ought to be done depends upon the particular
circumstances. 31

Turning now to the case at bar, petitioner does not deny and, as a matter of fact, even made a public statement that she had every intention of
leaving the country allegedly to pursue higher studies abroad. We uphold the course of action adopted by the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial
notice of such fact of petitioner's plan to go abroad and in thereafter issuing sua sponte the hold departure order, in justified consonance with
our preceding disquisition. To reiterate, the hold departure order is but an exercise of respondent court's inherent power to preserve and to
maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.

Second, petitioner asseverates that considering that she is leaving for abroad to pursue further studies, there is no sufficient justification for the
impairment of her constitutional right to travel; and that under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the right to travel may be impaired
only when so required in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law.

It will be recalled that petitioner has posted bail which we have declared legally valid and complete despite the absence of petitioner at the time
of filing thereof, by reason of the peculiar circumstances and grounds hereinbefore enunciated and which warrant a relaxation of the aforecited
doctrine in Feliciano. Perforce, since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds herself amenable at all times to the
orders and processes of the court, she may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case. This was the ruling
we handed down in Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,32 to the effect that:

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and
function of a bail bond.

Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person who is in custody of the law,
that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.

Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put
the accused as much under the power of the court as if he were in custody of the proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the accused
so as to answer the call of the court and do what the law may require of him.

The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction on his right to travel. As we have held in People vs. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935):

. . . the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower
court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be
nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have
no binding force outside of said jurisdiction.

Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.

This was reiterated in a more recent case where we held:

Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can impair the right to travel only on the grounds of "national security, public
safety, or public health."

The submission is not well taken.

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court
Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can
impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which
did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin, G., S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 197, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the
1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing
Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party (See Salonga v. Hermoso & Travel Processing
Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means
necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial
officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer (Rule 135, Section
6, Rules of Court).

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as
a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the
People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue
delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes.33

One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be
said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly
from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even
mandated bylaw to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court
but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded
or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is
not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling
for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we elucidate that such policy includes the matter of petitions or motions involving hold departure
orders of the trial or lower courts. Parties with pending cases therein should apply for permission to leave the country from the very same courts
which, in the first instance, are in the best position to pass upon such applications and to impose the appropriate conditions therefor since they
are conversant with the facts of the cases and the ramifications or implications thereof. Where, as in the present case, a hold departure order
has been issued ex parte or motu propio by said court, the party concerned must first exhaust the appropriate remedies therein, through a
motion for reconsideration or other proper submissions, or by the filing of the requisite application for travel abroad. Only where all the
conditions and requirements for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus indubitably obtain against a
disposition of the lower courts may our power of supervision over said tribunals be invoked through the appropriate petition assailing on
jurisdictional or clearly valid grounds their actuations therein.

WHEREFORE, with respect to and acting on the motion now before us for resolution, the same is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.