G.R. No.

L-68053 May 7, 1990

LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ,petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT and JESUS YANES,
ESTELITA YANES, ANTONIO YANES, ROSARIO YANES, and ILUMINADO
YANES,respondents.
Francisco G. Banzon for petitioner.

Renecio R. Espiritu for private respondents.

FERNAN, C.J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorariseeking the reversal of: (a) the decision of the
Fourth Civil Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 31, 1983 in
AC-G.R. CV No. 56626 entitled "Jesus Yanes et al. v. Dr. Rodolfo Siason et al." affirming
the decision dated July 8, 1974 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
insofar as it ordered the petitioners to pay jointly and severally the private respondents
the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the
cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental and reversing the subject decision insofar
as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral
damages and attorney's fees, respectively and (b) the resolution of said appellate court
dated May 30, 1984, denying the motion for reconsideration of its decision.

The real properties involved are two parcels of land identified as Lot 773-A and Lot 773-
B which were originally known as Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros
Occidental. Lot 773, with an area of 156,549 square meters, was registered in the name of
the heirs of Aniceto Yanes under Original Certificate of Title No. RO-4858 (8804) issued
on October 9, 1917 by the Register of Deeds of Occidental Negros (Exh. A).
Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents,
Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private
respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child,
Jovita (Jovito) Alib. 1 ﾧ It is not clear why the latter is not included as a party in this case.

Aniceto left his children Lots 773 and 823. Teodora cultivated only three hectares of Lot
823 as she could not attend to the other portions of the two lots which had a total area of
around twenty-four hectares. The record does not show whether the children of Felipe
also cultivated some portions of the lots but it is established that Rufino and his children
left the province to settle in other places as a result of the outbreak of World War II.
According to Estelita, from the "Japanese time up to peace time", they did not visit the
parcels of land in question but "after liberation", when her brother went there to get their
share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santiago,
Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773. 2 ﾧ
It is on record that on May 19, 1938, Fortunato D. Santiago was issued Transfer Certificate of Title
No. RF 2694 (29797) covering Lot 773-A with an area of 37,818 square meters. 3 ﾧ TCT No. RF
2694 describes Lot 773-A as a portion of Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia and as
originally registered under OCT No. 8804.

The bigger portion of Lot 773 with an area of 118,831 square meters was also registered
in the name of Fortunato D. Santiago on September 6, 1938 Under TCT No. RT-2695
(28192 ). 4 ﾧ Said transfer certificate of title also contains a certification to the effect that
Lot 773-B was originally registered under OCT No. 8804.

On May 30, 1955, Santiago sold Lots 773-A and 773-B to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr. in
consideration of the sum of P7,000.00. 5 ﾧ Consequently, on February 20, 1956, TCT
Nos. T-19291 and T-19292 were issued in Fuentebella's name. 6 ﾧ

After Fuentebella's death and during the settlement of his estate, the administratrix
thereof (Arsenia R. Vda. de Fuentebella, his wife) filed in Special Proceedings No. 4373
in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, a motion requesting authority to sell
Lots 773-A and 773-B. 7 ﾧ By virtue of a court order granting said motion, 8 ﾧ on March
24, 1958, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez. 9
ﾧ Hence, on April 1, 1958 TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 covering Lots 773-A and 773-
B were respectively issued to Rosendo Alvarez. 10 ﾧ

Two years later or on May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother
Rufino, namely, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, filed in the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental a complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella,
Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership
and possession of Lots 773 and 823. They also prayed that an accounting of the produce
of the land from 1944 up to the filing of the complaint be made by the defendants, that
after court approval of said accounting, the share or money equivalent due the plaintiffs
be delivered to them, and that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs P500.00 as damages
in the form of attorney's fees. 11 ﾧ
During the pendency in court of said case or on November 13, 1961, Alvarez sold Lots 773-A, 773-B
and another lot for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason. 12 ﾧ Accordingly, TCT Nos. 30919 and
30920 were issued to Siason, 13 ﾧ who thereafter, declared the two lots in his name for
assessment purposes. 14 ﾧ

Meanwhile, on November 6, 1962, Jesus Yanes, in his own behalf and in behalf of the
other plaintiffs, and assisted by their counsel, filed a manifestation in Civil Case No. 5022
stating that the therein plaintiffs "renounce, forfeit and quitclaims (sic) any claim,
monetary or otherwise, against the defendant Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella in connection
with the above-entitled case." 15 ﾧ
On October 11, 1963, a decision was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in
Civil Case No. 5022, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered, ordering the defendant Rosendo Alvarez to reconvey to the
plaintiffs lots Nos. 773 and 823 of the Cadastral Survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, now covered
by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 in the name of said defendant, and
thereafter to deliver the possession of said lots to the plaintiffs. No special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 16 ﾧ
It will be noted that the above-mentioned manifestation of Jesus Yanes was not mentioned in the
aforesaid decision.
However, execution of said decision proved unsuccessful with respect to Lot 773. In his return of
service dated October 20, 1965, the sheriff stated that he discovered that Lot 773 had been subdivided
into Lots 773-A and 773-B; that they were "in the name" of Rodolfo Siason who had purchased them
from Alvarez, and that Lot 773 could not be delivered to the plaintiffs as Siason was "not a party per
writ of execution." 17 ﾧ
The execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 having met a hindrance, herein private
respondents (the Yaneses) filed on July 31, 1965, in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a
petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title and for a declaration of nullity of TCT Nos. T-
23165 and T-23166 issued to Rosendo Alvarez. 18 ﾧ Thereafter, the court required Rodolfo
Siason to produce the certificates of title covering Lots 773 and 823.

Expectedly, Siason filed a manifestation stating that he purchased Lots 773-A, 773-B and
658, not Lots 773 and 823, "in good faith and for a valuable consideration without any
knowledge of any lien or encumbrances against said properties"; that the decision in the
cadastral proceeding 19 ﾧ could not be enforced against him as he was not a party thereto;
and that the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 could neither be enforced against him not
only because he was not a party-litigant therein but also because it had long become final
and executory. 20 ﾧ Finding said manifestation to be well-founded, the cadastral court, in
its order of September 4, 1965, nullified its previous order requiring Siason to surrender
the certificates of title mentioned therein. 21 ﾧ

In 1968, the Yaneses filed an ex-partemotion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution
in Civil Case No. 5022. Siason opposed it. 22 ﾧ In its order of September 28, 1968 in
Civil Case No. 5022, the lower court, noting that the Yaneses had instituted another
action for the recovery of the land in question, ruled that at the judgment therein could
not be enforced against Siason as he was not a party in the case. 23 ﾧ

The action filed by the Yaneses on February 21, 1968 was for recovery of real property
with damages. 24 ﾧ Named defendants therein were Dr. Rodolfo Siason, Laura Alvarez,
Flora Alvarez, Raymundo Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. The
Yaneses prayed for the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-19291 and 19292 issued to Siason
(sic) for being null and void; the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of the
Yaneses "in accordance with the sheriffs return of service dated October 20, 1965;"
Siason's delivery of possession of Lot 773 to the Yaneses; and if, delivery thereof could
not be effected, or, if the issuance of a new title could not be made, that the Alvarez and
Siason jointly and severally pay the Yaneses the sum of P45,000.00. They also prayed
that Siason render an accounting of the fruits of Lot 773 from November 13, 1961 until
the filing of the complaint; and that the defendants jointly and severally pay the Yaneses
moral damages of P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00 plus attorney's fees
of P4, 000.00. 25 ﾧ

In his answer to the complaint, Siason alleged that the validity of his titles to Lots 773-A
and 773-B, having been passed upon by the court in its order of September 4, 1965, had
become res judicata and the Yaneses were estopped from questioning said order. 26 ﾧ On
their part, the Alvarez stated in their answer that the Yaneses' cause of action had been
"barred by res judicata, statute of limitation and estoppel." 27 ﾧ
In its decision of July 8, 1974, the lower court found that Rodolfo Siason, who purchased
the properties in question thru an agent as he was then in Mexico pursuing further
medical studies, was a buyer in good faith for a valuable consideration. Although the
Yaneses were negligent in their failure to place a notice of lis pendens "before the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental in order to protect their rights over the property
in question" in Civil Case No. 5022, equity demanded that they recover the actual value
of the land because the sale thereof executed between Alvarez and Siason was without
court approval. 28 ﾧ The dispositive portion of the decision states:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, judgment is hereby rendered in

the following manner:
A. The case against the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason and the Register of Deeds are (sic) hereby
dismmissed,
B. The defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez being the legitimate children of
the deceased Rosendo Alvarez are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the sum of
P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre, Negros
Occidental; the sum of P2,000.00 as actual damages suffered by the plaintiff; the sum of P5,000.00
representing moral damages and the sum of P2.000 as attorney's fees, all with legal rate of interest
from date of the filing of this complaint up to final payment.
C. The cross-claim filed by the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason against the defendants, Laura, Flora and
Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez is hereby dismissed.
D. Defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez are hereby ordered to pay the costs
of this suit.
SO ORDERED. 29 ﾧ

The Alvarez appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which in its decision of
August 31, 1983 30 ﾧ affirmed the lower court's decision "insofar as it ordered
defendants-appellants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs-appellees the sum of
P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral
survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it awarded the sums of
P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages and attorney's
fees, respectively." 31 ﾧ The dispositive portion of said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed insofar as it ordered defendants-

appellants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs- appellees the sum of P20,000.00
representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of
Murcia, Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00,
P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages and attorney's fees,
respectively. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 32 ﾧ

Finding no cogent reason to grant appellants motion for reconsideration, said appellate
court denied the same.
Hence, the instant petition. ln their memorandum petitioners raised the following issues:
1. Whethere or not the defense of prescription and estoppel had been timely and properly invoked and
raised by the petitioners in the lower court.
2. Whether or not the cause and/or causes of action of the private respondents, if ever there are any, as
alleged in their complaint dated February 21, 1968 which has been docketed in the trial court as Civil
Case No. 8474 supra, are forever barred by statute of limitation and/or prescription of action and
estoppel.
3. Whether or not the late Rosendo Alvarez, a defendant in Civil Case No. 5022, supra and father of
the petitioners become a privy and/or party to the waiver (Exhibit 4-defendant Siason) in Civil Case
No. 8474, suprawhere the private respondents had unqualifiedly and absolutely waived, renounced
and quitclaimed all their alleged rights and interests, if ever there is any, on Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-
B of Murcia Cadastre as appearing in their written manifestation dated November 6, 1962 (Exhibits
"4" Siason) which had not been controverted or even impliedly or indirectly denied by them.
4. Whether or not the liability or liabilities of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos. 773-
A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre to Dr. Rodolfo Siason, if ever there is any, could be legally passed or
transmitted by operations (sic) of law to the petitioners without violation of law and due process . 33 ﾧ
The petition is devoid of merit.
As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, it is powerless and for that matter so is the Supreme Court,
to review the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 ordering Alvarez to reconvey the lots in dispute to
herein private respondents. Said decision had long become final and executory and with the possible
exception of Dr. Siason, who was not a party to said case, the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 is the
law of the case between the parties thereto. It ended when Alvarez or his heirs failed to appeal the
decision against them. 34 ﾧ
Thus, it is axiomatic that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and
those in privity with them in law or estate. 35 ﾧ As consistently ruled by this Court, every
litigation must come to an end. Access to the court is guaranteed. But there must be a
limit to it. Once a litigant's right has been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a
competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled license to return for another try.
The prevailing party should not be harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless litigation
were to be allowed, unscrupulous litigations will multiply in number to the detriment of
the administration of justice. 36 ﾧ

There is no dispute that the rights of the Yaneses to the properties in question have been
finally adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022. As found by the lower court, from the
uncontroverted evidence presented, the Yaneses have been illegally deprived of
ownership and possession of the lots in question. 37 ﾧ In fact, Civil Case No. 8474 now
under review, arose from the failure to execute Civil Case No. 5022, as subject lots can
no longer be reconveyed to private respondents Yaneses, the same having been sold
during the pendency of the case by the petitioners' father to Dr. Siason who did not know
about the controversy, there being no lis pendens annotated on the titles. Hence, it was
also settled beyond question that Dr. Siason is a purchaser in good faith.

Under the circumstances, the trial court did not annul the sale executed by Alvarez in
favor of Dr. Siason on November 11, 1961 but in fact sustained it. The trial court ordered
the heirs of Rosendo Alvarez who lost in Civil Case No. 5022 to pay the plaintiffs
(private respondents herein) the amount of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of
the subdivided lots in dispute. It did not order defendant Siason to pay said amount. 38 ﾧ
As to the propriety of the present case, it has long been established that the sole remedy of the
landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is to bring
an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into
the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages. 39 ﾧ "It is one thing to protect an
innocent third party; it is entirely a different matter and one devoid of justification if
deceit would be rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his nefarious
decided As clearly revealed by the undeviating line of decisions coming from this Court,
such an undesirable eventuality is precisely sought to be guarded against." 40 ﾧ

The issue on the right to the properties in litigation having been finally adjudicated in
Civil Case No. 5022 in favor of private respondents, it cannot now be reopened in the
instant case on the pretext that the defenses of prescription and estoppel have not been
properly considered by the lower court. Petitioners could have appealed in the former
case but they did not. They have therefore foreclosed their rights, if any, and they cannot
now be heard to complain in another case in order to defeat the enforcement of a
judgment which has longing become final and executory.
Petitioners further contend that the liability arising from the sale of Lots No. 773-A and 773-B made
by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or
of his estate, after his death.
Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction on the general
transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. Thus,
the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to
the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or
others either by his will or by operation of law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by his death.
Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs except in case where
the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property received from
the decedent.
As explained by this Court through Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the case of Estate of Hemady vs.
Luzon Surety Co., Inc.41 ﾧ
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision of
our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before
the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus
made from the state is ultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the paid
claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive.
Under our law, therefore. the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations are
transmissible to the successors.
The rule is a consequence of the progressive "depersonalization" of patrimonial rights and duties that,
as observed by Victorio Polacco has characterized the history of these institutions. From the Roman
concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony
to patrimony with the persons occupying only a representative position, barring those rare cases where
the obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of its
performance by a specific person and by no other.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences of
their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages. That petitioners did not
inherit the property involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent
thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary
assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate. 42 ﾧ
It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their
inheritance. With this clarification and considering petitioners' admission that there are other
properties left by the deceased which are sufficient to cover the amount adjudged in favor of private
respondents, we see no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, subject to the clarification herein above stated, the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 82027 March 29, 1990

ROMARICO G. VITUG,petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ROWENA FAUSTINO-
CORONA,respondents.
Rufino B. Javier Law Office for petitioner.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:
This case is a chapter in an earlier suit decided by this Court 1 ﾧ involving the probate of the two wills
of the late Dolores Luchangco Vitug, who died in New York, U. S.A., on November 10, 1980, naming
private respondent Rowena Faustino-Corona executrix. In our said decision, we upheld the
appointment of Nenita Alonte as co-special administrator of Mrs. Vitug's estate with her (Mrs. Vitug's)
widower, petitioner Romarico G. Vitug, pending probate.
On January 13, 1985, Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from the probate court to
sell certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to the estate to cover allegedly his advances
to the estate in the sum of P667,731.66, plus interests, which he claimed were personal funds. As
found by the Court of Appeals, 2 ﾧ the alleged advances consisted of P58,147.40 spent for the
payment of estate tax, P518,834.27 as deficiency estate tax, and P90,749.99 as "increment thereto." 3
ﾧ According to Mr. Vitug, he withdrew the sums of P518,834.27 and P90,749.99 from
savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America, Makati, Metro Manila.
On April 12, 1985, Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that the
same funds withdrawn from savings account No. 35342-038 were conjugal partnership
properties and part of the estate, and hence, there was allegedly no ground for
reimbursement. She also sought his ouster for failure to include the sums in question for
inventory and for "concealment of funds belonging to the estate." 4 ﾧ
Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the same
through a survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank on June 19,
1970. The agreement provides:
We hereby agree with each other and with the BANK OF AMERICAN NATIONAL TRUST AND
SAVINGS ASSOCIATION (hereinafter referred to as the BANK), that all money now or hereafter
deposited by us or any or either of us with the BANK in our joint savings current account shall be the
property of all or both of us and shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by either or any of
us during our lifetime, and after the death of either or any of us shall belong to and be the sole
property of the survivor or survivors, and shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by such
survivor or survivors.
We further agree with each other and the BANK that the receipt or check of either, any or all of us
during our lifetime, or the receipt or check of the survivor or survivors, for any payment or withdrawal
made for our above-mentioned account shall be valid and sufficient release and discharge of the
BANK for such payment or withdrawal. 5 ﾧ
The trial courts 6 ﾧ upheld the validity of this agreement and granted "the motion to sell some of the
estate of Dolores L. Vitug, the proceeds of which shall be used to pay the personal funds of Romarico
Vitug in the total sum of P667,731.66 ... ." 7 ﾧ
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, in the petition for certiorari filed by the herein private
respondent, held that the above-quoted survivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa
which "did not comply with the formalities of a valid will as prescribed by Article 805 of the Civil
Code," 8 ﾧ and secondly, assuming that it is a mere donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation
under the provisions of Article 133 of the Civil Code. 9 ﾧ
The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent Judge dated November 26, 1985 (Annex II, petition) is hereby
set aside insofar as it granted private respondent's motion to sell certain properties of the estate of
Dolores L. Vitug for reimbursement of his alleged advances to the estate, but the same order is
sustained in all other respects. In addition, respondent Judge is directed to include provisionally the
deposits in Savings Account No. 35342-038 with the Bank of America, Makati, in the inventory of
actual properties possessed by the spouses at the time of the decedent's death. With costs against
private respondent. 10 ﾧ
In his petition, Vitug, the surviving spouse, assails the appellate court's ruling on the strength of our
decisions in Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust Co. 11 ﾧ and Macam v. Gatmaitan 12 ﾧ in which we
sustained the validity of "survivorship agreements" and considering them as aleatory
contracts. 13 ﾧ
The petition is meritorious.
The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa, which should be embodied in a
will. A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated
person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after his
death." 14 ﾧ In other words, the bequest or device must pertain to the testator. 15 ﾧ In this case, the
monies subject of savings account No. 35342-038 were in the nature of conjugal funds In the case
relied on, Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust Co., 16 ﾧ we rejected claims that a survivorship
agreement purports to deliver one party's separate properties in favor of the other, but simply, their
joint holdings:
xxx xxx xxx
... Such conclusion is evidently predicated on the assumption that Stephenson was the exclusive owner
of the funds-deposited in the bank, which assumption was in turn based on the facts (1) that the
account was originally opened in the name of Stephenson alone and (2) that Ana Rivera "served only
as housemaid of the deceased." But it not infrequently happens that a person deposits money in the
bank in the name of another; and in the instant case it also appears that Ana Rivera served her master
for about nineteen years without actually receiving her salary from him. The fact that subsequently
Stephenson transferred the account to the name of himself and/or Ana Rivera and executed with the
latter the survivorship agreement in question although there was no relation of kinship between them
but only that of master and servant, nullifies the assumption that Stephenson was the exclusive owner
of the bank account. In the absence, then, of clear proof to the contrary, we must give full faith and
credit to the certificate of deposit which recites in effect that the funds in question belonged to Edgar
Stephenson and Ana Rivera; that they were joint (and several) owners thereof; and that either of them
could withdraw any part or the whole of said account during the lifetime of both, and the balance, if
any, upon the death of either, belonged to the survivor. 17 ﾧ
xxx xxx xxx
In Macam v. Gatmaitan, 18 ﾧ it was held:
xxx xxx xxx
This Court is of the opinion that Exhibit C is an aleatory contract whereby, according to article 1790 of
the Civil Code, one of the parties or both reciprocally bind themselves to give or do something as an
equivalent for that which the other party is to give or do in case of the occurrence of an event which is
uncertain or will happen at an indeterminate time. As already stated, Leonarda was the owner of the
house and Juana of the Buick automobile and most of the furniture. By virtue of Exhibit C, Juana
would become the owner of the house in case Leonarda died first, and Leonarda would become the
owner of the automobile and the furniture if Juana were to die first. In this manner Leonarda and
Juana reciprocally assigned their respective property to one another conditioned upon who might die
first, the time of death determining the event upon which the acquisition of such right by the one or the
other depended. This contract, as any other contract, is binding upon the parties thereto. Inasmuch as
Leonarda had died before Juana, the latter thereupon acquired the ownership of the house, in the same
manner as Leonarda would have acquired the ownership of the automobile and of the furniture if
Juana had died first. 19 ﾧ
xxx xxx xxx
There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence it must be presumed
to be conjugal, having been acquired during the existence of the marita. relations. 20 ﾧ
Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons, because it was to
take effect after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a donation between the spouses because it
involved no conveyance of a spouse's own properties to the other.
It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no modification petition of the conjugal partnership,
as held by the Court of Appeals, 21 ﾧ by "mere stipulation" 22 ﾧ and that it is no "cloak" 23 ﾧ to
circumvent the law on conjugal property relations. Certainly, the spouses are not prohibited by law to
invest conjugal property, say, by way of a joint and several bank account, more commonly
denominated in banking parlance as an "and/or" account. In the case at bar, when the spouses Vitug
opened savings account No. 35342-038, they merely put what rightfully belonged to them in a money-
making venture. They did not dispose of it in favor of the other, which would have arguably been
sanctionable as a prohibited donation. And since the funds were conjugal, it can not be said that one
spouse could have pressured the other in placing his or her deposits in the money pool.
The validity of the contract seems debatable by reason of its "survivor-take-all" feature, but in reality,
that contract imposed a mere obligation with a term, the term being death. Such agreements are
permitted by the Civil Code. 24 ﾧ
Under Article 2010 of the Code:
ART. 2010. By an aleatory contract, one of the parties or both reciprocally bind themselves to give or
to do something in consideration of what the other shall give or do upon the happening of an event
which is uncertain, or which is to occur at an indeterminate time.
Under the aforequoted provision, the fulfillment of an aleatory contract depends on either the
happening of an event which is (1) "uncertain," (2) "which is to occur at an indeterminate time." A
survivorship agreement, the sale of a sweepstake ticket, a transaction stipulating on the value of
currency, and insurance have been held to fall under the first category, while a contract for life annuity
or pension under Article 2021, et sequentia, has been categorized under the second. 25 ﾧ In either
case, the element of risk is present. In the case at bar, the risk was the death of one party and
survivorship of the other.
However, as we have warned:
xxx xxx xxx
But although the survivorship agreement is per se not contrary to law its operation or effect may be
violative of the law. For instance, if it be shown in a given case that such agreement is a mere cloak to
hide an inofficious donation, to transfer property in fraud of creditors, or to defeat the legitime of a
forced heir, it may be assailed and annulled upon such grounds. No such vice has been imputed and
established against the agreement involved in this case. 26 ﾧ
xxx xxx xxx
There is no demonstration here that the survivorship agreement had been executed for such unlawful
purposes, or, as held by the respondent court, in order to frustrate our laws on wills, donations, and
conjugal partnership.
The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having predeceased her husband, the latter
has acquired upon her death a vested right over the amounts under savings account No. 35342-038 of
the Bank of America. Insofar as the respondent court ordered their inclusion in the inventory of assets
left by Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court was in error. Being the separate property of petitioner, it
forms no more part of the estate of the deceased.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court, dated June 29, 1987, and its resolution,
dated February 9, 1988, are SET ASIDE.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-7188 August 9, 1954
In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.
SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
Manuel A. Zosa, Luis B. Ladonga, Mariano A. Zosa and B. G. Advincula for appellants.
C. de la Victoria for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a document
purporting to be his Last Will and Testament now marked Exhibit "A". Resident of the City of Cebu,
he died on January 14, 1943, in the municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an evacuee. He
left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the
legatees in Exhibit "A", filed a petition for its probate in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some
cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed opposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without
contradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote out in
longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish which the testator spoke and understood; that he (testator) signed on
he left hand margin of the front page of each of the three folios or sheets of which the document is
composed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of his
writing at the last page, all this, in the presence of the three attesting witnesses after telling that it was
his last will and that the said three witnesses signed their names on the last page after the attestation
clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The oppositors did not submit any evidence.
The learned trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be a holographic will; that it was in the
handwriting of the testator and that although at the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's
death, holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when
the case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the
execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator which
according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may override any defect in form, said trial
court by order dated January 24, 1952, admitted to probate Exhibit "A", as the Last Will and
Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors are appealing from that decision; and because
only questions of law are involved in the appeal, the case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals.
The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides that a person may
execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated and signed by the testator himself and
need not be witnessed. It is a fact, however, that at the time that Exhibit "A" was executed in 1923 and
at the time that Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted, and the law at the
time imposed certain requirements for the execution of wills, such as numbering correlatively each
page (not folio or sheet) in letters and signing on the left hand margin by the testator and by the three
attesting witnesses, requirements which were not complied with in Exhibit "A" because the back pages
of the first two folios of the will were not signed by any one, not even by the testator and were not
numbered, and as to the three front pages, they were signed only by the testator.
Interpreting and applying this requirement this Court in the case of In re Estate of Saguinsin, 41 Phil.,
875, 879, referring to the failure of the testator and his witnesses to sign on the left hand margin of
every page, said:
. . . . This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is not enough that the signatures
guaranteeing authenticity should appear upon two folios or leaves; three pages having been written on,
the authenticity of all three of them should be guaranteed by the signature of the alleged testatrix and
her witnesses.
And in the case of Aspe vs. Prieto, 46 Phil., 700, referring to the same requirement, this Court
declared:
From an examination of the document in question, it appears that the left margins of the six pages of
the document are signed only by Ventura Prieto. The noncompliance with section 2 of Act No. 2645
by the attesting witnesses who omitted to sign with the testator at the left margin of each of the five
pages of the document alleged to be the will of Ventura Prieto, is a fatal defect that constitutes an
obstacle to its probate.
What is the law to apply to the probate of Exh. "A"? May we apply the provisions of the new Civil
Code which not allows holographic wills, like Exhibit "A" which provisions were invoked by the
appellee-petitioner and applied by the lower court? But article 795 of this same new Civil Code
expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in
force at the time it is made." The above provision is but an expression or statement of the weight of
authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the
testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the petition is
decided by the court but at the time the instrument was executed. One reason in support of the rule is
that although the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about
the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the
time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. This
ruling has been laid down by this court in the case of In re Will of Riosa, 39 Phil., 23. It is a
wholesome doctrine and should be followed.
Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator should be the ruling and controlling factor
and that all adequate remedies and interpretations should be resorted to in order to carry out said
intention, and that when statutes passed after the execution of the will and after the death of the
testator lessen the formalities required by law for the execution of wills, said subsequent statutes
should be applied so as to validate wills defectively executed according to the law in force at the time
of execution. However, we should not forget that from the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves
a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it becomes a vested right, protected under the due
process clause of the constitution against a subsequent change in the statute adding new legal
requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning, when
one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at the time
of its execution then upon his death he should be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and
his heirs will then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal
requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate
a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate succession.
The general rule is that the Legislature can not validate void wills (57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 231, pp.
192-193).
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and Exhibit "A" is denied probate. With
costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and
Reyes J.B.L., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-46364 April 6, 1990

SULPICIA JIMENEZ and TORIBIO MATIAS,petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE FERNANDEZ alias HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ and TEODORA
GRADO,respondents.
Antonio E. Bengzon III for petitioners.
Agustin U. Cruz for private respondents.

PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari of the following Decision 1 ﾧ and Resolution 2 ﾧ of
the Honorable Court of Appeals: (1) Decision, dated March 1, 1977 in C.A.-G.R. No. 49178-R entitled
"Sulpicia Jimenez, et al., v. Vicente Fernandez, et al." affirming in toto the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, Third Judicial District in Civil Case No. 14802-I between the same
parties and (2) Resolution dated June 3, 1977 denying plaintiffs-appellants' motion for reconsideration.
As gathered from the records, the factual background of this case is as follows:
The land in question is the Eastern portion with an area of Four Hundred Thirty Six (436) square
meters of that parcel of residential land situated in Barrio Dulig (now Magsaysay), Municipality of
Labrador, Pangasinan actually covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 82275 (Exhibit A) issued in
the name of Sulpicia Jimenez.
The entire parcel of land with an area of 2,932 square meters, formerly belonged to Fermin Jimenez.
Fermin Jimenez has two (2) sons named Fortunato and Carlos Jimenez. This Fortunato Jimenez who
predeceased his father has only one child, the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez. After the death of Fermin
Jimenez, the entire parcel of land was registered under Act 496 in the name of Carlos Jimenez and
Sulpicia Jimenez (uncle and niece) in equal shares pro-indiviso. As a result of the registration case
Original Certificate of Title No. 50933 (Exhibit 8) was issued on February 28, 1933, in the names of
Carlos Jimenez and Sulpicia Jimenez, in equal shares pro-indiviso.
Carlos Jimenez died on July 9, 1936 and his illegitimate daughter, Melecia Cayabyab, also known as
Melecia Jimenez, took possession of the eastern portion of the property consisting of 436 square
meters.
On January 20, 1944, Melecia Jimenez sold said 436 square meter-portion of the property to Edilberto
Cagampan and defendant Teodora Grado executed a contract entitled "Exchange of Real Properties"
whereby the former transferred said 436 square meter-portion to the latter, who has been in occupation
since.
On August 29, 1969, plaintiff Sulpicia Jimenez executed an affidavit adjudicating unto herself the
other half of the property appertaining to Carlos Jimenez, upon manifestation that she is the only heir
of her deceased uncle. Consequently Transfer Certificate of Title No. 82275 was issued on October 1,
1969 in petitioner's name alone over the entire 2,932 square meter property.
On April 1, 1970, Sulpicia Jimenez, joined by her husband, instituted the present action for the
recovery of the eastern portion of the property consisting of 436 square meters occupied by defendant
Teodora Grado and her son.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint and holding the defendant,
Teodora Grado, the absolute owner of the land in question; ordering the plaintiffs to pay to the
defendant the amount of P500.00 as damages, as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 20)
Petitioner appealed the above judgment to the respondent Court of Appeals and on March 1, 1977,
respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the same in toto. Said decision was
rendered by a special division of five (5) justices, with the Hon. Lourdes San Diego, dissenting.
Petitioners within the reglementary period granted by the Honorable Court of Appeals, filed therewith
a motion for reconsideration. But said motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals
in its resolution dated June 3, 1977.
In their appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals from the aforequoted decision of the trial court,
herein petitioner raised the following assignments of error to wit:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALSO
KNOWN AS MELECIA JIMENEZ, IS NOT THE DAUGHTER OF CARLOS JIMENEZ.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALSO
KNOWN AS MELECIA JIMENEZ, HAS NO RIGHT TO SELL THE LAND IN QUESTION TO
EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN DID NOT
BECOME THE OWNER OF THE LAND IN QUESTION BY VIRTUE OF THE DEED OF SALE
(EXH. "1") EXECUTED BY MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALIAS MELECIA JIMENEZ, IN HIS
FAVOR.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT TEODORA GRADO DID NOT
BECOME THE OWNER OF THE LAND IN QUESTION BY VIRTUE OF THE DEED OF
EXCHANGE (EXH. "7") EXECUTED BY HER AND EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN.
 V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE TITLE OF APPELLANT
SULPICIA JIMENEZ OVER THE LAND IN QUESTION CAN NOT BE DEFEATED BY THE
ADVERSE OPEN AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF APPELLEE TEODORA GRADO.
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE APPELLEE TEODORA GRADO IS
THE ABSOLUTE OWNER OF THE LAND IN QUESTION IN THE LIGHT OF THE DECISION
OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF LOURDES ARCUINO, ET AL., V. RUFINA
APARIS AND CASIANO PURAY, G.R. NO. L-23424, PROMULGATED JANUARY 31, 1968,
WHICH CASE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
VII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND ORDERING THE
APPELLANTS TO PAY THE APPELLEES THE SUM OF P500.00 AS ATTORNEYS FEES PLUS
THE COSTS.
From the foregoing, this petition for review was filed.
We find merit in the petition.
From the start the respondent court erred in not declaring that Melecia Jimenez Cayabyab also known
as Melecia Jimenez, is not the daughter of Carlos Jimenez and therefore, had no right over the
property in question. Respondents failed to present concrete evidence to prove that Melecia Cayabyab
was really the daughter of Carlos Jimenez. Nonetheless, assuming for the sake of argument that
Melecia Cayabyab was the illegitimate daughter of Carlos Jimenez there can be no question that
Melecia Cayabyab had no right to succeed to the estate of Carlos Jimenez and could not have validly
acquired, nor legally transferred to Edilberto Cagampan that portion of the property subject of this
petition.
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment
of the death of the decedent (Art. 777, Civil Code). Moreover, Art. 2263 of the Civil Code provides as
follows:
Rights to the inheritance of a person who died with or without a will, before the effectivity of this
Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of
Court . . . (Rollo, p. 17)
Thus, since Carlos Jimenez, owner of one-half pro-indiviso portion of that parcel of land then covered
by Original Certificate of title No. 50933, died on July 9, 1936 (Exhibit "F") way before the effectivity
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the successional rights pertaining to his estate must be determined
in accordance with the Civil Code of 1889.
Citing the case of Cid v. Burnaman (24 SCRA 434) wherein this Court categorically held that:
To be an heir under the rules of Civil Code of 1889 (which was the law in force when Carlos Jimenez
died and which should be the governing law in so far as the right to inherit from his estate was
concerned), a child must be either a child legitimate, legitimated, or adopted, or else an acknowledged
natural child — for illegitimate not natural are disqualified to inherit. (Civil Code of 1889, Art. 807,
935)
Even assuming that Melecia Cayabyab was born out of the common-law-relationship between her
mother (Maria Cayabyab) and Carlos Jimenez, she could not even be considered an acknowledged
natural child because Carlos Jimenez was then legally married to Susana Abalos and therefore not
qualified to marry Maria Cayabyab and consequently Melecia Cayabyab was an illegitimate spurious
child and not entitled to any successional rights in so far as the estate of Carlos Jimenez was
concerned.
Melecia Cayabyab in the absence of any voluntary conveyance to her by Carlos Jimenez or Sulpicia
Jimenez of the litigated portion of the land could not even legally transfer the parcel of land to
Edilberto Cagampan who accordingly, could not also legally transfer the same to herein private
respondents.
Analyzing the case before Us in this manner, We can immediately discern another error in the decision
of the respondent court, which is that the said court sustained and made applicable to the case at bar
the ruling in the case of Arcuino, et al., v. Aparis and Puray, No. L-23424, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA
407, wherein We held that:
. . . it is true that the lands registered under the Torrens System may not be acquired by prescription
but plaintiffs herein are not the registered owners. They merely claim to have acquired by succession,
their alleged title or interest in lot No. 355. At any rate plaintiffs herein are guilty of laches.
The respondent court relying on the Arcuino case, concluded that respondents had acquired the
property under litigation by prescription. We cannot agree with such conclusion, because there is one
very marked and important difference between the case at bar and that of the Arcuino case, and that is,
that since 1933 petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez was a title holder, the property then being registered in her
and her uncle Carlos Jimenez' name. In the Arcuino case, this Supreme Court held. "(I)t is true that
lands registered under the Torrens System may not be acquired by prescription but plaintiffs herein are
not the registered owners." (Rollo, p. 38) Even in the said cited case the principle of imprescriptibility
of Torrens Titles was respected.
Melecia Cayabyab's possession or of her predecessors-in-interest would be unavailing against the
petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez who was the holder pro-indiviso with Carlos Jimenez of the Torrens
Certificate of Title covering a tract of land which includes the portion now in question, from February
28, 1933, when the Original Certificate of Title No. 50933 (Exhibit 8) was issued.
No possession by any person of any portion of the land covered by said original certificate of titles,
could defeat the title of the registered owner of the land covered by the certificate of title. (Benin v.
Tuason, L-26127, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531)
Sulpicia's title over her one-half undivided property remained good and continued to be good when
she segregated it into a new title (T.C.T No. 82275, Exhibit "A") in 1969. Sulpicia's ownership over
her one-half of the land and which is the land in dispute was always covered by a Torrens title, and
therefore, no amount of possession thereof by the respondents, could ever defeat her proprietary rights
thereon. It is apparent, that the right of plaintiff (now petitioner) to institute this action to recover
possession of the portion of the land in question based on the Torrens Title of Sulpicia Jimenez, T.C.T.
No. 82275 (Exhibit "A") is imprescriptible and not barred under the doctrine of laches. (J.M. Tuason
& Co. v. Macalindong, L-15398, December 29, 1962, Francisco v. Cruz, et al., 43 O.G. 5105) Rollo, p.
39)
The respondent Court of Appeals declared the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez guilty of laches and citing
the ruling in the case of Heirs of Lacamen v. Heirs of Laruan (65 SCRA 605), held that, since
petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez executed her Affidavit of Self-Adjudication only in 1969, she lost the right
to recover possession of the parcel of land subject of the litigation.
In this instance, again We rule for the petitioner. There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches
or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances. The
question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and since laches is an equitable
doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice
or to perpetrate fraud and injustice. It would be rank injustice and patently inequitous to deprive the
lawful heirs of their rightful inheritance.
Petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez is entitled to the relief prayed for, declaring her to be the sole and absolute
owner of the land in question with right to its possession and enjoyment. Since her uncle Carlos
Jimenez died in 1936, his pro-indiviso share in the properties then owned in co-ownership with his
niece Sulpicia descended by intestacy to Sulpicia Jimenez alone because Carlos died without any issue
or other heirs.
After all, the professed objective of Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act or the
law which established the Torrens System of Land Registration in the Philippines is that the stability
of the landholding system in the Philippines depends on the confidence of the people in the titles
covering the properties. And to this end, this Court has invariably upheld the indefeasibility of the
Torrens Title and in, among others, J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Macalindong (6 SCRA 938), held that
"the right of the appellee to file an action to recover possession based on its Torrens Title is
imprescriptible and not barred under the doctrine of laches.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution dated
March 1, 1977 and June 3, 1977 in CA G.R. No. L-49178-R are SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984
POLLY CAYETANO,petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch
XXXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila and NENITA CAMPOS
PAGUIA,respondents.
Ermelo P. Guzman for petitioner.

Armando Z. Gonzales for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the order of the respondent judge of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXXVIII, which admitted to and allowed the probate of the
last will and testament of Adoracion C. Campos, after an ex-parte presentation of evidence by herein
private respondent.
On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos
and her sisters, private respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as
the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit
of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of Court whereby he adjudicated unto himself
the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.
Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a
will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly executed in the United States and for
her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.
In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and
was a permanent resident of 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix
died in Manila on January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing with her sister at 2167 Leveriza,
Malate, Manila; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last wig and testament on July 10,
1975, according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as
executor; that after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed,
and registered with the Registry of Wins at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., that Clement L.
McLaughlin, the administrator who was appointed after Dr. Barzaga had declined and waived his
appointment as executor in favor of the former, is also a resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and that
therefore, there is an urgent need for the appointment of an administratrix to administer and eventually
distribute the properties of the estate located in the Philippines.
On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner alleging
among other things, that he has every reason to believe that the will in question is a forgery; that the
intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic
provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to
him.
On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through his counsel, Atty. Franco Loyola, filed a
Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests) stating that he "has been able to
verify the veracity thereof (of the will) and now confirms the same to be truly the probated will of his
daughter Adoracion." Hence, an ex-parte presentation of evidence for the reprobate of the questioned
will was made.
On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order, to wit:
At the hearing, it has been satisfactorily established that Adoracion C. Campos, in her lifetime, was a
citizen of the United States of America with a permanent residence at 4633 Ditman Street,
Philadelphia, PA 19124, (Exhibit D) that when alive, Adoracion C. Campos executed a Last Will and
Testament in the county of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to the laws thereat (Exhibits
E-3 to E-3-b) that while in temporary sojourn in the Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos died in the
City of Manila (Exhibit C) leaving property both in the Philippines and in the United States of
America; that the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos was admitted and granted
probate by the Orphan's Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas, the probate court of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and letters of administration were
issued in favor of Clement J. McLaughlin all in accordance with the laws of the said foreign country
on procedure and allowance of wills (Exhibits E to E-10); and that the petitioner is not suffering from
any disqualification which would render her unfit as administratrix of the estate in the Philippines of
the late Adoracion C. Campos.
WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos is hereby admitted to
and allowed probate in the Philippines, and Nenita Campos Paguia is hereby appointed Administratrix
of the estate of said decedent; let Letters of Administration with the Will annexed issue in favor of said
Administratrix upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00 conditioned under the provisions
of Section I, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on April 14, 1979, confirming the withdrawal of his
opposition, acknowledging the same to be his voluntary act and deed.
On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief, praying that the order allowing the
will be set aside on the ground that the withdrawal of his opposition to the same was secured through
fraudulent means. According to him, the "Motion to Dismiss Opposition" was inserted among the
papers which he signed in connection with two Deeds of Conditional Sales which he executed with the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). He also alleged that the
lawyer who filed the withdrawal of the opposition was not his counsel-of-record in the special
proceedings case.
The petition for relief was set for hearing but the petitioner failed to appear. He made several motions
for postponement until the hearing was set on May 29, 1980.
On May 18, 1980, petitioner filed another motion entitled "Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside the
Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. In this motion, the notice of
hearing provided:
Please include this motion in your calendar for hearing on May 29, 1980 at 8:30 in the morning for
submission for reconsideration and resolution of the Honorable Court. Until this Motion is resolved,
may I also request for the future setting of the case for hearing on the Oppositor's motion to set aside
previously filed.
The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court for June 19, 1980. When the case was called for
hearing on this date, the counsel for petitioner tried to argue his motion to vacate instead of adducing
evidence in support of the petition for relief. Thus, the respondent judge issued an order dismissing the
petition for relief for failure to present evidence in support thereof. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied. In the same order, respondent judge also denied the motion
to vacate for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
Meanwhile, on June 6,1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left a will, which, incidentally
has been questioned by the respondent, his children and forced heirs as, on its face, patently null and
void, and a fabrication, appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix of his last will and testament.
Cayetano, therefore, filed a motion to substitute herself as petitioner in the instant case which was
granted by the court on September 13, 1982.
A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the petitioner Hermogenes Campos
merged upon his death with the rights of the respondent and her sisters, only remaining children and
forced heirs was denied on September 12, 1983.
Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the respondent judge acted without or in excess
of his jurisdiction when:
1) He ruled the petitioner lost his standing in court deprived the Right to Notice (sic) upon the filing of
the Motion to Dismiss opposition with waiver of rights or interests against the estate of deceased
Adoracion C. Campos, thus, paving the way for the hearing ex-parte of the petition for the probate of
decedent will.
2) He ruled that petitioner can waive, renounce or repudiate (not made in a public or authenticated
instrument), or by way of a petition presented to the court but by way of a motion presented prior to an
order for the distribution of the estate-the law especially providing that repudiation of an inheritance
must be presented, within 30 days after it has issued an order for the distribution of the estate in
accordance with the rules of Court.
3) He ruled that the right of a forced heir to his legitime can be divested by a decree admitting a will to
probate in which no provision is made for the forced heir in complete disregard of Law of Succession
4) He denied petitioner's petition for Relief on the ground that no evidence was adduced to support the
Petition for Relief when no Notice nor hearing was set to afford petitioner to prove the merit of his
petition — a denial of the due process and a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
5) He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate case, the fact that the Testator at the time of death was a
usual resident of Dasmariñas, Cavite, consequently Cavite Court of First Instance has exclusive
jurisdiction over the case (De Borja vs. Tan, G.R. No. L-7792, July 1955).
The first two issues raised by the petitioner are anchored on the allegation that the respondent judge
acted with grave abuse of discretion when he allowed the withdrawal of the petitioner's opposition to
the reprobate of the will.
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. No proof was adduced to
support petitioner's contention that the motion to withdraw was secured through fraudulent means and
that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his counsel of record. The records show that after the firing of the
contested motion, the petitioner at a later date, filed a manifestation wherein he confirmed that the
Motion to Dismiss Opposition was his voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the time the motion was
filed, the petitioner's former counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long withdrawn from the case and had
been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn filed the motion. The present petitioner cannot,
therefore, maintain that the old man's attorney of record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the
motion. Since the withdrawal was in order, the respondent judge acted correctly in hearing the probate
of the will ex-parte, there being no other opposition to the same.
The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a general rule, the
probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof,
the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed
by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will
has been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
(Maninang vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed the reprobate of
Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law
for him.
This contention is without merit.
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge
should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently established that
Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which
respectively provide:
Art. 16 par. (2).
xxx xxx xxx
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
Art. 1039.
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the
national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide
for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the
petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and
established public policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by
Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. This was
squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein we ruled:
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it
has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national
law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
xxx xxx xxx
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and
under the law of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity
of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas
law, the Philippine Law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief, the records wig bear the
fact that what was repeatedly scheduled for hearing on separate dates until June 19, 1980 was the
petitioner's petition for relief and not his motion to vacate the order of January 10, 1979. There is no
reason why the petitioner should have been led to believe otherwise. The court even admonished the
petitioner's failing to adduce evidence when his petition for relief was repeatedly set for hearing. There
was no denial of due process. The fact that he requested "for the future setting of the case for
hearing . . ." did not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to vacate would be heard and given
preference in lieu of the petition for relief. Furthermore, such request should be embodied in a motion
and not in a mere notice of hearing.
Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of jurisdiction utterly devoid of merit.
Under Rule 73, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, it is provided that:
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of
the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of
his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the Court of First
Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time
of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of America and not a
"usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and after
failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. (See Saulog Transit, Inc. vs.
Hon. Manuel Lazaro, et al., G. R. No. 63 284, April 4, 1984).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-14074 November 7, 1918

In the matter of the probation of the will of Jose Riosa.
MARCELINO CASAS, applicant-appellant,
Vicente de Vera for petitioner-appellant.

MALCOLM, J.:
The issue which this appeal presents is whether in the Philippine Islands the law existing
on the date of the execution of a will, or the law existing at the death of the testator,
controls.
Jose Riosa died on April 17, 1917. He left a will made in the month of January, 1908, in
which he disposed of an estate valued at more than P35,000. The will was duly executed
in accordance with the law then in force, namely, section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The will was not executed in accordance with Act No. 2645, amendatory of
said section 618, prescribing certain additional formalities for the signing and attestation
of wills, in force on and after July 1, 1916. In other words, the will was in writing, signed
by the testator, and attested and subscribed by three credible witnesses in the presence of
the testator and of each other; but was not signed by the testator and the witnesses on the
left margin of each and every page, nor did the attestation state these facts. The new law,
therefore, went into effect after the making of the will and before the death of the testator,
without the testator having left a will that conforms to the new requirements.
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:
No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real
or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the
testator, or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of each other. The attestation shall state the fact that the
testator signed the will, or caused it to be signed by some other person, at his express
direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and that they attested and subscribed it in his
presence and in the presence of each other. But the absence of such form of attestation
shall not render the will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact signed and attested
as in this section provided.
Act No. 2645 has amended section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to make said
section read as follows:
SEC. 618. Requisites of will. — No will, except as provided in the preceding section,
shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it
be written in the language or dialect known by the testator and signed by him, or by the
testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction,
and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of each other. The testator or the person requested by him to write his name
and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each, and every
page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters
placed on the upper part of each sheet. The attestation shall state the number of sheets or
pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will
and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express
direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will
and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.
This court has heretofore held in a decision handed down by the Chief Justice, as to a will
made after the date Act No. 2645 went into effect, that it must comply with the provisions
of this law. (Caraig vs Tatlonghari, R. G. No. 12558, dated March 23, 1918 [not
published].) The court has further held in a decision handed down by Justice Torres, as to
will executed by a testator whose death took place prior to the operative date of Act No.
2645, that the amendatory act is inapplicable. (Bona vs. Briones, [1918], 38 Phil., 276.)
The instant appeal presents an entirely different question. The will was execute prior to
the enactment of Act No. 2645 and the death occurred after the enactment of this law.
There is a clear cleavage of authority among the cases and the text-writers, as to the effect
of a change in the statutes prescribing the formalities necessary to be observed in the
execution of a will, when such change is made intermediate to the execution of a will and
the death of a testator. (See generally 40 Cyc., 1076. and any textbook on Wills, and
Lane's Appeal from Probate [1889], 57 Conn., 182.) The rule laid down by the courts in
many jurisdictions is that the statutes in force at the testator's death are controlling, and
that a will not executed in conformity with such statutes is invalid, although its execution
was sufficient at the time it was made. The reasons assigned for applying the later statute
are the following: "As until the death of the testator the paper executed by him,
expressing his wishes, is not a will, but a mere inchoate act which may or may not be a
will, the law in force at the testator's death applies and controls the proof of the will."
(Sutton vs. Chenault [1855], 18 Ga., 1.) Were we to accept the foregoing proposition and
the reasons assigned for it, it would logically result that the will of Jose Riosa would have
to be held invalid.
The rule prevailing in many other jurisdictions is that the validity of the execution of a
will must be tested by the statutes in force at the time of its execution and that statutes
subsequently enacted have no retrospective effect. This doctrine is believed to be
supported by the weight of authority. It was the old English view; in Downs (or
Downing) vs. Townsend (Ambler, 280), Lord Hardwicke is reported to have said that "the
general rule as to testaments is, that the time of the testament, and not the testator's death,
is regarded." It is also the modern view, including among other decisions one of the
Supreme Court of Vermont from which State many of the sections of the Code if Civil
Procedure of the Philippine Islands relating to wills are taken. (Giddings vs. Turgeon
[1886], 58 Vt., 103.)
Of the numerous decisions of divergent tendencies, the opinion by the learned Justice
Sharswood (Taylor vs. Mitchell [1868], 57 Pa. St., 209) is regarded to be the best
considered. In this opinion is found the following:
Retrospective laws generally if not universally work injustice, and ought to be so
construed only when the mandate of the legislature is imperative. When a testator makes
a will, formally executed according to the requirements of the law existing at the time of
its execution, it would unjustly disappoint his lawful right of disposition to apply to it a
rule subsequently enacted, though before his death.
While it is true that every one is presumed to know the law, the maxim in fact is
inapplicable to such a case; for he would have an equal right to presume that no new law
would affect his past act, and rest satisfied in security on that presumption. . . . It is true,
that every will is ambulatory until the death of the testator, and the disposition made by it
does not actually take effect until then. General words apply to the property of which the
testator dies possessed, and he retains the power of revocation as long as he lives. The act
of bequeathing or devising, however, takes place when the will is executed, though to go
into effect at a future time.
A third view, somewhat larger in conception than the preceding one, finding support in
the States of Alabama and New York, is that statutes relating to the execution of wills,
when they increase the necessary formalities, should be construed so as not to impair the
validity of a will already made and, when they lessen the formalities required, should be
construed so as to aid wills defectively executed according to the law in force at the time
of their making (Hoffman vs. Hoffman, [1855], 26 Ala., 535; Price vs. Brown, 1 Bradf.,
Surr. N.Y., 252.)
This court is given the opportunity to choose between the three rules above described.
Our selection, under such circumstances, should naturally depend more on reason than on
technicality. Above all, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the testator has provided in
detail for the disposition of his property and that his desires should be respected by the
courts. Justice is a powerful pleader for the second and third rules on the subject.
The plausible reasoning of the authorities which back the first proposition is, we think,
fallacious. The act of bequeathing or devising is something more than inchoate or
ambulatory. In reality, it becomes a completed act when the will is executed and attested
according to the law, although it does not take effect on the property until a future
time.lawphil.net
It is, of course, a general rule of statutory construction, as this court has said, that "all
statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and
intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is
necessarily implied from the language used. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be
resolved against the restrospective effect." (Montilla vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos
[1913], 24 Phil., 220. See also Chew Heong vs. U.S. [1884], 112 U.S., 536; U.S. vs
American Sugar Ref. Co. [1906], 202 U.S., 563.) Statute law, as found in the Civil Code,
is corroborative; article 3 thereof provides that "laws shall not have a retroactive effect,
unless therein otherwise prescribed." The language of Act No. 2645 gives no indication of
retrospective effect. Such, likewise, has been the uniform tendency of the Supreme Court
of the Philippine Islands on cases having special application to testamentary succession.
(Abello vs. Kock de Monaterio [1904], 3 Phil., 558; Timbol vs. Manalo [1906], 6 Phil.,
254; Bona vs. Briones, supra; In the Matter of the Probation of the Will of Bibiana
Diquiña [1918], R. G. No. 13176, 1 concerning the language of the Will. See also section
617, Code of Civil Procedure.)
The strongest argument against our accepting the first two rules comes out of section 634
of the Code of Civil Procedure which, in negative terms, provides that a will shall be
disallowed in either of five cases, the first being "if not executed and attested as in this
Act provided." Act No. 2645 has, of course, become part and parcel of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The will in question is admittedly not executed and attested as provided by the
Code of Civil Procedure as amended. Nevertheless, it is proper to observe that the general
principle in the law of wills inserts itself even within the provisions of said section 634.
Our statute announces a positive rule for the transference of property which must be
complied with as completed act at the time of the execution, so far as the act of the
testator is concerned, as to all testaments made subsequent to the enactment of Act No.
2645, but is not effective as to testaments made antecedent to that date.
To answer the question with which we began this decision, we adopt as our own the
second rule, particularly as established by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The will
of Jose Riosa is valid.
The order of the Court of First Instance for the Province of Albay of December 29, 1917,
disallowing the will of Jose Riosa, is reversed, and the record shall be returned to the
lower court with direction to admit the said will to probate, without special findings as to
costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Street, Avanceña and Fisher, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers
of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the
denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the
purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business;
and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to
postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro
Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the
provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which,
among other things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the
amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the
property or the country in which it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in accordance
with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are
on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those
of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it
when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he
assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the
receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It
is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted
ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the
court in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the
testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being
contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed. lawphil.net
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a
legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into
consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been
conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand,
having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in
acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and
everything in connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in
force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul
and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who
fail to comply with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees
must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his
nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the
herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as
expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil
Code provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed
and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator
otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when,
according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to
govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the
institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the
herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to
the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and
effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate
be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and
the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects,
without any pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.