Upholding the Constitution and the Law
the door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of
MONTECILLO VS GICA, 60 SCRA 234
FACTS: Gica appealed the award of damages to the
Court of Appeals where the latter court reversed the
same. Atty. Del Mar then filed a motion for
reconsideration where he made a veiled threat against
the Court of Appeals judges intimating that he thinks the
CA justices “knowingly rendered an unjust decision”
and “judgment has been rendered through
negligence” and that the CA allowed itself to be
deceived.
The CA denied the MFR and it admonished Atty. Del
Mar from using such tone with the court. Del Mar then
filed a second MFR where he again made threats. The
CA then ordered del Mar to show cause as to why he
should not be punished for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Del Mar should be
suspended.
HELD: Yes. Atty. Del Mar, by his contemptuous acts is in
violation of his duties to the courts. As an officer of the
court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard
towards the court so essential to the proper
administration of justice.
It is manifest that del Mar has scant respect for the two
highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of
alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to
challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that
they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his
allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if
not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the
case of his client.
Del Mar was then suspended indefinitely.
LEE VS TAMBAGO, ADM CASE NO. 5281
FEBRUARY 12, 2008
Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent, Atty.
Regino B. Tambago, with violation of Notarial Law and
the Ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a will that
is alleged to be spurious in nature in containing forged
signatures of his father, the decedent, Vicente Lee Sr.
and two other witnesses. In the said will, the decedent
supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his wife Lim
Hock Lee, save for a parcel of land which he devised to
Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half-siblings of
complainant.
ISSUE: Was the will spurious?
HELD: Yes, thus Tambago violated the Notarial Law and
the ethics of legal profession.
The law provides for certain formalities that must be
followed in the execution of wills. The object of
solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close
wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and
authenticity.
The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold
purpose: (1) to safeguard the testator’s wishes long after
his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is
administered in the manner that he intends it to be
done.
A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the
will in question shows that this particular requirement
was neither strictly nor substantially complied with. For
one, there was the conspicuous absence of a notation
of the residence certificates of the notarial witnesses
Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment. Similarly,
the notation of the testator’s old residence certificate in
the same acknowledgment was a clear breach of the
law. These omissions by respondent invalidated the will.
As the acknowledging officer of the contested will,
respondent was required to faithfully observe the
formalities of a will and those of notarization. These
formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded.
IN RE GUTIERREZ, 5 SCRA 661 (1962)
Attorney Diosdado Gutierrez was convicted for the
murder of one Filemon Samaco in 1956. He was
sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In 1958,
after serving a portion of the penalty, he was granted a
conditional pardon by the President. He was released
on the condition that he shall not commit any crime.
Subsequently, the widow of Samaco filed a disbarment
case against Gutierrez by reason of the latter’s
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Murder,
is without a doubt, such a crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred
considering the fact that he was granted pardon.
HELD: Yes. The pardon granted to Gutierrez is not
absolute but conditional. It merely remitted his
sentence. It does not reach the offense itself. Gutierrez
must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for
murder without regard to the pardon (which he invoked
in defense). The crime was actually qualified by
treachery and aggravated by its having been
committed in hand, by taking advantage of his official
position (Gutierrez being municipal mayor at the time)
and with the use of motor vehicle. The degree of moral
turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged
from the profession.
ORONCE VS COURT OF APPEALS, 298 SCRA 133 (1998)
Facts: During a dispute over land, Flaminiano illegally
took possession of the property in litigation using abusive
methods. She was aided by her husband, a lawyer. The
illegal entry took place while the case was pending in
the CA & while a writ of preliminary injunction was in
force.
HELD: Atty. Flaminiano’s acts of entering the property
without the consent of its occupants & in contravention
of the existing writ or preliminary injunction & making
utterances showing disrespect for the law & this Court,
are unbecoming of a member of the Bar. Although he
says that they “peacefully” took over the property, such
“peaceful” take-over cannot justify defiance of the writ
of preliminary injunction that he knew was still in force.
Through his acts, he has flouted his duties as a member
of the legal profession. Under the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he is prohibited from counseling or
abetting “activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.”
DE YSASI VS NLRC, 231 SCRA 173 (1994)
Jon De Ysasi and Jon De Ysasi III are father and sons
respectively. The elder Ysasi owns a hacienda in Negros
Occidental. De Ysasi III is employed in the hacienda as
the farm administrator. In November 1982, De Ysasi III
underwent surgery and so he missed work. He was
confined and while he’s nursing from his infections he
was terminated, without due process, by his father. De
Ysasi III filed against his father for illegal dismissal before
the National Labor Relations Commission. His father
invoked that his son actually abandoned his work.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Ysasi III abandoned his work.
HELD: No. His absence from work does not constitute
abandonment. To constitute abandonment, there must
be a.) failure to report for work or absence without valid
or justifiable reason, and b.) a clear intention to sever
the employer-employee relationship, with the second
element as the more determinative factor and being
manifested by some overt acts. No such intent was
proven in this case.
The Supreme Court, in making its decision, noted that
the lawyers for both camps failed to exert all reasonable
efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of
court and especially in consideration of the direct and
immediate consanguineous ties between their clients
especially considering that the parties involved are
father and son. This case may have never reached the
courts had there been an earnest effort by the lawyers
to have both parties find an off court settlement but
records show that no such effort was made. The useful
function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but
to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or
withholding suit. He is often called upon less for
dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every
phase of life. He should be a mediator for concord and
a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of
technicality in the conduct of litigation.
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
explicitly provides that “(a) lawyer shall encourage his
client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will
admit of a fair settlement.” Both counsel fell short of
what was expected of them, despite their avowed
duties as officers of the court. In the same manner, the
labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has
been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor
Code mandating that a labor arbiter “shall exert all
efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor
dispute within his jurisdiction.” If he ever did so, or at
least entertained the thought, the copious records of
the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any
reflection of the same.
PAJARES VS ABAD SANTOS 30 SCRA 748 (1969)
FACTS:
Udharam Bazar & Co. sued Gloria Pajares for recovery
of a certain sum of money. The lawsuit was eventually
assigned to the sala of the respondent Judge Abad
Santos.
In its complaint the Udharam Bazar & Co. averred,
among others, as follows:
“2. That defendant in 1961, ordered from the plaintiff
quantities of ready made goods and delivered to her in
good condition and same were already sold, but did
not make the full payment up to the present time;
“3. That defendant is still indebted to the plaintiff in the
sum of P354.85, representing the balance of her
account as the value of the said goods, which is already
overdue and payable.”
Instead of answering the complaint against her, Pajares,
moved for a bill of particulars to require Udharam Bazar
& Co. to itemize the kinds of goods which she
supposedly purchased from the said company.
The inferior court denied the motion and her motion for
reconsideration has been likewise denied. She then
brought the incident on certiorari to the Court of First
Instance, alleging respondent judge acted in grave
abuse of discretion.
Udharam Bazar & Co. filed a motion to dismiss the
petition for a writ of certiorari and was granted. A
subsequent motion for reconsideration having been
similarly denied by the court, Pajares undertook the
present appeal to this Court.
ISSUE:
WON counsel for petitioner failed in his duty to
encourage amicable settlement or a confession of
judgment to accord respect to the other party’s claim,
saving his client additional expenses and help prevent
the clogging of court dockets.
RULING:
The circumstances surrounding this litigation definitely
prove that the appeal is frivolous and a plain trick to
delay payment and prolong litigation unnecessarily.
Such attitude deserves condemnation, wasting as it
does, the time that the courts could well devote to
meritorious cases.
This simple collection case has needlessly clogged the
court dockets for over seven years. Had appellant been
but prudently advised by her counsel to confess
judgment and ask from her creditor the reasonable time
she needed to discharge her lawful indebtedness, the
expenses of litigation that she has incurred by way of
filing fees in the Court of First Instance, premiums for her
appeal bond, appellate court docket fees, printing of
her appellant’s brief, and attorney’s fees would have
been much more than sufficient to pay off her just debt
to appellee. Yet, here she still remains saddled with the
same debt, burdened by accumulated interests, after
having spent uselessly much more than the amount in
litigation in this worthless cause.
The cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is
needed so that needless clogging of the court dockets
with unmeritorious cases may be avoided. A litigation
involves time, expense and ill feelings, which may well
be avoided by the settlement of the action. And in
those clearly unmeritorious cases, a compromise or
even a confession of judgment will accord respect to
the just claim of the other party, save the client
additional expenses and help prevent clogging of court
dockets.
MANUEL YUHICO VS FRED GUTIERREZ, A.C. NO. 8391,
NOVEMBER 23, 2010
Attorney; gross misconduct. Deliberate failure to pay just
debts constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer
may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of
law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of
justice and vanguards of our legal system. They must, at
all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the
bar, the courts and to their clients, which include
prompt payment of financial obligations.
In view of the previous disbarment of Gutierrez, the
IBP-CBD recommended to the Court that, instead of
rendering the instant case moot, Gutierrez should be
disbarred anew effective upon the expiration of the
sanction pursuant to the March 26, 2004 Supreme Court
Decision. The IBP-CBD explained that while we do not
have jurisprudence on the issue of double or multiple
disbarment, the American jurisprudence, however,
recognizes double or multiple disbarments as well as the
minimum requirement of five (5) years for readmission to
the Bar.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, in
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-649, resolved to adopt the
report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD and
approve it with modification as to the payment of the
amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos (P90,000.00), this time,
without interest.
We sustain the findings of the IBP, but with modification
as to its recommendations.
We have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts
constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be
sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law.
Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice
and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected
to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high
standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing
so that the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial
system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully
perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and
to their clients, which include prompt payment of
financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a
manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[7]
In the instant case, there is no question as to Gutierrez's
guilt. His admission of the loan he contracted and his
failure to pay the same leaves no room for
interpretation. Neither can he justify his act of
non-payment of debt by his dire financial condition.
Gutierrez should not have contracted loans which are
beyond his financial capacity to pay.
Likewise, we cannot overlook Gutierrez's propensity of
employing deceit and misrepresentations for the
purpose of obtaining debts without the intention of
paying them. Records show Gutierrez's pattern of
habitually making promises of paying his debts, yet
repeatedly failing to deliver. The series of text messages
he sent to Yuhico promising to pay his loans, while
simultaneously giving excuses without actually making
good of his promises, is clearly reprehensible.
Undoubtedly, his acts demonstrate lack of moral
character to satisfy the responsibilities and duties
imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of
the court.
We also note that in Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez,[8] the
Court had already disbarred Gutierrez from the practice
of law for gross misconduct due to non-payment of just
debts and issuance of bouncing checks.
In view of the foregoing, while we agree with the
findings of the IBP, we cannot, however, adopt its
recommendation to disbar Gutierrez for the second
time, considering that Gutierrez had already been
previously disbarred. Indeed, as the IBP pointed out, we
do not have double or multiple disbarment in our laws or
jurisprudence. Neither do we have a law mandating a
minimum 5-year requirement for readmission, as cited
by the IBP. Thus, while Gutierrez's infraction calls for the
penalty of disbarment, we cannot disbar him anew.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-649 dated
December 11, 2008, of the IBP, which found FRED L.
GUTIERREZ guilty of GROSS MISCONDUCT, is AFFIRMED.
He is ORDERED to PAY the amount of Ninety Thousand
Pesos (P90,000.00) to the complainant immediately from
receipt of this decision with interest.
NELIA PASUMBAL DE CHAVEZ-BLANCO VS JAIME
LUMASAG JR., A.C. NO. 5195, APRIL 16, 2009
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed
by complainant Nelia P. de Chavez-Blanco
against respondent Atty. Jaime Lumasag, Jr., for deceit,
dishonesty and gross misconduct.
 In a Report and Recommendation dated 11 December
2001,[1] the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commissioner Milagros San Juan found respondent
guilty of the charges and recommended the penalty of
disbarment. Subsequently, the IBP Board of Governors
reduced the penalty to a five (5)-year suspension in its
Resolution XV-2002-229 dated 29 June 2001. In a
Resolution dated 9 December 2002, the Court,
however, remanded the case to the IBP in view of its
findings that no formal hearing/investigation was
conducted.
Upon remand to the IBP, the case was re-assigned to IBP
Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa and hearings were
accordingly held thereafter.
Through her attorney-in-fact, Atty. Eugenia J. Muñoz,
complainant alleged in her Complaint[2] that she was a
resident of theUnited States of America together with
her husband, Mario Blanco. She also stated that she
owned two (2) adjacent parcels of land in Quezon City,
each with an area of 400 square meters, covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 22162 and 22163
registered in her name. In a document dated 20
November 1989, she authorized respondent, who were
her husband’s first cousin, to sell said lots.[3]
In a letter dated 20 March 1990, respondent reported
that he had sold only one lot for the price of P320,000.00
and therefrom he deducted P38,130.00 for taxes and
commissions. And, allegedly, per complainant’s
instructions, he remitted the remaining balance
of P281,900.00 to a certain Belen Johnnes.[4]
In 1995, complainant was informed by respondent that
the other lot remained unsold due to the presence of
squatters on the property.
In December 1998, Mario Blanco discovered that in
truth, the two (2) lots had been sold on 11 March 1990 to
the spouses Celso and Consolacion Martinez for the
price of P1,120,000.00, and that new titles had been
issued to the transferees. Mario Blanco confronted
respondent with these facts in a letter, but the latter
disregarded the same. Thus, in May 1999, complainant,
through Atty. Muñoz sent a demand letter to
respondent directing him to remit and turn over to her
the entire proceeds of the sale of the properties.
Soon thereafter, respondent admitted the sale of the
properties and his receipt of its proceeds, but he never
tendered or offered to tender the same to complainant.
Despite repeated and continued demands, respondent
has since not remitted the amount equivalent
to P838,100.00 (P278,000.00 for the first parcel of land
and P560,000.00 for the second).[5]
Complainant also averred that the Special Power of
Attorney dated 16 January 1989, which respondent had
used to sell the lots is a forgery and a falsified document,
as the signature therein were not the real signatures of
complainant and her spouse. In addition, they could
not have acknowledged the document before a
notary, as they were not in the Philippines at the time.[6]
For his part, respondent vehemently denied all the
accusations of deceit, dishonesty and gross
misconduct.[7]
Respondent countered that Mario Blanco was the true
owner of the properties, which had to be titled in
complainant’s name, as Mario Blanco was a U.S. citizen.
Mario Blanco had requested him to look for a buyer of
the properties and, in the course of selling them,
respondent claimed that he had only transacted with
the former and never with complainant. Respondent
averred that he had been authorized in November 1989
to sell the property, through a Special Power of
Attorney, for a price of not less thanP250,000.00 net for
the owner.[8]
Respondent also alleged that the deed of absolute sale
if the two (2) lots had been executed on 19 March
1990 but, only one lot was initially paid in the amount
of P281,980.00, which he immediately remitted to Mario
Blanco. The payment for the other lot was withheld,
pending the relocation of the squatters who had been
occupying the premises. And when respondent had
finally collected the proceeds of the second lot more
than three (3) years after, he asked Mario Blanco if the
former could use the amount for a real estate venture
whose profit, if successful, he would share with the latter.
Mario Blanco allegedly did not think twice and
consented to the proposal. The venture, however, did
not push through.[9]
Respondent strongly maintained that the two (2) lots
had been sold for only P563,960.00.[10]
Finally, respondent denied the charge of falsification.
He claimed that complainant and her spouse, Mario
Blanco, had in fact signed the Special Power of
Attorney, but it was only notarized later.[11]
In his Report and Recommendation dated 4 December
2006, Atty. Dennis A.B. Funa arrived at the following
findings:
It appears from the records that the
two lots were sold by Respondent
for P560,000.00, not P1,120,000.00 as
alleged by Complainant. The basis is
the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated March 11, 1990 which
shows that the two lots composing 800
sq. meters being sold forP560,000.00.
There appears to be no documentary
basis for the claimed amount
of P1,120,000.00 of Complainant.
However, Respondent in his Comment
stated that the two lots were sold by
him for P563,960.00. In any case, we
shall uphold and apply the amount
stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale.
In Respondent’s letter dated March 20,
1990, he acknowledged that he
already received P320,000.00 as the
“total value of one lot”. Moreover, the
computation shows that
the P320,000.00 was only for 400 sq.m.
as the computation stated: “400 sq.m.
x 800p/sqm=P320,000.00.” Therefore, if
the first lot was sold for P320,000.00,
then the second lot must have been
sold for P240,000 x xx
 x xx there was clear deception on the
part of Respondent when he wrote the
letter dated March 20, 1990
“informing” the Blanco spouses that he
had sold only one of the two parcels of
land for P320,000.00. This is belied by
the fact that on March 11, 1990, or 9
days before he wrote the letter, a
Deed of Absolute Sale was executed
by him selling the two lots
for P560,000.00. This Deed of Absolute
Sale was notarized on March 19, 1990.
During the hearing, Respondent
admitted that the Deed of
Sale covered two lots. Clearly,
Respondent was not forthcoming
towards the Blanco spouses.
x xx
x xx Instead of representing
that two lots had been sold
for P560,000.00. Respondent only
represented that he sold only one lot
forP320,000.00 and pocketing the
balance of P240,000.00.
x xx
During the course of hearing,
Respondent claims that the Deed of
Sale referred to above is a fake, and
that there is a Deed of Sale showing a
selling price of P320,000.00 which is the
real Deed of Sale. However, no such
Deed of Sale has been presented by
Respondent and no such Deed of Sale
appears in the records. Later in the
hearing, Respondent retracted his
statement claiming he was merely
confused.
As for the alleged falsification of a
Special Power of Attorney dated
January 16, 1989, wherein the
signatures of the Blanco spouses
appear in the SPA when they were not
in the Philippines on January 16, 1989
but were allegedly in the United States,
their absence in the country has not
been satisfactorily established since
mere xerox copies of their passports,
although noted by a notary public,
cannot duly establish their absence in
the country on that date. Other
acceptable documents such as a
certification from the Bureau of
Immigration would have been
appropriate but which, however, had
not been presented. In any case,
Respondent denies the charge of
falsification.[12] (Citations omitted)
[Emphasis supplied]
Accordingly, the IBP Commissioner recommended that,
in view of the fact that respondent was already 72 years
old, he be meted out the penalty of suspension of one
(1)-year suspension, not disbarment as had been prayed
for and not 5 year-suspension as had been earlier
resolved by the IBP Board of Governors. Moreover, the
IBP Commissioner recommended that respondent be
ordered to deliver to Complainant the amount
of P240,000.00 plus the legal interest rate of 6% per
annum computed from March 1990.
On 31 May 2007, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XVII-2007-222 adopting and approving
the Report and Recommendation of the IBP
Commissioner.[13]
The Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the
IBP, but a reduction of the recommended penalty is
called for, following the dictum that the appropriate
penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of
sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding
facts.[14]
A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his
professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit to
continue to be an officer of the court. Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility commands all
lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of
the legal profession. Specifically, Rule 1.01 thereof
provides:
Rule 1.01—A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest and immoral or
deceitful conduct.
There is no need to stretch one’s imagination to arrive at
an inevitable conclusion that respondent committed
dishonesty and abused the confidence reposed in him
by the complainant and her spouse.
Records show that two lots had been sold by
respondent as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale
of 11 March 1990. Respondent, however, taking
advantage of the absence of complainant and her
spouse from the Philippines and their complete trust in
him, deceitfully informed them in a letter dated 20
March 1990 that he had sold only one. It can be
reasonably deduced from the exchanges between the
parties that the proceeds of the first lot had been
transmitted to complainant and her spouse.
Respondent’s contention, though, that he had been
authorized to retain the proceeds of the second is
specious, as complainant and her spouse could not
have given the same, having been left in the dark as
regards its sale. And despite repeated demands, to
date, there is no showing that the outstanding amount
has been paid. Thus, respondent’s deceitful conduct
warrants disciplinary sanction and a directive for the
remittance of the remaining proceeds is in order.
As to the charge of falsification, the Court agrees with
the IBP that the same appears to be unsubstantiated.
Settled is the rule that, in administrative proceedings, the
burden of proof that the respondent committed the acts
complained of rests on the complainant. In fact, if the
complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving his
cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner
the facts upon which he bases his claim, the respondent
is under no obligation to prove his exception or
defense.[15] Mere allegation is not evidence and is not
equivalent to proof.[16]
Respondent’s actions erode the public perception of
the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct
for which he may be suspended, following Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor.— A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for
a willful disobedience appearing as
attorney for a party to a case without
authority to so do.
Complainant asks that respondent be disbarred. The
Court finds, however, that suspension from the practice
of law is sufficient to discipline respondent. The supreme
penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
member of the bar. While the Court will not hesitate to
remove an erring attorney from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it,
the Court will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty
will suffice to accomplish the desired end. In this case,
the Court finds the recommended penalty of suspension
of two (2) years for respondent to be too severe,
considering his advanced age. The Court believes that
a suspension of six (6) months is sufficient. Suspension, by
the way, is not primarily intended as punishment, but as
a means to protect the public and the legal
profession.[17]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty.
Jaime Lumasag, Jr. is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS, effective
immediately, with a warning that a repetition of the
same or a similar act will be dealt with more
severely. Further, respondent is ordered to deliver to
complainant the amount of P240,000.00 plus legal
interest rate of 6% per annum computed from March
1990.
Let notice of this Resolution be spread in respondent’s
record as an attorney in this Court, and notice thereof
be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
all the courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.
MELVYN G. GARCIA VS. ATTY. RAUL H. SESBREÑO,A.C.
NO. 7973 AND A.C. NO. 10457, FEBRUARY 03, 2015
Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against
Sesbreño, claiming that the latter still practices law
despite being convicted of homicide in Criminal Case
CBU-31733, and despite being on parole and not
having fully served hissentence.
Sesbreño argues that his sentence was commuted and
the phrase "with the inherent accessory penalty
provided by law" was deleted. He also claims that
homicide does not involve moral turpitude. He claims
that the complaint was purely motivated by bad faith
and malice.
According to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), the RTC found
Sesbreño guilty of murder and was sentenced to suffer
reclusion perpetua. The Supreme Court (SC)
downgraded the crime to homicide and he was
sentenced to serve imprisonment of 9 years and 1 day
as minimum period and 16 years and 4 months
imprisonment as maximum period. It held that homicide
may or may not involve moral turpitude to be a ground
for dismissal, depending on the circumstances of the
crime. It also reviewed the ruling of the SC and found
that the circumstances leading to the death of the
victim in the criminal case involved moral turpitude.
The IBP-CBD quoted the SC:
"Respondent acted like a god who deserved not to be
slighted by a couple of drunks who might have
shattered the stillness of the early morning with their
boisterous antics...Respondent was not only vindictive
without a cause; he was cruel with a misplaced sense of
superiority."
ISSUE: Is moral turpitude involved in a conviction for
homicide?
RULING: Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states
that a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended as attorney of the Court by reason of his
conviction of a crime against moral turpitude. Moral
turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in
the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men
or to society, in general, contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty or good morals.
Sesbreño was found to have just indiscriminately fired
against the victims, Without being provoked, he fired at
them. The SC rejected his argument that the
commutation given by the President of the Philippines
restored his civil and political rights. There was no
mention that the executive clemency was absolute and
conditional and restored Sesbreño to his full civil and
political rights. The penalty for Sesbreño's crime was
never wiped out. Commutation is a mere reduction of
penalty. It only partially extinguished criminal liability.
The SC repeated that the practice of law is not a right,
but a privilege. It is granted only to those possessing
good moral character. A violation of the high moral
standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition
of the appropriate penalty against a lawyer, including
the penalty of disbarment.
Sesbreño was ordered DISBARRED.
ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA VS. ATTY. IAN RAYMOND
PANGALANAN, A.C. NO. 10676, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
This is a case for disbarment against Atty. Pangalangan
for his illicit relations, chronic womanizing, abuse of
authority as an educator, and "other unscrupulous
activities" which cause "undue embarrassment to the
legal profession."
Complainant and respondent were best friends and
both graduated from the University of the Philippines
(UP) College of Law in 1990, where they were part of a
peer group or barkada with several of their classmates.
After passing the bar examinations and being admitted
as members of the Bar in 1991, they were both
registered with the IBP Quezon City.
Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin
(Jardiolin) with whom he has three (3) children.
Complainant avers that while married to Jardiolin,
respondent had a series of adulterous and illicit relations
with married and unmarried women between the years
1990 to 2007. These alleged illicit relations involved:
1. AAA, who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP
College of Law, from 1990 to 1992, which complainant
had personal knowledge of such illicit relations; 2. BBB,
sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994 or from
1994 to 1996, despite being already married to Jardiolin;
3. CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while
also being romantically involved with DDD; 4. DDD,
sometime during the period from 2000 to 2002, despite
still being married to Jardiolin and while still being
romantically involved with CCC; 5. EEE, who is related to
complainant, sometime during the period from May
2004 until the filing of the Petition, while still being
romantically involved with CCC.
ISSUE: Should Atty. Pangalangan be disbarred?
RULING: Atty. Pangalangan was disbarred by the SC for
grossly immoral conduct.
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT
FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life. behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
The practice of law is a privilege given to those who
possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications
for the profession. Good moral character is not only
required for admission to the Bar, but must also be
retained in order to maintain one's good standing in this
exclusive and honored fraternity.
In the case at bar, complainant alleged that
respondent carried on several adulterous and illicit
relations with both married and unmarried women
between the years 1990 to 2007, including
complainant's own wife. Through documentary
evidences in the form of email messages, as well as the
corroborating testimonies of the witnesses presented,
complainant was able to establish respondent's illicit
relations with DOD and CCC by preponderant
evidence.
In sum, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable
arrogance by making a mockery out of the institution of
marriage, and taking advantage of his legal skills by
attacking the Petition through technicalities and
refusing to participate in the proceedings. His actions
showed that he lacked the degree of morality required
of him as a member of the bar, thus warranting the
penalty of disbarment.
B. Making Legal Services Available
PEOPLE VS ESTEBIA, 27 SCRA 106 (1969)
Once again, this Court is confronted with the unwanted
task of ascertaining whether certain acts and conduct
of a member of the Bar deserve disciplinary action.
The problem arose because of facts that follow:
One RemigioEstebia was convicted of rape by the
Court of First Instance of Samar, 1 and sentenced to
suffer the capital punishment. His case came up before
this Court on review.
On December 14, 1966, Lope E. Adriano, a member of
the Bar, was appointed by this Court as Estebia's
counsel de oficio. In the notice of his appointment,
Adriano was required to prepare and file his brief within
thirty days from notice. He was advised that to enable
him to examine the case, the record would be at his
disposal. Adriano received this notice on December 20,
1966. On January 19, 1967, Adriano sought for a 30-day
extension to file appellant's brief in mimeographed form.
On February 18, Adriano again moved for a 20-day
extension (his second). This was followed by a third filed
on March 8, for fifteen days. And a fourth on March 27,
also for fifteen days. He moved for a "last" extension of
ten days on April 11. On April 21, he even sought a
special extension of five days. All these motions for
extension were granted. The brief was due on April 26,
1967. But no brief was filed.
On September 25, 1967, Adriano was ordered to show
cause within ten days from notice thereof why
disciplinary action should not be taken against him for
failure to file appellant's brief despite the lapse of the
time therefor. Adriano did not bother to give any
explanation.
For failing to comply with the September 25, 1967
resolution, this Court, on October 3, 1968, resolved to
impose upon him a fine of P500 payable to this Court
within fifteen days from notice with a warning that upon
further non-compliance with the said resolution of
September 25, 1967 within the same period of fifteen
days, "more drastic disciplinary action will be taken
against him." Still, counsel paid no heed.
Finally, on December 5, 1968, this Court ordered
Adriano to show cause within ten days from notice
thereof why he should not be suspended from the
practice of law "for gross misconduct and violation of his
oath of office as attorney." By express order of this Court,
the resolution was personally served upon him on
December 18, 1968. He ignored the resolution.
Upon the facts just narrated, we now pass judgment.
1. By specific authority, this Court may assign an
attorney to render professional aid to a destitute
appellant in a criminal case who is unable to employ an
attorney. Correspondingly, a duty is imposed upon the
lawyer so assigned "to render the required service." 2 A
lawyer so appointed "as counsel for an indigent
prisoner", our Canons of Professional Ethics demand,
"should always exert his best efforts" in the indigent's
behalf. 3
No excuse at all has been offered for non-presentation
of appellant's brief. And yet, between December 20,
1966, when he received notice of his appointment, and
December 5, 1968, when the last show cause order was
issued by this Court, more than sufficient time was
afforded counsel to prepare and file his brief de oficio.
The death sentence below imposed was upon a plea of
guilty. The record of the proceedings leading to the
lower court's sentence consists of but 31 pages. Counsel
had the record since January 19, 1967. In fact, in his
third motion for extension of time, he manifested that
the drafting of apellant's brief "is more than half-way
through" and that "additional time is needed to review,
effectuate the necessary corrections, put in final form
and print the said brief." In his motion for fourth extension,
he intimated that the preparation of the brief "is almost
through" and that "additional time is needed to redraft
and rehash some significant portions of said brief and
have the same stencilled and mimeographed upon
completion of a definitive text." His motion for last (fifth)
extension of time came with the excuse that he
"suddenly got sick (influenza) in the course of redrafting
and rehashing some significant portions of said brief,
which ailment hampered and interrupted his work
thereon for sometime." Finally, in his "Special Extension of
Time" to file brief, he claimed that he needed only five
days from April 21, 1967 to put said brief in final form and
have the same stencilled and mimeographed.
In the face of the fact that no brief has ever been filed,
counsel's statements in his motions for extension have
gone down to the level of empty and meaningless
words; at best, have dubious claim to veracity.
It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do
say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty
to the accused as one employed and paid by
defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the latter,
he must exercise his best efforts and professional ability
in behalf of the person assigned to his care. His is to
render effective assistance. The accused defendant
expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory
representation. We do not accept the paradox that
responsibility is less where the defended party is poor. It
has been said that courts should "have no hesitancy in
demanding high standards of duty of attorneys
appointed to defend indigent persons charged with
crime." 4 For, indeed, a lawyer who is a vanguard in the
bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger dose of
social conscience and a little less of self interest.
Because of this, a lawyer should remain ever conscious
of his duties to the indigent he defends.
Worth remembering is the 1905 case of In the matter of
Jose Robles Lahesa. 5 He was counsel de oficio before
the Supreme Court in two cases: one for robo en
cuadrilla and the other for homicide. He failed to take
any action in behalf of the defendants in both eases.
This Court imposed upon him a fine of P200. Significant is
the pronouncement we there made that: "This court
should exact from its officers and subordinates the most
scrupulous performance of their official duties,
especially when negligence in the performance of
those duties necessarily result in delays in the
prosecution of criminal cases and the detention of
accused persons pending appeal." The validity of the
foregoing observation remains to the present day. 6 It
applies to the present case.
Here, appellant was without brief since December 20,
1966. The effect of this long delay need not be essayed.
We, therefore, find that Attorney Lope E. Adriano has
violated his oath that he will conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his "knowledge and discretion".
2. An attorney's duty of prime importance is "[t]o
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice and judicial officers. The first Canon of the Code
of Ethics enjoins a lawyer "to maintain towards the
Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance." By the oath of
office, the lawyer undertook to "obey the laws as well as
the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities."
In People vs. Carillo, 8 this Court's pointed observation
was that as an officer of the court, it is a lawyer's "sworn
and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the
courts so essential to the proper administration of
justice."
Here, we have a clear case of an attorney whose acts
exhibit willful dis-obedience of lawful orders of this Court.
A cause sufficient is thus present for suspension or
disbarment. 9 Counsel has received no less than three
resolutions of this Court requiring compliance of its
orders. To be recalled is that on September 25, 1967, this
Court directed him, in ten days from notice, to show
cause why disciplinary action should not be taken
against him for his failure to file appellant's brief despite
the lapse of the time therefor. Nothing was done by
counsel for over a year. To impress upon counsel the
gravity of his repeated failure to obey this Court's orders,
on October 3,1968, a fine of P500 was clamped upon
him. He was directed to pay that fine in ten days. He
was in that order also required to file his brief in fifteen
days. He was warned that more drastic disciplinary
action would be taken upon his failure to do either. Still
he remained unmoved. Then, this Court issued the
peremptory order of December 5, 1968 commanding
him to show cause within ten days from notice thereof
why he should not be suspended from the practice of
law for gross misconduct and violation of his oath of
office. The Court made it certain that this order would
reach him. He personally acknowledged receipt
thereof. He has not paid the fine. He has done nothing.
This is 1969. No brief has as yet been filed. And this,
inspite of the fact that as early as March 27, 1967, when
he moved for a fourth extension of time to file his
brief de oficio, he represented to this Court that all that
was needed was to redraft and to rehash some
significant portions of the brief which was almost
through and to have the same stencilled and
mimeographed upon completion of a definitive text.
Disrespect is here present. Contumacy is as patent.
Disciplinary action is in order.
Controlling here is the 1961 decision In the Matter of Atty.
FiloteoDianala Jo. 10 There, as here, counsel failed to file
appellant's brief (in a criminal case) despite extensions
of time granted him by this Court. Likewise, this Court
issued a show-cause order why disciplinary action
should not be taken against him. The explanation was
considered unsatisfactory. This Court imposed a fine of
P50 payable in ten days from notice. Attorney Dianala
Jo did not pay that fine. Came the subsequent
resolution of this Court advising him to pay the fine,
otherwise, he would be arrested and confined to jam.
This warning was not heeded. On November 18, 1960,
the Court resolved to give him ten days from notice
within which to explain why he should not be
suspended from the practice of law. Despite receipt of
this notice, he did not care to explain his behaviour
which this Court considered as "consumacy and
unwillingness to comply with the lawful orders of this
Court of which he is an officer or to conduct himself as a
lawyer should, in violation of his oath of office." He was
suspended from the practice of law for three months.
In the present case, counsel's pattern of conduct, it
would seem to us, reveals a propensity on the part of
counsel to benumb appreciation of his obligation as
counsel de oficio and of the courtesy and respect that
should be accorded this Court.
For the reasons given, we vote to suspend Attorney
Lope E. Adriano from the practice of law throughout the
Philippines for a period of one (1) year.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal
record, in this Court, of Lope E. Adriano as member of
the Bar. So ordered.
PEOPLE VS ROSQUETA, 55 SCRA 486 (1974)
Rosqueta Jr and two others were convicted of a crime.
They appeal their conviction until it reached the
Supreme Court. Their lawyer (counsel de parte), Atty.
Gregorio Estacio, failed to file their Brief. And so the
Supreme Court ordered Atty. Estacio to show cause
why he should not be disciplined for failure to file said
Brief. Atty. Estacio failed yet again to submit his
explanation. The Supreme Court then suspended him
from the practice of law except for the purpose of filing
the Brief in this particular case. Atty. Estacio then filed a
Motion for Reconsideration where he explained that he
did actually prepare an explanation the same being
left with Rosqueta Sr (father of accused) for the latter to
mail it. But then Rosqueta Sr.’s house burned down
together with the explanation. He only came to know of
this fact when he was preparing for the Motion for
Reconsideration.
Atty. Estacio also explained that his clients are
withdrawing their appeal by reason of their failure to
raise the needed fund for the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Estacio’s suspension should
continue.
HELD: No. His liability is mitigated. But the Supreme Court
noted that Atty. Estacio has been irresponsible, has
been negligent and inattentive to his duty to his clients.
Atty. Estacio should be aware that even in those cases
where counsel de parte is unable to secure from his
clients or from their near relatives the amount necessary
to pursue the appeal, that does not necessarily
conclude his connection with the case. He should be
aware that in the pursuance of the duty owed this Court
as well as to a client, he cannot be too casual and
unconcerned about the filing of pleadings. It is not
enough that he prepares them; he must see to it that
they are duly mailed. Such inattention as shown in this
case is inexcusable.
Applicability of Code to Government Lawyers
MACOCO VS DIAZ, 70 PHIL 97 (1940)
A complaint for malpractice filed by one Marcelino
Macoco against Esteban B. Diaz, attorney-at-law, with
license to practice in Philippine courts. In order to
redeem a property belonging to his wife's father, which
had been levied upon sold at public auction,
complainant Marcelino Macoco deposited with the
provincial sheriff of Ilocos Norte the sum of P380. As no
redemption could be done, the money was returned by
the sheriff to one Alberto Suguitan, then counsel for
Marcelino Macoco. Suguitan used the money
according to himself and failed to turn it over to
Macoco; whereupon, the latter entrusted its collection
to respondent herein, Esteban B. Diaz. It appears that
Diaz succeeded in collecting P300 from Suguitan, but
he also misappropriated this amount.
Respondent admitted the misappropriation. He
averred, however, that he had an agreement with
Macoco for the payment of the money by him
misappropriated; that when this agreement failed, he
again entered into a similar arrangement with
Hermenegildo Galapia, Lope Ragragola and Pedro
Ragragola, who, as he attempted to prove, were the
persons to whom the sum of P300 was really due,
Macoco being merely a trustee thereof; and that in
pursuance of this arrangement whereby he would pay
the sum of P300, deducting therefrom 20 per cent for his
attorney's fees, he had already made partial payments
to said persons.
Macoco, however, and Lope Ragragola denied this
agreement. Whatever might have been the agreement
and with whomsoever respondent might have entered
it into, the undeniable fact remains that he
misappropriated the money in breach of trust. This
makes him unfit for the office of an attorney-atlaw. And
his being a deputy fiscal and not law practitioner at the
time of the misappropriation, far from mitigating his guilt,
aggravates it. Want of moral integrity is to be more
severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a
responsible public office.
Wherefore, respondent Esteban B. Diaz is hereby
disbarred from the practice of law, and is hereby
ordered to surrender his certificate to the clerk of court
within five days from notice. This Solicitor General is
hereby ordered to investigate the conduct of Attorney
Alberto Suguitan and file later the corresponding report.
PIMENTEL VS LLORENTE, 339 SCRA 154 (2000)
FACTS: Petitioner, Aquilino Pimentel who was then
running for Senator in the 1995 elections filed a
complaint for disbarment against respondents Antonio
M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon for gross misconduct,
serious breach of trust, and violation of the lawyer's
oath. This is in connection with the discharge of their
duties as members of the Pasig City Board of
Canvassers.
Salayon, then election officer of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), was designated chairman of said
Board, while Llorente, who was then City Prosecutor of
Pasig City, served as its ex oficio vice-chairman as
provided by law. Petitioner alleges that, in violation of
R.A. No. 6646, §27(b), respondents tampered with the
votes received by him, through illegal padding.
He maintains that, by signing the Statements of Votes
(SoVs) and Certificate of Canvass (CoC) despite
respondents' knowledge that some of the entries therein
were false, the latter committed a serious breach of
public trust and of their lawyers' oath. Respondents
denied the allegations and alleged that the
preparation of the SoVs was made by the canvassing
committees which the Board had constituted to assist in
the canvassing. They claimed that the errors pointed
out by complainant could be attributed to honest
mistake, oversight, and/or fatigue.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to which this
matter had been referred, recommended the dismissal
of the complaint for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration was also denied. He then
filed petition before this Court. Issue: Whether or not
respondents were guilty of misconduct and violation of
the lawyer’s oath. Holding: What is involved here is not
just a case of mathematical error in the tabulation of
votes per precinct but a systematic scheme to pad the
votes of certain senatorial candidates at the expense of
petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation in the
election returns.
Despite the fact that these discrepancies, especially the
double recording of the returns from 22 precincts and
the variation in the tabulation of votes as reflected in
the SoVs and CoC, were apparent on the face of these
documents and that the variation involves substantial
number of votes, respondents nevertheless certified the
SoVs as true and correct.
Their acts constitute misconduct. As a lawyer who holds
a government position may not be disciplined as a
member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of
his duties as a government official. However, if the
misconduct also constitutes a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the lawyer's oath or is of
such character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer
or shows moral delinquency on his part, such individual
may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such
misconduct.
In this case, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in
question, respondents committed a breach of Rule 1.01
of the Code which stipulates that a lawyer shall not
engage in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." By express provision of Canon 6, this is made
applicable to lawyers in the government service. In
addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as
lawyers to "do no falsehood." The above committed
acts would have merited suspension were it not for the
fact that this is their first administrative transgression and
in the case of Salayon, after a long public service.
Under, the circumstances the Court find respondents
guilty of misconduct and imposes on each of them a
fine in the amount of P10,000.00 with a warning that
commission of similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
CABRAL VS PUNO, 70 SCRA 606 (1976)
Certiorari and prohibition to nullify the Order of
respondent Judge dated May 21, 1975, reviving the
Information in Criminal Case No. B-537-74 of the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan, Baliwag Branch, and to
prohibit said court from conducting further proceedings
on the case.
parties in their total meaning and import in determining
once and for all the direction direction and thrust of
these evidence of both parties."
Two (2) days later on, or on May 21, 1975, respondent
Judge set aside the Resolution of March 25, 1975, and
reinstated the Information. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration of the Order on the ground that (a) "the
judgment of acquittal which became final immediately
upon promulgation and could not, therefore, be
recalled for correction or amendment"; and (b) by
instituting Civil Case No. 120-V-74, respondent San
Diego lost his right to intervene in the prosecution of the
criminal case. This motion was denied, as well as the
second motion for reconsideration, hence this petition,
raising the issue of whether or not the trial court had
jurisdiction to set aside its Resolution of March 25, 1975.

The issue being purely legal and considering that the

On the complaint of private respondent Silvino San
matter has been amply discuss in the pleadings, 1 this
Diego, the Provincial Fiscal filed an Information on
case was deemed submitted for decision without need
September 24, 1974 with respondent court, accusing
of memoranda.
petitioner Eugenio Cabral of the crime of Falsification of
Public Document for allegedly falsifying on August 14,
The Solicitor General was required to appear in this
1948 the signature of Silvino San Diego in a deed of sale
case, and he recommends giving due course to the
of a parcel of land. Before arraignment, petitioner
petition and the reversal of the challenged order.
moved to quash the Information on the ground of
According to the Solicitor General, the Resolution of
prescription of the crime charge, as the said document
March 25, 1975 dismissing the Information on the ground
of sale of Lot No. 378-C was notarized on August 14,
of prescription of the crime became a bar to another
1948, registered with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan
charge of falsification, including the revival of the
on August 26, 1948 and as a consequence the original
Information. This is more so, because said Resolution had
certificate of title was cancelled and a new transfer
already become final and executory, inasmuch as the
certificate of title issued, and since then Eugenio Cabral
Fiscal neither sought its reconsideration nor appealed
had publicly and continuously possessed said property
therefrom within the. reglementary period of fifteen (15)
and exercised acts of ownership thereon, which facts
days after his receipt of a copy thereof on March 31,
are apparently admitted in the letter of San Diego's
1975. When the Fiscal moved to reinstate the case on
lawyer to Cabral on September 17, 1953. After hearing
May 21, 1975, or about two (2) months from receipt of a
said motion, Judge Juan F. Echiverri, in a Resolution
copy of the order of dismissal, the same had already
dated March 25, 1975, granted the motion to quash
long been final.
and dismissed the Information on the ground of
prescription. The order of dismissal was predicated upon
We agree with the Solicitor General. The Rules of Court is
said court's finding that the factual averments
explicit that an order sustaining a motion to quash
contained in the notion to quash were supported by the
based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for
evidence. Private prosecutor, who was not present
the same offense. 2 Article 89 of the Revised Penal
during the hearing of the motion to quash, filed a
Code also provides that "prescription of the crime" is
motion dated April 8, 1975, for the reconsideration of
one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal
said Resolution. This was opposed by petitioner on the
liability." Petitioner was charged with the crime of
ground that San Diego can no longer intervene in the
falsification under Article 172, sub-paragraphs (1) and
criminal case, having filed a civil action in April 1974
(2) of the Revised Penal Code, which carries an
against the same accused (Eugenio Cabral) on the
imposable penalty of prisioncorreccional in its medium
basis of the same factual averments contained in the
and maximum periods and a fine of not more than
criminal Information. Acting on the motion for
P5,000.00. This crime prescribes ten (10) years. 3 Here,
reconsideration, respondent. Judge Benigno M. Puno,
San Diego had actual if not constructive notice of the
now presiding, ordered on May 12, 1975 the Fiscal to
alleged forgery after the document was registered in
"make known his position to the Court." In compliance
the Register of Deeds on August 26, 1948.
with said Order, the Fiscal submitted his comment dated
May 19, 1975, expressing the view that the crime, has
In Pangan v. Pasicolan, 4 where the trial court set aside
not prescribed as Silvino San Diego stated that he only
its own order dismissing the criminal case nine (9)
discovered the crime sometime in October 1970, and "...
months thereafter, this Court held that the order was null
that, in the interest of justice, arraignment and trial is
proper to ventilate the respective evidence of both
and void for want of jurisdiction, as the first order had
already become final and executory.
Petition for certiorari to set aside the order of the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga setting aside its order of
September 10, 1956 dismissing the case against
petitioners nine months thereafter, or on June 11, 1957.
The issue is whether or not the court had jurisdiction to
enter that order. While the court may find it necessary to
hear the views of a private prosecutor before acting on
a motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal, it does not follow
that it can set aside its order dismissing the case even if
the same has already become final. There is no law
which requires notice to a private prosecutor, because
under the rules all criminal actions are prosecuted
"under the direction and control of the fiscal" (Section 4,
Rule 106). It appearing that the order already final, the
court acted without jurisdiction in in issuing the the
subsequent order.
And likewise, in People v. Sanchez, 5 it was held that "a
judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the
lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, ... Under
the circumstances, the sentence having become final,
no court, not even this high Tribunal, can modify it even
if erroneous ...". We hold that these rulings are
applicable to the case at bar.
While it is true that the offended party, Silvino San Diego,
through the private prosecutor, filed a motion 'for
reconsideration within the reglementary fifteen-day
period, such move did not stop the running of the
period for appeal. He did not have the legal personality
to appeal or file the motion for reconsideration on his
behalf. The prosecution in a criminal case through the
private prosecutor is under the direction and control of
the Fiscal, and only the motion for reconsideration or
appeal filed by the Fiscal could have interrupted the
period for appeal. 6
The right of the offended party to appeal is recognized
under the old Code of Criminal Procedure. Under
Section 4 of Rule 110 which provides that the
prosecution shall be "under the direction and control of
the fiscal" without the limitation imposed by section 107
of General Order No. 58 subjecting the direction of the
prosecution to the right "of the person injured to appeal
from any decision of the court denying him a legal
right", said right to appeal by an offended party from an
order of dismissal is no longer recognized in the
offended party. ... (U)nder the new Rules of Court, the
fiscal has the direction and control of the prosecution,
without being subject to the right of intervention on the
part of the offended party to appeal from an order
dismising a criminal case upon petition of the fiscal
would be tantamount to giving said party as much right
the direction and control of a criminal proceeding as
that of fiscal. 7
More important, he lost his right to intervene in the
criminal case. Prior to the filing of the criminal case on
September 24, 1974, the spouses Silvino San Diego and
Eugenia Alcantara, on the basis of the same allegations
that San Diego's signature on the deed of August 14,
1948 was a forgery, filed on May 2, 1974 an action
against Eugenio Cabral and Sabina Silvestre, with the
Bulacan Court of First Instance (Civil Case No. 120-V-74)
for the recovery of the same property and damages. It
appearing, therefore, from the record that at the time
the order of dismissal was issued there was a pending
civil action arising out of the same alleged forged
document filed by the offended party against the same
defendant, the offended party has no right to intervene
in the prosecution of the criminal case,, and
consequently cannot ask for the reconsideration of the
order of dismissal, or appeal from said order.8
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted, and Orders
of May 21, 1975, August 4, 1975 and September 3, 1975,
of respondent Judge are hereby set aside. No
pronouncement as to costs.
PCGG VS SANDIGANBAYAN AND MENDOZA,
G.R. NOS. 151800-12, APRIL 12, 2005
1976: General Bank & Trust Company (Genbank)
encountered financial difficulties. Central Bank
extended loans to Genbank in the hope of
rehabilitating it (P310M). Nonetheless, Genbank failed
to recover.
1977: Genbank was declared insolvent. A public
bidding of Genbank’s assets was held with the Lucio Tan
Group winning the bid. Solicitor General Mendoza,
representing the government, intervened with the
liquidation of Genbank.
1986: after EDSA I, Cory established the PCGG to
recover the ill-gotten wealth of Marcos, his family and
cronies.
1987: PCGG filed a case against Lucio Tan and certain
other people (basta marami sila). In relation to this case,
PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties
allegedly acquired by the respondents by taking
advantage of their close relationship and influence with
Marcos. Sandiganbayan heard the case.
Estelito Mendoza (Solicitor General during the time of
Marcos) represented the respondents.
1991: PCGG filed a motion to disqualify Mendoza,
because of his participation in the liquidation of
Genbank. Genbank (now Allied Bank) is one of the
properties that PCGG is seeking to be sequestered from
the Lucion Tan group. PCGG invoked Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Sandiganbayan denied PCGG’s motion. According to
the Sandiganbayan, Mendoza did not take an adverse
position to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank.
And Mendoza’s appearance as counsel was beyond
the 1 year prohibitory period since he retired in 1986.

ISSUE: W/N Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility apllies to Estelito Mendoza

HELD: No, it does not apply to Mendoza.

Sandiganbayan decision is affirmed.

The matter (see 3rd note), or the act of Mendoza as

Solicitor General is advising the Central Bank on how to
proceed with the liquidation of Genbank. This is not the
“matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

The matter involved in the liquidation of Genbank is

entirely different from the matter involved in the PCGG
case against the Lucio Tan group.

The intervention contemplated in Rule 6.03 should be

substantial and important. The role of Mendoza in the
liquidation of Genbank is considered insubstantial.

SC is even questioning why PCGG took such a long time

to revive the motion to disqualify Mendoza.

Apparently, PCGG already lost a lot of cases against

Mendoza. Kyle’s interpretation: PCGG getting
desperate.

Something to think about: SC is somehow of the opinion

that Rule 6.03 will make it harder for the government to
get good lawyers in the future to work for them because
of the prohibition of accepting cases in the future that
were related to one’s work as a government counsel.