Poli Digested Cases

20
09
Understandi
ng Political
Law
Compilation of Case
Digests
This compilation contains the digested cases
which are useful to understanding the different
principles and legal concepts enshrined in
Political Law.
Melvin Miscala Christine Ruflo

Meltin Co.
7/5/2009
[UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL LAW] July 5, 2009
Procedure for Passage of Bills (Sec 26 [2])
Power of the Senate to propose amendments to revenue bills.
G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO vs. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE
Facts:
Some of the petitioners (Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc., Philippine Airlines (PAL), Roco, and Chamber
of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA)) reiterate previous claims made by them that R.A. No.
7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of
the Constitution. Although they admit that H. No. 11197 was filed in the House of
Representatives where it passed three readings and that afterward it was sent to the Senate where
after first reading it was referred to the Senate Ways and Means Committee, they complain that the
Senate did not pass it on second and third readings. Instead what the Senate did was to pass its own
version (S. No. 1630) which it approved on May 24, 1994.
Issue:
Can the Senate pass its own version of a revenue bill after the lower house passed its own version to it
for aaproval when the Constitution says that revenue bill must originate exclusively from the Lower
House? What is meant by the term “Exclusively?”
Held:
Yes. The power of the Senate to propose amendments must be understood to be full, plenary and
complete "as on other Bills." Thus, because revenue bills are required to originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, the Senate cannot enact revenue measures of its own without such bills. After
a revenue bill is passed and sent over to it by the House, however, the Senate certainly can pass its own
version on the same subject matter. This follows from the coequality of the two chambers of Congress.
In sum, while Art. VI, Sec 24 provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills must "originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives," it also adds, "but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments." In
the exercise of this power, the Senate may propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure.
Query: What is the purpose of the three readings in 3 separate days?
Answer: The purpose for which three readings on separate days is required is said to be two-fold: (1) to
inform the members of Congress of what they must vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure
Meltin Co. | Procedure for Passage of Bills (Sec 26 [2]) 2

is progressing through the enacting process, thus enabling them and others interested in the measure to
prepare their positions with reference to it.
Facts:
PAL maintains that R.A. No. 7716 violates Art. VI, Sec 26 (1) of the Constitution which provides that
"Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof." PAL contends that the amendment of its franchise by the withdrawal of its exemption from the
VAT is not expressed in the title of the law.
Issue: whether the law failed to comply with Art VI, Sec 26.
Held:
No. PAL asserts that the amendment of its franchise must be reflected in the title of the law by
specific reference to P.D. No. 1590. It is unnecessary to do this in order to comply with the constitutional
requirement, since it is already stated in the title that the law seeks to amend the pertinent provisions of
the NIRC, among which is Sec 103(q), in order to widen the base of the VAT. Actually, it is the bill which
becomes a law that is required to express in its title the subject of legislation. The titles of H. No. 11197
and S. No. 1630 in fact specifically referred to Sec 103 of the NIRC as among the provisions sought to be
amended. We are satisfied that sufficient notice had been given of the pendency of these bills in
Congress before they were enacted into what is now R.A.
No. 7716.
In Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, supra, a similar argument as that now made by PAL was
rejected. R.A. No. 7354 is entitled AN ACT CREATING THE PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORPORATION, DEFINING
ITS POWERS, FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, PROVIDING FOR REGULATION OF THE INDUSTRY AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES CONNECTED THEREWITH. It contained a provision repealing all franking
privileges. It was contended that the withdrawal of franking privileges was not expressed in the title of
the law. In holding that there was sufficient description of the subject of the law in its title, including the
repeal of franking privileges, this Court held: To require every end and means necessary for the
accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to be expressed in its title would not only be
unreasonable but would actually render legislation impossible.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]
RODOLFO C. FARIAS et al vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Facts:
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006,
insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should
be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They point out the
dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the
ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices,
while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who
run for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them
as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject
matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
Issue:
Whether the law violates the constitutional requirement.
Held:
The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling
legislation as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all
parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title.
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that:
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of
an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is
sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute
seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the
accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or
index of the Act.
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive
enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To
require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be
a complete index of its content.
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a
limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other
provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election
propaganda, does not violate the one subject-one title rule. This Court has held that an act having a
single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to
diverse they may be,
the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the
method and means of carrying out the general subject.
Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be
embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions,
and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of
the legislators and the public. In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of
the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as the same was amply and comprehensively
deliberated upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners, as members of the House of
Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their votes.
Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code.

ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE

The signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the
Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment.
Query:
The Effectivity clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 provides that it shall take effect
immediately upon its approval. Valid?
Answer:
No. However, the same does not render the entire law invalid. In Tanada v. Tuvera,1[54] this Court
laid down the rule:
... the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that
the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its
previous publication. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended.
Presidential Veto (Sec. 27)
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20740 June 30, 1964
BOLINAO ELECTRONICS CORPORATION vs. BRIGIDO VALENCIA
Facts:
It is provided in the Appropriations Act that the amount appropriated for the operation of the Philippine
Broadcasting Service shall be made subject to the condition that the same shall not be used or expended
for operation of television stations in Luzon, where there are already existing commercial television
stations. The president vetoed this appropriation.
Issue:
Whether the president’s veto power include the conditions attached thereto.
Held:
No. This is not a novel question. A little effort to research on the subject would have yielded enough
authority to guide action on the matter For, in the leading case of State v. Holder,2 it was already
declared that such action by the Chief Executive was illegal. This ruling, that the executive's veto power
1
Meltin Co. | Presidential Veto (Sec. 27) 5
does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in
subsequent cases.3 If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect
whatsoever,4 and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION vs.HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ
Facts:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and
approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. Pursuant to the procedure on the passage
and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the
President for consideration and approval. On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law,
and declared the same to have become Republic Act No. 7663. On the same day, the President delivered
his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed
certain conditions. The president vetoed a special provision under one article in that law on debt
payment but did not veto the amount appropriated by congress to debt payment. The petitioners
question this because they argued that this is tantamount to vetoing the entire provision and the
president cannot do this without vetoing the entire bill; thus the president cannot do this by a mere item
veto.
Issue: whether this is a valid item veto.
Held:
Yes. The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President may not veto a
provision without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and
severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional
mandate that any provision in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular
appropriation therein and that any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to
which it relates (1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 25 [2]). In other words, in the true sense of the
term, a provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to some particular appropriation to
which it relates, and does not relate to the entire bill.
The Court, citing Henry v. Edwards, La., 346 So. 2d 153 (1977), said that Congress cannot include
in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in separate legislation, and
if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as "item", which can be vetoed
by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power.
It is readily apparent that the Special Provision applicable to the appropriation for debt service
insofar as it refers to funds in excess of the amount appropriated in the bill, is an "inappropriate"
provision referring to funds other than the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriated in the General
Appropriations Act of 1991.
The Court will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto, the same as it
will presume the constitutionality of an act of Congress (Texas Co. v. State, 254 P. 1060; 31 Ariz, 485, 53
A.L.R. 258 [1927]).
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process
(Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7). That is why it is found in Article VI on
the Legislative Department rather than in Article VII on the Executive Department in the Constitution.
Meltin Co. | Presidential Veto (Sec. 27) 6

There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on
those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.
Under his general veto power, the President has to veto the entire bill, not merely parts thereof
(1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[1]). The exception to the general veto power is the power given to
the President to veto any particular item or items in a general appropriations bill (1987 Constitution, Art.
VI, Sec. 27[2]). In so doing, the President must veto the entire item.
As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can include in an appropriations
bill must "relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein" and "be limited in its operation to
the appropriation to which it relates," it follows that any provision which does not relate to any
particular item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered "an
inappropriate provision" which can be vetoed separately from an item. Also to be included in the
category of "inappropriate provisions" are unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are intended
to amend other laws, because clearly these kind of laws have no place in an appropriations bill. These
are matters of general legislation more appropriately dealt with in separate enactments. Former Justice
Irene Cortes, as Amicus Curiae, commented that Congress cannot by law establish conditions for and
regulate the exercise of powers of the President given by the Constitution for that would be an
unconstitutional intrusion into executive prerogative.
The doctrine of "inappropriate provision" was well elucidated in Henry v. Edwards, supra., thus:
Just as the President may not use his item-veto to usurp constitutional powers conferred on the
legislature, neither can the legislature deprive the Governor of the constitutional powers conferred on
him as chief executive officer of the state by including in a general appropriation bill matters more
properly enacted in separate legislation. The Governor's constitutional power to veto bills of general
legislation . . . cannot be abridged by the careful placement of such measures in a general appropriation
bill, thereby forcing the Governor to choose between approving unacceptable substantive legislation or
vetoing "items" of expenditures essential to the operation of government. The legislature cannot by
location of a bill give it immunity from executive veto. Nor can it circumvent the Governor's veto power
over substantive legislation by artfully drafting general law measures so that they appear to be true
conditions or limitations on an item of appropriation. Otherwise, the legislature would be permitted to
impair the constitutional responsibilities and functions of a co-equal branch of government in
contravention of the separation of powers doctrine . . . We are no more willing to allow the legislature to
use its appropriation power to infringe on the Governor's constitutional right to veto matters of
substantive legislation than we are to allow the Governor to encroach on the Constitutional powers of
the legislature. In order to avoid this result, we hold that, when the legislature inserts inappropriate
provisions in a general appropriation bill, such provisions must be treated as "items" for purposes of the
Governor's item veto power over general appropriation bills.
Effectivity of Laws
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
Meltin Co. | Effectivity of Laws 7

LORENZO M. TAÑADA vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA

Facts:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6,
Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners
seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication
in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement
for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus
submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they
are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point
stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
Issue: Whether publication of the law is an indispensable requirement.
Held:
Yes. Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws
with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the
conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It
would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated
by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category.
Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned.
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by
law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.
In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary
to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the
persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials
considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains
from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official
Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect
immediately.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200 June 18, 1987

PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A NEWSPAPER OF
GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY
WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided . . .;"
WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws to be effective only a publication thereof in the Official Gazette
will suffice has entailed some problems, a point recognized by the Supreme Court in Tañada. et al. vs.
Tuvera, et al. (G.R. No. 63915, December 29, 1986) when it observed that "[t]here is much to be said of
the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic release and
limited readership";
WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that "[u]ndoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better
perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily
available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly"; and
WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Article 2 of the Civil Code should accordingly be amended
so the laws to be effective must be published either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the country;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested
in me by the Constitution, do hereby order:
Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise
provided.
Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the Philippines," and all
other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in the Official Gazette.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-
seven.
G.R. No. 105364*

June 28, 2001
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-N.U.B.E. and PERFECTO V. FERNANDEZ vs.
HONORABLE BENJAMIN VEGA
Facts:
The Central Bank of the Philippines (Central Bank, for brevity) filed with Branch 39 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Philippine Veterans Bank. On January 2,
1992, the Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7169 providing for the rehabilitation of the Philippine
Veterans Bank. Despite the legislative mandate for rehabilitation and reopening of PVB, respondent
judge continued with the liquidation proceedings of the bank. Petitioners argue that with the passage of
R.A. 7169, the liquidation court became functus officio, and no longer had the authority to continue with
liquidation proceedings. The law provided for its immediate effectivity upon its approval. On April 10,
1992, the Monetary Board issued Monetary Board Resolution No. 348 which approved the Rehabilitation
Plan submitted by the Rehabilitaion Committee. The Central Bank and Liquidator of PVB claimed that
R.A. No. 7169 became effective only on March 10, 1992 or fifteen (15) days after its publication in the
Official Gazette; and, the contention of intervenors VOP Security, et. al. that the effectivity of said law is
conditioned on the approval of a rehabilitation plan by the Monetary Board, among others.
Issue:
Whether Congress can provide for an exception of the publication requirement.
Held: Yes (I am surprised!).

Anent the claim of respondents Central Bank and Liquidator of PVB that R.A. No. 7169 became effective
only on March 10, 1992 or fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette; and, the
contention of intervenors VOP Security, et. al. that the effectivity of said law is conditioned on the
approval of a rehabilitation plan by the Monetary Board, among others, the Court is of the view that
both contentions are bereft of merit.
While as a rule, laws take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the
authority to provide for exceptions, as indicated in the clause "unless otherwise provided."
In the case at bar, Section 10 of R.A. No. 7169 provides:
Sec. 10. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Hence, it is clear that the legislature intended to make the law effective immediately upon its approval. It
is undisputed that R.A. No. 7169 was signed into law by President Corazon C. Aquino on January 2, 1992.
Therefore, said law became effective on said date.
Assuming for the sake of argument that publication is necessary for the effectivity of R.A. No. 7169, then
it became legally effective on February 24, 1992, the date when the same was published in the Official
Gazette, and not on March 10, 1992, as erroneously claimed by respondents Central Bank and Liquidator.
c.5 Initiative and Referendum
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 111230. September 30, 1994.]
ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, ET AL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MORONG,
BATAAN
Facts:
In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, Bataan agreed to
the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with
Republic Act No. 7227.
On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. The municipality of Morong did not take any action on the
petition within thirty (30) days after its submission. Petitioners then resorted to their power of initiative
under the Local Government Code of 1991. They started to solicit the required number of signatures 4
to cause the repeal of said resolution. In its session of July 6, 1993, the COMELEC en banc resolved to
deny the petition for local initiative on the ground that its subject is "merely a resolution (pambayang
kapasyahan) and not an ordinance. COMELEC contended that under the Local Government Code of
1991, a resolution cannot be the subject of a local initiative.
Issue: Whether Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan
is the proper subject of an initiative.
Meltin Co. | c.5 Initiative and Referendum 10

Held: Yes. We reject respondents' narrow and literal reading of the above provision for it will collide with
the Constitution and will subvert the intent of the lawmakers in enacting the provisions of the Local
Government Code of 1991 on initiative and referendum.
The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as
appropriate subjects of a local initiative. Section 32 of Article VI provides in luminous
language: "The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and
the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject
any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress, or local legislative body . . ." An act includes a
resolution. Black 20 defines an act as "an expression of will or purpose . . . it may denote something
done . . . as a legislature, including not merely physical acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judgments,
resolves, awards, and determinations . . ." It is basic that a law should be construed in harmony with and
not in violation of the Constitution. In line with this postulate, we held in In Re Guarina that "if there is
doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of the legislative, if the words or provisions are obscure, or if the
enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that interpretation will be adopted which
will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality, even though it may be necessary, for this purpose, to
disregard the more usual or apparent import of the language used."
The constitutional command to include acts (i.e., resolutions) as appropriate subjects of initiative was
implemented by Congress when it enacted Republic Act No. 6735 entitled "An Act Providing for a System
of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor." Thus, its section 3(a) expressly includes
resolutions as subjects of initiative on local legislations, viz: prcd
"Sec. 3. Definition of Terms — For purposes of this act, the following terms shall mean:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose
and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the
Constitution.
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial,
city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance."
Similarly, its section 16 states: "Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies — Any proposition on
ordinance or resolution approved through the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided
shall not be repealed, modified or amended, by the local legislative body concerned within six (6)
months from the date therefrom . . ." On January 16, 1991, the COMELEC also promulgated its
Resolution No. 2300 entitled "In Re Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the
Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum, on National and Local Laws." It likewise recognized
resolutions as proper subjects of initiatives. Section 5, Article I of its Rules states: "Scope of power of
initiative — The power of initiative may be exercised to amend the Constitution, or to enact a national
legislation, a regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay law, resolution or ordinance." LLjur
There can hardly be any doubt that when Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6735 it intended
resolutions to be proper subjects of local initiatives. The debates confirm this intent.
We note that respondents do not give any reason why resolutions should not be the subject of a local
initiative. In truth, the reason lies in the well known distinction between a resolution and an ordinance
— i.e., that a resolution is used whenever the legislature wishes to express an opinion which is to have
only a temporary effect while an ordinance is intended to permanently direct and control matters
applying to persons or things in general. Thus, resolutions are not normally subject to referendum for it
may destroy the efficiency necessary to the successful administration of the business affairs of a city.
Meltin Co. | c.5 Initiative and Referendum 11

In the case at bench, however, it can not be argued that the subject matter of the resolution of the
municipality of Morong merely temporarily affects the people of Morong for it directs a permanent rule
of conduct or government. The inclusion of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone has far
reaching implications in the governance of its people.
D. Limitations to Power of Legislation

d.1. Express Limitations
Art III
Sec 26, 28
Art XIV, Sec 4 [3]
Sec. 29-31
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 129742. September 16, 1998.]
TERESITA G. FABIAN, petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO
Facts:
Private respondent Nestor Agustin was administratively charged for inter alia grave misconduct
committed by him as then Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Public Works and Highways
before the Office of the Ombudsman. The Graft Investigator found him guilty of the charge and
henceforth issued a resolution ordering his dismissal from the service. The resolution was approved by
the Ombudsman, but on motion for reconsideration, Deputy Ombudsman Jesus Guerrero set aside the
resolution and exonerated private respondent.
At issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 27 of R.A. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) which
vests appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court over decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman as it
infringes the constitutional proscription against laws increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court without its advise and consent.
Issue:
Whether Sec Section 27 of R.A. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) is constitutional.
Held:
No. Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section
27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office
of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the
constitutional prohibition which was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed
Meltin Co. | D. Limitations to Power of Legislation 12

under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its
appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.
d.2. Implied Substantive Limitations

d.2.a. Non-delegation of Legislative Powers
[G.R. No. 45685. November 16, 1937.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. JOSE O. VERA
Facts:
Act No. 4221 (Probation Law) is assailed because section 11 of said Act No. 4221 endows the provincial
boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective provinces.
Issue: Whether the delegation to the provincial board as to the enforcement of Act No. 4221 is valid.
Held: No. The rule, however which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and
inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central
legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. On quite the same principle, Congress
is empowered to delegate legislative power to such agencies in the territories of the United States as it
may select. Courts have also sustained the delegation of legislative power to the people at large, though
some authorities maintain that this may not be done. Doubt less, also, legislative power may be
delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of Article VI of the Constitution of the
Philippines provides that "The National Assembly may by law authorize the President, subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, — to fix within specified limits, tariff rates, import or export
quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues." And section 16 of the same article of the Constitution provides
that "In times of war or other national emergency, the National Assembly may by law authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules
and regulations to carry out a declared national policy."
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to
inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the
legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature.
In United States vs. Ang Tang Ho ( [1922], 43 Phil., 1), the Supreme Court adhered to the foregoing rule.
The general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a certain extent matters of detail may be left
to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and
administrative boards. As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay
down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative board may be guided in the exercise of
the discretionary powers delegated to it.
The Probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial
boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted is a "roving
commission" which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 of the
Act, the legislature does seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the
provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. If a
provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to
appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. This is a virtual surrender of
legislative power to the provincial boards.
Meltin Co. | d.2. Implied Substantive Limitations 13
The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection
can be made. ( Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Clinton County Comrs. [1852], 1 Ohio St., 77, 88. See also,
Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 68.) To the same effect are decisions of the Supreme Court in
the Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binañgonan ([1917], 36 Phil., 547); Rubi vs. Provincial
Board of Mindoro ([1919], 39. Phil., 660); and Cruz vs. Youngberg ([1931], 56 Phil., 234).
Laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive or the
adoption by the people of a particular community (6 R. C. L., 116, 170- 172; Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 8th ed., vol. I, p. 227). In Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1; 6 Law. ed., 253), the
Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the legislature may delegate a power not legislative which
it may itself rightfully exercise. The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated.
There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of
the taking into effect of a law. That is a mental process common to all branches of the government.
Notwithstanding the apparent tendency to relax the rule pro hi biting delegation of legislative authority
on account of the complexity arising from social and economic forces at work in this modern industrial
age, the orthodox pronouncement of .Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations finds
restatement in Professor Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution of the United States and is accepted.
The legislature has not made the operation of the Probation Act contingent upon specified facts or
conditions to be ascertained by the provincial board. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of
the law upon the provincial boards. The discretion vested is arbitrary be cause it is absolute and
unlimited. A provincial board need not investigate conditions or find any fact, or await the happening of
any specified contingency. It is bound by no rule — limited by no principle of expediency announced by
the legislature. It may take into consideration certain facts or conditions; and, again, it may not. It may
have any purpose or no purpose at all. It need not give any reason or have any reason whatsoever for
refusing or failing to appropriate any funds for the salary of a probation officer. This is a matter which
rests entirely at its pleasure.
The legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different from those applicable to other localities
and, while recognizing the force of the principle hereinabove expressed, courts in many jurisdictions
have sustained the constitutionality of the submission of option laws to the vote of the people. (6 R. C.
L., p. 171.) But option laws thus sustained treat of subjects purely local in character which should receive
different treatment in different localities placed under different circumstances. Without denying the
right of local self-government and the propriety of leaving matters of purely local concern in the hands of
local authorities or for the people of small communities to pass upon in matters of general legislation like
that which treats of criminals in general, and as regards the general subject of probation, discretion may
not be vested in a manner so unqualified and absolute as provided in Act No. 4221.
The statute does not expressly state that the provincial boards may suspend the operation of the
Probation Act in particular provinces but, considering that, in being vested with the authority to
appropriate or not the necessary funds for the salaries of probation officers they thereby are given
absolute discretion to determine whether or not the law should take effect or operate in their respective
provinces, the provincial boards are in reality empowered by the legislature to suspend the operation of
the Probation Act in particular provinces, the Act to be held in abeyance until the provincial boards
should decide otherwise by appropriating the necessary funds. The validity of a law is not tested by what
has been done, but by what may be done under its provisions. (Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese and
Trinidad [1922], 43 Phil., 259; 12 C. ,T., p. 786.)
A great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature not only in the expression of what may be
termed legislative policy but in the elaboration and execution thereof. "Without this power, legislation
would become oppressive and yet imbecile." (People vs. Reynolds, 5 Gilman, 1.) It has been said that
popular government lives because of the inexhaustible reservoir of power behind it. It is unquestionable
that the mass of powers of government is vested in the representatives of the people and that these
representatives are no further restrained under our system than by the express language of the
instrument imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions which by clear intendment, have that
effect. But it should be borne in mind that a constitution is both a grant and a limitation of power and
one of these time-honored limitations is that, subject to certain exceptions, legislative power shall not be
delegated.
[G.R. No. L-32096. October 24, 1970.]

ROMEO F. EDU vs. HON. VICENTE G. ERICTA
Facts:
Petitioner Romeo F. Edu, the Land Transportation Commissioner issued Administrative Order No. 2
implementing the Reflector Law. This was assailed as an invalid delegation of legislative power.
Issue: whether there was an invalid delegation of power.
Held: No.
It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not
delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that
local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the
authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness
of the statute all its term and provision when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine
whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to the
scope and definiteness of the measure enactment. The legislative does not abdicate its functions when it
describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex
economy, that may be the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that
the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. A standard thus
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out.
Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.
The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met.
The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and
purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public
safety. What is sought to be obtained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads." This is to
adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not-too-long after
the Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt
itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the
principle of 'subordinate legislation' not only in the United States and England but in practically all
modern governments." He continued: "Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the

multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering
the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the
legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts." Consistency with the conceptual
approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the
completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed.
[G.R. No. 76633. October 18, 1988.]

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. vs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION
Facts:
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in
Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The POEA granted the award prayed for pursuant to the said
Memorandum Circular no. 2. The petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself
as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had
been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation
represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
Issue: Whether the subject memorandum is violative of the principle against non-delegation of
legislative power.
Held: No.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power, viz,, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the
delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of
legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and
exercise a power essentially legislative.
The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the
Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the many
instances when its delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers
have to be delegated by the authorities to which they legally pertain. In the case of the legislative power,
however, such occasions have become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the
observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the
exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has
ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many
of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence
to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may,
however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields
assigned to them.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar
problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative
agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the
"power of subordinate legislation." With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad
policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity
or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary
regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code.
These regulations have the force and effect of law.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed
thereby has been applied in a significant number of cases without challenge by the employer. The
power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not
unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That
standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and
equitable employment practices."
Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient standards "public interest" in
People v. Rosenthal, "justice and equity" in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR, "public convenience and welfare"
in Calalang v. Williams, and "simplicity, economy and efficiency" in Cervantes v. Auditor General, to
mention only a few cases. In the United States, the "sense and experience of men" was accepted in
Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, and "national security" in Hirabayashi v. United States.
Exception Under the Constitution

Sec 23[2] and 28 [2] – Delegation to the President
Sec. 32, Art. VI – delegation to the people
Art. X, Sec.5 – delegation to LGUs
d.2.b. Prohibition against Passage of irrepealable laws
d.3. Procedural Limitations (sec. 26-27)
[G.R. No. 105371. November 11, 1993.]

THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION vs. HON. PETE PRADO
Facts:
The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal
Corporation through its Circular No. 9228. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the
Supreme Court and the lower courts. The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the
grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did
not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form
were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches
Meltin Co. | Exception Under the Constitution 17
on the independence of the Judiciary. It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No.
7354 which withdrew the franking privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor
does it reflect its purposes.
Issue:
Whether the title of the challenged act violates the Constitution.
Held:
No. We do not agree that the title of the challenged act violates the Constitution.
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to
cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general
subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the
legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of
the statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render
legislation impossible. This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The
repeal of a statute on a given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on
the same subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the
title is silent on the subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a matter more germane to an act and to
the object to be accomplished thereby than the repeal of previous legislations connected therewith."
The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the
subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly
expressed in its title. As observed in one case, if the title of an act embraces only one subject, we
apprehend it was never claimed that every other act which it repeals or alters by implication must be
mentioned in the title of the new act. Any such rule would be neither within the reason of the
Constitution, nor practicable.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is
germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the
creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature
as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.
Another issue in this Case
Facts:
The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking
privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the
original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or of House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the
Conference Committee Report, its addition violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, reading as
follows:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three
days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment
to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be
allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in
the Journal.
Issue: Whether the Bicameral Conference Committee transgressed the limits of its power.
Meltin Co. | Exception Under the Constitution 18

Held: No. While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences
between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader
function is described thus:
A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited
to resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even where the conference
committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom
with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a
conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its mandate. These
excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on conference committee
jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of conference committee (Davies,
Legislative Law and Process: In A Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p. 81).
It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on the bill in question was
returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill
was enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra
of the House of Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then
presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification
of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez
laid down the rule that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to
be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are
themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons,
where we explained the reason thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as
we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit of the organic laws
by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and
functions of the Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an
amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that
copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the
enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance
with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a
coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
Note: However,Sec 35 was declared unconstitutional based not on procedural lapses but because of a
substantive infraction. SC said it violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
E. Aid to Legislation
Read: Part I of Legislative Investigations and Right to Privacy
By: Hon. Reynato S. Puno, The Lawyer’s Review, Apr 30, 2005
e.1. Question Hour (Sec 22)

Meltin Co. | E. Aid to Legislation 19
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 169777. * April 20, 2006.]
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA
Facts:
The petitioners alleged that the President has abused its power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O.
464) last September 28, 2005. They thus pray for its declaration as null and void for being
unconstitutional. On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued
invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as
resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation
with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). On
September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464 which required all heads of departments of the
Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
either House of Congress. It also invoked the principle of separation of powers and executive privilege.
Issue: Whether the president abused its power in issuing EO 464.
Held:
Yes. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or
proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible.
The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the
Constitution. The required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the
Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour.
SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the
consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall
provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their
departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker
of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance.
Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in
writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the meaning of Section 22 of
Article VI. Section 22 which provides for the question hour must be interpreted vis-à-vis Section 21 which
provides for the power of either House of Congress to "conduct inquiries in aid of legislation."
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission shows that the framers were aware that these two
provisions involved distinct functions of Congress.
A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour.
While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was
compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. In the context of a parliamentary system of
government, the "question hour" has a definite meaning. It is a period of confrontation initiated by
Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the other ministers accountable for their acts and the
operation of the government, corresponding to what is known in Britain as the question period. There
was a specific provision for a question hour in the 1973 Constitution which made the appearance of

ministers mandatory. The same perfectly conformed to the parliamentary system established by that
Constitution, where the ministers are also members of the legislature and are directly accountable to it.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during
the question hour in the present Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of separation of
powers. To that extent, the question hour, as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction, departs from
the question period of the parliamentary system. That department heads may not be required to appear
in a question hour does not, however, mean that the legislature is rendered powerless to elicit
information from them in all circumstances. In fact, in light of the absence of a mandatory question
period, the need to enforce Congress' right to executive information in the performance of its legislative
function becomes more imperative. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of
powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which
Congress requires their appearance is "in aid of legislation" under Section 21, the appearance is
mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
e.2. Legislative Investigations (Sec 21)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 169777. * April 20, 2006.]
The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the

Constitution which reads:
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules
of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
This provision is worded exactly as Section 8 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution except that,
in the latter, it vests the power of inquiry in the unicameral legislature established therein — the
Batasang Pambansa — and its committees.
That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be
deduced from the same case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is co-extensive with the
power to legislate. The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a
proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate
subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.
Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be
incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most
familiar with and informed on executive operations.
As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, "with process to enforce it," is grounded on
the necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by
executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by
parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure
thereof.
For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, the inquiry itself might not
properly be in aid of legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry
could not usurp judicial functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress to avoid such a result
as occurred in Bengzon is to indicate in its invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person

for that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such
statement in its invitations, along with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions
relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be less room for speculation on the part of the
person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of legislation.
Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the
power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of "executive privilege." Since this term
figures prominently in the challenged order, it being mentioned in its provisions, its preambular clauses,
and in its very title, a discussion of executive privilege is crucial for determining the constitutionality of
E.O. 464.
That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it
would be considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the
question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the
traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting.
From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United
States and in this jurisdiction, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted
against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of
information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a
claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context
in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the
duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary
character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy
and in favor of disclosure.
The President herself has, through the challenged order, made the determination that they are.
Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage of department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend
on the department heads' possession of any information which might be covered by executive privilege.
In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis-à-vis Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege at
all. Rather, the required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the
Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on
whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of
impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect
accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to
appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President
herself or by the Executive Secretary.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 89914. November 20, 1991.]
JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR. vs. THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS
Facts:
On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG), assisted by the Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No.
0035 (PCGG Case No. 35) entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, et al.",

for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages. Thereafter, the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the
Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of the thirty-six (36)
corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez." At the hearing held on 23 May 1989, Ricardo
Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may "unduly prejudice" the defendants in Civil
Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. likewise refused to testify
invoking his constitutional right to due process, and averring that the publicity generated by respondent
Committee's inquiry could adversely affect his rights as well as those of the other petitioners who are his
co-defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners contend that (1) the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation;
(2) the sale or disposition of the Romualdez corporations is a "purely private transaction" which is
beyond the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3) the inquiry violates their
right to due process.
The Senate Investigation was triggered by the privilege speech of Sen. Enrile which (based on SC
review) contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look
into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act."
Issue: Whether the Senate can compel Lopa, et al to attend in the Senate inquiry.
Held: No.
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation (Sec 21).
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not absolute or
unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation
must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the
rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the
right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of
the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the
implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the
formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution
in Congress and/or in the Senate alone. As held in Jean L. Aznault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., the inquiry,
to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body making it, must be material or necessary to the
exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member. Under
Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee or committees any speech or
resolution filed by any Senator which in its judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation.
In order therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry, resort must be had to the speech or
resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to be made.
Now to another matter. It has been held that "a congressional committee's right to inquire
is 'subject to all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action,'
including `the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights'." In another case — " . . . the mere semblance of
legislative purpose would not justify an inquiry in the face of the Bill of Rights. The critical element is the
existence of, and the weight to be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress in demanding disclosures
from an unwilling witness. We cannot simply assume, however, that every congressional investigation is
justified by a public need that over-balances any private rights affected. To do so would be to abdicate
the responsibility placed by the Constitution upon the judiciary to insure that the Congress does not
unjustifiably encroach upon an individual's right to privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech, press,
religion or assembly."
In Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29, this Court observed that "we are bound to presume that the
action of the legislative body was with a legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and we
have no right to assume that the contrary was intended." (People ex rel. McDonald vs. Keeler, 99 N.Y.
463; 52 Am. Rep., 49; 2 N.E., 615, quoted with approval by the U.S. Supreme Court in McGrain vs.
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135). As far as He knows, that is still the rule today. More importantly, the
presumption is supported by the established facts. The inquiry is sustainable as an implied power of the
legislature and even as expressly limited by the Constitution.
The inquiry deals with alleged manipulations of public funds and illicit acquisitions of properties
now being claimed by the PCGG for the Republic of the Philippines. The purpose of the Committee is to
ascertain if and how such anomalies have been committed. It is settled that the legislature has a right to
investigate the disposition of the public funds it has appropriated; indeed, "an inquiry into the
expenditure of all public money is an indispensable duty of the legislature." Moreover, an investigation
of a possible violation of a law may be useful in the drafting of mandatory legislation to correct or
strengthen that law.
The petitioners' contention that the questioned investigation would compel them to reveal their
defense in the cases now pending against them in the Sandiganbayan is untenable. They know or should
know that they cannot be compelled to answer incriminating questions. The case of Chavez v. Court of
Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, where we held that an accused may refuse at the outset to take the stand on the
ground that the questions to be put by the prosecutor will tend to incriminate him is, of course, not
applicable to them. They are not facing criminal charges before the Blue Ribbon Committee.
Like any ordinary witness, they can invoke the right against self-incrimination only when and as
the incriminating question is propounded.
If we presently rule that petitioners may not be compelled by the respondent Committee to
appear, testify and produce evidence before it, it is only because we hold that the questioned inquiry is
not in aid of legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of the principle of separation of powers
between the legislative and the judicial departments of government, ordained by the Constitution.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 72492. November 5, 1987.]
NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOP vs. SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETE
Facts:
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete established an ad hoc committee to conduct an
inquiry on the alleged anomaly committed by NORECO II. The inquiry was to focus on the alleged
installation and use by the petitioner NORECO II of inefficient power lines in that city. It sent to subpoena
to some NORECO II personnel but the latter refused to heed to it. The SP of Dumaguete cited them for
contempt. Petitioners contend that the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete is bereft of
the power to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses, nor the power to order the arrest of
witnesses who fail to obey its subpoena. Respondents, for their part, claim that inherent in the
legislative functions performed by the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod is the power to conduct
investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters
within its jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether the local legislative bodies have the power to compel the attendance of any person in aid
of its local legislation function. Corollarily, whether they have the power to cite contempt.
Held: No.
A line should be drawn between the powers of Congress as the repository of the legislative
power under the Constitution, and those that may be exercised by the legislative bodies of local
government unit, e.g. the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete which, as mere creatures of law,
possess delegated legislative power. While the Constitution does not expressly vest Congress with the
power to punish non-members for legislative contempt, the power has nevertheless been invoked by the
legislative body as a means of preserving its authority and dignity.
The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is
founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the
exercise of legislative power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information or,
which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and
information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of the
Constitution adopted the principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme within the
realm of its respective authority, it must have intended each department's authority to be full and
complete, independently of the other's authority or power. And how could the authority and power
become complete if for every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the
legislative body must resort to the judicial department for the appropriate remedy, because it is
impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with the affronts committed against its authority or
dignity .
The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation as that
branch of the government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch,
asserts its authority and punishes contempts thereof. The contempt power of the legislature is,
therefore, sui generis, and local legislative bodies cannot correctly claim to possess it for the same
The power attaches not to the discharge of
reasons that the national legislature does.
legislative functions per se but to the character of the legislature as one of the
three independent and coordinate branches of government. The same thing cannot be
said of local legislative bodies which are creations of law.
To begin with, there is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the Local
Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena
witnesses and the power to punish non-members for contempt. Absent a constitutional or legal
provision for the exercise of these powers, the only possible justification for the issuance of a subpoena
and for the punishment of non-members for contumacious behavior would be for said power to be
deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt power and the
subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power.
Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions. To allow local
legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these powers without express statutory basis
would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Thus, the contempt power, as well as the subpoena power, which the framers of the
fundamental law did not expressly provide for but which the then Congress has asserted essentially for
self-preservation as one of three co-equal branches of the government cannot be deemed implied in the
delegation of certain legislative functions to local legislative bodies. These cannot be presumed to exist
in favor of the latter and must be considered as an exception to Sec. 4 of B.P. 337 which provides for
liberal rules of interpretation in favor of local autonomy.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete may, therefore, enact ordinances to regulate the
installation and maintenance of electric power lines, e.g. prohibit the use of inefficient power lines, in
order to protect the city residents from the hazards these may pose. In aid of this ordinance-making
power, said body or any of its committees may conduct investigations similar to, but not the same as, the
legislative investigations conducted by the national legislature. As already discussed, the difference lies
in the lack of subpoena power and of the power to punish for contempt on the part of the local
legislative bodies. They may only invite resource persons who are willing to supply information which
may be relevant to the proposed ordinance. The type of investigation which may be conducted by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod does not include within its ambit an inquiry into any suspected violation by an
electric cooperative of the conditions of its electric franchise.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-3820. July 18, 1950.]
JEAN L. ARNAULT vs. LEON NAZARENO
Facts:
The Senate created a special committee to conduct an inquiry on the anomalous Buenavista and
Tambobong Estate deals. It called and examined various witnesses, among the most important of whom
was the herein petitioner, Jean L. Arnault. The Committee cited Arnault for contempt because of his
refusal to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the money in relation to the anomalous
transaction. He was committed to the custody of the Senate Sgt at Arms. Arnault argued that the inquiry
is violative of his right against self-incriminination.
Issue: Whether the legislative inquiry is violative of Arnault’s constitutional right. Whether Congress has
the power to cite him in legislative contempt.
Held:
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress
with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative
functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be
implied. In other words, the power of inquiry — with process to enforce it — is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in
the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislations is intended to affect or
change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information — which is not
frequently true — recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere
requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not
always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to
make, we think the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question
pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The
inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the
exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every
question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or
pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. So a witness may not be coerced to answer a
question that obviously has no relation to the subject of the inquiry. But from this it does not follow that
every question that may propounded to a witness must be material to any proposed or possible
legislation. In other words, the materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to
the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The
reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the
action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the
investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question.
Applying the criterion laid down in the last two preceding paragraphs to the resolution of the
issue under consideration, we find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was
held in contempt by the Senate which the petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to
the matter under inquiry.
If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative
inquiry and the proposed testimony called relate to that subject, obedience to its process may be
enforced by the committee by imprisonment.
The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative
body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may
be and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of
performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such
committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for
which that power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to its
legislative function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to
be preserved.
Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000
to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter's verbal instruction, we find no basis upon which
to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him. There is no conflict of
authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:
"Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of the Court. At least, it
is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him, as he is not the sole judge of
his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the
circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his general conception of the relations of the
witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the province of the court to determine whether a direct
answer to a question may criminate or not. . . . The fact that the testimony of a witness may tend to
show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of the
constitutional provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution and
punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse,
for protection against an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person." (3 Wharton's
Criminal Evidence, 11th ed., secs. 1135, 1136.)
"It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances of the case
whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 136760. July 29, 2003.]
THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE vs. HON. JOSE B. MAJADUCON
Facts:
Petitioners alleged that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction when he enjoined the petitioners from proceeding with the inquiry in
P.S. 160 on the alleged anomaly in the purchase of Lot X, MR-1160-D, located in General Santos City, by
the AFP-RSBS, and enforcing its subpoenas to respondent Flaviano. According to petitioner Committee,
courts have no jurisdiction to restrain Congress from performing its constitutionally vested function to
conduct investigations in aid of legislation, following the principle of separation of powers. On the other
hand, respondent Flaviano contended that the trial court may properly intervene into investigations by
Congress pursuant to the power of judicial review vested in it by the Constitution.
Issue: Whether Judge Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion when it enjoined the Senate BR
Committee from proceeding with the said inquiry.
Held:
Yes. The principle of separation of powers essentially means that legislation belongs to Congress,
execution to the Executive, and settlement of legal controversies to the Judiciary. Each is prevented from
invading the domain of the others. When the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee served subpoena on
respondent Flaviano to appear and testify before it in connection with its investigation of the alleged
misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution, thus:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. Hence, the Regional Trial Court of General
Santos City, or any court for that matter, had no authority to prohibit the Committee from requiring
respondent to appear and testify before it.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 174340. October 17, 2006.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF CAMILO L. SABIO
Facts:
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate
Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455), "directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous
losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due
to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors." Chief of Staff Rio
C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the
PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting
jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee
on Public Services. Sabio however refused to heed the invitation invoking Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1
which provides that: No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance. The Committee cited him for contempt. Sabio argued that the Committee is bereft of
contempt power because the same is specifically lodged in the Congress and not in a committee created
by Congress.
Issue: Whether Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 constitutes a limitation on the power of legislative inquiry.
Whether it is repealed by the 1987 Constitution. Whether the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, which is a
creation of Congress, enjoys the powers i.e. inquiry and contempt powers, as the Congress does.
Held: Yes. Where no constitutional limitation or restriction exists, it is competent for either of the two
bodies composing the legislature to do, in their separate capacity, whatever may be essential to enable
them to legislate. . . . It is well-established principle of this parliamentary law, that either house may
institute any investigation having reference to its own organization, the conduct or qualification of its
members, its proceedings, rights, or privileges or any matter affecting the public interest upon which it
may be important that it should have exact information, and in respect to which it would be competent
for it to legislate. The right to pass laws, necessarily implies the right to obtain information upon any
matter which may become the subject of a law. It is essential to the full and intelligent exercise of the
legislative function.
Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not just of Congress, but
also of "any of its committee." This is significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory
power upon the committees and it means that the mechanisms which the Houses can take in order to
effectively perform its investigative function are also available to the committees.
It can be said that the Congress' power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive
construal. The Court's high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it
categorically ruled that "the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch."
Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that "the operation of government, being a legitimate
subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation" and that "the power of inquiry is co-extensive
with the power to legislate."
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, we find Section 4(b) directly repugnant with
Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress' power of
inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such
exemption. The Congress' power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends "to
government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress
to regulate or even abolish."
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in
the absence of any constitutional basis.
Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution stating
that: "Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives."
Section 4(b) limits or obstructs the power of Congress to secure from PCGG members and staff
information and other data in aid of its power to legislate. Again, this must not be countenanced. In
Senate v. Ermita, 31 this Court stressed:
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however,
any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations
necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is
presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which
they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress — opinions which they
can then communicate to their representatives and other government officials through the various legal
means allowed by their freedom of expression.
A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to
enact; or it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose
or effect violates the Constitution or its basic principles. 32 As shown in the above discussion, Section
4(b) is inconsistent with Article VI, Section 21 (Congress' power of inquiry), Article XI, Section 1 (principle
of public accountability), Article II, Section 28 (policy of full disclosure) and Article III, Section 7 (right to
public information).
Significantly, Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:

All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive
issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or
revoked.
The clear import of this provision is that all existing laws, executive orders, proclamations, letters
of instructions and other executive issuances inconsistent or repugnant to the Constitution are repealed.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 170165. August 15, 2006.]
B/GEN. (RET.) FRANCISCO V. GUDANI vs. LT./GEN. GENEROSO S. SENGA
Facts:
Petitioners seek the annulment of a directive from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo enjoining
them and other military officers from testifying before Congress without the President's consent.
Petitioners also pray for injunctive relief against a pending preliminary investigation against them, in
preparation for possible court-martial proceedings, initiated within the military justice system in
connection with petitioners' violation of the aforementioned directive. Petitioners wish to see annulled
the "gag order" that required them to secure presidential consent prior to their appearance before the
Senate, claiming that it violates the constitutional right to information and transparency in matters of
public concern; or if not, is tantamount at least to the criminal acts of obstruction of justice and grave
coercion.
Issue: Whether the President, the Commander-in-Chief can prohibit a military officer from attending
legislative inquiry without its prior approval.
Held:
Yes. We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable
under military justice. At the same time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks the
appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies
under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it
may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be
commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have
the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
As earlier noted, we ruled in Senate that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of
prior consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In
doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the
privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent
military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief
Executive's power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed
forces. The President's prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as
in executive privilege.
Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek
presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary
rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds
significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of
higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-
chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military
discipline and the chain of command mandate that the President's ability to control the individual
members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between
obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer
has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the
Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before
Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature's
functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to
interfere with the President's power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President
to unduly interfere with Congress's right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to
pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court
is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent
from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.
In Senate, the Court ruled that the President could not impose a blanket prohibition barring
executive officials from testifying before Congress without the President's consent notwithstanding the
invocation of executive privilege to justify such prohibition. The Court did not rule that the power to
conduct legislative inquiry ipso facto superseded the claim of executive privilege, acknowledging instead
that the viability of executive privilege stood on a case to case basis. Should neither branch yield to the
other branch's assertion, the constitutional recourse is to the courts, as the final arbiter if the dispute. It
is only the courts that can compel, with conclusiveness, attendance or non-attendance in legislative
inquiries.
Following these principles, it is clear that if the President or the Chief of Staff refuses to allow a
member of the AFP to appear before Congress, the legislative body seeking such testimony may seek
judicial relief to compel the attendance. Such judicial action should be directed at the heads of the
executive branch or the armed forces, the persons who wield authority and control over the actions of
the officers concerned. The legislative purpose of such testimony, as well as any defenses against the
same — whether grounded on executive privilege, national security or similar concerns — would be
accorded due judicial evaluation. All the constitutional considerations pertinent to either branch of
government may be raised, assessed, and ultimately weighed against each other. And once the courts
speak with finality, both branches of government have no option but to comply with the decision of the
courts, whether the effect of the decision is to their liking or disfavor.
Petitioners have presented several issues relating to the tenability or wisdom of the President's
order on them and other military officers not to testify before Congress without the President's consent.
Yet these issues ultimately detract from the main point — that they testified before the Senate despite
an order from their commanding officer and their commander-in-chief for them not to do so, in
contravention of the traditions of military discipline which we affirm today. The issues raised by
petitioners could have very well been raised and properly adjudicated if the proper procedure was
observed. Petitioners could have been appropriately allowed to testify before the Senate without having
to countermand their Commander-in-chief and superior officer under the setup we have prescribed.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 180643. March 25, 2008.]
ROMULO L. NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
INVESTIGATIONS
Facts:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a
contract with Zhing Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services
for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $329,481,290 (approximately
P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People's Republic of China. Respondent
Committees initiated the investigation, in aid od legislation, by sending invitations to certain
personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was among those invited. In
particular, he refused to answer, invoking executive privilege, the questions on (a) whether or not
President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, 6 (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve. In a letter sent to the Senate, Ermita justified the claim
of executive privilege saying that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as
well as economic relations with the People's Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in which
these information were conveyed to the President, he (Neri) cannot provide the Committee any further
details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.
Issue:
Whether the Senate can compel Neri to disclose the information asked for.
Held:
No, because those information are covered by executive privilege. (Executive privilege will be
discussed under the proper section).
At the outset, a glimpse at the landmark case of Senate v. Ermita becomes imperative. Senate
draws in bold strokes the distinction between the legislative and oversight powers of the Congress, as
embodied under Sections 21 and 22, respectively, of Article VI of the Constitution
Senate cautions that while the above provisions are closely related and complementary to each
other, they should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. Section 21 relates to
the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, its aim is to elicit information that may be used for
legislation, while Section 22 pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is
to obtain information in pursuit of Congress' oversight function. Simply stated, while both powers allow
Congress or any of its committees to conduct inquiry, their objectives are different.
This distinction gives birth to another distinction with regard to the use of compulsory process.
Unlike in Section 21, Congress cannot compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 22. The
Court's pronouncement in Senate v. Ermita 20 is clear:
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are
implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative
as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report
of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the
separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless,
when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is 'in aid of legislation' under
Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under section
21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the
executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to
legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner's claim of executive
privilege violates the constitutional provisions on right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But
petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned
for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions
from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.

More than anything else, though, the right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain
information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the people's right to public information. The
former cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the people' right to information. The
distinction between such rights is laid down in Senate v. Ermita:
There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to
information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of people to information
on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of
documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force
as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information
grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These powers
belong only to Congress, not to individual citizen.
Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow,
except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising
their right to information.
F. OTHER POWERS
f.1. As Board of Canvassers in elections for Pres and V-pres (Art VII, Sec 4)
f.2. Call special election for president and vp (Art VII, Sec 10)
f.3. Revoke/extend suspension of privilege of writ of habeas corpus, declaration of martial law
(Art VII, Sec 18)
f.4. Approve presidential amnesties (Art VII, Sec 9 abd 16)
f.5 Confirm certain appointments
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 79974. December 17, 1987.]
ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA vs. SALVADOR MISON
Facts:
The petitioners questioned the appointment of Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs for being unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent
Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
Issue: Whether the appointment of Mison needs concurrence of the Commission on Appointments.
Held: No.
It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there are
four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will
hereafter refer from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Meltin Co. | F. OTHER POWERS 33

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.
The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention. Should they
be appointed by the President with or without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments? By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an
express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those
appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.
Coming now to the immediate question before the Court, it is evident that the position of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of
appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as
already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those officers
whose appointments need the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution, on
the other hand, deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need
the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
f.6. Concur in treaties (Art VII, Sec 21)

f.7. Declare war and delegate emergency powers (Sec 23)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 171396. May 3, 2006.]
PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
Facts:
Petitioners allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order
No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. On February
24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo
issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency. Respondents stated that the proximate cause
behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the
New People's Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or
assassinate President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over
the reigns of government as a clear and present danger. The mass demonstrations conducted during the
commemoration of EDSA were dispersed by the anti-riot police. During the dispersal of the rallyists along
EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the
Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of
party-list Akbayan. petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it
encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional
requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. President Arroyo also invoked in PP 1017 Section 17,
Article XII which reads:
Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of
any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
The invocation of the said constitutional provision was made the justification of the takeover of
several privately-owned public utility during the effectivity of PP 1017.
Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives, claim that President
Arroyo's inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment on the legislature's emergency
powers.
Issue:
Whether it is within the power of the President to take over privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest in times of national emergency.
Held:
No. A distinction must be drawn between the President's authority to declare "a state of
national emergency" and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated by the Court, Section
18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be
raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 23.(1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting
separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.
(2)In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress,
such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war
but also to "other national emergency." If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to
withhold from the President the authority to declare a "state of national emergency" pursuant to Section
18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state
of war), then the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first
authorize the President before he can declare a "state of national emergency." The logical conclusion
then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in
the absence of a Congressional enactment.
But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility
or business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.
Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be construed
together. Otherwise stated, different clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution which relate to
the same subject matter will be construed together and considered in the light of each other.
Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI, previously quoted, relate to
national emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation of the exercise of
emergency powers.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section
23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot
delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be
possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution
deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain
conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The
taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency
powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the "the State may, during
the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest," it refers to
Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent
on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP
1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected
with public interest without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency,
however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist
warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor
can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the
President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be
taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under
Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 155001. January 21, 2004.]
DEMOSTHENES P. AGAN, et al. vs. PIATCO
Held:
Section 17, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution grants the State in times of national emergency
the right to temporarily take over the operation of any business affected with public interest. This right is
an exercise of police power which is one of the inherent powers of the State. Police power has been
defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare." It consists of two essential elements. First, it is an imposition of
restraint upon liberty or property. Second, the power is exercised for the benefit of the common good.
Its definition in elastic terms underscores its all-encompassing and comprehensive embrace. It is and still
is the "most essential, insistent, and illimitable" of the State's powers. It is familiar knowledge that unlike
the power of eminent domain, police power is exercised without provision for just compensation for its
paramount consideration is public welfare. It is also settled that public interest on the occasion of a
national emergency is the primary consideration when the government decides to temporarily take over
or direct the operation of a public utility or a business affected with public interest. The nature and
extent of the emergency is the measure of the duration of the takeover as well as the terms thereof. It is
the State that prescribes such reasonable terms which will guide the implementation of the temporary
takeover as dictated by the exigencies of the time. As we ruled in our Decision, this power of the State
can not be negated by any party nor should its exercise be a source of obligation for the State. Section
5.10 (c), Article V of the ARCA provides that respondent PIATCO "shall be entitled to reasonable
compensation for the duration of the temporary takeover by GRP, which compensation shall take into
account the reasonable cost for the use of the Terminal and/or Terminal Complex." It clearly obligates
the government in the exercise of its police power to compensate respondent PIATCO and this obligation
is offensive to the Constitution. Police power can not be diminished, let alone defeated by any contract
for its paramount consideration is public welfare and interest.

f.8 Judge President’s fitness

Art VII, Sec. 11, par. 4
[G.R. No. 146738. April 3, 2001.]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada denies he resigned as President or that he suffered from a
permanent disability. He contended that the Office of the President was not vacant when respondent
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo took her oath as president. Private respondents, on the other hand, claim that
the threshold issue that the cases at bar posed falls within the realm of political question, and hence, are
beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to decide. They stressed that respondent Arroyo ascended the
presidency through people power; that she had already taken her oath as the 14th President of the
Republic; that she had exercised the powers of the presidency and that she had been recognized by
foreign governments.
Petitioner argues that the Court misinterpreted the meaning of section 11, Article VII, of the
Constitution in that Congress can only decide the issue of inability when there is a variance of opinion
between a majority of the Cabinet and the President. The situation presents itself when majority of the
Cabinet determines that the President is unable to govern; later, the President informs Congress that his
inability has ceased but is contradicted by a majority of the members of the Cabinet. It is also urged that
the President's judgment that he is unable to govern temporarily which is thereafter communicated to
the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate is the political question which this Court
cannot review.
Issue:
Whether the Congress committed an error in deciding over the fitness of Estrada to govern.
Held:
No. We cannot sustain the petitioner. Lest petitioner forgets, he himself made the submission in
G.R. No. 146738 that "Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether
the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of Article
VII." We sustained this submission and held that by its many acts, Congress has already determined and
dismissed the claim of alleged temporary inability to govern proffered by petitioner. If petitioner now
feels aggrieved by the manner Congress exercised its power, it is incumbent upon him to seek redress
from Congress itself. The power is conceded by the petitioner to be with Congress and its alleged
erroneous exercise cannot be corrected by this Court. The recognition of respondent Arroyo as our de
jure president made by Congress is unquestionably a political judgment. It is significant that House
Resolution No. 176 cited as the bases of its judgment such factors as the "people's loss of confidence on
the ability of former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern" and the "members of the
international community had extended their recognition of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as
President of the Republic of the Philippines" and it has a constitutional duty "of fealty to the supreme
will of the people . . .." This political judgment may be right or wrong but Congress is answerable only to
the people for its judgment. Its wisdom is fit to be debated before the tribunal of the people and not
before a court of justice. Needless to state, the doctrine of separation of power constitutes an
insuperable bar against this Court's interposition of its power of judicial review to review the judgment
of Congress rejecting petitioner's claim that he is still the President, albeit on leave and that respondent
Arroyo is merely an acting President.
On the issue of inability to govern under section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, we held
that Congress has the ultimate authority to determine the question as opined by the petitioner himself
and that the determination of Congress is a political judgment which this Court cannot review.
Petitioner cannot blur these specific rulings by the generalization that whether one is a de jure or de
facto President is a judicial question.
Section 8 of Article VII covers the situation of the death, permanent disability, removal from
office or resignation of the President. Section 11 of Article VII covers the case where the President
transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. In each case, the
Constitution specifies the body that will resolve the issues that may arise from the contingency. In case
of election contest, section 4, Article VII provides that the contests shall be resolved by this Court sitting
en banc. In case of resignation of the President, it is not disputed that this Court has jurisdiction to
decide the issue. In case of inability to govern, section 11 of Article VII gives the Congress the power to
adjudge the issue and petitioner himself submitted this thesis which was shared by this Court. I n light of
these clear provisions of the Constitution, it is inappropriate, to say the least, for petitioner to make
inferences that simply distort their meanings.
f.9. Power of Impeachment (Art. XI)

f.9.a. Who may be impeached (Art XI, Sec. 2)
EN BANC
[A.M. No. 88-4-5433. April 15, 1988.]
IN RE FIRST INDORSEMENT FROM HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ DATED 16 MARCH 1988
REQUESTING HONORABLE JUSTICE MARCELO B. FERNAN TO COMMENT ON AN ANONYMOUS LETTER-
COMPLAINT.
Facts:
The case started with the disbarment complaint filed by Miguel Cuenco against Justice Fernan.
Raul Gonzales received an anonymous letter which contained disbarment complaint against the said
Justice and he transmitted the same to Justice Fernan who in turn transmitted the same to the hands of
SC en banc for resolution.
Issue:
Whether a disbarment case can be filed against an encumbent justice of the Supreme Court
when the Constitution says that he can only be removed thru impeachment.
Held:
No. It is important to underscore the rule of constitutional law here involved. This principle may
be succinctly formulated in the following terms: A public officer who under the Constitution is required
to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be
removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency
of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally
before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offense which carries with it the penalty of
removal from office, or any penalty service of which would amount to removal from office.
The Court dealt with this matter in its Resolution of 17 February 1988 in Administrative Case No.
3135 in the following terms:
"There is another reason why the complaint for disbarment here must be dismissed.
Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution, be members of
the Philippine Bar and may be removed from office only by impeachment (Article XI [2],
Constitution). To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the
Member's incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to run afoul of the
constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by
impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution.
Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in
relation to Article XI [2], id.), a majority of the members of the Commission on Elections (Article
XI [C] [1] [1] in relation to Article XI [2], id. and the members of the Commission on Audit who are
not certified public accountants (Article XI [D] [1] [1], id.), all of whom are constitutionally
required to be members of the Philippine Bar." (Emphasis supplied)
This is not the first time the Court has had occasion to rule on this matter. In Lecaroz v.
Sandiganbayan, the Court said:
"The broad power of the New Constitution vests the respondent court with jurisdiction over 'public
officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations.' There are
exceptions, however, like constitutional officers, particularly those declared to be removed by
impeachment. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution provides:
'Sec. 2. The President, the Members of the Supreme Court, and the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of
the Constitution, treason, bribery, other high crimes, or graft and corruption.'
Thus, the above provision proscribes removal from office of the aforementioned constitutional officers
by any other method; otherwise, to allow a public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment
to be charged criminally while holding his office with an offense that carries the penalty of removal from
office, would be violative of the clear mandate of the fundamental law.
It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that its Members or the other
constitutional officers we referred to above are entitled to immunity from liability for possibly criminal
acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehaviour. What the
Court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed before such
liability may be determined and enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from
office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he
may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any
wrong or misbehaviour that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.
The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence and separation of
powers. The rule is important because judicial independence is important. Without the protection of
this rule, Members of the Supreme Court would be vulnerable to all manner of charges which might be
brought against them by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties who, for any
number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court. It follows from
the foregoing that a fiscal or other prosecuting officer should forthwith and motu proprio dismiss any
charges brought against a Member of this Court. The remedy of a person with a legitimate grievance is
to file impeachment proceedings.

f.9.b. Grounds
f.9.c. Procedure
f.9.d. Effect (Art XI, Sec 3[7])
[G.R. No. 160405. November 10, 2003.]

DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Facts:
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed with the Office of the Secretary
General of the House of Representatives, a verified impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. and seven (7) other Associate Justices of the Court for violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of public trust and, committing high crimes. The House Committee on Justice subsequently
dismissed said complaint on October 22, 2003 for insufficiency of substance.
The next day, or on October 23, 2003, Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr., First District,
Tarlac and Felix William B. Fuentebella, Third District, Camarines Sur, filed another verified impeachment
complaint with the Office of the Secretary General of the House against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., alleging underpayment of the COLA of the members and personnel of the judiciary from the JDF and
unlawful disbursement of said fund for various infrastructure projects and acquisition of service vehicles
and other equipment. Attached to the second impeachment complaint was a Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the members of the House of
Representatives. The complaint was set to be transmitted to the Senate for appropriate action.
Petitioners contended that the filing of second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice
was barred under Article XI, Sec. 3 (5) of the 1987 Constitution which states that "no impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."
On the other hand, Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground
that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment.
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and
17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present
Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in
that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate all
cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2),
Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint
for impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution
of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House. Respondent
House of Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of
Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.
Issues:
1. Whether the SC should restrain itself from taking cognizance of this case for the reason that the
Senate is the sole impeachment court.

2. Whether there is violation to the one-year bar in the filing of impeachment cases. Corollarily,
what is meant by the term “initiate” in applying the following constitutional provisions, viz:
Section 3 (1). The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate
all cases of impeachment.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied by the author)
Held:
First Issue:
No. The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court.
Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be
renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred." Otherwise, this Court
would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being
clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions. In the
august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which
may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot
inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other office has the authority to do so. On the
occasion that this Court had been an interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the
matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with
detachment and fairness." After all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member
of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their
varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to
be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong
enough to resist the temptations lurking in [his] office."
Second Issue:
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to
statutory construction is, therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado,
who eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to
file," as proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional
Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral
arguments on the instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of
"initiating" included the act of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the
word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint
and take initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence,
or set going. As Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it
means "to perform or facilitate the first action," which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and that of
Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003
in this wise:

Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a complexus of

acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the
articles of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative
moments leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or
the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco and
Fuentebella says that impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of
impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does
not say "impeachment proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated.” The language is
recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a
time after actual initiation. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
(In this juncture, the SC revisited the deliberations by made 1987 Consti Commissioners in order
to shed light to the meaning of the term “initiate.” Supplied by the author)
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing
of the complaint. In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious
reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of the
provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of
impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House
in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already
initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the
Constitution."
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word "initiate,"
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The object
in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is "impeachment
proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo singula singulis, the term "cases" must be
distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be
decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all
its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive power" to
initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate
a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be
"initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand,
proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the
Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either
by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the
House of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee
which may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects
or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4)
there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms a
favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the
members. If at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are
prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates an impeachment
case." It is at this point that an impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is
successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the
complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the
beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated

when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something
prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding,
not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is
filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the
series of steps that follow.
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former
Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the
members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning
of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following
Article XI, Section 3 (5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2,
2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment
complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief
Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
f.10. Power to amend constitution
VI. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT: THE PRESIDENT (Art. VII)
QUALIFICATIONS, ELECTION, TERM, OATH (Secs. 2,4,5)
EN BANC
[P.E.T. Case No. 002. March 29, 2005.]
RONALD ALLAN POE a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR. vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
Facts:
Past midnight, in the early hours of June 24, 2004, the Congress as the representatives of the
sovereign people and acting as the National Board of Canvassers, in a near-unanimous roll-call vote,
proclaimed Mrs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) the duly elected President of the Philippines. Refusing
to concede defeat, the second-placer in the elections, Mr. FPJ, filed seasonably an election protest before
Meltin Co. | QUALIFICATIONS, ELECTION, TERM, OATH (Secs. 2,4,5) 43

this Electoral Tribunal on July 23, 2004. Mrs. GMA, through counsel, filed her Answer with Counter
Protest on August 5, 2004. On December 14, 2004, the Protestant died in the course of his medical
treatment at St. Luke's Hospital. Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe a.k.a. Susan Roces, moved to substitute the
deceased husband.
Mrs. FPJ claims that because of the untimely demise of her husband and in representation not
only of her deceased husband but more so because of the paramount interest of the Filipino people,
there is an urgent need for her to continue and substitute for her late husband in the election protest
initiated by him to ascertain the true and genuine will of the electorate in the 2004 elections.
On the other hand, Protestee contended that Mrs. FPJ cannot substitute for her deceased
husband because under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, only the registered candidates
who obtained the 2nd and 3rd highest votes for the presidency may contest the election of the president
and patently, Mrs. FPJ did not receive the 2nd and 3rd highest votes for she was not even a candidate for
the presidency in the election that is being contested.
Issue: May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency of the
latter's protest case?
Held:
No. In our application of this rule (refering to Rule 14 of the PET Rules concerning election
protest) to an election contest, we have every time ruled that a public office is personal to the public
officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs upon death. 9 Thus, we consistently rejected
substitution by the widow or the heirs in election contests where the protestant dies during the
pendency of the protest.
This is not to say that death of the protestant necessarily abates the pending action. We have
held as early as Vda. de De Mesa (1966) that while the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to
the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the
protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest
proceedings. Hence, we have allowed substitution and intervention but only by a real party in interest. A
real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party who
is entitled to the avails of the suit. In Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias and Lomugdang v. Javier, we
permitted substitution by the vice-mayor since the vice-mayor is a real party in interest considering that
if the protest succeeds and the protestee is unseated, the vice-mayor succeeds to the office of the mayor
that becomes vacant if the one duly elected cannot assume office. In contrast, herein
movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, herself denies any claim to the august office of President. Thus, given the
circumstances of this case, we can conclude that protestant's widow is not a real party in interest to this
election protest.
Mrs. FPJ, has overly stressed that it is with the "paramount public interest" in mind that she
desires "to pursue the process" commenced by her late husband. She avers that she is "pursuing the
process" to determine who truly won the election, as a service to the Filipino people. We laud her noble
intention and her interest to find out the true will of the electorate. However, nobility of intention is not
the point of reference in determining whether a person may intervene in an election protest. Rule 19,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on intervention in the absence of such a rule in the
PET Rules. In such intervention, the interest which allows a person to intervene in a suit must be in the
matter of litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or
lose by the effect of the judgment. In this protest, Mrs. FPJ will not immediately and directly benefit from
the outcome should it be determined that the declared president did not truly get the highest number of
votes. We fully appreciate counsel's manifestation that movant/intervenor herself claims she has no
interest in assuming the position as she is aware that she cannot succeed to the presidency, having no
legal right to it. Yet thus far, in this case, no real parties such as the vice-presidential aspirants in the 2004
elections, have come forward to intervene, or to be substituted for the deceased protestant.
Author’s Note: “ This case is not responsive to the topic under which it is classified per Largo’s outline.
This is more of a procedural matter. The author therefore encourages the reader to read the full text of
the case for further illumination.”
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

[PET Case No. 003. January 18, 2008.]
LOREN B. LEGARDA vs. NOLI L. DE CASTRO
Facts:
On June 23, 2004, Congress sitting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) proclaimed 1
protestee Noli L. de Castro the duly elected Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines. On July 23,
2004, the protestant filed this protest with this Tribunal praying for the annulment of the protestee's
proclamation as the duly elected Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines. In the first aspect,
Protestant seeks the recomputation, recanvass and retabulation of the election returns to determine the
true result. The Second Aspect required revision of ballots in 124,404 precincts specified in the protest.
In the meantime, Legarda won and assumed office as Senator of the Republic and started
discharging her duties as such.
Issue: Whether Legarda’s election to and assumption of office as Senator rendered the election protest
moot and academic.
Held:
Yes. In assuming the office of Senator and discharging her duties as such, which fact we can take
judicial notice of, has effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest, or abandoned her determination
to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the
electorate. The most relevant precedent on this issue is Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos, a decision rendered
by this Tribunal, which held that:
The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May 1995 election is six years, the
first three of which coincides with the last three years of the term of the President elected in the
11 May 1992 synchronized elections. The latter would be Protestant Santiago's term if she would
succeed in proving in the instant protest that she was the true winner in the 1992 elections. In
assuming the office of Senator then, the Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this
protest, or at the very least, in the language of Moraleja, abandoned her "determination to
protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the
electorate." Such abandonment or withdrawal operates to render moot the instant protest.
Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura
of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential election, thereby enhancing the all-[too]
crucial political stability of the nation during this period of national recovery.
In the case at bar, protestant's tenure in the Senate coincides with the term of the Vice-
Presidency 2004-2010, that is the subject of her protest. In Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos, the protestant's
tenure in the Senate also coincided with the term of the Presidency she was vying for. Like the protestant
in the aforementioned case, the protestant in the case at bar filed her certificate of candidacy for the
Senate, campaigned for the office, assumed office after election, and discharged the duties and functions
of said office. Thus, we agree concerning the applicability of the Defensor-Santiago case as a precedent

in the resolution of the present protest, though they differ in that Defensor-Santiago's case involves the
Presidency while Legarda's protest concerns only the Vice-Presidency.
PRIVILEGE AND SALARY (Sec. 6)

b.1 Executive Immunity
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 82585. November 14, 1988.]
MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN vs. THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR
Facts:
Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran
Petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit
impose a correlative disability to file suit". He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of
the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the
prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect
way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be
exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal
proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit. If she may initiate,
what are the repercussions of such initiation to her executive immunity?
2. Can Beltran invoke the executive immunity of the president as a defense?
Held:
First Issue:
Yes. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to
assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction,
considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the
office-holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
Second Issue:
No. But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and
may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf Thus,
an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential
privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit
to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
Meltin Co. | PRIVILEGE AND SALARY (Sec. 6) 46

EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 146710-15. April 3, 2001.]
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA vs. ANIANO DESIERTO
Facts:
Estrada argued that he cannot be criminally prosecuted because he is covered by the executive
immunity during the entire period of his term and that he should be removed through impeachment
first before he can be prosecuted.
Issues:
Whether the president is immune from suit during his term as president.
Whether impeachment is a conditio sine qua non to his prosecution.
Held:
First Issue:
No. This is in accord with our ruling in In re: Saturnino Bermudez that "incumbent Presidents are
immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but
not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner
has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition
sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the
impeachment proceedings.
Petitioner, however, fails to distinguish between term and tenure. The term means the time
during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the
several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the
incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond
the power of the incumbent. 50 From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the
immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term.
Indeed, petitioner's stubborn stance cannot but bolster the belief that the cases at bar were filed not
really for petitioner to reclaim the presidency but just to take advantage of the immunity attached to the
presidency and thus, derail the investigation of the criminal cases pending against him in the Office of
the Ombudsman.
The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery
and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which
carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president.
Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and
wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an
inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials
are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same
footing as any other trespasser.
Second Issue:
No. We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be
convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by
the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on
February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the Impeachment Court
is Functus Officio." Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to
demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if
granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend
itself for it will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to
impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in
the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot
due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against
him.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 152259. July 29, 2004.]
ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ vs. The Honorable SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
Petitioner was charged in an Information for violation of Section 5 of the Anti-Graft Law for
intervening in a sale between the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation, a government-owned and
controlled corporation, and the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company, a private corporation, the
majority stocks of which were allegedly owned by his brother-in-law, the late President Marcos. In this
petition, petitioner alleged that the Sandiganbayan erred in not dismissing the criminal case on the
ground that, among others, he enjoys derivative immunity, because he allegedly served as a high-ranking
naval officer — specifically, as naval aide-de-camp — of former President Marcos.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner is immune from criminal prosecution.
Held:
No. In Estrada v. Desierto, this Court exhaustively traced the origin of executive immunity in
order to determine the extent of its applicability. We explained therein that executive immunity applied
only during the incumbency of a President. It could not be used to shield a non-sitting President from
prosecution for alleged criminal acts done while sitting in office. The reasoning of petitioner must
therefore fail, since he derives his immunity from one who is no longer sitting as President. Verily, the
felonious acts of public officials and their close relatives "are not acts of the State, and the officer who
acts illegally is not acting as such but stands on the same footing as any other trespasser.
b.2. Executive Privilege
[G.R. No. 95367. May 23, 1995.]

COMMISSIONER JOSE T. ALMONTE vs. vs. HONORABLE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ and CONCERNED
CITIZENS
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul the subpoena duces tecum
and orders issued by respondent Ombudsman, requiring petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as
chief accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all
evidence such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988" and to enjoin him from
enforcing his orders.
Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is
Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the
Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing
savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have
been written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of
Finance, with copies furnished several government offices, including the Office of the Ombudsman. The
petitioners questioned the issuance of the said subpoena on the ground that the documents asked for
are classified. They argued that knowledge of EIIB's documents relative to its Personal Services Funds
and its plantilla . . . will necessarily [lead to] knowledge of its operations, movements, targets, strategies,
and tactics and the whole of its being" and this could "destroy the EIIB."
Issue:
Whether petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating to personal services and
salary vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such documents are classified.
Held:
Yes. At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to
state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public
interest of such paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of a
private citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights.
The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence,
like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we
accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection
of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-
making. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of
shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except
privately. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential
communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of the government and inextricably
rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution .
On the other hand, where the claim of confidentiality does not rest on the need to protect
military, diplomatic or other national security secrets but on a general public interest in the
confidentiality of his conversations, courts have declined to find in the Constitution an absolute privilege
of the President against a subpoena considered essential to the enforcement of criminal laws.
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the
production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and
evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national
economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting."
Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the
circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose
military matters without compelling production, no similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on
other considerations.
Nor has our attention been called to any law or regulation which considers personnel records of
the EIIB as classified information. To the contrary, COA Circular No. 88-293, which petitioners invoke to
support their contention that there is adequate safeguard against misuse of public funds, provides that

the "only item of expenditure which should be treated strictly confidential" is that which refers to the
"purchase of information and payment of rewards."
The other statutes and regulations invoked by petitioners in support of their contention that the
documents sought in the subpoena duces tecum of the Ombudsman are classified merely indicate the
confidential nature of the EIIB's functions, but they do not exempt the EIIB from the duty to account for
its funds to the proper authorities. Indeed by denying that there were savings made from certain items
in the agency and alleging that the DBM had released to the EIIB only the allocations needed for the 947
personnel retained after its reorganization, petitioners in effect invited inquiry into the veracity of their
claim. If, as petitioners claim, the subpoenaed records have been examined by the COA and found by it
to be regular in all respects, there is no reason why they cannot be shown to another agency of the
government which by constitutional mandate is required to look into any complaint concerning public
office.
Above all, even if the subpoenaed documents are treated as presumptively privileged, this
decision would only justify ordering their inspection in camera but not their nonproduction. However, as
concession to the nature of the functions of the EIIB and just to be sure no information of a confidential
character is disclosed, the examination of records in this case should be made in strict confidence by the
Ombudsman himself. Reference may be made to the documents in any decision or order which the
Ombudsman may render or issue but only to the extent that it will not reveal covert activities of the
agency. Above all, there must be a scrupulous protection of the documents delivered.
With these safeguards outlined, it is believed that a satisfactory resolution of the conflicting
claims of the parties is achieved, It is not amiss to state that even matters of national security have been
inquired into in appropriate in camera proceedings by the courts. In Lansang v. Garcia this Court held
closed door sessions, with only the immediate parties and their counsel present, to determine claims
that because of subversion there was imminent danger to public safety warranting the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus in 1971. Again in Marcos v. Manglapus the Court met behind closed doors to
receive military briefings on the threat posed to national security by the return to the country of the
former President and his family. In the United States, a similar inquiry into the danger to national
security as a result of the publication of classified documents on the Vietnam war was upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court. We see no reason why similar safeguards cannot be made to enable an agency of the
Government, like the Office of the Ombudsman, to carry out its constitutional duty to protect public
interests while insuring the confidentiality of classified documents.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 169777. * April 20, 2006.]
Facts:
The petitioners alleged that the President has abused its power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O.
464) last September 28, 2005. They thus pray for its declaration as null and void for being
unconstitutional. On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued
invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as
resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation
with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). On
September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464 which required all heads of departments of the
Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
either House of Congress. It also invoked the principle of separation of powers and executive privilege.

Author’s Note: I will reproduce some of the salient provisions of the EO 464 for the reader’s
guidance and reference on the principles lengthtily discussed in the SC’s ruling.
E.O. 464, "ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, ADHERENCE TO THE
RULE ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS APPEARING IN
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. — In accordance with Article VI,
Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of
powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive
Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either
House of Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in
writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.
SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. —

(a) Nature and Scope. — The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to
the operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte
vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees shall
not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office
and not made available to the public to prejudice the public interest.
Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and the public
officers covered by this executive order, including:
i. Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this
executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,
G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002);
ii. Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security
should not be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998).
iii. Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and
executive agreements (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9
December 1998);
iv. Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);
v. Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No.
133250, 9 July 2002).
(b) Who are covered. — The following are covered by this executive order:
i. Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are
covered by the executive privilege;
ii. Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in
the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; EaCSTc
iii. Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such
other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege;
iv. Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are
covered by the executive privilege; and
v. Such other officers as may be determined by the President.
SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. — All public officials enumerated
in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House
of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on
executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Issue:
Whether the executive privilege is properly invoked in this case.
Held:
No. Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the
power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of "executive privilege." Since this term figures
prominently in the challenged order, it being mentioned in its provisions, its preambular clauses, and in
its very title, a discussion of executive privilege is crucial for determining the constitutionality of E.O.
464.
While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not
depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is
any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere
fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that
the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on
whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of
impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect
accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.
Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad.
It covers all senior officials of executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP, and all senior
national security officials who, in the judgment of the heads of offices designated in the same section
(i.e. department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the PNP, and the National Security Adviser), are
"covered by the executive privilege."
The enumeration also includes such other officers as may be determined by the President. Given
the title of Section 2 — "Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege" —, it is evident that under
the rule of ejusdem generis, the determination by the President under this provision is intended to be
based on a similar finding of coverage under executive privilege.
En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 virtually states that executive privilege
actually covers persons. Such is a misuse of the doctrine. Executive privilege, as discussed above, is
properly invoked in relation to specific categories of information and not to categories of persons.
In light, however, of Sec 2(a) of E.O. 464 which deals with the nature, scope and coverage of executive
privilege, the reference to persons being "covered by the executive privilege" may be read as an
abbreviated way of saying that the person is in possession of information which is, in the judgment of
the head of office concerned, privileged as defined in Section 2(a). The Court shall thus proceed on the
assumption that this is the intention of the challenged order.
The letter dated September 28, 2005 of respondent Executive Secretary Ermita to Senate
President Drilon illustrates the implied nature of the claim of privilege authorized by E.O. 464. It reads:
In connection with the inquiry to be conducted by the Committee of the Whole regarding the Northrail
Project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation on 29 September 2005 at 10:00 a.m., please be
informed that officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting will not be able to
attend the same without the consent of the President, pursuant to Executive Order No. 464 (s. 2005),
entitled "Ensuring Observance Of The Principle Of Separation Of Powers, Adherence To The Rule On
Executive Privilege And Respect For The Rights Of Public Officials Appearing In Legislative Inquiries In Aid
Of Legislation Under The Constitution, And For Other Purposes". Said officials have not secured the
required consent from the President.
While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the issue of whether executive privilege
may be invoked against Congress, it is gathered from Chavez v. PEA that certain information in the
possession of the executive may validly be claimed as privileged even against Congress. Thus, the case
holds:
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged
information rooted in the separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential
conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like
internal-deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of
either house of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be
pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and
assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to
protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative
and Judicial power. This is not the situation in the instant case.
While the validity of claims of privilege must be assessed on a case to case basis, examining the
ground invoked therefor and the particular circumstances surrounding it, there is, in an implied claim of
privilege, a defect that renders it invalid per se. By its very nature, and as demonstrated by the letter of
respondent Executive Secretary quoted above, the implied claim authorized by Section 3 of E.O. 464 is
not accompanied by any specific allegation of the basis thereof (e.g., whether the information
demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.). While Section
2(a) enumerates the types of information that are covered by the privilege under the challenged order,
Congress is left to speculate as to which among them is being referred to by the executive. The
enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive, but a mere statement of what is included in the
phrase "confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by
this executive order."
Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information
privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has
determined that it is so, and that the President has not overturned that determination. Such declaration
leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged. That the
message is couched in terms that, on first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it
more pernicious. It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the question of why the executive branch
is not providing it with the information that it has requested.
A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must,
therefore, be clearly asserted. As U.S. v. Reynolds teaches:
The privilege belongs to the government and must be asserted by it; it can neither be
claimed nor waived by a private party. It is not to be lightly invoked. There must be a formal
claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after
actual personal consideration by that officer. The court itself must determine whether the
circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a
disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.
Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is no way of
determining whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the circumstances
in which it is made, it should be respected. These, in substance, were the same criteria in assessing the
claim of privilege asserted against the Ombudsman in Almonte v. Vasquez 94 and, more in point, against
a committee of the Senate in Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon.
A.O. Smith v. Federal Trade Commission is enlightening:
[T]he lack of specificity renders an assessment of the potential harm resulting from
disclosure impossible, thereby preventing the Court from balancing such harm against plaintiffs'
needs to determine whether to override any claims of privilege.
And so is U.S. v. Article of Drug:
On the present state of the record, this Court is not called upon to perform this balancing operation. In
stating its objection to claimant's interrogatories, government asserts, and nothing more, that the
disclosures sought by claimant would inhibit the free expression of opinion that non-disclosure is
designed to protect. The government has not shown — nor even alleged — that those who evaluated
claimant's product were involved in internal policymaking, generally, or in this particular instance.
Privilege cannot be set up by an unsupported claim. The facts upon which the privilege is based must be
established. To find these interrogatories objectionable, this Court would have to assume that the
evaluation and classification of claimant's products was a matter of internal policy formulation, an
assumption in which this Court is unwilling to indulge sua sponte.
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy 99 similarly emphasizes that "an agency must provide
'precise and certain' reasons for preserving the confidentiality of requested information."
Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America 100 amplifies, thus:
A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a specific designation and description of the
documents within its scope as well as precise and certain reasons for preserving their confidentiality.
Without this specificity, it is impossible for a court to analyze the claim short of disclosure of the very
thing sought to be protected. As the affidavit now stands, the Court has little more than its sua sponte
speculation with which to weigh the applicability of the claim. An improperly asserted claim of privilege
is no claim of privilege. Therefore, despite the fact that a claim was made by the proper executive as
Reynolds requires, the Court can not recognize the claim in the instant case because it is legally
insufficient to allow the Court to make a just and reasonable determination as to its applicability. To
recognize such a broad claim in which the Defendant has given no precise or compelling reasons to
shield these documents from outside scrutiny, would make a farce of the whole procedure.
Due respect for a co-equal branch of government, moreover, demands no less than a claim of
privilege clearly stating the grounds therefor. Apropos is the following ruling in McPhaul v. U.S:
We think the Court's decision in United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 70 S. Ct. 724, is
highly relevant to these questions. For it is as true here as it was there, that 'if (petitioner) had
legitimate reasons for failing to produce the records of the association, a decent respect for the
House of Representatives, by whose authority the subpoenas issued, would have required that
(he) state (his) reasons for noncompliance upon the return of the writ. Such a statement would
have given the Subcommittee an opportunity to avoid the blocking of its inquiry by taking other
appropriate steps to obtain the records. 'To deny the Committee the opportunity to consider the
objection or remedy is in itself a contempt of its authority and an obstruction of its processes.
His failure to make any such statement was "a patent evasion of the duty of one summoned to
produce papers before a congressional committee[, and] cannot be condoned."
Upon the other hand, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with
such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. A
useful analogy in determining the requisite degree of particularity would be the privilege against self-
incrimination.
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se.
It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it
merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It
is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified
under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.
Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, in particular, cites the case of the United States where, so it
claims, only the President can assert executive privilege to withhold information from Congress.
Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines that a
certain information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the President's authority and
has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject only to the express
pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the appearance of such official. These provisions thus
allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence.
Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege.
Executive privilege, as already discussed, is recognized with respect to information the confidential
nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive
branch, 105 or in those instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of
highly important executive responsibilities. 106 The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on
the fact that certain informations must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the
public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose
information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the
public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the
President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to
invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is
"By order of the President," which means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege being an
extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other
words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. There is even less
reason to uphold such authorization in the instant case where the authorization is not explicit but by
mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is further invalid on this score.
It follows, therefore, that when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own
judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the
President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary in
order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the
matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither
the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect
the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal
means to compel his appearance.
In light of the above discussion of Section 3, it is clear that it is essentially an authorization for
implied claims of executive privilege, for which reason it must be invalidated. That such authorization is
partly motivated by the need to ensure respect for such officials does not change the infirm nature of
the authorization itself.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 180643. March 25, 2008.]
ROMULO L. NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
INVESTIGATIONS
Facts:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a
contract with Zhing Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services
for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $329,481,290 (approximately
P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People's Republic of China. Respondent
Committees initiated the investigation, in aid of legislation, by sending invitations to certain personalities
and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was among those invited. In particular, he
refused to answer, invoking executive privilege, the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo
followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not
she directed him to approve. In a letter sent to the Senate, Ermita justified the claim of executive
privilege saying that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the People's Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in which these
information were conveyed to the President, he (Neri) cannot provide the Committee any further details
of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.
Issue:
Whether the Senate can compel Neri to disclose the information asked for.
Held:
No, because those informations are covered by executive privilege and the same was properly
invoked by Ermita. At this juncture, it must be stressed that the revocation of E.O. 464 does not in any
way diminish our concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional
underpinnings. Unlike the United States which has further accorded the concept with statutory status by
enacting the Freedom of Information Act 23 and the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 24 the Philippines
has retained its constitutional origination, occasionally interpreted only by this Court in various cases.
The most recent of these is the case of Senate v. Ermita where this Court declared unconstitutional
substantial portions of E.O. 464.
In In re: Sealed Case, 30 the U.S. Court of Appeals delved deeper. It ruled that there are two (2)
kinds of executive privilege; one is the presidential communications privilege and, the other is the
deliberative process privilege. The former pertains to "communications, documents or other materials
that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the President believes should remain
confidential." The latter includes 'advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part
of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated."
Accordingly, they are characterized by marked distinctions. Presidential communications
privilege applies to decision-making of the President while, the deliberative process privilege, to
decision-making of executive officials. The first is rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of
power and the President's unique constitutional role; the second on common law privilege. Unlike the
deliberative process privilege, the presidential communications privilege applies to documents in their
entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones 31 As a
consequence, congressional or judicial negation of the presidential communications privilege is always
subject to greater scrutiny than denial of the deliberative process privilege.
Turning on who are the officials covered by the presidential communications privilege, In Re
Sealed Case confines the privilege only to White House Staff that has "operational proximity" to direct
presidential decision-making. Thus, the privilege is meant to encompass only those functions that form
the core of presidential authority, involving what the court characterized as "quintessential and non-
delegable Presidential power", such as commander-in-chief power, appointment and removal power,
the power to grant pardons and reprieves, the sole-authority to receive ambassadors and other public
officers, the power to negotiate treaties etc.
In Chavez v. PCGG, 38 this Court held that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure
with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters." In Chavez v. PEA,
39 there is also a recognition of the confidentiality of Presidential conversations, correspondences, and

discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. In Senate v. Ermita, the concept of presidential

communications privilege is fully discussed.
As may be gleaned from the above discussion, the claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in
cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the
President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the
repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with
the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater
confidentiality than others.
The above cases, especially, Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, somehow provide the
elements of presidential communications privilege, to wit:
1) The protected communication must relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power."
2) The communication must be authored or "solicited and received" by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in "operational proximity"
with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome
by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought "likely contains important evidence"
and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground
that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions "fall under conversation and correspondence
between the President and public officials" necessary in "her executive and policy decision-making
process" and, that "the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the People's Republic of China." Simply put, the bases are presidential
communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to
a "quintessential and non-delegable power" of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements
without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
Second, the communications are "received" by a close advisor of the President. Under the "operational
proximity" test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo's
cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of
the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
The third element deserves a lengthy discussion.
The foregoing is consistent with the earlier case of Nixon vs. Sirica, where it was held that
presidential communications privilege are presumptively privileged and that the presumption can be
overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access to conversations. The
courts are enjoined to resolve the competing interests of the political branches of the government "in
the manner that preserves the essential functions of each Branch." Here, the record is bereft of any
categorical explanation from respondent Committees to show a compelling or critical need for the
answers to the three (3) questions in the enactment of a law. Instead, the questions veer more towards
the exercise of the legislative oversight function under Section 22 of Article VI rather than Section 21 of
the same Article. Senate v. Ermita ruled that the "the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated
by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation." It is conceded
that it is difficult to draw the line between an inquiry in aid of legislation and an inquiry in the exercise of
oversight function of Congress. In this regard, much will depend on the content of the questions and the
manner the inquiry is conducted.
In this regard, Senate v. Ermita stressed that the validity of the claim of executive privilege
depends not only on the ground invoked but, also, the procedural setting or the context in which the
claim is made.
The respondent Committees should cautiously tread into the investigation of matters which may
present a conflict of interest that may provide a ground to inhibit the Senators participating in the
inquiry if later on an impeachment proceeding is initiated on the same subject matter of the present
Senate inquiry. Pertinently, in Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, it
was held that since an impeachment proceeding had been initiated by a House Committee, the Senate
Select Committee's immediate oversight need for five presidential tapes, should give way to the House
Judiciary Committee which has the constitutional authority to inquire into presidential impeachment.
The Court expounded on this issue in this wise:
It is true, of course, that the Executive cannot, any more than the other branches of government,
invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and employees from investigations by the
proper governmental institutions into possible criminal wrongdoing. The Congress learned this as to its
own privileges in Gravel v. United States, as did the judicial branch, in a sense, in Clark v. United States,
and the executive branch itself in Nixon v. Sirica. But under Nixon v. Sirica, the showing required to
overcome the presumption favoring confidentiality turned, not on the nature of the presidential conduct
that the subpoenaed material might reveal, but, instead, on the nature and appropriateness of the
function in the performance of which the material was sought, and the degree to which the material was
necessary to its fulfillment. Here also our task requires and our decision implies no judgment whatever
concerning possible presidential involvement in culpable activity. On the contrary, we think the
sufficiency of the Committee's showing must depend solely on whether the subpoenaed evidence is
demonstrably critical to the responsible fulfillment of the Committee's functions.
Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim of
privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter." A formal and
proper claim of executive privilege requires a "precise and certain reason" for preserving their
confidentiality.
The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement. It
serves as the formal claim of privilege. There he expressly states that "this Office is constrained to invoke
the settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri
accordingly." Obviously, he is referring to the Office of the President. That is more than enough
compliance. In Senate v. Ermita, a less categorical letter was even adjudged to be sufficient.
With regard to the existence of "precise and certain reason", we find the grounds relied upon by
Executive Secretary Ermita specific enough so as not "to leave respondent Committees in the dark on
how the requested information could be classified as privileged." The case of Senate v. Ermita only
requires that an allegation be made "whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic
secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc." The particular ground must only be specified. The
enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive." The following statement of grounds satisfies
the requirement:
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought
to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People's
Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the
President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations, without
disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.
At any rate, as held further in Senate v. Ermita, the Congress must not require the executive to
state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which
the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a coordinate and co-equal department.

A. PROHIBITIONS (Sec 13)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 85468. September 7, 1989.]
QUINTIN S. DOROMAL vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
In October 1987, Special Prosecution Officer II, Dionisio A. Caoili, conducted a preliminary
investigation of the charge against the petitioner, Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with his shareholdings and position as president and
director of the Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids to supply P61
million worth of electronic, electrical, automotive, mechanical and airconditioning equipment to the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (or DECS) and the National Manpower and Youth Council
(or NMYC), which act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether the said act violates the constitution.
Held:
Yes. Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the President, Vice-President,
the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not . . . during (their) tenure, . . .
directly or indirectly . . . participate in any business." The constitutional ban is similar to the prohibition
in the Civil Service Law (PD No. 807, Sec. 36, subpar. 24) that "pursuit of private business . . . without the
permission required by Civil Service Rules and Regulations" shall be a ground for disciplinary action
against any officer or employee in the civil service.
Author’s Note: This case is more of a Criminal Procedure than a Political Law case.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 83896. February 22, 1991.]
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Facts:
The petitioners sought a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued
by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. The pertinent provisions of the assailed Executive
Order are:
"SECTION 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of the
Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department
may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and
government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that this
limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the
President is the Chairman.
"SECTION 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive

official of the Executive Department holds more positions than what is allowed in Section 1 hereof, they
(sic) must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no
case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary position.
"SECTION 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in government-owned or
controlled corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the members of the boards of such corporation
should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary."
Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet,
their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition
to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
In sum, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being challenged by petitioners on the
principal submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in the
Constitution. According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution," the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are
those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the
Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in
the Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B insofar as
the appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned.
Issue:
Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet
members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive
officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B which, for easy reference is quoted anew, thus:
"Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries."
Held:
No. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision
under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in
mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented
or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the
condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the
reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose
sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to
that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.
The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes of discontent with the
Marcos regime. It was therefore quite inevitable and in consonance with the overwhelming sentiment of
the people that the 1986 Constitutional Commission, convened as it was after the people successfully
unseated former President Marcos, should draft into its proposed Constitution the provisions under
consideration which are envisioned to remedy, if not correct, the evils that flow from the holding of
multiple governmental offices and employment. In fact, as keenly observed by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz
during the deliberations in these cases, one of the strongest selling points of the 1987 Constitution

during the campaign for its ratification was the assurance given by its proponents that the scandalous
practice of Cabinet members holding multiple positions in the government and collecting
unconscionably excessive compensation therefrom would be discontinued.
But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7, Article IX-B already contains a
blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming
both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate
another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their
tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself.
Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the constitutional
provisions in question, the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition
on the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the
government or elsewhere is concerned.
Moreover, such intent is underscored by a comparison of Section 13, Article VII with other
provisions of the Constitution on the disqualifications of certain public officials or employees from
holding other offices or employment. Under Section 13, Article VII, "(N)o Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government. . .". Under
Section 5(4), Article XVI, "(N)o member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be
appointed in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries." Even Section 7 (2), Article IX-B, relied upon by
respondents provides "(U)nless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government."
It is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications to hold other office or employment, the
prohibition pertains to an office or employment in the government and government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. In striking contrast is the wording of Section 13, Article VII which states
that "(T)he President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
tenure." In the latter provision, the disqualification is absolute, not being qualified by the phrase "in the
Government." The prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is therefore all-embracing
and covers both public and private office or employment.
Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence provides: "They shall not, during
said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries." These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on
the President and his official family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials
or employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of
the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official
family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary
functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when
expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay
down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while
Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" in
Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article IX-B
of the 1987 Constitution. To construe said qualifying phrase as respondents would have us do, would
render nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution to
impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies
and assistants with respect to holding other offices or employment in the government during their
tenure. Respondents' interpretation that Section 13 of Article VII admits of the exceptions found in
Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B would obliterate the distinction so carefully set by the framers of the
Constitution as to when the high-ranking officials of the Executive Branch from the President to Assistant
Secretary, on the one hand, and the generality of civil servants from the rank immediately below
Assistant Secretary downwards, on the other, may hold any other office or position in the government
during their tenure.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article
VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive
officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law
and as required by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do no
comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly
an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. To characterize these posts otherwise
would lead to absurd consequences, among which are: The President of the Philippines cannot chair the
National Security Council reorganized under Executive Order No. 115 (December 24, 1986). Neither can
the Vice-President, the Executive Secretary, and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice, Labor and
Employment and Local Government sit in this Council, which would then have no reason to exist for lack
of a chairperson and members. The respective undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, would also be
prohibited.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment cannot chair the Board of Trustees of the National
Manpower and Youth Council (NMYC) or the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA),
both of which are attached to his department for policy coordination and guidance. Neither can his
Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries chair these agencies.
The Secretaries of Finance and Budget cannot sit in the Monetary Board. 24 Neither can their
respective undersecretaries and assistant secretaries. The Central Bank Governor would then be assisted
by lower ranking employees in providing policy direction in the areas of money, banking and credit. 25
Indeed, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended such absurd consequences. A
Constitution, viewed as a continuously operative charter of government, is not to be interpreted as
demanding the impossible or the impracticable; and unreasonable or absurd consequences, if possible,
should be avoided.
To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering
positions held without additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of the concerned official's office. The term ex-officio means "from
office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from official character merely, not expressly
conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position. " Ex-officio likewise
denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other
appointment or authority than that conferred by the office." 27 An ex-officio member of a board is one
who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment.
Mandating additional duties and functions to the President, Vice-President, Cabinet Members,
their deputies or assistants which are not inconsistent with those already prescribed by their offices or
appointments by virtue of their special knowledge, expertise and skill in their respective executive
offices is a practice long-recognized in many jurisdictions. It is a practice justified by the demands of
efficiency, policy direction, continuity and coordination among the different offices in the Executive
Branch in the discharge of its multifarious tasks of executing and implementing laws affecting national
interest and general welfare and delivering basic services to the people. It is consistent with the power
vested on the President and his alter egos, the Cabinet members, to have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus and offices and to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Without these
additional duties and functions being assigned to the President and his official family to sit in the
governing bodies or boards of governmental agencies or instrumentalities in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by their primary functions, they would be deprived of the means for
control and supervision, thereby resulting in an unwieldy and confused bureaucracy.
It bears repeating though that in order that such additional duties or functions may not
transgress the prohibition embodied in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, such additional
duties or functions must be required by the primary functions of the official concerned, who is to
perform the same in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law, without receiving any additional
compensation therefor.
The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it
follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the
said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation
attached to his principal office. It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a
meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he is actually and in legal
contemplation performing the primary function of his principal office in defining policy in monetary and
banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance, therefore,
he is not entitled to collect any extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an
honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such
additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.
In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2),
Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional.
Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant
secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the
government and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold
multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.
Compare with provisions against other officials:

Art VI, Sec. 13
Art. IX, A, Sec. 2
Art. IX, B, Sec. 7
Art. VIII, Sec. 12
Exceptions to the Rule:

Vice-President – Art VII, Sec. 3, par 2
Secretary of Justice – Art VIII, Sec 8 (1)
Ex officio positions
B. SUCCESSION
(A) At the beginnin gof the term
Art VII, Sec. 7, 10
(B) During the term
Art VII, Sec 8, 10

(C) Temporary Disability

Art. VII, Sec 2-3
[G.R. No. 146738. April 3, 2001.]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
Facts:
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the
inability of the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. His significant submittal
is that "Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President
is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of article VII."
Issue:
Whether Estrada was just temporarily incapable of discharging his functions as President; hence
did not resign.
Held:
No. An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
"SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the
contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall
immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall
reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members
of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the
Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its
rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in
session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of
both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties
of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue
exercising the powers and duties of his office."
That is the law. Now, the operative facts:

1. Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the Senate President
and Speaker of the House;
2. Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20,
2001 at about 12:30 p.m.;
3. Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January 24, 2001 House
Resolution No. 175; On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House
Resolution No. 176, expressing its support to the assumption of the office of the president by
Arroyo.
 On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 178 which
states: "RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF
SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
4. Also, despite receipt of petitioner's letter claiming inability, some twelve (12) members of the
Senate signed
 On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82 which states: "RESOLUTION
CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF SEM. TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
 On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise passed Senate Resolution No. 83 which
states: "RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO
5. On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 "certifying to the existence of vacancy
in the Senate and calling on the COMELEC to fill up such vacancy through election to be held
simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the Senatorial candidate
garnering the thirteenth (13 th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of
Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
6. Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by respondent Arroyo as
President.
7. Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition from
any sector of government, and without any support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and the Philippine National Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his inability to govern is
only momentary.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized
respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability
of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of
inability.
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of
petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing
respondent Arroyo as president of the Philippines. Following Tañada v. Cuenco, we hold that this Court
cannot exercise its judicial power for this is an issue "in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the Legislative xxx branch of the government." Or to use the language in Baker vs.
Carr,103 there is a "textually demonstrable or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it." Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon petitioner's claim of inability to discharge the power
and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by
constitutional fiat. It is a political issue, which cannot be decided by this Court without transgressing the
principle of separation of powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim
that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That
claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure,
president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
VII. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT
A. EXECUTIVE POWER (Art VII, Secs. 1 and 17)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 88211. September 15, 1989.]
FERDINAND E. MARCOS vs. HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS
Facts:
Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But Mrs.
Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of
government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move
forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.
Issue:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Held:
Yes. As the Supreme Court in Ocampo v. Cabangis [15 Phil. 626 (1910)] pointed out "a grant of
the legislative power means a grant of all legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power means a
grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the government." [At 631-632.] If this can
be said of the legislative power which is exercised by two chambers with a combined membership of
more than two hundred members and of the judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it
can equally be said of the executive power which is vested in one official — the President.
Consideration of tradition and the development of presidential power under the different
constitutions are essential for a complete understanding of the extent of and limitations to the
President's powers under the 1987 Constitution. Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on
the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as
within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be
limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is
more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the
people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore
Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the
Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand. The President is not only clothed with
extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day
problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquillity in times when no foreign
foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in
times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the
commander-in-chief provision.
The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be
considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right
to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even
remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to
those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount
duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or

demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine
whether it must be granted or denied.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-21897. October 22, 1963.]
RAMON A. GONZALES vs. RUFINO G. HECHANOVA
Facts:
On September 22, 1963, respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation of 67,000
tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources, and created a rice procurement committee
composed of the other respondents herein for the implementation of said proposed importation.
Thereupon, or on September 25, 1963, herein petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales — a rice planter, and
president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, whose members are, likewise, engaged in the
production of rice and corn — filed the petition herein, averring that, in making or attempting to make
said importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents "are acting without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction", because Republic Act No. 3452 — which allegedly repeals or amends Republic Act
No. 2207 — explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn by "the Rice and Corn Administration or
any other government agency." On the other hand, Respondents question the sufficiency of petitioner's
cause of action upon the theory that the proposed importation in question is not governed by Republic
Act Nos. 2207 and 3452, but was authorized by the President as commander-in-chief "for military stock
pile purposes" in the exercise of his alleged authority under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1; 8
that in cases of necessity, the President "or his subordinates may take such preventive measure for the
restoration of good order and maintenance of peace"; and that, as Commander-in-Chief of our armed
forces, "the President . . . is duty-bound to prepare for the challenge of threats of war or emergency
without waiting for any special authority."
Issue:
Whether the president can enter into executive agreements in violation of a legislative
enactment.
Held:
No. Respondents' trend of thought, that, if an executive officer believes that compliance with a
certain statute will not benefit the people he is at liberty to disregard it, must be rejected — we still live
under a rule of law.
Although the President may, under the American constitutional system, enter into executive
agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a
transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.
Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by
Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except
in the exercise of the veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status
of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance
of the very act prohibited by said laws.
[G.R. No. 149724. August 19, 2003.]

DENR vs. DENR REGION 12 EMPLOYEES
Facts:
Pursuant to DENR Adm. Order No. 99-14, a Memorandum was issued directing the immediate transfer of
the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The respondents
questioned the authority of the DENR Secretary to reorganize the DENR because they claimed that the
power to reorganize is “executive” in nature.
Issue:
Whether the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR.
Held:
It is apropos to reiterate the elementary doctrine of qualified political agency, thus:
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under Article VII, Section
17 of the 1987 Constitution.
Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the power of the President to reorganize the
National Government may validly be delegated to his cabinet members exercising control over a
particular executive department. Thus, in DOTC Secretary v. Mabalot, we held that the President —
through his duly constituted political agent and alter ego, the DOTC Secretary — may legally and validly
decree the reorganization of the Department, particularly the establishment of DOTC-CAR as the LTFRB
Regional Office at the Cordillera Administrative Region, with the concomitant transfer and performance
of public functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB.
Similarly, in the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the
transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise
of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for
the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.
B. POWER OF CONTROL (Sec. 17)
[G.R. No. L-7708. May 30, 1955.]

JOSE MONDANO vs. FERNANDO SILVOSA
Facts:
The petitioner is the duly elected and qualified mayor of the municipality of Mainit, province of
Surigao. On 27 February 1954 Consolacion Vda. de Mosende filed a sworn complaint with the
Presidential Complaints and Action Committee accusing him of (1) rape committed on her daughter

Caridad Mosende; and (2) concubinage for cohabiting with her daughter in a place other than the
conjugal dwelling. On 6 March the Assistant Executive Secretary indorsed the complaint to the
respondent provincial governor for immediate investigation, appropriate action and report. On 10 April
the petitioner appeared before the provincial governor in obedience to his summons and was served
with a copy of the complaint filed by the provincial governor with the provincial board. On the same day,
the provincial governor issued Administrative Order No. 8 suspending the petitioner from office.
Thereafter, the Provincial Board proceeded to hear the charges preferred against the petitioner over his
objection.
Issue:
Whether the Assistant Executive Secretary, as agent of the Chief Executive, can exercise control
over local governments, most specifically a town mayor in this case.
Held:
No. The department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all
bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative
Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus
and offices under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct
of any person in the person in the service of any bureau of office under his department is confined to
bureaus under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over the President exercises
only general supervision as may be provided by law (section 10, paragraph 1, Article VII of the
Constitution). If the provisions of section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed as
conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all
local governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local
government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of
paragraph 1, section 10, article VII, of the Constitution.
In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to
see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former
may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform these duties. Control, on the
other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that
of the latter.
The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal
officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to "receive and investigate complaints made under
oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of
maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude."
And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial
board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he
may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if
in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question." 3 Section 86 of
the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the
Department Head over the administration of . . . municipalities . . . If it be construed that it does and
such additional power is the same authority as that vested in the Department Head by section 79 (c) of
the Revised Administrative Code, then such additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated
by section 10(1), Article VII, of the Constitution.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 46570. April 21, 1939.]

JOSE D. VILLENA vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
Facts:
It appears that the Division of Investigation of the Department of Justice, upon the request of
the Secretary of the Interior, conducted an inquiry into the conduct of the petitioner, mayor of Makati,
Rizal, as a result of which the latter was found to have committed bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of
authority and unauthorized practice of the law profession. The respondent, therefore, on February 8,
1939, recommended to the President of the Philippines the suspension of the petitioner to prevent
possible coercion of witnesses, which recommendation was granted, according to the answer of the
Solicitor-General of March 20, 1939, verbally by the President on the same day. The Secretary of the
Interior suspended the petitioner from office on February 9, 1939, and then and thereafter wired the
Provincial Governor of Rizal with instruction that the petitioner be advised accordingly.
Villena contended that the Secretary of the Interior has no jurisdiction or authority to suspend
and much less to prefer by himself administrative charges against the petitioner and decide also by
himself the merits of the charges as the power to suspend municipal elective officials and to try and
punish them for misconduct in office or dereliction of duty is lodged in some other agencies of the
government. As to him, the Secretary of the Interior, by suspending him, has exercised control over local
governments when that power has been taken away from the President of the Philippines by the
Constitution
Issue:
Whether the Secretary of Interior has authority to investigate and to suspend Villena, pending
the investigation of the charges against the latter.
Held:
Yes. Section 79 (C) of the Administrative Code provides as follows:
"The Department Head shall have direct control, direction, and supervision over all
bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction and may, any provision of existing law to the contrary
notwithstanding, repeal or modify the decisions of the chiefs of said bureaus or offices when
advisable in the public interest.
"The Department Head may order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person
in the service of any bureau or office under his department and in connection therewith may
appoint a committee or designate an official or person who shall conduct such investigations,
and such committee, official, or person may summon, witness by subpoena and subpoena duces
tecum, administer cath and take testimony relevant to the investigation."
The above section speaks, it is true, of direct control, direction, and supervision over bureaus and offices
under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior, but this section should be interpreted in relation to
section 86 of the same Code which grants to the Department of the Interior "executive supervision over
the administration of provinces, municipalities, chartered cities and other local political subdivisions." In
the case of Planas vs. Gil (37 Off. Gaz., 1228), we observed that "Supervision is not a meaningless thing.
It is an active power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into
facts and conditions in order to render the power real and effective. If supervision is to be conscientious
and rational, and not automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon a knowledge of actual facts and
conditions disclosed after careful study and investigation." The principle there enunciated is applicable
with equal force to the present case.

We hold, therefore, that the Secretary of the Interior is invested with authority to order the investigation
of the charges against the petitioner and to appoint a special investigator for that purpose. As
regards the challenged power of the Secretary of the Interior to decree the suspension of the herein
petitioner pending an administrative investigation of the charges against him, the question, it may be
admitted, is not free from difficulties. There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to
suspend a mayor of a municipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears
lodged in the provincial governor by section 2188 of the Administrative Code which provides that "The
provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers
for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction
by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude. For minor delinquency he may reprimand the
offender; and if a more severe punishment seems to be desirable he shall submit written charges
touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either
personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal
treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity
of the officer in question. Where suspension is thus effected, the written charges against the officer shall
be filed with the board within five days." The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly
granted by section 2188 of the Administrative Code to the provincial governor does not mean that the
grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar power.
For instance, counsel for the petitioner admitted in the oral argument that the President of the
Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office in virtue of his greater power of removal (sec.
2191, as amended, Administrative Code) to be exercised conformably to law. Indeed, if the President
could, in the manner prescribed by law, remove a municipal official, it would be a legal incongruity if he
were to be devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And the incongruity would be more patent if,
possessed of the power both to suspend and to remove a provincial official (sec. 2078, Administrative
Code), the President were to be without the power to suspend a municipal official. Here is,
parenthetically, an instance where, as counsel for petitioner admitted, the power to suspend a municipal
official is not exclusive. Upon the other hand, it may be argued with some degree of plausibility that, if
the Secretary of the Interior is, as we have hereinabove concluded, empowered to investigate the
charges against the petitioner and to appoint a special investigator for that purpose, preventive
suspension may be a means by which to carry into effect a fair and impartial investigation. This is a point,
however, which, for the reason hereinafter indicated, we do not have to decide.
In the deliberation of this case it has also been suggested that, admitting that the President of
the Philippines is invested with the authority to suspend the petitioner, and it appearing that he had
verbally approved or at least acquiesced in the action taken by the Secretary of the Interior, the
suspension of the petitioner should be sustained on the principle of approval or ratification of the act of
the Secretary of the Interior by the President of the Philippines. There is, to be sure, more weight in this
argument than in the suggested generalization of section 37 of Act No. 4007. Withal, at first blush, the
argument of ratification may seem plausible under the circumstances, it should be observed that there
are certain prerogative acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or
ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief
Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or
ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, i9
his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (par. 3, sec. 11, Art. VII) and the
exercise by him of the benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem). Upon the other hand, doubt is
entertained be some members of the court whether the statement made by the Secretary to the
President in the latter's behalf and by his authority that the President had no objection to the
suspension of the petitioner could be accepted as an affirmative exercise of the power of suspension in

this case, or that the verbal approval by the President of the suspension alleged in a pleading presented
in this case by the Solicitor-General could be considered as a sufficient ratification in law.
After serious reflection, we have decided to sustain the contention of the government in this
case on the broad proposition, albeit not suggested, that under the presidential type of government
which we have adopted and considering the departmental organization established and continued in
force by paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is
crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is, the
establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing
with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that "The executive power
shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." This means that the President of the Philippines is the
Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive departments
occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas
Jefferson, "should be of the President's bosom confidence" (7 Writings, Ford ed., 498), and, in the
language of Attorney-General Cushing (7 Op., Attorney-General, 453), "are subject to the direction of the
President." Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their
personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly
characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the United States, "each head of a
department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the
President is required by law to exercise authority"
Secretaries of departments, of course, exercise certain powers under the law but the law cannot
impair or in any way affect the constitutional power of control and direction of the President. As a matter
of executive policy, they may be granted departmental autonomy as to certain matters but this is by
mere concession of the executive, in the absence of valid legislation in the particular field. If the
President, then, is the authority in the Executive Department, he assumes the corresponding
responsibility. The head of a department is a man of his confidence; he controls and directs his acts; he
appoints him and can remove him at pleasure; he is the executive, not any of his secretaries. It is
therefore logical that he, the President, should be answerable for the acts of administration of the entire
executive Department before his own conscience no less than before that undefined power of public
opinion which, in the language of Danie, Webster, is the last repository of popular government. These
are the necessary corollaries of the American presidential type of government, and if there is any defect,
it is attributable to the system itself. We cannot modify the system unless we modify the Constitution,
and we cannot modify the Constitution by any subtle process of judicial interpretation or construction.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-58184. October 30, 1981.]
FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION vs. THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF LABOR
Facts:
Petitioner filed with the Ministry of Labor a notice of strike for unfair labor practices allegedly
committed by private respondent company inviolation of their existing collective bargaining agreement,
particularly the unilateral and arbitrary implementation of a Code of Conduct to the detriment and
interest of its members. Several conciliation meetings called by the Ministry followed. Thereafter, the
Ministry of Labor pursuant to law, certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration and
the holding of any strike at private respondent establishment was enjoined. Hearing was subsequently
conducted whereas private respondent agreed to the indefinite preventive suspension of the provisions
of the Code of Conduct, the principal cause of the controversy. In a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court, petitioner union submits that Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 insofar as it amends Article 264
of the Labor Code delegating to the Minister of Labor the power and discretion to assume jurisdiction
and/or certify strikes for compulsory arbitration to the NLRC, and in effect make or unmake the law on
free collective bargaining, is an undue delegation of legislative powers and is contrary to the assurance of
the State to the workers' right to self organization and collective bargaining. Such power, according to
petitioner union, is within the competence of the President who can best determine national interests
when a strike is in progress.
Issue: Whether there is invalid delegation in this case.

Author’s Note: The crux of this case is the validity of delegation of powers. The president’s power
of control over the members of the Cabinet is discussed only to support the claim that the Philippines still
maintained a presidential, not parliamentary, form of government during the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution under Marcos.
Held:
Yes. (The author omitted the discussion on delegation of power by reason of its irrelevance.)
As the only one whose constituency is national it is the President who, by virtue of his election
by the entire electorate, has an indisputable claim to speak for the country as a whole. Moreover, it is he
who explicitly granted the greater power of control of such ministries. He continues to be the Executive,
the amplitude and scope of the functions entrusted to him in the formulation of policy and its execution
leading to the apt observation by Laski that there is not one aspect of which that does not affect the lives
of all. The Prime Minister can be of valuable assistance indeed to the President in the discharge of his
awesome responsibility, but it is the latter who is vested with powers, aptly characterized by Justice
Laurel in Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62 (1939) as broad and extraordinary (being) expected to govern with a
firm and steady hand without vexation or embarrassing interference and much less dictation from any
source.
Under the presidential system, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the
Chief Executive, and. except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law
to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
C. POWER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER LGUs

Art. X, Sec 4, 16

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 93252. August 5, 1991.]
RODOLFO T. GANZON vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting through the Secretary
of Local Government), to suspend and/or remove local officials. The petitions of Mayor Ganzon
originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in number, filed against him by various city
officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave
misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and
arbitrary detention.
Issue:
Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's alter ego, can suspend
and or remove local officials under the power of supervision of the President.
Held:
Yes. The 1987 Constitution provides in Art. X, Sec. 4 that "[T]he President of the Philippines shall
exercise general supervision over local governments." It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in
the 1935 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 10(1), stating that "[T]he President shall . . . exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law." It is the considered opinion of the
Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the Charter did not intend to
divest the legislature of its right — or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation
— to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as
may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from
Congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did not,
however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal
corporations, in particular, concerning discipline. The change in constitutional language did not exempt
local governments from legislative regulation provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental
premise of autonomy.
Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and
in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials. In the case at bar, the
Secretary of Local Government, the President's alter ego, in consonance with the specific legal provisions
of Batas Blg. 337, the existing Local Government Code, can suspend petitioner Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R.
Nos. 93252 and 95245) and petitioner member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod.
The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere
supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control,
which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, "supervision"
is not incompatible with disciplinary authority as this Court has held.
"Supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority. As this Court held in Ganzon vs.
Cayanan, 104 Phil. 484, "in administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority
of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them
the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties."
Thus, in those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend remove) it was
not because we did not think that the President can not exercise it on account of his limited power, but
because the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in those cases in which the law gave him the power,
the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him.
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There

is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local
governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social
progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs
and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over
them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over
their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
[G.R. No. 125350. December 3, 2002.]

HON. RTC JUDGES MERCEDES G. DADOLE vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Facts:
In 1986, petitioners as RTC and MTC judges stationed in Mandaue City received a monthly
allowance of P1,260 each pursuant to the yearly appropriation ordinance. Eventually, in 1991, it was
increased to P1,500 for each judge. However, on March 15, 1994, the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) issued Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which provides that the additional
monthly allowances to be given by a local government unit should not exceed P1,000 in provinces and
cities and P700 in municipalities. Acting on the said DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued
notices of disallowance to herein petitioners in excess of the amount authorized by LBC 55. Thus,
petitioners filed with the Office of the City Auditor a protest. However, it was treated as a motion for
reconsideration and was endorsed to the Commission on Audit (COA) Regional Office No. 7. In turn, the
COA Regional Office referred the said motion to their Head Office with recommendation that the same
should be denied. Accordingly, it was denied by the COA. Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition .
They argued, among others, that LBC 55 is void for infringing on the local autonomy of Mandaue City by
dictating a uniform amount that a local government unit can disburse as additional allowances to judges
stationed therein.
Petitioner judges argue that LBC 55 is void for infringing on the local autonomy of Mandaue City
by dictating a uniform amount that a local government unit can disburse as additional allowances to
judges stationed therein. They maintain that said circular is not supported by any law and therefore goes
beyond the supervisory powers of the President.
Issue:
Whether LBC 55 of the DBM is void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the President
Held:
No. We recognize that, although our Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government
units, the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power
of supervision by the President. Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. . . .
In Pimentel vs. Aguirre, 7 we defined the supervisory power of the President and distinguished it from
the power of control exercised by Congress. Thus:
This provision (Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution) has been
interpreted to exclude the power of control. In Mondano v. Silvosa, the Court contrasted the
President's power of supervision over local government officials with that of his power of control
over executive officials of the national government. It was emphasized that the two terms —
supervision and control — differed in meaning and extent. The Court distinguished them as
follows:
". . . In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill
them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or
set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."
In Taule v. Santos, we further stated that the Chief Executive wielded no more authority than
that of checking whether local governments or their officials were performing their duties as provided by
the fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot interfere with local governments, so long as they act
within the scope of their authority. "Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of
mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body," we
said.
In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim, the difference between control and supervision was further
delineated. Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of act. If these
rules are not followed, they may, in their discretion, order the act undone or redone by their
subordinates or even decide to do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision does not cover such
authority. Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not
lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not
observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not
prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see
to it that the rules are followed.
Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President. The
members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are subject to
the power of control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or
their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. In contrast, the heads of political
subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the electorate, to whom
they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the President's supervision only,
not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same
token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the Constitution
and the law.
Clearly then, the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government
unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the President's
supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any of his or her alter egos
cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within the
parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or her
alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local
government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of
powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing municipal corporations.
Does LBC 55 go beyond the law it seeks to implement? Yes.
LBC 55 provides that the additional monthly allowances to be given by a local government unit
should not exceed P1,000 in provinces and cities and P700 in municipalities. Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi),
of RA 7160, the law that supposedly serves as the legal basis of LBC 55, allows the grant of additional
allowances "when the finances of the city government allow." The said provision does not authorize
setting a definite maximum limit to the additional allowances granted to judges. Thus, we need not
belabor the point that the finances of a city government may allow the grant of additional allowances
higher than P1,000 if the revenues of the said city government exceed its annual expenditures. Thus, to
illustrate, a city government with locally generated annual revenues of P40 million and expenditures of
P35 million can afford to grant allowances of more than P1,000 each to, say, ten judges inasmuch as the
finances of the city can afford it.
Setting a uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances is an inappropriate way of
enforcing the criterion found in Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160. The DBM over-stepped its power
of supervision over local government units by imposing a prohibition that did not correspond with the
law it sought to implement. In other words, the prohibitory nature of the circular had no legal basis.
D. POWER OF APPOINTMENT
d.1. Basis
d.2. with concurrence of COA

Art VII, Sec. 16
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 139554. July 21, 2006.]
ARMITA B. RUFINO vs. BALTAZAR N. ENDRIGA
Facts:
Presidential Decree No. 15 (PD 15) created the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) for the
primary purpose of propagating arts and culture in the Philippines. PD 15 created a Board of Trustees
("Board") to govern the CCP. The controversy revolves on who between the contending groups, Rufino
and Endriga groups, both claiming as the rightful trustees of the CCP Board, has the legal right to hold
office. The resolution of the issue boils down to the constitutionality of the provision of PD 15 on the
manner of filling vacancies in the Board. During the term of President Fidel V. Ramos, the CCP Board
included Endriga, Lagdameo, Sison, Potenciano, Fernandez, Lenora A. Cabili ("Cabili"), and Manuel T.
Mañosa ("Mañosa"). On 22 December 1998, then President Joseph E. Estrada appointed seven new
trustees to the CCP Board for a term of four years to replace the Endriga group (by the Rufino Group) as
well as two other incumbent trustees.
Endriga questioned President Estrada's appointment of seven new members to the CCP Board.
The Endriga group alleged that under Section 6(b) of PD 15, vacancies in the CCP Board "shall be filled by
election by a vote of a majority of the trustees held at the next regular meeting . . . ." In case "only one
trustee survive[s], the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving trustee acting in consultation with the
ranking officers of the [CCP]." The Endriga group claimed that it is only when the CCP Board is entirely
vacant may the President of the Philippines fill such vacancies, acting in consultation with the ranking
officers of the CCP. The Endriga group asserted that when former President Estrada appointed the Rufino
group, only one seat was vacant due to the expiration of Mañosa's term. It maintained that under the
CCP Charter, the trustees' fixed four-year term could only be terminated "by reason of resignation,
incapacity, death, or other cause."
On the other hand, Rufino group asserted that the law could only delegate to the CCP Board the
power to appoint officers lower in rank than the trustees of the Board. The law may not validly confer on
the CCP trustees the authority to appoint or elect their fellow trustees, for the latter would be officers of
equal rank and not of lower rank. Section 6(b) of PD 15 authorizing the CCP trustees to elect their fellow
trustees should be declared unconstitutional being repugnant to Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution allowing the appointment only of "officers lower in rank" than the appointing power.
Issue:
Whether Section 6(b) of PD 15 is constitutional.
Held:
No. The source of the President's power to appoint, as well as the Legislature's authority to
delegate the power to appoint, is found in Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The power to appoint is the prerogative of the President, except in those instances when the
Constitution provides otherwise. Usurpation of this fundamentally Executive power by the Legislative
and Judicial branches violates the system of separation of powers that inheres in our democratic
republican government.
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of
officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group refers to
those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law.
Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments
Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The present
case involves the interpretation of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution with respect to the
appointment of this fourth group of officers.
The President appoints the first group of officers with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
The President appoints the second and third groups of officers without the consent of the Commission
on Appointments. The President appoints the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is the
appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency, commission, or board to
appoint is declared unconstitutional. Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is found unconstitutional, the
President shall appoint the trustees of the CCP Board because the trustees fall under the third group of
officers.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly intended that Congress could by law vest the
appointment of lower-ranked officers in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The deliberations 26 of the 1986 Constitutional Commission explain this intent beyond any doubt.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution changed the qualifying word "inferior" to the less
disparaging phrase "lower in rank" purely for style. However, the clear intent remained that these
inferior or lower in rank officers are the subordinates of the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards who are vested by law with the power to appoint. The express language of the
Constitution and the clear intent of its framers point to only one conclusion — the officers whom the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards may appoint must be of lower rank than those
vested by law with the power to appoint.
Further, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution authorizes Congress to vest "in the heads
of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards" the power to appoint lower-ranked officers. Section
16 provides:
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
In a department in the Executive branch, the head is the Secretary. The law may not authorize
the Undersecretary, acting as such Undersecretary, to appoint lower-ranked officers in the Executive
department. In an agency, the power is vested in the head of the agency for it would be preposterous to
vest it in the agency itself. In a commission, the head is the chairperson of the commission. In a board,
the head is also the chairperson of the board. In the last three situations, the law may not also authorize
officers other than the heads of the agency, commission, or board to appoint lower-ranked officers.
The grant of the power to appoint to the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards is a matter
of legislative grace. Congress has the discretion to grant to, or withhold from, the heads of agencies,
commissions, or boards the power to appoint lower-ranked officers. If it so grants, Congress may impose
certain conditions for the exercise of such legislative delegation, like requiring the recommendation of
subordinate officers or the concurrence of the other members of the commission or board.
This is in contrast to the President's power to appoint which is a self-executing power vested by
the Constitution itself and thus not subject to legislative limitations or conditions. The power to appoint
conferred directly by the Constitution on the Supreme Court en banc and on the Constitutional
Commissions is also self-executing and not subject to legislative limitations or conditions.
The 1987 Constitution speaks of vesting the power to appoint "in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards." This is consistent with Section 5(6), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution which states that the "Supreme Court shall . . . [a]ppoint all officials and employees of
the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law," making the Supreme Court en banc the
appointing power. In sharp contrast, when the 1987 Constitution speaks of the power to appoint lower-
ranked officers in the Executive branch, it vests the power "in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards."
The CCP, being governed by a board, is not an agency but a board for purposes of Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is thus irreconcilably inconsistent with
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 empowers the remaining
trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing them to elect their fellow trustees .
On the other hand, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allows heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards to appoint only "officers lower in rank" than such "heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards." This excludes a situation where the appointing officer
appoints an officer equal in rank as him. Thus, insofar as it authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to
elect their co-trustees, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is unconstitutional because it violates Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
It does not matter that Section 6(b) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees to "elect" and
not "appoint" their fellow trustees for the effect is the same, which is to fill vacancies in the CCP Board. A
statute cannot circumvent the constitutional limitations on the power to appoint by filling vacancies in a
public office through election by the co-workers in that office. Such manner of filling vacancies in a public
office has no constitutional basis.
Further, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP trustees the independent appointing power of their
fellow trustees. The creation of an independent appointing power inherently conflicts with the
President's power to appoint. This inherent conflict has spawned recurring controversies in the
appointment of CCP trustees every time a new President assumes office.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 79974. December 17, 1987.]
ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA vs. SALVADOR MISON
Facts:

The petitioners questioned the appointment of Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of

customs as it was done without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
Issue:
Whether the appointment is valid.
Held:
Yes. It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there
are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will
hereafter refer from time to time, are:
 First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
 Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law;
 Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
 Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. The second, third and fourth groups of officers
are the present bone of contention.
in the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments. It is now a sad part of our political history that the power of confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments, under the 1935 Constitution, transformed that commission, many
times, into a venue of "horse-trading" and similar malpractices.
On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was
molded and remolded by successive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in the
President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature.
Given the above two in extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other, in the 1973 Constitution,
it is not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting
it, struck a "middle ground" by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments
for the first group of appointments and leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the
appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the second and third groups as well as those in the fourth
group, i.e., officers of lower rank.
As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are
officers whose appointments require no confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, even if such
officers may be higher in rank, compared to some officers whose appointments have to be confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments under the first sentence of the same Sec. 16, Art. VII.
But these contrasts, while initially impressive, merely underscore the purposive intention and deliberate
judgment of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that, except as to those officers whose appointments
require the consent of the Commission on Appointments by express mandate of the first sentence in
Sec., 16, Art. VII, appointments of other officers are left to the President without need of confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments. This conclusion is inevitable, if we are to presume, as we must, that
the framers of the 1987 Constitution were knowledgeable of what they were doing and of the foreseable
effects thereof.
Besides, the power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on
or qualifications of such power should be strictly construed against them. Such limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. But, it is only in the first sentence of Sec.
16, Art. VII where it is clearly stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein
enumerated require the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not
one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on
Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution
includes "heads of bureaus" among those officers whose appointments need the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, deliberately excluded the
position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the
Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau
of Customs. The original text of Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines, which was enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on 22 June 1967.
After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34 have to be
read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of the Commissioner
of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an appointment he is authorized by
law to make, such appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.
[G.R. No. 86439. April 13, 1989.]

MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA vs. SENATOR JOVITO R. SALONGA
Facts:
On 27 August 1987, the President of the Philippines designated herein petitioner Mary
Concepcion Bautista as "Acting Chairman, Commission on Human Rights." Realizing perhaps the need for
a permanent chairman and members of the Commission on Human Rights, befitting an independent
office, as mandated by the Constitution, the President of the Philippines on 17 December 1988 extended
to petitioner Bautista a permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission. On 22 December 1988,
before the Chief Justice of this Court, Hon. Marcelo B. Fernan, petitioner Bautista took her oath of office
by virtue of her appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights.
On 9 January 1989, petitioner Bautista received a letter from the Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments requesting her to submit to the Commission certain information and documents as
required by its rules in connection with the confirmation of her appointment as Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights. On 26 January 1989, the Commission on Appointments disapproved
petitioner Bautista's "ad interim appointment" as Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights in
view of her refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments. The President had
designated PCHR Commissioner Hesiquio R. Mallillin as "Acting Chairman of the Commission" pending
the resolution of Bautista's case.
Issue:
Whether or not the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR), an "independent office" created by the 1987 Constitution, is to be made with or
without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
Held:

Since the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not among the positions
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, appointments to which are
to be made with the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, it follows that the appointment
by the President of the Chairman of the CHR is to be made without the review or participation of the
To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the Commission on
Human Rights is not specifically provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members
of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose
appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointment.
The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights pursuant to
the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, that is, without the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments because they are among the officers of government "whom he (the President) may be
authorized by law to appoint." And Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, 5 May 1987, authorizes the
President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights.
As disclosed by the records, and as previously adverted to, it is clear that petitioner Bautista was
extended by Her Excellency, the President a permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights on 17 December 1988. Before this date, she was merely the "Acting Chairman" of the
Commission. Bautista's appointment on 17 December 1988 is an appointment that was for the President
solely to make, i.e., not an appointment to be submitted for review and confirmation (or rejection) by
the Commission on Appointments. This is in accordance with Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution
and the doctrine in Mison which is here reiterated.
The threshold question that has really come to the fore is whether the President, subsequent to
her act of 17 December 1988, and after petitioner Bautista had qualified for the office to which she had
been appointed, by taking the oath of office and actually assuming and discharging the functions and
duties thereof, could extend another appointment to the petitioner on 14 January 1989, an "ad interim
appointment" as termed by the respondent Commission on Appointments or any other kind of
appointment to the same office of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights that called for
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
The Court, with all due respect to both the Executive and Legislative Departments of
government, and after careful deliberation, is constrained to hold and rule in the negative. When Her
Excellency, the President converted petitioner Bautista's designation as Acting Chairman to a permanent
appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights on 17 December 1988, significantly she
advised Bautista (in the same appointment letter) that, by virtue of such appointment, she could qualify
and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office (of Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights). All that remained for Bautista to do was to reject or accept the appointment. Obviously, she
accepted the appointment by taking her oath of office before the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
Hon. Marcelo B. Fernan and assuming immediately thereafter the functions and duties of the Chairman
of the Commission on Human Rights. Bautista's appointment therefore on 17 December 1988 as
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights was a completed act on the part of the President.
Respondent Commission vigorously contends that, granting that petitioner's appointment as
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is one that, under Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, as
interpreted in the Mison case, is solely for the President to make, yet, it is within the president's
prerogative to voluntarily submit such appointment to the Commission on Appointment for
confirmation. The mischief in this contention, as the Court perceives it, lies in the suggestion that the
President (with Congress agreeing) may, from time to time move power boundaries, in the Constitution
differently from where they are placed by the Constitution.

Nor can the Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its constitutionally delimited
power to review presidential appointments, create power to confirm appointments that the Constitution
has reserved to the President alone. Stated differently, when the appointment is one that the
Constitution mandates is for the President to make without the participation of the Commission on
Appointments, the executive's voluntary act of submitting such appointment to the Commission on
Appointments and the latter's act of confirming or rejecting the same, are done without or in excess of
jurisdiction.
Nor can respondents impressively contend that the new appointment or re-appointment on 14
January 1989 was an ad interim appointment, because, under the Constitutional design, ad interim
appointments do not apply to appointments solely for the President to make, i.e., without the
participation of the Commission on Appointments. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under
the 1987 Constitution, extend only to appointments where the review of the Commission on
Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by
the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are
for the President solely to make, that is, without the participation of the Commission on Appointments,
can not be ad interim appointments.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 83216. September 4, 1989.]
TERESITA QUINTOS-DELES vs CIMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
Facts:
On April 6, 1988, petitioner and three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the
President pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution.
However, petitioner and the three other sectoral representatives-appointees were not able to take their
oaths and discharge their duties as members of Congress due to the opposition of some congressmen-
members of the Commission on Appointments, who insisted that sectoral representatives must first be
confirmed by the respondent Commission before they could take their oaths and/or assume office as
members of the House of Representatives.
Issue:
Whether the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of
Representatives to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
Held:
In Sarmiento vs. Mison, et al. (156 SCRA 549 [1987]), we construed Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution to mean that only appointments to offices mentioned in the first sentence of the said
Section 16, Article VII require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The ruling in Mison
was reiterated in the recent case of Mary Concepcion Bautista vs. Sen. Jovito Salonga, et al. (G.R. No.
86439, promulgated on April 13, 1989). Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in
paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of
Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is indubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of
Representatives are among the "other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this
Constitution," referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

There are appointments vested in the President in the Constitution which, by express mandate
of the Constitution, require no confirmation such as appointments of members of the Supreme Court
and judges of lower courts (Sec. 9, Art. VIII) and the Ombudsman and his deputies (Sec. 9, Art. XI). No
such exemption from confirmation had been extended to appointments of sectoral representatives in
the Constitution.
Petitioner's appointment was furthermore made pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, paragraph 2
which provides:
"SEC 16. ...
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress."
The reference to paragraph 2, Section 16 of Article VII as additional authority for the
appointment of petitioner is of vital significance to the case at bar. The records show that petitioner's
appointment was made on April 6, 1988 or while Congress was in recess (March 26, 1988 to April 17,
1988); hence, the reference to the said paragraph 2 of Section 16, Art. VII in the appointment extended
to her.
Implicit in the invocation of paragraph 2, Section 16, Art. VII as authority for the appointment of
petitioner is, the recognition by the President as appointing authority that petitioner's appointment
requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Under paragraph 2, Section 16, Art. VII,
appointments made by the President pursuant thereto "shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress." If indeed appointments of
sectoral representatives need no confirmation, the President need not make any reference to the
constitutional provisions above-quoted in appointing the petitioner. As a matter of fact, the President in
a letter dated April 11, 1989 had expressly submitted petitioner's appointment for confirmation by the
The provisions of Executive Order No. 198 do not deal with the manner of appointment of
sectoral representatives. Executive Order No. 198 confines itself to specifying the sectors to be
represented, their number, and the nomination of such sectoral representatives. The power of the
President to appoint sectoral representatives remains directly derived from Section 7, Article XVIII of the
Constitution which is quoted in the second "Whereas" clause of Executive Order No. 198. Petitioner
Deles' appointment was issued not by virtue of Executive Order No. 198 but pursuant to Art. VII, Section
16, paragraph 2 and Art. XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution which require submission to the
confirmation process.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 91636. April 23, 1992.]
PETER JOHN D. CALDERON vs. BARTOLOME CARALE
Facts:
Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), amending the Labor Code (PD 442)
was approved. It provides in Section 13 thereof as follows:
"xxx xxx xxx

The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners shall all
be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated the
predecessor. The Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters shall also be appointed by the
President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, and shall be
subject to the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations."
Pursuant to said law (RA 6715), President Aquino appointed the Chairman and Commissioners of the
NLRC representing the public, workers and employers sectors.
This petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality and legality of the permanent
appointments extended by the President of the Philippines to the respondents Chairman and Members
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), without submitting the same to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by said RA 6715.
Issue:
Whether RA 6715 is constitutional insofar as it requires confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments the appointment of the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC by the president .
whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
appointments extended by the President to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned
in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments.
Held:
No. From the cases of Sarmiento III vs. Mison (156 SCRA 549); Mary Concepcion Bautista v.
Salonga (172 SCRA 160), and Teresita Quintos Deles, et al. v. the Commission on Constitutional
Commissions, et al (177 SCRA 259), these doctrines are deducible: 1. Confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section
16, Article VII, including, those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution
itself in the president (like sectoral representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional
commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election). 2. Confirmation is not required when the President
appoints other government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those
officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the
Commission on Human Rights). Also, as observed in Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but
omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional manner for such
appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law.
The second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII refers to all other officers of the government whose
appointment are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom the President may be authorized by
law to appoint. Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more specifically under the "third groups" of appointees
referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably,
the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of
Section 16, Article VII whose appointments requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the
appointments of respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission, it
is unconstitutional because: 1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; and 2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments
which are otherwise entrusted only with the President. Deciding on what law to pass is a legislative
prerogative. Determining their constitutionality is a judicial function. The Court respects the laudable
intention of the legislature. Regretfully, however, the constitutional infirmity of Sec. 13 of RA 6715
amending Art. 215 of the Labor Code, insofar as it requires confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments over appointments of the Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) is, as we see it, beyond redemption if we are to render fealty to the mandate of the
Constitution in Sec. 16, Art. VII thereof.
(a) Heads of departments

(b) Ambassadors, public ministers and consuls
(c) Officers of AFP from colonel and naval captain
(d) Chairman and members of the constitutional commission
(e) Regular members of JBC (Art VIII, Sec. 8 [2])
(f) Sectoral (Art XVIII, Sec. 7)
d.3 Upon Recommendation of JBC

(a) members of SC and all other courts (Art VIII, Sec 9)
(b) ombudsman and deputies
d.4 Appointment of VP as cabinet member (Sec 3)
d.5 Appointments solely by president (Sec 16)

(a) those whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law
(b) those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint
d.6 Limitations to appointing power

d.6.1. Art VII, Secs 13 and 15
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-19313. January 19, 1962.]
DOMINADOR R. AYTONA vs. ANDRES V. CASTILLO
Facts:
On December 29, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia appointed Dominador R. Aytona as ad
interim Governor of the Central Bank. On the same day, the latter took the corresponding oath.
On December 30, 1961, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on December
31, 1961, he issued Administrative Order No. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim
appointments made by President Garcia after December 13, 1961 (date when he, Macapagal, had been
proclaimed elected by the Congress). On January 1, 1962, President Macapagal appointed Andres V.
Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank, and the latter qualified immediately.
Issue:

Whether the new President had power to issue the order of cancellation of the ad interim
appointments made by the past President, even after the appointees had already qualified.
Held:
As a rule, once an appointment is issued, it cannot be reconsidered specially where the
appointee has qualified. On the other hand, the authorities admit of exceptional circumstances justifying
revocation such as when mass ad-interim appointments (350) issued in the last hours of an outgoing
Chief Executive are to be considered by the Commission on Appointments that is different from that be
submitted by an incoming Chief Executive who may not wholly approve of the selections especially if it is
doubtful that the outgoing President exercised double care in extending such appointments.
After the proclamation of the election of an incoming Chief Executive, the outgoing Chief
Executive is no more than a "care- taker" administration. He is duty bound to prepare for the orderly
transfer of authority to the incoming President and he should not do acts which, he ought to know,
would embarrass or obstruct the policies, of his successor. It is not for him to use his powers as
incumbent President to continue the political warfare that had ended or to avail himself of presidential
prerogatives to serve partisan purposes.
The filling up of vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced as to afford some
assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the
appointee's qualifications may be undoubtedly permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one
night and the planned induction of almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new
President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse of presidential prerogatives.
When the President makes ad-interim appointments, he exercises a special prerogative and is
bound to be prudent to insure approval of his selection either by previous consultation with the
members of the Commission or by thereafter explaining to them the reason for such selection. Where
the Commission on Appointments that will consider the appointees is different from that existing at the
time of the appointment and where the names are to be submitted by his successor who may not wholly
approved of the selections, the President should be doubly careful in extending such appointments.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-21776. February 28, 1964.]
NICANOR G. JORGE vs. JOVENCIO Q. MAYOR
Facts:
Petitioner, Nicanor G. Jorge, is a career official in the Bureau of Lands. He started working there
as a Junior Computer in the course of 38 years service, from February 1, 1922 to October 31, 1960, and
attained the position of Acting Director, through regular and successive promotions, in accordance with
civil service rules. On June 17, 1961, he was designated Acting Director of the same Bureau, and on
December 13, 1961 was appointed by President Carlos Garcia ad interim Director. He qualified by taking
the oath of office on the 23rd December of 1961. This appointment was on December 26, 1961,
transmitted to the Commission on Appointments, and on May 14, 1962, petitioner's ad interim
appointment as Director of Lands was confirmed by the Commission.
Petitioner discharged the duties as Director until on November 14, 1962 he received a letter
from Benjamin Gozon, then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources of the Macapagal
Administration, informing him that pursuant to a letter from the Assistant Executive Secretary Bernal,
served on petitioner on November 13, his appointment was among those revoked by Administrative

Order No. 2 of President Diosdado Macapagal; that the position of Director of Lands was considered
vacant.
Issue:
Whether the Jorge appointment is similarly situated as those in Aytona case and therefore invalid.
Held:
Petitioner Jorge's ad interim appointment is dated December 13, 1961, but there is no evidence
on record that it was made and released after the joint session of Congress that ended on the same day .
It is a matter of contemporary history, of which this Court may take judicial cognizance, that the session
ended late in the night of December 13, 1961, and, therefore, after regular office hours . In the absence
of competent evidence to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the appointment of Jorge was made
before the close of office hours, that being the regular course of business. The appointment, therefore,
was not included in, nor intended to be covered by, Administrative Order No. 2, and the same stands
unrevoked. Consequently, it was validly confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, and thereafter,
the office never became vacant.
It is an error to consider petitioner's case as within the purview of our ruling in the Aytona vs.
Castillo case (L-19313, Jan. 20, 1962). If in that case this Court refused to interfere with the application of
the Chief Executive's Administrative Order No. 2, it was because the circumstances of the appointments
therein involved rendered it doubtful whether the appointees' equitable rights could be
invoked,"considering the rush conditional appointments, hurried maneuvers and other happenings
detracting from that degree of good faith, morality and propriety which form the basic foundation of
claims to equitable relief."
There is certainly no parity between the appointment of petitioner in December 13, 1961 and
the confused scramble for appointments in and during the days immediately preceding the inauguration
of the present administration. For aught that appears on the record before us, the appointment of
petitioner Jorge was the only one made in that day, and there is nothing to show that it was not —
"so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the
appointment and the appointee's qualifications."That could be validly made even by an outgoing
President under the Aytona ruling.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-19981. February 29, 1964.]
GODOFREDO QUIMSING vs. EDUARDO TAJANGLANGIT
Facts:
On May 20, 1960, Godofredo Quimsing was designated Acting Chief of Police of Iloilo City. On
December 20, 1961, and while such incumbent of the office, he was extended by then President Garcia
an ad-interim appointment to the same position. Quimsing took his oath of office before the City Mayor
of Iloilo on December 28, 1961, and continued discharging the functions of Chief of Police of said City.
At the session of the Commission on Appointments on May 16, 1962, the appointment of
Quimsing, among others was confirmed. On the following day, however, at the session of said body,
Senator Puyat moved for the reconsideration of all the appointments previously confirmed, manifesting
at the same time that said "motion for reconsideration be laid on the table."
On June 11, 1962, President Macapagal designated Eduardo Tajanglangit as acting Chief of Police
of Iloilo City and the latter took his oath and tried to discharge the functions of the office on June 13,
1962. Respondent Tajanglangit, in his answer, claimed among others, that petitioner's ad-interim
appointment was a nullity in view of the President's Administrative Order No. 2, withdrawing, cancelling,
or recalling ad-interim appointments extended after December 13, 1961; and that the alleged
confirmation of petitioner's ad-interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments did not also
produce any effect, because the same had been the subject of a motion for reconsideration and no
further action has been taken on said appointment until the present time.
Issue:
Whether the Quimsing appointment is similarly situated as those rejected in the Aytona case,
hence illegal.
Held:
No. In the various cases decided by this Court after the Aytona v. Castillo case, the matter of the
validity of appointments made after December 13, 1961 by former President Garcia was considered not
in the light of the said Administrative Order No. 2 (which was never upheld by this Court), but on the
basis of the nature, character and merit of the individual appointments and the particular circumstances
surrounding the same. In other words, this Court did not declare that all the ad-interim appointments
made by the outgoing President after December 13, 1961 are invalid by the mere fact that the same
were extended after said date, nor they automatically come within the category of the, "midnight"
appointments, the validity of which were doubted and which gave rise to the ruling in the Aytona case
cited by respondent.
In the present case, petitioner Quimsing admittedly had been occupying the position in
controversy, in an acting capacity since May 20,1960, and discharging the functions thereof. Clearly, it
cannot be said that the ad-interim appointment extended to him on December 20, 1961, by virtue of
which he took his oath of office on December 28, 1961 was one of those hurried designations that
brought about the "scramble" on the 29th and 30th of December, 1961, where the outgoing Chief
Executive perhaps did not have the opportunity to consider the merits and qualifications of the
hundreds of nominees to the positions to which they were respectively being appointed. The ad-interim
appointment of petitioner, whose qualification is not in dispute and the regularity of which is not
questioned except for the fact that it was made only on December 20, 1961, can not be considered as
among those "midnight" appointments the validity of which this Court declared to be, at least, doubtful
to entitle the appointees to the equitable relief of quo warranto".
d.6.2. Interim or recess appointments

Art VI, Sec 19
Art VII, Sec 16, par 2
[G.R. No. L-25577. March 15, 1966.]

ONOFRE P. GUEVARA vs. RAOUL M. INOCENTES
Facts:
Petitioner was extended an ad interim appointment as undersecretary of Labor by the former
Executive on November 18, 1965, having taken his oath of office on November 25 of the same year, and
considering that the ad interim appointment for the same position extended to respondent by the
incumbent Executive on January 23, 1966 is invalid in spite of Memorandum Circular No. 8 issued by the

latter on the same date declaring all ad interim appointments made by the former Executive as having
lapsed with the adjournment of the special session of Congress at about midnight of January 22, 1966
Petitioner argued that his position is subsisting because the term “session” in Article VII, section
10, subsection 4 of the Constitution refers to a regular session and not a special session; and because the
commission on appointment has not yet been constituted.
Issue:
Whether the ad interim appointment of the petitioner has already expired.
Held:
Yes. After due deliberation, the Court resolved that the ad interim appointment extended to
petitioner on November 18, 1965 by the former Executive lapsed when the special session of Congress
adjourned sine die at about midnight of January 22, 1966, as embodied in our resolution dated February
16, 1966.
Petitioner's theory that the first mode of termination consisting in the disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments should be inseparably related with the clause "until the next adjournment of Congress" in
the sense that the Commission has to be first organized in order that the last mode may operate is
untenable considering that the latter is not dependent upon, nor influenced in any manner by, the
operation of the former. As already stated, the two modes of termination are completely separate from
and independent of each other. If the framers of the Constitution had intended to make the operation of
the second clause dependent upon the prior constitution of the Commission on Appointments they
should have so stated in clear terms considering that the first clause implies a positive act of the
Commission while the second an entirely separate and independent act of Congress. Indeed, the theory
of petitioner, if carried to its logical conclusion, may result into the anomaly that, should Congress be
controlled by a party not inclined to organize said Commission, or should there arise a group which for
reasons of its own indulges in obstructionism, the Commission on Appointments contemplated in the
Constitution is never organized as a consequence of the action of either, any appointment made during
the recess of Congress would never run the test of legislative scrutiny and would thereby then be always
considered permanent even if it is extended ad interim, a result which, to be sure, was never intended
by the framers of our Constitution. It thus becomes imperative that we avoid such absurd result.
It is true that the phrases "until the next adjournment of the Congress" does not make any
reference to any specific session of the Congress — whether regular or special — but such silence is of
no moment, for it is a well-known maxim in statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. Consequently, it is safe to conclude that the framers of the
Constitution in employing merely the word adjournment as a mode of terminating an appointment
made during the recess of Congress had in mind either the regular or special session, and not simply the
regular one.
The power to appoint is inherently an executive function while the power to confirm or reject
appointments belongs to the legislative department, the latter power having been conferred as a check
on the former. This power to check may be exercised through the members of both Houses in the
Commission on Appointments. But although the Commission on Appointments is provided for in the
Constitution, its organization requires congressional action, and once organized, by express provision of
the Constitution, it "shall meet only while Congress is in session." Consequently, if for any reason
Congress adjourns a regular or special session without organizing the Commission on Appointments,
Congress should be deemed to have impliedly exercised said power to check by allowing the ad interim
appointment to lapse as provided for in the Constitution.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 131136. February 28, 2001.]
CONRADO L. DE RAMA vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Upon assumption as Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, Conrado L. de Rama wrote a letter to the Civil
Service Commission (or CSC), seeking the recall of the appointments of fourteen municipal employees
on the ground that those were "midnight" appointments of the former mayor in violation of Article VII,
Section 15 of the Constitution. While the matter was pending before the CSC, Elsa Marino, Morell Ayala
and Flordeliza Oriazel filed with the CSC a claim for payment of their salaries which were withheld
pursuant to Office Order No. 95-01, issued by de Rama wherein their appointments as permanent
employees were recalled.
Issue:
Whether the “midnight appointment” ban against the president applies to local chiefs.
Held:
No. The only reason advanced by the petitioner to justify the recall was that these were
"midnight appointments." The CSC correctly ruled, however, that the constitutional prohibition on so-
called "midnight appointments," specifically those made within two (2) months immediately prior to the
next presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President.
It has been held that upon the issuance of an appointment and the appointee's assumption of
the position in the civil service, "he acquires a legal right which cannot be taken away either by
revocation of the appointment or by removal except for cause and with previous notice and hearing."
Moreover, it is well-settled that the person assuming a position in the civil service under a completed
appointment acquires a legal, not just an equitable, right to the position. This right is protected not only
by statute, but by the Constitution as well, which right cannot be taken away by either revocation of the
appointment, or by removal, unless there is valid cause to do so, provided that there is previous notice
and hearing.
A thorough perusal of the records reveal that the CSC's ruling is supported by the evidence and
the law. The fourteen (14) employees were duly appointed following two meetings of the Personnel
Selection Board held on May 31 and June 26, 1995. There is no showing that any of the private
respondents were not qualified for the positions they were appointed to. Moreover, their appointments
were duly attested to by the Head of the CSC field office at Lucena City. By virtue thereof, they had
already assumed their appointive positions even before petitioner himself assumed his elected position
as town mayor. Consequently, their appointments took effect immediately and cannot be unilaterally
revoked or recalled by petitioner.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 149036. April 2, 2002.]
MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG vs. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO
Facts:
Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the appointment and the right to hold office of
respondents Alfredo L. Benipayo, as Chairman of the Commission on Elections, and Resurreccion Z. Borra
and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., as COMELEC Commissioners. The first ad interim appointment of the
respondents were by-passed by Commission on Appointment (failed to act) and such appointment was
later on renewed by the president. Petitioner claimed that the ad interim appointments and
reappointments of the respondents violated the constitutional provisions on the independence of the
COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments of its
Chairman and members under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
Issues:
1. What is the nature of ad interim appointment, permanent or temporary?
2. Does the renewal of the ad interim appointment when the same was by-passed by the CA
constitute reappointment, hence violative of the constitution?
Held:
First Issue: It is permanent.
Second Issue: It does not constitute renewal.
Discussion:
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can
no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it
is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective
until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. The
second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides as follows: "The President shall
have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress." Thus, the ad interim appointment
remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be
withdrawn or revoked by the President. The fear that the President can withdraw or revoke at any time
and for any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly without basis.
The Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad interim appointment, and thus
an ad interim appointment takes effect immediately. The appointee can at once assume office and
exercise, as a de jure officer, all the powers pertaining to the office. In Pacete vs. Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments, this Court elaborated on the nature of an ad interim appointment as
follows: "A distinction is thus made between the exercise of such presidential prerogative requiring
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments when Congress is in session and when it is in recess.
In the former, the President nominates, and only upon the consent of the Commission on Appointments
may the person thus named assume office. It is not so with reference to ad interim appointments. It
takes effect at once. The individual chosen may thus qualify and perform his function without loss of
time. His title to such office is complete. In the language of the Constitution, the appointment is effective
'until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress."
Petitioner cites Black's Law Dictionary which defines the term "ad interim" to mean "in the
meantime" or "for the time being." Hence, petitioner argues that an ad interim appointment is
undoubtedly temporary in character. This argument is not new and was answered by this Court in
Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, where we explained that: ". . .
From the arguments, it is easy to see why the petitioner should experience difficulty in understanding
the situation. Private respondent had been extended several 'ad interim' appointments which petitioner
mistakenly understands as appointments temporary in nature. Perhaps, it is the literal translation of the
word 'ad interim' which creates such belief. The term is defined by Black to mean "in the meantime" or
"for the time being." Thus, an officer ad interim is one appointed to fill a vacancy, or to discharge the
duties of the office during the absence or temporary incapacity of its regular incumbent (Black's Law
Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, 1978). But such is not the meaning nor the use intended in the
context of Philippine law. In referring to Dr. Esteban's appointments, the term is not descriptive of the
nature of the appointments given to him. Rather, it is used to denote the manner in which said
appointments were made, that is, done by the President of the Pamantasan in the meantime, while
the Board of Regents, which is originally vested by the University Charter with the power of
appointment, is unable to act. . . .." Thus, the term "ad interim appointment," as used in letters of
appointment signed by the President, means a permanent appointment made by the President in the
meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a temporary appointment that can be
withdrawn or revoked at any time. The term, although not found in the text of the Constitution, has
acquired a definite legal meaning under Philippine jurisprudence. The Court had again occasion to
explain the nature of an ad interim appointment in the more recent case of Marohombsar vs. Court of
Appeals, where the Court stated: "We have already mentioned that an ad interim appointment is not
descriptive of the nature of the appointment, that is, it is not indicative of whether the appointment is
temporary or in an acting capacity, rather it denotes the manner in which the appointment was made.
An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution. The
first cause is the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments. The
second cause is the adjournment of Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on his
appointment. These two causes are resolutory conditions expressly imposed by the Constitution on all
ad interim appointments. These resolutory conditions constitute, in effect, a Sword of Damocles over the
heads of ad interim appointees. No one, however, can complain because it is the Constitution itself that
places the Sword of Damocles over the heads of the ad interim appointees.
While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by law, an
appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the
pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of
tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the
President from making to the three independent constitutional commissions, including the COMELEC.
Thus, in Brillantes vs. Yorac, this Court struck down as unconstitutional the designation by then President
Corazon Aquino of Associate Commissioner Haydee Yorac as Acting Chairperson of the COMELEC. This
Court ruled that: "A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially temporary and
therefore revocable at will. No cause need be established to justify its revocation. Assuming its validity,
the designation of the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections may be
withdrawn by the President of the Philippines at any time and for whatever reason she sees fit. It is
doubtful if the respondent, having accepted such designation, will not be estopped from challenging its
withdrawal. . . . The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the independence of the Commission
on Elections, foremost among which is the security of tenure of its members. That guarantee is not
available to the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections by designation of the
President of the Philippines."
Earlier, in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista, a case decided under the 1935 Constitution, which did
not have a provision prohibiting temporary or acting appointments to the COMELEC, this Court
nevertheless declared unconstitutional the designation of the Solicitor General as acting member of the
COMELEC. This Court ruled that the designation of an acting Commissioner would undermine the
independence of the COMELEC and hence violate the Constitution. We declared then: "It would be more
in keeping with the intent, purpose and aim of the framers of the Constitution to appoint a permanent
Commissioner than to designate one to act temporarily." In the instant case, the President did in fact
appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent appointments
during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity,
unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac and Solicitor General Felix Bautista in
Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista. The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly
allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to make
appointments that take effect immediately.
While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC "shall be independent," this provision
should be harmonized with the President's power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the
independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim
appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the President's power to make ad
interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give meaning and effect to
every provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution.
The reinstatement in the present Constitution of the ad interim appointing power of the
President was for the purpose of avoiding interruptions in vital government services that otherwise
would result from prolonged vacancies in government offices, including the three constitutional
commissions. In his concurring opinion in Guevara vs. Inocentes, decided under the 1935 Constitution,
Justice Roberto Concepcion, Jr. explained the rationale behind ad interim appointments in this manner:
"Now, why is the lifetime of ad interim appointments so limited? Because, if they expired before the
session of Congress, the evil sought to be avoided — interruption in the discharge of essential functions
— may take place. Because the same evil would result if the appointments ceased to be effective during
the session of Congress and before its adjournment. Upon the other hand, once Congress has adjourned,
the evil aforementioned may easily be conjured by the issuance of other ad interim appointments or
reappointments." Indeed, the timely application of the last sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution barely avoided the interruption of essential government services in the May 2001 national
elections. Following the decision of this Court in Gaminde vs. Commission on Appointments,
promulgated on December 13, 2000, the terms of office of constitutional officers first appointed under
the Constitution would have to be counted starting February 2, 1987, the date of ratification of the
Constitution, regardless of the date of their actual appointment. By this reckoning, the terms of office of
three Commissioners of the COMELEC, including the Chairman, would end on February 2, 2001.
Evidently, the exercise by the President in the instant case of her constitutional power to make
ad interim appointments prevented the occurrence of the very evil sought to be avoided by the second
paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. This power to make ad interim appointments is
lodged in the President to be exercised by her in her sound judgment. Under the second paragraph of
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, the President can choose either of two modes in appointing
officials who are subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. First, while Congress is
in session, the President may nominate the prospective appointee, and pending consent of the
Commission on Appointments, the nominee cannot qualify and assume office. Second, during the
recess of Congress, the President may extend an ad interim appointment which allows the appointee
to immediately qualify and assume office.
There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments can no longer be extended a new appointment. The disapproval is a final decision of the
Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of the
President. The disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a refusal by the Commission on
Appointments to give its consent after deliberating on the qualifications of the appointee. Since the
Constitution does not provide for any appeal from such decision, the disapproval is final and binding on
the appointee as well as on the appointing power. In this instance, the President can no longer renew
the appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition on reappointment, but because of a
final decision by the Commission on Appointments to withhold its consent to the appointment.
An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the
Commission on Appointments to organize is another matter. A by-passed appointment is one that has
not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the
session of Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold
its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is
free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee. This is recognized in Section 17 of
the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, which provides as follows: "Section 17. Unacted
Nominations or Appointments Returned to the President. Nominations or appointments submitted by
the President of the Philippines which are not finally acted upon at the close of the session of Congress
shall be returned to the President and, unless new nominations or appointments are made, shall not
again be considered by the Commission." Hence, under the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, a
by-passed appointment can be considered again if the President renews the appointment.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the President can renew the ad interim appointments
of by-passed appointees. Justice Roberto Concepcion, Jr. lucidly explained in his concurring opinion in
Guevara vs. Inocentes why by-passed ad interim appointees could be extended new appointments, thus:
"In short, an ad interim appointment ceases to be effective upon disapproval by the Commission,
because the incumbent can not continue holding office over the positive objection of the Commission. It
ceases, also, upon "the next adjournment of the Congress," simply because the President may then issue
new appointments — not because of implied disapproval of the Commission deduced from its inaction
during the session of Congress, for, under the Constitution, the Commission may affect adversely the
interim appointments only by action, never by omission. If the adjournment of Congress were an implied
disapproval of ad interim appointments made prior thereto, then the President could no longer appoint
those so by-passed by the Commission. But, the fact is that the President may reappoint them, thus
clearly indicating that the reason for said termination of the ad interim appointments is not the
disapproval thereof allegedly inferred from said omission of the Commission, but the circumstance that
upon said adjournment of the Congress, the President is free to make ad interim appointments or
reappointments."
The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither
to disapproved nor by-passed ad interim appointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot
be revived by another ad interim appointment because the disapproval is final under Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution, and not because a reappointment is prohibited under Section 1(2), Article IX-C of
the Constitution. A by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim appointment
because there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new
appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years.
The phrase "without reappointment" applies only to one who has been appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, whether or not such person completes
his term of office. There must be a confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the previous
appointment before the prohibition on reappointment can apply. To hold otherwise will lead to
absurdities and negate the President's power to make ad interim appointments. In the great majority of
cases, the Commission on Appointments usually fails to act, for lack of time, on the ad interim
appointments first issued to appointees. If such ad interim appointments can no longer be renewed, the
President will certainly hesitate to make ad interim appointments because most of her appointees will
effectively be disapproved by mere inaction of the Commission on Appointments. This will nullify the
constitutional power of the President to make ad interim appointments, a power intended to avoid
disruptions in vital government services. This Court cannot subscribe to a proposition that will wreak
havoc on vital government services.
The ad interim appointments and subsequent renewals of appointments of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason do not violate the prohibition on reappointments because there were no previous appointments
that were confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. A reappointment presupposes a previous
confirmed appointment. The same ad interim appointments and renewals of appointments will also not
breach the seven-year term limit because all the appointments and renewals of appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are for a fixed term expiring on February 2, 2008. Any delay in their
confirmation will not extend the expiry date of their terms of office. Consequently, there is no danger
whatsoever that the renewal of the ad interim appointments of these three respondents will result in
any of the evils intended to be exorcised by the twin prohibitions in the Constitution. The continuing
renewal of the ad interim appointment of these three respondents, for so long as their terms of office
expire on February 2, 2008, does not violate the prohibition on reappointments in Section 1 (2), Article
IX-C of the Constitution.
d.6.3. Temporary Designations

Adm. Code of 1987, Book III, Sec 17
d.6.4. Limitations on Appointing Power of Acting President (Secs 14-15)
E. PARDONING POWER (Sec 19)
Art IX, C, Sec. 5
e.1. pardon distinguished from probation
[G.R. No. 45685. December 22, 1937.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE O. VERA
Facts:
e.2. pardon distibguished from parole
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 76872. July 23, 1987.]
WILFREDO TORRES Y SUMULONG vs. HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES
Facts:
Petitioner was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime of estafa. On 18
April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the President of the Philippines on
condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this
condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law." Petitioner
accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement.
On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole (the "Board") resolved to recommend to the
President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. In making its
recommendation to the President, the Board relied upon the decisions of this Court in Tesoro vs.
Director of Prisons (68 Phil. 154 [1939]) and Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol (108 Phil. 356
[1960]). The evidence before the Board showed that on 22 March 1982 and 24 June 1982, petitioner had
been charged with twenty counts of estafa in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-19672 and Q-20756, which cases
were then (on 21 May 1986) pending trial before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal (Quezon City). The
record before the Board also showed that on 26 June 1985, petitioner had been convicted by the
Regional Trial Court of Rizal (Quezon City) of the crime of sedition in Criminal Case No. Q-22926: this
conviction was then pending appeal before the Intermediate Appellate Court. The Board also had before
it a letter report dated 14 January 1986 from the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"), addressed to
the Board, on the petitioner. Per this letter, the records of the NBI showed that a long list of charges had
been brought against the petitioner during the last twenty years for a wide assortment of crimes
including estafa, other forms of swindling, grave threats, grave coercion, illegal possession of firearms,
ammunition and explosives, malicious mischief, violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and violation of
Presidential Decree No. 772 (interfering with police functions). Some of these charges were identified in
the NBI report as having been dismissed. The NBI report did not purport to be a status report on each of
the charges there listed and identified.
On 10 October 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice issued "by authority of the President" an
Order of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly arrested and
confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.
Petitioner now impugns the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment. He claims that he
did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the twenty
(20) counts of estafa charged in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-19672 and Q-20756 nor of the crime of sedition in
Criminal Case No. Q-22926 3 Petitioner also contends that he was not given an opportunity to be heard
before he was arrested and recommitted to prison, and accordingly claims he has been deprived of his
rights under the due process clause of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether the pending charges suffice to constitute breach of the conditional pardon.
Held:
No. It may be emphasized that what is involved in the instant case is not the prosecution of the
parolee for a subsequent offense in the regular course of administration of the criminal law. What is
involved is rather the ascertainment of whether the convict has breached his undertaking that he would
"not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines" for purposes of reimposition upon him of the
remitted portion of his original sentence. The consequences that we here deal with are the
consequences of an ascertained breach of the conditions of a pardon. A convict granted conditional
pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is recommitted must of course be convicted by final judgment of
a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was charged before the criminal penalty for
such subsequent offense(s) can be imposed upon him. Again, since Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code
defines a distinct, substantive, felony, the parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the
provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made
to suffer the penalty prescribed in Article 159.
Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is
alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to
proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against
him under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prision correccional,
minimum period, upon a convict who "having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive,
shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon." Here, the President has chosen to proceed against
the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the
President's executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

e.3. pardon distinguished from amnesty
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-1278. January 21, 1949.]
LORETO BARRIOQUINTO and NORBERTO JIMENEZ vs. ENRIQUE A. FERNANDEZ
Facts:
Petitioners Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto were charged with the crime of murder.
As the latter had not yet been arrested the case proceeded against the former, and after trial the Court
of First Instance of Zamboanga sentenced Jimenez to life imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting
an appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware of the Proclamation No. 8, dated
September 7, 1946, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act
penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons
aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and committed during the period from December 8, 1941, to the
date when each particular area of the Philippines where the offense was actually committed was
liberated from enemy control and occupation, and said Jimenez decided to submit his case to the
Guerrilla Amnesty Commission presided by the respondents herein, and the other petitioner Loreto
Barrioquinto, who had then been already apprehended, did the same.
The Amnesty Commission denied to extend the benefits of the Amnesty on the ground that
Jimenez and Barrioquinto did not admit their commission of the crime charged.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners can invoke the benefits of the amnesty regardless of whether there is
prior admission of the offense charged.
Held:
Yes. Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be
pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty
by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which
the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted
to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after
the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and
relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it
abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does "nor work the restoration of the rights
to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the
pardon," and it "in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon
him by the sentence" (article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and
puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged
that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no
offense.
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that, in order to entitle a person to
the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not necessary that he should, as a
condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he
is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the
complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty
Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that "invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature
of a plea of confession and avoidance." Although the accused does not confess the imputation against
him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the
amnesty. For, whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he is
charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct summary
hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on whether he has committed the
offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the
enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be "regarded as a patriot or
hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation," or not, in accordance with the terms of the
Amnesty Proclamation. Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the Amnesty
Commissions created thereby should take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply the
benefits granted therein to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or
claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence presented shows that the
accused is entitled to said benefits.
e.4. effect of pardon
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 78239. February 9, 1989.]
SALVACION A. MONSANTO vs. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR.
Facts:
Petitioner (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City)had been convicted of the complex crime of
estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced to imprisonment of four years, two months
and one day of prision correccional as minimum, to ten years and one day of prision mayor as
maximum. The penalty of prision mayor carries the accessory penalties of temporary absolute
disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, enforceable during the
term of the principal penalty. He was granted pardon. By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the
Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer
since the same was still vacant.
Petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Ministry of Finance for resolution in view of the
provision of the Local Government Code transferring the power of appointment of treasurers from the
city governments to the said Ministry. In its 4th Indorsement dated March 1, 1985, the Finance Ministry
ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not
earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. It also directed the city treasurer to see to
it that the amount of P4,892.50 which the Sandiganbayan had required to be indemnified in favor of the
government as well as the costs of the litigation, be satisfied.
Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner wrote the Ministry on April 17, 1985
stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in
the government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should
correspond to the date of her preventive suspension which is August 1, 1982; that she is entitled to
backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the
proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50.

Issue:
Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.
Held:
No. Temporary absolute disqualification bars the convict from public office or employment, such
disqualification to last during the term of the sentence. Even if the offender be pardoned, as to the
principal penalty, the accessory penalties remain unless the same have been expressly remitted by the
pardon. The penalty of prision correccional carries, as one of its accessory penalties, suspension from
public office.
Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution
of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts
for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered
to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court . . . A
pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete without
acceptance.
The modern trend of authorities now rejects the unduly broad language of the Garland case [4
Wall, 333 18 L.ED. 366] (reputed to be perhaps the most extreme statement which has been made on
the effects of a pardon). To our mind, this is the more realistic approach. While a pardon has generally
been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as
innocent as though he never Committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very
essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact
of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It
involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness. The better considered cases regard full pardon (at least one
not based on the offender's innocence) as relieving the party from all the punitive consequences of his
criminal act, including the disqualifications or disabilities based on the finding of guilt. But it relieves him
from nothing more. "To say, however, that the offender is a 'new man', and 'as innocent as if he had
never committed the offense;' is to ignore the difference between the crime and the criminal. A person
adjudged guilty of an offense is a convicted criminal, though pardoned; he may be deserving of
punishment, though left unpunished; and the law may regard him as more dangerous to society than
one never found guilty of crime, though it places no restraints upon him following his conviction." A
pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for
what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make
reparation for what has been suffered. "Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings,
that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done
and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required." This would explain why petitioner, though
pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
In this ponencia, the Court wishes to stress one vital point: While we are prepared to concede
that pardon may remit all the penal consequences of a criminal indictment if only to give meaning to the
fiat that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action, we
do not subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon blots out the guilt of an individual and that once he is
absolved, he should be treated as if he were innocent. For whatever may have been the judicial dicta in
the past, we cannot perceive how pardon can produce such "moral changes" as to equate a pardoned
convict in character and conduct with one who has constantly maintained the mark of a good, law-
abiding citizen. Pardon cannot mask the acts constituting the crime. These are "historical" facts which,
despite the public manifestation of mercy and forgiveness implicit in pardon, "ordinary, prudent men will
take into account in their subsequent dealings with the actor." Pardon granted after conviction frees the
individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless
expressly grounded on the person's innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. This must be constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the true
character and purpose of the privilege.
Notwithstanding the expansive and effusive language of the Garland case, we are in full
agreement with the commonly-held opinion that pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to
public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although such pardon
undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office. The rationale is plainly evident. Public
offices are intended primarily for the collective protection, safety and benefit of the common good. They
cannot be compromised to favor private interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a
mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly
untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing
appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason
of the pardoned conviction.
What it the effect of accepted pardon to pending appeal?
It is our view that in the present case, it is not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether
before or after conviction, for the result would still be the same. Having accepted the pardon, petitioner
is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan
assumed the character of finality.
e.5. Who may avail amnesty
F. MILITARY POWERS (Sec 18)

Art II, Sec 13
Art VIII, Sec 1, par 2
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 159085. February 3, 2004.]
SANLAKAS vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ANGELO REYES
Facts
Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4
issued by the President on July 27, 2003 declaring "a state of rebellion" and calling upon the Armed
Forces to suppress the rebellion, in the wake of the so-called "Oakwood Incident". The challenged
issuances were lifted by the President five (5) days later, on August 1, 2003, through Proclamation No.
435. Party-list organizations, Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa (PM), contend that Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed
forces. They further submit that, because of the cessation of the Oakwood occupation, there exists no

sufficient factual basis for the proclamation by the President of a state of rebellion for an indefinite
period.
Issue:
Whether the proclamation of the state of rebellion circumvents the constitutional requirements
for the proclamation of a state of national emergency. Whether such proclamation is equivalent to
martial law; thus would result to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
warrantless arrests.
Held:
No. It is true that for the purpose of exercising the calling out power the Constitution does not
require the President to make a declaration of a state of rebellion. Section 18, Article VII provides:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-
eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus,
the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke
such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon
the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation
or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall
persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant
the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of the
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function,
nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged
for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained
shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
The above provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of "graduated

power[s]." From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the
latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual
invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such power. However, as we
observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, "[t]hese conditions are not required in the

exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that 'whenever it becomes necessary,' the
President may call the armed forces 'to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.'"
Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit the
President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not only with
Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers.
The President's authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as
chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers.
Should there be any "confusion" generated by the issuance of Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4, we clarify that, as the dissenters in Lacson correctly pointed out, the mere declaration of a
state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. Indeed, if a state of martial
law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution or automatically suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, then it is with more reason that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion could
not bring about these conditions. At any rate, the presidential issuances themselves call for the
suppression of the rebellion "with due regard to constitutional rights."
For the same reasons, apprehensions that the military and police authorities may resort to
warrantless arrests are likewise unfounded. In Lacson vs. Perez, supra, majority of the Court held that
"[i]n quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of
persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, 63 if the
circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the
declaration of a 'state of rebellion.'" In other words, a person may be subjected to a warrantless arrest
for the crime of rebellion whether or not the President has declared a state of rebellion, so long as the
requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are present.
It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to
determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the
power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion,
none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted
without factual basis.
The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law
and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no indication that
military tribunals have replaced civil courts in the "theater of war" or that military authorities have taken
over the functions of civil government. There is no allegation of curtailment of civil or political rights.
There is no indication that the President has exercised judicial and legislative powers. In short, there is
no illustration that the President has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial law powers.
Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the declaration constitute an indirect exercise of emergency
powers, which exercise depends upon a grant of Congress pursuant to Section 23 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution:
Sec. 23. (1) . . . .
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize
the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn
by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has attempted to or has
exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The President, in
declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her
Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the
President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated
by Section 23 (2), Article VI.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000.]
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA
Facts:
The President of the Philippines, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP
and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression.
In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar
B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 (the "LOI") which detailed the manner by which the
joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted. Task Force Tulungan was placed
under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila. Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief
under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP
Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist
the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President also declared that the
services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable
period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(the "IBP") filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the
Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that the deployment of marines in Metro
Manila is violative of the Constitution because no emergency situation obtains in Metro Manila as would
justify, even only remotely, the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement work; hence, said
deployment in derogation of Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether the said deployment violates the constitution.
Held:
No. When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from
the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called
upon to overrule the President's wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it
was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to
give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it
is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President's decision is totally bereft of factual basis.
The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the
assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence
to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in
such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the
performance of this Court's duty of purposeful hesitation" before declaring an act of another branch as
unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere
with the President's judgment. To doubt is to sustain.
Under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there
must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not
required in the case of the power to call out the Armed Forces. The only criterion is that "whenever it
becomes necessary," the President may call the armed forces "to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion." The implication is that the President is given full discretion and wide latitude in
the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers.
The President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information,
some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the
exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency
situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to
call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were
to have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not farfetched when we consider the present situation in
Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could spill over the other parts of the country. The
determination of the necessity for the calling out power if subjected to unfettered judicial scrutiny could
be a veritable prescription for disaster, as such power may be unduly straitjacketed by an injunction or a
temporary restraining order every time it is exercised. Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution
to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the
military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. Unless the petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely
abused, the President's exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded respect from this Court.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 147780. May 10, 2001.]
PANFILO LACSON vs. SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ
Facts:
Faced by an "angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs,
stones and other deadly weapons" assaulting and attempting to break into Malacañang. President
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 38 on May 1, 2001. In the said proclamation, the President
declared that the National Capital Region was in a state of rebellion. She likewise issued General Order
No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the
ongoing rebellion. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the "rebellion" were
thereafter effected. Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a "state of rebellion",
which allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the arrests, four related petitions were filed before the
Court. The petitions assailed the declaration of a state of rebellion by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in
law. Significantly, on May 6, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of the declaration of a
"state of rebellion" in Metro Manila.
Issue:
Whether the declaration of a state of rebellion was without factual basis, hence issued with
grave abuse of discretion.
Held:
No. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution expressly provides that "[t]he President shall be
the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he
may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion . . ." thus,
we held in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, (G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000): . . . The
factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively
established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are
not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to
judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for
the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts.
In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out
the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof. On the other hand, the President
as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be
classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call,
on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of
human lives and mass destruction of property. . . . The Court, in a proper case, may look into the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of this power. However, this is no longer feasible at this
time, Proclamation No. 38 having been lifted.
In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of
persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the
circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the
declaration of a "state of rebellion."
Moreover, petitioners' contention in G.R. No. 147780 (Lacson Petition), 147781 (Defensor-
Santiago Petition), and 147799 (Lumbao Petition) that they are under imminent danger of being arrested
without warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition,
since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without adequate remedies in the ordinary
course of law.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 171396. May 3, 2006.]
Facts:
Petitioners allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5
(G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. On February 24,
2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued
PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency. Respondents stated that the proximate cause behind
the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New
People's Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate
President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns
of government as a clear and present danger. The mass demonstrations conducted during the
commemoration of EDSA were dispersed by the anti-riot police. During the dispersal of the rallyists along
EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the
Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of
party-list Akbayan. petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it
encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional
requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.
Issue:
Whether President Arroyo abused her power in declaring a state of rebellion.

Held:
No. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, 111 this Court, through Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga, held
that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a
"sequence" of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power,
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law.
Citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 112 the Court ruled that the only criterion for the
exercise of the calling-out power is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the President may call the
armed forces "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." Are these conditions
present in the instant cases? As stated earlier, considering the circumstances then prevailing, President
Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP 1017. Owing to her Office's vast intelligence network, she is in the
best position to determine the actual condition of the country.
Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in
suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every act
that goes beyond the President's calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a
President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a greater power when he
wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the
greater are the limitations.
It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction between the President's authority to declare a
"state of rebellion" (in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. While
President Arroyo's authority to declare a "state of rebellion" emanates from her powers as Chief
Executive, the statutory authority cited in Sanlakas was Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:
SEC. 4. Proclamations. — Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or
condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific
law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the
force of an executive order.
G. EMERGENCYPOWERS (Art VI, Sec 23 [2])
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 171396. May 3, 2006.]
Facts:
The pertinent provision of PP 1017 states:
. . . and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders, and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article XII
of the Constitution do hereby declare a state of national emergency.
The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of national emergency under PP
1017, can call the military not only to enforce obedience "to all the laws and to all decrees . . ." but also
to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Article XII which reads:

Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of
any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
Issue:
Did the president properly invoked Sec 17 of Art XII of the Constitution incident to her
declaration of a state of national emergency. Does the executive power to declare state of national
emergency carries with it the “exercise of emergency power” e.g. the take over of private
establishment?
Held:
No. During the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports to grant the
President, without any authority or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the operation of any
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
A distinction must be drawn between the President's authority to declare "a state of national
emergency" and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated by the Court, Section 18,
Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised.
But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 23.(1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session
assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of
war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy.
Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war
but also to "other national emergency." If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to
withhold from the President the authority to declare a "state of national emergency" pursuant to Section
18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state
of war), then the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first
authorize the President before he can declare a "state of national emergency." The logical conclusion
then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even
in the absence of a Congressional enactment.
But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility
or business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from
Congress.
Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI, previously quoted, relate to
national emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation of the exercise of
emergency powers.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section
23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot
delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be
possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution
deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain
conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The
taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency
powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the "the State may, during
the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest," it refers to
Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent
on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President's military power as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The Government attempts to do so by citing a number of
cases upholding broad powers in military commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater of war.
Such cases need not concern us here. Even though "theater of war" be an expanding concept, we cannot
with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes
from stopping production. This is a job for the nation's lawmakers, not for its military authorities.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP
1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected
with public interest without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency,
however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist
warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor
can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the
President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be
taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under
Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
H. CONTRACTING AND GUARANTEEING FOREIGN LOANS (Sec 20, 21)

I. POWER OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sec 21)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 138570. October 10, 2000.]
BAYAN vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO ZAMORA
Facts:
The instant petitions for certiorari and prohibition assailed the agreement forged between the
RP and the USA — THE VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT, which formalized, among others, the use of
installations in the Philippine territory by the US military personnel to strengthen their defense and
security relationship. On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada ratified the VFA, and then
transmitted to the Senate his letter of ratification and the VFA for concurrence pursuant to Section 21,
Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution. The Senate subsequently approved the VFA by a 2/3 vote of its
members.
From these consolidated petitions, petitioners — as legislators, non-governmental organizations, citizens
and taxpayers — assailed the constitutionality of the VFA and imputed to respondents grave abuse of
discretion in ratifying the agreement. Petitioners argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is applicable
considering that the VFA has for its subject the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines.
Respondents, on the contrary, maintain that Section 21, Article VII should apply inasmuch as the VFA is
not a basing arrangement but an agreement which involves merely the temporary visits of United States
personnel engaged in joint military exercises.
Issue:
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of
the Constitution?
Held:
The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the
Senate on treaties or international agreements.
Section 21, Article VII, which herein respondents invoke, reads:
"No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate."
Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:
"After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines
and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the
Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the
people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State."
Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements in general, in which case,
the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is required to make the
subject treaty, or international agreement, valid and binding on the part of the Philippines. This provision
lays down the general rule on treaties or international agreements and applies to any form of treaty with
a wide variety of subject matter, such as, but not limited to, extradition or tax treaties or those economic
in nature. All treaties or international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject
matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be
valid and effective.
In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve
the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision, the
concurrence of the Senate is only one of the requisites to render compliance with the constitutional
requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines. Section 25, Article XVIII further
requires that "foreign military bases, troops, or facilities" may be allowed in the Philippines only by
virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national

referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other
contracting state.
It is our considered view that both constitutional provisions, far from contradicting each other,
actually share some common ground. These constitutional provisions both embody phrases in the
negative and thus, are deemed prohibitory in mandate and character. In particular, Section 21 opens
with the clause "No treaty . . .," and Section 25 contains the phrase "shall not be allowed." Additionally,
in both instances, the concurrence of the Senate is indispensable to render the treaty or international
agreement valid and effective.
To our mind, the fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Section 21, Article
VII, and that the Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision, is immaterial. For in either
case, whether under Section 21, Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamental law is crystalline
that the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional requirements.
On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and
personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military
personnel, and further defines the rights of the United States and the Philippine government in the
matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of
equipment, materials and supplies.
Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited
sense, however, the provisions of Section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and
for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the
Senate, as will be further discussed hereunder.
Moreover, it is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere transient
agreements for the reason that there is no permanent placing of structure for the establishment of a
military base. On this score, the Constitution makes no distinction between "transient" and
"permanent." Certainly, we find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or
facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.
In like manner, we do not subscribe to the argument that Section 25, Article XVIII is not
controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely foreign troops and facilities, are involved in the
VFA. Notably, a perusal of said constitutional provision reveals that the proscription covers "foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities." Stated differently, this prohibition is not limited to the entry of
troops and facilities without any foreign bases being established. The clause does not refer to "foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities" collectively but treats them as separate and independent subjects.
The use of comma and the disjunctive word "or" clearly signifies disassociation and independence of one
thing from the others included in the enumeration, 28 such that, the provision contemplates three
different situations — a military treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign
troops, or (c) foreign facilities — any of the three standing alone places it under the coverage of Section
25, Article XVIII.
At this juncture, we shall then resolve the issue of whether or not the requirements of Section
25 were complied with when the Senate gave its concurrence to the VFA.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly
concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by Congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by
the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA.
As to the matter of voting, Section 21, Article VII particularly requires that a treaty or
international agreement, to be valid and effective, must be concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
members of the Senate. On the other hand, Section 25, Article XVIII simply provides that the treaty be
"duly concurred in by the Senate."
Applying the foregoing constitutional provisions, a two-thirds vote of all the members of the
Senate is clearly required so that the concurrence contemplated by law may be validly obtained and
deemed present. While it is true that Section 25, Article XVIII requires, among other things, that the
treaty — the VFA, in the instant case — be a "duly concurred in by the Senate," it is very true however
that said provision must be related and viewed in light of the clear mandate embodied in Section 21,
Article VII, which in more specific terms, requires that the concurrence of a treaty, or international
agreement, be made by a two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. Indeed, Section 25, Article
XVIII must not be treated in isolation to Section 21, Article, VII.
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase "recognized as a treaty" means that the other
contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. 32 To require the other
contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States
Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, 33 is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.
It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement
because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. 35 To be sure, as long
as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be
taken equally as a treaty.
In international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their
binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within
their powers. 38 International law continues to make no distinction between treaties and executive
agreements: they are equally binding obligations upon nations.
By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the President, as head of State, is
the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country. In many ways, the President is the
chief architect of the nation's foreign policy; his "dominance in the field of foreign relations is (then)
conceded." 51 Wielding vast powers and influence, his conduct in the external affairs of the nation, as
Jefferson describes, is "executive altogether."
As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the Constitution vests
the same in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds vote of all the members
of the Senate. In this light, the negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification of the
agreement are exclusive acts which pertain solely to the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast
executive and diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the fundamental law itself. Into the field
of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it . Consequently,
the acts or judgment calls of the President involving the VFA — specifically the acts of ratification and
entering into a treaty and those necessary or incidental to the exercise of such principal acts —
squarely fall within the sphere of his constitutional powers and thus, may not be validly struck down,
much less calibrated by this Court, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power or
discretion.
It is the Court's considered view that the President, in ratifying the VFA and in submitting the
same to the Senate for concurrence, acted within the confines and limits of the powers vested in him by
the Constitution. It is of no moment that the President, in the exercise of his wide latitude of discretion
and in the honest belief that the VFA falls within the ambit of Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution,
referred the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under the aforementioned provision. Certainly, no abuse
of discretion, much less a grave, patent and whimsical abuse of judgment, may be imputed to the
President in his act of ratifying the VFA and referring the same to the Senate for the purpose of
complying with the concurrence requirement embodied in the fundamental law. In doing so, the
President merely performed a constitutional task and exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to the
functions of his office. Even if he erred in submitting the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under the
provisions of Section 21 of Article VII, instead of Section 25 of Article XVIII of the Constitution, still, the
President may not be faulted or scarred, much less be adjudged guilty of committing an abuse of
discretion in some patent, gross, and capricious manner.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 158088. July 6, 2005.]
SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL vs. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Facts:
This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the Office of the Executive
Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with
Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a
treaty, under both domestic law and international law, is a function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of
the executive department to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to
exercise its discretion with respect to ratification of treaties. Moreover, petitioners submit that the
Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute under treaty law and customary
international law. Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enjoining the states to
refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when they have signed the
treaty prior to ratification unless they have made their intention clear not to become parties to the
treaty. On the other hand, respondents argue that the executive department has no duty to transmit the
Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence.
Issue:
Whether the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a ministerial duty
to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to
the United Nations even without the signature of the President. Does the power to ratify treaty belong
to the Senate?
Held:
No. In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole
organ and authority in external relations and is the country's sole representative with foreign nations. As
the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to
international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and
governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and
otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the
sole authority to negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties,
the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the
members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution provides that "no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate."
The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to
provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations. 14 By requiring the concurrence of the
legislature in the treaties entered into by the President, the Constitution ensures a healthy system of
checks and balance necessary in the nation's pursuit of political maturity and growth.

Justice Isagani Cruz, in his book on International Law, describes the treaty-making process in this
wise:
The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation, signature, ratification, and
exchange of the instruments of ratification. The treaty may then be submitted for registration
and publication under the U.N. Charter, although this step is not essential to the validity of the
agreement as between the parties.
Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the head of state but he now usually assigns
this task to his authorized representatives. These representatives are provided with credentials
known as full powers, which they exhibit to the other negotiators at the start of the formal
discussions. It is standard practice for one of the parties to submit a draft of the proposed treaty
which, together with the counter-proposals, becomes the basis of the subsequent negotiations.
The negotiations may be brief or protracted, depending on the issues involved, and may even
"collapse" in case the parties are unable to come to an agreement on the points under
consideration.
If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty, the same is opened
for signature. This step is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and for
the purpose of symbolizing the good faith of the parties; but, significantly, it does not indicate
the final consent of the state in cases where ratification of the treaty is required. The document
is ordinarily signed in accordance with the alternat, that is, each of the several negotiators is
allowed to sign first on the copy which he will bring home to his own state.
Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state confirms and
accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representatives. The purpose of ratification is
to enable the contracting states to examine the treaty more closely and to give them an
opportunity to refuse to be bound by it should they find it inimical to their interests. It is for this
reason that most treaties are made subject to the scrutiny and consent of a department of the
government other than that which negotiated them.
The last step in the treaty-making process is the exchange of the instruments of
ratification, which usually also signifies the effectivity of the treaty unless a different date has
been agreed upon by the parties. Where ratification is dispensed with and no effectivity clause is
embodied in the treaty, the instrument is deemed effective upon its signature.
Petitioners' arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative
with ratification. It should be underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two
separate and distinct steps in the treaty-making process. As earlier discussed, the signature is primarily
intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. It
is usually performed by the state's authorized representative in the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on
the other hand, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty
concluded by its representative. It is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the
state or of the government.
Petitioners' submission that the Philippines is bound under treaty law and international law to
ratify the treaty which it has signed is without basis. The signature does not signify the final consent of
the state to the treaty. It is the ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof. In fact, the
Rome Statute itself requires that the signature of the representatives of the states be subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states. Ratification is the act by which the
provisions of a treaty are formally confirmed and approved by a State. By ratifying a treaty signed in
its behalf, a state expresses its willingness to be bound by the provisions of such treaty. After the treaty
is signed by the state's representative, the President, being accountable to the people, is burdened with
the responsibility and the duty to carefully study the contents of the treaty and ensure that they are not
inimical to the interest of the state and its people. Thus, the President has the discretion even after the
signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative whether or not to ratify the same. The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties does not contemplate to defeat or even restrain this power of the
head of states. If that were so, the requirement of ratification of treaties would be pointless and futile. It
has been held that a state has no legal or even moral duty to ratify a treaty which has been signed by
its plenipotentiaries. There is no legal obligation to ratify a treaty, but it goes without saying that the
refusal must be based on substantial grounds and not on superficial or whimsical reasons. Otherwise,
the other state would be justified in taking offense.
It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the
President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to
giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority
of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its
ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in
its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the
President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no
jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. The
Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its
jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome
Statute to the Senate.
i.1. Deportation of undesirable aliens
[G.R. No. L-23846. September 9, 1977.]

GO TEK vs. DEPORTATION BOARD
Facts:
On March 3, 1964 the chief prosecutor of the Deportation Board filed a complaint against Go
Tek, a Chinaman residing at Ilagan, Isabela and 1208-B, Misericordia Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. It was
alleged in the complaint that in December, 1963 certain agents of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) searched an office located at 1439 O'Donnel Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, believed to be the
headquarters of a guerilla unit of the "Emergency Intelligence Section, Army of the United States", and
that among those arrested thereat was Go Tek, an alleged sector commander and intelligence and
record officer of that guerilla unit. It was further alleged that fake dollar checks were found in Go Tek's
possession and that, therefore, he had violated article 168 of the Revised Penal Code and rendered
himself an undesirable alien.
The prosecutor prayed that after trial the Board should recommend to the President of the
Philippines the immediate deportation of Go Tek as an undesirable alien. Go Tek filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that the complaint was premature because there was a pending case against him in the
city fiscal's office of Manila for violation of article 168 (I.S. 64-7267). He contended that the Board had no
jurisdiction to try the case in view of the obiter dictum in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board, 118 Phil.
868, 875, that the President may deport aliens only on the grounds specified in the law. On the other
hand, The Board reasoned out that a criminal conviction is not a prerequisite before the State may
exercise its right to deport an undesirable alien and that the Board is only a fact-finding body whose
function is to make a report and recommendation to the President in whom is lodged the exclusive
power to deport an alien or dismiss a deportation proceeding.

Issues:
1. Whether the president can deport undesirable alien only on the ground specified by law.
2. Is conviction of a crime necessary to warrant deportation?
Held:
First Issue:
No. The President's power to deport aliens and the investigation of aliens subject to deportation
are provided for in the following provisions of the Revised Administrative Code:
SEC. 69.Deportation of subject of foreign power. — A subject of a foreign power residing
in the Philippine Islands shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or
repatriated to his own country by the Governor-General except upon prior investigation,
conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such action is
contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges
against him and he shall be allowed not less than three days for the preparation of his defense.
He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own
behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses."
On the other hand, section 37 of the Immigration Law provides that certain aliens may be
arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him
for the purpose and deported upon the Commissioner's warrant "after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien." Thirteen
classes of aliens who may be deported by the Commissioner are specified in section 37 (See PO Siok Pin
vs. Vivo, L-24792, February 14, 1975, 62 SCRA 363, 368).
So, under existing law, the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected (1) by order of
the President, after due investigation, pursuant to section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and (2)
by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners under
section 37 of the Immigration Law (Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board, supra).
The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228
U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be exercised by the Chief Executive "when
he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation": Justice
Johnson's opinion is that when the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens whose continued
presence in the country is injurious to the public interest, "he may, even in the absence of express law,
deport them". (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil. 534, 568, 569; In re McCulloch Dick, 38
Phil. 41).
"The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is
detrimental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified" (Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam vs. Commissioner
of Immigration and the Director of NBI, 104 Phil. 949, 956).
Section 69 and Executive Order No. 398, reorganizing the Deportation Board, do not specify the
grounds for deportation. Paragraph 1(a) of Executive Order No. 398 merely provides that "the
Deportation Board, motu proprio or upon complaint of any person, is authorized to conduct
investigations in the manner prescribed in section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code to determine
whether a subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines is an undesirable alien or not, and
thereafter to recommend to the President of the Philippines the deportation of such alien."
As observed by Justice Labrador, there is no legal nor constitutional provision defining the power
to deport aliens because the intention of the law is to grant the Chief Executive "full discretion to
determine whether an alien's residence in the country is so undesirable as to affect or injure the security,
welfare or interest of the state. The adjudication of facts upon which deportation is predicated also
devolves on the Chief Executive whose decision is final and executory." (Tan Tong vs. Deportation Board,
96 Phil. 934, 936; Tan Sin vs. Deportation Board, 104 Phil. 868, 872).
It has been held that the Chief Executive is the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of facts
which warrant the deportation of aliens, as disclosed in an investigation conducted in accordance with
section 69. No other tribunal is at liberty to reexamine or to controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on
which he acted. (Martin vs. Mott, 12 Wheat., 19, 31, cited in re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41, 62).
In the Dick case it was noted "that every alien forfeits his right of asylum in the country in which
he resides, in the absence of treaty provisions to the contrary, when his conduct or his mode of life
renders his presence there inimical to the public interests". "The reasons may be summed up and
condensed in a single word: the public interest of the State." (38 Phil. 41, 47, 100).
Second Issue:
No. "It is fundamental that an executive order for deportation is not dependent on a prior
judicial conviction in a criminal case" (Ang Beng vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 100 Phil. 801, 803).
Thus, it was held that the fact that an alien has been acquitted in a criminal proceeding of the particular
charge does not prevent the deportation of such alien based on the same charge. Such acquittal does
not constitute res judicata in the deportation proceedings. Conviction of a crime is not necessary to
warrant deportation. (3 C.J.S. 743, note 40, citing Lewis vs. Frick, 233 U.S. 291, 58 L. Ed. 967 and U.S. ex.
rel. Mastoras vs. McCandless, 61 F. 2nd 366; Tama Miyake vs. U.S. 257 F. 732).
And in the Tan Tong case, supra, it was ruled that the Deportation Board could take cognizance
of the charge of illegal importation against an alien, as a ground for deportation, even if he has not been
convicted of that offense.
J. POWER OVER LEGISLATION

j.1. to address congress (Sec 23)
j.2. Preparation and submission of budget
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 132988. July 19, 2000.]
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. vs. Hon. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE
Facts:
On December 27, 1997, the then President of the Philippines, Fidel V. Ramos, issued
Administrative Order (AO) 372. Subsequently, on December 10, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada issued
AO 43, amending Section 4 of AO 372, by reducing to five percent (5%) the amount of internal revenue
allotment (IRA) to be withheld from local government units (LGUs.) In this original petition for certiorari
and prohibition before the Supreme Court, petitioner seeks to annul Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it
requires LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular appropriations for non-
personal services; and to enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds
a portion of their internal revenue allotments.
Issue:
Does AO 43 violate the local fiscal autonomy?

Held:
Yes. Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having administrative autonomy in
the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy means that local
governments have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share
in the national taxes released by the national government, as well as the power to allocate their
resources in accordance with their own priorities. It extends to the preparation of their budgets, and
local officials in turn have to work within the constraints thereof. They are not formulated at the national
level and imposed on local governments, whether they are relevant to local needs and resources or not.
Hence, the necessity of a balancing of viewpoints and the harmonization of proposals from both local
and national officials, who in any case are partners in the attainment of national goals.
Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner of national government
intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are
consistent with national goals. Significantly, the President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the
economic and planning agency of the government, primarily responsible for formulating and
implementing continuing, coordinated and integrated social and economic policies, plans and
programs 26 for the entire country. However, under the Constitution, the formulation and the
implementation of such policies and programs are subject to "consultations with the appropriate
public agencies, various private sectors, and local government units." The President cannot do so
unilaterally.
Consequently, the Local Government Code provides: 27
". . . [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public sector deficit,
the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of [the]
Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget
and Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of
Congress and the presidents of the liga, to make the necessary adjustments in the internal
revenue allotment of local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty
percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year
preceding the current fiscal year . . ."
There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters:
(1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding
officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues;
and (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and
Local Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in
no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third
fiscal year preceding the current one.
Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these requisites before the issuance
and the implementation of AO 372. At the very least, they did not even try to show that the national
government was suffering from an unmanageable public sector deficit. Neither did they claim having
conducted consultations with the different leagues of local governments. Without these requisites, the
President has no authority to adjust, much less to reduce, unilaterally the LGU's internal revenue
allotment.
The solicitor general insists, however, that AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by the
President consistent with his power of supervision over local governments. It is intended only to advise
all government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help
maintain economic stability in the country, which is facing economic difficulties. Besides, it does not
contain any sanction in case of noncompliance. Being merely an advisory, therefore, Section 1 of AO 372

is well within the powers of the President. Since it is not a mandatory imposition, the directive cannot be
characterized as an exercise of the power of control.
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the
automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less
than the Constitution. The Local Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made
directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall not be
subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose."
As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning. 31 The
provision is, therefore, imperative.
Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of 10 percent of
the LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating
Committee of the emerging fiscal situation" in the country. Such withholding clearly contravenes the
Constitution and the law. Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback which means "something
held back or withheld, often temporarily." Hence, the "temporary" nature of the retention by the
national government does not matter. Any retention is prohibited.
In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an advisory effected in times of national
crisis, Section 4 thereof has no color of validity at all. The latter provision effectively encroaches on the
fiscal autonomy of local governments. Concededly, the President was well-intentioned in issuing his
Order to withhold the LGUs' IRA, but the rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be
carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be
carried out by legal methods.
VIII. THE JUDICIARY (Art VIII)
A. THE SUPREME COURT

A.1. Composition (Sec 4)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-1612. February 26, 1948.]
JORGE B. VARGAS vs. EMILIO RILLORAZA
Facts:
This starts as a treason case. Thru CA 682, six Justices of the Supreme Court were disqualified to
try the case because they served as Justices of the Supreme Court during the Japanese occupation and
they were replaced by judges from the inferior courts. This another “Supreme Court” was dubbed as
Meltin Co. | VIII. THE JUDICIARY (Art VIII) 119

People’s Court. Counsel for the defense, in a motion dated August 28, 1947, assails the constitutionality
of section 14 of the People's Court Act (Commonwealth Act No. 682) upon the following grounds:
"(a) It provides for qualifications of members of the Supreme Court, other than those provided in
section 6, Article VIII of the Philippine Constitution.
"(b) It authorizes the appointment of members of the Supreme Court who do not possess the
qualifications set forth in section 6, Article VIII, of the Philippine Constitution.
"(c) It removes from office the members of the Supreme Court by means of a procedure other than
impeachment, contrary to Article IX, of the Philippine Constitution.
"(d) It deprives the Commission on Appointments of Congress of its constitutional prerogative to
confirm or reject appointments to the Supreme Court.
"(e) It creates two Supreme Courts.
"(f) It impairs the rule making power of the Supreme Court, contrary to section 13, Article VIII, of the
Philippine Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not CA 682 is constitutional. Can Congress by an ordinary legislation channge the
composition of the Supreme Court?
Held:
No. If, according to section 4 of said Article VIII, "the Supreme Court shall be composed" of the
Chief Justice and Associate Justices therein referred to, its jurisdiction can only be exercised by it as thus
composed. To disqualify any of these constitutional component members of the Court — particularly, as
in the instant case, a majority of them — in a treason case, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the
Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a
deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by the constitution to exercise
the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their
judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It would seem
evident that if the Congress could disqualify members of this Court to take part in the hearing and
determination of certain collaboration cases it could extend the disqualification to other cases. The
question is not one of degree or reasonableness. It affects the very heart of judicial independence.
Because Article VIII, sections 4 and 5, of the Constitution do not admit any composition of the
Supreme Court other than by the Chief Justice and Associate Justices therein mentioned appointed as
therein provided. And the infringement is enhanced and aggravated where a majority of the members of
the Court — as in this case — are replaced by judges of first instance. It is distinctly another Supreme
Court in addition to this. And the constitution provides for only one Supreme Court.
From all that has been said above it results that the ground for disqualification added by section 14 of
Commonwealth Act No. 682 to those already existing at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and
continued by it is not only arbitrary and irrational but positively violative of the organic law.
In the face of the constitutional requirement (Art. VIII, section 5) that the members of the
Supreme Court should be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, we are of opinion that no person not so appointed may act as Justice of the Supreme
Court and that the "designation" authorized in section 14 of the People's Court Act to be made by the
President of any Judge of First Instance, Judge-at-large of First Instance or Cadastral Judge can not
possibly be a compliance with the provision requiring that appointment. An additional disqualifying
circumstance of the "designee" is the lack of confirmation by or consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Without intending the least reflection on the ability, learning, and integrity of any such
"designee," we are merely construing and applying the fundamental law of the land. A Judge of First
Instance, Judge-at-large of First Instance or Cadastral Judge, under section 149 of the Revised
Administrative Code, need not be at least forty years of age, nor have for ten years or more been a judge
of a court of record or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines (as required by section 6 of
Article VIII of the Constitution), because under said section he need only have practiced law in the
Philippines for a period of not less than five years or have held during a like period within the Philippines
an office requiring a lawyer's diploma. So that it may happen that a "designee" under section 14 of the
People's Court Act, sitting as a substitute Justice of the Supreme Court in particular collaboration cases,
and participating therein in the deliberations and functions of the Supreme Court, like any regular Justice
thereof, does not possess the required constitutional qualifications of a regular member of said Court.
Here again is another point of repugnancy between the challenged section and the constitution. And if
we consider the actual fact that only four of the present ten Justices of this Court are not adversely
affected by the disqualification established in section 14 of the People's Court Act, we see that the
"designees" constitute a majority when sitting with said four Justices, giving rise to the result that, if the
body composed by them all should be considered as the Supreme Court, it would be composed by four
members appointed and confirmed pursuant to sections 4 and 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution and six
who have not been so appointed and confirmed. The situation would not be helped any by saying that
such composition of the Court is only temporary, for no temporary composition of the Supreme Court is
authorized by the constitution. This Tribunal, as established under the organic law, is one of the
permanent institutions of the government. The clause "unless otherwise provided by law" found in
said section 4 can not be construed to authorize any legislation which would alter the composition of
the Supreme Court, as determined by the constitution, for however brief a time as may be imagined.
In principle, what really matters is not the length or shortness of the alteration of the constitutional
composition of the Court, but the very permanence and unalterability of that composition so long as the
constitution which ordains it remains permanent and unaltered. We are furthermore of opinion that said
clause refers to the number of Justices who were to compose the Court upon its initial organizati but it
was and is not empowered to alter the qualifications of the Justices and the mode of their
appointment, which are matters governed by sections 5 and 6 of said Article VIII wherein the clause
"unless otherwise provided by law" does not even exist, nor the provision on who shall be the
component members of the Court.on under the Commonwealth, and the manner of its sitting; that is,
that the Legislature, when providing for the initial organization of the Supreme Court under the
Commonwealth, was authorized to fix a different number of Justices than eleven, and determine the
manner of the Court's sitting differently from that established in section 4 of Article VIII of the
Constitution, Such a legislation was enacted in the form of Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259, the
pertinent provisions of which amended sections 133 and 134 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Under sections 4 and 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution, it is clear that the framers intended the
Supreme Court to function through the members who are therein defined; and by section 6 they
determined who may be appointed such members. This naturally excludes the intervention of any
person or official who is not a member of the Court in the performance of its functions; and it is self-
evident that the "designees" spoken of in section 14 of the People's Court Act can not be such members
in view of the fact that they have not been appointed and confirmed as such pursuant to said sections 5
and 6.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 16217. October 9, 1920.]
THE UNITED STATES vs. M. J. LIM SIONGCO
Facts:
The second division of the Supreme Court rendered a decision in a gambling case. Within the
time allowed by the Rules of the Court, counsel for appellants have raised a most interesting question
unconnected with the merits of the particular case but assailing the very structure of the court itself.
Appellant's motion is based "on the ground that the instant decision was rendered by a division of the
court and not by the body constituted by law for the purpose, and hence the decision as rendered, was
rendered by a body outside the law and having no power, authority or jurisdiction to render a final
decision in the controversy." In answer, the Attorney-General submits "that section 138 of the
Administrative Code permitting and authorizing the Supreme Court to sit in division only touches and
affects the matter of practice and method of procedure of said court, which the acts of Congress . . .
clearly authorized the Legislature to do."
Issue:
Whether a division of the Supreme Court has a diminished authority and jurisdiction as
compared to one en banc.
Held:
No. There is but one Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands. It is the jurisdiction of this
Supreme Court which cannot be diminished. The Supreme Court remains a unit notwithstanding it works
in divisions. Although it may have two divisions, it is but a single court. Actions considered in any one of
these divisions and decisions rendered therein are, in effect, by the same Tribunal. The two divisions of
this court are not to be Considered as two separate and distinct courts but as divisions of one and the
same court. In the exact words of the law which is questioned, "the Supreme court shall, as a body, sit in
banc, but it may sit in divisions.
The Legislature has merely attempted to regulate the organization of the court in a way not
prohibited by any constitutional provision. The constitution of divisions has been permitted for
convenience and the prompt dispatch of business. The provision in no way involves the question of
jurisdiction.
A.2. Appointment and Qualifications (Secs 7,8,9)

A.3. Salary (Sec 10)
Art XVIII, Sec 17
[G.R. No. L-2348. February 27, 1950.]

GREGORIO PERFECTO vs. BIBIANO L. MEER
Facts:
In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay
income tax upon his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount
(P802), he instituted this action in the Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment was
illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in
violation of the Constitution.
Issue:

Does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary amount to a diminution thereof?
Held:
Yes. As in the United States during the second period, we must hold that salaries of judges are
not included in the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances may
additionally be indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines
1913, taxable "income" did not include salaries of judicial officers when these are protected from
diminution. That was the prevailing official belief in the United States, which must be deemed to have
been transplanted here ; and second, when the Philippine Constitutional Convention approved (in 1935)
the prohibition against diminution of the judges' compensation, the Federal principle was known that
income tax on judicial salaries really impairs them.
This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. These pay taxes. Upon
buying gasoline, or cars or other commodities, they pay the corresponding duties. Owning real property,
they pay taxes thereon. And on incomes other than their judicial salary, assessments are levied. It is only
when the tax is charged directly on their salary and the effect of the tax is to diminish their official
stipend — that the taxation must be resisted as an infringement of the fundamental charter.
Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did not perceive and block
encroachments upon their prerogatives in whatever form. The undiminishable character of judicial
salaries is not a mere privilege of judges — personal and therefore waivable — but a basic limitation
upon legislative or executive action imposed in the public interest (Evans vs. Gore).
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. L-6355-56. August 31, 1953.]
PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO vs. SATURNINO DAVID
Facts:
This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring section
13 of Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant Saturnino David as Collector of
Internal Revenue to refund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia the sum of P1,744.45, representing the income
tax collected on his salary as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to Justice Fernando
Jugo the amount of P2,345.46, representing the income tax collected on his salary from January 1, 1950
to October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and from October 20, 1950 to
December 31, 1950, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, without special pronouncement as to
costs.
According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal
Revenue, our decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress,
because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590 which provides:
"SEC. 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the
Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby
declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law."
Issue:
Whether taxes on the salary of the judges constitute diminution thereof.
Held:
Under the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the
collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of
their compensation and therefore was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered
the refund of said taxes.
By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, Congress says that taxing the
salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or
ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which shall not be diminished during their continuance in
office," found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This
act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-
defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
So much for the constitutional aspect of the case. Considering the practical side thereof, we
believe that the collection of income tax on a salary is an actual and evident diminution thereof. The
reason behind the exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Federal Supreme
Court and this Court, is to preserve the independence of the Judiciary. The exemption was not primarily
intended to benefit judicial officers, but was grounded on public policy.
When a judicial officer assumes office, he does not exactly ask for exemption from payment of
income tax on his salary, as a privilege. It is already attached to his office, provided and secured by the
fundamental law, not primarily for his benefit, but based on public interest, to secure and preserve his
independence of judicial thought and action.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 78780. July 23, 1987.]
DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, JR. vs. CIR
Facts:
Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila, seek
to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the
Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their
salaries. prcd
In a nutshell, they submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial
officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that '(d)uring their continuance in office, their salary shall
not be decreased,' even as it is anathema to the ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by
said Constitution."
Issue:
Whether the tax withheld constituted diminution of the salary of the members of the bench.
Held:
No. The Court hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs.
Meer and Endencia vs. David, infra, that declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from
payment of the income tax and considered such payment as a diminution of their salaries during their
continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly
subject to a general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that payment of such
does NOT fall within the constitutional protection

income tax by Justices and Judges
against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office .
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in
question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of
the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The
ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be
given effect.
With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the imposition of
income tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so violates the Constitution" in
Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must be declared discarded. The framers of the
fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the
meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted.
Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and
deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the
cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden of general income taxation
equitably.
A.4. Security of Tenure (Secs 11, 2 [2])
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 57883. March 12, 1982.]
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA vs. MANUEL ALBA
Facts:
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled "An Act
Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefore and for other Purposes," the same being
contrary to the security of tenure provision of the Constitution as it separates from the judiciary Justices
and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts except the occupants
of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established
by such Act. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justifies a suit of this character,
it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and
disregarded. The Solicitor General maintains that there is no valid justification for the attack on the
constitutionality of the statute, it being a legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang
Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the allegations of absence of good faith as well as the attack on
the independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and devoid of any support in law.
Issue:
Whether BP 129 violates the security of tenure of the members of the judiciary, hence
unconstitutional.
Held:

No. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the
competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. The ponencia of Justice
J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr. reiterated such a doctrine: "We find this point urged by respondents,
to be without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners from the service is here involved, but the
validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue that is for the Courts to decide. It is well-
known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. . . .
And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The
preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to the merits of the case. As well-settled as the rule that the
abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in
order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith." The above excerpt was quoted with
approval in Bendanillo, Sr. v. Provincial Governor, two earlier cases enunciating a similar doctrine having
preceded it. As with the offices in the other branches of the government, so it is with the judiciary. The
test remains whether the abolition is in good faith. As that element is conspicuously present in the
enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, then the lack of merit of this petition becomes even more
apparent.
Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the
office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In
case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that
sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does
not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As
to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is
devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed
legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction
that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be
accorded the fullest consideration.
To be specific, the Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to reorganize
inferior courts and in the process to abolish existing ones. As noted in the preceding paragraph, the
termination of office of their occupants, as a necessary consequence of such abolition, is hardly
distinguishable from the practical standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in this Tribunal.
A.5. Removal (Sec 11)

Art XI , Sec 2
A.6. Fiscal Autonomy (Sec 3)
B. POWERS OF THE SUPREME COURT

B.1. JUDICIAL POWER
b.1.a. (Art VIII, Sec 1)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-25024. March 30, 1970.]
TEODORO C. SANTIAGO, JR. vs. MISS JUANITA BAUTISTA
Facts:

Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a pupil in Grade Six at the public school named Sero Elementary School
in Cotabato City. As the school year 1964-1965 was then about to end, the "Committee On The Rating Of
Students For Honor" was constituted by the teachers concerned at said school for the purpose of
selecting the "honor students" of its graduating class.
The committee deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Liñgat and Teodoro C.
Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors, respectively. The school's graduation exercises were
thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but three days before that date, the "third placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr.,
represented by his mother, and with his father as counsel, sought the invalidation of the "ranking of
honor students" thus made, by instituting a civil case in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, against
the committee members along with the District Supervisor and the Academic Supervisor of the place.
The complaint accused the committee of grave abuse of official discretion and unjust and discriminating
abuses.
Issue:
Whethe the case presents a justiceable issue.
Held:
No. 'Judicial action is an adjudication upon the rights of parties who in general appear or are
brought before the tribunal by notice or process, and upon whose claims some decision or judgment is
rendered. It implies impartiality, disinterestedness, a weighing of adverse claims, and is inconsistent with
discretion on the one hand — for the tribunal must decide according to law and the rights of the parties
— or with dictation on the other; for in the first instance it must exercise its own judgment under the
laws and not act under a mandate from another power . . . The character of its action in a given case
must decide whether that action is judicial, ministerial, or legislative, or whether it be simply that of a
public agent of the country or State, as in its varied jurisdictions it may by turns be each.' (In Re Saline
County Subscription, 100 Am. Dec. 337, 338, cited in Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Georgia Public
Service Commission, 181 S. E. 836-837.)
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that
there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse
claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn, before the
tribunal, board or officer clothed with power and authority to determine what the law is and
thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.
The committee on rating of students for honor whose actions are questioned in this case
exercised neither judicial nor quasi-judicial functions in the performance of its assigned task. There is
nothing on record about any rule of law that provides that when teachers sit down to assess the
individual merits of their pupils for purpose of rating them for honors, such-function involves the
determination of what the law is and that they are therefore automatically vested with judicial or quasi-
judicial functions
The issue of whether courts have authority to reverse the award of the board of judges of an
oratorical contest was resolved in the case of Felipe vs. Leuterio, etc., et al, wherein the Court declared
that the judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges of that contest and, for that
matter it would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests and similar competitions.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 86540-41. November 6, 1989.]
MANTRUSTE SYSTEMS, INC. vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Mantruste System, Inc. (MSI) entered into an 'interim lease agreement' dated August 26, 1986
with the Development Bank of the Philippines — owner of the Bayview Plaza Hotel — wherein the
former would operate the hotel for 'a minimum of three months or until such time that the said
properties are sold to MSI or other third parties by DBP.
On December 8, 1986 the President issued Proclamation No. 50 entitled 'Launching a Program
for the Expeditious Disposition or Privatization of Certain Government Corporations and/or the
(acquired) Assets thereof, and creating a Committee on Privatization and the Asset Privatization Trust.'
The Bayview Hotel properties were among the government assets identified for privatization and were
consequently transferred from DBP to APT for disposition.
To effect the disposition of the property, the DBP notified MSI that it was terminating the
'interim lease agreement.' In a certificate dated September 18, 1987 signed by Ernesto S. Salgado,
President and Chairman of the Board of herein private respondent (Annex D; Exh. 2-APT) the latter
agreed to the termination.
On October 7, 1987 the APT sent a letter to MSI through Mr. Salgado granting the latter an
extension of thirty days from October 18 'within which to effect the delivery of the Bayview Prince Hotel
to APT. However, fifteen days later, or on October 22, 1987, MSI informed APT that since its lease on the
hotel properties has been for more than one year now, its lease status has taken the character of a long
term one. As such MSI as the lessee has acquired certain rights and privileges under law and equity and
it is the company's firm contention that it has acquired a priority right to the purchase of Bayview Hotel
properties over and above other interested parties. The trust alleged on the other hand that MSI
voluntarily desisted from participating in the bidding. The property eventually was awarded to herein
petitioners Makati-Agro Trading and La Filipina Uy Gongco Corporation. MSI applied for issuance of a
restraining order enjoining APT from approving the winning bid and awarding the Bayview property to
private petitioners, and from ejecting MSI from the property or from terminating the contract of lease.
The Court of Appeals nullified the lower court's writ of preliminary injunction for being violative
of Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A dated December 15, 1986, which provides:
"No court or administrative agency shall issue any restraining order or injunction against
the Trust in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it.. Nor
shall such order or injunction be issued against any purchaser of assets sold by the Trust to
prevent such purchaser from taking possession of any assets purchased by him."
The judge of the trial court argued that the above provision impinges upon the judicial power as
defined in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Isseu:
Whether Sec 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A is violative of the Constitution as it impenges judicial
power.
Held:
No. Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does not infringe any provision of the Constitution. It
does not impair the inherent power of courts "to settle actual controversies which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government" (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). The power to define, prescribe and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts belongs to the legislature, except that it may not deprive the

Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).
While the judicial power may appear to be pervasive, the truth is that under the system of
separation of powers set up in the Constitution, the power of the courts over the other
branches and instrumentalities of the Government is limited only to the
determination of "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion (by
them) amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" in the exercise of their authority and in
the performance of their assigned tasks (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Courts may not substitute
their judgment for that of the APT, nor block, by an injunction, the discharge of its functions and the
implementation of its decisions in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets
transferred to it.
There can be no justification for judicial interference in the business of an administrative agency,
except when it violates a citizen's constitutional rights, or commits a grave abuse of discretion, or acts in
excess of, or without jurisdiction.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 86344. December 21, 1989.]
REP. RAUL A. DAZA vs. REP. LUIS C. SINGSON
Facts:
After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives proportionally
apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments among the several political parties
represented in that chamber, including the Lakas ng Bansa, the PDP-Laban, the NP-Unido, the Liberal
Party, and the KBL, in accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza
was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party.
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political
realignment in the House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally
resigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly
reducing their former party to only 17 members.
On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the
Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the
newly-formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of
the original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the
additional member from the LDP. The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his
removal from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent.
The contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the Commission on
Appointments because his election thereto is permanent under the doctrine announced in Cunanan v.
Tan. His claim is that the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a
permanent political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet
attained political stability. For his part, the respondent argues that the question raised by the petitioner
is political in nature and so beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. At the core of this controversy is Article
VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether the case presents a justiciable controversy.

Held:
Yes. Contrary to the respondent's assertion, the Court has the competence to act on the matter
at bar. Our finding is that what is before us is not a discretionary act of the House of Representatives that
may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here is the legality, not the
wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments.
The issue presented to us is justiciable rather political, involving as it does the legality and not
the wisdom of the act complained of, or the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as
prescribed by the Constitution. Even if the question were political in nature, it would still come within
our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the
Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 92024. November 9, 1990.]
CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA vs. THE BOARD OF INVESTMENTS
Facts:
This is a petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Board of Investments
(BOI)/Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) approving the transfer of the site of the proposed
petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and the shift of feedstock for that plant from naphtha only
to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). The Bataan Refining Corporation (BRC) is a wholly
government owned corporation, located at Bataan. It produces 60% of the national output of naphtha.
Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) and
applied with BOI for registration as a new domestic producer of petrochemicals. Its application specified
Bataan as the plant site. One of the terms and conditions for registration of the project was the use of
"naphtha cracker" and "naphtha" as feedstock or fuel for its petrochemical plant. The petrochemical
plant was to be a joint venture with PNOC.
However, in February, 1989, A.T. Chong, chairman of USI Far East Corporation, the major investor
in BPC, personally delivered to Trade Secretary Jose Concepcion a letter dated January 25, 1989 advising
him of BPC's desire to amend the original registration certification of its project by changing the job site
from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas. The reason adduced for the transfer was the insurgency and unstable
labor situation, and the presence in Batangas of a huge liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) depot owned by
the Philippine Shell Corporation.
Issue:
Held:
Yes and the petition is granted. First, Bataan was the original choice as the plant site of the BOI
to which the BPC agreed. That is why it organized itself into a corporation bearing the name Bataan.
There is available 576 hectares of public land precisely reserved as the petrochemical zone in Limay,
Bataan under P.D. No. 1803. There is no need to buy expensive real estate for the site unlike in the
proposed transfer to Batangas. The site is the result of careful study long before any covetous interests
intruded into the choice. The site is ideal. It is not unduly constricted and allows for expansion. The
respondents have not shown nor reiterated that the alleged peace and order situation in Bataan or
unstable labor situation warrant a transfer of the plant site to Batangas. Certainly, these were taken into
account when the firm named itself Bataan Petrochemical Corporation.
In the light of all the clear advantages manifest in the plant's remaining in Bataan, practically
nothing is shown to justify the transfer to Batangas except a near-absolute discretion given by BOI to
investors not only to freely choose the site but to transfer it from their own first choice for reasons which
remain murky to say the least.
And this brings us to a prime consideration which the Court cannot rightly ignore.
Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution provides that:
xxx xxx xxx
"The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound
agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient
use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition
and trade practices."
The Court, therefore, holds and finds that the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in
approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the change
of feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final say is in the
investor all other circumstances to the contrary notwithstanding. No cogent advantage to the
government has been shown by this transfer. This is a repudiation of the independent policy of the
government expressed in numerous laws and the Constitution to run its own affairs the way it deems
best for the national interest.
[G.R. No. 160405. November 10, 2003.]

DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Facts:
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed with the Office of the Secretary
General of the House of Representatives, a verified impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. and seven (7) other Associate Justices of the Court for violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of public trust and, committing high crimes. The House Committee on Justice subsequently
dismissed said complaint on October 22, 2003 for insufficiency of substance.
The next day, or on October 23, 2003, Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr., First District,
Tarlac and Felix William B. Fuentebella, Third District, Camarines Sur, filed another verified impeachment
complaint with the Office of the Secretary General of the House against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., alleging underpayment of the COLA of the members and personnel of the judiciary from the JDF and
unlawful disbursement of said fund for various infrastructure projects and acquisition of service vehicles
and other equipment. Attached to the second impeachment complaint was a Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the members of the House of
Representatives. The complaint was set to be transmitted to the Senate for appropriate action.
Subsequently, several petitions were filed with this Court by members of the bar, members of
the House of Representatives and private individuals, asserting their rights, among others, as taxpayers,
to stop the illegal spending of public funds for the impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice.
Petitioners contended that the filing of second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice was
barred under Article XI, Sec. 3 (5) of the 1987 Constitution which states that "no impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."

House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by
way of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to
hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal
branch of government under the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated
duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf,
filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela) 21 and Comment, praying that "the consolidated
petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment
proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court
to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be
recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution."
Issue:
Whether the case presents a justiciable controversy. Plainly stated, whether the Supreme Court
has jurisdiction.
Held:
Yes. This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in
Section l, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. . . As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this
"moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of
government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all
courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.". . In the scholarly
estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, ". . . judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the
three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of
authority and control between them." To him,"[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of
participation — or instrument of intervention — of the judiciary in that balancing operation." To ensure
the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by "any branch or
instrumentalities of government." the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves,
for the first time into its history, into block letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of
this court.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution
and American authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to
try and decide impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the
legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of
the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers
upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident to
impeachment proceedings. Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American
Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and
have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the
case of Garcia vs. COMELEC, "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by
foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different
constitutional settings and needs." Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to
that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful words of
amicius curiae Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of
the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S.
Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower
courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and
it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on
the part of any government branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between the
U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of
Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of
impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in
the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several
limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3). (4) and (5), Article XI
thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar
on the impeachment of one and the same official.
The futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of Congress before coming to this
Court is shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the
Senate is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether
concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary
by the earlier quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body
which is bereft of power to grant it.
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear
that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere
specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to
clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions."
From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly
political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions. " Truly
political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason being that respect for the doctrine of
separation of powers must be maintained. On the other hand. by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court.
Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be
renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred."Otherwise, this Court
would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being
clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions. In the
august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which
may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty." Even in
cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot inhibit itself and
must rule upon the challenge because no other office has the authority to do so. On the occasion when
this Court had been an interested party to the controversy before it, it had acted upon the matter "not
with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and
fairness." After all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary]
their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions.
For this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to
displease any person, interest or power and to equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the
temptation lurking in [his] office."
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 133064. September 16, 1999.]
JOSE C. MIRANDA vs. HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE

Facts:
In 1998, by virtue of RA No. 8528, the City of Santiago, Isabela was converted from an
independent component city to a component city. Herein assailed is the constitutionality of RA No. 8528
on the ground of lack of provision in the said law submitting the same for ratification by the people of
Santiago City in a proper plebiscite. The Solicitor General contended R.A. No. 8528 is merely reclassified
Santiago City from an independent component city to a component city. It allegedly did not involve any
"creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units,"
hence, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary. It is also argued that the Supreme Court
should back for lack of jurisdiction as the case involves a political question.
Issue:
Held:
Yes. Clearly, the petition at bar presents a justiciable issue. Petitioners claim that under Section
10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution they have a right to approve or disapprove R.A. No. 8528 in a
plebiscite before it can be enforced. It ought to be self-evident that whether or not petitioners have the
said right is a legal not a political question. For whether or not laws passed by Congress comply with the
requirements of the Constitution pose questions that this Court alone can decide. The proposition that
this Court is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning and nuances of the Constitution need not be the subject
of a prolix explanation.
Ruling on the Lis Mota of the Case:

The resolution of the issue depends on whether or not the downgrading falls within the meaning
of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of municipalities per
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal
that the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units involve a common denominator — material change in the political and economic rights of the local
government units directly affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the
Constitution requires the approval of the people "in the political units directly affected." It is not difficult
to appreciate the rationale of this constitutional requirement. The 1987 Constitution, more than any of
our previous Constitutions, gave more reality to the sovereignty of our people for it was borne out of the
people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable practice in
the past whereby local government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis of the
vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the consent of the people of the local
government unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of
legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries of local government
units. It is one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects
them — direct democracy of the people as opposed to democracy thru people's representatives. This
plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the Constitution granting more autonomy
to local government units. The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from
an independent component city to a component city are many and cannot be characterized as
insubstantial. For one, the independence of the city as a political unit will be diminished. The city mayor
will be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The resolutions and
ordinances of the city council of Santiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela.
Taxes that will be collected by the city will now have to be shared with the province. Petitioners pointed
out these far reaching changes on the life of the people of the city of Santiago.
The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward in character, so long as they
result in a material change in the local government unit directly affected, especially a change in the
political and economic rights of its people.
A word on the dissenting opinions of our esteemed brethren. Mr. Justice Buena justifies R.A. No.
8528 on the ground that Congress has the power to amend the charter of Santiago City. This power of
amendment, however, is limited by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Quite clearly, when an
amendment of a law involves the creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory. He
also contends that the amendment merely caused a transition in the status of Santiago as a city.
Allegedly, it is a transition because no new city was created nor was a former city dissolved by R.A. No.
8528. As discussed above, the spirit of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution calls for the people of the
local government unit directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in
their rights and responsibilities. They may call the downgrading of Santiago to a component city as a
mere transition but they cannot blink away from the fact that the transition will radically change its
physical and political configuration as well as the rights and responsibilities of its people.
Author’s Note: Although irrelevant to the topic under which this case is classified, The Author opted to
include the ruling on the Lis Mota of the case by reason of its importance in understanding the other
principles in Political Law.
B.2. JUDICIAL REVIEW
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.]
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Facts:
Same facts with Barcenas vs. House of Representatives. All these cases are consolidated by the
Supreme Court.
Ruling (reproduced):
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in
Section l, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. . . As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this
"moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of
government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all
courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.". . In the scholarly
estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, ". . . judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the

three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of
authority and control between them." To him,"[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of
participation — or instrument of intervention — of the judiciary in that balancing operation." To ensure
the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by "any branch or
instrumentalities of government." the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves,
for the first time into its history, into block letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of
this court.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution
and American authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to
try and decide impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the
legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of
the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers
upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident to
impeachment proceedings. Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American
Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and
have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the
case of Garcia vs. COMELEC, "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by
foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different
constitutional settings and needs." Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to
that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful words of
amicius curiae Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."
B.3. ART. VIII, Sec 5
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 76180. October 24, 1986.]
In Re: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ
Facts:
In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes the
first paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7 as erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986
Constitution, which provides in full as follows:
"Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the
February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to
noon of June 30, 1992."
"The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution
shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992."
Claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court "to
declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the present
incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice President Salvador Laurel and the elected President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under the said Section 7
(sic) of ARTICLE XVIII of the TRANSITORY PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986 Constitution refers to

Issue:
Whether the can exercise jurisdiction over cases for declaratory relief.
Held:
No.It is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief.
More importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent President of the
Republic, President Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally elementary that incumbent Presidents are
immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure.
The petition furthermore states no cause of action. Petitioner's allegation of ambiguity or
vagueness of the aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and
common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President
Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the
extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence, the
second paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of
the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution. In previous
cases, the legitimacy of the government of President Corazon C. Aquino was likewise sought to be
questioned with the claim that it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. The said cases
were dismissed outright by this court which held that:
"Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the
legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where
only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have
accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire
country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government.
Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the
eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the
Republic under her government." (Joint Resolution of May 22, 1986 in G.R. No. 73748 [Lawyers League
for a Better Philippines, etc. vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.]; G.R. No. 73972 [People's Crusade for
Supremacy of the Constitution etc. vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al.]; and G.R. No. 73990 [Councilor Clifton U.
Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al.])
Author’s Note:
Art VIII, Sec 5 talks about the powers of the Supreme Court. The author believes that this case
fails to connect to such Constitutional Provision (Irrelevant).
[G.R. No. L-49818. February 20, 1979.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LUCAS RAMOS y MACASIRAY
Facts:
Invoking Section 12, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals, after finding the
accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape, refrained from rendering judgment and from imposing the
appropriate penalty and certified the case to the Supreme Court for final determination since the
imposable penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua (Art. 335 Revised Penal Code as amended by RA
XIII).
Issue:
Procedurally proper?
Held:
No. Should the Court of Appeals be of the opinion that the penalty of death or reclusion
perpetua (life imprisonment) should be imposed in any criminal case appealed to it where the penalty
imposed by the trial court is less than reclusion perpetua, the said Court, with a comprehensive written
analysis of the evidence and discussion of the law involved, shall render judgment expressly and
explicitly imposing the penalty of either death or reclusion perpetua as the circumstances warrant,
refrain from entering judgment, and forthwith certify the case and elevate the entire record thereof to
this Court for review.
Author’s Note:
The case does not make mention of any constitutional provision but the author believes, to give
justice to it, that this makes a slight relevance to Art VIII, Sec 5 (2.d):
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the
law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
xxx
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 147678-87. July 7, 2004.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EFREN MATEO y GARCIA
Facts:
On 30 October 1996, ten (10) informations, one for each count of rape, allegedly committed on
ten different dates were filed against appellant EFREN MATEO.
Issue:
Can the Supreme Court require intermediate review by the CA in cases where the crime charged
is punishable by a maximum penalty when the law says “automatic review?”
Held:
Yes. Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal
cases in which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but
involving offenses committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise
to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is
imposed). The practice finds justification in the 1987 Constitution —
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
"(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
"xxx xxx xxx
"(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher." aCHDAE
The same constitutional article has evidently been a thesis for Article 47 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659, 10 as well as procedural rules contained in
Section 3 of Rule 122, 11 Section 10 of Rule 122, 12 Section 13 of Rule 124 13 and Section 3 of Rule 125
14 of the Rules of Court. It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive

in character, and it does not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, from
adding an intermediate appeal or review in favor of the accused.
In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has been a marked
absence of unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are convinced
that the evidence would appear to be sufficient to convict; some would accept the recommendation of
acquittal from the Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Indeed, the occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e., the determination and appreciation of
primarily factual matters, which the Supreme Court has had to face with in automatic review cases; yet,
it is the Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct mandate to review factual issues.
While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where
the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it
proscribed an intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling to
provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme
Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must
be accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior
determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the possibility
of an error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the
circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to
the Supreme Court for its final disposition.
Under the Constitution, the power to amend rules of procedure is constitutionally vested in the
Supreme Court —
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
"(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts." AaEDcS
Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule-making prerogative of
the Supreme Court than the law-making power of Congress. The rule here announced additionally
allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals, a subordinate appellate court, before the case
is elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review, is such a procedural matter.
Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, more particularly Section 3 and Section
10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, Section 3 of Rule 125, and any other rule insofar as they provide
for direct appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty
imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as well as the resolution of the Supreme
Court en banc, dated 19 September 1995, in "Internal Rules of the Supreme Court" in cases similarly
involving the death penalty, are to be deemed modified accordingly.
B.4. ART VII, Sec 18, par 3

Art VII, Sec 4 par 7
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-25716. July 28, 1966.]
FERNANDO LOPEZ vs. GERARDO ROXAS

Facts:
Petitioner Fernando Lopez and respondent Gerardo Roxas were the main contenders for the
Office of Vice-President of the Philippines in the general elections held on November 9, 1965. On
January 5, 1966, respondent filed with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, Election Protest No. 2,
contesting the election of petitioner herein as Vice President of the Philippines, upon the ground that it
was not he, but said respondent, who had obtained the largest number of votes for said office.
On February 22, 1966, petitioner Lopez instituted in the Supreme Court the present original action, for
prohibition with preliminary injunction, against respondent Roxas, to prevent the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal from hearing and deciding the aforementioned election contest, upon the ground that Republic
Act No. 1793, creating said Tribunal, is "unconstitutional", and that, "all proceedings taken by it are a
nullity." Petitioner's contention is predicated upon the ground, that it is illegal for Justices of the
Supreme Court to sit as Members of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, since the decisions thereof are
appealable to the Supreme Court on questions of law; that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is a court
inferior to the Supreme Court; and that Congress cannot by legislation appoint in effect the members of
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
Issue:
Whether the PET is inferior to the Supreme Court. Is it a tribunal distinct from Supreme Court?
Held:
No. Prior to the approval of Republic Act No. 1793, a defeated candidate for president or vice-
president, who believed that he was the candidate who obtained the largest number of votes for either
office, despite the proclamation by Congress of another candidate as the President-elect or vice
president-elect, had no legal right to demand by election protest a recount of the votes cast for the office
concerned, to establish his right thereto. As a consequence, controversies or disputes on this matter
were not justiciable. 5 Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1793, which provides that:
"There shall be on independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal . . . which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the president-elect and
the Vice-president elect of the Philippines."
has the effect of giving said defeated candidate the legal right to contest judicially the election of the
President-elect or Vice- President-elect and to demand a recount of the votes cast for the office involved
in the litigation, as well as to secure a judgment declaring that he 6 is the one elected president or vice-
president, as the case may be and that, as such, he is entitled to assume the duties attached to said
office. And by providing, further, that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal "shall be composed of the Chief
Justice and the other ten Members of the Supreme Court", said legislation has conferred upon such
Court an additional original jurisdiction of an exclusive character.
Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or separate court. It has merely conferred upon the
Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The result of the enactment may be
likened to the fact that courts of first instance perform the functions of such ordinary courts of first
instance, those of courts of land registration, those of probate courts, and those courts of juvenile and
domestic relations. It is, also, comparable to the situation obtaining when the municipal court of a
provincial capital exercises its authority, pursuant to law, over a limited number of cases which were
previously within the exclusive jurisdiction of courts of first instance.
In all of these instances, the court (court of first instance or municipal court) is only one,
although the functions may be distinct and, even, separate. Thus the powers of a court of first instance,
in the exercise of its jurisdiction over ordinary cases, are broader than, as well as distinct and separate

from, those of the same court acting as a court of land registration or a probate court, or as a court of
juvenile and domestic relations. So too, the authority of the municipal court of a provincial capital, when
acting as such municipal court, is, territorially more limited than that of the same court when hearing
the aforementioned cases which are primarily within the jurisdiction of courts of first instance. In other
words, there is only one court, although it may perform the functions pertaining to several types of
courts, each having some characteristics different from those of the others.
Indeed, the Supreme Court, 14 the Court of Appeals 15 and courts of first instance, 16 are
vested with original jurisdiction, as well as with appellate jurisdiction, in consequence of which they are
both trial courts and appellate courts, without detracting from the fact that there is only one Supreme
Court, one Court of Appeals, and one court of first instance, clothed with authority to discharge said dual
functions. A court of first instance, when performing the functions of a probate court or a court of land
registration, or a court of juvenile and domestic relations, although with powers less broad than those of
a court of first instance, hearing ordinary actions, is not inferior to the latter, for one cannot be inferior to
itself. So too, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not inferior to the Supreme Court ,
since it is the same Court, although the functions peculiar to said Tribunal are more limited in scope
than those of the Supreme Court in the exercise of its ordinary functions. Hence, the enactment of
Republic Act No. 1793 does not entail an assumption by Congress of the power of appointment vested
by the Constitution in the President. It merely connotes the imposition of additional duties upon the
Members of the Supreme Court.
Moreover, the power to be the "judge . . . of . . . contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications" of any public officer is essentially judicial. As such — under the very principle of
separation of powers invoked by petitioner herein — it belongs exclusively to the judicial department,
except only insofar as the Constitution provides otherwise. This is precisely the reason why said organic
law ordains that "the Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members" (Article VI, Section 11, of the Constitution). In other words, the purpose of this
provision was to exclude the power to decide such contests relating to Members of Congress — which by
nature is judicial— from the operation of the general grant of judicial power to the Supreme Court and
such inferior courts as may be established by law."
Art IX, A, Sec 7

B.5. Congressional Power over Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
Sec 2, par 1
Art VI, Sec 30
[G.R. No. 133715. February 23, 2000.]

DOUGLAS R. VILLAVERT vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Sec.
27 of RA 6770 1 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), seeking the annulment of the Memorandum 2 of the
Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas dated 17 July 1997, in Adm. Case No. OMB-VIS-ADM-95-0088, approved by
the Ombudsman, which recommended the dismissal of petitioner from the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), Cebu, as well as the Order 3 dated 30 January 1998 denying petitioner's

motion for reconsideration. Such provision provides the appellate jurisdiction of the SC over the cases
decided by the Ombudsman.
Issue:
Whether the said provision is constitutional.
Held:
Yes. In Fabian, Sec. 27 of RA 6770, which authorizes an appeal to this Court from decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases, was declared violative of the proscription
in Sec. 30, Art. VI, of the Constitution 20 against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court without its advice and consent. In addition, the Court noted that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure precludes appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, like the Office of the Ombudsman, to the
Supreme Court. Consequently, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, as reiterated in the subsequent case of
Namuhe v. Ombudsman.
In both Fabian and Namuhe, the petitions were referred to the Court of Appeals for final
disposition and considered as petitions for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 129742. September 16, 1998.]
TERESITA G. FABIAN vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO
Facts:
Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) placed under the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court the cases decided by the Ombudsman.
Issue:
Valid?
Held:
No. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates
the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such
disregard of the constitutional prohibition which was intended to give this Court a measure of control
over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation
enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.
B.6. Manner of sitting and votes required

Art VIII, Sec 4
Rule 56, Sec 11 and Rule 125, Sec 3, Rules of Court
B.7. Requirement as to decisions (Secs 13-14)

[G.R. No. 132428. October 24, 2000.]

GEORGE YAO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Petitioner was convicted with the crime of unfair competition in the MeTC. Later, he filed an
appeal to the RTC where Judge Angeles affirmed the conviction quoting in his decision the dispositive
portion of the MeTC decision and then stated, " after going over the evidence on record, the
Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the MeTC ." Petitioner then
filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision but the same was denied. On the last day of the
period allowed by law to perfect an appeal, petitioner filed a notice of appeal instead of the required
petition for review with the Court of Appeals. This, appellate court dismissed; and when petitioner finally
filed a petition for review on certiorari, the same was also dismissed. Since petitioner never instituted
the correct mode appeal on time, he lost his right to appeal.
Held:
[T]he decision of the RTC affirming the conviction of YAO palpably transgressed Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution, which states: Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. . . [The Court has]
sustained decisions of lower courts as having substantially or sufficiently complied with the
constitutional injunction notwithstanding the laconic and terse manner in which they were written and
even if "there (was left) much to be desired in terms of (their) clarity, coherence and comprehensibility"
provided that they eventually set out the facts and the law on which they were based, as when they
stated the legal qualifications of the offense constituted by the facts proved, the modifying
circumstances, the participation of the accused, the penalty imposed and the civil liability; or discussed
the facts comprising the elements of the offense that was charged in the information, and accordingly
rendered a verdict and imposed the corresponding penalty; or quoted the facts narrated in the
prosecution's memorandum but made their own findings and assessment of evidence, before finally
agreeing with the prosecution's evaluation of the case. [The Court has] also sanctioned the use of
memorandum decisions, a specie of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts in accordance with
the provisions of Section 40, B.P. Blg. 129 on the grounds of expediency, practicality, convenience and
docket status of our courts. [The Court has] also declared that memorandum decisions comply with the
constitutional mandate. In Francisco v. Permskul, however, [the Court] laid down the conditions for the
validity of memorandum decisions . The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate
the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to
say that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the
memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for
direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in
a statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision
authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of
the decision.
The memorandum decision may be employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary
collection cases, where the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time needed
to dismiss it.

It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of the
decision of the lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a proper examination of
the facts and the law on which it is based. The proximity at least of the annexed statement should
suggest that such an examination has been undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the decision
being adopted should, to begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation
or adoption will rectify its violation.
Tested against these standards, [the Court] find[s] that the RTC decision at bar miserably failed to
meet them and, therefore, fell short of the constitutional injunction. The RTC decision is brief indeed,
but it is starkly hallow, otiosely written, vacuous in its content and trite in its form. It achieved nothing
and attempted at nothing, not even at a simple summation of facts which could easily be done. Its
inadequacy speaks for itself. [The Court] cannot even consider or affirm said RTC decision as a
memorandum decision because it failed to comply with the measures of validity laid down in Francisco v.
Permskul. It merely affirmed in toto the MeTC decision without saying more. A decision or resolution,
especially one resolving an appeal, should directly meet the issues for resolution; otherwise, the appeal
would be pointless.
[The Court] reiterates its our admonition in Nicos Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, in
that while it conceded that brevity in the writing of decisions is an admirable trait, it should not and
cannot be substituted for substance; and again in Francisco v. Permskul, where the Court cautioned that
expediency alone, no matter how compelling, cannot excuse non-compliance with the constitutional
requirements. This is not to discourage the lower courts to write abbreviated and concise decisions, but
never at the expense of scholarly analysis, and more significantly, of justice and fair play, lest the fears
expressed by Justice Feria as the ponente in Romero v. Court of Appeals come true, i.e., if an appellate
court failed to provide the appeal the attention it rightfully deserved, said court deprived the appellant
of due process since he was not accorded a fair opportunity to be heard by a fair and responsible
magistrate. This situation becomes more ominous in criminal cases, as in this case, where not only
property rights are at stake but also the liberty if not the life of a human being. Faithful adherence to the
requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of
due process and fair play. It is likewise demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution. The
parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and
legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is
rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its
action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if
permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was
reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of
the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties
that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a
safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed
neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign
prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must
ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in the justness of his decision.
[G.R. No. 110263. July 20, 2001.]

ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
On September 13, 1995, petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad, a corporation
organized under the laws of Malaysia, obtained a favorable money judgment for its collection suit from
the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur against herein private respondent Philippine National
Construction Corporation, a corporation duly incorporated and existing under Philippine laws, then
known as Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines. For its failure to secure
payment from private respondent under the judgment, petitioner subsequently filed a complaint before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, to enforce the judgment of the High Court of Malaya.
Private respondent opposed the complaint, contending that the alleged judgment of the High Court of
Malaya should be denied recognition or enforcement since on its face, it is tainted with want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to private respondent, collusion and/or fraud, and there is a clear mistake of
law or fact. On its part, petitioner claimed that the High Court of Malaya acquired jurisdiction over the
person of private respondent by its voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction through its appointed
counsel, Mr. Khay Chay Tee. Furthermore, private respondent's counsel waived any and all objections to
the High Court's jurisdiction in a pleading filed before the Court. In due time, the trial court rendered its
Decision which dismissed petitioner's complaint. The decision of the trial court was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. Hence, petitioner elevated the matter before the Supreme Court.
Issues:
1. Whether the foreign decision is valid and binding in the Philippines.
2. The foreign decision did not provide the facts and the laws on which it is based. Valid?
Held:
First Issue:
Yes. Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its
dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country; however, the rules of comity, utility
and convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of
foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under
certain conditions that may vary in different countries. In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by
a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action
are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair
hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that the trial upon regular proceedings has been
conducted, following due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of
jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing to indicate
either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the
judgment.
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes,
until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the
giving of due notice in the foreign forum. Under Section 50(b), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which was the governing law at the time the instant case was decided by the trial and respondent
appellate court, a judgment, against a person, of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to
pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors-in-
interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. In addition,
under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, a court, whether in the Philippines or
elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence,

once the authenticity of the foreign judgment is proved, the party attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked
with the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity.
The reasons or grounds relied upon by private respondent in preventing enforcement and
recognition of the Malaysian judgment primarily refer to matters of remedy and procedure taken by the
Malaysian High Court relative to the suit for collection initiated by petitioner. Needless to stress, the
recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that the
procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the
courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. Ultimately, matters of remedy and procedure
such as those relating to the service of summons or court process upon the defendant, the authority of
counsel to appear and represent a defendant and the formal requirements in a decision are governed by
the lex fori or the internal law of the forum, i.e., the law of Malaysia in this case.
Second Issue:
Yes. There is no merit to the argument that the foreign judgment is not enforceable in view of
the absence of any statement of facts and law upon which the award in favor of the petitioner was
based. As aforestated, the lex fori or the internal law of the forum governs matters of remedy and
procedure. Considering that under the procedural rules of the High Court of Malaya, a valid judgment
may be rendered even without stating in the judgment every fact and law upon which the judgment is
based, then the same must be accorded respect and the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the
judgment of the foreign court simply because our rules provide otherwise.
[G.R. No. 123547. May 21, 2001.]

REV. FR. DANTE MARTINEZ vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
This is a land dispute case. CA decided the case against the petitioner. The motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied because it did not raise anything new. But the petitioner questioned
the written decision denying his motion for reconsideration as it was allegedly rendered in violation of
the Constitution because it does not state the legal basis thereof.
Issue:
Valid?
Held:
Yes. Art. VIII, Sec. 14 of the Constitution provides that "No petition for review or motion for
reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the basis
therefor." This requirement was fully complied with when the Court of Appeals, in denying
reconsideration of its decision, stated in its resolution that it found no reason to change its ruling
because petitioner had not raised anything new. Thus, its resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration states:
For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration of Our Decision filed by the petitioners.

Evidently, the motion poses nothing new. The points and arguments raised by the
movants have been considered and passed upon in the Decision sought to be reconsidered. Thus,
We find no reason to disturb the same.
b.7. Mandatory periods for deciding cases

Art. VIII, Sec 15
Art VII, Sec 18, par 3
Art XVIII, Sec 12-14
B.8. ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS

b.8.1 Supervision of lower courts (Sec 6,11)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993.]
BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA vs. HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ
Facts:
In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman,
respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office alleged that petitioner had falsified his
Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by certifying "that all civil and criminal cases which have
been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided
on or before January 31, 1998," when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been
rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent
Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of service for the months of
February, April, May, June, July and August, all in 1989; and the months beginning January up to
September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by this Court an extension of
ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases. Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has
no jurisdiction over said case despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, 2 since the offense
charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is under the control and
supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an
encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts.
Issue:
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged
falsification of a judge's certification submitted to the Supreme Court, and assuming that it can, whether
a referral should be made first to the Supreme Court.
Held:
No. We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken against him
by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down
to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can
oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative
action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude
into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the
Constitution, 3 for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution
granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel, but likewise
undermines the independence of the judiciary.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this
Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as
the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination . . . In fine, where a criminal
complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the
Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination
whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.
b.8.2. Tmporary Assignment of Judges (Sec 5[3])

b.8.3. Change of Venue (Sec 4)
b.8.4. Appointment of officials and employees of judiciary (Sec 5[6])
B.9. RULE-MAKING POWERS (Sec 5[5])

Art XII, Sec 14[2]
Art VII, Sec 18[3]
[Resolution. March 18, 1954.]

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN ET AL.
Facts:
Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953" was passed by
Congress which fixed the passing mark for the Bar from 1946 to 1955. After its approval, many of the
unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while
others motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid
law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the
reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to
individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether
or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. RA 972 woul have passed a total of 1094 bar flunkers.
Issue:
Is RA 972 constitutional?
Held:
No. By its declared objective, Republic Act No. 972 is contrary to public interest because it
qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the
profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest
demands of the legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal
problems evolved by the times become more difficult.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment
and reinstatement of attorneys-at-law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous
possession and exercise by the judicial power have been demonstrated during more than six centuries,
which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles."
The Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities
governing the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the
Constitution recognizes, continue to reside in this court. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the
rules promulgated by this court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys-at-law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme
Court.
[A.C. No. 1928. August 3, 1978.]

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLON
Facts:
For respondent's stubborn refusal to pay his memebership dues to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since the latter's constitution, notwithstanding due notice, the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines unanimously adopted and submitted to the Supreme Court a resolution
recommending the removal of respondent's name from its Roll of Attorneys.
Respondent, although conceding the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, questions the all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership therein and the
obligation to pay membership dues arguing that the provisions therein (Section 1 and 9 of the Court Rule
139-A) constitute an invasion of his constitutional right in the sense that he is being compelled, as a
precondition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to
pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to
liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Respondent likewise questions the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that this
matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is of an administrative nature
pertaining to an administrative body.
Issue:
Whether the SC has jurisdiction to disbar a lawyer on the ground stated. Whether the
integration of the Bar is valid.
Held:
Yes. All legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally
sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not
a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes
substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to
the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of
justice — as an officer of the Court. The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of
this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he
has created. The expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the
exercise of the police power"
Even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the
provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law, "(Sec. 5[5], Art.
X, 1973 Costitution) it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests
the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to
and supervision of the practice of law.
The matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their
regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities. The power of the Supreme Court to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers
does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It has limitations no less real because they
are inherent. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or
prostituted.
EN BANC
[A.M. No. 02-1-07-SC. January 21, 2002.]
RE: REQUEST OF ACCUSED THROUGH COUNSEL FOR CREATION OF A SPECIAL DIVISION TO TRY THE
PLUNDER CASE
Facts:
This refers to the Sandiganbayan's Resolution No. 01-2002 recommending that the plunder cases
filed against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and those charged with him be referred to a
Special Division to be created by the Supreme Court. The Defense Panel on the other hand, in its letter of
11 January 2002, argues that the creation of an Ad Hoc Special Division "may create serious equal
protection concerns and set a dangerous precedent that may come back to haunt us."
Issue:
Whether SC is warranted to create the “special division” requested for to try the plunder case
against President Estrada.
Held:
Yes. Under Sec. 5, par. [5], Art. VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court has the power
to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights and procedure
in all courts, including the Sandiganbayan. Accordingly, given the nature of the Plunder Case
and cases related thereto, the prominence of the principal accused and the importance of the
immediate resolution of the cases to the Filipino people and the Philippine Government, this Court, in
the interest of justice and the speedy disposition of cases, with due regard to the procedural and
substantive rights of the accused, deems it best to create a Special Division of the Sandiganbayan to be
composed of members mentioned in the immediately preceeding paragraph. This Special Division shall
hear, try and decide with dispatch the Plunder Case and all related cases filed or which may hereafter be
filed against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and those accused with him, until they are
resolved, decided and terminated.

EN BANC
[B.M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003.]
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE vs. EDWIN L. RANA
Facts:
Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") was among those who passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations. On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar
examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre ("complainant") filed
against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled
oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled
that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him.
Thus, respondent took the lawyer's oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys
up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct.
Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the
May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers ("MBEC") of Mandaon, Masbate.
Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled
Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-
Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as "counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty
Candidate, George Bunan," and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan ("Bunan").
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his "specific assistance" to represent him
before the MBEC. Respondent claims that "he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as
a person who knows the law." Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the
inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a
lawyer or represented himself as an "attorney" in the pleading.
Issue:
Whether respondent is engaged in unauthorized practice of law.
Held:
Yes. We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar. Respondent
took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent appeared as
counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyer's oath.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings
before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the
charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself "counsel" knowing fully well that he
was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing that he had no authority to
practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a
privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained
and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge,
educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate
does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a

privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person
seeking admission had practiced law without a license.
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer's oath. However, it
is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that
respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a
lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and his
signature in the Roll of Attorneys.
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 6052. December 11, 2003.]
IN RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA, ON LEGAL AND MORAL GROUNDS, FROM
BEING ELECTED IBP GOVERNOR FOR EASTERN MINDANAO IN THE MAY 31, IBP ELECTIONS. OLIVER
OWEN L. GARCIA, EMMANUEL RAVANERA and TONY VELEZ vs. ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA And IBP BOARD
OF GOVERNORS
Facts:
Petitioner lawyers Oliver L. Garcia, Emmanuel Ravanera and Tony Velez filed a petition seeking
the disqualification of respondent lawyer Leonard De Vera from being elected Governor of Eastern
Mindanao in the 16th Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Regional Governor's Elections. Petitioner
Garcia is the Vice-President of Bukidnon IBP Chapter, while petitioners Ravanera and Velez are the past
president and the incumbent President, respectively, of the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter. Petitioners
contended that respondent's transfer from Pasay, Parañaque, Las Piñas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter
to Agusan del Sur Chapter is a brazen abuse and misuse of the rotation rule, a mockery of the domicile
rule and a great insult to the lawyers of Eastern Mindanao for it implied that there is no lawyer from the
region qualified and willing to serve the IBP. Petitioners also submitted that respondent De Vera lacks the
requisite moral aptitude for the position. According to petitioners, respondent De Vera was previously
sanctioned by the Supreme Court for irresponsibly attacking the integrity of the SC Justices during the
deliberations of the plunder law. They further alleged that respondent De Vera could have been
disbarred in the United States for misappropriating his client's funds had he not surrendered his
California license to practice law. Respondent De Vera argued that the Court has no jurisdiction over the
present controversy contending that the election of the officers of the IBP, including the determination
of the qualification of those who want to serve the organization, is purely an internal matter governed as
it is by the IBP By-Laws and exclusively regulated and administered by the IBP. Respondent also averred
that an IBP member is entitled to select, change or transfer his chapter or transfer his chapter
membership under Section 19, Article II and Section 29-2, Article IV of the IBP By-Laws. He also stressed
that the right to transfer membership is also recognized in Section 4, 139-A of the Rules of Court which is
exactly the same as the first of the above-quoted provision of the IBP By-Laws.
Issue:
Whether the SC has jurisdiction over this case.
Held:
Yes. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution confers on the Supreme Court the power to
promulgate rules affecting the IBP. Implicit in this constitutional grant is the power to supervise

all the activities of the IBP, including the election of its officers. The authority of the
Supreme Court over the IBP has its origins in the 1935 Constitution. Section 13, Art. VIII thereof granted
the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law. The
above-quoted sections in both the 1987 and 1935 Constitutions and the similarly worded provision in
the intervening 1973 Constitution through all the years have been the sources of this Court's authority to
supervise individual members of the Bar. The term "Bar" refers to the "collectivity of all persons whose
names appear in the Roll of Attorneys." Pursuant to this power of supervision, the Court initiated the
integration of the Philippine Bar by creating on October 5, 1970 the Commission on Bar Integration,
which was tasked to ascertain the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar. Not long after, Republic Act
No. 6397 was enacted and it confirmed the power of the Supreme Court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar. Finally, on January 1, 1973, in the per curiam Resolution of this Court captioned "In the
Matter of the Integration of the Bar to the Philippines," we ordained the Integration of the Philippine Bar
in accordance with Rule 139-A, of the Rules of Court, which we promulgated pursuant to our rule-
making power under the 1935 Constitution. The IBP By-Laws, the document invoked by respondent De
Vera in asserting IBP independence from the Supreme Court, ironically recognizes the full range of the
power of supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP. For one, Section 77 of the IBP By-Laws vests on
the Court the power to amend, modify or repeal the IBP By-Laws, either motu propio or upon
recommendation of the Board of Governors of the IBP. Also in Section 15, the Court is authorized to send
observers in IBP elections, whether local or national. Section 44 empowers the Court to have the final
decision on the removal of the members of the Board of Governors.
On The Meat of the Case:

This Court is one with the IBP Board in its position that it is premature for the petitioners to seek
the disqualification of respondent De Vera from being elected IBP Governor for the Eastern Mindanao
Region. Before a member is elected governor, he has to be nominated first for the post. In this case,
respondent De Vera has not been nominated for the post. In fact, no nomination of candidates has been
made yet, by the members of the House of Delegates from Eastern Mindanao. Conceivably too,
assuming that respondent De Vera gets nominated, he can always opt to decline the nomination.
B.10. PROHIBITION AGAINST QUASI-JUDICIAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE WORKS (Sec 12)
[G.R. No. 43913. December 9, 1935.]

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. PASAY TRANSPORTATION CO.
Author’s Note:
This case is IRRELEVANT at its TOTALITY.
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 198-J. May 31, 1971.]
PAZ M. GARCIA vs. HON. CATALINO MACARAIG
Facts:

Administrative complaint filed by one Paz M. Garcia against the Honorable Catalino Macaraig, Jr.,
formerly Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch VI, now Undersecretary of Justice, in his
former capacity as judge, for alleged "dishonesty, violation of his oath of office as judge . . . gross
incompetence, violation of Republic Act 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended. Garcia alleged
that Judge Macaraig as incumbent Judge of Branch VI, Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo
and knowing fully well that he has never performed his official duties or discharged the duties
appertaining to his office, he has collected and was paid his salaries from July to December, 1970 and
from January to February 1971. Macaraig answered that he could not possibly start his job right away
because of the lack of facilities; that for the said reason, he decided to take a leave but the Secretary of
Justice, however, prevailed upon him to forego his leave and instead to assist him, without being
extended a formal detail, whenever respondent was not busy attending to the needs of his court.
Issue:
Whether it is proper for a judge to discharge a non-judicial function, i.e. assisting the office of
the Secretary of Justice.
Held:
No. Of course, none of these is to be taken as meaning that this Court looks with favor at the
practice of long standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed in the Department of Justice to assist the
Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the
courts. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working
with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the government must always be
kept clear and jealously observed, lest the principle of separation of powers on which our government
rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly
motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service. The fundamental advantages and the
necessity of the independence of said three departments from each other, limited only by the specific
constitutional precepts on check and balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged
as more paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or
exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of
government that no judge of even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself in a position
where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to review
and prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than
the Court of Appeals or this Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, this Court feels very
strongly that it is best that this practice is discontinued.
Concurring Opinion of Justice Fernando:
While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic
rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a
member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character.
That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of
the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can
pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official,
however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity
of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication.
Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be
satisfied with nothing less . . . Our holding today has been foreshadowed in Noblejas v. Teehankee, a

1968 decision. Justice J.B.L. Reyes who penned the opinion, first referred to the above Richardson
decision as well as to Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co. It went on to state: "In this spirit,
it has been held that the Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should not and cannot be
required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or
connected with the administration of judicial functions, and a law requiring the Supreme Court to
arbitrate disputes between public utilities was pronounced void in Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay
Transportation Co. (57 Phil. 600)." It is clear from the above Noblejas decision that even prior to the
Constitution, there was a commitment to the principle that a member of the judiciary cannot be asked
to discharge non-judicial functions. For in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co., mentioned
therein, Justice Malcolm, speaking for this Court, was quite explicit. Thus: "The Supreme Court and its
members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to
assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial
functions."
EN BANC
[A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC. October 5, 1988.]

IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS NORTE
PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.
Facts:
On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch
19, sent this Court a letter which reads:
"Hon. Marcelo Fernan

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Philippines
Manila
Thru channels: Hon. Leo Medialdea
Court Administrator
Supreme Court of the Philippines
Sir:
By Executive Order RF6-04 issued on June 21, 1988 by the Honorable Provincial Governor of
Ilocos Norte, Hon. Rodolfo C. Fariñas, I was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte
Provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to Presidential Executive Order No. 856 of 12
December 1986, as amended by Executive Order No. 326 of June 1, 1988. In consonance with
Executive Order RF6-04, the Honorable Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte issued my
appointment as a member of the Committee. For your ready reference, I am enclosing herewith
machine copies of Executive Order RF6-04 and the appointment.
Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the discharge of the powers and duties of the
position as member of the Ilocos (Norte) Provincial Committee on Justice, may I have the honor
to request for the issuance by the Honorable Supreme Court of a Resolution, as follows:
(1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to assume and discharge the powers and
duties attached to the said position;
(2) Considering my membership in the Committee as neither violative of the Independence
of the Judiciary nor a violation of Section 12, Article VIII, or of the second paragraph of Section 7,
Article IX (B), both of the Constitution, and will not in any way amount to an abandonment of my
present position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, and
as a member of the Judiciary; and
(3) Consider my membership in the said Committee as part of the primary functions of an
Executive Judge.
Issue:
Whether it is proper for Judge Manzano to accept the said appointment.
Held:
No. It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative
functions. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the
conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations
to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency
by the organic law of its existence.
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-
judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution). Considering that
membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges
administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his
request. This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic
insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC
Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity and performance in the
adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of
an orderly society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should
render assistance to said Committees to help promote the landable purposes for which they exist, but
only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.
This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic
insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC
Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity and performance in the
adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of
an orderly society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should
render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but
only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of
their judicial duties.
C. REPORT ON JUDICIARY (Sec 16)

D. THE LOWER COURTS
d.1. Qualifications and Appointments (Secs. 7[1][2], 8[5],9)
[A.M. No. 01-1608-RTJ. January 16, 2001.]

(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 97-471-RTJ)

SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF TAGUIG, METRO MANILA vs. Judge SANTIAGO G. ESTRELLA
Facts:
The present controversy stemmed from an election protest filed by then mayoralty candidate
Ricardo R. Papa, Jr. against Isidro B. Garcia, the candidate proclaimed mayor of Taguig, Metro Manila in
the May 8, 1995 elections. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig and was eventually
raffled to the sala of respondent judge. The issue narrowed down to the determination of the number of
Garcia votes that should have been considered stray, there having been another candidate named
Garcia. A revision committee was formed and thereafter reported that Papa objected to a total of 11,290
ballots and 3,049 were plain Garcia votes. Respondent judge issued an order directing the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to examine the contested ballots in the presence of a representative of
both parties. After the examination of the NBI, the ballot boxes were ordered by the respondent to be
removed from his custody and transferred to another RTC Branch. The NBI submitted its report and
Garcia moved to be furnished with the said report. Respondent judge denied the motion. Only the court
was furnished with the copy of the NBI report. After several motions and petitions for the resetting of
the promulgation of judgment, a judgment was promulgated in favor of Papa. On the day of the
promulgation of judgment, Garcia was given only by the respondent judge a few minutes to go over
several pages of questioned documents. In his complaint, Garcia alleged that respondent judge gave
unwarranted benefits to Papa, which caused undue injury to him as well as the people of Taguig by
depriving them of their duly elected mayor. Respondent judge denied Garcia's allegations. The Court
referred the matter to the Court Administrator for report and recommendation. The Office of the Court
Administrator consented to the Comelec's finding that the respondent's action showed utter disregard of
the appropriate procedure required of him, resulting in the disenfranchisement of thousands of voters.
Issue:
Whether the judge is impartial.
Held:
Yes. No less than the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should be the embodiment
of competence, integrity, and independence (Rule 1.01, Canon 1). Indeed, in every case, a judge shall
endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and applicable laws unswayed by partisan interests, public
opinion, or fear of criticism (Rule 3.02, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct). Thus, this Court has
continually reminded members of the bench that; The Judge should always be imbued with a high sense
of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly administer justice.
He must view himself as a priest for the administration of justice is akin to a religious crusade. Thus,
exerting the same devotion as a priest "in the performance of the most sacred ceremonies of religious
liturgy," the judge must render service with impartiality commensurate with public trust and confidence
repose in him. (Dimatulac vs. Villon, 297 SCRA 679 [1998].
On this score, we find pertinent our ruling in the recent case of Evelyn Agpalasin vs. Judge
Ernesto M. Agcaoili (A.M. No. RTJ-95-1308, April 12, 2000), that; A judge should, in pending or
prospective litigation before him, he scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to
waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element in
determining his judicial course. He must not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should
do so in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity. A
decision which correctly applies the law and jurisprudence will nevertheless be subject to questions of
impropriety when rendered by a magistrate or tribunal believed to be less than impartial and honest.
Verily, a judge must promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. These
stringent standards are intended to assure parties of just and equitable decisions and of a judiciary that
is capable of dispensing impartial justice in every issue in every trial (Abundo vs. Manio, Jr., 312 SCRA 1
[1999]).
Author’s Note:
This case is TOTALLY IRRELEVANT to the topic under which it is classified. This deals purelywith
judicial ethics and election law. Nothing was said about Secs 7,8, and 9 of Art VIII of the Constitution.
d.2. Salary (Sec 10)

d.3. Congressional power to reorganize and security of tenure (Secs 11,2[2])
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 57883. March 12, 1982.]
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA vs. MANUEL ALBA
Facts:
Please refer to the facts of this case under A.4 (Security of Tenure). For convenience, the author
reproduces the ruling of the SC of this case hereinunder:
Issue:
Whether BP 129 violates the security of tenure of the members of the judiciary, hence
unconstitutional.
Held:
No. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the
competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. The ponencia of Justice
J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr. reiterated such a doctrine: "We find this point urged by respondents,
to be without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners from the service is here involved, but the
validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue that is for the Courts to decide. It is well-
known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. . . .
And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The
preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to the merits of the case. As well-settled as the rule that the
abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in
order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith." The above excerpt was quoted with
approval in Bendanillo, Sr. v. Provincial Governor, two earlier cases enunciating a similar doctrine having
preceded it. As with the offices in the other branches of the government, so it is with the judiciary. The
test remains whether the abolition is in good faith. As that element is conspicuously present in the
enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, then the lack of merit of this petition becomes even more
apparent.
Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the
office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In
case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that
sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does
not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As
to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is
devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed
legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction
that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be
accorded the fullest consideration.
To be specific, the Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to reorganize
inferior courts and in the process to abolish existing ones. As noted in the preceding paragraph, the
termination of office of their occupants, as a necessary consequence of such abolition, is hardly
distinguishable from the practical standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in this Tribunal.
d.4. Removal (Sec 11)

d.5. Jurisdiction (Sec 1)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 74457. March 20, 1987.]
RESTITUTO YNOT vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Facts:
The constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A is assailed in this case. EO 626-A prohibits the
unauthorized interprovincial movement and slaughtering of carabaos. The petitioner had transported six
carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the
police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. The petitioner
sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a
supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the
confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of
the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raised by the
petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes
outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His
claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard
before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure
should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional.
Issue:
Whether the lower court are prevented from passing on issues involving constitutionality of law.
Held:
No. This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in
examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same
whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the
Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of
court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the

constitutionality of certain measures. This

simply means that the resolution of such cases
may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any
means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and
of the need to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the hammer fall, and heavily," to recall
Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least
resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they
should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist,
and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking
of the task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition
unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.
d.6. Preparation of Decisions (Sec 14)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 169885. July 25, 2006.]
ARTEMIO PEDRAGOZA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FRANCISCO SUMULONG, JR.
Facts:
This case started as an election protest which reached the COMELEC en banc. The said tribunal
decided the case against Pedragoza. Pedragoza assailed the COMELEC Resolution because two
Commissioners of the said tribunal inhibited themselves without expressly citing the reason therefor.
Petitioner is of the view that this omission annuls the 30 September 2005 Resolution for lack of quorum,
with the two non-participating Commissioners' votes becoming "inexistent."
While there is no extant record of the COMELEC's proceedings in adopting Section 1, Rule 18 of
the COMELEC Rules, the parallel deliberations of the framers of the 1987 Constitution on Section 13,
Article VIII shed light on the purpose of the rule requiring a member of this Court and all lower collegiate
courts to state his reason for taking no part in a case. Because of the exact identity of the rule in
question as stated in Section 1, Rule 18 and Section 13, Article VIII, these deliberations apply here by
analogy.
Issues:
1. Whether the subject resolution is valid.
2. Does non-compliance with cite-the-reason requirement affect the validity of the decision?
Held:
First Issue:
No. Under Section 1, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure 4 ("COMELEC Rules"), a
COMELEC member who takes no part in a decision or resolution must state the reason for his inhibition.
The provision states:
Procedure in Making Decisions. — The conclusions of the Commission in any case
submitted to it for decision en banc or in Division shall be reached in consultation before the case

is assigned by raffle to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Commission or the Division
and a certification to this effect signed by the Chairman or the Presiding Commissioner, as the
case may be, shall be incorporated in the decision. Any Member who took no part, or dissented,
or abstained from a decision or resolution must state the reason therefor. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution imposes an identical requirement on the
members of this Court and all lower collegiate courts. By intent of the Constitution's framers, as
reflected in the language of the text, this requirement is mandatory. Owing to the exact identity of the
two provisions' phrasing of the requirement in question, Section 1, Rule 18 (which, in all probability, was
lifted from Section 13, Article VIII), must be of mandatory nature itself.
Second Issue:
No. Being a devise to dissuade members of this Court and all lower collegiate courts (or in this
case, the members of the COMELEC) from not taking part in the deliberation of cases, the requirement
has nothing to do with the ruling involved but concerns the judge himself. Thus, non-compliance with
the rule does not annul the ruling in which a judge takes no part but may be basis for holding him
responsible for the omission.
Indeed, the omission involved here is akin to the failure of the head of a collegiate court to issue
the certification under Section 13, Article VIII that "The conclusions of the . . . Court in any case
submitted to it for decision en banc or in division [was] reached in consultation before the case [was]
assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court," a requirement also imposed on the
Chairman or the Presiding Commissioner of the COMELEC, as the case may be, under Section 1, Rule 18.
We held in Consing v. Court of Appeals that such omission does not invalidate the
questioned ruling but "may be basis for holding the official responsible for the
omission to account therefor.
The absence, however, of the certification would not necessarily mean that the case submitted for
decision had not been reached in consultation before being assigned to one member for the writing of
the opinion of the Court since the regular performance of official duty is presumed [Sec. 5 (m) of Rule
131, Rules of Court]. The lack of certification at the end of the decision would only serve as evidence of
failure to observe the certification requirement and may be basis for holding the official responsible for
the omission to account therefor . Such absence of certification would not have the effect of invalidating
the decision. Accordingly, we hold that the failure of Commissioners Sadain and Tuason to state the
reasons for their inhibition from the 30 September 2005 Resolution does not affect the validity
of that ruling.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 164702. March 15, 2006.]
PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA (PM) and BUTIL FARMERS PARTY (BUTIL) vs. COMELEC
Facts:
This case essentially raises again the question on the correct computation of seats to be allotted
to party-list representatives as decided in the landmark case (now abandoned) of Veteran’s. The
COMELEC resolution was questioned by the petitioners because it refused to apply the Veteran’s case
computation but rather on a later November 20, 2003 Resolution in Ang Bagong Bayani case where the

Court gave an additional seat to BUHAY. However in the latter case, the court advised that such decision
is pro hac vice.
Issues:
1. What is pro hac vice?
2. Whether it is proper for the COMELEC en banc to rely on that pro hac vice Resolution and
consider the Veteran’s Doctrine abandoned.
Held:
First Issue:
Pro hac vice is a Latin term meaning "for this one particular occasion." A ruling expressly
qualified as pro hac vice cannot be relied upon as a precedent to govern other cases.
Second Issue:
No. It was therefore erroneous for respondent Commission to apply the November 20, 2003
Resolution and rule that the formula in Veterans has been abandoned.
d.7. Mandatory Period for deciding

ART VIII, Sec 15
ART VIII, Secs 12-14
[G.R. No. L-42428. March 18, 1983.]

BERNARDINO MARCELINO vs. THE HON. FERNANDO CRUZ, JR.
Facts:
A petition for prohibition and writ of habeas corpus to enjoin respondent Judge Fernando Cruz,
Jr. from promulgating his decision in Criminal Case No. C-5910, entitled "People of the Philippines versus
Bernardino Marcelino," and for release from detention of petitioner, the accused in said case, on the
ground of loss of jurisdiction of respondent trial court over the case for failure to decide the same within
the period of ninety [90] days from submission thereof. Petitioner espouses the thesis that the three
month period prescribed by Section 11[1] of Article X of the 1973 Constitution, being a constitutional
directive, is mandatory in character and that non-observance thereof results in the loss of jurisdiction of
the court over the unresolved case.
Held:
Undisputed is the fact that on November 28, 1975, or eighty-five (85) days from September 4,
1975 the date the case was deemed submitted for decision, respondent judge filed with the deputy clerk
of court the decision in Criminal Case No. 5910. He had thus veritably rendered his decision on said case
within the three-month period prescribed by the Constitution. In Comia v. Nicolas, 29 SCRA 492, Ago v.
Court of Appeals, 6 SCRA 530, and Balquidra v. Court of First Instance, 83 SCRA 122, this Court refers that

the rendition of the judgment in trial courts refers to the filing of the signed decision with
the clerk of court. There is no doubt that the constitutional provision cited by petitioner refers to
the rendition of judgment and not to the promulgation thereof. Thus, it is this date that should be
considered in determining whether or not respondent judge had resolved the case within the alloted
period.
Indeed, the date of promulgation of a decision could not serve as the reckoning date because
the same necessary comes at a later date, considering that notices have to be sent to the accused as
well as to the other parties involved, an event which is beyond the control of the judge. As pointed out
in People v. Court of Appeals, 99 Phil. 786, the promulgation of a judgment in the trial court does not
necessarily coincide with the date of its delivery by the judge to the clerk of court.
Section 11[1], Article X of the New Constitution provides in full, to wit:
"SEC. 11[1]. Upon the effectivity of this Constitution, the maximum period within
which a case or matter shall be decided or resolved from the date of its submission, shall be
eighteen months for the Supreme court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve
months for all inferior collegiate courts, and three months for all other inferior courts."
To date, no authoritative interpretation of the above-quoted provision has been rendered by this
Court. Thus, in approaching this novel question, We now tread upon what Mr. Cooley characterizes as
"very dangerous ground when they [referring to the courts] venture to apply rules which distinguish
directory and mandatory statutes to the provisions of a constitution."
The established rule is that "constitutional provisions are to be construed as mandatory, unless
by express provision or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest." 10 "The difference
between a mandatory and a directory provision is often determined on grounds of expediency, the
reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than by enforcing the letter of
the law."
To Our mind, the phraseology of the provision in question indicates that it falls within the
exception rather than the general rule. By the phrase "unless reduced by the Supreme Court," it is
evident that the period prescribed therein is subject to modification by this Court in accordance with its
prerogative under Section 5[5] of Article X of the New Constitution to "promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts . . . ." And there can be no doubt that said provision, having
been incorporated for reasons of expediency, relates merely to matters of procedure. Albermarle Oil &
Gas Co. v. Morris, declares that constitutional provisions are directory, and not mandatory,
where they refer to matters merely procedural.
In practice, the Supreme Court has assumed a liberal stand with respect to this provision. The
Court had at various times, upon proper application and for meritorious reasons, allowed judges of
inferior courts additional time beyond the three-month period within which to decide cases submitted to
them. The reason is that a departure from said provision would result in less injury to the general
public than would its strict application. To hold that noncompliance by the courts with the aforesaid
provision would result in loss of jurisdiction, would make the courts, through which conflicts are
resolved, the very instruments to foster unresolved causes by reason merely of having failed to render
a decision within the alloted term. Such an absurd situation could not have been intended by the
framers of our fundamental law.
Notwithstanding the conclusion that courts are not divested of their jurisdiction
for failure to decide a case within the ninety day period , the Supreme Court emphasizes
the rule, for the guidance of the judges manning our courts, that cases pending before their salas must
be decided within the aforementioned period. Failure to observe said rule constitutes a ground for

administrative sanction against the defaulting judge . In fact, a certificate to this effect is
required before judges are allowed to draw their salaries.
[G.R. No. L-46903. July 23, 1987.]

BUHAY DE ROMA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
This is a civil case. The petitioner assailed the decision of CA because the same was rendered
beyond the 12-month limit.
Issue:
Tenable?
Held:
No. There is no need to dwell long on the other error assigned by the petitioner regarding the
decision of the appealed case by the respondent court beyond the 12-month period prescribed by
Article X, Section 11 (1) of the 1973 Constitution. As we held in Marcelino v. Cruz, the said provision was
merely directory and failure to decide on time would not deprive the corresponding courts of jurisdiction
or render their decisions invalid. It is worth stressing that the aforementioned provision has now been
reworded in Article VIII, Section 15, of the 1987 Constitution, which also impresses upon the courts of
justice, indeed with greater urgency, the need for the speedy disposition of the cases that have been
clogging their dockets these many years. Serious studies and efforts are now being taken by the Court to
meet that need.

Poli Digested Cases

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Poli Digested Cases

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

20

Melvin Miscala Christine Ruflo

Procedure for Passage of Bills (Sec 26 [2])

Power of the Senate to propose amendments to revenue bills.

G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995

Query: What is the purpose of the three readings in 3 separate days?

Meltin Co. | Procedure for Passage of Bills (Sec 26 [2]) 2

Whether the law violates the constitutional requirement.

Meltin Co. | Procedure for Passage of Bills (Sec 26 [2]) 4

ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE

Presidential Veto (Sec. 27)

Issue: whether this is a valid item veto.

Meltin Co. | Presidential Veto (Sec. 27) 6

Meltin Co. | Effectivity of Laws 7

LORENZO M. TAÑADA vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA

Issue: Whether publication of the law is an indispensable requirement.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200 June 18, 1987

Meltin Co. | Effectivity of Laws 8

G.R. No. 105364*

Whether Congress can provide for an exception of the publication requirement.

Held: Yes (I am surprised!).

c.5 Initiative and Referendum

Meltin Co. | c.5 Initiative and Referendum 10

Meltin Co. | c.5 Initiative and Referendum 11

D. Limitations to Power of Legislation

Art XIV, Sec 4 [3]

Meltin Co. | D. Limitations to Power of Legislation 12

d.2. Implied Substantive Limitations

[G.R. No. 45685. November 16, 1937.]

[G.R. No. L-32096. October 24, 1970.]

Issue: whether there was an invalid delegation of power.

Meltin Co. | d.2. Implied Substantive Limitations 15

[G.R. No. 76633. October 18, 1988.]

Meltin Co. | d.2. Implied Substantive Limitations 16

Exception Under the Constitution

Sec. 32, Art. VI – delegation to the people

Art. X, Sec.5 – delegation to LGUs

d.2.b. Prohibition against Passage of irrepealable laws

d.3. Procedural Limitations (sec. 26-27)

[G.R. No. 105371. November 11, 1993.]

Another issue in this Case

Meltin Co. | Exception Under the Constitution 18

e.1. Question Hour (Sec 22)

Issue: Whether the president abused its power in issuing EO 464.

Meltin Co. | E. Aid to Legislation 20

e.2. Legislative Investigations (Sec 21)

The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the

Meltin Co. | E. Aid to Legislation 21

Meltin Co. | E. Aid to Legislation 22

Meltin Co. | E. Aid to Legislation 24

Meltin Co. | E. Aid to Legislation 25

Meltin Co. | E. Aid to Legislation 29

Meltin Co. | E. Aid to Legislation 32

Meltin Co. | F. OTHER POWERS 33

f.6. Concur in treaties (Art VII, Sec 21)

Meltin Co. | F. OTHER POWERS 36

f.8 Judge President’s fitness

[G.R. No. 146738. April 3, 2001.]

f.9. Power of Impeachment (Art. XI)

Meltin Co. | F. OTHER POWERS 39

f.9.d. Effect (Art XI, Sec 3[7])

[G.R. No. 160405. November 10, 2003.]

Meltin Co. | F. OTHER POWERS 40

Meltin Co. | F. OTHER POWERS 41