Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Promulgated:
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.,
Respondent. October 17, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was
dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline
company.
He is now before this Court via a petition for review on certiorari claiming that
he was illegally dismissed. To buttress his stance, he argues that (1) his dismissal does
not fall under 282(e) of the Labor Code; (2) continuing adherence to the weight
standards of the company is not a bona fide occupational qualification; and (3) he was
discriminated against
because other overweight employees were promoted instead of being disciplined. 1989 to July 3, 1989. He was formally requested to trim down to his ideal weight and
report for weight checks on several dates. He was also told that he may avail ofthe
After a meticulous consideration of all arguments pro and con, We uphold the legality of services of the company physician should he wish to do so. He was advised that his case
dismissal. Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an will be evaluated on July 3, 1989.[2]
act of social justice or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious
misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral character. On February 25, 1989, petitioner underwent weight check. It was discovered
that he gained, instead of losing, weight. He was overweight at 215 pounds, which is 49
The Facts pounds beyond the limit. Consequently, his off-duty status was retained.
Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight steward of On October 17, 1989, PAL Line Administrator Gloria Dizon personally visited
Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL). He stands five feet and eight inches (58) with a large body petitioner at his residence to check on the progress of his effort to lose weight.Petitioner
frame. The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 weighed 217 pounds, gaining 2 pounds from his previous weight. After the visit,
pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew petitioner made a commitment[3] to reduce weight in a letter addressed to Cabin Crew
Administration Manual[1] of PAL. Group Manager Augusto Barrios. The letter, in full, reads:
Dear Sir:
The weight problem of petitioner dates back to 1984. Back then, PAL advised
him to go on an extended vacation leave from December 29, 1984 to March 4, 1985 to I would like to guaranty my commitment towards a weight loss
from 217 pounds to 200 pounds from today until 31 Dec. 1989.
address his weight concerns. Apparently, petitioner failed to meet the companys weight
standards, prompting another leave without pay from March 5, 1985 to November 1985. From thereon, I promise to continue reducing at a reasonable
percentage until such time that my ideal weight is achieved.
After meeting the required weight, petitioner was allowed to return to Likewise, I promise to personally report to your office at the
designated time schedule you will set for my weight check.
work. But petitioners weight problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay
fromOctober 17, 1988 to February 1989. Respectfully Yours,
F/S
Armando Yrasuegui[
4]
On April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, 43 pounds over his ideal
weight. In line with company policy, he was removed from flight duty effective May 6,
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight,
petitioner remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative
the PALdecision for him to remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily Charge for violation of company standards on weight requirements. He was given ten
complies with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every two weeks (10) days from receipt of the charge within which to file his answer and
for weight checks. submit controverting evidence.[8]
Petitioner failed to report for weight checks. Despite that, he was given one
more month to comply with the weight requirement. As usual, he was asked to report On December 7, 1992, petitioner submitted his Answer.[9] Notably, he did not
for weight check on different dates. He was reminded that his grounding would continue deny being overweight. What he claimed, instead, is that his violation, if any, had already
pending satisfactory compliance with the weight standards.[5] been condoned by PAL since no action has been taken by the company regarding his
case since 1988. He also claimed that PAL discriminated against him because the
Again, petitioner failed to report for weight checks, although he was seen company has not been fair in treating the cabin crew members who are similarly
submitting his passport for processing at the PAL Staff Service Division. situated.
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to On December 8, 1992, a clarificatory hearing was held where petitioner
report for weight check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of manifested that he was undergoing a weight reduction program to lose at least two (2)
weight check dates.[6] Again, petitioner ignored the directive and did not report for pounds per week so as to attain his ideal weight.[10]
weight checks. On June 26, 1990, petitioner was required to explain his refusal to
undergo weight checks.[7] On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his
inability to attain his ideal weight, and considering the utmost leniency extended to him
When petitioner tipped the scale on July 30, 1990, he weighed at 212 which spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5) years, his services were
pounds. Clearly, he was still way over his ideal weight of 166 pounds. considered terminated effective immediately.[11]
From then on, nothing was heard from petitioner until he followed up his case His motion for reconsideration having been denied,[12] petitioner filed a
requesting for leniency on the latter part of 1992. He weighed at 219 pounds onAugust complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL.
20, 1992 and 205 pounds on November 5, 1992.
Labor Arbiter, NLRC and CA Dispositions On October 8, 1999, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution directing the
reinstatement of petitioner without loss of seniority rights and other benefits. [20]
On November 18, 1998, Labor Arbiter Valentin C. Reyes ruled[13] that petitioner
was illegally dismissed. The dispositive part of the Arbiter ruling runs as follows: On February 1, 2000, the Labor Arbiter denied[21] the Motion to Quash Writ of
Execution[22] of PAL.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered, declaring the complainants dismissal illegal, and ordering the
respondent to reinstate him to his former position or substantially On March 6, 2000, PAL appealed the denial of its motion to quash to the
equivalent one, and to pay him:
NLRC.[23]
Just like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, the CA held that the weight standards
PAL moved for reconsideration to no avail.[29] Thus, PAL elevated the matter to of PAL are reasonable.[38] Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed because he repeatedly
the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of failed to meet the prescribed weight standards.[39] It is obvious that the issue of
Civil Procedure.[30] discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of escaping the result of his
dismissal for being overweight.[40]
By Decision dated August 31, 2004, the CA reversed[31] the NLRC:
On May 10, 2005, the CA denied petitioners motion for
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the
reconsideration.[41] Elaborating on its earlier ruling, the CA held that the weight
petition. The assailed NLRC decision is declared NULL and VOID and is
hereby SET ASIDE. The private respondents complaint is hereby standards of PAL are abona fide occupational qualification which, in case of violation,
DISMISSED. No costs.
justifies an employees separation from the service.[42]
SO ORDERED.[32]
Issues
The CA opined that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC
because it looked at wrong and irrelevant considerations [33] in evaluating the In this Rule 45 petition for review, the following issues are posed for resolution:
evidence of the parties. Contrary to the NLRC ruling, the weight standards of PAL are
I.
weight as prescribed by the weight standards. The dismissal of the employee would thus
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS OBESITY CAN BE A GROUND FOR fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. As explained by the CA:
DISMISSAL UNDER PARAGRAPH (e) OF ARTICLE 282 OF THE LABOR
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES;
x x x [T]he standards violated in this case were not mere orders of the
II. employer; they were the prescribed weights that a cabin crew must
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED maintain in order to qualify for and keep his or her position in the
IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS DISMISSAL FOR OBESITY CAN BE company. In other words, they were standards that
PREDICATED ON THE BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION establish continuing qualifications for an employees position. In this
(BFOQ) DEFENSE; sense, the failure to maintain these standards does not fall under
Article 282(a) whose express terms require the element of willfulness
III. in order to be a ground for dismissal. The failure to meet the
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN employers qualifying standards is in fact a ground that does not
HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT UNDULY DISCRIMINATED squarely fall under grounds (a) to (d) and is therefore one that falls
AGAINST WHEN HE WAS DISMISSED WHILE OTHER OVERWEIGHT under Article 282(e) the other causes analogous to the foregoing.
CABIN ATTENDANTS WERE EITHER GIVEN FLYING DUTIES OR
PROMOTED; By its nature, these qualifying standards are norms that apply prior to
and after an employee is hired. They apply prior to
IV. employment because these are the standards a job applicant must
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED initially meet in order to be hired. They apply after hiring because an
WHEN IT BRUSHED ASIDE PETITIONERS CLAIMS FOR employee must continue to meet these standards while on the job in
REINSTATEMENT [AND] WAGES ALLEGEDLY FOR BEING order to keep his job. Under this perspective, a violation is not one of
MOOT AND ACADEMIC.[43] (Underscoring supplied) the faults for which an employee can be dismissed pursuant to pars. (a)
to (d) of Article 282; the employee can be dismissed simply because he
no longer qualifies for his job irrespective of whether or not the failure
to qualify was willful or intentional. x x x[45]
Our Ruling
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that
Conscious of the fact that Naduras case cannot be made to
they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job.Tersely fall squarely within the specific causes enumerated in subparagraphs
1(a) to (e), Benguet invokes the provisions of subparagraph 1(f) and
put, an employee may be dismissed the moment he is unable to comply with his ideal
says that Naduras illness occasional attacks of asthma is a cause
analogous to them.
determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on December
Even a cursory reading of the legal provision under consideration is
sufficient to convince anyone that, as the trial court said, illness cannot 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that [t]he issue is could I bring my weight down to
be included as an analogous cause by any stretch of imagination.
ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it now.[49]
It is clear that, except the just cause mentioned in sub-paragraph 1(a),
all the others expressly enumerated in the law are due to the voluntary
and/or willful act of the employee. How Nadurasillness could be True, petitioner claims that reducing weight is costing him a lot of
considered as analogous to any of them is beyond our understanding, expenses.[50] However, petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed
there being no claim or pretense that the same was contracted through
his own voluntary act.[48] the assistance of the company physician, per the advice of PAL.[51] He chose to ignore the
suggestion. In fact, he repeatedly failed to report when required to undergo weight
The reliance on Nadura is off-tangent. The factual milieu in Nadura is substantially checks, without offering a valid explanation. Thus, his fluctuating weight indicates
different from the case at bar. First, Nadura was not decided under the Labor Code. The absence of willpower rather than an illness.
law applied in that case was Republic Act (RA) No. 1787. Second, the issue of flight safety
is absent in Nadura, thus, the rationale there cannot apply here.Third, in Nadura, the Petitioner cites Bonnie Cook v. State of Rhode Island, Department of Mental
employee who was a miner, was laid off from work because of illness, i.e., asthma. Here, Health, Retardation and Hospitals,[52] decided by the United States Court of Appeals (First
petitioner was dismissed for his failure to meet the weight standards of PAL. He was not Circuit). In that case, Cook worked from 1978 to 1980 and from 1981 to 1986 as an
dismissed due to illness. Fourth, the issue in Nadura is whether or not the dismissed institutional attendant for the mentally retarded at the Ladd Center that was being
employee is entitled to separation pay and damages. Here, the issue centers on the operated by respondent. She twice resigned voluntarily with an unblemished
propriety of the dismissal of petitioner for his failure to meet the weight standards record. Even respondent admitted that her performance met the Centers legitimate
of PAL. Fifth, in Nadura, the employee was not accorded due process. Here, petitioner expectations. In 1988, Cook re-applied for a similar position. At that time, she stood 52
was accorded utmost leniency. He was given more than four (4) years to comply with tall and weighed over 320 pounds. Respondent claimed that the morbid obesity of
the weight standards of PAL. plaintiff compromised her ability to evacuate patients in case of emergency and it also
put her at greater risk of serious diseases.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioners claims
that obesity is a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 Cook contended that the action of respondent amounted to discrimination on
clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the proper attitude, the basis of a handicap. This was in direct violation of Section 504(a) of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973,[53] which incorporates the remedies contained in Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Respondent claimed, however, that morbid obesity could influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes under
never constitute a handicap within the purview of the Rehabilitation Act. Among others, Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and
obesity is a mutable condition, thus plaintiff could simply lose weight and rid herself of habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the
concomitant disability. element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).[54]
The appellate Court disagreed and held that morbid obesity is a disability under II. The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide
the Rehabilitation Act and that respondent discriminated against Cook based on occupational qualification defense.
perceived disability. The evidence included expert testimony that morbid obesity is a
physiological disorder. It involves a dysfunction of both the metabolic system and the Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion,
neurological appetite suppressing signal system, which is capable of causing adverse or national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is
effects within the musculoskeletal, respiratory, and cardiovascular systems.Notably, the an actual qualification for performing the job. The qualification is called a bona fide
Court stated that mutability is relevant only in determining the substantiality of the occupational qualification (BFOQ).[55] In the United States, there are a few federal and
limitation flowing from a given impairment, thus mutability only precludes those many state job discrimination laws that contain an exception allowing an employer to
conditions that an individual can easily and quickly reverse by behavioral alteration. engage in an otherwise unlawful form of prohibited discrimination when the action is
based on a BFOQ necessary to the normal operation of a business or enterprise. [56]
Unlike Cook, however, petitioner is not morbidly obese. In the words of the Petitioner contends that BFOQ is a statutory defense. It does not exist if there is
District Court for the District of Rhode Island, Cook was sometime before 1978 at least no statute providing for it.[57] Further, there is no existing BFOQ statute that could justify
one hundred pounds more than what is considered appropriate of her height. According his dismissal.[58]
to the Circuit Judge, Cook weighed over 320 pounds in 1988. Clearly, that is not the case
Both arguments must fail.
here. At his heaviest, petitioner was only less than 50 pounds over his ideal weight.
First, the Constitution,[59] the Labor Code,[60] and RA No. 7277[61] or the
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his
Magna Carta for Disabled Persons[62] contain provisions similar to BFOQ.
work as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor
Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but
Second, in British Columbia Public Service Employee Commission (BSPSERC) v. The British
is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, [v]oluntarinessbasically means that
Columbia Government and Service Employees Union (BCGSEU),[63] the Supreme Court of
the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external force
Canada adopted the so-called Meiorin Test in determining whether an employment business and for reasons of public policy, is bound to observe extraordinary diligence for
policy is justified. Under this test, (1) the employer must show that it adopted the the safety of the passengers it transports.[74] It is bound to carry its passengers safely as
standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job; [64] (2) the far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary [65] to the persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.[75]
accomplishment of that work-related purpose; and (3) the employer must establish that
the standard is reasonably necessary in order to accomplish the legitimate work-related The law leaves no room for mistake or oversight on the part of a common
purpose. Similarly, in Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol,[66] this Court held that in order to carrier. Thus, it is only logical to hold that the weight standards of PAL show its effort to
justify a BFOQ, the employer must prove that (1) the employment qualification is comply with the exacting obligations imposed upon it by law by virtue of being a
reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and (2) that there is common carrier.
factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to
would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.[67] safely transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its
employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the
In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of
parallel to BFOQ.[68] BFOQ is valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably discipline upon its employees.
necessary for satisfactory job performance.[69]
In other words, the primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight
In Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWTO v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, standards for cabin crew is flight safety. It cannot be gainsaid that cabin attendants must
Inc.,[70] the Court did not hesitate to pass upon the validity of a company policy which maintain agility at all times in order to inspire passenger confidence on their ability to
prohibits its employees from marrying employees of a rival company. It was held that care for the passengers when something goes wrong. It is not farfetched to say that
the company policy is reasonable considering that its purpose is the protection of the airline companies, just like all common carriers, thrive due to public confidence on their
interests of the company against possible competitor infiltration on its trade secrets and safety records. People, especially the riding public, expect no less than that
procedures. airline companies transport their passengers to their respective destinations safely and
soundly. A lesser performance is unacceptable.
Verily, there is no merit to the argument that BFOQ cannot be applied if it has no
supporting statute. Too, the Labor Arbiter,[71] NLRC,[72] and CA[73] are one in holding that The task of a cabin crew or flight attendant is not limited to serving meals or
the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. A common carrier, from the nature of its attending to the whims and caprices of the passengers. The most important activity of
the cabin crew is to care for the safety of passengers and the evacuation of the aircraft evidence.[77] It would also be absurd to require airline companies to reconfigure the
when an emergency occurs. Passenger safety goes to the core of the job of a cabin aircraft in order to widen the aisles and exit doors just to accommodate overweight
attendant. Truly, airlines need cabin attendants who have the necessary strength to cabin attendants like petitioner.
open emergency doors, the agility to attend to passengers in cramped working
conditions, and the stamina to withstand grueling flight schedules. The biggest problem with an overweight cabin attendant is the possibility of
impeding passengers from evacuating the aircraft, should the occasion call for it. The job
On board an aircraft, the body weight and size of a cabin attendant are of a cabin attendant during emergencies is to speedily get the passengers out of the
important factors to consider in case of emergency. Aircrafts have constricted cabin aircraft safely. Being overweight necessarily impedes mobility. Indeed, in an emergency
space, and narrow aisles and exit doors. Thus, the arguments of respondent situation, seconds are what cabin attendants are dealing with, not minutes. Three lost
that [w]hether the airlines flight attendants are overweight or not has no direct relation seconds can translate into three lost lives. Evacuation might slow down just because a
to its mission of transporting passengers to their destination; and that the weight wide-bodied cabin attendant is blocking the narrow aisles. These possibilities are not
standards has nothing to do with airworthiness of respondents airlines, must fail. remote.
The rationale in Western Air Lines v. Criswell[76] relied upon by petitioner cannot Petitioner is also in estoppel. He does not dispute that the weight standards
apply to his case. What was involved there were two (2) airline pilots who were denied of PAL were made known to him prior to his employment. He is presumed to know the
reassignment as flight engineers upon reaching the age of 60, and a flight engineer who weight limit that he must maintain at all times. [78] In
was forced to retire at age 60. They sued the airline company, alleging that the age-60 fact, never did he question the authority of PAL when he was repeatedly asked to trim
retirement for flight engineers violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of down his weight. Bona fides exigit ut quod convenit fiat. Good faith demands that what is
1967. Age-based BFOQ and being overweight are not the same. The case of overweight agreed upon shall be
cabin attendants is another matter. Given the cramped cabin space and narrow aisles done. Kung ang tao ay tapat kanyang tutuparin ang napagkasunduan.
and emergency exit doors of the airplane, any overweight cabin attendant would
certainly have difficulty navigating the cramped cabin area. Too, the weight standards of PAL provide for separate weight limitations based
on height and body frame for both male and female cabin attendants. A progressive
In short, there is no need to individually evaluate their ability to perform their discipline is imposed to allow non-compliant cabin attendants sufficient opportunity to
task. That an obese cabin attendant occupies more space than a slim one is an meet the weight standards. Thus, the clear-cut rules obviate any
unquestionable fact which courts can judicially recognize without introduction of possibility for the commission of abuse or arbitrary action on the part of PAL.
treatment by PAL. In the words of the CA, PAL really had no substantial case of
III. Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he was discriminated discrimination to meet.[82]
against by PAL.
We are not unmindful that findings of facts of administrative agencies, like the
Petitioner next claims that PAL is using passenger safety as a convenient excuse Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, are accorded respect, even finality. [83] The reason is simple:
to discriminate against him.[79] We are constrained, however, to hold otherwise.We administrative agencies are experts in matters within their specific and specialized
agree with the CA that [t]he element of discrimination came into play in this case as a jurisdiction.[84] But the principle is not a hard and fast rule. It only applies if the findings
secondary position for the private respondent in order to escape the consequence of of facts are duly supported by substantial evidence. If it can be shown that
dismissal that being overweight entailed. It is a confession-and-avoidance position that administrative bodies grossly misappreciated evidence of such nature so as to compel a
impliedly admitted the cause of dismissal, including the reasonableness of the applicable conclusion to the contrary, their findings of facts must necessarily be reversed. Factual
standard and the private respondents failure to comply. [80] It is a basic rule in findings of administrative agencies do not have infallibility and must be set aside when
evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation.[81] they fail the test of arbitrariness.[85]
Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts an affirmative
allegation, petitioner has to prove his allegation with particularity. There is nothing on Here, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC inexplicably misappreciated evidence. We
the records which could support the finding of discriminatory treatment. Petitioner thus annul their findings.
cannot establish discrimination by simply naming the supposed cabin attendants who
are allegedly similarly situated with him. Substantial proof must be shown as to how and To make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the equal protection
why they are similarly situated and the differential treatment petitioner got clause guaranty[86] of the Constitution. However, in the absence of governmental
fromPAL despite the similarity of his situation with other employees. interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked. [87] Put
differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private
Indeed, except for pointing out the names of the supposed overweight cabin attendants, individuals.[88] Indeed, the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting the Fourteenth
petitioner miserably failed to indicate their respective ideal weights; weights over their Amendment,[89] which is the source of our equal protection guarantee, is consistent in
ideal weights; the periods they were allowed to fly despite their being overweight; the saying that the equal protection erects no shield against private conduct, however
particular flights assigned to them; the discriminating treatment they got from PAL; and discriminatory or wrongful.[90] Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate
other relevant data that could have adequately established a case of discriminatory the equal protection guarantee.[91]
IV. The claims of petitioner for reinstatement and wages are moot. Petitioner cannot take refuge in the pronouncements of the Court in a
case[97] that [t]he unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate the dismissed employee
As his last contention, petitioner avers that his claims for reinstatement and wages have entitles him to payment of his salaries effective from the time the employer failed to
not been mooted. He is entitled to reinstatement and his full backwages, from the time reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of execution[98] and even if the order of
he was illegally dismissed up to the time that the NLRC was reversed by the CA. [92] reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of
the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the employee during the period of appeal
At this point, Article 223 of the Labor Code finds relevance: until reversal by the higher court.[99] He failed to prove that he complied with the return
to work order of PAL. Neither does it appear on record that he actually rendered
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed
services for PAL from the moment he was dismissed, in order to insist on the payment of
or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is
concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The his full backwages.
employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms
and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the
option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of In insisting that he be reinstated to his actual position despite being overweight,
a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement
provided herein. petitioner in effect wants to render the issues in the present case moot. He asksPAL to
comply with the impossible. Time and again, the Court ruled that the law does not exact
The law is very clear. Although an award or order of reinstatement is self- compliance with the impossible.[100]
executory and does not require a writ of execution,[93] the option to exercise actual
reinstatement or payroll reinstatement belongs to the employer. It does not belong to V. Petitioner is entitled to separation pay.
Contrary to the allegation of petitioner that PAL did everything under the sun to
frustrate his immediate return to his previous position,[94] there is evidence Normally, a legally dismissed employee is not entitled to separation pay. This
thatPAL opted to physically reinstate him to a substantially equivalent position in may be deduced from the language of Article 279 of the Labor Code that [a]n employee
accordance with the order of the Labor Arbiter.[95] In fact, petitioner duly received the who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of
return to work notice on February 23, 2001, as shown by his signature.[96] seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances,
and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Luckily
for petitioner, this is not an ironclad rule.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION The evidence for the petitioners show that respondents Ronaldo D. Simbol (Simbol),
Wilfreda N. Comia (Comia) and Lorna E. Estrella (Estrella) were all regular employees of
STAR PAPER CORPORATION, G.R. No. 164774 the company.[1]
JOSEPHINE ONGSITCO & Simbol was employed by the company on October 27, 1993. He met Alma Dayrit, also an
SEBASTIAN CHUA, employee of the company, whom he married on June 27, 1998. Prior to the marriage,
Petitioners, Present:
Ongsitco advised the couple that should they decide to get married, one of them should
PUNO, J., Chairman, resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated in 1995,[2] viz.:
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, 1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has
CORONA, [a] relative, up to [the] 3rd degree of relationship, already employed by
AZCUNA, and the company.
-versus- GARCIA, JJ.
2. In case of two of our employees (both singles [sic],
Promulgated: one male and another female) developed a friendly relationship during
RONALDO D. SIMBOL, April 12, 2006 the course of their employment and then decided to get married, one of
WILFREDA N. COMIA & them should resign to preserve the policy stated above.[3]
LORNA E. ESTRELLA,
Respondents. Simbol resigned on June 20, 1998 pursuant to the company policy.[4]
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x Comia was hired by the company on February 5, 1997. She met Howard Comia, a co-
employee, whom she married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco likewise reminded them that
DECISION
pursuant to company policy, one must resign should they decide to get married. Comia
PUNO, J.: resigned on June 30, 2000.[5]
Estrella was hired on July 29, 1994. She met Luisito Zuiga (Zuiga), also a co-worker.
We are called to decide an issue of first impression: whether the policy of the employer Petitioners stated that Zuiga, a married man, got Estrella pregnant. The company
banning spouses from working in the same company violates the rights of the employee allegedly could have terminated her services due to immorality but she opted to resign
under the Constitution and the Labor Code or is a valid exercise of management on December 21, 1999.[6]
prerogative. The respondents each signed a Release and Confirmation Agreement. They stated
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of therein that they have no money and property accountabilities in the company and that
Appeals dated August 3, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73477 reversing the decision of the they release the latter of any claim or demand of whatever nature.[7]
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which affirmed the ruling of the Labor
Arbiter. Respondents offer a different version of their dismissal. Simbol and Comia allege that
Petitioner Star Paper Corporation (the company) is a corporation engaged in trading they did not resign voluntarily; they were compelled to resign in view of an illegal
principally of paper products. Josephine Ongsitco is its Manager of the Personnel and company policy. As to respondent Estrella, she alleges that she had a relationship with
Administration Department while Sebastian Chua is its Managing Director. co-worker Zuiga who misrepresented himself as a married but separated man. After he
got her pregnant, she discovered that he was not separated. Thus, she severed her Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC in a
relationship with him to avoid dismissal due to the company policy. OnNovember 30, Resolution[11] dated August 8, 2002. They appealed to respondent court viaPetition for
1999, she met an accident and was advised by the doctor at the Orthopedic Hospital to Certiorari.
recuperate for twenty-one (21) days. She returned to work onDecember 21, 1999 but In its assailed Decision dated August 3, 2004, the Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC
she found out that her name was on-hold at the gate. She was denied entry. She was decision, viz.:
directed to proceed to the personnel office where one of the staff handed her a WHEREFORE, premises considered, the May 31, 2002 (sic)[12] Decision
of the National Labor Relations Commission is hereby REVERSED and
memorandum. The memorandum stated that she was being dismissed for immoral
SET ASIDE and a new one is entered as follows:
conduct. She refused to sign the memorandum because she was on leave for twenty-one
(21) days and has not been given a chance to explain. The management asked her to (1) Declaring illegal, the petitioners dismissal from
write an explanation. However, after submission of the explanation, she was nonetheless employment and ordering private respondents to
reinstate petitioners to their former positions without
dismissed by the company. Due to her urgent need for money, she later submitted a loss of seniority rights with full backwages from the
letter of resignation in exchange for her thirteenth month pay.[8] time of their dismissal until actual reinstatement; and
Respondents later filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive dismissal,
(2) Ordering private respondents to pay petitioners
separation pay and attorneys fees. They averred that the aforementioned company
attorneys fees amounting to 10% of the award and the
policy is illegal and contravenes Article 136 of the Labor Code. They also contended that cost of this suit.[13]
they were dismissed due to their union membership. On appeal to this Court, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
On May 31, 2001, Labor Arbiter Melquiades Sol del Rosario dismissed the complaint for that:
lack of merit, viz.: 1. X X X THE SUBJECT 1995 POLICY/REGULATION IS VIOLATIVE OF
[T]his company policy was decreed pursuant to what the THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TOWARDS MARRIAGE AND THE
respondent corporation perceived as management prerogative. This FAMILY OF EMPLOYEES AND OF ARTICLE 136 OF THE LABOR CODE;
management prerogative is quite broad and encompassing for it covers AND
hiring, work assignment, working method, time, place and manner of 2. X X X RESPONDENTS RESIGNATIONS WERE FAR FROM
work, tools to be used, processes to be followed, supervision of VOLUNTARY.[14]
workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision,
lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. We affirm.
Except as provided for or limited by special law, an employer is free to
regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment all the aspects
of employment.[9] (Citations omitted.) The 1987 Constitution[15] states our policy towards the protection of labor
under the following provisions, viz.:
On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter
on January 11, 2002. [10]
Article II, Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social Respondents submit that their dismissal violates the above provision. Petitioners allege
economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their that its policy may appear to be contrary to Article 136 of the Labor Code but it assumes
welfare. a new meaning if read together with the first paragraph of the rule. The rule does not
xxx require the woman employee to resign. The employee spouses have the right to choose
Article XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local who between them should resign. Further, they are free to marry persons other than co-
and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employees. Hence, it is not the marital status of the employee,per se, that is being
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. discriminated. It is only intended to carry out its no-employment-for-relatives-within-
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, the-third-degree-policy which is within the ambit of the prerogatives of management.[16]
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted It is true that the policy of petitioners prohibiting close relatives from working in the
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They
same company takes the nature of an anti-nepotism employment policy. Companies
shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a
living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making adopt these policies to prevent the hiring of unqualified persons based on their status as
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. a relative, rather than upon their ability.[17] These policies focus upon the potential
employment problems arising from the perception of favoritism exhibited towards
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between
workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share relatives.
in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable With more women entering the workforce, employers are also enacting employment
returns on investments, and to expansion and growth. policies specifically prohibiting spouses from working for the same company. We note
that two types of employment policies involve spouses: policies banning only spouses
The Civil Code likewise protects labor with the following provisions: from working in the same company (no-spouse employment policies), and those
Art. 1700. The relation between capital and labor are not merely banning all immediate family members, including spouses, from working in the same
contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor company (anti-nepotism employment policies).[18]
contracts must yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are
subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining,
strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of Unlike in our jurisdiction where there is no express prohibition on marital
labor and similar subjects. discrimination,[19] there are twenty state statutes[20] in the United States prohibiting
Art. 1702. In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts
marital discrimination. Some state courts[21] have been confronted with the issue of
shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the
laborer. whether no-spouse policies violate their laws prohibiting both marital status and sex
discrimination.
The Labor Code is the most comprehensive piece of legislation protecting labor. The In challenging the anti-nepotism employment policies in the United States, complainants
case at bar involves Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides: utilize two theories of employment discrimination: the disparate treatment and
Art. 136. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition the disparate impact. Under the disparate treatment analysis, the plaintiff must
of employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee
shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon prove that an employment policy is discriminatory on its face. No-spouse employment
getting married a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or policies requiring an employee of a particular sex to either quit, transfer, or be fired are
separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise facially discriminatory. For example, an employment policy prohibiting the employer
prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.
from hiring wives of male employees, but not husbands of female employees, is qualification[29] invalidates a rule denying employment to one spouse due to the
discriminatory on its face.[22] current employment of the other spouse in the same office.[30] Thus, they rule that
On the other hand, to establish disparate impact, the complainants must prove that a unless the employer can prove that the reasonable demands of the business require a
facially neutral policy has a disproportionate effect on a particular class. For example, distinction based on marital status and there is no better available or acceptable policy
although most employment policies do not expressly indicate which spouse will be which would better accomplish the business purpose, an employer may not discriminate
required to transfer or leave the company, the policy often disproportionately affects against an employee based on the identity of the employees spouse. [31]This is known as
one sex.[23] the bona fide occupational qualification exception.
The state courts rulings on the issue depend on their interpretation of the scope of We note that since the finding of a bona fide occupational qualification justifies an
marital status discrimination within the meaning of their respective civil rights acts. employers no-spouse rule, the exception is interpreted strictly and narrowly by these
Though they agree that the term marital status encompasses discrimination based on a state courts. There must be a compelling business necessity for which no alternative
person's status as either married, single, divorced, or widowed, they are divided on exists other than the discriminatory practice.[32] To justify a bona fide occupational
whether the term has a broader meaning. Thus, their decisions vary.[24] qualification, the employer must prove two factors: (1) that the employment
The courts narrowly[25] interpreting marital status to refer only to a person's status as qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and, (2)
married, single, divorced, or widowed reason that if the legislature intended a broader that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the
definition it would have either chosen different language or specified its intent. They qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.[33]
hold that the relevant inquiry is if one is married rather than to whom one is The concept of a bona fide occupational qualification is not foreign in our jurisdiction.
married. They construe marital status discrimination to include only whether a person is We employ the standard of reasonableness of the company policy which is parallel to
single, married, divorced, or widowed and not the identity, occupation, and place of the bona fide occupational qualification requirement. In the recent case of Duncan
employment of one's spouse. These courts have upheld the questioned policies and Association of Detailman-PTGWO and
ruled that they did not violate the marital status discrimination provision of their Pedro Tecson v. GlaxoWellcome Philippines, Inc.,[34] we passed on the validity of the
respective state statutes. policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying employees
The courts that have broadly[26] construed the term marital status rule that it of any competitor company. We held that Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets,
encompassed the identity, occupation and employment of one's spouse. They strike manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs and
down the no-spouse employment policies based on the broad legislative intent of the information from competitors. We considered the prohibition against personal or
state statute. They reason that the no-spouse employment policy violate the marital marital relationships with employees of competitor companies
status provision because it arbitrarily discriminates against all spouses of present upon Glaxosemployees reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of
employees without regard to the actual effect on the individual's qualifications or work that nature might compromise the interests of Glaxo. In laying down the assailed
performance.[27] These courts also find the no-spouse employment policy invalid for company policy, we recognized that Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the
failure of the employer to present any evidence of business necessity other than the possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures. [35]
general perception that spouses in the same workplace might adversely affect the
business.[28] They hold that the absence of such a bona fide occupational
The requirement that a company policy must be reasonable under the The policy is premised on the mere fear that employees married to each other will be
circumstances to qualify as a valid exercise of management prerogative was also at issue less efficient. If we uphold the questioned rule without valid justification, the employer
in the 1997 case of Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company v. NLRC.[36] In said can create policies based on an unproven presumption of a perceived danger at the
case, the employee was dismissed in violation of petitioners policy of disqualifying from expense of an employees right to security of tenure.
work any woman worker who contracts marriage. We held that the company policy Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee
violates the right against discrimination afforded all women workers under Article 136
of the Labor Code, but established a permissible exception, viz.: marries a co-employee, but they are free to marry persons other than co-employees. The
[A] requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried could questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it creates a
be justified as a bona fide occupational qualification, or BFOQ, where
the particular requirements of the job would justify the same, but not disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only way it could
on the ground of a general principle, such as the desirability of pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory,
spreading work in the workplace. A requirement of that nature would
be valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably albeit disproportionate, effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business
necessary for satisfactory job performance.[37] (Emphases supplied.) concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the employees right to be
The cases of Duncan and PT&T instruct us that the requirement of free from arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working
reasonableness must be clearly established to uphold the questioned employment together in one company.[40]
policy. The employer has the burden to prove the existence of a reasonable business
Lastly, the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in
necessity. The burden was successfully discharged in Duncan but not in PT&T.
our jurisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners. The protection given to labor in our
We do not find a reasonable business necessity in the case at bar. jurisdiction is vast and extensive that we cannot prudently draw inferences from the
legislatures silence[41] that married persons are not protected under our Constitution
Petitioners sole contention that the company did not just want to have two (2)
or more of its employees related between the third degree by affinity and/or and declare valid a policy based on a prejudice or stereotype. Thus, for failure of
consanguinity[38] is lame. That the second paragraph was meant to give teeth to the first petitioners to present undisputed proof of a reasonable business necessity, we rule that
paragraph of the questioned rule[39] is evidently not the valid reasonable business
the questioned policy is an invalid exercise of management prerogative. Corollarily, the
necessity required by the law.
issue as to whether respondents Simbol and Comia resigned voluntarily has become
It is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired after they moot and academic.
were found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they married a co-employee.
As to respondent Estrella, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their ruling on
Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine
Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of the Repacking Section, could be the singular fact that her resignation letter was written in her own handwriting. Both
detrimental to its business operations. Neither did petitioners explain how this ruled that her resignation was voluntary and thus valid. The respondent court failed to
detriment will happen in the case of Wilfreda Comia, then a Production Helper in the
categorically rule whether Estrella voluntarily resigned but ordered that she be
Selecting Department, who married Howard Comia, then a helper in the cutter-machine.
reinstated along with Simbol and Comia.
Estrella claims that she was pressured to submit a resignation letter because
she was in dire need of money. We examined the records of the case and
findEstrellas contention to be more in accord with the evidence. While findings of fact by
administrative tribunals like the NLRC are generally given not only respect but, at times,
finality, this rule admits of exceptions,[42] as in the case at bar.
Estrella avers that she went back to work on December 21, 1999 but was
dismissed due to her alleged immoral conduct. At first, she did not want to sign the
termination papers but she was forced to tender her resignation letter in exchange for
her thirteenth month pay.
The contention of petitioners that Estrella was pressured to resign because she
got impregnated by a married man and she could not stand being looked upon or talked
about as immoral[43] is incredulous. If she really wanted to avoid embarrassment and
humiliation, she would not have gone back to work at all. Nor would she have filed a suit
for illegal dismissal and pleaded for reinstatement. We have held that in voluntary
resignation, the employee is compelled by personal reason(s) to dissociate himself from
employment. It is done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the
act of abandonment. [44] Thus, it is illogical for Estrella to resign and then file a complaint
for illegal dismissal. Given the lack of sufficient evidence on the part of petitioners that
the resignation was voluntary, Estrellasdismissal is declared illegal.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
73477 dated August 3, 2004 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.