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Judicial Proceedings Digest
El Banco Español-Filipino vs Vicente Palanca
Judicial Due Process Requisites
Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to his debt.
His debt amounted to P218,294.10. His property is worth 75k more than what he owe. Due to
the failure of Engracio to make his payments, El Banco executed an instrument to mortgage
Engracio’s property. Engracio however left for China and he never returned til he died. Since
Engracio is a non resident El Banco has to notify Engracio about their intent to sue him by
means of publication using a newspaper. The lower court further orderdd the clerk of court to
furnish Engracio a copy and that it’d be sent to Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El
Banco petition to execute Engracio’s property. 7 years thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of
Engracio as his administrator to petition for the annulment of the ruling. Vicente averred that
there had been no due process as Engracio never received the summons.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was not observed.
HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for judicial due process
had been met. The requisites are;
1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and
decide the matter before it.
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the
property subject of the proceedings.
3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.
4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.
Galvez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114046 October 24, 1994
Facts:
On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso,
Bulacan, and one Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate informations with homicide
and two counts of frustrated homicide for allegedly shooting to death Alvin Calma Vinculado
and seriously wounding Levi Calma Vinculado and Miguel Reyes Vinculado, Jr.
On December 15, 1993, before petitioners could be arraigned, respondent prosecutor filed
an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw Informations of the original informations. This motion was
granted by Judge Villajuan also on December 15, 1993 and the cases were considered
withdrawn from the docket of the court. On the same day, Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four
new informations against herein petitioners for murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms.
Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the new informations for lack of jurisdiction was filed by
petitioners before Judge Pornillos on January 3, 1994. At the court session set for the
arraignment of petitioners on January 24, 1994, Judge Pornillos issued an order denying the
motion to quash.
In the meantime, and prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners before Judge Pornillos, an
order was issued on January 20, 1994 by Judge Villajuan granting the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners, ordering the reinstatementof the original informations,
and setting the arraignment of the accused therein for February 8, 1994. On said date,
however, the arraignment was suspended and, in the meanwhile, petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with respondent Court of Appeals, assailing the order
dated January 24, 1994 issued by Judge Pornillos which denied petitioners’ motion to quash
filed for the new informations. As earlier stated, respondent court dismissed the petition in its
questioned resolution of February 18, 1994, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the original informations is null and void on the
ground that there was no notice and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court.
Held:
No, considering that in the original cases before Branch 14 of the trial court petitioners had not
yet been placed in jeopardy, and the ex parte motion to withdraw was filed and granted before
they could be arraigned, there would be no imperative need for notice and hearing thereof. In
actuality, the real grievance of herein accused is not the dismissal of the original three
informations but the filing of four new informations, three of which charge graver offenses and
the fourth, an additional offense. Had these new informations not been filed, there would
obviously have been no cause for the instant petition. Accordingly, their complaint about the

supposed procedural lapses involved in the motion to dismiss filed and granted in Criminal
Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93 does not impress us as a candid presentation of their real
position.
Petitioner’s contention that the dismissal of the original informations and the consequent filing
of the new ones substantially affected their right to bail is too strained and tenuous an
argument. They would want to ignore the fact that had the original informations been
amended so as to charge the capital offense of murder, they still stood to likewise be deprived
of their right to bail once it was shown that the evidence of guilt is strong. Petitioners could not
be better off with amended informations than with the subsequent ones. It really made no
difference considering that where a capital offense is charged and the evidence of guilt is
strong, bail becomes a matter of discretion under either an amended or a new information.
Contrary to petitioners’ submission, the absence of notice and hearing does not divest a trial
court of authority to pass on the merits of the motion. It has been held that—“The order of the
court granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service
thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent court of
jurisdiction over the case. The court still retains its authority to pass on the merits of the
motion. The remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is either to have the order set aside or
the irregularity otherwise cured by the court which dismissed the complaint or to appeal from
the dismissal and not certiorari.”
State Prosecutors vs Muro, 236 SCRA 505 (19 September 1994)
“the doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to
take judicial notice is to be exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken that
the requisite notoriety exists; and reasonable doubt on the subject should be resolved in the
negative”
Facts:
The state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecution filed a complaint
against respondent Judge Muro on the ground of ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and
violation of the provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct. The case at bar involves the
prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in violation of the Central Bank Foreign
Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank Circular 960. The respondent judge dismissed all 11
cases solely on the basis of the report published from the 2 newspapers, which the judge
believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that the Pres. of the Philippines lifted all
foreign exchange restrictions. The respondent’s decision was founded on his belief that the
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reported announcement of the Executive Department in the newspaper in effect repealed the
CB 960 and thereby divested the court of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case thus
motu propio dismissed the case. He further contends that the announcement of the President
as published in the newspaper has made such fact a public knowledge that is sufficient for the
judge to take judicial notice which is discretionary on his part.
The complainants contend that the respondent judge erred in taking judicial notice on matters
he purported to be a public knowledge based merely on the account of the newspaper
publication that the Pres. has lifted the foreign exchange restriction. It was also an act of
inexcusable ignorant of the law not to accord due process to the prosecutors who were already
at the stage of presenting evidence thereby depriving the government the right to be heard.
The judge also exercised grave abuse of discretion by taking judicial notice on the published
statement of the Pres. In the newspaper which is a matter that has not yet been officially in
force and effect of the law.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in taking
judicial notice on the statement of the president lifting the foreign exchange restriction
published in the newspaper as basis for dismissing the case?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held the respondent judge guilty for gross ignorance of the law. It cannot
comprehend his assertion that there is no need to wait for the publication of the circular no.
1353 which is the basis of the President’s announcement in the newspaper, believing that the
public announcement is absolute and without qualification and is immediately effective and
such matter becomes a public knowledge which he can take a judicial notice upon in his
discretion. It is a mandatory requirement that a new law should be published for 15 days in a
newspaper of general circulation before its effectivity. When the President’s statement was
published in the newspaper, the respondent admitted of not having seen the official text of CB
circular 1353 thus it was premature for him to take judicial notice on this matter which is
merely based on his personal knowledge and is not based on the public knowledge that the law
requires for the court to take judicial notice of.
For the court to take judicial notice, three material requisites should be present:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
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(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; Petitioner further maintains that he was denied due process when he, as an applicant in a land
registration case, was not able to take the witness stand. According to petitioner, even his
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. counsel hardly participated in the proceeding except to propound clarificatory questions during
the examination of Engineer Silverio Perez of the Land Registration Authority
The fact that should be assumed as judicially known must be on such notoriety that such fact
cannot be disputed. Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge where the personal knowledge of ISSUE:
the judge does not amount to the judicial notice of the court. The common knowledge
contemplated by the law where the court can take judicial notice must come from the Whether or not the petitioners were denied due process of law
knowledge of men generally in the course of ordinary experiences that are accepted as true
and one that involves unquestioned demonstration. The court ruled that the information he HELD:
obtained from the newspaper is one of hearsay evidence. The judge erred in taking cognizant
No. While petitioner claims that he was denied due process because he was unable to take the
of a law that was not yet in force and ordered the dismissal of the case without giving the
witness stand. The court ruled that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be
prosecution the right to be heard and of due process. The court ordered for the dismissal of
heard. It is the denial of this opportunity that is repugnant to due process. [19] In this case,
the judge from service for gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion for
petitioner was afforded an opportunity to present witnesses, and he did present
dismissing the case motu proprio and for erring in exercising his discretion to take judicial
three. However, petitioner did not invoke his right to take the witness stand even when the
notice on matters that are hearsay and groundless with a reminder the power to take judicial
trial court ordered the submission of the parties’ memoranda which signified the termination
notice is to be exercised by the courts with caution at all times.
of the proceedings. Because he acquiesced to the termination of the case, he forfeited his
right to take the witness stand.
Carvajal vs CA

G.R. No. 98328 RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER
CASES AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
October 9, 1997 HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO,
RENATO CAYETANO and ATTY. RICARDO ROMULO,petitioners,
FACTS:
vs.
Petitioner allegedly acquired portions of the parcel of land by inheritance from his father Felix
Carvajal who came to possess the unregistered land in 1938, continuously, openly, adversely JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositors.
and peacefully in the concept of an owner up to the time of his death.
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC.
The latter court upheld the trial court LRC Case No. 414(-A), LRC Record No. N-60084 filed
before Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City, Branch 71. In dismissing petitioner's application for June 29, 2001
registration of title of a parcel of land in Antipolo City. The Court recognized respondent Solid
Homes, Inc. as the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. N-7873, situated in
Antipolo City.
Facts: On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mgaBrodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a
letterrequesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder
The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the application for registration, and denied the
and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the
subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, this recourse to this Court via Rule 45 of the
Sandiganbayan. The petitioners invoked other than the freedom of the press, the
Rules of Court.
constitutional right of the people to be informed of matters of public concern which could only
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be recognized, served and satisfied by allowing live radio and television coverage of the court
proceedings. Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the proceedings will also
serve the dual purpose of ensuring the desired transparency in the administration of justice.
However, in the Resolution of the Court on October 1991, in a case for libel filed by then
President Corazon C. Aquino read that the Court resolved to prohibit live radio and television
coverage of court proceedings in view of protecting the parties’ right to due process, to
prevent distraction of the participants in the proceedings and to avoid miscarriage of justice.
themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a
courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the
proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract
the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what
they have observed during the proceedings.

Issue : Whether the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and right to information
of public concern be given more weight than the fundamental rights of the accused.

Ruling : The petition is denied.

The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right
to public information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate
and comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the
public with the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding
consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process which must never be
allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions.

Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in
a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of public's attention and
where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influencebut only by
evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is
demanded."Television can work profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses
on."The conscious or unconscious effect that such coverage may have on the testimony of
witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is not at
all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it.

Although an accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than
anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to
ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are
not compromised. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the
court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct