CAYETANO VS.

MONSOD
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
In 1991, Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of chairman
of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification
of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-
C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree,
and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years.
Monsod’s track record as a lawyer:
1. Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.
2. Immediately after passing, worked in his father’s law firm for one year.
3. Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where he had a degree in economics and held various positions in various
foreign corporations.
4. In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive jobs for various local corporations until 1986.
5. In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional Commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod qualifies as chairman of the COMELEC. What constitutes practice of law?
HELD: Yes. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy
the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of
the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which service requires the use in
any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In view of the foregoing, the petition
is DISMISSED.
PEOPLE VS. MACEDA
G.R. Nos. 89591-96 January 24, 2000
On September 8, 1999, we denied the Peoples motion seeking reconsideration of our August 13, 1990 decision in
these cases. In said resolution, we held that respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda committed no grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the order of August 8, 1989 giving custody over private respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, Atty. Deogracias del Rosario, during the pendency of Criminal
Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At that time, sufficient reason was shown why private respondent Javellana should not be detained
at the Antique Provincial Jail. The trial courts order specifically provided for private respondents detention at the residence
of Atty. del Rosario. However, private respondent was not to be allowed liberty to roam around but was to be held as
detention prisoner in said residence.
This order of the trial court was not strictly complied with because private respondent was not detained in the
residence of Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his normal activities as if he were a free man, including engaging in the
practice of law. Despite our resolution of July 30, 1990 prohibiting private respondent to appear as counsel in Criminal Case
No. 4262, the latter accepted cases and continued practicing law.
 On April 7, 1997, Senior State Prosecutor Henrick F. Guingoyon filed with the Supreme Court a motion seeking
clarification on the following questions: "(1) Does the resolution of this Honorable Court dated July 30, 1990, prohibiting
Atty. Javellana from appearing as counsel refer only to Criminal Case No. 4262? (2) Is Atty. now (Judge) Deogracias del
Rosario still the custodian of Atty. Javellana? and (3) Since it appears that Atty. (now Judge) del Rosario never really held
and detained Atty. Javellana as prisoner in his residence, is not Atty. Javellana considered an escapee or a fugitive of justice
for which warrant for his arrest should forthwith be issued?"
In a resolution dated June 18, 1997, we "noted" the above motion.
After we denied the motion for reconsideration on September 8, 1999, the trial court resumed hearing Criminal
Cases Nos. 3350-3355. Earlier, on August 2, 1999, Rolando Mijares filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose,
Antique, a motion seeking the revocation of the trial courts custody order and the imprisonment of private respondent
Javellana in the provincial jail.
On November 15, 1999, private respondent Javellana filed with the Supreme Court an urgent motion seeking to
clarify whether the June 18, 1997 resolution finally terminated or resolved the motion for clarification filed by the State
Prosecutor on April 7, 1997.
Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of criminal cases against him. By such arrest, he
is deemed to be under the custody of the law. The trial court gave Atty. Deogracias del Rosario the custody of private
respondent Javellana with the obligation "to hold and detain" him in Atty. del Rosarios residence in his official capacity as
the clerk of court of the regional trial court. Hence, when Atty. del Rosario was appointed judge, he ceased to be the
personal custodian of accused Javellana and the succeeding clerk of court must be deemed the custodian under the same
undertaking.
In our mind, the perceived threats to private respondent Javelanas life no longer exist. Thus, the trial courts order
dated August 8, 1989 giving custody over him to the clerk of court must be recalled, and he shall be detained at the
Provincial Jail of Antique at San Jose, Antique.
Regarding his continued practice of law, as a detention prisoner private respondent Javellana is not allowed to
practice his profession as a necessary consequence of his status as a detention prisoner. The trial courts order was clear
that private respondent "is not to be allowed liberty to roam around but is to be held as a detention prisoner." The
prohibition to practice law referred not only to Criminal Case No. 4262, but to all other cases as well, except in cases where
private respondent would appear in court to defend himself. Spped
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of
the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the
offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be
released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final
sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive,
while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention. Consequently, all the accused in Criminal Cases
Nos. 3350-3355 must be confined in the Provincial Jail of Antique.
Considering that the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 has dragged on for more than ten (10) years, the
presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, is ordered to continue with the trial of said criminal
cases with all deliberate dispatch and to avoid further delay.
WHEREFORE, the August 8, 1989 order of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE. All accused in Criminal Cases Nos.
3350-3355, including Avelino T. Javellana and Arturo F. Pacificador are ordered detained at the Provincial Jail of Antique,
San Jose, Antique, effective immediately, and shall not be allowed to go out of the jail for any reason or guise, except upon
prior written permission of the trial court for a lawful purpose.
Let copies of this resolution be given to the Provincial Director, PNP Antique Provincial Police Office, San Jose,
Antique and to the Provincial Jail Warden, Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose, Antique. SO ORDERED.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA
A.M. No. P-99-1287. January 26, 2001

In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 133, requested the Court Administrator, Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, for authority to appear as pro
bono counsel of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, in Criminal Case No. 84885, entitled People vs. Narcisa Naldoza
Ladaga for Falsification of Public Document pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 40. While
respondents letter-request was pending action, Lisa Payoyo Andres, the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 84885,
sent a letter to the Court Administrator, dated September 2, 1998, requesting for a certification with regard to respondents
authority to appear as counsel for the accused in the said criminal case. On September 7, 1998, the Office of the Court
Administrator referred the matter to respondent for comment.
In his Comment, dated September 14, 1998, respondent admitted that he had appeared in Criminal Case No. 84885
without prior authorization. He reasoned out that the factual circumstances surrounding the criminal case compelled him
to handle the defense of his cousin who did not have enough resources to hire the services of a counsel de parte; while, on
the other hand, private complainant was a member of a powerful family who was out to get even with his
cousin. Furthermore, he rationalized that his appearance in the criminal case did not prejudice his office nor the interest of
the public since he did not take advantage of his position. In any case, his appearances in court were covered by leave
application approved by the presiding judge.
On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a resolution denying respondents request for authorization to appear as
counsel and directing the Office of the Court Administrator to file formal charges against him for appearing in court without
the required authorization from the Court. On January 25, 1999, the Court Administrator filed the instant administrative
complaint against respondent for violating Sec. 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, which provides:
Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now
prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public
official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto.- Public officials and employees during their incumbency
shall not:
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, Provided, that
such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions;
In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we required respondent to comment on the administrative complaint.
In his Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms. Ladaga are close blood cousins who belong to a powerless
family from the impoverished town of Bacauag, Surigao del Norte. From childhood until he finished his law degree, Ms.
Ladaga had always supported and guided him while he looked up to her as a mentor and an adviser. Because of their close
relationship, Ms. Ladaga sought respondents help and advice when she was charged in Criminal Case No. 84885 for
falsification by the private complainant, Lisa Payoyo Andres, whose only purpose in filing the said criminal case was to seek
vengeance on her cousin. He explained that his cousins discord with Ms. Andres started when the latters husband, SPO4
Pedro Andres, left the conjugal home to cohabit with Ms. Ladaga. During the course of their illicit affair, SPO4 Andres and
Ms. Ladaga begot three (3) children. The birth certificate of their eldest child is the subject of the falsification charge against
Ms. Ladaga. Respondent stated that since he is the only lawyer in their family, he felt it to be his duty to accept Ms. Ladagas
plea to be her counsel since she did not have enough funds to pay for the services of a lawyer. Respondent also pointed out
that in his seven (7) years of untainted government service, initially with the Commission on Human Rights and now with
the judiciary, he had performed his duties with honesty and integrity and that it was only in this particular case that he had
been administratively charged for extending a helping hand to a close relative by giving a free legal assistance for
humanitarian purpose. He never took advantage of his position as branch clerk of court since the questioned appearances
were made in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City and not in Makati where he is holding office. He stressed that
during the hearings of the criminal case, he was on leave as shown by his approved leave applications attached to his
comment.
In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted respondents comment and referred the administrative matter to
the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Judge Josefina Guevarra-Salonga, for investigation, report and
recommendation.
In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge Salonga made the following findings and recommendation:
 There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga appeared as counsel for and in behalf of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza
Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for Falsification of Public Documents before the METC of Quezon City. It is
also denied that the appearance of said respondent in said case was without the previous permission of the Court.
An examination of the records shows that during the occasions that the respondent appeared as such counsel
before the METC of Quezon City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his Presiding Judge, Judge Napoleon
Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling. That the respondent appeared as pro bono counsel likewise cannot be
denied. His cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga herself positively declared that the respondent did not receive a single centavo
from her. Helpless as she was and respondent being the only lawyer in the family, he agreed to represent her out of his
compassion and high regard for her.
It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first time that respondent ever handled a case for a member of his
family who is like a big sister to him. He appeared for free and for the purpose of settling the case amicably. Furthermore,
his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as counsel for his cousin. On top of this, during all the years that he has
been in government service, he has maintained his integrity and independence.
RECOMMENDATION
In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the respondent appeared as counsel for his cousin without first
securing permission from the court, and considering that this is his first time to do it coupled with the fact that said
appearance was not for a fee and was with the knowledge of his Presiding Judge, it is hereby respectfully recommended
that he be REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt with more severely.
We agree with the recommendation of the investigating judge.
Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice of their profession. A similar prohibition is
found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private
practice of their profession. The said section reads:
SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice.- No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the
Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients.
However, it should be clarified that private practice of a profession, specifically the law profession in this case,
which is prohibited, does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the
same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.
In the case of People vs. Villanueva, we explained the meaning of the term private practice prohibited by the said
section, to wit:
We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice, within the
meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768) Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding ones self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State
vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of
engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and
continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation,
as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate
superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro bono counsel of
his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the private practice of the law profession contemplated by law.
Nonetheless, while respondents isolated court appearances did not amount to a private practice of law, he failed
to obtain a written permission therefor from the head of the Department, which is this Court as required by Section 12,
Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, thus:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected
with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the
Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and
responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee
is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency
to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, That no
permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent
conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he
shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors.
Respondent entered his appearance and attended court proceedings on numerous occasions, i.e., May 4-15, 1998,
June 18, 1998, July 13, 1998 and August 5, 1998, as borne out by his own admission. It is true that he filed leave applications
corresponding to the dates he appeared in court. However, he failed to obtain a prior permission from the head of the
Department. The presiding judge of the court to which respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department
contemplated by law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga is hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern
warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.
IN RE: VICENTE ALMACEN
G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970
Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case. They lost in said civil case but Almacen filed
a Motion for Reconsideration. He notified the opposing party of said motion but he failed to indicate the time and place of
hearing of said motion. Hence, his motion was denied. He then appealed but the Court of Appeals denied his appeal as it
agreed with the trial court with regard to the motion for reconsideration. Eventually, Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari
before the Supreme Court which outrightly denied his appeal in a minute resolution.
This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute resolutions as unconstitutional. He then filed before the
Supreme Court a petition to surrender his lawyer’s certificate of title as he claimed that it is useless to continue practicing
his profession when members of the high court are men who are calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons
their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. He further alleged that
due to the minute resolution, his client was made to pay P120k without knowing the reasons why and that he became “one
of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.” He also stated “that justice as administered by the present members
of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.”
The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacen’s petition as the Court wanted to wait for Almacen to
ctually surrender his certificate. Almacen did not surrender his lawyer’s certificate though as he now argues that he chose
not to. Almacen then asked that he may be permitted “to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken
against him . . . in an open and public hearing.” He said he preferred this considering that the Supreme Court is “the
complainant, prosecutor and Judge.” Almacen was however unapologetic.
ISSUE: Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed because the Supreme Court cannot
accept every case or write full opinion for every petition they reject otherwise the High Court would be unable to effectively
carry out its constitutional duties. The proper role of the Supreme Court is to decide “only those cases which present
questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved.” It should
be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court’s denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already
mentioned in the Court of Appeals’ opinion.
On Almacen’s attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court regarded said criticisms as uncalled for; that such
is insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory. It is true that a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and
as a citizen, has the right to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence
of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. But it is the cardinal condition of all such
criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism
is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts.
 In the case at bar, Almacen’s criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer, he should have known that a motion for
reconsideration which failed to notify the opposing party of the time and place of trial is a mere scrap of paper and will not
be entertained by the court. He has only himself to blame and he is the reason why his client lost. Almacen was suspended
indefinitely.
IN RE: LANUEVO
A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
FACTS: This is an administrative proceeding against Victorio Lanueva who was the Bar Confidant during the 1971
Bar Examination emanating from the revelation of one Oscar Landicho, a bar examinee of the same bar exam, in his
confidential letter that the result of the bar exam of one of the bar examinee later identified as Ramon Galang was raised
before the result was released to make him pass the bar. Acting upon said letter, the court called the 5 bar examiners and
the Bar Confident Lanuevo to submit their sworn statements on the matter. It appears that each of the 5 bar examiners
were approached by Lanuevo with the examination booklet asking them to re-evaluate the grades of the bar examiner
explaining that it is a practice policy in bar exams that he will review the grades obtained in all subjects by an examinee and
when he finds a candidate to have extraordinary high grades in other subjects and low grade in one subject he can bring it
to the examiner for reconsideration to help the candidate pass. In good faith of trust and confidence to the authority of
Lanuevo, the examiners re-evaluated the exam of the candidate and reconsider the grade they give for each subject matter.
Further investigation also revealed that Ramon Galang was charged with crime of slight physical injuries in the Mla. MTC
but did not revealed the information in his application to take the bar examination.
ISSUE: WON Lanuevo has the authority to ask bar examiners to re-evaluate and re-correct the examination result
of a bar candidate.
RULING: The court ruled that it is evident that Lanuevo has deceptively staged a plot to convince each examiner
individually to re-evaluate the grades of Galang in order to help him pass the bar without prior authorization of the Court.
His duty as a Bar Confident is limited only as a custodian of the examination notebooks after they are corrected by the
examiners where he is tasked to tally the general average of the bar candidate. All requests for re-evaluation of grades from
the bar exam shall be made by the candidate themselves. With the facts fully established that Lanuevo initiated the re-
evaluation of the exam answers of Galang without the authority of the Court, he has breached the trust and confidence
given to him by the court and was disbarred with his name stricken out from the rolls of attorneys. Galang was likewise
disbarred for fraudulently concealing the criminal charges against him in his application for the bar exam while under oath
constituting perjury. The court believed that the 5 bar examiners acted in good faith and thereby absolved from the case
but reminded to perform their duties with due care.