In the matter of: Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence against the

Abolition of JDF and Reduction of Autonomy

UDK-15143 January 21, 2015

IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

AND FISCAL AUTONOMY MOVEMENT VS. ABOLITION OF JUDICIARY
DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND REDUCTION OF FISCAL AUTONOMY.

FACTS:

Petitioner Rolly Mijares (Mijares) prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in order
to compel this court to exercise its judicial independence and fiscal autonomy against
the perceived hostility of Congress.

In the letter-petition, Mijares alleges that he is "a Filipino citizen, and a concerned
taxpayer[.]"He filed this petition as part of his "continuing crusade to defend and uphold
the Constitution" because he believes in the rule of law. He is concerned about the
threats against the judiciary after this court promulgated Priority Development
Assistance Fund

The complaint implied that certain acts of members of Congress and the President after
the promulgation of these cases show a threat to judicial independence.

Petitioner argues that Congress "gravely abused its discretion with a blatant usurpation
of judicial independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court."

Petitioner points out that Congress is exercising its power "in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility by abolishing the ‘Judiciary
Development Fund’ (JDF) of the Supreme Court."

With regard to his prayer for the issuance of the writ of mandamus, petitioner avers that
Congress should not act as "wreckers of the law" by threatening "to clip the powers of
the High Tribunal[.]" Congress committed a "blunder of monumental proportions" when
it reduced the judiciary’s 2015 budget.

Petitioner prays that this court exercise its powers to "REVOKE/ABROGATE and
EXPUNGE whatever irreconcilable contravention of existing laws affecting the judicial
independence and fiscal autonomy as mandated under the Constitution to better serve
public interest and general welfare of the people."

ISSUE

The issue for resolution is whether petitioner Rolly Mijares has sufficiently shown
grounds for this court to grant the petition and issue a writ of mandamus.
HELD:

THIS COURT RESOLVES TO DENY THE PETITION.

THE REQUISITES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

The power of judicial review, like all powers granted by the Constitution, is subject to
certain limitations. Petitioner must comply with all the requisites for judicial review
before this court may take cognizance of the case. The requisites are:

(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power;

(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity
of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement;

(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and

(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

Petitioner’s failure to comply with the first two requisites warrants the outright dismissal
of this petition.

The petition does not comply with the requisites of judicial review

NO ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY

Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution provides that:

ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis
supplied)
One of the requirements for this court to exercise its power of judicial review is the
existence of an actual controversy. This means that there must be "an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory,
lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion." As emphasized by
this court in Information Technology Foundation of the Phils. v. Commission on
Elections:

It is well-established in this jurisdiction that ". . . for a court to exercise its power of
adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy — one which involves a
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other
similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. . . .

The reason for this requirement was explained in Angara v. Electoral Commission:

Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and
to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner,
the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through
their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.

Petitioner’s allegations show that he wants this court to strike down the proposed bills
abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund. This court, however, must act only within its
powers granted under the Constitution. This court is not empowered to review proposed
bills because a bill is not a law.

NO LEGAL STANDING TO QUESTION THE VALIDITY OF THE PROPOSED BILL

Even assuming that there is an actual case or controversy that this court must resolve,
petitioner has no legal standing to question the validity of the proposed bill. The rule on
legal standing has been discussed in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo:

Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given

question." In private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as
contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It
provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit." Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits.

Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official
action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is
affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in
the category of a "citizen," or ‘taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show that
he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient
interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or
"taxpayer."

....

This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held
that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as
a result."

Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or will sustain a direct injury if the
proposed bill is passed into law. While his concern for judicial independence is laudable,
it does not, by itself, clothe him with the requisite standing to question the
constitutionality of a proposed bill that may only affect the judiciary.

This court, however, has occasionally relaxed the rules on standing when the issues
involved are of "transcendental importance" to the public. Specifically, this court has
stated that:

the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional
plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

Transcendental importance is not defined in our jurisprudence, thus, in Francisco v.

House of Representatives:

There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following

instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the
case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and
(3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised.41

Kilsobayan v. Guingona
FACTS:

The PCSO decided to establish an online lottery system for the purpose of increasing its
revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after
learning that the PCSO was interested in operating on an online lottery system, the
Berjaya Group Berhad, with its affiliate, the International Totalizator Systems, Inc.
became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO. Considering the
citizenship requirement, the PGMC claims that Berjaya Group undertook to reduce its
equity stakes in PGMC to 40% by selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign
stockholdings to local investors. An open letter was sent to President Ramos strongly
opposing the setting up of an online lottery system due to ethical and moral concerns,
however the project pushed through.

ISSUES:

1 Whether the petitioners have locus standi (legal standing); and


2 Whether the Contract of Lease is legal and valid in light of Sec. 1 of R.A. 1169 as
amended by B.P. Blg. 42.
RULING:

1 The petitioners have locus standi due to the transcendental importance to the public
that the case demands. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect
the social, economic and moral well-being of the people. The legal standing then
of the petitioners deserves recognition, and in the exercise of its sound
discretion, the Court brushes aside the procedural barrier.
Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the PCSO from holding
and conducting lotteries “in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person,
association, company, or entity, whether domestic or foreign.” The language of the
section is clear that with respect to its franchise or privilege “to hold and conduct charity
sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities,” the PCSO cannot exercise it
“in collaboration, association or joint venture” with any other party. This is the
unequivocal meaning and import of the phrase. By the exception explicitly made, the
PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way of the methods mentioned, nor
can it transfer, assign or lease such franchise.

Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol

Facts:
3 On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted
and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding
the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.
4 On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed
the Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the
manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
 Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
5 On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint
(first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint
was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House
Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of
Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13
October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but
voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in
substance.
6 The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was
filed with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the
House of Representatives.
7 Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the
Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the
Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year.”
Issues:
2 Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute
valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
3 Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted
by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section
3, Article XI of the Constitution.
4 Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI
of the Constitution.

horizontal small

Rulings:
1 This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the
judicial power of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
1 Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of
what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely
political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of
the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.
2 Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable
 and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
2 The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.
1 Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules
on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.”
Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the
phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Hence, these
rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said
rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article
XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules.
2 It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the
fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power,
then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend
the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
3 It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
1 Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice,
the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within
a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
2 Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with
seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the
House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment
complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates
the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year
period.

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment

Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28,
2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of
the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section
3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

Brillantes v. Commission on Elections

Facts:
Comelec issued resolutions adopting an Automated Elections System including the
assailed resolution, Resolution 6712, which provides for the electronic transmission
of advanced result of “unofficial” count. Petitioners claimed that the resolution would
allow the preemption and usurpation of the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the
votes for President and Vice-President and would likewise encroach upon the authority
of NAMFREL, as the citizens’ accredited arm, to conduct the "unofficial" quick count as
provided under pertinent election laws. Comelec contended that the resolution was
promulgated in the exercise of its executive and administrative power "to ensure free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections” Comelec added that the issue is
beyond judicial determination.

Issue:
Whether or not Comelec's promulgation of Resolution 6712 was justified.

Ruling:

The Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction in issuing Resolution 6712. The issue squarely fell within the ambit of the
expanded jurisdiction of the court.

Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, further bolstered by RA 8436, vest upon
Congress the sole and exclusive authority to officially canvass the votes for the
elections of President and Vice-President. Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436,
solely authorize NAMFREL, the duly-accredited citizen’s arm to conduct the “unofficial
counting of votes for the national or local elections. The quick count under the guise of
an “unofficial” tabulation would not only be preemptive of the authority of congress and
NAMFREL, but would also be lacking constitutional and/or statutory basis. Moreover,
the assailed COMELEC resolution likewise contravened the constitutional provision that
"no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law." It being “unofficial”, any disbursement of public fund would be contrary to
the provisions of the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 9206, which is the 2003 General
Appropriations Act.

The Omnibus Election Code in providing the powers and functions of the Commission
subjects the same to certain conditions with respect to the adoption of the latest
technological and electronic devices, to wit: (1)consideration of the area and available
funds (2) notification to all political parties and candidates. The aforementioned
conditions were found to have not been substantially met.

Resolution 6712 was null and void.

National Artist for Literature Virgilio Alamario, et al. v. The Executive Secretary

ALMARIO V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 189028
16 July 2013
 Leonardo-de Castro, J.:

Doctrine: The President’s discretion is circumscribed by her constitutional duty to

faithfully execute the laws and observe the applicable rules, guidelines, and policies.

Quick Facts: Virgilio Almario (Almario) and his fellow Petitioners assail the validity of
the declaration of Cecile Guidote-Alvarez and four (4) other persons as National
Artists for not having passed screening by the Board of Trustees of both the National
Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA) and the Cultural Center of the
Philippines (CCP).

Facts:
 On 6 May 2009, the Chairperson of NCCA and the President and Artistic Director of
the CCP sent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo a letter containing the
recommendation of the Board of Trustees of both the NCCA and the CCP that the
following persons be proclaimed National Artists: (1) Manuel Conde (posthumous) for
Film and Broadcast Arts, (2) Ramon Santos (Santos) for Music, (3) Lazaro Francisco
(posthumous) for Literature, and (4) Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz for Visual Arts.
 The said letter was supposedly referred by the Office of the President to the
Committee on Honors.
 In the meantime, the Office of the President allegedly received nominations from
various sectors, cultural groups, and individuals strongly endorsing other persons for
the same conferment, namely, (1) Cecile Guidote-Alvarez (Guidote-Alvarez), (2) Carlo
Magno, (3) Jose Caparas (Caparas), (4) Francisco Mañosa, and (5) Jose Moreno
(Guidote-Alvarez et al.).
 The Committee on Honors purportedly processed these nominations and invited
resource persons to validate the qualifications and credentials of the nominees.
 The Committee on Honors thereafter submitted a memorandum to the President
recommending the conferment of the Order of National Artists on the four
recommendees of the NCCA and the CCP Boards, as well as on Guidote-Alvarez et
al.
 Acting on this recommendation, several proclamations were made declaring Manuel
Conde, Lazaro Francisco, Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz, and Guidote-Alvarez et al. as
National Artists.
 Consequently, Almario, his fellow National Artists, a number of cultural workers and
academics, and the Concerned Artists of the Philippines (Almario et al.) filed a Petition
for Prohibition, Certiorari, and Injunction before the Supreme Court assailing the
declaration of Guidote-Alvarez et al. as National Artists.

Almario et al.’s Contention: The President gravely abused her discretion in

disregarding the results of the rigorous screening and selection process for the Order
 of National Artists and in substituting her own choice for those of the deliberation
panels.

Caparas’ Contention: The function of the NCCA and the CCP Boards is simply to
advise the President. The award of the Order of National Artists is the exclusive
prerogative of the President who is not bound in any way by such recommendation.
The implementing rules and regulations or guidelines of the NCCA cannot restrict or
limit the exclusive power of the President to select the recipients of the Order of
National Artists.

The Solicitor General’s Contention: While the President exercises control over the
NCCA and the CCP, she has the duty to faithfully execute the laws, including the
NCCA-CCP guidelines for the selection of National Artists and the implementing rules
of Executive Order No. 236, Series of 20031.

Issue: Whether or not the President gravely abused her discretion in declaring Guidote-
Alvarez et al. National Artists.

Held: Yes. Guidote-Alvarez et al. were not recommended by the NCCA and CCP Board
of Trustees and consequently, their declaration as National Artists were done in
disregard of the applicable rules.

Ratio:
 The President’s discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists should be
exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant laws.
 The faithful execution clause is best construed as an obligation imposed on the
President, not a separate grant of power.
 It simply underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle that the
President is not above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them.
 An administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law has the force and effect of law
and thus, the rules, guidelines, and policies regarding the Order of National Artists
jointly issued by the CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA pursuant to their
respective statutory mandates have the force and effect of law and until set aside,
they are binding upon executive and administrative agencies, including the President
herself as chief executor of laws.
 In view of the various stages of deliberation in the selection process and as a
consequence of her duty to faithfully enforce the relevant laws, the discretion of the
President in the matter of the Order of National Artists is confined to the names
submitted to her by the NCCA and the CCP Boards.

1
Establishing the Honors Code of the Philippines to Create an Order of Precedence of Honors Conferred and for
Other Purposes.
 This means that the President could not have considered conferment of the Order of
National Artists on any person not considered and recommended by the NCCA and
the CCP Boards.
 The President could not have properly considered Guidote-Alvarez et al., as their
names were not recommended by the NCCA and the CCP Boards.
 The NCCA and CCP Guidelines provide that Board members and consultants and
NCCA and CCP officers and staff are automatically disqualified from being nominated.
 Consequently, Guidote-Alvarez, who was the Executive Director of the NCCA at that
time, could not have even been nominated and hence, she was not qualified to be
considered and conferred the Order of National Artists.
 The President’s discretion on the matter does not extend to removing a legal
impediment or overriding a legal restriction.
 The advice or recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP Boards as to the
conferment of the Order of National Artists was not binding on the former President
but only discretionary or optional for her whether or not to act on such advice or
recommendation.
 Also, by virtue of the power of control, the President had the authority to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside such recommendation or advice.
 It was well within the President’s power and discretion to proclaim all, or some or even
none of the recommendees of the CCP and the NCCA Boards, without having to
justify his or her action.
 Thus, the exclusion of Santos did not constitute grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the former President.
 There was a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution when the
President gave preferential treatment to Guidote-Alvarez et al.
 The President’s constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws and observe the rules,
guidelines, and policies of the NCCA and the CCP as to the selection of the nominees
for conferment of the Order of National Artists proscribed her from having a free and
uninhibited hand in the conferment of the said award.
 The manifest disregard of the rules, guidelines, and processes of the NCCA and the
CCP was an arbitrary act that unduly favored respondents Guidote-Alvarez et al.

Other Pronouncements:
 Pleadings and Practice. It has been held that the remedies of prohibition and
injunction are preventive and, as such, cannot be availed of to restrain an act that is
already fait accompli. Where the act sought to be prohibited or enjoined has already
been accomplished or consummated, prohibition or injunction becomes moot.
Nevertheless, even if the principal issue is already moot, this Court may still resolve its
merits for the future guidance of both bench and bar. Courts will decide a question
otherwise moot and academic if it is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”
 Administrative Law. It has been held that an administrative regulation adopted
pursuant to law has the force and effect of law. Thus, the rules, guidelines, and
policies regarding the Order of National Artists jointly issued by the CCP Board of
Trustees and the NCCA pursuant to their respective statutory mandates have the
force and effect of law. Until set aside, they are binding upon executive and
administrative agencies, including the President herself as chief executor of laws.

Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System

POLI - #88
Divinagracia v. CBS (2009)
Doctrine:
Although there is no doubt that the President may exercise the authority granted
to him under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7477 (charter of PBS) which provides that the
President of the Philippines may temporarily take over and operate the stations of
the grantee, temporarily suspend the operation of any stations in the interest of
public safety, security and public welfare, or authorize the temporary use and
operation thereof by any agency of the Government, such authority can be
exercised only under limited and rather drastic circumstances. They still do not
vest in the NTC the broad authority to cancel licenses and permits.
Facts:
Santiago Divinagracia alleged that Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) and
People’s Broadcasting Service, Inc. (PBS), two of three radio networks that comprise
Bombo Radyo Philippines, violated the terms of their congressional franchises when
they failed to offer at least 30 percent of their common stocks to the public as required
by law and their legislative franchises.
Divinagracia claimed that because of the misuse and violation of their franchises, the
provisional authorities granted by the NTC to PBS and CBS to install, operate and
maintain various AM and FM broadcast stations had to be cancelled.
The NTC however dismissed the complaints, claiming that while it had full jurisdiction to
revoke or cancel a PA or CPC for violations or infractions of the terms and conditions
embodied therein, the complaints actually constituted collateral attacks on the legislative
franchises of the two networks which are more properly the subject of a quo warranto
action to be commenced by the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Divinagracia went to the Court of Appeals which upheld the NTC’s denial. He then
elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the NTC has the power to cancel the CPCs it has issued to legislative
franchisees
Held/Ratio:
No, the NTC does not have the power to cancel CPCs.
The Radio Control Act of 1931 requires broadcast stations to obtain a legislative
franchise and such requirement was not repealed by E.O. 546 which established the
 NTC, the administrative agency which has regulatory jurisdiction over broadcast
stations.
When Congress grants a legislative franchise, it is the legal obligation of the NTC to
facilitate the operation by the franchisee of its broadcast station and since public
administration of the airwaves is a highly technical function, the Congress has
delegated to the NTC the task of administration.
The licensing power of the NTC arises from the necessary delegation by Congress of
legislative power geared towards the orderly exercise by franchisees of the rights
granted them by Congress.
But even as the NTC is vested with the power to issue CPCs to broadcast stations, it is
not expressly vested with the power to cancel such CPCs, or otherwise prevent
broadcast stations with duly issued franchises and CPCs from operating radio and
television stations. There is no such expression in the law, and by presuming such right
the Court will be acting contrary to the stated State interest as expressed in
respondents’ legislative franchises.
Although there is no doubt that the President may exercise the authority granted to him
under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7477 (charter of PBS) which provides that the President of
the Philippines may temporarily take over and operate the stations of the grantee,
temporarily suspend the operation of any stations in the interest of public safety,
security and public welfare, or authorize the temporary use and operation thereof by any
agency of the Government, such authority can be exercised only under limited and
rather drastic circumstances. They still do not vest in the NTC the broad authority to
cancel licenses and permits.

Digested by: AERON B. HALOS

The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections

The Diocese of Bacolod, Represented by the Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra and the Bishop Him
Commission on Elections and the Election Officer of Bacolod City, Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon

FACTS:

GR No. 205728

SUMMARY OF THE PETITION

Petitioner Diocese of Bacolod is a Roman Catholic diocese and is represented

in this petition by its Bishop, the Most Rev. Vicente M. Navarra. Petitioner Bishop Navarra is also filing t
capacity as the questioned orders are personally directed at him and also as a concerned citizen, as th
paramount and transcendental importance to the public which must be settled early given the far-reachi
acts of the respondents.

Named as respondents are the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and its Election Officer of Bacolo

On 21 February 2013, the petitioners have caused to be placed on the front wall of the Bacolod Cathed
feet, with the messageConscience Vote (Team Buhay/Team Patay (Team Patay Tarpaulin). The Team
both Anti- and Pro-Reproductive Health Law senatorial candidates.

In their special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioners
2013 order issued by respondent Atty. Majarucon, which orders them to remove the supposed oversize
Bacolod. They also sought to nullify the 27 February 2013 order issued by

the COMELEC, through its Law Department, which orders the immediate removal of the Team Patay Ta
Bishop of Bacolod with the filing of an election offense if he fails to cause its immediate removal.

On March 5, 2013, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the resp
from removing the Team Patay Tarpaulin.

ISSUES/GROUNDS:

8 Respondents’ orders directives to remove or cause the removal of the subjectTeam

Patay Tarpaulin are unconstitutional and void for infringing on petitioners’ right to
freedom of expression on their own private property. 


9 Respondents’ orders/directives to remove or cause the removal of the subjectTeam

Patay Tarpaulin are unconstitutional and void for violating the principle of
separation of Church and State enshrined in Section 6 of Article II of the 1987
Constitution. 


ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSIONS:
1. The assailed Orders/Directives to remove or cause the removal of the subjectTeam
Patay Tarpaulin are not electoral campaign materials and that the mention of the
candidates in the infringes on the petitioners’ right to freedom of expression on their
own private property:

o the subject Team Patay Tarpaulins “are not electoral campaign materials,” stressing
that the mentioning of candidates’ name in the second tarpaulin was merely incidental
to the petitioners’ campaign against the RH Law, which they have firmly campaigned
against even when it was just a bill being deliberated in Congress;

o subject Team Patay Tarpaulins are “covered by the broader constitutional guaranty of
freedom of expression and of conscience and not by the more narrow and limited
election laws, rules, and regulations”;

o petitioners “have the constitutional right to communicate their views and beliefs by
posting the subject Team Patay Tarpaulins on the Bacolod Cathedral, a private property
owned by the Diocese of Bacolod”;

o the RH Law and the candidates and party-lists running in the 2013 National Elections
who supported and who opposed its passage into a law are matters of public concern
and a legitimate subject of general interest and of discussion;

o citing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Chavez v. PCGG (G. R. No. 130716,
December 9, 1998), the petitioners’ argued that that public concern “...embraces a
broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know...”

o citing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Adiong v. COMELEC ( G. R. No. 103956,

March 31, 1992), the petitioners’ further argued that “debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide open.”

o the content and the message of the subject Team Patay Tarpaulin “plainly relates to
broad issues of interest to the community especially to the members of the Catholic
community” and that the subject tarpaulin “simply conveys the position of the petitioners
on the RH bill and the public officials who supported or opposed it as it gains relevance
in the exercise of the people’s right of suffrage” in the advent of the 2013

polls;
 o considering the petitioners’ message, through the Team Patay

Tarpaulin, was a matter of public concern, the message being conveyed and the mode
used for its communication and expression to the public is entitled to protection under
the Free Expression clause of the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution;
 o not being candidates or political parties, the freedom of expression curtailed by the
questioned prohibition, using the logic of the Supreme Court in Adiong v. COMELEC, is
not so much that of the candidate or the political party;

o there is no compelling and substantial State interest that is endangered or which will
be endangered by the posting of the subject Team Patay Tarpaulin which would justify
the infringement of the preferred right of freedom of expression.

2. The assailed orders/directives to remove or cause the removal of the subjectTeam

Patay Tarpaulin are unconstitutional and void for violating the principle of separation of
Church and State enshrined in Section 6 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution:

o petitioners’ petition against the RH Law “is not only a matter of exercise of its freedom
of expression and of conscience but is also a matter of Catholic faith, morals, belief, and
of duty”;

o the Diocese of Bacolod has taken on the issue of the RH Law as part of her mission
as part of its continued advocacy and obedience to the Catholic Church’s teachings;

o in line with what they believe to be their duty in the faith, the petitioners have declared
the RH Law as being anti-life, anti- morals, anti-family, anti-marriage, and contrary to
the teachings of the Catholic Church. Consequently, petitioners have called on its
members and followers not to support any candidate who is anti-life, and to support
those who are pro-life;

o considering that the views and position of the petitioners on the RH Bill is inextricably connected to its
teachings, the posting of the subject Team Patay Tarpaulin has already gone beyond mere exercise of
but also of the right and privilege of the Church to propagate and spread its teachings which should be i
and intrusion on the part of the State, and its agencies and officials;

o section 6 of the Article II of the 1987 Constitution monumentalizes the principle of separation of Churc

o at the core of its advocacy against the RH Bill is the Gospel of

Life which is a matter of Catholic doctrine, creed and dogma;
 o the petitioners believe, as a matter of f

when there is a great conflict between a culture of death and a culture of life, the Church should have th
for the common good of society;

o the questioned orders are unpardonable intrusion into the affairs of the Church and constitute serious
Church and State which the State and its officials, including the herein respondents, are bound to respe
PRAYER:

5 Petition be given due course; 


6 Issue a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary 
 Injunction restraini

in enforcing their orders for the removal of the subject Team Patay Tarpaulin; 


7 Declare the questioned orders of respondents as unconstitutional and void and perman
enforcing them or any other similar orders; and 


Issue other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable under the premises.

THE ISSUES TO BE ARGUED AS PER ADVISORY OF THE COURT EN BANC

DATED MARCH 12, 2013

1. Whether or not the 22 February 2013 Notice/Order by Election Officer Majarucon and
the 27 February 2013 Order by the COMELEC Law Department are considered
judgments/final orders/resolutions of the

COMELEC which would warrant a review of this Court via a Rule 65 Petition.

(a) Whether or not petitioners violated the hierarchy of courts doctrine and
jurisprudential rules governing appeals from COMELEC decisions;

(b) Assuming arguendo that the aforementioned Orders are not considered
judgments/final orders/resolutions of the COMELEC, whether there are exceptional
circumstances which would allow this Court to take cognizance of the case.

4 Whether or not it is relevant to determine whether the tarpaulins are “political

advertisement” or “election propaganda” considering that petitioner is not a
political candidate. 

5 Whether or not the tarpaulins are a form of expression (protected speech), or election
propaganda/political advertisement. 


(a) Assuming arguendo that the tarpaulins are a form of expression, whether or not the
COMELEC possesses the authority to regulate the same.

(b) Whether or not this form of expression may be regulated.

4. Whether or not the 22 February 2013 Notice/Order by Election Officer Majarucon and
the 27 February 2013 Order by the COMELEC Law Department violate the
Constitutional principle of separation of church and state. 


5. Whether or not the action of the petitioners in posting its tarpaulin violates the
Constitutional principle of separation of church and state. 


OSG COMMENT: DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, et al. vs. COMELEC, et al. ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioners availed of the proper remedy in assailing respondents’

notice and letter ordering the removal of the subject tarpaulin. 


2. Whether or not the assailed order and notice issued by respondents are valid and
constitutional considering that the same allegedly violate the petitioners’ right to
freedom of expression and the 


principle of separation of Church and State enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.

ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSION:

1. A petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed before
this Honorable Court is not the proper remedy to question the subject notice and letter
of respondents.
o Petitioners filed the petition before the Honorable Court, claiming that they have no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to assail the notice and letter issued by the
respondents.

Contrary to their claim, prior resort to the COMELEC constitutes a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy that bars the petitioners from directly asking relief from the Honorable
Court from the alleged injurious effects of the subject letter and notice.

o In filing the instant suit, the petitioners violated the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Before a party is allowed to seek intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition
that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him.
Petitioners should have first brought the matter to the COMELEC En Banc or to any of
its Divisions before going directly to the Supreme Court via petition for certiorari and
prohibition.

o The letter and notice issued by the respondents are not subject to review by the
Supreme Court, as the power of the Court to review the decisions of the COMELEC is
limited only to final decisions, rulings and orders of the COMELEC en banc rendered in
the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power (citing Ambil Jr. vs. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 143398 October 25, 2000). Considering that the assailed letter and notice are
not final orders of the COMELEC En Banc rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory
and quasi-judicial functions but mere issuances

of Atty. Marjucom and the COMELEC Law Department, the same are not reviewable by
the Honorable Court but by the COMELEC itself.

o Granting that the assailed notice and letter are subject to review by the Honorable
Court, petitioners must be able to show that respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the same. Petitioners
have not shown facts essential to prove that the assailed notice and letter were issued
in a “whimsical, arbitrary

or capricious” manner or the abuse of discretion is so “patent and gross” to amount to

grave abuse of discretion. The respondents issued the notice andletter pursuant to the
COMELEC’s mandate to regulate and supervise the use of mass media during election
period as embodied in the 1987 Constitution.

2. The subject tarpaulin is an election propaganda subject to regulation by respondent

COMELEC pursuant to its mandate under Section 4, Article IX-C of the 1987
 Constitution. Hence, respondent’s notice and letter ordering its removal for being
oversized are valid and constitutional.

o In furtherance of COMELEC’s mandate to supervise and regulate elections, Congress

enacted RA 9006 (the Fair Elections Act), giving the COMELEC power to promulgate its
own rules and regulations. Pursuant to this, COMELEC promulgated Resolution 9615
(Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 9006, in connection to the 13 May 2013
National and Local Elections, and Subsequent Elections). Resolution 9615 defines the
following terms:

Election Campaign or Partisan Political Activity- “an act designed to

promote the election of defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public
office, and shall include, among others, the act of directly or indirectly soliciting
votes, pledges of support for or against any candidate” 


Political Advertisement or Election Propaganda- “ any matter

broadcasted, published, printed, displayed or exhibited, in any medium, which
contain the name, image, logo, brand, insignia, motif, initials,and other symbol or
representation, that is capable of being associated with a candidate or a party,
and is intended to draw the attention of thepublic or a segment thereof to
promote or 


oppose, directly or indirectly, the election of the said candidate or candidates to a public
office”

From the definitions, the subject tarpaulin is a form of election propaganda subject to
regulation by the COMELEC pursuant to its mandate under Section 4, Article IX-C of
the 1987 Constitution.

o The subject tarpaulin contains the message “CONSCIENCE VOTE” and classifies the candidates into
mark) and “Team Patay” (with a cross mark). The check mark on “Team Buhay” and the cross mark on
those belonging to the “Team Buhay” should be voted while those under “Team Patay” should be reject
tarpaulin is petitioners’ way of endorsing those candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting
Petitioner also admitted in their petition that they “have called on its members and followers not to supp

candidate who is anti-life, and to support those who are pro- life”. These declarationsconfirm that they p
the Church’s position on the RH Law but to express their support for or against the candidates listed the
RH Law.
o Section 6 of Resolution 9615 sets the size limit for campaign posters to two feet by three feet. This is
Omnibus Election Code. The subject tarpaulin has the estimated size of six feet by ten feet, which is be
campaign posters for private properties. In ordering the removal of the tarpaulin, Atty. Marjucom, in her
enforcedsection 6 of Resolution 9615 and section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code. Similarly, in issuing
Department only acted pursuant to COMELEC’s regulatory and supervisory functions under the 1987 C

o Petitioners cannot claim that their right to freedom of expression has been violated. Petitioners are co
or against any candidate through the use of campaign posters and other forms of propaganda,

provided they comply with the limitations provided by law as

regards their size.
 o The assailed notice and letter are not forms of censorship. The

only reason that the respondents sought the removal of the tarpaulin is that it failed to comply with the m

o Assuming that the assailed notice and letter amount to infringement of the petitioners’ right to freedom
authorized by the Constitution itself. The

supervisory and regulatory powers of the COMELEC under the Constitution set to some extent a limit o
election period. By ordering the petitioners to comply with the size requirement, the COMELEC was exe
authority for the purpose of ensuring equal opportunity for candidates for political office.

o The assailed notice and letter do not intrude into purely religious and ecclesiastical matters. They do n
subject tarpaulin, but only the size, which respondents found to be in violation of Resolution 9615 and th
the subject

tarpaulin does not convey any religious doctrine of the Catholic Church. Rather, it is an election propaga
comply with Resolution 9615 and the Omnibus Election Code gave respondents reason to order its rem
mandate to regulate and supervise all form of media communication and information during election per
principle of separation of Church and State provided in the Constitution.

PRAYER: The Petition should be dismissed for lack of merit.

Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait, et.al. v. Reyes

CASE: Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v.

Secretary Angelo Reyes in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy,
et.al. (G.R. No. 180771 and 181527)
DATE: 21 April 2015
PONENTE: J. Leonardo-De Castro

FACTS

 On 13 June 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the

Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration
Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX).
 The studies included surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of
seismic and magnetic data. Geophysical and satellite surveys as well as oil and
gas sampling in Tañon Strait was conducted.
 On 12 December 2004, DOE and JAPEX converted GSEC-102 to Service
Contract No. 46 (SC-46) for the exploration, development, and production of
petroleum resources in a block covering approximately 2,850 sqm. offshore the
Tañon Strait.
 From 9-18 May 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around Tañon
Strait, including a multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751
kms. to determine the area’s underwater composition.
 During the 2nd sub-phase of the project, JAPEX committed to drill one exploration
well. Since the same was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguisan and
Pinamungajan where the Tañon Strait was declared a protected seascape in
1988, JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment
requirements under Presidential Decree No. 1586 (PD 1586), entitled
“Establishing an Environmental Impact Statement System, Including Other
Environmental Management Related Measures and For Other Purposes.”
 On 31 January 2007, the Protected Area Management Board (PAMB) of the
Tañon Strait issued Resolution No. 2007-01 where it adopted the Initial
Environmental Examination commissioned by JAPEX, and favourably
recommended the approval of the latter’s application for an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC).
 On 6 March 2007, DENR-EMB Region VII granted an ECC to DOE and JAPEX
for the offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait.
 From 16 November 2007 to 8 February 2008, JAPEX drilled an exploratory well
with a depth of 3,150 meters near Pinamungajan town.
 On 17 December 2007, two separate original petitions were filed commonly
seeking that the implementation of SC-46 be enjoined for violation of the 1987
Constitution.
 The petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 are the “Resident Marine Mammals” which
inhibit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait, joined by “Stewards” Gloria
Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio as their legal guardians and friends
seeking their protection. Also impleaded as unwilling co-petitioner is former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. In G.R. No. 181527, the petitioners are the
Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC), a non-stock, non-profit,
non-governmental organization established for the welfare of the marginal
fisherfolk in Region VII and representatives of the subsistence fisherfolk of the
municipalities of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, Cebu. Their contentions are:
 - A study made after the seismic survey showed that there is a drastic
reduce in fish catch by 50-70% attributable to the destruction of the
“payao” or the artificial reef.
- The ECC obtained by the respondents is invalid because there is no
public consultations and discussions prior to its issuance.
- SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, considering that there is no general law prescribing the
standard or uniform terms, conditions, and requirements for service
contracts involving oil exploration and extraction
- FIDEC alleges that it was barred from entering and fishing within a 7-
kilometer radius from the point where the oilrig was located, an area
grated than the 1.5-kilometer radius exclusion zone stated in the Initial
Environmental Examination
 The respondents in both petitions are: the late Angelo T. Reyes, DOE Secretary;
Jose L. Atienza, DENR Secretary; Leonardo Sibbaluca, DENR-Region VII
Director and Chairman of Tañon Strait PAMB; JAPEX, a Japanese company;
and Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS) as the alleged Philippine agent of
JAPEX. Their counter-allegations are:
- The “Resident Marine Mammals” and “Stewards” have no legal standing
to file the petition.
- SC-46 is constitutional.
- The ECC was legally issued.
- The case is moot and academic since SC-46 is mutually terminated on 21
June 2008.

ISSUES

1. WON the case is moot and academic

2. WON Petitioners have a legal standing
3. WON SC-46 is unconstitutional

RULING

1. No. The Court makes clear that the “moot and academic” principle is not a magic
formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Despite
the termination of SC-46, the Court deems it necessary to resolve the
consolidated petitions as it falls within the exceptions. Both petitioners allege that
SC-46 is violative of the Constitution, the environmental and livelihood issues
raised undoubtedly affect the public’s interest, and the respondents’ contested
actions are capable of repetition.

2. Yes. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a
more liberalized approach. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
allow for a “citizen suit,” and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our
courts for violation of our environmental laws on the principle that humans are
stewards of nature:
 “Section 5. Citizen suit. – Any Filipino citizen in representation
of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file
an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental
laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order
which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the
reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their
interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice
thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected
baragngays copies of said order.

Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be
governed by their respective provisions. (Emphasis supplied)”

Although the petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that
rules of procedure may be retroactively applied to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and will not violate any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no
vested rights in rules of procedure.

Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases

became effective, the SC had already taken a permissive position on the issue of
locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, the SC allowed the suit to be
brought in the name of generations yet unborn “based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned.”

It is also worth noting that the Stewards in the present case are joined as
real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean
species.

3. Yes. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides in part:

“The President may enter into agreement with foreign-owned

corporations involving either technical or financial assistance
for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the
general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of
the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the
development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
 The President shall notify the Congress of every contract
entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty
days from its execution.” (Emphases supplied)

The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of

indigenous petroleum in the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No.
87 (PD 87) or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972. Although the
Court finds that PD 87 is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a general law, the
absence of the two other conditions, that the President be a signatory to SC-46,
and that the Congress be notified of such contract, renders it null and void.

SC-46 appears to have been entered into and signed by the DOE through
its then Secretary Vicente S. Perez, Jr. Moreover, public respondents have
neither shown nor alleged that Congress was subsequently notified of the
execution of such contract.

Service contracts involving the exploitation, development, and utilization of

our natural resources are of paramount interest to the present and future
generations. Hence, safeguards were out in place to insure that the guidelines
set by law are meticulously observed and likewise eradicate the corruption that
may easily penetrate departments and agencies by ensuring that the President
has authorized or approved of the service contracts herself.

Even under the provisions of PD 87, it is required that the Petroleum

Board, now the DOE, obtain the President’s approval for the execution of any
contract under said statute.

The SC likewise ruled on the legality of SC-46 vis-à-vis other pertinent

laws to serve as a guide for the Government when executing service contracts.

Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Tañon Strait is an environmentally

critical area, having been declared as a protected area in 1998; therefore, any
activity outside the scope of its management plan may only be implemented
pursuant to an ECC secured after undergoing an Environment Impact
Assessment (EIA) to determine the effects of such activity on its ecological
system.

Public respondents admitted that JAPEX only started to secure an ECC

prior to the 2nd sub-phase of SC-46, which required the drilling of the exploration
well. This means that no environmental impact evaluation was done when the
seismic surveys were conducted. Unless the seismic surveys are part of the
management plan of the Tañon Strait, such surveys were done in violation of
Section 12 of NIPAS Act and Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586.

While PD 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract
for petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and
 utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only
through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area.
Since there is no such law specifically allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in
the Tañon Strait, no energy resource exploitation and utilization may be done in
said protected seascape.

Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE

OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND
JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., Respondents.

Facts:
 A complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching"
Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other
public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al),
accusing them of Plunder11 and violation of Republic Act No. (RA)
3019,12 otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in
connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the
Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building).
 The Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators14 to conduct a fact-
finding investigation, submit an investigation report, and file the necessary
complaint, if warranted (1st Special Panel). the 1st Special Panel filed a
complaint16 (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with six (6)
administrative cases17 for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases 18 for
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and
Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases).
 Binay’s First Term:
o Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award21 for Phase III, IV and V of the
Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's Construction Corporation
(Hilmarc's), and consequently, executed the corresponding contract
without the required publication and the lack of architectural design, 24 and
approved the release of funds therefor.
 Binay’s Second Term:
o Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of
contract with Hilmarc's for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project;
and
o Approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the
contract48 with MANA Architecture & Interior Design Co. (MANA) for the
design and architectural services covering the Makati Parking Building.
 Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, the
subject preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive
 suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay, during the pendency of
the OMB Cases.53 The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the preventive
suspension of a public officer are present,54 finding that:
o (a) the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was strong given that
 (1) the losing bidders and members of the Bids and Awards
Committee of Makati City had attested to the irregularities attending
the Makati Parking Building project;
 (2) the documents on record negated the publication of bids; and
 (3) the disbursement vouchers, checks, and official receipts
showed the release of funds; and
o (b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged with Grave
Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service;
o (2) said charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal from public service
under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(RRACCS), and
o (3) Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective positions give them access to public
records and allow them to influence possible witnesses; hence, their
continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation relative to the
OMB Cases filed against them.
 Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals:
o Binay contends: that he could not be held administratively liable for
any anomalous activity attending any of the five (5) phases of the Makati
Parking Building project since: (a) Phases I and II were undertaken before
he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V transpired
during his first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for
a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability
therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot
and academic.61In any event, Binay, Jr. claimed that the
Ombudsman's preventive suspension order failed to show that the
evidence of guilt presented against him is strong, maintaining that he
did not participate in any of the purported irregularities.62 In support of his
prayer for injunctive relief, Binay, Jr. argued that he has a clear and
unmistakable right to hold public office, having won by landslide vote in
the 2010 and 2013 elections, and that, in view of the condonation doctrine,
as well as the lack of evidence to sustain the charges against him, his
suspension from office would undeservedly deprive the electorate of the
services of the person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into
office.
 At noon of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution 65 (dated March 16, 2015),
granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO,66 notwithstanding Pena, Jr.'s assumption
of duties as Acting Mayor earlier that day.
o The OMB manifested71 that the TRO did not state what act was being
restrained and that since the preventive suspension order had already
been served and implemented, there was no longer any act to restrain
 Proceedings before the SC:
 o In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to its April 6,
2015 Resolution, the Ombudsman filed a supplemental petition 99 before
this Court, arguing that the condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the
determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of
issuing preventive suspension orders. The Ombudsman also maintained
that a reliance on the condonation doctrine is a matter of defense, which
should have been raised by Binay, Jr. before it during the administrative
proceedings, and that, at any rate, there is no condonation because Binay,
Jr. committed acts subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in
2013.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO
and/or WPI enjoining the implementation of a preventive suspension order
issued by the Ombudsman;
2. Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and
eventually, the WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 enjoining the implementation
of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the
condonation doctrine

Held:
1. YES
o OMB contends that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue any provisional injunctive
writ against her office to enjoin its preventive suspension orders. As basis, she
invokes the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 in conjunction with her
office's independence under the 1987 Constitution. She advances the idea that
"[i]n order to further ensure [her office's] independence, [RA 6770] likewise
insulated it from judicial intervention,"157particularly, "from injunctive reliefs
traditionally obtainable from the courts,"158 claiming that said writs may work "just
as effectively as direct harassment or political pressure would."

A. The concept of Ombudsman independence.

 Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the independence of the

Office of the Ombudsman:

o Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the

Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan,
one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas[,] and
Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise
be appointed.
 Gonzales III v. Office of the President is the first case which grappled with the
meaning of the Ombudsman's independence vis-a-vis the independence of the
other constitutional bodies. the concept of Ombudsman's independence covers
three (3) things:
 First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be
abolished, nor its constitutionally specified functions and privileges, be removed,
altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or an
amendment thereto is made;cralawlawlibrary

Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be obstructed
from [its] freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to [its]
functions;168hence, its budget cannot be strategically decreased by officials of the
political branches of government so as to impair said functions; and

Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that
those within the ranks of the office can only be disciplined by an internal
authority.

Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of the
Ombudsman frompolitical harassment and pressure, so as to free it from the
"insidious tentacles of politics."

 That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be

invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power
constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which
are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice to all.
Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that it can be exempt from an incident of
judicial power - that is, a provisional writ of injunction against a preventive
suspension order - clearly strays from the concept's rationale of insulating
the office from political harassment or pressure.

B. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA

6770 in light of the powers of Congress and the
Court under the 1987 Constitution.

 The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 textually prohibits courts from
extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted by her
office. Despite the usage of the general phrase "[n]o writ of injunction shall be
issued by any court," the Ombudsman herself concedes that the prohibition does
not cover the Supreme Court.

 Despite the ostensible breach of the separation of powers principle, the Court is
not oblivious to the policy considerations behind the first paragraph of Section 14,
RA 6770, as well as other statutory provisions of similar import. Thus, pending
deliberation on whether or not to adopt the same, the Court, under its sole
prerogative and authority over all matters of procedure, deems it proper to
declare as ineffective the prohibition against courts other than the Supreme Court
from issuing provisional injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the
 Office of the Ombudsman, until it is adopted as part of the rules of procedure
through an administrative circular duly issued therefor.

Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing the
first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770) without the Court's consent thereto, it
remains that the CA had the authority to issue the questioned injunctive writs
enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay,
Jr. At the risk of belaboring the point, these issuances were merely ancillary to
the exercise of the CA's certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under Section 9 (1),
Chapter I of BP 129, as amended, and which it had already acquired over the
main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 case.

2.

A. Subject matter of the CA's iniunctive writs is the preventive suspension order.

 By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a preventive

measure. Its purpose is to prevent the official to be suspended from using his
position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential
witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the
case against him
 The law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to justify the issuance
of an order of preventive suspension pending an investigation, namely:

(1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and

(2) Either of the following circumstances co-exist with the first requirement:
(a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or
neglect in the performance of duty;cralawlawlibrary

(b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; or

(c) The respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him.

B. The basis of the CA's injunctive writs is the condonation doctrine.

Examining the CA's Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 would, however, show that
the Ombudsman's non-compliance with the requisites provided in Section 24, RA 6770
was not the basis for the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs.

The Ombudsman contends that it was inappropriate for the CA to have considered the
condonation doctrine since it was a matter of defense which should have been raised
and passed upon by her office during the administrative disciplinary
proceedings.243 However, the Court agrees with the CA that it was not precluded from
considering the same given that it was material to the propriety of according provisional
injunctive relief in conformity with the ruling in Governor Garcia, Jr., which was the
subsisting jurisprudence at that time. Thus, since condonation was duly raised by Binay,
Jr. in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,244 the CA did not err in passing upon the
same. Note that although Binay, Jr. secondarily argued that the evidence of guilt against
him was not strong in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,245 it appears that the CA
found that the application of the condonation doctrine was already sufficient to enjoin
the implementation of the preventive suspension order. Again, there is nothing aberrant
with this since, as remarked in the same case of Governor Garcia, Jr., if it was
established that the acts subject of the administrative complaint were indeed committed
during Binay, Jr.'s prior term, then, following the condonation doctrine, he can no longer
be administratively charged. In other words, with condonation having been invoked by
Binay, Jr. as an exculpatory affirmative defense at the onset, the CA deemed it
unnecessary to determine if the evidence of guilt against him was strong, at least for the
purpose of issuing the subject injunctive writs.

With the preliminary objection resolved and the basis of the assailed writs herein laid
down, the Court now proceeds to determine if the CA gravely abused its discretion in
applying the condonation doctrine.

D. Testing the Condonation Doctrine.

Pascual's ratio decidendi may be dissected into three (3) parts:

First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public
officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct:

Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held not to
furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where the constitution provides
that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the removal from
office, and disqualification from holding office for the term for which the officer
was elected or appointed.
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms x x x.272

Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous

misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor; and

[T]hat the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous

misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.

Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life
and character of candidates, of their right to elect officers:
As held in Conant vs. Grogan
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of
office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their
officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that
they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded
or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the
court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the
people.274

The doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.

To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary
requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the
1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's
administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off
by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective
post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is
simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an
official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising
from an offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from
administrative offenses may be condoned bv the President in light of Section 19,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos293 to apply
to administrative offenses:

Also, it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that the grounds for discipline
enumerated therein cannot anymore be invoked against an elective local official to hold
him administratively liable once he is re-elected to office. In fact, Section 40 (b) of the
LGC precludes condonation since in the first place, an elective local official who is
meted with the penalty of removal could not be re-elected to an elective local position
due to a direct disqualification from running for such post. In similar regard, Section 52
(a) of the RRACCS imposes a penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public
office as an accessory to the penalty of dismissal from service.

To compare, some of the cases adopted in Pascual were decided by US State

jurisdictions wherein the doctrine of condonation of administrative liability was supported
by either a constitutional or statutory provision stating, in effect, that an officer cannot
be removed by a misconduct committed during a previous term,294 or that
the disqualification to hold the office does not extend beyond the term in which
the official's delinquency occurred.295 In one case,296 the absence of a provision
against the re-election of an officer removed - unlike Section 40 (b) of the LGC-was the
justification behind condonation. In another case,297 it was deemed that condonation
through re-election was a policy under their constitution - which adoption in this
jurisdiction runs counter to our present Constitution's requirements on public
accountability. There was even one case where the doctrine of condonation was not
adjudicated upon but only invoked by a party as a ground; 298 while in another case,
which was not reported in full in the official series, the crux of the disposition was that
the evidence of a prior irregularity in no way pertained to the charge at issue and
therefore, was deemed to be incompetent.299Hence, owing to either their variance or
inapplicability, none of these cases can be used as basis for the continued adoption of
the condonation doctrine under our existing laws. At best, Section 66 (b) of the LGC
prohibits the enforcement of the penalty of suspension beyond the unexpired portion of
the elective local official's prior term, and likewise allows said official to still run for re-
election.

Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that the electorate, when re-electing a local
official, are assumed to have done so with knowledge of his life and character, and that
they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any.
Suffice it to state that no such presumption exists in any statute or procedural
rule.302 Besides, it is contrary to human experience that the electorate would have full
knowledge of a public official's misdeeds. The Ombudsman correctly points out the
reality that most corrupt acts by public officers are shrouded in secrecy, and concealed
from the public.Misconduct committed by an elective official is easily covered up, and is
almost always unknown to the electorate when they cast their votes.303 At a conceptual
level, condonation presupposes that the condoner has actual knowledge of what is to
be condoned. Thus, there could be no condonation of an act that is unknown.

It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation

doctrine should beprospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the
legal system of the Philippines.305 Unto this Court devolves the sole authority to interpret
what the Constitution means, and all persons are bound to follow its interpretation.
Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a
general rule, recognized as "good law" prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the
people's reliance thereupon should be respected.

E. Consequence of ruling.

As for this section of the Decision, the issue to be resolved is whether or not
the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed injunctive writs.

It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave
abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.311 It has also been held that "grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower
court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence."312
As earlier established, records disclose that the CA's resolutions directing the issuance
of the assailed injunctive writs were all hinged on cases enunciating the condonation
doctrine. To recount, the March 16, 2015 Resolution directing the issuance of the
subject TRO was based on the case of Governor Garcia, Jr., while the April 6, 2015
Resolution directing the issuance of the subject WPI was based on the cases
of Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and again, Governor Garcia, Jr. Thus, by merely
following settled precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at that time, unwittingly
remained "good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA committed a grave abuse of
discretion based on its legal attribution above. Accordingly, the WPI against the
Ombudsman's preventive suspension order was correctly issued.

With this, the ensuing course of action should have been for the CA to resolve the main
petition forcertiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 on the merits. However, considering
that the Ombudsman, on October 9, 2015, had already found Binay, Jr. administratively
liable and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal, which carries the accessory
penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office, for the present
administrative charges against him, the said CA petition appears to have been
mooted.313 As initially intimated, the preventive suspension order is only an ancillary
issuance that, at its core, serves the purpose of assisting the Office of the Ombudsman
in its investigation. It therefore has no more purpose - and perforce, dissolves - upon the
termination of the office's process of investigation in the instant administrative case.

F. Exceptions to the mootness principle.

This notwithstanding, this Court deems it apt to clarify that the mootness of the issue
regarding the validity of the preventive suspension order subject of this case does not
preclude any of its foregoing determinations, particularly, its abandonment of the
condonation doctrine. As explained in Belgica, '"the moot and academic principle' is not
a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case. The
Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review."314 All of these
scenarios obtain in this case:

First, it would be a violation of the Court's own duty to uphold and defend the
Constitution if it were not to abandon the condonation doctrine now that its infirmities
have become apparent. As extensively discussed, the continued application of the
condonation doctrine is simply impermissible under the auspices of the present
Constitution which explicitly mandates that public office is a public trust and that public
officials shall be accountable to the people at all times.

Second, the condonation doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential creation that has

persisted as a defense of elective officials to escape administrative liability. It is the first
time that the legal intricacies of this doctrine have been brought to light; thus, this is a
situation of exceptional character which this Court must ultimately resolve. Further,
since the doctrine has served as a perennial obstacle against exacting public
accountability from the multitude of elective local officials throughout the years, it is
indubitable that paramount public interest is involved.

Third, the issue on the validity of the condonation doctrine clearly requires the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public. The
issue does not only involve an in-depth exegesis of administrative law principles, but
also puts to the forefront of legal discourse the potency of the accountability provisions
of the 1987 Constitution. The Court owes it to the bench, the bar, and the public to
explain how this controversial doctrine came about, and now, its reasons for
abandoning the same in view of its relevance on the parameters of public office.

And fourth, the defense of condonation has been consistently invoked by elective local
officials against the administrative charges filed against them. To provide a sample size,
the Ombudsman has informed the Court that "for the period of July 2013 to December
2014 alone, 85 cases from the Luzon Office and 24 cases from the Central Office were
dismissed on the ground of condonation. Thus, in just one and a half years, over a
hundred cases of alleged misconduct - involving infractions such as dishonesty,
oppression, gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct - were placed beyond the
reach of the Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutorial powers."315 Evidently, this
fortifies the finding that the case is capable of repetition and must therefore, not evade
review.

In any event, the abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within the prerogative of the
Court. As mentioned, it is its own jurisprudential creation and may therefore, pursuant to
its mandate to uphold and defend the Constitution, revoke it notwithstanding
supervening events that render the subject of discussion moot.chan