Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL,
ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed ABISTO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case mandatory or
directory?

Statement of the Case

The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not
deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed
this petition to set aside the Decision 1 promulgated on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent Resolution 2 promulgated on
November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court of Appeals 3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the
challenged Decision reads: 4

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside, and a new
one entered confirming the registration and title of applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident of
Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, now deceased and substituted by Margarita, Marissa,
Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa Abistado,
Filipinos, residents of Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to the parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-
A-8) 315-D located in Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.

The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private oppositor are hereby dismissed for
want of evidence.

Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes due on this land, let an order
for the issuance of a decree be issued.

The Facts

On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title
over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529. 5 The application was docketed as Land
Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro. 6However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence, his heirs — Margarita, Marissa,
Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado — represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was
appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.

The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition "for want of jurisdiction."
However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938.

In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned: 7

. . . However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529,
requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. "E") in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines. Exhibit "E" was only published in the Official Gazette (Exhibits "F" and "G"). Consequently,
 the Court is of the well considered view that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant application
for want of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation.

The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982, which in its pertinent portion
provides:8

It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD 1529] has a two-fold purpose; the
first, which is mentioned in the provision of the aforequoted provision refers to publication in the Official
Gazette, and is jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned in the opening clause of the same
paragraph, refers to publication not only in the Official Gazette but also in a newspaper of general circulation,
and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is dispensable. As to the first, publication in the Official Gazette is
indispensably necessary because without it, the court would be powerless to assume jurisdiction over a
particular land registration case. As to the second, publication of the notice of initial hearing also in a
newspaper of general circulation is indispensably necessary as a requirement of procedural due process;
otherwise, any decision that the court may promulgate in the case would be legally infirm.

Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which, as earlier explained, set aside
the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.

The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA Resolution dared November 19,
1991.

The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to us. This Court notes
that the petitioner's counsel anchored his petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on
Rule 45 because he is appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition as
one for review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65. 9

The Issue

Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed "grave abuse of discretion" 10 in holding —

. . . that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86 need not be published in a
newspaper of general circulation, and in not dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such publication.

Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing shall be "published both in the
Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation." According to petitioner, publication in the Official
Gazette is "necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and . . . in . . . a newspaper of general circulation
to comply with the notice requirement of due process." 11

Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the requirement of publication in a
newspaper of general circulation is a mere "procedural defect." They add that publication in the Official Gazette
is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 12

In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals ruled: 13

. . . although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation is
couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal force that
publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.

Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity "to explain matters fully and
present their side." Thus, it justified its disposition in this wise: 14

. . . We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required procedure prejudiced them in any way.
Moreover, the other requirements of: publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and
posting at the site and other conspicuous places, were complied with and these are sufficient to notify any
party who is minded to make any objection of the application for registration.
 The Court's Ruling

We find for petitioner.

Newspaper Publication Mandatory

The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring publication of the notice of initial
hearing reads as follows:

Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. — The court shall, within five days from filing of the
application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than
forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.

The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1)
publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.

1. By publication. —

Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land
Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once
in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the
Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to
all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as
known, and "to all whom it may concern." Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear
in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.

xxx xxx xxx

Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that publication in the Official Gazette
suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court. However, the question boils down to whether,
absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court can validly confirm and
register the title of private respondents.

We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of statutory construction and the
due process rationale behind the publication requirement.

The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon
the latter's receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and
thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. 15 While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule
in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the
present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan, 16 the Court
through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by
means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with. "If the intention of the law
were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons
named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the
land." Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general
circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such requirement in its detailed provision.

It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. 17 Being in rem, such proceeding requires
constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the
property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be
complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose rights may be adversely affected would be barred
from contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner seeking the
inscription of realty in the land registration court must prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his
ownership thereof but the identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an action for
recovery of realty. 18 He must prove his title against the whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can
best be achieved when all persons concerned — nay, "the whole world" — who have rights to or interests in the
subject property are notified and effectively invited to come to court and show cause why the application should not be
granted. The elementary norms of due process require that before the claimed property is taken from concerned
parties and registered in the name of the applicant, said parties must be given notice and opportunity to oppose.
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory when the
law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which
have already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official
Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that
the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may
not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-
encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the
whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory
construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.

Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law. Private respondents
did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered because the statute itself allows no
excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is
unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear
and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for
application. 19There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents must be
dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied
with.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The application of private respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992

OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners,

vs.
ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C.
PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF
ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES,
VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-
DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig,
Metro Manila, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside: (a) the decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 dated April 29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 14010 entitled "Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v.
Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C. Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual,
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al." which dismissed the petition and in effect affirmed the decision of the trial court and
(b) the resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio
Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).

Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural,
adopted or spurious children and was survived by the following:

(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;

(b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the deceased, to wit:

Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista
Manuel C. Pascual
Jose C. Pascual
Susana C. Pascual-Bautista
Erlinda C. Pascual
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.

(c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased, to wit:

Avelino Pascual
Isoceles Pascual
Loida Pascual-Martinez
Virginia Pascual-Ner
Nona Pascual-Fernando
Octavio Pascual
Geranaia Pascual-Dubert;

(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the deceased, to
wit:

Olivia S. Pascual
Hermes S. Pascual

(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased and represented
by the following:

Dominga M. Pascual
Mamerta P. Fugoso
Abraham S. Sarmiento, III
Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay
Eleuterio P. Sarmiento
Domiga P. San Diego
Nelia P. Marquez
Silvestre M. Pascual
Eleuterio M. Pascual
(Rollo, pp. 46-47)

Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for administration of the
intestate estate of her late husband (Rollo, p. 47).

On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental Petition to the Petition for letters of
Administration, where she expressly stated that Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don
Andres Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).

On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit, to the effect that of her own
knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood brother of her late husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie the
statement made by the oppositors, that they were are not among the known heirs of the deceased Don Andres
Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).
On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the
vehement objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual, although paragraph V of
such compromise agreement provides, to wit:

This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the above-entitled
proceedings until the final determination thereof by the court, or by another compromise
agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual as legal heirs of the
deceased, Don Andres Pascual. (Rollo, p. 108)

The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners
Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres
Pascual, their uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112).

On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 113-114) and the
Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 116-130).

On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina issued an order,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it is hereby resolved to Deny this
motion reiterating the hereditary rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual (Rollo, p. 136).

On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 515-526). and such motion was
denied.

Petitioner appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 14010 (Rollo, p. 15.).

On Aril 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision the decision the dispositive part of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 38)

Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said decision and on July 14, 1988, the Court of Appeals
issued its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 42).

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given due course.

The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.

Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article 992 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized and of the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC (150 SCRA
645 [1987]) because being acknowledged natural children, their illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a
prior marriage when such children were under conception (Rollo, p. 418).

Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children as provided in Article 992 must be strictly construed to
refer only to spurious children (Rollo, p. 419).

On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein petitioners are within the prohibition of Article 992 of
the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC is applicable to them.

The petition is devoid of merit.

Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:

 An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of
his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child.

The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, supra, where this Court ruled that:

Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of
the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate
child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of
which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the
product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than
recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.

Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.

Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding that petitioners herein
cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent
Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.

In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the light of Articles 902 and 989 of the Civil Code
allows them (Olivia and Hermes) to represent Eligio Pascual in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual.

On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC, this Court further elucidated the successional rights
of illegitimate children, which squarely answers the questions raised by the petitioner on this point.

The Court held:

Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of illegitimate children, which
rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these
illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or
illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be
represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this
matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants
of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by
petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue
of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants
shall inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate
succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation
which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to the instant
case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate
child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state
Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.

The rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right
of representation" and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are transmitted
upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the
limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. (Amicus Curiae's
Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
182 SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).

Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an elementary
rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their
meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what
is says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent
of the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not
susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh
or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the
same as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language
fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception.
Thus, where a general rule is established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by
implication (Samson v. C.A., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).

Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.

Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one category,
which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not acknowledged natural children should be treated
differently, in the negative.

It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.

Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R. Rosete and Solicitor O. C.
Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:

The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether or not the
appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a
sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. We hold that it
does not.

The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14, 1962 reading as
follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in connection with
Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further
amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows: That on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the
City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession
and under his custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6)
rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the
corresponding authorities. Contrary to law."

When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the outset asked the counsel for
the accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accused was found in possession of the gun involved in this case,
that he has neither a permit or license to possess the same and that we can submit the same on a question of
law whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit issued by the Philippine
Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he would not question the authenticity of
his exhibits, the understanding being that only a question of law would be submitted for decision, he explicitly
specified such question to be "whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm."
Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he could pass on their
authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with
six rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information was found in his possession on August 13, 1962, in the
City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license or permit thereof from the corresponding
authority?" The accused, now the appellant, answered categorically: "Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the lower
court made a statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused
admits."

Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision." Counsel for the accused on
his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste,"
then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962;1 another document likewise issued by Gov. Leviste also
addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential
mission;2the oath of office of the accused as such secret agent,3 a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect
that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste.4 Counsel for the accused then stated that with the
presentation of the above exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on the question of whether or not a secret
agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt from the requirement of having a
license of firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties were given time to file their respective
memoranda. 1äwphï1.ñët

Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the crime of
illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two
years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of the
Government."

The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must be affirmed.

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . .
possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition."5 The next section provides
that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons,
municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers,
municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in
possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties."6

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our task is
equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come
only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them."7 The conviction of
the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.

Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the
assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and
order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent
even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not
within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the extent
therefore that this decision conflicts with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks with
authority.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ.,
concur.

Footnotes

1 Exhibit 1.

2 Exhibit 2.

3 Exhibit 3.
 4 Exhibit 4.

5 Sec. 878 as amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.

6 Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.

7 Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico, (1913) 24 Phil. 504, 513.

8 L-12088, December 23, 1959.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 116719 January 18, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PATRICIO AMIGO alias "BEBOT", accused-appellant.

DECISION

MELO, J.:

Initially, Patricio Amigo was charged with frustrated murder in an Information reading as follows:

The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime of FRUSTRATED MURDER, under
Art. 248, in relation to Art. 5 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about December 29, 1989, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, armed with a knife, with treachery and evident
premeditation and with intent to kill wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and stab with
said weapon one Benito Ng Suy, thereby inflicting injuries upon the latter, the following injuries, to wit:

MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS-LEFT ARM, LEFT CHEST, ABDOMEN AND LEFT THIGH WITH
PENETRATION TO LEFT PLEURAL CAVITY, DIAPHRAGM STOMACH, DUODENUM,
PANCREAS AND MIDTRANVERSE COLON.

thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder as a
consequence but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is,
because of the timely and able medical assistance immediately rendered to the said Benito Ng Suy.

(p. 1, Rollo.)

to which he pleaded not guilty.

Subsequently, due to the death of the victim, an amended Information was filed charging now the crime of
murder, to wit:

That on or about December 29, 1989, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, armed with a knife, with treachery and evident
premeditation and with intent to kill wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and stabbed
with said weapon one Benito Ng Suy, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple wounds which caused his
death and the consequent loss and damage to the heirs of the victim.
 (p. 3, Rollo.)

After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a decision, disposing:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Patricio Amigo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER punishable under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with no modifying circumstance
present, the accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, which is the medium
period of the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum to death and to pay the cost; to indemnify the
offended party the amount of P93,214.70 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as compensatory
damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages.

(p. 32, Rollo.)

Reversal thereof is now sought, with accused-appellant arguing that error was committed by the trial court in
imposing or meting out the penalty of reclusion perpetua against him despite the fact that Sec. 19 (1), Article III
of the 1987 Constitution was already in effect when the offense was committed.

The facts of the case, as briefly summarized in the brief submitted by the Office of the Solicitor General and as
borne out by the evidence, are as follows:

On December 29, 1989, at around 1:00 P.M., after having spent half-day at their store, located at No.
166-A, Ramon Magsaysay Avenue, Davao City, Benito Ng Suy was driving their gray Ford Fiera back
home, situated at the back of Car Asia, Bajada, Davao City. With him during that time were his
daughters, Jocelyn Ng Suy and a younger one together with his two year old son, who were all seated at
the front seat beside him while a five year old boy was also seated at the back of the said vehicle. (TSN,
April 29, 1991, pp. 3-5; TSN, March 31, 1992)

On their way home and while traversing the National Highway of Bajada, Davao City, an orange Toyota
Tamaraw driven by one Virgilio Abogada, suddenly made a left turn in front of the Regional Hospital,
Bajada, Davao City, without noticing the Ford Fiera coming from the opposite direction. This Tamaraw
was heading for Sterlyn Kitchenette, which was situated at the comer of the said hospital. (TSN, April 29,
1991, p. 4; TSN, March 31, 1992, pp. 3 and 13)

With Virgilio was Patricio Amigo alias Bebot, a vulcanizer at Lingling's vulcanizing shop owned and
operated by a certain Galadua. He was also seated at the right front seat beside Virgilio.

Due to the unexpected veer made by Virgilio, an accidental head on collision occurred between the Fiera
and the Tamaraw, causing a slight damaged to the right bumper of the latter. (TSN, March 31, 1992, p.
4)

Right after the collision, Benito immediately alighted from the driver's seat and confronted Virgilio
Abogada who also went down from his vehicle. (TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 5)

Benito, who was a big man with a loud voice told Virgilio, "You were not looking," to which Virgilio
retorted, I did not see you". (TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 16)

While the two drivers where having this verbal confrontation, Patricio who was merely a passenger of
Virgilio also alighted from the front seat of the Tamaraw and instantaneously approached Benito and
advised the latter to leave since it was merely a small and minor accident. (TSN, April 29, 1991, pp. 16-
18)

A bit irritated with the actuation exhibit by Patricio, Benito rebuked the former and told him not to
interfere, since he had nothing to do with the accident. (ibid. p. 7)

Irked by the comment made by Benito, Patricio sarcastically asked; "You are Chinese, is it you?" With a
ready answer Benito said; "Yes, I am a Chinese and why?" Patricio in turn replied; So, you are a
Chinese, wait for a while," then left. (ibid. pp. 7 and 19)

Immediately thereafter, Benito ordered Jocelyn to call a policeman, but after a lapsed of about one
minute, Patricio returned and arrogantly approached Benito, asking the latter once again, "You are a
Chinese, is it not?" To this Benito calmly responded in the affirmative. (ibid. pp. 7, 19-20)
 Upon hearing the response, Patricio mumbled "Ah, so you are a Chinese," and suddenly took a five inch
knife from his waist and simultaneously stabbed Benito hitting him twice on the chest. (Ibid. p. 20)

After being hit, Benito wounded and sensing that his life was in peril, tried to evade his assailant by
pushing Patricio away and run around the Tamaraw but Patricio wielding the same knife and not content
with the injuries he had already inflicted, still chased Benito and upon overtaking the latter embraced him
and thrusted his knife on the victim several times, the last of which hit Benito on the left side of his body.
(ibid. pp. 8, 10, 22)

It was at this juncture that Jocelyn who was still inside the Ford Fiera, pleading for mercy to spare her
father tried to get out of the vehicle but it was very unfortunate that she could not open its door. (Ibid. p.
10)

Knowing that Patricio was really determined to kill her father by refusing to heed her pleas, Joselyn
shouted for help, since there were already several people around witnessing that fatal incident, but to her
consternation nobody lifted a single finger to help them. (ibid. pp. 6, 10, 18, 21-22) Only after her father
lay seated on the floor of their Ford Fiera after being hit on the left side of his body that she was able to
open the door of the said vehicle. (Ibid. p 12)

After this precise moment, her younger sister, upon seeing their father bathing with his own blood,
embraced him, causing Patricio to cease from his ferocious assault and noticing the presence of several
people, he fled. (Ibid. p. 22)

Thereafter, an enraged Jocelyn chased him, but since the assailant ran faster than her, she was not able
to overtake him, thus, she instead decided to go back to where her father was and carried him inside the
Tamaraw who bumped them and consequently brought him to San Pedro Hospital where he was
attended to at the Emergency Room. (ibid. p 13)

While at the Emergency Room, Benito who was on a very critical condition, due to multiple (13) stabbed
wounds, was operated by Dr. Rolando Chiu. After the operation, he was subsequently brought to the
ICU and stayed there for three (3) weeks. (July 12, 1991, pp. 3 and 4)

In a last ditch effort to save his life, having only 10 to 20 percent survival, Benito was airlifted to Manila
and was directly confined at the Chinese General Hospital. After three (3) weeks of confinement, Benito
expired. CAUSE OF DEATH — SEPSIS (an overwhelming infection). This means that the infection has
already circulated in the blood all over the body. (ibid. pp. 6-7)

(pp. 59-65, Rollo.)

Accused-appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the promulgation of Republic Act No.
7659, the death penalty had been abolished and hence, the penalty that should have been imposed for the
crime of murder committed by accused-appellant without the attendance of any modifying circumstances, should
be reclusion temporal in its medium period or 17 years, 4 months and 1 day, to 20 years of reclusion temporal.

Reasons out accused-appellant:

. . . Since the death penalty (or capital punishment) is not imposable when the stabbing and killing
happened, the computation of the penalty should be regarded from reclusion perpetua down and not
from death penalty. Indeed, the appropriate penalty is deducible from reclusion perpetua down
to reclusion temporal in its medium period. Hence, there being no modifying circumstances present (p. 5
Decision, ibid.), the correct penalty should be in the medium period (Art. 64, par. 1, Revised Penal Code)
which is 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal.

(p. 10, Appellant's Brief, ff. p. 50, Rollo.)

The question raised by accused-appellant was settled by this Court in People vs. Muñoz (170 SCRA 107 [1989])
thusly:

In People vs. Gavarra, Justice Pedro L. Yap declared for the Court that "in view of the abolition of the
death penalty under Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be imposed for
murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua," thereby eliminating death as
the original maximum period. Later, without categorically saying so, the Court, through Justice Ameurfina
A. Melencio-Herrera in People vs. Masangkay and through Justice Andres R. Narvasa in People
vs. Atencio, divided the modified penalty into three new periods, the limits of which were specified by
Justice Edgardo L. Paras in People vs. Intino, as follows: the lower half of reclusion temporal maximum
as the minimum; the upper half of reclusion temporal maximum as the medium; and reclusion
perpetua as the maximum.

The Court has reconsidered the above cases and, after extended discussion, come to the conclusion
that the doctrine announced therein does not reflect the intention of the framers as embodied in Article
III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution. This conclusion is not unanimous, to be sure. Indeed, there is much
to be said of the opposite view, which was in fact shared by many of those now voting for its reversal.
The majority of the Court, however, is of the belief that the original interpretation should be restored as
the more acceptable reading of the constitutional provision in question.

The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution abolished the death penalty and
thereby limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium.
These should now be divided into three new periods in keeping with the three-grade scheme intended by
the legislature. Those who disagree feel that Article III, Section 19(1) merely prohibits the imposition of
the death penalty and has not, by reducing it to reclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the
remaining penalties. These should be maintained intact.

A reading of Section 19(1) of Article III will readily show that here is really nothing therein which
expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty
shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter
provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while
rather awkward, is still plain enough. And it is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language
under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the
records of the constitutional convention, for its interpretation.

xxx xxx xxx

The question as we see it is not whether the framers intended to abolish the death penalty or merely to
prevent its imposition. Whatever the intention was, what we should determine is whether or not they also
meant to require a corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of the prohibition against
the death penalty.

It is definite that such a requirement, if there really was one, is not at all expressed in Article III, Section
19(1) of the Constitution or indicated therein by at least clear and unmistakable implication. It would have
been so easy, assuming such intention, to state it categorically and plainly, leaving no doubts as to its
meaning.

One searches in vain for such a statement, express or even implied. The writer of this opinion makes the
personal observation that this might be still another instance where the framers meant one thing and
said another or — strangely, considering their loquacity elsewhere — did not say enough.

The original ruling as applied in the Gavarra, Masangkay, Atencio and Intino cases represented the
unanimous thinking of the Court as it was then constituted. All but two members at that time still sit on
the Court today. If we have seen fit to take a second look at the doctrine on which we were all agreed
before, it is not because of a change in the composition of this body. It is virtually the same Court that is
changing its mind after reflecting on the question again in the light of new perspectives. And well it might,
and can, for the tenets it lays down are not immutable. The decisions of this Court are not petrified rules
grown rigid once pronounced but vital, growing things subject to change as all life is. While we are told
that the trodden path is best, this should not prevent us from opening a fresh trial or exploring the other
side or testing a new idea in a spirit of continuing inquiry.

Accordingly, with the hope that "as judges, (we) will be equal to (our) tasks," whatever that means, we
hereby reverse the current doctrine providing for three new periods for the penalty for murder as reduced
by the Constitution. Instead, we return to our original interpretation and hold that Article III, Section 19(1)
does not change the periods of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except
only insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The
range of the medium and minimum penalties remains unchanged.
 The Court realizes that this interpretation may lead to certain inequities that would not have arisen under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code before its modification. Thus, a person originally subject to the
death penalty and another who committed the murder without the attendance of any modifying
circumstance will now be both punishable with the same medium period although the former is
concededly more guilty than the latter. True enough. But that is the will not of this Court but of the
Constitution. That is a question of wisdom, not construction. Of some relevance perhaps is the parable in
the Bible of the workman who was paid the stipulated daily wage of one penny although he had worked
longer than others hired later in the day also paid the same amount. When he complained because he
felt unjustly treated by the hoe jurisdiction of the court over the person. An appearance may be madt
agree with me for a penny?

The problem in any event is addressed not to this Court but to the Congress. Penalties are prescribed by
statute and are essentially and exclusively legislative. As judges, we can only interpret and apply them
and have no authority to modify them or revise their range as determined exclusively by the legislature.
We should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body.

Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no generic aggravating or mitigating
circumstance attending the commission of the offenses, the applicable sentence is the medium period of
the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which, conformably to the new doctrine
here adopted and announced, is still reclusion perpetua. This is the penalty we imposed on all the
accused-appellants for each of the three murders they have committed in conspiracy with the others.
The award of civil indemnity for the heirs of each of the victims is affirmed but the amount thereof is
hereby increased to P30,000.00 in line with the present policy.

(at pp. 120-125.)

The above ruling was reiterated in People vs. Parominog (203 SCRA 673 [1991]) and in People vs. De la
Cruz (216 SCRA 476 [1992]).

Finally, accused-appellant claims that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harsh a penalty and
pleads for sympathy. Courts are not the forum to plead for sympathy. The duty of courts is to apply the law,
disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for an accused. DURA LEX SED LEX. The remedy is elsewhere —
clemency from the executive or an amendment of the law by the legislative, but surely, at this point, this Court
can but apply the law.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed,
insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and
personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." 1

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages,
attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and
other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled
from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. 2 The transcript reads as follows:

Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) — Good Afternoon M'am.

Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) — Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na

kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano
ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.

CHUCHI — Kasi, naka duty ako noon.

ESG — Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)

CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon
—

ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi
hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang
babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung
kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin
makakahingi.

CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00
p.m.

ESG — Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel.

Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka
nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako.
Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).

CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.

ESG — Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.
 ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on your
own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply
alam kong hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng exam noon.

ESG — Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo

ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako.

CHUCHI — Eh, di sana —

ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo
ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.

CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako.

ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano
ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo
ang mga magulang ko.

ESG — Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka

puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.

CHUCHI — Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.

ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka

makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin,
dahil tapos ka na.

CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.

ESG — Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no,
nilapastangan mo ako.

CHUCHI — Paano kita nilapastanganan?

ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas

ka na. Magsumbong ka. 3

As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation
was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of
Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private
communication, and other purposes." An information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated
October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:

INFORMATION

The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act
No. 4200, committed as follows:

That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named
accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to record
the latter's conversation with said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder secretly record the said
conversation and thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the said
recording to other person.
 Contrary to law.

Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.

MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal

Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial
court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense
under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a
person other than a participant to the communication. 4

From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which
forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.

On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court's
order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:

[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In
thus quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an
offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. 5

Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent Court of
Appeals denied in its Resolution 6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200
does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that the
provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than those involved in the
communication. 8 In relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged
in the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner agues
that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently,
her act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10

We disagree.

First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute
is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted
to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of
Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie
or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the
parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The
law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other
than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as
respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his
private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this
provision of R.A. 4200.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's conclusion that in
enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private
conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons. Thus:
 xxx xxx xxx

Senator Tañada: That qualified only "overhear".

Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy would not
appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not made by all the parties
but by some parties and involved not criminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but
would cover, for example civil cases or special proceedings whereby a recording is made not
necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent of the parties
because the actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the
act may be indicative of their intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would you say, Your
Honor, that the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?

Senator Tañada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.

Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense but as
evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?

Senator Tañada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations taken
without the authorization of all the parties.

Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?

Senator Tañada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the observation of
one without his knowing it and then using it against him. It is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the
purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties should
know that the observations are being recorded.

Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.

Senator Tañada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board of directors
where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties know. It is but fair
that the people whose remarks and observations are being made should know that the
observations are being recorded.

Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.

Senator Tañada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please be informed
that whatever you say here may be used against you." That is fairness and that is what we
demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging statements against his own interest,
well, he cannot complain any more. But if you are going to take a recording of the observations
and remarks of a person without him knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without him
knowing that what is being recorded may be used against him, I think it is unfair.

xxx xxx xxx

(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)

Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as now
worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized under Section 1?
Because the speech is public, but the recording is done secretly.

Senator Tañada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the
communication between one person and another person — not between a speaker and a public.

xxx xxx xxx

(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)

xxx xxx xxx

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from
the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision
seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one
does not distinguish.

Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same
need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated
therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of
a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General
pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before
one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person
should be professed." 14

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not
include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of
absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In
its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which meanings or
thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or
gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February
22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the
legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the
terms "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to
the bill quoted below:

It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their conversations being
overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as well the undeniable
fact that most, if not all, civilized people have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to
expose. Free conversations are often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable
falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to be taken seriously.
The right to the privacy of communication, among others, has expressly been assured by our
Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must have recognized the
nature of conversations between individuals and the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions of
life are to be found in the unaudited, and free exchange of communication between individuals —
free from every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means. 17

In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held
that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization did
not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)"
enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused." 20 The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a
violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording"
of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.

WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us with
no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo JJ., concur.

Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992

GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IMELDA SALAZAR, respondents.

Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner.

Gerardo S. Alansalon for private respondent.

ROMERO, J.:

For private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, it would seem that her close association with Delfin Saldivar would
mean the loss of her job. In May 1982, private respondent was employed by Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio
Corporation (GMCR) as general systems analyst. Also employed by petitioner as manager for technical
operations' support was Delfin Saldivar with whom private respondent was allegedly very close.

Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company equipment and spare parts worth
thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were missing, caused the investigation of the latter's
activities. The report dated September 25, 1984 prepared by the company's internal auditor, Mr. Agustin
Maramara, indicated that Saldivar had entered into a partnership styled Concave Commercial and Industrial
Company with Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager of Elecon Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier of
petitioner often recommended by Saldivar. The report also disclosed that Saldivar had taken petitioner's missing
Fedders airconditioning unit for his own personal use without authorization and also connived with Yambao to
defraud petitioner of its property. The airconditioner was recovered only after petitioner GMCR filed an action for
replevin against Saldivar. 1

It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that Imelda Salazar violated company reglations
by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the company's interests. Evidence showed that she signed as
a witness to the articles of partnership between Yambao and Saldivar. It also appeared that she had full
knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of the Fedders airconditioner but failed to inform her employer.

Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, petitioner company placed private respondent Salazar under
preventive suspension for one (1) month, effective October 9, 1984, thus giving her thirty (30) days within which
to, explain her side. But instead of submitting an explanations three (3) days later or on October 12, 1984 private
respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal suspension, which she subsequently amended to
include illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay and damages, after petitioner notified
her in writing that effective November 8, 1984, she was considered dismissed "in view of (her) inability to refute
and disprove these findings. 2

After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated July 16, 1985, ordered petitioner company to reinstate
private respondent to her former or equivalent position and to pay her full backwages and other benefits she
would have received were it not for the illegal dismissal. Petitioner was also ordered to pay private respondent
moral damages of P50,000.00. 3

On appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations, Commission in the questioned resolution dated
December 29, 1987 affirmed the aforesaid decision with respect to the reinstatement of private respondent but
limited the backwages to a period of two (2) years and deleted the award for moral damages. 4
Hence, this petition assailing the Labor Tribunal for having committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that
the suspension and subsequent dismissal of private respondent were illegal and in ordering her reinstatement
with two (2) years' backwages.

On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for petitioner GMCR.

The inestigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin Saldivar's acts in conflict with his position as
technical operations manager, necessitated immediate and decisive action on any employee closely, associated
with Saldivar. The suspension of Salazar was further impelled by th.e discovery of the missing Fedders
airconditioning unit inside the apartment private respondent shared with Saldivar. Under such circumstances,
preventive suspension was the proper remedial recourse available to the company pending Salazar's
investigation. By itself, preventive suspension does, not signify that the company has adjudged the employee
guilty of the charges she was asked to answer and explain. Such disciplinary measure is resorted to for the
protection of the company's property pending investigation any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed
by the employee. 5

Thus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated Salazar's right to due process when she
was promptly suspended. If at all, the fault, lay with private respondent when she ignored petitioner's
memorandum of October 8, 1984 "giving her ample opportunity to present (her) side to the Management."
Instead, she went directly to the Labor Department and filed her complaint for illegal suspension without giving
her employer a chance to evaluate her side of the controversy.

But while we agree with the propriety of Salazar's preventive suspension, we hold that her eventual separation
from employment was not for cause.

What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful dismissal so as to "make whole" the victim who has not merely
lost her job which, under settled Jurisprudence, is a property right of which a person is not to be deprived without
due process, but also the compensation that should have accrued to her during the period when she was
unemployed?

Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:

Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the
services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee
who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld
from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. 6 (Emphasis supplied)

Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code:

Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employments, the employer shall not terminate
the services of an employee except for a just cause as provided in the Labor Code or when
authorized by existing laws.

Sec. 3. Reinstatement. — An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall by entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to backwages." 7 (Emphasis supplied)

Before proceeding any furthers, it needs must be recalled that the present Constitution has gone further than the
1973 Charter in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including labor.
Given the pro-poor orientation of several articulate Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, it
was not surprising that a whole new Article emerged on Social Justice and Human Rights designed, among
other things, to "protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and
political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
common good." 8 Proof of the priority accorded to labor is that it leads the other areas of concern in the Article on Social Justice, viz., Labor ranks
ahead of such topics as Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform, Urban Land Roform and Housing, Health, Women, Role and Rights of Poople's
Organizations and Human Rights. 9

The opening paragraphs on Labor states

The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized,
and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
 It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with
law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage.
They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and
benefits is may be provided by law. 10 (Emphasis supplied)

Compare this with the sole.provision on Labor in the 1973 Constitution under the Article an Declaration of
Principles and State Policies that provides:

Sec. 9. The state shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. The State shall ensure the rights of workers to self-
organization, collective baegaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.
The State may provide for compulsory arbitration. 11

To be sure, both Charters recognize "security of tenure" as one of the rights of labor which the State is
mandated to protect. But there is no gainsaying the fact that the intent of the framers of the present Constitution
was to give primacy to the rights of labor and afford the sector "full protection," at least greater protection than
heretofore accorded them, regardless of the geographical location of the workers and whether they are
organized or not.

It was then CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who substantially contributed to the
present formulation of the protection to labor provision and proposed that the same be incorporated in the Article
on Social Justice and not just in the Article on Declaration of Principles and State Policies "in the light of the
special importance that we are giving now to social justice and the necessity of emphasizing the scope and role
of social justice in national development." 12

If we have taken pains to delve into the background of the labor provisions in our Constitution and the Labor
Code, it is but to stress that the right of an employee not to be dismissed from his job except for a just or
authorized cause provided by law has assumed greater importance under the 1987 Constitution with the singular
prominence labor enjoys under the article on Social Justice. And this transcendent policy has been translated
into law in the Labor Code. Under its terms, where a case of unlawful or unauthorized dismissal has been
proved by the aggrieved employee, or on the other hand, the employer whose duty it is to prove the lawfulness
or justness of his act of dismissal has failed to do so, then the remedies provided in Article 279 should find,
application. Consonant with this liberalized stance vis-a-vis labor, the legislature even went further by enacting
Republic Act No. 6715 which took effect on March 2, 1989 that amended said Article to remove any possible
ambiguity that jurisprudence may have generated which watered down the constitutional intent to grant to labor
"full protection." 13

To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence to show an authorized, much less a legal, cause for the
dismissal of private respondent, she had every right, not only to be entitled to reinstatement, but ay well, to full
backwages." 14

The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment of backwages is, in the
former, to restore the dismissed employee to her status before she lost her job, for the dictionary meaning of the
word "reinstate" is "to restore to a state, conditione positions etc. from which one had been removed" 15 and in the
latter, to give her back the income lost during the period of unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past, would
perforce make her "whole."

Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been thwarted when reinstatement has not been forthcoming
and the hapless dismissed employee finds himself on the outside looking in.

Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the Court for denying reinstatement under the facts of
the case and the law applicable thereto; that reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the long passage
of time (22 years of litigation) or because of the realities of the situation; 16 or that it would be "inimical to the
employer's interest; " 17 or that reinstatement may no longer be feasible; 18 or, that it will not serve the best interests of
the parties involved; 19 or that the company would be prejudiced by the workers' continued employment; 20 or that it will
not serve any prudent purpose as when supervening facts have transpired which make execution on that score unjust
or inequitable 21 or, to an increasing extent, due to the resultant atmosphere of "antipathy and antagonism" or "strained
relations" or "irretrievable estrangement" between the employer and the employee. 22
In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered the payment of backwages and separation pay 23 or
solely separation pay. 24

In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. In the first place the wording of the Labor Code is
clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement. . .
. and to his full backwages. . . ." 25 Under the principlesof statutory construction, if a statute is clears plain and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning
rule or verba legis derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid
presumption that the words employed by, the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude
the court from construing it differently. 26 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to:have used
words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. 27 Verba legis
non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure. Neither does the provision admit of
any qualification. If in the wisdom of the Court, there may be a ground or grounds for non-application of the above-
cited provision, this should be by way of exception, such as when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to
ensuing strained relations between the employer and the employee.

In such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a position where he enjoys the trust
and confidence of his employer; and that it is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism
may be generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and productivity of the employee concerned.

A few examples, will suffice to illustrate the Court's application of the above principles: where the employee is a
Vice-President for Marketing and as such, enjoys the full trust and confidence of top management; 28 or is the
Officer-In-Charge of the extension office of the bank where he works; 29 or is an organizer of a union who was in a
position to sabotage the union's efforts to organize the workers in commercial and industrial establishments; 30 or is a
warehouseman of a non-profit organization whose primary purpose is to facilitate and maximize voluntary gifts. by
foreign individuals and organizations to the Philippines; 31 or is a manager of its Energy Equipment Sales. 32

Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately. Otherwisey reinstatement can
never be possible simply because some hostility is invariably engendered between the parties as a result of
litigation. That is human nature. 33

Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting one's right; otherwise an
employee who shall assert his right could be easily separated from the service, by merely paying his separation
pay on the pretext that his relationship with his employer had already become strained. 34

Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as systems analyst is one that may be
characterized as a position of trust and confidence such that if reinstated, it may well lead to strained relations
between employer and employee. Hence, this does not constitute an exception to the general rule mandating
reinstatement for an employee who has been unlawfully dismissed.

On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence reposed in her by engaging in transactions that may have
created conflict of interest situations? Petitioner GMCR points out that as a matter of company policy, it prohibits
its employees from involving themselves with any company that has business dealings with GMCR.
Consequently, when private respondent Salazar signed as a witness to the partnership papers of Concave (a
supplier of Ultra which in turn is also a supplier of GMCR), she was deemed to have placed. herself in an
untenable position as far as petitioner was concerned.

However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public respondent that such a circumstance did not create a conflict
of interests situation. As a systems analyst, Salazar was very far removed from operations involving the
procurement of supplies. Salazar's duties revolved around the development of systems and analysis of designs
on a continuing basis. In other words, Salazar did not occupy a position of trust relative to the approval and
purchase of supplies and company assets.

In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on loss of confidence. As we have held
countless times, while loss of confidence or breach of trust is a valid ground for terminations it must rest an
some basis which must be convincingly established. 35 An employee who not be dismissed on mere presumptions
and suppositions. Petitioner's allegation that since Salazar and Saldivar lived together in the same apartment, it
"presumed reasonably that complainant's sympathy would be with Saldivar" and its averment that Saldivar's
investigation although unverified, was probably true, do not pass this Court's test. 36 While we should not condone the
acts of disloyalty of an employee, neither should we dismiss him on the basis of suspicion derived from speculative
inferences.
To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar's dismissal would be most inequitous because the bulk of
the findings centered principally oh her friend's alleged thievery and anomalous transactions as technical
operations' support manager. Said report merely insinuated that in view of Salazar's special relationship with
Saldivar, Salazar might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar's questionable activities. Direct evidence
implicating private respondent is wanting from the records.

It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report came out after Saldivar had already resigned from GMCR
on May 31, 1984. Since Saldivar did not have the opportunity to refute management's findings, the report
remained obviously one-sided. Since the main evidence obtained by petitioner dealt principally on the alleged
culpability of Saldivar, without his having had a chance to voice his side in view of his prior resignation, stringent
examination should have been carried out to ascertain whether or not there existed independent legal grounds
to hold Salatar answerable as well and, thereby, justify her dismissal. Finding none, from the records, we find
her to have been unlawfully dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated
December 29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner GMCR is ordered to REINSTATE private respondent
Imelda Salazar and to pay her backwages equivalent to her salary for a period of two (2) years only.

This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., concurs in the result.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Padilla, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

I believe there is just cause for dismissal per investigative findings. (See Decision, p. 2.)

Narvasa C.J., concurs

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

I believe there is just cause for dismissal per investigative findings. (See Decision, p. 2.)

Narvasa C.J., concurs

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 109445 November 7, 1994

FELICITO BASBACIO, petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FRANKLIN DRILON in his capacity as
Secretary of Justice, respondent.

Amparita S. Sta. Maria for petitioner.

MENDOZA, J.:

This case presents for determination the scope of the State's liability under Rep. Act No. 7309, which among
other things provides compensation for persons who are unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but on
appeal are acquitted and ordered released.

Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted of frustrated murder and of
two counts of frustrated murder for the killing of Federico Boyon and the wounding of the latter's wife Florida and
his son Tirso, at Palo, Calanuga, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, on the night of June 26, 1988. The motive for the killing
was apparently a land dispute between the Boyons and petitioner. Petitioner and his son-in-law were sentenced
to imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after their bonds had been cancelled.

Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. Only petitioner's appeal proceeded to judgment, however, as the appeal
of the other accused was dismissed for failure to file his brief.

On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on the ground that the
prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. He had been pointed to by a daughter of
Federico Boyon as the companion of Balderrama when the latter barged into their hut and without warning
started shooting, but the appellate court ruled that because petitioner did nothing more, petitioner's presence at
the scene of the crime was insufficient to show conspiracy.

Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, sec. 3(a), which provides for the
payment of compensation to "any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently
released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal." 1 The claim was filed with the Board of Claims of the Department of
Justice, but the claim was denied on the ground that while petitioner's presence at the scene of the killing was not
sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there was bad blood between him and the
deceased as a result of a land dispute and the fact that the convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there was basis for
finding that he was "probably guilty."

On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice affirmed the Board's ruling. Said the Secretary of Justice in his
resolution dated March 11, 1993:

It is believed therefore that the phrase "any person . . . unjustly accused, convicted and
imprisoned" in Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7309 refers to an individual who was wrongly accused
and imprisoned for a crime he did not commit, thereby making him "a victim of unjust
imprisonment." In the instant case, however, Claimant/Appellant cannot be deemed such a victim
since a reading of the decision of his acquittal shows that his exculpation is not based on his
innocence, but upon, in effect, a finding of reasonable doubt.

Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari. Neither Rule 45 nor Rep. Act No. 7309, however, provides
for review by certiorari of the decisions of the Secretary of Justice. Nonetheless, in view of the importance of the
question tendered, the Court resolved to treat the petition as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
Petitioner questions the basis of the respondent's ruling that to be able to recover under sec. 3(a) of the law the
claimant must on appeal be found to be innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted in the trial court.
Through counsel he contends that the language of sec. 3(a) is clear and does not call for interpretation. The
"mere fact that the claimant was imprisoned for a crime which he was subsequently acquitted of is already unjust
in itself," he contends. To deny his claim because he was not declared innocent would be to say that his
imprisonment for two years while his appeal was pending was justified. Petitioner argues that there is only one
requirement for conviction in criminal cases and that is proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to
present such proof, the presumption that the accused is innocent stands and, therefore, there is no reason for
requiring that he be declared innocent of the crime before he can recover compensation for his imprisonment.

Petitioner's contention has no merit. It would require that every time an accused is acquitted on appeal he must
be given compensation on the theory that he was "unjustly convicted" by the trial court. Such a reading of sec.
3(a) is contrary to petitioner's professed canon of construction that when the language of the statute is clear it
should be given its natural meaning. It leaves out of the provision in question the qualifying word "unjustly" so
that the provision would simply read: "The following may file claims for compensation before the Board: (a) any
person who was accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal."

But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused, convicted [and] imprisoned." The fact that his
conviction is reversed and the accused is acquitted is not itself proof that the previous conviction was "unjust."
An accused may be acquitted for a number of reasons and his conviction by the trial court may, for any of these
reasons, be set aside. For example, he may be acquitted not because he is innocent of the crime charged but
because of reasonable doubt, in which case he may be found civilly liable to the complainant, because while the
evidence against him does not satisfy the quantum of proof required for conviction, it may nonetheless be
sufficient to sustain a civil action for damages. 2 In one case the accused, an alien, was acquitted of statutory rape
with homicide because of doubt as to the ages of the offended parties who consented to have sex with him.
Nonetheless the accused was ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages and ordered deported. 3 In such a case
to pay the accused compensation for having been "unjustly convicted" by the trial court would be utterly inconsistent
with his liability to the complainant. Yet to follow petitioner's theory such an accused would be entitled to
compensation under sec. 3(a).

The truth is that the presumption of innocence has never been intended as evidence of innocence of the
accused but only to shift the burden of proof that he is guilty to the prosecution. If "accusation is not synonymous
with guilt," 4 so is the presumption of innocence not a proof thereof. It is one thing to say that the accused is presumed
to be innocent in order to place on the prosecution the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is
guilty. It is quite another thing to say that he is innocent and if he is convicted that he has been "unjustly convicted." As
this Court held in a case:

Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with homicide, we emphasize that
we are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only the constitutional presumption of
innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build an airtight case for conviction which saved
him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do not exist. 5

To say then that an accused has been "unjustly convicted" has to do with the manner of his conviction rather
than with his innocence. An accused may on appeal be acquitted because he did not commit the crime, but that
does
not necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for having been the victim of an "unjust conviction." If
his conviction was due to an error in the appreciation of the evidence the conviction while erroneous is not
unjust. That is why it is not, on the other hand, correct to say as does respondent, that under the law liability for
compensation depends entirely on the innocence of the accused.

The phrase "unjustly convicted" has the same meaning as "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment" in art. 204
of the Revised Penal Code. What this Court held in In re Rafael C. Climaco 6 applies:

In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be
shown beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the
evidence, and the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice . . . .

To hold a judge liable for the rendition of manifestly unjust judgment by reason of inexcusable
negligence or ignorance, it must be shown, according to Groizard, that although he has acted
without malice, he failed to observe in the performance of his duty, that diligence, prudence and
care which the law is entitled to exact in the rendering of any public service. Negligence and
ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a
 reasonable interpretation. Inexcusable mistake only exists in the legal concept when it implies a
manifest injustice, that is to say, such injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable
interpretation, even though there is a misunderstanding or error of the law applied, yet in the
contrary it results, logically and reasonably, and in a very clear and indisputable manner, in the
notorious violation of the legal precept.

Indeed, sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result of which the accused is unjustly
imprisoned, but, in addition, to an unjust accusation. The accused must have been "unjustly accused, in
consequence of which he is unjustly convicted and then imprisoned. It is important to note this because if from
its inception the prosecution of the accused has been wrongful, his conviction by the court is, in all probability,
also wrongful. Conversely, if the prosecution is not malicious any conviction even though based on less than the
required quantum of proof in criminal cases may be erroneous but not necessarily unjust.

The reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4, the question for the prosecutor in filing a case in court is not whether
the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt but only whether "there is reasonable ground to believe that a
crime has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof." Hence, an accusation which is based on
"probable guilt" is not an unjust accusation and a conviction based on such degree of proof is not necessarily an
unjust judgment but only an erroneous one. The remedy for such error is appeal.

In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence to show that petitioner's conviction by the trial court was
wrongful or that it was the product of malice or gross ignorance or gross negligence. To the contrary, the court
had reason to believe that petitioner and his co-accused were in league, because petitioner is the father-in-law
of Wilfredo Balderrama and it was petitioner who bore the victim a grudge because of a land dispute. Not only
that. Petitioner and his coaccused arrived together in the hut of the victims and forced their way into it.

The Court of Appeals ruled there was no conspiracy only because there was no proof that he did or say anything
on the occasion. Said the appellate court.

Both eyewitness testimonies fail to show the appellant Felicito Basbacio to have committed any
act at all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having said anything at all. Both fail to show
Felicito Basbacio as having committed anything in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit the
crimes charged against the defendants. It seems to be a frail and flimsy basis on which to
conclude that conspiracy existed between actual killer Wilfredo Balderrama and Felicito Basbacio
to commit murder and two frustrated murders on that night of June 26, 1988. It may be asked:
where was the coming together of the two defendants to an agreement to commit the crimes of
murder and frustrated murder on two counts? Where was Basbacio's contribution to the
commission of the said crimes? Basbacio was — as the record shows — nothing but part of the
dark shadows of that night. . . .

One may take issue with this ruling because precisely conspiracy may be shown by concert of action and other
circumstances. Why was petitioner with his son-in-law? Why did they apparently flee together? And what about
the fact that there was bad blood between petitioner and the victim Federico Boyon? These questions may no
longer be passed upon in view of the acquittal of petitioner but they are relevant in evaluating his claim that he
had been unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned before he was released because of his acquittal on
appeal. We hold that in view of these circumstances respondent Secretary of Justice and the Board of Claims
did not commit a grave abuse of its discretion in disallowing petitioner's claim for compensation under Rep. Act
No. 7309.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and
Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 109835 November 22, 1993

JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ULPIANO L. DE LOS SANTOS, respondent.

Don P. Porciuncula for petitioner.

Eulogio Nones, Jr. for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

The sole issue submitted in this case is the validity of the order of respondent National Labor Relations
Commission dated October 30, 1992, dismissing the petitioner's appeal from a decision of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration on the ground of failure to post the required appeal bond. 1

The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended, providing that:

In the case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be
perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company
duly accredited by the Commission in an amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
judgment appealed from.

and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended, reading as follows:

Sec. 6. Bond — In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter involves a monetary award, an appeal by
the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award.

The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying these rules to decisions
rendered by the POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for
overseas employment because they are already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules
not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also to post a cash bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000,
thus:

Upon approval of the application, the applicant shall pay a license fee of P30,000. It shall also
post a cash bond of P100,000 and surety bond of P50,000 from a bonding company acceptable
to the Administration and duly accredited by the Insurance Commission. The bonds shall answer
for all valid and legal claims arising from violations of the conditions for the grant and use of the
license, and/or accreditation and contracts of employment. The bonds shall likewise guarantee
compliance with the provisions of the Code and its implementing rules and regulations relating to
recruitment and placement, the Rules of the Administration and relevant issuances of the
Department and all liabilities which the Administration may impose. The surety bonds shall
include the condition that the notice to the principal is notice to the surety and that any judgment
against the principal in connection with matters falling under POEA's jurisdiction shall be binding
and conclusive on the surety. The surety bonds shall be co-terminus with the validity period of
license. (Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000 with the Philippine National Bank
in compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, "to primarily answer for valid and legal claims of
recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or money claims."

Required to comment, the Solicitor General sustains the appeal bond requirement but suggest that the rules
cited by the NLRC are applicable only to decisions of the Labor Arbiters and not of the POEA. Appeals from
decisions of the POEA, he says, are governed by the following provisions of Rule V, Book VII of the POEA
Rules:

Sec. 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. The appeal shall be filed within the reglementary
period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of payment of the
required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this
Rule; shall be accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied
upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date
when the appellant received the appealed decision and/or award and proof of service on the
other party of such appeal.

A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop the
running of the period for perfecting an appeal.

Sec. 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Administration involves a monetary award, an appeal by
the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in an amount equivalent to the
monetary award. (Emphasis supplied)

The question is, having posted the total bond of P150,000 and placed in escrow the amount of P200,000 as
required by the POEA Rules, was the petitioner still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a
decision of the POEA to the NLRC?

It was.

The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in addition to the cash and surety bonds and
the escrow money, an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an
appeal from a decision of the POEA. Obviously, the appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment of the
monetary award in favor of the employee if it is eventually affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.

It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money placed in escrow are supposed to guarantee the
payment of all valid and legal claims against the employer, but these claims are not limited to monetary awards
to employees whose contracts of employment have been violated. The POEA can go against these bonds also
for violations by the recruiter of the conditions of its license, the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing rules, E.O. 247 (reorganizing POEA) and the POEA Rules, as well as the settlement of other
liabilities the recruiter may incur.

As for the escrow agreement, it was presumably intended to provide for a standing fund, as it were, to be used
only as a last resort and not to be reduced with the enforcement against it of every claim of recruited workers
that may be adjudged against the employer. This amount may not even be enough to cover such claims and,
even if it could initially, may eventually be exhausted after satisfying other subsequent claims.

As it happens, the decision sought to be appealed grants a monetary award of about P170,000 to the dismissed
employee, the herein private respondent. The standby guarantees required by the POEA Rules would be
depleted if this award were to be enforced not against the appeal bond but against the bonds and the escrow
money, making them inadequate for the satisfaction of the other obligations the recruiter may incur.

Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in favor of the employee to exceed the amount of P350,000, which
is the sum of the bonds and escrow money required of the recruiter.

It is true that these standby guarantees are not imposed on local employers, as the petitioner observes, but
there is a simple explanation for this distinction. Overseas recruiters are subject to more stringent requirement
because of the special risks to which our workers abroad are subjected by their foreign employers, against
whom there is usually no direct or effective recourse. The overseas recruiter is solidarily liable with a foreign
employer. The bonds and the escrow money are intended to insure more care on the part of the local agent in its
choice of the foreign principal to whom our overseas workers are to be sent.

It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case), care should
be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and
not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. 2 Under the petitioner's
interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section 6 of the aforementioned POEA Rule should be disregarded
because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it has posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a
superfluity but we do not see any such redundancy; on the contrary, we find that Section 6 complements Section 4
and Section 17. The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead,
apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious
whole.

Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary obligations of the overseas recruiter prescribed in Section
4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and the escrow agreement under Section 17 of the same Rule, it is
necessary to post the appeal bond required under Section 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules, as a condition
for perfecting an appeal from a decision of the POEA.

Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in favor of the working class, conformably to the mandate of the
Constitution. By sustaining rather than annulling the appeal bond as a further protection to the claimant
employee, this Court affirms once again its commitment to the interest of labor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Davide and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J, is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 75222 July 18, 1991

RADIOLA-TOSHIBA PHILIPPINES, INC., through its assignee-in-insolvency VICENTE J. CUNA, petitioner,

vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. LEONARDO I. CRUZ, as Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Angeles City, Branch No. LVI, EMILIO C. PATINO, as assignee-in-insolvency of CARLOS and
TERESITA GATMAYTAN, SHERIFF OF ANGELES CITY, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ANGELES CITY,
SANYO MARKETING CORPORATION, S & T ENTERPRISES INC., REFRIGERATION INDUSTRIES INC.,
and DELTA MOTOR CORPORATION, respondents.

Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.

Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. for private respondents.

BIDIN, J.:p

This is a petition for certiorari of the March 31, 1986 Decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court * in A.C-
G.R. SP No. 04160 entitled "Radiola-Toshiba Philippines, Inc. vs. Hon. Leonardo I. Cruz, et al." denying the
petition for certiorari and mandamus; and its Resolution of July 1, 1986 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of this case, as found by the then Intermediate Appellate Court, are as follows:

On July 2, 1980, three creditors filed a petition for the involuntary insolvency of Carlos
Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan, the private respondents herein, the case docketed as
Special Proceeding No. 1548 of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Pampanga and Angeles City.

On July 9, 1980, the respondent court issued an order taking cognizance of the said petition and
stating inter alia that:

. . . the Court forbids the payment of any debts, and the delivery of any property
owing and belonging to said respondents-debtors from other persons, or, to any
other persons for the use and benefit of the same respondents-debtors and/or the
transfer of any property by and for the said respondents-debtors to another, upon
petitioners' putting up a bond by way of certified and reputable sureties. (Annex 1,
Comment).

Counsel for the petitioners-creditors informed respondent sheriff Angeles City of the aforesaid
order (Annex 2, Ibid) and on March 26, 1981, also communicated with counsel for the petitioner
herein regarding same order, apprising the latter that "the personal and real property which have
been levied upon and/or attached should be preserved till the final determination of the petition
aforementioned." (Annex 3, Ibid).

On April 12, 1983, petitioners-creditors filed second urgent motion for issuance of insolvency
order and resolution of the case, alleging among other things, that in November, 1982, they filed
an urgent motion to issue insolvency order; on December 2, 1982, they presented a motion to
prohibit the city sheriff of Angeles City from disposing the personal and real properties of the
insolvent debtors, Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan; on January 18, 1983, they (sic)
appealed in the Bulletin Today issue of even date a news item to the effect that Radiola-Toshiba
Phil. Inc. has already shut down its factory, sometime in March 1983, through their
representative, they caused to be investigated the real properties in the names of Carlos
Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan and they were surprised to find out that some of the
aforesaid properties were already transferred to Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc.; and that in view of
such development, it is their submission that without an insolvency order and a resolution of the
case which was ripe for resolution as early as March 3, 1982, the rights and interest of
petitioners-creditors would be injured and jeopardized. (Annex "C").

On April 15, 1983, petitioner filed an opposition to the said motion vis-a-vis the prayer that the
insolvency order (which has not been rendered yet by the court) be annotated on the transfer
certificates of title already issued in its name (Annex "D").

On April 22, 1983, judgment was rendered declaring the insolvency of respondents-debtors
Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan.

On April 28, 1983, petitioner filed a supplemental opposition to the same second urgent motion
and motion to direct respondent sheriff to issue a final certificate of sale for the properties
covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 in its favor (Annex "E").

On February 3, 1984, acting upon petitioner's motion claiming that ownership of certain real
properties of the insolvents had passed to it by virtue of foreclosure proceedings conducted in
Civil Case No. 35946 of the former Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro
Manila, which properties were not redeemed within the period of redemption, respondent court
issued an order disposing, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby, confirms the election of Mr. Emilio C. Patino, as
assignee of all the registered claimants in this case, and, in consequence thereof,
the said assignee is hereby directed to post a bond in the amount of P30,000.00
and to take his oath thereafter so as to be able to perform his duties and
discharge his functions, as such.

The Court, likewise, sets the meeting of all the creditors with the attendance, of
course, of the assignee, on March 9, 1984, at 8:30., as by that time the
 proposals, which the respective representatives of the parties-claimants desire to
clear with their principals, shall have already been reported.

The assignee shall see to it that the properties of the insolvents which are now in
the actual or constructive custody and management of the receiver previously
appointed by the Court on petitioners' and claimants' proposals be placed under
this actual or constructive custody and management, such as he is able to do so,
as the Court hereby dissolves the receivership previously authorized, it having
become a superfluity. (Annex "F").

On May 18, 1984, the Regional Trial Court, Branch CLII, Pasig, Metro Manila, in Civil Case No.
35946, issued an order directing respondent Sheriff of Angeles City, or whoever is acting in his
behalf, to issue within seven (7) days from notice thereof a final deed of sale over the two (2)
parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. 18905 and 40430 in favor of
petitioner. (Annex "G").

In said Civil Case No. 35946, a case for collection of sum of money covering the proceeds of
television sets and other appliances, the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig,
Metro Manila, issued a writ of preliminary attachment on February 15, 1980 upon application of
the petitioner, as plaintiff, which put up a bond of P350,000.00. On March 4, 1980, 3:00 P.M.,
levy on attachment was done in favor of petitioner on the real properties registered in the names
of spouses Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan under TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 of the
Registry of Deeds of Angeles City, per Entry No. 7216 on said titles. (Annex "A" and "B").

On December 10, 1980, a decision was rendered in favor of petitioner, ordering private
respondents and their co-defendant Peoples Appliance Center, Inc. to pay petitioner, jointly and
severally, the sum of P721,825.91 plus interest thereon of 14% per annum from October 12,
1979 until fully paid; P20,000.00, for and attorney's fees; and the costs of suit (Annex "5",
Comment). After the said decision in the aforementioned Civil Case No. 35946 became final and
executory, a writ of execution for the satisfaction thereof issued on March 18, 1981; and on May
4, 1981, respondent sheriff of Angeles City sold at auction sale the attached properties covered
by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430, to petitioner as the highest bidder, and the certificate of sale was
accordingly issued in its favor.

On September 21, 1982, the court ordered the consolidation of ownership of petitioner over said
properties; but respondent sheriff of Angeles City refused to issue a final certificate of sale in
favor of petitioner.

On May 30, 1984, petitioners-creditors interposed their opposition, stating among other things,
that subject motion is improper and premature because it treats of matters foreign to the
insolvency proceedings; and premature, for the reason that the properties covered by TCT Nos.
18905 and 40430-Angeles City were brought to the jurisdiction of the insolvency court for the
determination of the assets of the insolvents available for distribution to the approved
credits/liabilities of the insolvents. Petitioners-creditors theorized that the insolvency court is
devoid of jurisdiction to grant the motion referring to matters involved in a case pending before a
coordinate court in another jurisdiction (Annex "l").

Prior thereto or on July 13, 1984, to be precise, respondent court came out with its assailed
extended order with the following decretal portion:

WHEREFORE, and also for the reason stated in the aforequoted order issued in
pursuance of a similar motion of the movant, the Court denies, as it is hereby
denied the motion of Radiola-Toshiba, dated May 28, 1984 and directs the latter
to participate in the supposed meeting of all the creditors/claimants presided by
the duly elected assignee. (Annex "J").

On September 8, 1984, herein petitioner Radiola-Toshiba Philippines, Inc. (RTPI, for short) filed a petition
for certiorari and mandamus with respondent Intermediate Appellate Court.

The then Intermediate Appellate Court, in a Decision promulgated on March 31, 1986, denied petitioner's
aforesaid petition. On April 19, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in a
Resolution dated July 1, 1986.
Hence, the instant petition. Herein petitioner raised two issues —

1. WHETHER OR NOT CERTIORARI IS A REMEDY DESIGNATED FOR THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF

JURISDICTION ONLY; and

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE REFUSAL OF THE COURTS TO ENFORCE THE LIEN OF PETITIONER
ARISING FROM A LEVY OF ATTACHMENT NOT MADE WITHIN ONE MONTH NEXT PRECEDING THE
COMMENCEMENT OF THE INSOLVENCY PROCEEDING IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

The main issue in this case is whether or not the levy on attachment in favor of the petitioner is dissolved by the
insolvency proceedings against respondent spouses commenced four months after said attachment.

On this issue, Section 32 of the Insolvency Law (Act No. 1956, as amended), provides:

Sec. 32 — As soon as an assignee is elected or appointed and qualified, the clerk of the court
shall, by an instrument under his hand and seal of the court, assign and convey to the assignee
all the real and personal property, estate, and effects of the debtor with all his deeds, books, and
papers relating thereto, and such assignment shall relate back to the commencement of the
proceedings in insolvency, and shall relate back to the acts upon the adjudication was founded,
and by operation of law shall vest the title to all such property, estate, and effects in the
assignee, although the same is then attached on mesne process, as the property of the debtor.
Such assignment shall operate to vest in the assignee all of the estate of the insolvent debtor not
exempt by law from execution. It shall dissolve any attachment levied within one month next
preceding the commencement of the insolvency proceedings and vacate and set aside any
judgment entered in any action commenced within thirty days immediately prior to the
commencement of insolvency proceedings and shall set aside any judgment entered by default
or consent of the debtor within thirty days immediately prior to the commencement of the
insolvency proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)

Relative thereto, the findings of the then Intermediate Appellate Court are undisputed that the levy on
attachment against the subject properties of the Gatmaytans, issued by the then Court of First Instance of Pasig
in Civil Case No. 35946, was on March 4, 1980 while the insolvency proceeding in the then Court of First
Instance of Angeles City, Special Proceeding No. 1548, was commenced only on July 2, 1980, or more than four
(4) months after the issuance of the said attachment. Under the circumstances, petitioner contends that its lien
on the subject properties overrode the insolvency proceeding and was not dissolved thereby.

Private respondents, on the other hand, relying on Section 79 of the said law, which reads:

Sec. 79. When an attachment has been made and is not dissolved before the commencement of
proceedings in insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking given by the defendant, if the claim
upon which the attachment suit was commenced is proved against the estate of the debtor, the
plaintiff may prove the legal costs and disbursements of the suit, and of the keeping of the
property, and the amount thereof shall be a preferred debt.

and the fact that petitioner and its counsel have full knowledge of the proceedings in the insolvent case, argue
that the subsequent Certificate of Sale on August 3, 1981, issued in favor of petitioner over the subject
properties, was issued in bad faith, in violation of the law and is not equitable for the creditors of the insolvent
debtors; and pursuant to the above quoted Section 79, petitioner should not be entitled to the transfer of the
subject properties in its name.

Petitioner's contention is impressed with merit. The provision of the above-quoted Section 32, of the Insolvency
Law is very clear — that attachments dissolved are those levied within one (1) month next preceding the
commencement of the insolvency proceedings and judgments vacated and set aside are judgments entered in
any action, including judgment entered by default or consent of the debtor, where the action was filed within
thirty (30) days immediately prior to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings. In short, there is a cut off
period — one (1) month in attachment cases and thirty (30) days in judgments entered in actions commenced
prior to the insolvency proceedings. Section 79, on the other hand, relied upon by private respondents, provides
for the right of the plaintiff if the attachment is not dissolved before the commencement of proceedings in
insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking given by the defendant, if the claim upon which the attachment suit
was commenced is proved against the estate of the debtor. Therefore, there is no conflict between the two
provisions.
But even granting that such conflict exists, it may be stated that in construing a statute, courts should adopt a
construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. This rule is expressed in the
maxim, ut maqis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the
statute — its every word. Hence, where a statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court should
adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective
and harmonious with each other (Javellana vs. Tayo, 6 SCRA 1042 [1962]; Statutory Construction by Ruben E.
Agpalo, p. 182).

Neither can the sheriff's sale in execution of the judgment in favor of the petitioner be considered as a fraudulent
transfer or preference by the insolvent debtors, which constitute a violation of Sec. 70 of the Insolvency Law. In
the case of Velayo vs. Shell Co. of the Philippines (100 Phil. 187, [1956]), this Court ruled that Sections 32 and
70 contemplate only acts and transactions occurring within 30 days prior to the commencement of the
proceedings in insolvency and, consequently, all other acts outside of the 30-day period cannot possibly be
considered as coming within the orbit of their operation.

Finally, petitioner correctly argued that the properties in question were never placed under the jurisdiction of
respondent insolvency court so as to be made available for the payment of claim filed against the Gatmaytans in
the insolvency proceedings.

Hence, the denial by respondent insolvency court to give due course to the attachment and execution of Civil
Case No. 35946 of the CFI of Rizal constitutes a freezing of the disposition of subject properties by the former
which were not within its jurisdiction; undeniably, a grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction,
correctable by certiorari.

WHEREFORE, the March 31, 1986 decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby Reversed and
SET ASIDE. The attachment and execution sale in Civil Case No. 35946 of the former CFI of Rizal are given
due course and petitioner's ownership of subject properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 is ordered
consolidated.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 104712 May 6, 1992

MANUEL T. DE GUIA, in his capacity as Councilor of the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro

Manila, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the validity and the enforcement by respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) of its RESOLUTION NO. 2313, adopting rules and guidelines in the
apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces
with only one (1) legislative district and the Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the Metro Manila Area for the
preparation of the Project of District Apportionment by the Provincial Election Supervisors and Election
Registrars (Annex "A", Petition), RESOLUTION NO. 2379, approving the Project of District Apportionment
submitted pursuant to Resolution No. 2313 (Annex "B", Petition), and RESOLUTION UND. 92-010 holding that
pars. (a), (b) and (c), and the first sentence of par. (d), all of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, apply to the May 11, 1992
elections (Annex "C", Petition).

Petitioner Manuel T. De Guia is an incumbent Member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
Parañaque, Metro Manila, having been elected in the January 1988 local elections. He prays, more particularly,
for reversal of the position of respondent insofar as it affects the municipality of Parañaque and all the other
municipalities in the Metro Manila Area. He claims that the second proviso of par. (c), Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, which
requires the apportionment into districts of said municipalities does not specify when the members of their
Sangguniang Bayan will be elected by district. He would consequently lean on par. (d) of Sec. 3, which
immediately succeeds par. (c), to support his view that the elected members of these municipalities mentioned in
par. (c) should continue to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992 elections.

Paragraph (d) states that "[F]or purposes of the regular elections on May 11, 1992, elective members of the
Sangguniang Panlunsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large in accordance with existing laws.
However, beginning with the regular elections in 1995, they shall be elected by district." Petitioner therefore
insists that the elected members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Parañaque fall under this category so that they
should continue to be elected at large until the 1995 regular elections.

Before addressing the crux of the controversy, the Court observes that petitioner does not allege that he is
running for reelection, much less, that he is prejudiced by the election, by district, in Parañaque. As such, he
does
not appear to have a locus standi, a standing in law, personal or substantial interest. 1 He does not also allege
any legal right that has been violated by respondent. If for this alone, petitioner does not appear to have any
cause of action.

However, considering the importance of the issue involved, concerning as it does the political exercise of
qualified voters affected by the apportionment, and petitioner alleging abuse of discretion and violation of the
Constitution by respondent, We resolve to brush aside the question of procedural infirmity, even as We perceive
the petition to be one of declaratory relief. We so held similarly through Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras in Osmeña
v. Commission on Elections. 2

Now on the meat of the dispute.

On November 18, 1991, Congress passed R.A. 7166, signed into law by the President on November 26, 1991. It
is "An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing
Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes." At issue in this case is the proper interpretation of Sec. 3
thereof which provides:

Sec. 3. Elections of Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and

Sangguniang Bayan. — The elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang
Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected as follows:

(a) For provinces with two (2) or more legislative districts, the elective members
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall be elected by legislative districts . . .

(b) For provinces with only one (1) legislative district, the Commission shall divide
them into two (2) districts for purposes of electing the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan . . .

(c) The number and election of elective members of the Sangguniang

Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan in the Metro Manila Area, City of Cebu, City
of Davao and any other city with two (2) or more legislative districts shall continue
to be governed by the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 6636 . .
. Provided, further, That, the Commission shall divide each of the municipalities in
Metro Manila Area into two (2) districts by barangay for purposes of
representation in the Sangguniang Bayan
. . . . and,

(d) For purposes of the regular elections on May 11, 1992, elective members of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large
in accordance with existing laws. However, beginning with the regular elections in
1995, they shall be elected by district . . . .
On November 20, 1991, respondent COMELEC, invoking authority of the Constitution, the Omnibus Election
Code, R.A. 6636, R.A. 6646 and R.A. 7166, 3 issued Resolution No. 2313 and the subsequent resolutions in
question.

On February 20, 1992, in view of the perceived ambiguity in the meaning of par. (d), particularly in relation to
par. (c), Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, petitioner filed with COMELEC a Motion for Clarification of its Resolution No. 2313
inquiring whether the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Parañaque and the other municipalities of Metro
Manila enumerated therein, which are all single-district municipalities, would be elected by district in May 11,
1992 or in the 1995 regular elections.

Meanwhile, on March 3, 1992 COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2379 approving the guidelines submitted by the
Provincial Election Supervisors and Municipal Election Registrars concerned pursuant to Resolution No. 2313,
and stating therein its purpose in recommending to Congress the districting/apportionment of Sangguniang
Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan seats, i.e., to reduce the number of candidates to be voted for in the May
11, 1992 synchronized elections. In this Project of Apportionment, Parañaque together with the other twelve (12)
municipalities in the Metro Manila Area was divided into two (2) districts with six (6) elective councilors for each
district.

On March 10, 1992, COMELEC resolved petitioner's Motion for Clarification by interpreting Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, to
mean that the election of elective members of the Sangguniang Bayan, by district, of the thirteen (13)
municipalities in the Metro Manila Area shall apply in the May 11, 1992 elections (Resolution UND. 92-010,
prom. March 10, 1992). Petitioner says that he received copy of Resolution UND. 92-010 on March 13, 1992.

On April 7, 1992, apparently not satisfied with this third Resolution of COMELEC, petitioner filed the instant
petition asserting that under par. (d), Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166 the elective members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
and the Sangguniang Bayan, for purposes of the May 11, 1992 regular elections, shall be elected at large in
accordance with existing laws. He would include in this class of sanggunian members to be elected at large
those of the municipality of Parañaque.

Petitioner therefore imputes grave abuse of discretion to COMELEC in promulgating Resolution No. 2313,
Resolution No. 2379 and Resolution UND. 92-010 which clarifies, contrary to his view, that the district
apportionment of the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area is applicable to the May 11, 1992 regular elections.

We have carefully examined pars. (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, and its precursor bills on
synchronized elections, Senate Bill No. 1861 and House Bill No. 34811, and We realize the web of confusion
generated by the seeming abstruseness in the language of the law. Some framers of the law were even fazed at
the empirical implications of some of its provisions, particularly Sec. 3 thereof, and they admitted in fact that said
provisions were susceptible of varied interpretations, as borne by the sponsorship and explanatory speeches
now spread in the Journals of Congress. Hence, We can understand why petitioner would interpret Sec. 3 as he
would. But if we pursue his course, we may conclude in absurdity because then there would have been no
reason for R.A. 7166 to single out the single-district provinces referred to in par. (b), and the municipalities in the
Metro Manila Area mentioned in the second proviso of par. (c), to be apportioned at once into two (2) districts
each if the members of their respective sanggunian after all would still be elected at large as they were in the
1988 elections.

No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile. We must therefore, as far as we
can, divine its meaning, its significance, its reason for being. As it has oft been held, the key to open the door to
what the legislature intended which is vaguely expressed in the language of a statute is its purpose or the
reason which induced it to enact the statute. If the statute needs construction, as it does in the present case, the
most dominant in that process is the purpose of the act. 4 Statutes should be construed in the light of the object
to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, 5 and they should be given such construction as will
advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended. 6 A construction should be rejected
that gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the
statute was enacted, and that tends to defeat the ends which are sought to be attained by the enactment. 7

The reason for the promulgation of R.A. 7166 is shown in the explanatory note of Senate Bill No. 1861 which
states in part:

This bill proposes to set the national and local elections for May 11, 1992, and provide for the
necessary implementing details. It also endorses reforms and measures to ensure the conduct of
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. Specifically, it seeks to: (1) Reduce the
number of positions to be voted for by providing therein that the members of the Sangguniang
 Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan be elected not at large, but by
district . . . .

That respondent COMELEC is cognizant of this legislative intent of R.A. 7166 is reflected in the "WHEREAS"
clauses constituting the preamble to Resolution No. 2379. Thus —

WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections, in order to reduce the number of candidates to be

voted for in the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections recommended, among others, to the
Congress of the Philippines, the districting/apportionment of sangguniang panlungsod and
sangguniang bayan seats;

WHEREAS, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act 7166, and approved by the
President of the Philippines on November 26, 1991, adopting among others, the
recommendation of the Commission on Elections aforestated;

WHEREAS, pursuant to, and in implementation of Republic Act 7166, particularly Section 3
thereof, the Commission promulgated Resolution No. 2313, directing the Provincial Election
Supervisors and Election Registrars concerned to submit, after consultation, public hearings, and
consensus-taking with the different sectors in the community, the Project of District
Apportionment of single legislative-district provinces and municipalities in the Metro Manila area;

WHEREAS, the established criteria/guidelines in the determination of the district apportionment

are as follows: a. compactness, contiguity and adjacentness of territory; b. apportionment shall
be based on the 1990 census of population; c. no municipality, in the case of provinces, and no
barangay, in the case of cities and municipalities, shall be fragmented or apportioned into
different districts.

This avowed policy of having sanggunian members elected by district is also manifest from the four corners of
Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166. 8 Thus, a careful analysis of the provisions of Sec. 3 shows that the purpose of
districting/apportionment of the sanggunian seats is to reduce the number of positions to be voted for in the May
11, 1992, synchronized elections and ensure the efficiency of electoral process. Considering that the single-
district provinces and the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area, which are all single-districts, and under pars.
(b) and (c) have already been apportioned into two (2) districts, they will henceforth be electing the members of
their Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Bayan by district in the coming May 11, 1992, elections,
although under par. (d), the single-district cities and all the municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area which
are all likewise single-districts, will have to continue electing at large the members of their Sangguniang
Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan as they have yet to be apportioned. But beginning the regular elections of
1995, they will all have to be elected by district. By then, COMELEC would have had enough time to apportion
the single-district cities and the municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area.

As they now stand in relation to the districting/apportionment of local government units for purposes of election
under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, it is clear that: (1) for provinces with two (2) or more legislative districts contemplated
in par. (a), they shall continue to be elected by district; (2) for provinces with single legislative districts, as they
have already been apportioned into two (2) districts each under par. (b), they shall henceforth be elected
likewise by district; (3) for cities with two (2) or more legislative districts, e.g., the cities of Manila, Cebu and
Davao, they shall also continue to be elected by district under the first part of par. (c); and (4) for the thirteen (13)
municipalities in the Metro Manila Area, which have already been apportioned into two (2) districts each under
the second proviso of par. (c), they shall likewise be elected by district in the regular elections of May 11, 1992.

Then, that should leave us the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the single-district cities and the Sangguniang Bayan
of the municipalities outside Metro Manila, which remain single-districts not having been ordered apportioned
under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166. They will have to continue to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992, elections,
although starting 1995 they shall all be elected by district to effect the full implementation of the letter and spirit
of R.A. 7166. That is the true import of par. (d). Consequently, as We view it, where he stands, petitioner must
fall.

WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion, much less grave, on the part of respondent, and for lack of merit,
the instant petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.