Bagabuyo v.
COMELEC 57 bills seeking the conversion of municipalities into
G.R. No. 176970 / December 8, 2008 / Brion, J./Local
government, administrative regions, autonomous
regions/GRACEgar
SUMMARY. RA No. 9371 increased CDO’s legislative district
from one to two. Bagabuyo assailed the constitutionality
of the RA since according to him, a plebiscite is needed.
SC disagreed.
DOCTRINE. The Constitution and the Local Government
Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any
creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of
boundary of a local government unit; No plebiscite
requirement exists under the apportionment or
reapportionment provision.
LOCGOV - 25
NAVARRO v. ERMITA (2011)
It must be borne in mind that the central policy
considerations in the creation of local government units
are economic viability, efficient administration, and
capability to deliver basic services to their constituents,
and the criteria prescribed by the Local Government
Code (LGC), i.e., income, population and land area, are
all designed to accomplish these results. In this light,
Congress, in its collective wisdom, has debated on the
relative weight of each of these three criteria, placing
emphasis on which of them should enjoy preferential
consideration. Without doubt, the primordial criterion in
the creation of local government units, particularly of a
province, is economic viability. This is the clear intent of the
framers of the LGC.
LOCGOV - #29
League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) v COMELEC, (Feb
2011)
Doctrine: The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an
exercise by Congress of its legislative power. The LGC is a
creation of Congress through its law-making powers.
Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it did when
it enacted R.A. No. 9009 and when it enacted the
Cityhood Laws. Congress deemed it wiser to exempt
respondent municipalities from belatedly imposed
modified income requirement in order to uphold its higher
calling of putting flesh and blood to the very intent and
thrust of the LGC, which is countryside development and
autonomy.
Facts:
Petitions for prohibition were filed by the League of Cities
of the Philippines assailing the constitutionality of 16 laws
converting the municipality covered thereby into a
component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting
plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws.
League of Cities vs. COMELEC
GR No. 176951; April 12, 2011; Bersamin, J.
SUMMARY:
component cities were filed but Congress acted only on
33 bills leaving 24 municipalities. Meanwhile, RA 9009
became effective increasing the income requirement to
qualify for conversion into a city from 20M to 100M.
Afterwards, 16 of the 24 filed individual cityhood bills all
containing a common provision exempting them from the
100M income requirement. Petitioner LCP alleges that the
16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional for violating the
equal protection clause and the constitutional
requirement that LGUs shall have a just share in the
national taxes.
In the Nov 2008 ruling, SC (6-5 vote) declared them
unconstitutional. SC then denied the 1 st MR (7-5 vote). On
Apr 2009, the SC denied a 2nd MR (6-6). On Dec 2009, SC
reversed itself and declared the laws constitutional (6-4).
On Aug 2010, SC again reversed itself and granted LCP’s
MR. On Feb 2011, SC reversed itself and declared the laws
constitutional. LCP thus filed this Ad Cautelam MR alleging
that the SC can no longer modify its decision since it has
already become final and executory. The SC denies this
and upholds the laws’ constitutionality.
SEMA v COMELEC
G.R. No.177597 & 178628 / July 16 2008 / Carpio, J. (hallo,
this is 72 pages, I’ll try to make it short)
SUMMARY. Under the amended organic act of the ARMM
(RA 9054), the ARMM regional assembly had the power to
create provinces, which it invoked in enacting MMA 201
creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. COMELEC
declared, through Resolution 7902, that Cotabato city was
still part of the legislative district of Shariff Kabunsuan.
Sema and Marquez argued that Cotabato city was not a
part of said legislative district. SC ruled that the power to
create provinces rests only in the legislature and could not
be delegated, as such the creation of Shariff Kabunsuan
was unconstitutional.
DOCTRINE. The creation of a legislative district by Congress
does not emanate alone from Congress power to
reapportion legislative districts, but also from Congress
power to create provinces which cannot be created
without a legislative district. Thus, when a province is
created, a legislative district is created by operation of the
Constitution because the Constitution provides that each
province shall have at least one representative in the
House of Representatives.
LOC GOV – No. 16
Tan v. Comelec (1986)
J. Alampay
When the Constitution speaks of “the unit or units
affected,” it means all of the people of the province (city,
municipality, or barangay) if the province (city,
municipality, or barangay) is to be divided or all of the
people of two or more provinces (cities, municipalities, or
barangays) if there be a merger. Congress cannot, by
mere legislative fiat, diminish or restrict “the unit or units
affected” referred to by the Constitution to cities and
municipalities comprising the new province, thereby
ignoring the evident reality that there are other people
necessarily affected.
Background
1. BP 885 (an act creating a new province—Negros del
Norte) took effect in 1985. Thereafter, petitioners (residents
of Negros Occidental) filed a petition for prohibition
against respondents Comelec and Provincial Treasurer of
Negros Occidental: to enjoin the former from conducting
the plebiscite pursuant to said BP, and to enjoin the latter
from disbursing the funds for said plebiscite. The BP
provided that 3 cities and 8 municipalities (all in northern
Negros) would constitute the new province, and that the
territorial area of Negros del Norte would be 4,019 sq. km
more or less.
2. The plebiscite was nevertheless conducted
(participated in only by a select few voters, namely the
residents of the 3 cities and 8 municipalities of the
proposed new province and not by the voters of the entire
Negros Occidental province), so petitioners filed a
supplemental petition (recognizing that their initial petition
to prohibit the conduct of plebiscite had been mooted)
this time to prohibit respondent Comelec from issuing the
official proclamation of the results of the plebiscite, and to
compel respondent Comelec to hold another plebiscite
wherein all the voters of the entire province of Negros
Occidental shall be allowed to participate.
3. Sen. Ambrosio Padilla filed a motion that he be allowed
to appear as amicus curiae, which was granted.
MIRANDA V. AGUIRRE
G.R. No. 133064 / SEPT 16, 1999 / PUNO, J. /
LOCGOV – Plebiscite / JCFMAGSINO
SUMMARY: RA No. 7720, which converted the municipality
of Santiago, Isabela into an independent component city
was signed into law. The people of Santiago ratified it in a
plebiscite. RA No. 8528 was enacted. It amended RA No.
7720, it changed the status of Santiago from an
independent component city to a component city.
Miranda, mayor of Santiago assailed the constitutionality
of RA No. 8528 due to lack of ratification through plebiscite
pursuant to Sec. 10, Article X of the Constitution.
DOCTRINE: Sec. 10, Art. X addressed the undesirable
practice where LGUs were created, abolished, etc. on the
basis of vagaries of politics and not of the people’s
welfare. The consent of the people was required to serve
as a checking mechanism to any exercise of legislative
power. It is one instance where the people in their
sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects them.
This is also in accord with the philosophy of the Constitution
granting more autonomy to LGUs.
UMALI vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 203974
"Political units directly affected" defined
In identifying the LGU or LGUs that should be allowed to
take part in the plebiscite, what should primarily be
determined is whether or not the unit or units that desire to
participate will be "directly affected" by the change.
Petitioner Umali asseverates that Sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution should be the basis for determining the
qualified voters who will participate in the plebiscite to
resolve the issue. Sec. 10, Art. X reads:
Section 10, Article X. – No province, city, municipality, or
barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished,
or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.
Petitioner Umali elucidates that the phrase "political units
directly affected" necessarily encompasses not only
Cabanatuan City but the entire province of Nueva Ecija.
Hence, all the registered voters in the province are
qualified to cast their votes in resolving the proposed
conversion of Cabanatuan City.
On the other hand, respondents invoke Sec. 453 of the
LGC to support their claim that only the City of
Cabanatuan should be allowed to take part in the voting.
Sec. 453 states:
Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. – It
shall be the duty of the President to declare a city as highly
urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the
minimum requirements prescribed in the immediately
preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and
ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein.
Respondents take the phrase "registered voters therein" in
Sec. 453 as referring only to the registered voters in the city
being converted, excluding in the process the voters in the
remaining towns and cities of Nueva Ecija.
In this case, the provision merely authorized the President
to make a determination on whether or not the
requirements under Sec. 4521 of the LGC are complied
with. The provision makes it ministerial for the President,
upon proper application, to declare a component city as
highly urbanized once the minimum requirements, which
are based on certifiable and measurable indices under
Sec. 452, are satisfied. The mandatory language "shall"
used in the provision leaves the President with no room for
discretion.
In so doing, Sec. 453, in effect, automatically calls for the
conduct of a plebiscite for purposes of conversions once
the requirements are met. No further legislation is
necessary before the city proposed to be converted
becomes eligible to become an HUC through ratification,
as the basis for the delegation of the legislative authority is
the very LGC.
The plebiscite requirement under the constitutional
provision should equally apply to conversions as well.
While conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in
Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution we nevertheless observe
that the conversion of a component city into an HUC is
substantial alteration of boundaries.
Abbas vs. COMELEC
G.R. No.89651 and 89965/ November 10 1989 / Cortes,
J./LOCGOV-Local governments, Administrative regions,
Autonomous regions/JMQAquino
SUMMARY. Petitioners assail the validity and
constitutionality of RA6734 (Organic Act for ARMM) on the
grounds that: (a) it conflicts with the Tripoli Agreement; (b)
it unconditionally creates an autonomous region ; (c) it
violates the constitutional requirement that only areas
which share common characteristics shall be included; (d)
it is violative of equal protection ;(e) it violates religious
freedom; (f) that the president may choose to merge
existing regions without conducting a plebiscite contrary
to the constitution; (g) that the organization of an
Oversight Committee would delay the creation of an
autonomous region which, according to the Constitution,
shall take effect upon the conduct of a plebiscite
LocGov #94
Arsadi M. DISOMANGCOP and Ramir M. Dimalotang,
petitioners,
vs.
Secretary of the DPWH Simeon A. DATUMANONG and the
Secretary of Budget and Management Emilia T. Boncodin,
respondents.
(Nov. 25, 2004)
Doctrine: “The creation of autonomous regions
contemplates the grant of political autonomy. It
serves as a break from Congress’ control over
local government affairs.”
Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. COA
Petition to assail constitutionality of EO 220
The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the
creation of an autonomous region in the Cordilleras. A
Regional Consultative Commission shall first be created.
The President shall then appoint the members of a
Regional Consultative Commission from a list of nominees
from multi-sectoral bodies. The commission shall assist the
Congress in preparing the organic act for the autonomous
region. The first Congress under the 1987 Constitution within
eighteen months shall pass the organic act from the time
of its organization and enactment into law. Thereafter
there shall be held a plebiscite for the approval of the
organic act. Only then, after its approval in the plebiscite,
shall the autonomous region be created.
ORDILLO V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 93054 / DEC 4, 1990 / GUTIERREZ, Jr., J. /
LOCGOV – Local Governments, Administrative Regions,
Autonomous Regions / JCFMAGSINO
SUMMARY: A plebiscite was conducted for the approval
of the CAR Organic Act. Only a majority from the province
of Ifugao approved said Act. COMELEC issued a resolution
stating that the Organic Act has been approved only by
the province of Ifugao. The SOJ, on the other hand, issued
a memo stating that only Ifugao – due to its majority votes,
approving the Organic Act, alone, legally and validly
constitute the CAR. Executive Secretary then issues a
memo asking the CEB and CRA to wind-up its affairs.
DOCTRINE: An autonomous region cannot be created if
only one province approved of its creation in the
plebiscite called for the purpose.
MMDA vs BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION
G.R. No. 135962 / March 27, 2000 / PUNO, J./ LOCGOV –
MISCELLANEOUS AND FINAL PROVISIONS – THE MMDA /
REDMAINES
SUMMARY. MMDA sought to open Neptune St. in Makati,
a private subdivision road, and to cause the demolition of
its perimeter walls. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., the
registered owner of Neptune St. and the perimeter walls,
filed for injunction. MMDA argues that it has authority
because it is an agent of the State and such orders are
part of its exercise of police power.
SC ruled that MMDA’s orders have no legal mooring. First,
police power is vested with the legislature and MMDA has
no legislative power under its Charter, RA 7924. MMDA was
limited only to administrative functions. Second, MMDA
cannot invoke the powers of its precursor, MMC, because
in the latter’s Charter, there was an express grant to enact
or approve ordinances; such grant is absent in MMDA’s
Charter. Finally, there was no legislative intent to grant it
with such powers and its Council, the Metropolitan Manila
Council, is limited only to administrative rules and
regulations.
DOCTRINE. An LGU is a “political subdivision of a nation or
a state which is constituted by law and has substantial
control of local affairs.” MMDA is not an LGU, not even a
special metropolitan political subdivision as contemplated
in Sec. 11, Art. X Const, and it is not endowed with
legislative power to enact ordinances for the welfare of
the community.
MMDA v. GARIN
G.R. No. 130230/ April 15 2005/ Chico-Nazario, J.
/LOCGOV/ Miggy
SUMMARY. A lawyer who got his license confiscated by the
MMDA is questioning its power to do the same under Sec.
5(f) of RA 7294. Held: The MMDA has no police power, all
its functions are administrative in nature. It may only
enforce, but not enact ordinances since it is not a political
unit. It cannot summarily confiscate licenses for public
safety without any other legislative enactment. Sec. 5(f)
mandates that the MMDA shall enforce all traffic laws and
regulations.
DOCTRINE. *The implementation of MMDA Circular 4 made
the issue moot and academic. However, MMDA is not
precluded from re-implementing the former circular, or
any other scheme, for that matter, that would entail
confiscating driver’s licenses. For the proper
implementation of its future programs, the Ct deems it
appropriate to make the ff observations:
RA 7924 does NOT grant the MMDA with police power, let
alone legislative power, and that all its functions are
administrative in nature. Insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No.
7924 grants the MMDA the power to confiscate and
suspend or revoke drivers licenses without need of any
other legislative enactment, such is an UNAUTHORIZED
exercise of police power. Having been lodged primarily in
the National Legislature, police power cannot be
exercised by any group or body of individuals not
possessing legislative power.
Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing
traffic regulations. Thus, where there is a traffic law or
regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those
agencies to whom legislative powers have been
delegated, like the City of Manila, in this case, MMDA is not
precluded, and is in fact duty-bound, to confiscate and
suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses in the exercise of its
mandate of transport and traffic mgt

MMDA v. Viron Transport Co., Inc.

G.R. No. 70656-57/ August 15, 2007/ Carpio-Morales,
J./MMDA/GRACEgar

SUMMARY. As early as 1969, traffic was a problem in Metro

Manila. On February 10, 2003, then-President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued an Executive Order (179) for the
establishment of the Greater Manila Mass Transport
system. It designated the MMDA as the implementing
agency for a mass transport terminal facilities project,
which was recommended by the MMDA as a means to
alleviate Metro Manila’s traffic caused by buses and the
inefficient connectivity of transportation systems. The
MMDA was to prepare the master plan, coordinate land
use, supervise and manage construction, execute the
necessary contracts and agreements, manage the funds,
enlist the assistance of other government instrumentalities,
and assign and hire personnel. The project also entailed
the closure of existing provincial bus terminals. The Metro
Manila Council supported the project, citing bus terminals
as a contributor to traffic. Provincial bus operators (Viron
Transport Co., Inc. and Mencorp Transportation System,
Inc.) sought declaratory relief against the project. The trial
court initially found for the MMDA but reversed itself. The
SC upheld the trial court’s reversal, holding that the MMDA
cannot be the implementing agency for the project as its
charter does not include police or legislative powers.
Assuming that it has police powers, the proposed project
fails the test for the valid exercise of police power.
DOCTRINE. In light of the administrative nature of its
powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to
implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it
could not have been validly designated by the President
to undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot
validly order the elimination of respondents’ terminals.
Even the MMDA’s claimed authority under the police
power must necessarily fail in consonance with the
above-quoted ruling in MMDA v. Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc., 328 SCRA 836 (2000), and this Court’s
subsequent ruling in Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority v. Garin, 456 SCRA 176 (2005), that the MMDA is
not vested with police power.