[G.R. No. 155080.

February 5, 2004]

SOLEDAD CALICDAN, represented by her guardian GUADALUPE CASTILLO, petitioner, vs. SILVERIO CENDAA, substituted by his legal
heir CELSA CENDAA-ALARAS, respondent.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review seeks the reversal of the April 4, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67266,[1] which set aside the
November 12, 1996 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44 in Civil Case No. D-10270.[2]

The instant controversy involves a 760 square meter parcel of unregistered land located in Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan. The land was
formerly owned by Sixto Calicdan, who died intestate on November 4, 1941. He was survived by his wife, Fermina, and three children, namely,
petitioner Soledad, Jose and Benigno, all surnamed Calicdan.[3]

On August 25, 1947, Fermina executed a deed of donation inter vivos whereby she conveyed the land to respondent Silverio Cendaa,[4] who
immediately entered into possession of the land, built a fence around the land and constructed a two-storey residential house thereon sometime in
1949, where he resided until his death in 1998.[5]

On June 29, 1992, petitioner, through her legal guardian Guadalupe Castillo, filed a complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and
Damages against the respondent, alleging that the donation was void; that respondent took advantage of her incompetence in acquiring the land;
and that she merely tolerated respondents possession of the land as well as the construction of his house thereon.[6]

In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss, respondent alleged, by way of affirmative defenses, that the land was donated to him by Fermina in 1947;
and that he had been publicly, peacefully, continuously, and adversely in possession of the land for a period of 45 years. Moreover, he argued that
the complaint was barred by prior judgment in the special proceedings for the Inventory of Properties of Incompetent Soledad Calicdan, where the
court decreed the exclusion of the land from the inventory of properties of the petitioner.[7]

On November 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant as follows:

1. Ordering defendant Silverio Cendaa to vacate the land in question and surrender ownership and possession of the same to plaintiff; and
2. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P20,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P10,000.00 by way of attorneys fees and other
litigation expenses, plus cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.[8]

On appeal by the respondent, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision and declared that the donation was valid. Furthermore, it
held that petitioner lost her ownership of the property by prescription.
 Hence, the instant petition for review on the following issues:

(1) whether or not the donation inter vivos is valid; and

(2) whether or not petitioner lost ownership of the land by prescription.

As a rule, our jurisdiction in cases brought from the Court of Appeals is limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by
the appellate court. This is because its findings of fact are deemed conclusive and we are not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the
evidence already considered in the proceedings below.[9]

The rule, however, admits of the following exceptions:

(1) when the findings are grounded on speculation, surmises or conjectures;

(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(4) when the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts are conflicting;
(5) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, has gone beyond the issues of the case and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee;
(6) when the judgment of the appellate court is premised on a misapprehension of facts or when it has failed to consider certain relevant facts which, if properly
taken into account, will justify a different conclusion;
(7) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence upon which they are based; and
(8) when findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record.[10]

In the case at bar, the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are conflicting; thus, we are constrained to review the findings
of facts.

The trial court found the donation of the land void because Fermina was not the owner thereof, considering that it was inherited by Sixto from
his parents. Thus, the land was not part of the conjugal property of the spouses Sixto and Fermina Calicdan, because under the Spanish Civil Code,
the law applicable when Sixto died in 1941, the surviving spouse had a right of usufruct only over the estate of the deceased spouse. Consequently,
respondent, who derived his rights from Fermina, only acquired the right of usufruct as it was the only right which the latter could convey.

After a review of the evidence on record, we find that the Court of Appeals ruling that the donation was valid was not supported by convincing
proof. Respondent himself admitted during the cross examination that he had no personal knowledge of whether Sixto Calicdan in fact purchased
the subject land from Felomino Bautista. Pertinent portions of his testimony read:

Q. And Sixto Calicdan inherited this property from his parents?

A. No, sir.
Q. What do you mean by no?
A. To my knowledge and information, Sixto Calicdan bought the property from his cousin, I think Flaviano or Felomino Bautista.
Q. So, in other words, you have no personal knowledge about how Sixto Calicdan acquired this property?
A. I think it was by purchase.
 Q. According to information, so you have no actual personal knowledge how Sixto Calicadan acquired this property?
A. Yes, because when the property was bought by my uncle, I was not yet born, so information only.
Q. So when you were born, you came to know already that Sixto Calicdan is the owner of this property?
A. Yes, thru the son of Felomino Bautista who is now, I think, in Baguio.
Q. You have not seen any document to show that Sixto Calicdan purchased the property from one Felomino Bautista?
A. None, sir.[11]

In People v. Guittap,[12] we held that:

Under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court, a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own personal knowledge, i.e., which are derived
from his own perception; otherwise, such testimony would be hearsay. Hearsay evidence is defined as evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what
he has heard from others. The hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely recites what someone else has told him, whether orally or in
writing. In Sanvicente v. People, we held that when evidence is based on what was supposedly told the witness, the same is without any evidentiary weight for
being patently hearsay. Familiar and fundamental is the rule that hearsay testimony is inadmissible as evidence.

The Court of Appeals thus erred in ruling based on respondents bare hearsay testimony as evidence of the donation made by Fermina.

Notwithstanding the invalidity of the donation, we find that respondent has become the rightful owner of the land by extraordinary acquisitive
prescription.

Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property. It is concerned with lapse of time in the
manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted
and adverse. Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with
just title for ten years. In extraordinary prescription ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted
adverse possession thereof for thirty years without need of title or of good faith.[13]

The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and
could transmit his ownership.[14] For purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property
through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not
transmit any right.[15]

Assuming arguendo that ordinary acquisitive prescription is unavailing in the case at bar as it demands that the possession be in good faith and
with just title,[16] and there is no evidence on record to prove respondents good faith, nevertheless, his adverse possession of the land for more than
45 years aptly shows that he has met the requirements for extraordinary acquisitive prescription to set in.

The records show that the subject land is an unregistered land. When the petitioner filed the instant case on June 29, 1992, respondent was in
possession of the land for 45 years counted from the time of the donation in 1947. This is more than the required 30 years of uninterrupted adverse
possession without just title and good faith. Such possession was public, adverse and in the concept of an owner. Respondent fenced the land and
built his house in 1949, with the help of Guadalupes father as his contractor. His act of cultivating and reaping the fruits of the land was manifest
and visible to all. He declared the land for taxation purposes and religiously paid the realty taxes thereon.[17] Together with his actual possession of
the land, these tax declarations constitute strong evidence of ownership of the land occupied by him. As we said in the case of Heirs of Simplicio
Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano Santiago:[18]

Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the
concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession. They constitute at least
proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere
and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute
needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.

Moreover, the deed of donation inter vivos, albeit void for having been executed by one who was not the owner of the property donated, may
still be used to show the exclusive and adverse character of respondents possession. Thus, in Heirs of Segunda Maningding v. Court of
Appeals,[19] we held:

Even assuming that the donation propter nuptias is void for failure to comply with formal requisites, it could still constitute a legal basis for adverse
possession. With clear and convincing evidence of possession, a private document of donation may serve as basis for a claim of ownership. In Pensader v.
Pensader we ruled that while the verbal donation under which the defendant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the lands in question is not
effective as a transfer of title, still it is a circumstance which may explain the adverse and exclusive character of the possession. (Underscoring ours)

In sum, the Court of Appeals correctly ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. D-10270 before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch
44, and declared respondent the rightful owner of the subject property, not on the basis of the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos, which is hereby
declared void, but on extraordinary acquisitive prescription.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 4, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No.
67266, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. D-10270 before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 146823. August 9, 2005]

SPOUSES RAMON and ESTRELLA RAGUDO, petitioners, vs. FABELLA ESTATE TENANTS ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent.

DECISION
GARCIA, J.:

Under consideration is this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside the following issuances of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51230, to wit:

1. Decision dated 19 July 2000,[1] affirming with modification an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court at Pasig City, Branch 155, in an action for
recovery of possession thereat commenced by the herein respondent against the petitioners; and
 2. Resolution dated 29 January 2001,[2] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The facts may be briefly stated, as follows:

Earlier, the tenants of a parcel of land at Mandaluyong City with an area of 6,825 square meters (hereinafter referred to as the Fabella Estate),
which formed part of the estate of the late Don Dionisio M. Fabella, organized themselves and formed the Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc.
(FETA), for the purpose of acquiring said property and distributing it to its members.

Unable to raise the amount sufficient to buy the property from the heirs of Don Dionisio M. Fabella, FETA applied for a loan from the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) under the latters Community Mortgage Program.

However, as a pre-condition for the loan, and in order that specific portions of the property could be allotted to each tenant who will have to pay
the corresponding price therefor, NHMFC required all tenants to become members of FETA.

Accordingly, all the tenants occupying portions of the Fabella Estate were asked to join FETA. While the rest did, the spouses Ramon Ragudo
and Estrella Ragudo who were occupying the lot subject matter of this controversy, consisting of about 105 square meters of the Fabella Estate,
refused to join the Association. Consequently, the portion occupied by them was awarded to Mrs. Miriam De Guzman, a qualified FETA member.

Later, and with the help of the city government of Mandaluyong, FETA became the registered owner of the entire Fabella Estate, as evidenced
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2902 issued in its name by the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong in 1989.

To effect the ejectment of the spouses Ragudo from the portion in question which they continued to occupy despite the earlier award thereof to
Mrs. Miriam de Guzman, FETA filed against them a complaint for unlawful detainer before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City.

In a decision dated 6 August 1990, the MeTC dismissed the unlawful detainer case on the ground that it was an improper remedy because the
Ragudos had been occupying the subject portion for more than one (1) year prior to the filing of the complaint, hence the proper action should have
been one for recovery of possession before the proper regional trial court. FETA appealed the dismissal to the Regional Trial Court at Pasig City,
which affirmed the same.

FETA then filed with the RTC-Pasig a complaint for recovery of possession against the Ragudos. In their Answer, the spouses interposed the
defense that they have already acquired ownership of the disputed portion since they have been in occupation thereof in the concept of an owner
for more than forty (40) years. They further argued that FETAs title over the entire Fabella Estate is fake because as appearing on TCT No. 2902, it
was originally registered as OCT No. 13, a title which has been previously adjudged null and void by RTC-Pasig in a much earlier case involving
different parties. Finally, they insist that FETAs right to recover has been barred by laches in view of their more than 40-year occupancy of the
portion in question.

Eventually, in a decision dated 29 July 1994,[3] the trial court rendered judgment in FETAs favor, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) ordering [spouses Ragudo] to vacate the premises in question and to turn over possession thereof to [FETA];
2) to pay [FETA] rent in the amount of P500.00 for the month of November 1981 and every month thereafter until they vacate the premises;
3) to pay [FETA] attorneys fees in the amount of P20,000.00;
4) to pay [FETA] the amount of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
5) to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Therefrom, the spouses Ragudo went on appeal to the Court of Appeals, whereat their appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
51230.

Meanwhile, pending resolution by the appellate court of the Ragudos appeal, FETA filed with the trial court a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution pending appeal, to which the Ragudos interposed an Opposition, followed by FETAs Reply to Opposition. Then, on 11 October 1994, the
Ragudos filed with the trial court a Rejoinder to Reply With Counter-Motion to Admit Attached Documentary Evidence Relevant to the Pending
Incident.[4] Attached thereto and sought to be admitted therein were the following documents and photographs, to wit:

1. Letter dated 21 November 1989[5] of the spouses Ragudos son, Engr. Aurelio Ragudo, addressed to FETA, stating therein that the Ragudos were willing to
become FETA members;
2. Joint Affidavit, dated 07 October 1994, of three (3) residents of the Fabella Estate;[6]
3. Photos of three (3) alleged houses of Miriam de Guzman located at the Fabella Estate;[7]
4. Photos of two (2) alleged houses of the sons of Miriam de Guzman located at the Fabella Estate;[8]
5. Photo of a lot allegedly awarded by FETA to its president, Amparo Nobleza, located at the Fabella Estate;[9] and
6. Photo of a three (3)-storey house of Noblezas relative named Architect Fernandez located at the Fabella Estate.[10]

In an order dated 25 November 1994, the trial court admitted in evidence the attachments to the Ragudos' aforementioned Rejoinder With
Counter-Motion, etc., and ultimately denied FETAs motion for execution pending appeal.

Later, in CA-G.R. CV No. 51230, the Ragudos filed with the appellate court a Motion To Admit Certain Documentary Evidence by Way of Partial
New Trial, In the Interest of Justice,[11]thereunder seeking the admission in evidence of the very documents earlier admitted by the trial court in
connection with the then pending incident of execution pending appeal, and praying that said documents be made part of the records and
considered in the resolution of their appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 51230.

This time, however, the Ragudos were not as lucky. For, in a Resolution dated 19 May 1997,[12] the appellate court denied their aforesaid
motion and ordered expunged from the records of the appealed case the documents they sought admission of, on the ground that they could not be
considered as newly discovered evidence under Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. Dispositively, the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant motion to admit certain documentary evidence by way of partial new trial is DENIED for lack of merit.
ACCORDINGLY, the Joint Affidavit dated October 7, 1994 of Honesto Garcia III and Miguela L. Balbino and the latter of Aurelio Raguo to Atty. Cesar G.
Untalan dated November 21, 1989 are ordered EXPUNGED from the records of this case.

SO ORDERED.
 The Ragudos moved for a reconsideration, invoking liberality in the exercise of judicial discretion and the interest of equity and substantial
justice. Unmoved, the appellate court denied their motion in its subsequent Resolution of 24 September 1997.[13]

Eventually, in the herein assailed decision dated 19 July 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Ragudos appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 51230
and affirmed with modification the RTC decision in the main case, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, except for the second clause of the dispositive portion which should
be MODIFIED, as follows:
2) to pay [FETA] rent in the amount of P500.00 for the month of November, 1989 and every month thereafter until they vacate the premises.
SO ORDERED.

With their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court in its equally challenged Resolution of 29 January 2001, the
Ragudos are now with us via the instant recourse, commending for our resolution the following issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE DOCUMENTS SOUGHT TO BE
INTRODUCED BY RAGUDO AT THE APPELLATE LEVEL ON THE GROUND OF LIBERALITY OF PROCEDURAL RULES, EQUITY AND
SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE, THE MISTAKE AND EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THEIR FORMER COUNSEL, AND THE
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND PARENS PATRIAE CLAUSE OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
2. WHETHER OR NOT ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION AND EQUITABLE LACHES HAD SET IN TO WARRANT THE CONTINUED POSSESSION
OF THE SUBJECT LOT BY RAGUDO AND WHETHER THE SAME PRINCIPLES HAD CREATED A VESTED RIGHT IN FAVOR OF RAGUDO
TO CONTINUE TO POSSESS AND OWN THE SUBJECT LOT.[14]

Informed of Mr. Ramon Ragudos death on 26 March 2001, the Court, in a resolution dated 14 January 2002,[15] allowed his substitution by his
other heirs.

The recourse must fall.

Relative to the first issue, it is petitioners submission that the appellate court committed an error when it refused admission as evidence in the
main case the documents earlier admitted by the trial court in connection with FETAs motion for execution pending appeal. Appealing to this Courts
sense of judicial discretion in the interest of equity and substantial justice, petitioners explain that the documents in question were not presented and
offered in evidence during the trial of the main case before the RTC due to the honest mistake and excusable negligence of their former counsel,
Atty. Celso A. Tabobo, Jr.

We are not persuaded.

In this jurisdiction, well-entrenched is the rule that the mistake and negligence of counsel to introduce, during the trial of a case, certain pieces
of evidence bind his client.[16] For sure, in Aguila vs. Court of First Instance of Batangas,[17] we even ruled that the omitted evidence by reason of
counsels mistake or negligence, cannot be invoked as a ground for new trial:

On the effects of counsels acts upon his client, this Court has categorically declared:
It has been repeatedly enunciated that a client is bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of a case and cannot be heard to complain that the result might
have been different had he proceeded differently. A client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. If such grounds were to be admitted and reasons for reopening
cases, there would never be an end to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who could allege and show that prior counsel had not been sufficiently
diligent or experienced or learned. x x x Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence, the
proper defense, or the burden of proof, x x x failure to introduce certain evidence, to summon witnesses and to argue the case are not proper grounds for a new
trial, unless the incompetency of counsel is so great that his client is prejudiced and prevented from properly presenting his case. (Vol. 2, Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, pp. 218, 219-220, citing Rivero v. Santos, et al., 98 Phil. 500, 503-504; Isaac v. Mendoza, 89 Phil. 279; Montes v. Court, 48 Phil. 64; People v.
Manzanilla, 43 Phil. 167; U.S. v. Umali, 15 Phil. 33; see also People v. Ner, 28 SCRA 1151, 1164). In the 1988 case of Palanca v. American Food, etc. (24 SCRA
819, 828), this principle was reiterated. (Tesoro v. Court of Appeals, 54 SCRA 296, 304). [Citations in the original; Emphasis supplied].

This is, as it should be, because a counsel has the implied authority to do all acts which are necessary or, at least, incidental to the prosecution
and management of the suit in behalf of his client.[18] And, any act performed by counsel within the scope of his general and implied authority is, in
the eyes of the law, regarded as the act of the client himself and consequently, the mistake or negligence of the clients counsel may result in the
rendition of an unfavorable judgment against him.[19]

A contrary rule would be inimical to the greater interest of dispensing justice. For, all that a losing party will do is to invoke the mistake or
negligence of his counsel as a ground for reversing or setting aside a judgment adverse to him, thereby putting no end to litigation. Again, to quote
from our decision in Aguila:

Now petitioner wants us to nullify all of the antecedent proceedings and recognize his earlier claims to the disputed property on the justification that his counsel
was grossly inept. Such a reason is hardly plausible as the petitioners new counsel should know. Otherwise, all a defeated party would have to do to salvage his
case is claim neglect or mistake on the part of his counsel as a ground for reversing the adverse judgment. There would be no end to litigation if this were
allowed as every shortcoming of counsel could be the subject of challenge by his client through another counsel who, if he is also found wanting, would
likewise be disowned by the same client through another counsel, and so on ad infinitum. This would render court proceedings indefinite, tentative and subject
to reopening at any time by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. (Emphasis supplied).

Admittedly, the rule thus stated admits of exceptions. Thus, in cases where the counsels mistake is so great and serious that the client is
prejudiced and denied his day in court[20] or when he is guilty of gross negligence resulting in the clients deprivation of his property without due
process of law,[21] the client is not bound by his counsels mistakes and the case may even be reopened in order to give the client another chance to
present his case.

Unfortunately, however, petitioners case does not fall under any of the exceptions but rather squarely within the ambit of the rule.

As it is, petitioners were given full opportunity during the trial of the main case to adduce any and all relevant evidence to advance their cause.
In no sense, therefore, may it be argued that they were denied due process of law. As we said in Antonio vs. Court of Appeals,[22] a client cannot be
said to have been deprived of his day in court and there is no denial of due process as long as he has been given an opportunity to be heard, which,
we emphasize, was done in the instant case.
 Petitioners further argue that the documents which their former counsel failed to adduce in evidence during trial of the main case must be
allowed to stay in the records thereof and duly considered in the resolution of their appeal because they were duly admitted in the trial court during
the hearing on the incidental motion for execution pending appeal.

Again, we are not persuaded.

With the reality that those documents were never presented and formally offered during the trial of the main case, their belated admission for
purposes of having them duly considered in the resolution of CA-G.R. CV No. 51230 would certainly collide with Section 34, Rule 132, of the Rules
of Court, which reads:

SECTION 34. Offer of Evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered
must be specified. (Emphasis supplied).

To stress, it was only during the hearing of the motion for execution pending appeal that said documents were presented and offered in
evidence. Sure, the trial court admitted them, but the admission was only for the purpose for which they were offered, that is, by way of opposition to
FETAs motion for execution pending appeal. It is basic in the law of evidence that the court shall consider evidence solely for the purpose for which
it was offered.[23]

While the said documents may have the right to stay in the records of the case for purposes of the incidental issue of execution pending appeal,
they do not have that same right insofar as far as the main case is concerned, and ought not be considered in the resolution thereof.

Petitioners next contend that acquisitive prescription and equitable laches had set in, thereby vesting them with a right to a continued
possession of the subject lot.

The contention holds no water.

It is not disputed that at the core of this controversy is a parcel of land registered under the Torrens system. In a long line of cases,[24] we have
consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. So it is that in Natalia Realty Corporation
vs. Vallez, et al.,[25] we held that a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land involved is a registered land because of Article 1126 of
the Civil Code[26] in relation to Act 496 (now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 1529[27]):

Appellants claim of acquisitive prescription is likewise baseless. Under Article 1126 of the Civil Code, prescription of ownership of lands registered under
the Land Registration Act shall be governed by special laws. Correlatively, Act No. 496 provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of
the registered owner shall be acquired by adverse possession. Consequently, proof of possession by the defendants is both immaterial and inconsequential.
(Emphasis supplied).

Petitioners would take exception from the above settled rule by arguing that FETA as well as its predecessor in interest, Don Dionisio M.
Fabella, are guilty of laches and should, therefore, be already precluded from asserting their right as against them, invoking, in this regard, the
rulings of this Court[28] to the effect that while a registered land may not be acquired by prescription, yet, by virtue of the registered owners inaction
and neglect, his right to recover the possession thereof may have been converted into a stale demand.
 While, at a blush, there is apparent merit in petitioners posture, a closer look at our jurisprudence negates their submission.

To start with, the lower court found that petitioners possession of the subject lot was merely at the tolerance of its former lawful owner. In this
connection, Bishop vs. Court of Appeals[29]teaches that if the claimants possession of the land is merely tolerated by its lawful owner, the latters
right to recover possession is never barred by laches:

As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to eject any person illegally occupying their property. This right is
imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were aware of the petitioners occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that possession,
the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all.
This right is never barred by laches. (Emphasis supplied).

To the same effect is our pronouncement in Urquiaga vs. Court of Appeals,[30] to wit:

We find no reversible error committed by respondent Court of Appeals. We sustain private respondents ownership of Lot No. 6532-B. As between the verbal
claim of ownership by petitioners through possession for a long period of time, which was found by the court a quo to be inherently weak, and the validly
documented claim of ownership of respondents, the latter must naturally prevail. (Emphasis supplied).

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 141007. September 13, 2005]

ADORACION REYES BAUTISTA, LIBRADA REYES VDA. DE PONCIANO, ESTELA REYES QUIAMBAO, MARCELO REYES, JR., JOSE
SINO, LEONILA SINO and DOMINADOR SINO, petitioners, vs. CELIA REYES POBLETE, MELENCIO REYES POBLETE, ELVIRA
REYES POBLETE, JULIA REYES POBLETE, and REMEDIOS POBLETE TORIO, respondents.

DECISION
CORONA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review assailing the decision[1] dated January 7, 1999 of the Court of Appeals:

WHEREFORE, the judgment herein appealed from is hereby REVERSED, and the lower court is hereby directed to issue a decree of registration over Lot No.
1243 in favor of the applicants.

SO ORDERED.[2]
 This controversy stems from a petition for the registration, filed by private respondents, of a 6.2556 hectare parcel of land identified as Lot
1243.

In their application, private respondents, the successors-in-interest of Socorro Reyes vda. de Poblete (Socorro), claimed that Lot 1243 was
donated by Marcelo Reyes Sr. (Marcelo Sr.) to Socorro, his daughter by a second marriage; that the cadastral survey of Lot 1243 had been
undertaken primarily for and in the name of Socorro; that they purchased the same land from their parents Socorro and Juan Poblete; and that they
and their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, peaceful and notorious possession of the subject lot in the concept of owner for
more than 50 years. Thus, they prayed that the land be registered in their names as co-owners.

Petitioners, Marcelo Sr.s children by his third marriage, opposed said application alleging that Lot 1243 had been acquired by the deceased
Marcelo Reyes, Sr. by purchase from a certain Juan Aranda. Hence, said lot should be awarded to them as their fathers lawful heirs.

In the course of the proceedings, private respondents presented three witnesses, namely, Socorro Reyes Poblete, Pantaleon Garcia Ancero
and Cecilia Poblete. The material portions of their testimonies were summarized by the appellate court as follows:

SOCORRO REYES VDA. DE POBLETE, an octogenarian, testified that Lot No. 1243 was given to her by her father, Marcelo Reyes, Sr. in 1932, by way of a
deed of donation which was destroyed when her house was burned.

Her father was married twice. By his first marriage, he had two daughters, Candida and Carmen. By his second marriage, he also had two
daughters, Socorro and Henerosa, who is already dead. He had other children, who are the oppositors in this case. Her father had given her
sisters Candida and Carmen other parcels of land also. The oppositors Sinos (or Seno) were given five carabaos and financial support.

She had Lot No. 1243 planted to sugar cane and palay, and had the same surveyed by the Bureau of Lands in her name (Exh. F). She also had it tax declared in her
name (Exh. G) and had been paying the taxes thereon until she sold it to her children, the petitioners herein (Exh. I). She did not have the land registered at once
because she thought that it first had to be tax declared.

PANTALEON GARCIA ANCERO testified that he was working in Lot No. 1243 since 1942 or 1943 first as a tenant of Socorro Reyes and thereafter of
petitioner Celia Poblete. The latter sold the property two years ago to a Chinaman, and he was paid P700,000.00.

Of the oppositors, he knows only Marcelo Reyes, Jr. who was a candidate for councilor and asked his help in the election campaign, and Dominador Seno who
went to the field he was cultivating twice to get a share of the harvest.

CELIA POBLETE testified that on August 10, 1983, she and her sisters bought Lot No. 1243 for P39,000.00 from her mother, who acquired it more than fifty
years before from her father Marcelo Reyes, Sr. She brought the deed of sale to the Provincial Capitol and had the tax declaration transferred to her and her and
her sisters names (Exh. J), and they have been paying the real estate tax since then (Exh. K). Their mother and they have been in possession of the property for 60
years already.

The oppositors are half brothers and sisters of her mother, and they had good relations before. The oppositors knew about the exclusive possession of Lot No. 1243
by their mother, because they lived only some 150 meters away and saw their mother harvesting the fruits of the land. They sometimes even asked her for some of
the harvest of the land but they never made a claim on it.
The applicants sold the property to Winthrop Corporation for P20 million, of which P3 million has been paid, and the balance to be paid upon registration of the
land.[3]
To buttress their claim over Lot 1243, private respondents ventured to prove that it was Marcelo Sr.s practice to give all his children by each of
his three wives similar gifts of land; that pursuant to this practice, Marcelo Sr. gave a six-hectare lot to his daughters by the first marriage, Candida
and Carmen Reyes; that Lot 1243 measuring 6.25 hectares was given to his daughter by a second marriage, private respondents mother Socorro;
that another six-hectare lot was given to his children by a third marriage, petitioners Adoracion B. Bautista, Librada R. Ponciano, Estela R.
Quiambao and Marcelo Reyes, Jr.; and finally, Marcelo Sr. gave five carabaos and financial support to his illegitimate children, petitioners Jose,
Leonila and Dominador, all surnamed Sino.

Private respondents failed to present the deed of donation by which Marcelo Sr. allegedly gave Lot 1243 to Socorro, claiming that the deed was
burned when fire razed their house sometime in 1980. Thus, the trial court dismissed the petition for registration.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals considered private respondents contention that even if the donation may have been invalid, the same could
still serve as basis for acquisitive prescription. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial courts decision and ordered the issuance of a
decree of registration over Lot 1243 in favor of private respondents. Hence, this petition.

Perusal of the records reveals that Socorro Reyes was already in physical possession of Lot 1243 as early as 1934, even before the death of
Marcelo Sr., and had the land planted to sugarcane and palay. Socorro filed her application as claimant of Lot 1243 with the Bureau of Lands way
back in 1940 when the latter conducted a cadastral survey. This was evidenced by the Cadastral Cost Register bearing on record that Socorro paid
the amount of P4.24, the owners proportionate cost for the cadastral survey of Lot 1243.

Socorros claim in Cad. 285, Carmona Cadastre, Case 2 was approved on August 5, 1941. The following year, she had the land tenanted by a
certain Pantaleon Ancero.

In 1948, Socorro registered Lot 1243 in her name under tax declaration no. 1430 and, thereafter, religiously paid the real estate tax on the
property.

On August 1, 1983, Socorro sold Lot 1243 to her children, the private respondents.

On October 27, 1983, private respondents obtained a Declaration of Real Property in their favor under PD 464 otherwise known as The Real
Property Tax Code.

Finally, on August 28, 1991, private respondents filed a Petition for Registration of Title to Lot 1243 before the lower court in order to perfect the
sale of the lot to Winthrop Realty Corporation for P20,694,600.

Petitioners insist that Socorro expressly and impliedly recognized their rights as her co-heirs when she was entrusted with the management of
the land in 1934; that the harvest had always been divided among the heirs, with petitioner Dominador Sino representing the others in getting their
respective shares; that there was a demand for partition but it did not push through because the land was tenanted.
 However, other than the bare allegation of cestui que trust, petitioners failed to present proof of their claim. There was no evidence showing
that Socorro managed Lot 1243 on behalf of Marcelo Sr.s heirs, including petitioners.

Furthermore, petitioner Marcelo Jr. admitted that Lot 1243 was the only property left by his father Marcelo Sr. when he died; that Marcelo Sr.
gave a six-hectare lot to his (Marcelo Jr.s) mother which they sold in 1951, bolstering private respondents claim that Marcelo Sr. had given land to
each of his four families.

Petitioners were obviously engaged in a fishing expedition when they opposed private respondents petition for registration of Lot 1243.
Petitioner Marcelo, Jr. was not even sure if they were co-owners of the property. This uncertainty explained why none of the petitioners was ever in
actual possession of the property. He also admitted that he did not know if Socorro inherited any property from their father. They were allegedly
surprised when they learned that the property was already in Socorros name.

The fact that petitioner Dominador Sino allegedly got a share of the harvest twice did not disprove at all that the entire harvest belonged to
Socorro. At most, these two occasions only proved Socorros generosity to him, considering that he was an illegitimate child and received almost
nothing by way of inheritance. Marcelo Sr., died in 1932 under the regime of the old Civil Code which granted no successional rights to illegitimate
children. Corollarily, the inheritance rights established by the new Civil Code in favor of illegitimate children could be claimed only by those whose
parents died after the effectivity of the law on August 30, 1950.[4] Thus, petitioners Jose, Leonila and Dominador never really had any cause of
action against private respondents.

Quite telling too was the admission of Felino Quiambao, petitioners attorney-in-fact, that neither he nor any of petitioners (except Jose Sino)
had ever been to the disputed land despite the fact that they lived only 150 meters away from the residence of Socorro in Carmona, Cavite; that
they never filed any answer or objection to the claim of Socorro in the cadastral proceedings over Lot 1243.[5]

There is a close parallelism between this case and Pensader v. Pensader [6] wherein the Court held that:
It was not shown that such possession was in common with the plaintiffs. As above stated, the origin of said possession is adverse to such community, namely, the
donation, which although it is not established by a sufficient documentary evidence, stands in this case as a circumstance explaining the exclusive character of the
possession of Maria Revelar and Alejandra Pensader and that of their common successor in interest Silverio P. Revelar.

The ruling was reiterated in Espique v. Espique[7] where the Court made the following pronouncement:
There is no question that the donation in question is invalid because it involves an immovable property and the donation was not made in a public document as
required by Article 633 of the old Civil Code, in connection with Article 1328 of the same Code (concerning gifts propter nuptias), but it does not follow that said
donation may not serve as basis of acquisitive prescription when on the strength thereof the donee has taken possession of the property adversely and in the
concept of owner.

The appellate court, upon meticulous review of the records, found that private respondents possession of Lot 1243 since 1934 was adverse,
continuous, open, public, peaceful and uninterrupted, and in the concept of an owner. This case was filed only in 1991. All this time, Socorro was
exercising acts of dominion over the land such as enjoying its fruits to the exclusion of all others, having the land cadastrally surveyed in her name
and faithfully paying realty taxes on Lot 1243 in her name. Assuming but not conceding that there existed an implied trust between the parties,
Socorros aforementioned acts of dominion clearly repudiated such trust. It is the essence of the statute of limitations that, whether the party had the
right to the possession or not, if he entered under the claim of such right and remained in possession for the period required for acquisitive
prescription, the right of action of a party claiming title is barred by that adverse possession. The right given by the statute of limitations does not
depend on and has no necessary connection to the validity of the claim under which the possession is held.[8]

The donation of Lot 1243 to Socorro was made in 1932. She took possession of the land immediately thereafter. Under the Code of Civil
Procedure which was then in force, ten years of adverse possession by the person claiming to be the owner, in whatever way such occupancy may
have commenced, shall vest in the actual possessor of the land a full and complete title.[9]

It is a settled rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court if borne out by the evidence on record. We find no
reversible error in the appellate courts decision. Thus, we declare that no co-ownership existed between petitioners and respondents. Socorro
obtained possession of the land even before Marcelo Sr. died. After his death, Socorro continued to enjoy exclusive possession of the land with no
objection from petitioners. The land was cadastrally surveyed and tax-declared in her name, again with no protestation from petitioners. It was only
when Lot 1243 was sold for P20.7 million that petitioners suddenly fantasized about being co-owners thereof and wanted to share in the bonanza.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales and Garcia, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 161720 November 22, 2005

HEIRS OF FLORES RESTAR namely: ESMENIA R. RESTAR, BERNARDITA R. RENTINO, LUCIA RESTAR, RODOLFO RESTAR, JANET R. RELOJERO, LORNA R.
RAMOS, MANUEL RESTAR, NENITA R. BELLEZA, MIRASOL R. DELA CRUZ, ROSELLE R. MATORRE, POLICARPIO RESTAR and ADOLFO RESTAR
Petitioners,

- versus –

HEIRS OF DOLORES R. CICHON, namely: RUDY R. CICHON, NORMA C. LACHICA, NILDA C. JUMAYAO, LYDIA C. SANTOS, and NELSON R. CICHON; HEIRS OF
PERPETUA R. STA. MARIA, namely GEORGE STA. MARIA, LILIA M. MANIAGO, DERLY M. CONCEPCION, GERVY STA. MARIA, DORY M. INDULO; HEIRS OF
MARIA R. ROSE, namely: TERESITA R. MALOCO, ROLANDO ROSE, EDELYN R. PALACIO and MINERVA R. PASTRANA, DOMINICA RESTAR-RELOJERO and
PACIENCIA RESTAR MANARES,
Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

In 1935, Emilio Restar (Restar) died intestate, leaving eight (8) children-compulsory heirs, namely: Flores Restar, Dolores Restar-Cichon, Perpetua Restar-Sta.
Maria, Paciencia Restar-Manares, Dominica Restar-Relojero, Policarpio Restar, Maria Restar-Rose and Adolfo Restar.

In 1960, Restars eldest child, Flores, on the basis of a July 12, 1959 Joint Affidavit[1] he executed with one Helen Restar, caused the cancellation of Tax
Declaration No. 6696[2] in Restars name covering a 5,918[3] square meter parcel of land, Lot 3177 (the lot), located at Barangay Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan which was
among the properties left by Restar, and the issuance of Tax Declaration No. 11134 in his name.
Flores died on June 10, 1989.

On November 5, 1998, the co-heirs of Flores discovered the cancellation of Restars Tax Declaration No. 6696 and the issuance in lieu thereof of Tax Declaration
No. 11134[4] in his name.

On January 21, 1999, the heirs of Flores sisters Dolores R. Cichon, Perpetua Sta. Maria, and Maria Rose who had in the meantime died, together with Flores
surviving sisters Dominica Restar-Relojero and Paciencia Restar-Manares, filed a Complaint[5] against Flores heirs for partition [of the lot], declaration of nullity
of documents, ownership with damages and preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aklan.
Flores brothers Policarpio and Adolfo were impleaded also as defendants, they being unwilling co-plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs, herein respondents, alleged that, inter alia, during the lifetime of Flores, they were given their shares of palay from the lot and even after Flores
death up to 1991; after Flores death in 1989, his widow Esmenia appealed to them to allow her to hold on to the lot to finance the education of her children, to
which they (the plaintiffs) agreed on the condition that after the children had finished their education, it would be divided into eight (8) equal parts; and upon their
demand for partition of the lot, the defendants Heirs of Flores refused, they claiming that they were the lawful owners thereof as they had inherited it from Flores.

By Answer[6] filed February 23, 1999, the defendants-herein petitioners Heirs of Flores claimed that they had been in possession of the lot in the concept of owner
for more than thirty (30) years and have been paying realty taxes since time immemorial. And they denied having shared with the plaintiffs the produce of the lot
or that upon Flores death in 1989, Esmenia requested the plaintiffs to allow her to hold on to it to finance her childrens education, they contending that by 1977,
the children had already finished their respective courses.[7]

The defendants Heirs of Flores further claimed that after World War II and under the new Tax Declaration in 1945, Flores caused the transfer of parcels of
ricelands situated in Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan to his siblings as their shares from the estate of their father Restar;[8] and an extra-judicial partition was subsequently
executed on September 28, 1973 by Restars heirs, which was notarized by one Atty. Jose Igtanloc, dividing and apportioning among themselves four (4) parcels of
land. [9]

The defendant Adolfo Restar, by separate Answer,[10] alleged that the complaint did not state a cause of action as against him for he interposed no objection to the
partition of the lot among the heirs of Restar.

As for the defendant Policarpio Restar, he in his Amended Answer[11] acknowledged Flores as the owner of the lot but claimed that a portion of it, 1,315 square
meters, was sold to him as shown by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 14, 1981.[12] He thus prayed that, among other things, an order for the partition of the lot
among Restars heirs be issued excluding, however, that portion sold to him by Flores.[13]
After trial, Branch 3 of the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan held that Flores share in Restars estate was not the lot but that covered by Cadastral Lot No. 3183. Nevertheless,
the trial court, holding that Flores and his heirs had performed acts sufficient to constitute repudiation of the co-ownership, concluded that they had acquired the lot
by prescription.[14]

Respecting the defendant Policarpios claim that a portion of the lot was sold to him, the trial court discredited the same upon noting that Flores signature in the
purported Deed of Sale differed from those appearing in other documents submitted by the parties; in 1981, when the said Deed of Sale was alleged to have been
executed, Flores was admittedly paralyzed and bedridden and could not have written his name in a straight manner, as in fact his signature appearing in at least two
documents dated 1980 was crooked, and there existed discrepancies in the spelling of Flores wifes signature which read Esmea in the deed, and not as Esmenia.[15]

The trial court thus dismissed the complaint by Decision of June 30, 1999.[16]
On appeal by the defendants Heirs of Flores and Policarpio Restar, the appellate court, by Decision of October 29, 2002.[17] reversed the decision of the trial court,
it finding that the defendants Heirs of Flores failed to prove that their possession of the lot excluded their co-owners or that they derived title to it from a separate
conveyance to them by Restar.

The appellate court further found that there was no adequate notice by Flores to his other co-heirs/co-owners of the repudiation of the co-ownership and neither
was there a categorical assertion by the defendants of their exclusive right to the entire lot that barred the
plaintiffs claim of ownership.[18]
And the appellate court found it credible for the plaintiffs to have failed to immediately take legal action to protect their rights on account of forbearance towards
their eldest brother who had asked them to continue cultivating the lot to support his childrens education.[19]

Respecting the defendant Policarpios claim that part of the lot had been sold to him by Flores, the appellate court sustained the trial courts rejection thereof.

Accordingly, the appellate court disposed:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appeal is hereby GRANTED in so far as plaintiffs-appellants Heirs of Dolores Cichon, et al., are
concerned and DENIED in so far as defendant-appellant Policarpio Restar. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 3,
dated June 30, 1999 is MODIFIED. The ruling of the said court that the heirs of Flores Restar have acquired ownership by adverse possession of
the land in question, Cadastral Lot No. 6686, is hereby REVERSED.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)

The appellate court having denied reconsideration of its decision, only the defendants Heirs of Flores filed the present petition, assigning the following errors:

A. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE RULING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THE
PETITIONERS AS HEIRS OF FLORES RESTAR HAVE ACQUIRED OWNERSHIP BY ADVERSE POSSESSION OF THE LAND
IN QUESTION.

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THERE WAS ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION ON
THE LAND IN QUESTION NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE LAND IN QUESTION HAS BEEN DECLARED IN THE NAME OF
FLORES RESTAR, FATHER OF PETITIONERS, AS EARLY AS 1960 AND THAT PETITIONERS AND THEIR PREDECESSOR-
IN-INTEREST HAVE BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN
QUESTION IN THE CONCEPT OF OWNER FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.[20]

The petition is impressed with merit.

Article 494 of the New Civil Code expressly provides:

ART. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in
common, insofar as his share is concerned.

xxx

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership.
While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not prescribe, a co-owner may acquire ownership thereof by prescription[21] where there exists a
clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership.[22]

Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good
faith and with just title for a period of ten years. Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character which requires
uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years.

Thus, the New Civil Code provides:

ART. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.

Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.

ART. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.

ART. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need
of title or of good faith.

Resolving the main issue of whether petitioners acquired ownership over the lot by extraordinary prescription, the appellate court held in the negative.

While this Court is not a trier of facts, if the inference drawn by the appellate court from the facts is manifestly mistaken, it may, in the interest of justice,
review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual conclusions based on the record.[23]

Contrary to the findings of the appellate court, the records of the case amply support petitioners claim that the requirements for extraordinary prescription
had been duly met.

When Restar died in 1935, his eight children became pro indiviso co-owners of the lot by intestate succession. Respondents never possessed the lot,
however, much less asserted their claim thereto until January 21, 1999 when they filed the complaint for partition subject of the present petition.
 In contrast, Flores took possession of the lot after Restars death and exercised acts of dominion thereon tilling and cultivating the land, introducing
improvements, and enjoying the produce thereof.

The statutory period of prescription, however, commenced not in 1935 but in 1960 when Flores, who had neither title nor good faith, secured a tax
declaration in his name and may, therefore, be said to have adversely claimed ownership of the lot. And respondents were also deemed to have been on said date
become aware of the adverse claim.[24]

Flores possession thus ripened into ownership through acquisitive prescription after the lapse of thirty years in accordance with the earlier quoted Article
1137 of the New Civil Code.

The following observations of the trial court thus merit this Courts approval.

The evidence proved that as far back as 1959, Flores Restar adjudicated unto himself the whole land in question as his share from his father by
means of a joint affidavit which he executed with one Helen Restar, and he requested the Provincial Treasurer/Assessor to have the land declared in
his name. It was admitted by the parties during the pre-trial that this affidavit was the basis of the transfer of Tax Declaration No. 6686 from Emilio
Restar to Flores Restar. So that from 1960 the land was declared in the name of Flores Restar (Exhibit 10). This was the first concrete act of
repudiation made by Flores of the co-ownership over the land in question. x x x

Plaintiffs did not deny that aside from the verbal partition of one parcel of land in Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan way back in 1945, they also had an
amicable partition of the lands of Emilio Restar in Cerrudo and Palale, Banga Aklan on September 28, 1973 (exhibit 20). If they were able to
demand the partition, why then did they not demand the inclusion of the land in question in order to settle once and for all the inheritance from their
father Emilio Restar, considering that at that time all of the brothers and sisters, the eight heirs of Emilio Restar, were still alive and participated in
the signing of the extra-judicial partition?

Also it was admitted that Flores died only in 1989. Plaintiffs had all the chances (sic) to file a case against him from 1960, or a period of 29 years
when he was still alive, yet they failed to do so. They filed the instant case only on January 22, 1999, almost ten (10) years after Flores death.

From the foregoing evidence, it can be seen that the adverse possession of Flores started in 1960, the time when the tax declaration was
transferred in his name. The period of acquisitive prescription started to run from this date. Hence, the adverse possession of Flores Restar from
1960 vested in him exclusive ownership of the land considering the lapse of more than 38 years. Acquisitive prescription of ownership, laches and
prescription of the action for partition should be considered in favor of Flores Restar and his heirs. [25]

While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership and do not prove title to the land, nevertheless, when coupled with actual
possession, they constitute evidence of great weight[26] and can be the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription.[27]
 As for respondents claim that they have been receiving shares from the produce of the land, it was correctly discredited by the trial court.

[P]laintiffs claim that Flores Restar gave them five to eight gantas each as their shares in the produce cannot be sustained. A few gantas cannot be
considered one-eight share of sixty (60) cavans of palay produced per cropping. One eight of sixty cavans would be at least six cavans, not merely
gantas after excluding expenses for cultivation and production. If plaintiffs were to be believed, their whole 7/8 share of the produce would total
two cavans, six gantas only at the usual rate of 25 gantas per cavan.[28]

Unless there are strong and impelling reasons to disturb the trial courts findings of facts which must, as a matter of judicial policy, be accorded with the highest
respect, they must remain. Respondents have not, however, proffered any reason warranting the disturbance of the trial courts findings of facts.

Indeed, the following acts of Flores show possession adverse to his co-heirs: the cancellation of the tax declaration certificate in the name of Restar and
securing another in his name; the execution of a Joint Affidavit stating that he is the owner and possessor thereof to the exclusion of respondents; payment of real
estate tax and irrigation fees without respondents having ever contributed any share therein; and continued enjoyment of the property and its produce to the
exclusion of respondents. And Flores adverse possession was continued by his heirs.

The appellate courts crediting of respondents justification for failing to immediately take legal action to protect their rights forbearance toward Flores
and/or his wife who asked to be allowed to cultivate the land to support their childrens education does not impress. For assuming such justification to be true, why
did not any of respondents assail Flores continuous possession after his children completed their college education in 1977?

The trial courts finding and conclusion that Flores and his heirs had for more than 38 years possessed the land in open, adverse and continuous possession
in the concept of owner − which length of possession had never been questioned, rebutted or disputed by any of respondents, being thus duly supported by
substantial evidence, he and his heirs have become owner of the lot by extraordinary prescription. It is unfortunate that respondents slept on their rights. Dura lex
sed lex.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the June 30, 1999 decision of the
trial court is REINSTATED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 171068 September 5, 2007
HEIRS OF MARCELINA ARZADON-CRISOLOGO, represented by Leticia C. del Rosario, MAURICIA ARZADON and BERNARDO
ARZADON, petitioners,
vs.
AGRIFINA RAÑON, substituted by SUZIMA RAÑON-DUTERTE and OTHELO RAÑON, respondents.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
72552, dated 10 November 2005 and 12 January 2006, respectively, which affirmed in toto the Decision3 dated 8 August 2002 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte, Branch 18, in Civil Case No. 3875-18. The RTC reversed the 11 December 2001 Decision4 of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Badoc-Pinili, Badoc, Ilocos Norte, in Civil Case No. 141-B.

Records show that on 18 October 1995, Agrifina Rañon5 filed a Complaint6 against spouses Conrado and Mila Montemayor (spouses Montemayor)
with the MCTC of Badoc, Ilocos Norte, claiming ownership over an unregistered residential lot (subject property) situated at Brgy. No. 2 Badoc,
Ilocos Norte, covered by Tax Declaration No. 420809, more particularly described as follows:

"RESIDENTIAL with an area of 472 sq. ms. (sic) Bounded on the North by Ladera St.; on the East by Dionisio Ladera; on the South by
Buenaventura Arzadon; and on the West by Rafael Ladera; Assessed at P1700.00 under Tax Dec. No. 420809."7

According to Agrifina Rañon, her family had enjoyed continuous, peaceful and uninterrupted possession and ownership over the subject property
since 1962, and had religiously paid the taxes thereon. They had built a house on the subject property where she and her family had resided.
Unfortunately, in 1986, when her family was already residing in Metro Manila, fire razed and destroyed the said house. Nonetheless, they continued
to visit the subject property, as well as pay the real estate taxes thereon. However, in August of 1986, her daughter, Zosie Rañon, discovered that
the subject property was already in the name of the spouses Montemayor under Tax Declaration No. 0010563 which was purportedly issued in their
favor by virtue of an Affidavit of Ownership and Possession which the spouses Montemayor executed themselves. The Affidavit was alleged to have
created a cloud of doubt over Rañon’s title and ownership over the subject property.

Hence, Agrifina Rañon sought a Writ of Preliminary Injunction8 against the spouses Montemayor commanding them to cease and desist from further
exercising any right of ownership or possession over the subject property. She further prayed that she be finally declared the true and lawful owner
of the subject property.

The spouses Montemayor, for their part, alleged that they acquired the subject lot by purchase from Leticia del Rosario and Bernardo Arzadon who
are the heirs of its previous owners for a consideration of P100,000.00.9

On 22 July 1996, the Heirs of Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo, (represented by Leticia A. Crisologo del Rosario), Mauricia Arzadon, and Bernardo
Arzadon (petitioners) filed an Answer in Intervention10 claiming, inter alia, that they are the rightful owners of the subject property, having acquired
the same from their predecessors-in-interest. They averred that there existed no liens or encumbrances on the subject property in favor of Agrifina
Rañon; and that no person, other than they and the spouses Montemayor, has an interest in the property as owner or otherwise.
Per petitioners’ allegations, their predecessors-in-interest, spouses Timoteo and Modesta Alcantara (spouses Alcantara) bought the subject
property from its owner, Rafael Ladera, on 2 May 1936. The spouses Alcantara then built a house of strong materials on the subject property which
served as their conjugal home. Residing with them was Timoteo Alcantara’s sister, Augustina Alcantara-Arzadon. As the spouses Alcantara died
without issue, their properties were left to Timoteo Alcantara’s nearest of kin, Augustina Alcantara-Arzadon and Tiburcio Alcantara, sister and
brother, respectively, of Timoteo Alcantara. Tiburcio Alcantara also died without any known heir; thus, leaving the subject property in Augustina
Alcantara-Arzadon’s sole favor. Augustina Alcantara-Arzadon is the mother of petitioners Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo (now deceased and whose
heirs are represented by Leticia del Rosario) and Mauricia Arzadon. Bernardo Arzadon is the son of Mauricia Arzadon.

Petitioners asseverated further that Bernardo Arzadon had lived in the house constructed on the subject property until 1985 when it was gutted by
fire. To further support their claims, petitioners averred that they had religiously paid the real estate taxes on the subject property. Finally, by way of
a counterclaim, petitioners sought compensation for the damages which they allegedly suffered by reason of the baseless filing of the instant suit.

On 22 October 1999, the MCTC issued an Order11 dropping the name of the spouses Montemayor from the caption of the case on the ground that
sometime in 1996, Leticia del Rosario and Bernardo Arzadon had repurchased the subject property from the spouses Montemayor for the
consideration of P100,000.00. As a result, the spouses Montemayor had no more interest or claim whatsoever on the property in litigation.

On 11 December 2001, the MCTC rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioners. The decretal portion thereof reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the [petitioners] to be the true and lawful owners of one-half (1/2) portion of the undivided whole of the lot-in-suit by
mode of succession pursuant to [A]rticle 1001 of the [C]ivil [C]ode of the Philippines;
2. Declaring the [petitioners] to have the better right over the other half of the undivided whole of the lot-in-suit by mode of
prescription pursuant to [A]rticle 1137 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;
3. Dismissing the counter-claim of the [petitioners] against the [respondents];
4. Ordering [petitioners] to pay the cost of the suit.12

First, the MCTC ruled that while the adverse claims of Agrifina Rañon on the subject lot against the spouses Alcantara may have started in 1962,
this adverse possession was interrupted in the year 1977 due to the filing of an adverse claim by petitioner Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo with the
Office of the Assessor. In 1977, the tax declaration in the name of Valentin Rañon, Agrifina Rañon’s husband, was cancelled and a new tax
declaration was issued in Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo’s name. The MCTC said that the period of possession of the spouses Rañon in the concept
of an owner from 1962 to 1977 did not ripen into ownership because their occupation was in bad faith. The Civil Code requires, for acquisitive
prescription of real property, 30 years of uninterrupted possession if the same is wanting in good faith and without a just title.

Second, the MCTC held that by virtue of succession, petitioners are entitled to one-half of the subject property. This is because according to Article
100113 of the Civil Code, should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or the widower (who are without issue), the latter shall
be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half. The spouses Alcantara died without issue. As
between Timoteo Alcantara and Modesta Alcantara, the former predeceased the latter. Timoteo Alcantara was survived by (1) his brother Tiburcio
Alcantara, who also died without any known heir; and (2) his sister Augustina Alcantara. Thus, following the death of the spouses Alcantara, only
the children of Augustina Alcantara, namely Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo and Mauricia Arzadon, stand to inherit Timoteo Alcantara’s share in the
subject property.

Moreover, the MCTC declared that for the part of Modesta Alcantara, there was no legal heir who claimed the other half of the property which
she14 inherited from her husband, Timoteo Alcantara who predeceased her. On this portion, the MCTC held that petitioners exercised rights of
ownership and dominion over the same by periodically visiting the lot and cleaning it.15 It also held that from 31 August 1977, when petitioners’
predecessor-in-interest Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo filed an adverse claim for herself and for her brothers and sisters which led to the issuance of
Tax Declaration No. 44120 in her name, to 11 December 2001,16 there is a total of 33 years, three months and 10 days which is sufficient to claim
ownership over the subject property by adverse possession under Article 113717 of the Civil Code.

On appeal, the RTC reversed and set aside the Decision of the MCTC.

The RTC declared that the respondent Rañons who are heirs of the original plaintiff had acquired the subject property by virtue of acquisitive
prescription, and therefore adjudged respondents to be the absolute owners thereof; thus, in the 8 August 2002 Decision of the RTC, it held:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the trial [c]ourt is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and judgment is hereby
rendered:

1) Declaring the [respondents] as the absolute owners of the parcel of land in suit, having acquired the same through extraordinary
acquisitive prescription.

No costs.18

In its findings, the RTC declared that a more circumspect scrutiny of the evidence showed that for a long time from the death of the spouses
Alcantara, no one adjudicated the subject property unto themselves. Although petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest claimed to have
successional rights over the subject property, they did not take action to have the same adjudicated to themselves or, at least, to have the same
declared for taxation purposes. The RTC ruled that petitioners had slept on their rights. On the part of the respondent Rañons, in 1962, Valentin
Rañon, respondents’ father, declared the subject property in his name for taxation purposes and paid the corresponding taxes thereon. In the years
that followed, his wife, Agrifina Rañon, declared the same in her name for taxation purposes, as well as paid the real estate taxes on the subject
property. In 1977, the latter even mortgaged the subject property with the Philippine National Bank. It was only in 1977 when petitioners’
predecessor-in-interest Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo executed an Adverse Claim and Notice of Ownership and declared the subject property in her
name and paid its taxes.

The RTC elucidated in this wise, to wit:

It bears to note that since the death of Timoteo Alcantara until the year 1977, [petitioners], as well as their predecessors-in-interests (sic)
had not taken any concrete step in exercising their supposed successional rights over the parcel of land in suit, or at least, the Intervenors
should have always [stayed] on their guard or especially vigilant against anyone who would secure a claim to the said parcel of land, more
so that Valentin Rañon and plaintiff Agrifina Rañon were then living with them. It is very unfortunate that it was only in 1977 that the
Intervenors made known to others of their supposed successional rights over the parcel of land in suit. Relief is denied to a claimant whose
 right has become stale for a long time, considering that some other persons like [respondents] had wayback (sic) taken the necessary action
in claiming the parcel of land in suit. It is the vigilant and not the sleepy that is being assisted by the laws. (Ledita Burce Jacob v. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 92159, July 1, 1993).

It stands to reason, therefore, to hold that because of the claim of the [respondents] to have acquired the parcel of land in suit by acquisitive
prescription, the Intervenors who belatedly claimed to be the legal and compulsory heirs of the late Timoteo Alcantara, as ruled by the trial
court, had regrettably forfeited their such (sic) successional rights, simply due to their inaction for a long period of time. Hence, contrary to
the findings of the trial court, the [petitioners] are not entitled to the one-half (1/2) portion of the parcel of land in suit.19

Likewise, the RTC reasoned that the Notice of Adverse Claim executed by petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo against
the Rañons in 1977 implied that respondents have been in possession of the subject property. On this matter, the RTC said, viz:

Evidently, the trial court considered by implication that the execution by Marcelina Arzadon Crisologo of said Adverse Claim and Notice of
Ownership in 1977 to have interrupted the running of the prescriptive period on the possession by the [respondents] of the parcel of land in
suit. It bears to stress on (sic) this point, that the Adverse Claim and Notice of Ownership executed by Marcelina Arzadon Crisologo is
nothing but a notice of a claim adverse to the [respondents]. By its nature, its implication is that the [respondents] have been in possession
of the parcel of land in suit in some concept. But definitely, said Adverse Claim does not, upon its execution, operate to toll or interrupt the
running of the prescriptive period because there is a necessity to determine the validity of the same. And this could only be done by the filing
of the necessary action in court such [as] contemplated in the provisions of Article 1123 of the Civil Code. It is only on (sic) such instance
that the prescriptive period should be deemed interrupted. And undisputedly, nothing had been done by the Intervenors after the execution
of said Adverse Claim by Marcelina Crisologo, except of course as they claimed, and as held by the trial court, they started to possess the
parcel of land in suit. Regretably (sic), however, such possession by the Intervenors of the parcel of land in suit does not benefit them for
purposes of prescription.20

The RTC also declared that the Rañons have been in possession of the parcel of land in the concept of an owner since 1962. Even as they had
gone to live in Manila following the burning of the house on the subject property, they continued to exercise acts of dominion over the same by
visiting and looking after the property. The RTC also considered in favor of the respondents, the admission of petitioner Bernardo Arzadon and the
petitioners’ witnesses that Valentin Rañon and Agrifina Rañon had been staying in the house on the subject lot since 1947, which shows that they
had been in possession of the subject property for a period of more than 50 years.

On review before the Court of Appeals, the Decision of the RTC was affirmed in toto.

The Court of Appeals held that when Valentin Rañon executed the affidavit declaring himself to be the true and lawful owner of the subject property
in 1962, the same was a repudiation of petitioners’ legal title over it. The repudiation, coupled with the payment of realty taxes, was made with the
knowledge of petitioners, who failed to act against it. Thus, from 1962 up to the filing of the action in 1995, respondents continued to adversely
occupy the property. In the assailed 10 November 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals, it ruled:

Moreover, respondents’ payment of realty taxes made with the knowledge and consent of petitioners and went unchallenged for a number of
years, indubitably show their positive claim as owners of the property. While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of
ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by
 prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property. It is only where payment of taxes is accompanied by actual
possession of the land covered by the tax declaration that such circumstance may be material in supporting a claim of ownership.

Needless to state, from 1962 onwards, prescription begun to run against petitioners and was not in any way interrupted from their mere
execution of the Notice of Adverse Claim since the notice of adverse claim cannot take the place of judicial summons which produces the
civil interruption provided for under the law. And even if We are to eliminate the question of good faith in determining the prescriptive period,
evidence are (sic) still abundant to substantiate respondents’ thirty years of possession in the concept of owner commencing from 1962 until
1995 when the complaint below was filed.21

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon which was denied by the Court of Appeals in the following manner, to wit:

After a careful study of the grounds relied upon by petitioners We find no new matters raised to justify a modification much less, a reversal of
the Decision sought to be reconsidered. To reiterate, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioner merely tolerated the Rañons (sic)
occupancy of the subject property, it must be stressed that the execution in 1962 of Valentin Rañon’s Affidavit, the corresponding payment
of realty taxes and other acts of dominion which went unchallenged by the petitioners, had effectively severed their alleged juridical relation.
Suffice it to state that these acts, taken as a whole, vest upon the Rañons the right to claim ownership over the subject property irrespective
of whether the nature of their occupation was rooted from the mere tolerance of the Arzadons or from a bona fide sale between Agrifina
Rañon and Rafael Ladera.22

Hence, the instant Petition.

The primordial issue in the case at bar is whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that respondents had acquired ownership over the subject
property through uninterrupted and adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith. Petitioners dispute the findings
of the Court of Appeals and the RTC in declaring that acquisitive prescription has set in against them and in favor of the respondents. They claim
that the evidence does not support respondents’ contention that they have been in public, notorious, and uninterrupted possession over the subject
property in the concept of an owner since 1962 as alleged in their Complaint. Instead, petitioners rely on the finding of the MCTC that respondents
were not able to prove their adverse claim for an uninterrupted period of thirty years.

At this juncture, we take an opportune look at the applicable rules on the acquisition of ownership through prescription.

Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property.23 It is concerned with lapse of time in the
manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted
and adverse.24 Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine.25 It is continuous when uninterrupted,
unbroken and not intermittent or occasional;26 exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an
appropriation of it to his own use and benefit;27and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the
people in the neighborhood.28 The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of the essential elements of
acquisitive prescription.

Article 1117 of the Civil Code is instructive:

 Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.

Articles 1134 and 1137 of the Civil Code fix the periods of possession,29 which provide:

Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.
Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years,
without need of title or of good faith.

From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.30Ordinary acquisitive prescription
requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law; without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can
only be extraordinary in character.31 Regarding real or immovable property, ordinary acquisitive prescription requires a period of possession of ten
years, while extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires an uninterrupted adverse possession of thirty years.32

Were respondents able to sufficiently satisfy the legal requirements to prove prescription?

To recapitulate, respondents traced their claim of ownership from the year 1962 until the filing of their Complaint for Ownership before the MCTC on
18 October 1995. To support their possession, they rely on an Affidavit executed on 19 October 1962 by Valentin Rañon claiming ownership over
the subject property by virtue of an alleged sale. The MCTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals were unanimous in declaring that the execution by
Valentin Rañon of the Affidavit in 1962 was an express repudiation of petitioners’ claim over the property. By virtue of such Affidavit, respondents
were able to cancel Tax Declaration No. 02853 in the name of petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest Timoteo Alcantara who was shown to have paid
taxes on the subject property in 1950. Hence, in 1962, Tax Declaration No. 033062 was issued in the name of Valentin Rañon. The same was
subsequently cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 033106, which was in the name of his wife, Agrifina Rañon. The same was likewise cancelled in
1967 by Tax Declaration No. 420809, similarly under the name of Agrifina Rañon. In 1977, however, petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest Marcelina
Arzadon-Crisologo filed an Adverse Claim and a Notice of Ownership claiming that the subject property which is not yet registered in the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Laoag City is declared under Tax Declaration No. 420809 in the name of Valentin Rañon for taxation purposes only; but
that they have been in possession of the said land publicly, peacefully and continuously without any intervention or interruption for more than 15
years.

However, a question must be asked: did the Notice of Adverse Claim filed by petitioners constitute an effective interruption since 1962 of
respondents’ possession of the subject property?

The answer is in the negative.

Article 112333 of the Civil Code is categorical. Civil interruption is produced by judicial summons to the possessor. Moreover, even with the presence
of judicial summons, Article 112434 sets limitations as to when such summons shall not be deemed to have been issued and shall not give rise to
interruption, to wit: 1) if it should be void for lack of legal solemnities; 2) if the plaintiff should desist from the complaint or should allow the
proceedings to lapse; or 3) if the possessor should be absolved from the complaint.

Both Article 1123 and Article 1124 of the Civil Code underscore the judicial character of civil interruption. For civil interruption to take place, the
possessor must have received judicial summons. None appears in the case at bar. The Notice of Adverse Claim which was filed by petitioners in
1977 is nothing more than a notice of claim which did not effectively interrupt respondents’ possession. Such a notice could not have produced civil
interruption. We agree in the conclusion of the RTC, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the execution of the Notice of Adverse Claim
in 1977 did not toll or interrupt the running of the prescriptive period because there remains, as yet, a necessity for a judicial determination of its
judicial validity. What existed was merely a notice. There was no compliance with Article 1123 of the Civil Code. What is striking is that no action
was, in fact, filed by petitioners against respondents. As a consequence, no judicial summons was received by respondents. As aptly held by the
Court of Appeals in its affirmance of the RTC’s ruling, the Notice of Adverse Claim cannot take the place of judicial summons which produces the
civil interruption provided for under the law.35 In the instant case, petitioners were not able to interrupt respondents’ adverse possession since 1962.
The period of acquisitive prescription from 1962 continued to run in respondents’ favor despite the Notice of Adverse Claim.

From another angle, we find that, quite clearly, questions of fact exist before us. There is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises
as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses,
the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the
situation.36

Thus, we find proper the application of the doctrine that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals upholding those of the trial court are binding upon
this Court.37 Even though the rule is subject to exceptions,38 we do not find them applicable in the instant case.

As found by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, nothing was done by petitioners to claim possession over the subject property from the
time their predecessors-in-interest had lost possession of the property due to their deaths. Plainly, petitioners slept on their rights. Vigilantibus sed
non dormientibus jura subveniunt. The law comes to the succor only to aid the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. It was only in 1977
when they attempted to call the attention of respondents, which as earlier discussed, did not even operate as an interruption on the latter’s
possession. The RTC and the Court of Appeals held that from 1962 to the time they filed their Complaint before the MCTC and until the present
time, respondents occupied without interruption the subject property in the concept of an owner, thereby acquiring ownership via extraordinary
acquisitive prescription. To reiterate, the RTC’s factual findings based on the evidence on record were manifestly in favor of respondents, to wit:

Thus, by preponderance of evidence, it has been established preponderantly that the [respondents] have been in possession of the parcel of
land in suit continuously, peacefully, publicly, notoriously, uninterrupted and in the concept of an owner since 1962 to the present. The fact
that the [respondents] have gone to live in Manila right after the house built in the parcel of land in suit was burned in 1988, they, however,
then and thereafter intermittently come to Badoc, Ilocos Norte purposely to look after and to visit the parcel of land in suit. Actual possession
of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.
One needs (sic) not to (sic) stay on it. The acts exercised by the [respondents] over the parcel of land in suit are consistent with ownership.
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before it can be said
that he is in possession [thereof]. (Ramos v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175, cited in the case of Somodio v. Court of Appeals, et al., 235
SCRA 307). It is sufficient that the [respondents] were able to subject the parcel of land to the action of their will.

Furthermore, the Court finds it (sic) significant the testimonies of [petitioner] Bernardo Arzadon and his witnesses Leonila Arzadon and
Elpidio Evangelista who categorically testified to the effect that Valentin Rañon and [respondent] Agrifina Rañon had been staying in the
house standing on the parcel of land in suit since 1947. Basically, the defendants are bound by their admissions and also bound by the
testimonies of the witnesses they presented. And going along with their respective testimonies, from 1947 to 1977 or for [a] period of thirty
(30) years the [respondents] have been in possession of the parcel of land in suit enough to invoke extraordinary acquisitive prescription,
 pursuant to the provisions of Article 113439 (sic) of the New (sic) Civil Code. However, as earlier stated, the [respondents], contrary to the
claim of the [petitioners] and findings of the trial court, have been in possession of the parcel of land in suit continuously and uninterrupted
from 1962 to the present but because of the admissions of the [petitioners], the [respondents] have been in possession of the same from
1947 to the present or for more than fifty (50) years now.40

The open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by respondents of the subject property for a period of more than 30 years in repudiation
of petitioners’ ownership had been established. During such length of time, respondents had exercised acts of dominion over the subject property,
and paid taxes in their name. Jurisprudence is clear that although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession.41 They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the
property.42 As is well known, the payment of taxes coupled with actual possession of the land covered by the tax declaration strongly supports a
claim of ownership.43 The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the factual findings of the RTC that respondents had validly established their
claim of ownership over the subject property through acquisitive prescription.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 10 November 2005 and the Resolution dated 12 January 2006
in CA-G.R. SP No. 72552 are AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 122249. January 29, 2004]

REYNALDO, TELESFORO, REMEDIOS, ALFREDO and BELEN, all surnamed AGUIRRE, VICENTA, HORACIO and FLORENCIO, all
surnamed MAGTIBAY and LEONILA, CECILIA, ANTONIO, and VENANCIO, all surnamed MEDRANO, and ZOSIMA
QUIAMBAO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ELIAS, JOSE, ARSENIA and ROGELIO, all surnamed BALITAAN, and MARIA
ROSALES, respondents.

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] dated July 26, 1995
rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 42350 which set aside the Decision[2] dated April 28, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court of
Batangas City (Branch 2) in Civil Case No. 202,[3] and declared private respondents Heirs of Tiburcio Balitaan, as owners of the parcel of
unregistered land with an approximate area of 1,695 square meters, located at Aplaya, Bauan, Batangas.

The facts of the case are as follows:

In his lifetime, Leocadio Medrano was the owner and possessor of a parcel of residential land, situated in Aplaya, Bauan, Batangas, containing
an area of 2,611 square meters.[4] The parcel of land was conjugal property, having been acquired by Leocadio during his first marriage with one
Emiliana Narito. Their union begot four children, namely: (a) Gertrudes Medrano, now deceased, represented in this case by her children, herein
petitioners Telesforo, Reynaldo, Remedios, Alfredo, and Belen, all surnamed Aguirre; (b) Isabel Medrano, likewise deceased, represented by her
children, herein petitioners Vicenta, Horacio, and Florencio, all surnamed Magtibay; (c) Placido Medrano, also deceased, represented by his only
child, herein petitioner Zosima Quiambao; and (d) Sixto Medrano.

After the death of his first wife, Leocadio contracted a second marriage with Miguela Cario. Their union bore four children, herein co-petitioners,
namely: Venancio, Leonila, Antonio and Cecilia, all surnamed Medrano.

Upon the death of Leocadio on March 19, 1945, the surviving heirs agreed that Sixto should manage and administer the subject property.

Sixto died on May 17, 1974. It was only after his death that petitioners heard rumors that Sixto had, in fact, sold significant portions of the estate
of Leocadio. It appears that on September 7, 1953, Sixto, without the knowledge and consent of the petitioners, executed an Affidavit of Transfer of
Real Property stating therein that he was the only heir of Leocadio.[5] Sixto declared that Leocadio died on September 16, 1949, instead of the
actual date of his death on March 19, 1945. With the use of said affidavit and a survey plan,[6] Tax Declaration No. 40105 in the name of Leocadio
was cancelled and Tax Declaration No. 44984 was issued in the name of Sixto.[7] On August 29, 1957, Sixto sold to Maria Bacong a 160- square
meter portion of the subject land.[8] On September 28, 1959, Sixto sold to Tiburcio Balitaan a 1,695 square meter portion of the same
land.[9] Sometime in November 1967, Maria Bacong sold her property to Rosendo Bacong.[10]

Petitioners demanded the reconveyance of the portions sold by Sixto but Tiburcio Balitaan, Maria Bacong and Rosendo Bacong refused to do
so. Hence, petitioners filed against them before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas (Branch 2), a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Documents, Partition, Malicious Prosecution and Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 202.[11]

In their Answer, Maria Bacong and Rosendo Bacong contend that petitioners have no cause of action because they acquired their property thru
a valid deed of sale dated August 29, 1957, executed by Sixto and, alternatively, petitioners cause of action, if any, was barred by prescription and
laches.[12]

In his Answer, Tiburcio Balitaan contends that petitioners have no cause of action since petitioners were well-aware of the sale of the property
to him by Sixto; and that he was an innocent purchaser for value, in possession and enjoyment of the land in the concept of absolute owner,
peacefully and publicly. He further echoed the contention of Maria and Rosendo Bacong that any cause of action petitioners may have was barred
by prescription and laches.[13]

Maria Bacong died during the pendency of the suit in the trial court and she was substituted by her surviving heirs, namely, Lorenza, Elena,
Felipa, Manuel, Marilou, Ricardo, Medel, Monchito and Milag, all surnamed Medrano.[14] Tiburcio Balitaan also died and was substituted by his
heirs, herein private respondents, namely: his wife, Maria Rosales and their four children: Elias, Jose, Arsenia and Rogelio, all surnamed
Balitaan.[15]

On July 28, 1989, petitioners and Rosendo Bacong, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of the heirs of Maria Bacong, entered into a compromise
agreement to settle the case between them.[16]The compromise agreement, as approved by the trial court, provided that Rosendo Bacong and the
heirs of Maria Bacong agreed to pay P30,000.00 to petitioners in recognition of petitioners ownership of a 269-square meter portion[17] and in
consideration of which, petitioners recognized the full ownership, rights, interest and participation of the former over said land.[18] The area of the
subject land is thus reduced to 2,342 square meters (2,611 square meters minus 269 square meters).
 After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment dated April 28, 1992, ruling that private respondents did not dispute, by any evidence,
the falsity of the Affidavit of Transfer, as well as the fact that Sixto had co-owners to the property. It found that private respondents affirmative
defense of laches and/or prescription are unavailing against a property held in co-ownership as long as the state of co-ownership is
recognized. Consequently, the trial court upheld the sale made by Sixto in favor of private respondents only to the extent that Sixto is entitled to by
virtue of his being a co-owner.[19]

In determining the area that Sixto could have validly sold to private respondents, the trial court, in its decision, provided for the manner of
partition among the parties, based on the memorandum submitted by petitioners, thus:

For the four (4) children of the first marriage, namely:

(1) Gertrudes, who is already dead represented by her children Tefesforo, Reynaldo, Remedios, Alfredo and Belen, all surnamed Aguirre
399.42 square meters;
(2) Isabel Medrano, who is already dead, represented by the plaintiffs, her children Vicenta, Horacio and Florencio, all surnamed Magtibay
399.42 square meters;
(3) Placido Medrano (dead), represented by his only child Zosima Medrano 399.42 square meters; and
(4) Sixto Medrano 399.42 square meters only which he had the right to dispose of in favor of Tiburcio Balitaan and Maria Rosales.

The above consist of undivided interest, shares and participations from the inheritance or succession to the conjugal estate of Leocadio Medrano and Emiliana
Narito.

For the children of the second marriage their shares in the inheritance from the property of Leocadio Medrano are as follows:
(1) To Venancio Medrano - 138.32 square meters
(2) To Leonila Medrano - 138.32 square meters
(3) To Antonio Medrano - 138.32 square meters
(4) To Cecilia Medrano - 138.32 square meters

with all the above consisting of undivided shares, interest and participation in the estate.

For the defendants Maria Rosales, surviving spouse of the deceased Tiburcio Balitaan and their Children, an area of 399.42 square meters, the only area and extent
which Sixto Medrano could have legally dispensed of in their favor.[20]

Thus, the dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, to wit:

(a) Ordering the partition of the property in question among the plaintiffs and the defendants; and
(b) Ordering the parties, plaintiffs and defendants, to make a partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance and to submit before this Court a
project of partition should the parties be able to agree for the confirmation of the Court within two (2) months upon receipt of this decision, otherwise this Court
will be constrained to appoint commissioners to make the partition in accordance with law.

All other claims not having been duly proved are ordered dismissed.

SO ORDERED.[21]

Aggrieved, private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.[22]

On July 26, 1995, the appellate court rendered judgment recognizing the validity of the sale only with respect to the undivided share of Sixto
Medrano as co-owner; but nonetheless, declaring respondents as absolute owners of 1,695 square meters of the subject property, reasoning that:

. . . Defendants-appellees have been in possession, in the concept of owner, of the entire parcel of land sold to Tiburcio Balitaan by Sixto Medrano for more than
ten years, seventeen years to be exact (1958-1975).Relying on the affidavit of transfer (Exhibit B) the tax declaration (Exhibit C) and the survey plan (Exhibit D)
shown to him by Sixto Medrano which indicate the latter as owner of the property in dispute, Tiburcio Balitaan believed transfer to him was effected. (TSN, April
17, 1991, pp. 14-17) and thus, entered the property as owner (Ibid. at p. 13) Tiburcio Balitaan, believing himself as the lawful transferee, in addition, caused Tax
Declaration No. 51038 to be issued in his name (Exhibits 6, 6-A, 6-B, and 6-C). Thus, although the sale of the co-owned property is only valid as to the undivided
share of Sixto Medrano, defendants, by virtue of their open, adverse and uninterrupted possession from 1958 (Exhibit G) to 1975, obtained title to the entire
property and not just Sixtos undivided share. This is pursuant to Article 1134 (1957a) of the New Civil Code which provides that:

Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.

Plaintiffs did not at all inquire as to the status of their property all this time and thus have been remiss of their duties as owners of the property. Plaintiffs waited
until Sixtos death to learn more about their property. Even though the co-ownership is to be preserved in accordance with the wishes of the deceased, the plaintiffs
should have taken it upon themselves to look into the status of the property once in a while, to assure themselves that it is managed well and that they are receiving
what is due them as co-owners of the parcel of land or to at least manifest their continued interest in the property as normal owners would do. But the plaintiffs did
not show any interest in the way Sixto Medrano was managing the property which in effect gave the latter carte blanche powers over the same. Such passivity is
aggravated by the fact that one of the plaintiffs resides a mere 600 meters away from the disputed property (TSN, April 17, 1991, p. 13). By not showing any
interest, the plaintiffs have, in fact, slept on their rights and thus, cannot now exercise a stale right.[23]

Petitioners sought reconsideration[24] but the appellate court denied it in a Resolution dated October 5, 1995.[25]

In their present recourse, petitioners take exception from the appellate courts findings that respondents have been in possession, in the
concept of owner of the entire parcel of land sold to Tiburcio Balitaan by Sixto Medrano for seventeen years (1958-1975), relying on the Affidavit of
Transfer and Tax Declaration No. 51038 in the name of Sixto; and that Tiburcio acquired ownership of the whole property from Sixto through
ordinary prescription for ten years.

Petitioners submit that Tiburcio Balitaan was not a purchaser in good faith and for value since there are enough circumstances which should
have put him on guard and prompted him to be more circumspect and inquire further about the true status of Sixto Medranos ownership; that during
his lifetime, Tiburcio was a neighbor of petitioners and was well-aware that Sixto had other siblings but Tiburcio chose to rely on the Affidavit of
Transfer executed by Sixto Medrano declaring that he was the only heir of Leocadio; that the Court of Appeals should not have faulted them for
failing to inquire about the status of the disputed property until after the death of Sixto Medrano; that they are not guilty of laches.

It is settled that in the exercise of the Supreme Courts power of review, the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding
on the Supreme Court.[26] The exceptions to this rule are: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based
on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the
issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial
court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[27] Exceptions (4), (7), (10) and (11) are present in the
instant case.

We find the petition meritorious.[28] We agree with the petitioners that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in upholding the claim of
petitioners that they acquired ownership of the subject property through prescription.

Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good
faith and with just title for the time fixed by law;[29] without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in
character. Regarding real or immovable property, ordinary acquisitive prescription requires a period of possession of ten years,[30] while
extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires an uninterrupted adverse possession of thirty years.[31]

Ordinary acquisitive prescription demands that possession be in good faith, which consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom
the thing is received has been the owner thereof and could thereby transmit that ownership.[32] There is just title when the adverse claimant comes
into possession of the property through any of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but that the grantor
is neither the owner nor in a position to transmit the right.[33]

Article 1130 of the Civil Code states that the title for prescription must be true and valid. In Doliendo vs. Biarnesa,[34] we elucidated on this
provision, thus:

We think that this contention is based on a misconception of the scope and effect of the provisions of this article of the Code in its application to ordinary
prescription. It is evident that by a titulo verdadero y valido in this connection we are not to understand a titulo que por si solo tiene fuerza de transferir el dominio
sin necesidad de la prescricion (a title which of itself is sufficient to transfer the ownership without the necessity of the lapse of the prescription period); and we
accept the opinion of a learned Spanish law writer who holds that the titulo verdadero y valido as used in this article of the code prescribes a titulo Colorado and
not merely putativo; a titulo Colorado being one which a person has when he buys a thing, in good faith, from one whom he believes to be the owner, and a titulo
putativo being one which is supposed to have preceded the acquisition of a thing, although in fact it did not, as might happen when one is in possession of a thing
in the belief that it had been bequeathed to him. (Viso Derecho Civil, Parte Segunda, p. 541)[35]

The requirements for ordinary acquisitive prescription as hereinabove described have not been met in this case.
 It must be remembered that the burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith lies upon him who asserts that status. It is not
sufficient to invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith, that is, that everyone is presumed to have acted in good faith, since the good faith that is
here essential is integral with the very status that must be established.[36]

After a careful examination of the records, we find that private respondents failed to discharge the burden of proof that Tiburcio Balitaan was a
purchaser in good faith. It is undisputed that Tiburcio practically lived his entire lifetime in the area where the property in dispute is located and had
been a neighbor of petitioners. He knew that Sixto Medrano had other siblings because his son, Dr. Elias Balitaan, is the godson by baptism of
spouses Jose Aguirre and Gertrudes Medrano, the latter being a deceased sister of Sixto. Thus, Tiburcio was not a complete stranger to the
Medrano clan. Yet, he deliberately chose to close his eyes to said facts and despite his personal knowledge to the contrary, he purchased the
disputed property from Sixto on the basis of the misrepresentation of the latter in his Affidavit of Transfer that he is the sole surviving heir of
Leocadio. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith
under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor.[37]

Since the disputed property is an unregistered land, Tiburcio as buyer thereof did so at his peril. Private respondents claim that Tiburcio bought
the land in good faith, that is, without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in the property, would not protect them if it turns out, as
it actually did in this case, that the seller, Sixto Medrano, did not own the entire property at the time of the sale, but only an undivided portion of the
land as a co-owner. Private respondents failed to show that the petitioners were notified of the subject sale or that respondents gave their consent
to the sale. Not being in good faith, the ten-year period required for ordinary acquisitive prescription does not apply.

Even the thirty-year period under extraordinary acquisitive prescription has not been met in this case. Private respondents claim to have been
in possession, in the concept of owner, of the entire parcel of land sold to Tiburcio Balitaan by Sixto Medrano for only seventeen years (1958-1975).
In addition, as we have enunciated in Salvador vs. Court of Appeals,[38] to wit:

This Court has held that the possession of a co-owner is like that of a trustee and shall not be regarded as adverse to the other co-owners but in fact as beneficial to
all of them. Acts which may be considered adverse to strangers may not be considered adverse insofar as co-owners are concerned. A mere silent
possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the property, the erection of buildings and fences and the planting of trees thereon,
and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear and convincing evidence that he exercised acts of
possession which unequivocably constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners.

Thus, in order that a co-owners possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or the other co-owners, the following elements must concur: (1) that he
has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or the other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or the other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and
convincing.[39] (Emphasis supplied)

Tested against these guidelines, respondents failed to present competent evidence that the acts of Sixto adversely and clearly repudiated the
existing co-ownership among the heirs of Leocadio Medrano.

Private respondents reliance on the tax declaration in the name of Sixto Medrano is unworthy of credit since we have held on several occasions
that tax declarations by themselves do not conclusively prove title to land.[40] Further, private respondents failed to show that the Affidavit executed
by Sixto to the effect that he is the sole owner of the subject property was known or made known to the other co-heirs of Leocadio Medrano.
 Neither can we subscribe to the appellate courts view that petitioners are guilty of laches. Laches is the negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it.[41] It does not involve
mere lapse or passage of time, but is principally an impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right, which has become under the
circumstances inequitable or unfair to permit.[42] The rule that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property implies
that an action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches.[43]

We have consistently held that if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-
owners who did not consent to the sale.[44] Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

It clearly provides that the sale or other disposition affects only the sellers share pro indiviso, and the transferee gets only what corresponds to
his grantors share in the partition of the property owned in common. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire
property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void; only the rights of the co-owner/seller are transferred,
thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.[45] Accordingly, we held in Bailon-Casilao vs. Court of Appeals:

From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one-co-owner without the
consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the
property.

The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who
substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the
co-owners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra].

Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale
merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. Neither recovery of possession
nor restitution can be granted since the defendant buyers are legitimate proprietors and possessors in joint ownership of the common property claimed [Ramirez v.
Bautista, supra].[46]

It is clear therefore that the deed of sale executed by Sixto Medrano in favor of Tiburcio Balitaan is a valid conveyance only insofar as the share
of Sixto Medrano in the co-ownership is concerned. Thus, the respondent court erred in declaring the ownership of the entire 1,695-square meter
property sold by Sixto, in favor of the private respondents.

The next question is what is the area of the pro indiviso share pertaining to Sixto Medrano that was sold to private respondents? The trial court
endeavored to determine the same by ascertaining the inheritance of each of the heirs of Leocadio. However, the manner of partition as set out by
the trial court in the text of its decision needs to be amended so as to conform to the laws on intestate succession under the Old Civil Code absent
any allegation or showing that Leocadio left any last will and testament.
 It is not disputed that the 2,342-square meter property was a conjugal property of Leocadio and Emiliana. Upon the death of Emiliana, which
occurred many years before the death of Leocadio in 1945, both deaths occurring before the enactment of the New Civil Code in 1950, all the four
children of the first marriage and the four children of the second marriage shall share equally. The subject property should have been divided into
eight equal parts, pursuant to Articles 921 and 931 of the old Civil Code,[47] or 292.75 square meters each. The respective heirs of the now
deceased children of Leocadio inherit by way of representation the respective shares of their respective parents, pursuant to Articles 933 and 934 of
the Old Civil Code.[48]

At the time of death of Leocadio in 1945, Miguela was entitled only to the usufruct of the land pursuant to Article 834 of the Old Civil
Code,[49] which provides that [i]f only one legitimate child or descendant survives, the widower or widow shall have the usufruct of the third available
for betterment, such child or descendant to have the naked ownership until, on the death of the surviving spouse, the whole title is merged in him.
Thus, to recapitulate, each of the heirs of Leocadio should inherit 292.75 square meters, pro-indiviso (2,342 square meters 8 = 292.75 square
meters) after deducting from the original 2,611 square meters of the subject property the 269 square meters ceded to the heirs of Maria Bacong in a
compromise agreement among the petitioners and the heirs of Maria Bacong. The deceased children of Leocadio are represented by their
respective heirs by right of representation under Articles 933 and 934 of the Old Civil Code.

Accordingly, the undivided shares of Leocadios eight children or their heirs by right of representation, upon the death of Leocadio in 1945 are
as follows:

(1) Venancio Medrano - 292.75 square meters

(2) Leonila Medrano - 292.75 square meters
(3) Antonio Medrano - 292.75 square meters
(4) Cecilia Medrano - 292.75 square meters
(5) Heirs of Gertrudes M. Aguirre, Telesforo, Reynaldo, Remedios, Alfredo and Belen, all surnamed
Aguirre- - 292.75 square meters
(6) Heirs of Isabel M. Magtibay, Vicenta, Horacio and Florencio, all surnamed Magtibay - 292.75
square meters
(7) Heirs of Placido Medrano, plaintiff Zosima Medrano Quimbao - 292.75 square meters
(8) Sixto Medrano - 292.75 square meters

During the pendency of the case in the trial court but after the death of Sixto, petitioners sold 460 square meters to one Mateo
Castillo. Consequently, the 460 square meters should be charged against the shares of petitioners only and should not affect the 292.75 square
meters undivided share of Sixto Medrano which he had sold in 1959.[50] Accordingly, 460 square meters divided by 7 equals 65.71 square
meters. Deducting said area from 292.75 square meters, the final undivided share of each of the seven heirs of Leocadio should be 227.04 square
meters (292.75 - 65.71 = 227.04) and that pertaining to Sixto in 292.75 square meters.

Thus, the manner of partition set forth by the trial court in its decision should be amended, as follows:

(1) Gertrudes M. Aguirre, deceased, represented by her children, herein petitioners Telesforo, Reynaldo,
Remedios, Alfredo and Belen, all surnamed Aguirre - 227.04 square meters
 (2) Isabel M. Magtibay, deceased, represented by her children, herein petitioners Vicenta, Horacio and
Florencio, all surnamed Magtibay - 227.04 square meters
(3) Placido Medrano, deceased, represented by his only child, Placido Medrano - 227.04 square meters
(4) Private respondents Maria Rosales and heirs of Tiburcio Balitaan, namely: Elias, Jose, Arsenia and
Rogelio all surnamed Balitaan (in lieu of Sixto Medrano) - 292.75 square meters
(5) Venancio Medrano - 227.04 square meters
(6) Leonila Medrano - 227.04 square meters
(7) Antonio Medrano - 227.04 square meters
(8) Cecilia Medrano - 227.04 square meters
(9) Rosendo Bacong - 269 square meters
(10) Mateo Castillo - 460 square meters

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 42350, dated July 26, 1995,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

The sale in favor of private respondents is declared VALID but only insofar as the 292.75 square meters undivided share of Sixto Medrano in
the subject property is concerned.

Let the parcel of land, located at Aplaya, Bauan, Batangas, consisting of 2,611 square meters, be partitioned and distributed as determined by
the Court in the text of herein decision.Accordingly, let the records of the case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City (Branch 2)
in Civil Case No. 202 for further appropriate proceedings under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.