Sri Lanka’s quest for strategic prominence in the Indian Ocean

ABHIJIT SINGH

At the Galle Dialogue 2016, Sri Lanka sought not only to stress its critical geographical
location at the crossroads of important Indian Ocean sea lines of communication, but
also to display a catalytic ability to spur regional collaboration in securing the
vulnerable commons.

Maithripala Sirisena and Harry B. Harris Jr. at Source: ColomboPage/Twitter

the inauguration of the Galle Dialogue

BEIJING COLOMBO GALLE DIALOGUE GEOPOLITICS

INDIAN OCEAN LITTORALS INDIAN OCEAN REGION IOZOP

MARITIME SILK ROAD SRI LANKA SRI LANKA NAVY

SRI LANKAN SPECIAL FORCES

Last week, Sri Lanka hosted the eighth iteration of the Galle Dialogue — a meeting of
regional navies held every year at the eponymous southern coastal city. Over the past few
years, the conference has emerged as an important fixture on the Asian maritime
calendar, and a key venue for consultation and dialogue among senior naval officers from
regional littoral states and beyond.

Traditionally, the conference has focused on common security themes in the Indian Ocean
littorals, as also the search for cooperative solutions. Through this forum, Sri Lanka has
sought not only to stress its critical geographical location at the crossroads of important
Indian Ocean sea lines of communication (SLOCs), but also to display a catalytic ability
to spur regional collaboration in securing the vulnerable commons. For some time now,
Colombo has been eager to play a larger role in the South Asian littorals — both to
protect the proximate sea routes, and also to establish a stronger maritime presence in the
Eastern Indian Ocean (the sea off Banda Aceh and the Strait of Malacca). In doing so, the
Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) has sought a cooperative relationship with its regional partners —
most of all, the Indian Navy, which has been more than generous with training, capacity
building, and naval assets.

Even though the dialogue each year has centered on

nontraditional security issues, there has always been a For some time now,
hint of geopolitics in its conduct. Beyond the outward Colombo has been eager to
demonstration of cooperation and amity, the tenor of play a larger role in the
discussions has reflected the changing nature of power South Asian littorals —
equations in the Indian Ocean. In 2011 and 2012 , for both to protect the
instance, when Colombo was in the process of building a proximate sea routes, and
close relationship with China, the subject of the also to establish a stronger
conference was "strategic maritime partnerships" in the maritime presence in the
Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Sri Lanka, it then appeared, Eastern Indian Ocean.
was supporting China's attempts to legitimise its
presence in the region. A year later, as New Delhi
objected to Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarine deployments in
Colombo, the theme at subsequent dialogues in 2014 and 2015 changed to "collaborative
approaches in the Indian Ocean."

This year, Sri Lanka's strategic ties in the IOR were in focus again. With
media reports of the sale of over 80% of assets in Hambantota port to China, and
a rise in PLAN deployments in the Eastern Indian Ocean, Sino-Sri Lankan relations have
been a subject of intense speculation in Asian strategic circles. In September 2014 when a
PLAN sub docked at Colombo, New Delhi officially protested, even reminding Sri Lanka
of its obligation to inform India's political leadership about such activities. An increasing
dependence on Beijing for investment and military aid, however, curtailed Colombo's
ability to limit China's influence in Sri Lanka's economic and maritime policy.

As expected, Beijing's contribution to the prosperity of the Indian Ocean was an

important subject of discussion at this year's dialogue. The Chinese leadership has been
keen to pitch its economic and infrastructure proposals to Indian Ocean states, even in
security-focused forums, and Sri Lanka has always been obliging. When Rear Admiral
Wang Dazhong, the Chinese delegate at the dialogue, highlighted the importance of the
Maritime Silk Road in bringing together "various economy blocks along the South China
Sea, the Pacific Ocean, and the Indian Ocean," his hosts were seen nodding in eager
agreement.
This is not to say that Colombo is seeking to curry favour
with Beijing. The challenge for Sri Lanka, as earlier, is to The Chinese leadership
establish a state of relative equilibrium in its relations has been keen to pitch its
with India and China. On more than one occasion, Ranil economic and infrastructure
Wickramasinghe, the Sri Lankan premier, has stated his proposals to Indian Ocean
government's determination to give equal space to India states, even in security-
and China on its maritime periphery. Despite recognising focused forums, and Sri
its special relationship with New Delhi, however, Lanka has always been
Colombo has been helpless in the face of a mounting obliging.
China debt. With more than a third of government
revenue going toward servicingChinese loans (interest
payments to the tune of about $8.2 billion annually) the Sri Lankan leadership has had
little choice but to prioritise China’s geopolitical interests. Notwithstanding early efforts
to restore strategic balance in a three-sided relationship with New Delhi and Beijing,
President Maithripala Sirisena has found his options severely constrained.

To add to Colombo's discomfiture, China has been trying to prop up Sri Lanka's political
opposition. A few days before the start of the dialogue, former President Mahinda
Rajapaksa visited Beijing, where he spoke about the Sirisena regime’s supposed bias
toward India. Colombo's vanity received another blow when Yi Xianliang, the Chinese
ambassador to Sri Lanka, wondered aloud why Colombo sought more loans from Beijing
if it found them "expensive". These developments bespeak a brewing tension between
Colombo and Beijing, reminding Sri Lankan policymakers that Chinese largesse comes
with strings attached.

Speaking at the dialogue, Admiral Sunil Lanba, the naval

chief, explained how strategic trends in the nautical For its part, India seems to
domain were shaping India's maritime priorities and have adopted a wait-and-
partnerships. Globalisation, energy security, watch approach in the
nontraditional threats, and climate change, he noted, neighbourhood.
were the principal determinants of India’s security role in
the Indian Ocean. Stressing the importance of combined
operations, he observed that regional partnerships could only be successful if states took
an integrated view of the region, recognising local patterns of relations and interactions.

The highlight at Galle, however, was a talk by Admiral Harry Harris, the US Pacific
Command (PACOM) chief, and the first American four-star officer to visit Sri Lanka.
Harris emphasised US security role and partnerships in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, reserving a
special mention for Washington's maritime relationship with Colombo. Sri Lanka, he
noted, was a significant contributor to the rules-based Indian Ocean system, and a good
example of a like-minded US partner in the Indian Ocean Region. Indeed, with US
Marines now training Sri Lankan Special Forces, the US-Sri Lanka defence partnership
seems to be at an all-time high — a striking reversal from a time when Washington
openly taunted Colombo in international forums, impugning the latter's human rights
record.

For Indian watchers, Harris' talk was indicative of US resolve to remain embedded in
South Asia's maritime security architecture. The PACOM chief's observation that "the
Indian Ocean matters to the United States, Sri Lanka matters to the United States, and
that the United States matters to Sri Lanka," was confirmation (if any was needed) that
Washington still saw itself as the principal arbiter of security in the Indian Ocean.

Despite these, and many other takeaways, the crucial question for India following this
year's dialogue remains the same: What is the larger purpose of organising a high-profile
event such as the Galle dialogue? Is it to genuinely enhance maritime cooperation? Or is
it a tacit means to showcase maritime ambitions? Do such events, in fact, seek to enhance
the host state’s strategic and political ties by advancing the interests of particular
partners?

For the lay observer, forums like Galle are useful in

creating consensus in tackling common challenges in the [T]he crucial question for
maritime domain. For astute realists, however, such India following this year's
dialogues offer an opportunity for smaller states to dialogue remains the same:
exploit the tides of geopolitics and leverage the shifting What is the larger purpose
balance of power. New Delhi's misplaced of organising a high-profile
endorsement of an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZOP) event such as the Galle
proposal during the 2014 Galle Dialogue, critics aver, dialogue?
ignored the dire implications of a similar idea advanced
by Sri Lanka in the early 1970s to furtively circumscribe
India's growing maritime influence in South Asia. New Delhi, the skeptics say, is still
oblivious to hidden agendas behind seemingly benign propositions.

If anything, the discussions at Galle point to the need for New Delhi to come up with
creative and imaginative solutions to existing challenges that highlight India's centrality
to regional security initiatives. In doing so, Indian maritime policy makers must seek to
expand their room for political maneuver, by raising the Indian Navy's security
involvement in the IOR's distant littorals.
While the need for the IN to cooperate constructively in addressing common challenges
at sea is indisputable, New Delhi must formulate an effective hedging strategy against
growing geopolitical uncertainties in the IOR. It must promote a model of inter-state
collaboration that draws on the Indian Navy’s cooperative maritime strategy, cultivating a
network of allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific domain. This could be useful in
both preserving Indian influence in the IOR, as also in sharing the security burden in the
regional commons.

The growing popularity of the Galle Dialogue is a cautionary for India that if New Delhi
does not raise its game in its maritime neighbourhood and wield the mantle of leadership,
someone else will — even tiny Sri Lanka.

This commentary originally appeared in The Diplomat.

COMMENTARIES INDIAN OCEAN MARITIME GOVERNANCE ARCHITECTURE

MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE MARITIME POLICY MARITIME SECURITY

NEIGHBOURHOOD SLOCS STRATEGIC STUDIES