Death of The Author CP

WaRu 2009-2010
Cummings
DEATH Utter domination
God is dead= Author is dead
1NC shell….. 2-5

A/T Link turn….6
A/T you give our plan context….7
A/T non competitive………………8
A/T theory (ontology comes first)...9
Multiple perms bad……………….10
Functional comp good….11
A/T textual comp good….12
A/T Perm do the cp…13
A/T Perm do both….14
A/T Perm do c/p then plan..15
A/T Perm do the plan then cp…16
Ontology 2nc….17
2nr Overview….18
1
WaRu 2009-2010
Cummings
[read plant text unaltered from the 1AC]
We disconnect the plan from the affirmative as an author. This allows us to break down the
notions of causality, linearity, ownership, and stasis in the text and celebrate the infinite
multiplicity and play of meaning. Roland Barthes. “The Death of the Author.” Image-Music-Text.
1977.
The removal of the Author (one could talk here with Brecht of a veritable ‘distancing’, the
Author diminishing like a figurine at the far end of the literary stage) is not merely an historical
fact or an act of writing; it utterly transforms the modern text (or — which is the same thing
—the text is henceforth made and read in such a way that at all its levels the author is absent).
The temporality is different. The Author, when believed in, is always conceived of as the past of
his own book: book and author stand automatically on a single line divided into a before and an
after. The Author is thought to nourish the book, which is to say that he exists before it,
thinks, suffers, lives for it, is in the same relation of antecedence to his work as a father to
his child. In complete contrast, the modern scriptor is born simultaneously with the text, is
in no way equipped with a being preceding or exceeding the writing, is not the subject with
the book as predicate; there is no other time than that of the enunciation and every text is
eternally written here and now. The fact is (or, it follows) that writing can no longer designate an
operation of recording, notation, representation, ‘depiction’ (as the Classics would say); rather, it
designates exactly what linguists, referring to Oxford philosophy, call a performative a rare
verbal form (exclusively given in the first person and in the present tense) in which the
enunciation has no other content (contains no other proposition) than the act by which it is
uttered—something like the I declare of kings or the I sing of very ancient poets. Having buried
the Author, the modern scriptor can thus no longer believe, as according to the pathetic view of
his predecessors, that this hand is too slow for his thought or passion and that consequently,
making a law of necessity, he must emphasize this delay and indefinitely ‘polish’ his form. For
him, on the contrary, the hand, cut off from any voice, borne by a pure gesture of inscription (and
not of expression), traces a field without origin—or which, at least, has no other origin than
language itself, language which ceaselessly calls into question all origins. We know now that a
text is not a line of words releasing a single ‘theological’ meaning (the ‘message’ of the
Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them
original, blend and clash. The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable
centres of culture. Similar to Bouvard and Pecuchet, those eternal copyists, at once sublime and
comic and whose profound ridiculousness indicates precisely the truth of writing, the writer can
only imitate a gesture that is always anterior, never original. His only power is to mix writings,
to counter the ones with the others, in such a way as never to rest on any one of them. Did
he wish to express himself, he ought at least to know that the inner ‘thing’ he thinks to
‘translate’ is itself only a ready-formed dictionary, its words only explainable through
other words, and so on indefinitely; something experienced in exemplary fashion by the young
Thomas de Quincey, he who was so good at Greek that in order to translate absolutely modern
ideas and images into that dead language, he had, so Baudelaire tells us (in Paradis Artificiels),
‘created for himself an unfailing dictionary, vastly more extensive and complex than those
resulting from the ordinary patience of purely literary themes’. Succeeding the Author, the
scriptor no longer bears within him passions, humours, feelings, impressions, but rather this
immense dictionary from which he draws a writing that can know no halt: life never does more
than imitate the book, and the book itself is only a tissue of signs imitation that is lost, infinitely
2
WaRu 2009-2010
Cummings
deferred. Once the Author is removed, the claim to decipher a text becomes quite futile. To
give a text an Author is to impose a limit on that text, to furnish it with a final signified, to
close the writing. Such a conception suits criticism very well, the latter then allotting itself the
important task of discovering the Author (or its hypostases: society, history, psyche, liberty)
beneath the work: when the Author has been found, the text is ‘explained’—victory to the critic.
Hence there is no surprise in the fact that, historically, the reign of the Author has also been that
of the Critic, nor again in the fact that criticism (be it new) is today undermined, along with the
Author. In the multiplicity of writing, everything is to be disentangled, nothing deciphered; the
structure can be followed, ‘run’ (like the thread of a stocking) at every point and at every level,
but there is nothing beneath: the space of writing is to be ranged over, not pierced; writing
ceaselessly posits meaning ceaselessly to evaporate it, carrying out a systematic exemption of
meaning. In precisely this way literature (it would bebetter from now on to say writing), by
refusing to assign a ‘secret’, an ultimate meaning, to the text (and to the world as text), liberates
what may be called an anti-theological activity, an activity that is truly revolutionary since to
refuse to fix meaning is, in the end, to refuse God and his hypostases—reason, science, law.
A) Our net benefit is the loss of ontology: we access this by destroying the traditional
norms of thinking that inevitably lead to technological thought processes destroying all
value to life.
Stenstad 6 (Gail, Professor in the department of philosophy and humanities at East Tennessee State University,
Transformations-Thinking after Heidegger, pg 186-187)
If we can succeed to a significant extent in releasement toward things, letting go of the things that constitute calculative, metaphysical thinking and letting go of the
most powerful notions that have emerged from that thinking then openness to mystery,” already at work, can come even more to the fore. Releasement toward things
is multifaceted, and, as it comes into play, it already begins to converge with openness to mystery. Why do I say that? Gathering up the “things” to be released and the
sense of “releasing” engaged in each case will help answer that question. The phrase “releasement toward things” is ambiguous; that very ambiguity is part of its
, releasement
power in helping us engage the thinking of be-ing and open up what it might mean to dwell in timing-spacing-thinking. On the one hand
means letting go of what blocks or hinders thinking and dwelling. On the other, releasement means releasing ourselves toward things, opening to them
in a new way. What things are released in the first sense, and how are their releasements related to one another? 1. The traditional rules, norms,
and expectations of what constitutes good thinking: conceptual grasping and fixing, method, theory, system. 2.The idea of
“being” as something that is reified upon being conceptually lifted out and separated from beings. 3. The things that such traditional philosophizing begins form and
works toward; arche and telos. Releasing the idea of being also releases the idea of its primary function: to serve as the ground of being and of thinking. Be-ing is ab-
ground, and there is no arche, no first principle, to be found in its thinking. With no arche there is no telos, no ultimate end or aim that could somehow be attained in
carrying out the thinking. 4. Therefore, the notion of “an ethics” is highly released along with other kinds of theorizing (metaphysics, epistemology). Dwelling cannot
be constrained within the frameworks of ethics. 5. The various interpretation of “beings” that are grounded on some concept of “being.” This involves releasing such
notions as substance (and the related philosophical notion of “accidents”), matter with its form, subject and object, and dualistically conceived mind and body. 6. the
And finally, the one that Heidegger himself gives when he first speaks of
idea of ourselves as beings, conceived in any of the ways listed in point five. 7.
our entrapped fascination with the products of techno-
releasement toward things in “memorial Address,” letting go of
calculative thinking, including taking language as merely information or entertainment. When
Heidegger first suggested that releasement toward things was a step toward being able to learn to think in a way that was not just calculative, he
described it as being able to say both “yes” and “no” to technical devices. Releasement toward things
does not mean flat rejection. In the case of the things indicated in point seven they can be used or
not used. What is released is the sense that they are somehow necessary; they become optional.
This “yes” and “no,” indicating the optional character of what is released has a bearing on all the
other items on my list, too, and we can examine each of them in that light.
3
WaRu 2009-2010
Cummings
B) Their understanding of knowledge is based in a Cartesian ontology which seeks to
reduce and enframe everything it encounters, constituting a veritable war on Being
Swazo 2 (Norman, Philosophy—University of Alaska, Fairbanks, 2002, Crisis Theory and World Order: Heideggerian
Reflections, p.98-100)
all fundamental positions of subjectivity are enabled and

In short, with Descartes’ metaphysical position
initiated, having their effective manifestation in the political domain (notwithstanding the role traditionally
assigned to Machiavelli and Hobbes as “founders” of modern political philosophy). Already with Descartes there is posited the
metaphysical ground of a subjective egoism having the world for its proper object; and it is the
Cartesian metaphysic that enables a universalist politics coordinate with the self-given task of
scrutiny, conquest, mastery, and disposition of the whole of being (hence the enlightenment practical philosophy
of Kant and the philosophes—and the rational project of the Enlightenment itself as a political project). The metaphysical
dispensation inaugurated by Descartes effectively transforms the conception of world order from
the medieval “order of creation” to that of the modern “order of reason” having its basis in “the
subjectivity of man’s essence”: It is on this basis that, as Heidegger said in the “Letter on Humanism,” all objects may
“be planned by means of worldly reason (Weltvernunft) which supplies the law for itself and thus
also claims that its procedure is immediately intelligible (what is considered logical).We can now understand—in the
context of world order thinking—Heidegger’s remarks cited earlier concerning “the quiescence of happening” that belongs to the essential history
of the West as the history of Being epochally given in the history of metaphysics. Specifically, we can see how a “basic form of its presence,”
viz., Descartes’ fundamental metaphysical position, yet governs today. In Descartes’ fundamental metaphysical position, as the articulation of an
epochal formation or configuration of thought, word, and deed, in the history of Being, ‘being’ as ‘representedness’ is that ruling understanding
Things in general are understood to be what they are according to their
of being which is given to thinking.
delimitation as represented beings. This ruling understanding holds true in its employment with
respect to the conception of human being understood as res cogitans and to the conception of the
totality of things that make up the external world, understood in the category of res exensae. The human being as
preeminent subject, being as representedness, truth as certitude, and man as measure—these basic metaphysical categories inform thinking and
we must
doing in the historical period of which Descartes is the essential thinker (its “herald,” as it were). To use Heidegger’s words,
understand Descartes’ metaphysics as the ground of the “essential formation” (Wesensgestalt) taking
place. The Cartesian metaphysical position serves to articulate a fundamental “repetition” of
a formative attack on the whole of being. This means that the creative force of this “formative” oreientation is not limited
to Descartes himself as a public personality, i.e., as one among others participating in “cultural activity.” Rather, the full creative force of this
repetition is expressed in the word and deed of poets, thinkers, statesment, artists, etc., who are more or less contemporary in the “transition”
from the medieval to the modern dispensation. It is through the fullness of this creative force that the repetition is at the same time a
transformation of the world. Thus, the world that comes into being, the essential formation, is manifest in the contemporaneous expression of all
such figures—precisely in the manner in which there is involvement with beings and their designation is secured in a way consonant to the
Cartesian metaphysical component.
4
WaRu 2009-2010
Cummings
C) This focus on knowledge production and assessment overwhelms the search for
transformative realities through its fundamental grounding in modern science—this
obliterates the possibility of politics—straight turns their argument. Meaning that their aff
literally has no solvency making all their advantages disads to the status quo which the
counter plan solves for.
Swazo 2 (Norman, Philosophy—University of Alaska, Fairbanks, 2002, Crisis Theory and World Order: Heideggerian
Reflections, p.138)
Cavaille adds, however, that Descartes himself “returns to this analogy to affirm in substance
that it is impossible to derive good politics from true science and that nothing in the political
realm is more detestable than utopia. In short, that philosophy and politics, whatever analogical
relationships may be possible, are incommensible.” Yet, as Cavaille remarks concerning “the
dialectic of political utopia” in interaction with “the specifically Cartesian attitude”—and here
we must think systems science—there is in Descartes’ analogy an illumination of “certain
fundamental aspects of the relationships that modern science since its origins has maintained
with politics.” Thus: Philosophical discourse creates a space for political utopia, as a correct
analogy for science, even if this space for political utopia in the Cartesian text is immediately
filled in, rejected covered over by the utopia of science. The disavowed utopia remains one of the
potential results of Cartesian science, first of all because it is an integral part of the referential
apparatus through which the modern episteme acquired its definition. Utopia, in other words, is
one of the founding myths of science. Once it has been established, science rejects the images
and dreams out of which it was born (and the Cartesian text is exemplary from this point of
view), but utopia reappears recurringly in history, as a political project justified through science.
Because political utopia is itself one of the models for nascent science, it can then take as model
victorious science….[T]he specifically Cartesian attitude, which aims at rejection utopia a priori
and with it every form of politics as a production of science, is even more paradigmatic of
modern scientificity. For the true utopia of science consists, perhaps, in its secret desire to
supplant politics, to substitute itself for it…[emphasis added]
Systems theory, and thus in particular the systems approach to the future of the world order,
viewed in its continuity with “the specifically Cartesian attitude,” becomes nothing less than a
tacit “denigration of politics” –an attempt “to dissolve it into the quantitative uniformity of its
mathematical universality.” Cavaille speaks all to aptly when he says: “The arrival of the utopia
of science necessarily coincides with the end of politics.”
5
WaRu 2009-2010
Cummings
Link turn
ONE----- Non responsive – This isn’t what the net benefit is saying it’s not saying that because
we assign authors to texts we lose all ontological worth it’s that they read a plan text and attempt
to by modern day knowledge inscribe this into your brains as though it were fact by the cards
they read as though this were the end and only way this could ever happen. It is limiting any
possibilities and it is prescribing into the technological thought process that has been the cause of
all modern day catastrophes.
TWO------ By removing the plan from the context of the 1AC we literally break down the
current methods of thought to introduce the world to a new and higher thought process it is not
about simply removing the author it is about literally bringing the reader into the text to
experience a whole new method of life. They make the mistake of completely abandoning the
reader which the counter plan solves for. Roland Barthes. “The Death of the Author.” Image-Music-
Text. 1977.
Let us come back to the Balzac sentence. No one, no ‘person’, says it: its source, its voice, is
not the true place of the writing, which is reading. Another—very precise— example will
help to make this clear: recent research (J.-P. Vernant) has demonstrated the constitutively
ambiguous nature of Greek tragedy, its texts being woven from words with double
meanings that each character understands unilaterally (this perpetual misunderstanding is
exactly the ‘tragic’); there is, however, someone who understands each word in its duplicity and
who, in addition, hears the very deafness of the characters speaking in front of him—this
someone being precisely the reader (or here, the listener). Thus is revealed the total existence
of writing: a text is made of multiple writings, drawn from many cultures and entering into
mutual relations of dialogue, parody, contestation, but there is one place where this
multiplicity is focused and that place is the reader, not, as was hitherto said, the author.
The reader is the space on which all the quotations that make up a writing are inscribed without
any of them being lost; a text’s unity lies not in its origin but in its destination. Yet this
destination cannot any longer be personal: the reader is without history, biography, psychology;
he is simply that someone who holds together in a single field all the traces by which the written
text is constituted. Which is why it is derisory to condemn the new writing in the name of a
humanism hypocritically turned champion of the reader’s rights. Classic criticism has never
paid any attention to the reader; for it, the writer is the only person in literature. We are
now beginning to let ourselves be fooled no longer by the arrogant antiphrastical
recriminations of good society in favour of the very thing it sets aside, ignores, smothers, or
destroys; we know that to give writing its future, it is necessary to overthrow the myth: the
birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author.
6
WaRu 2009-2010
Cummings
A/T you give our plan text context

We don’t give your plan context- Giving your plan context would be like reading a card specific
to your affirmative. We are simply reading the Barthes card to explain what the counter plan
does and how it interacts in the round. The out of context plan itself is with no context we know
nothing more or nothing less about the plan when it is taken out of context and placed next to a
card about removing the author.
7
WaRu 2009-2010
Cummings
A/T non competitive

1) Textual competition is bad
a) Fair division of ground: Allowing textual competition means the affirmative can advocate
doing the opposite of their original plan – e.g. “ban the plan” would not compete textually. This
is a ridiculous standard for proving competition.
b) It's key to garner offense. If we only looked at textual competition, the neg could just change
some miniscule word in the plan text that doesn't actually mean anything in regard to what the
plan actually does, like changing "of" to "for". We shouldn't have to defend every word in plan
text, just the words that have any functional meaning.
c) Key to establishing best policy option: Under textual competition, they could change "should"
to "did" and it would compete
d) Infinitely regressive: they could change any of the text and make it so it's not physically
possible with a critical net benefit, and we couldn't check its competition because we're just
looking at textual competition, which is key to check abusive counterplans.
2) We compete through functional competition
a) we are functionally competitive--our evidence says that the aff wouldn’t solve with an author,
the outcome of the aff and the counterplan are 100% different
b) We compete through net benefits--the impact to our argument exists only in a world of the aff,
makes it functionally competitive
c) err neg on this one--we have lit to prove that we compete functionally, they are just making
assertions
3) Don't vote on theory
a) as long as we reasonably compete, evaluate the policy aspect of the debate first
b) vote down the argument not the team--if they win the theory flow just don't evaluate the
counterplan
8
WaRu 2009-2010
Cummings
A2 Theory
1) Ontology comes before theory—Justification for theory rests on preserving fairness and
education but they concede the futility of this in a world where Being means nothing—that’s
Gelvin 89
2) Ontology turns theory—their attempt to order negates our ability to experience Being by
organizing it within an ideal world—Vote aff to reject this deeply conservative fantasy
Armstrong 2000 (Isobel, The Radical Aesthetic, 2000, p. 9-10)

Communality looks attractive. Unfortunately, though, there can be by definition only one common culture and shared
tradition, and on Scrution’s terms this can never be remade. Indeed, there are entry requirements for it. His communality is
a consoling and deeply authoritarian conservative fantasy. Scrution’s world is rule-bound in a way that
refuses to see that tradition, form and ceremony—to use the Shakespearian terms reinterpreted for modernity in the
‘ceremony’ of Yeats’s A Prayer for my Daughter—are rarely negotiable. If it is alive, the form and content of a culture is
continuously negotiated. Scruton assumes a static world of form and convention. But who legislates for
these forms and conventions? How are they authorized? How can they ever be challenged? Barbara Hernstein
Smith’s critique, in Contingencies of Value, of axiological propositions—those assumptions confirmed by a deeply felt intuition of their rightness
—is precisely that these ignore the contingency and variability of accounts of rightness, ignore the fact of their
continuous negotiation in a culture. ‘Evaluation is always compromised because value is always in
motion…it is constantly variable and eternally indeterminate’ (p 9). It is impossible to rest the full
weight of a culture on fixed forms and conventions, much less to see these as a communal mode of ethical
training in which the ethical is elided with an abstract aestheticism. Recent examples of cultural negotiation—the death
of Diana, Princess of Wales in 1997, the Drumcree marchers in 1998, the Clinton scandals of 1999, the death of John Kennedy in the same year
—suggest that the reality is more complex. There are some hopeful ways of thinking about a common culture, but Scruton’s ‘common
culture’ is a mode of exclusion rather than inclusion. It legislates for an aesthetic aristocracy.
Disenfranchising from the beginning the millions for whom the photography of a daily paper and the colors of cinema and TV
constitute aesthetic pleasure, it rests on ungenerous formalism.
3) Before you listen to any of the affirmatives’ arguments they must answer how ontology comes before
theory. If they fail to do this you have to pull the trigger as soon as the speech where they failed to answer
this is over.
9
WaRu 2009-2010
Cummings
Multiple Perms Bad:

1. EDUCATION: ECOURAGES CHEAP SHOT, LINE-BY-LINE DEBATING RATHER
THAN WARRANTS. PREOCCUPATION WITH DROPS PRECLUDES CRITICAL
THINKING ABOUT WARRANTS.
2. RECIPROCITY: THIS IS FUNCTIONALLY LIKE HAVING MULTIPLE ALTS

BECAUSE THEY ARE ALL CONDITIONAL ARGUMENTS THAT KILL THE
K IF DROPPED ENTIRELY BUT ATTEMPT TO FORCE US INTO
CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS ABOUT THE ABILITY TO SOLVE.
3. COUNTERINTERP: THE AFF GETS ONE PERM EXCLUSIVELY AS A TEST OF

COMPETITION.
10
WaRu 2009-2010
Cummings
FUNCTIONAL COMPETITION GOOD
1. Real world- members of congress evaluate the implications of policies in practice far more
than whether “texts are compatible.”
2. Only a functional evaluation allows the judge to determine competition based on the actual
arguments made in the round.
3. Promotes good judging- text comparison is removed from all substance within the round,
which leads to arbitrary decisions and skews fairness.
11
WaRu 2009-2010
Cummings
AT: TEXTUAL COMPETITION GOOD
1. Kills policymaking- debating semantics turns the contest into a race to see who can write the
best plans, not the best policy options for the real world.
2. Comparing texts removes all actual substance of the debate, leading to arbitrary decisions and
unfair debates
3. Only functional evaluation of how they would interact can prove real competition.
4. Leads to bad advocacies because adding “reject plan” to the bottom of the CP text makes a CP
competitive in their interpretation.
5. Justifies aff abuse- any “do both” perm would win because they don’t weigh whether or not
the perm is net beneficial, killing neg CP ground and skewing fairness.
12
WaRu 2009-2010
Cummings
AT: PERM DO THE CP
The 1AC fiat indicates immediate unconditional implementation of the plan. This perm severs
out of the immediate and unconditional passage of the plan. Severence is an independent voting
issue.
1. Makes the aff a moving target- the affirmative can change any part of their plan to avoid any
negative argument. This skews fairness in that they could change their plan in the 2AR and we’d
never be able to argue with them.
2. Infinitely regressive- allowing the aff to sever out of one part of their plan justifies them
severing out of all but one word of their plan text and claiming solvency from it. The neg would
never win in such a world, which kills competitive equity.
3. Strategy Skew- The affirmative speaks first, last, and has infinite prep time, while the negative
has mere minutes before the 1NC. With time already limited, allowing the aff to change their
advocacy after the 1AC completely kills neg strategy and makes for a wholly unfair debate.
4. Education- When the affirmative constantly changes advocacies, it becomes impossible to

learn from a debate round because we debate over running away from arguments.
5. Not real world- legislators and lawyers aren’t allowed to eliminate parts of their cases or bills
because someone objects to them. This lack of real world policymaking kills education.
13
WaRu 2009-2010
Cummings
AT: PERM DO BOTH
This perm is functionally the same as perm do the CP. The 1AC fiat indicates immediate
unconditional implementation of the plan. This perm severs out of the immediate and
unconditional passage of the plan. And severance is a reason to reject this perm because:

Lastly this doesn’t solve the counter plan at all because they are still putting their plan into
context when they “perm do both” it’s the same thing as saying just pass the aff. It makes no
sense to pass the exact same plan twice but just giving it context
14
WaRu 2009-2010
Cummings
AT: PERM DO THE CP THEN THE PLAN
The 1AC fiat indicates immediate unconditional implementation of the plan. This perm severs
out of the immediate and unconditional passage of the plan. And severance is a reason to reject
this perm because:

And this is also a timeframe perm because they are doing them at different times. This is a
reason to reject the perm because
1. Allowing timeframe perms to slide snowballs into wider justification of more abusive
arguments.
2. Timeframe perms are just another way of adding to and taking away from parts of the plan.
They are still severance/intrinsic, but the aff tries to hide the fact by saying “do this now, and that
later.” 3. Fairness- the aff could always solve for any DA impact and do any CP in the
future. This makes it impossible for the neg to win, killing fairness.
15
WaRu 2009-2010
Cummings
AT: PERM DO THE PLAN THEN THE CP
One, this makes no sense because you cant pass the same plan twice. Also it will still be linking
to the disad because you are still giving your plan context.
Second, this is a timeframe perm, which is a reason to reject the team because
1. Allowing timeframe perms to slide snowballs into wider justification of more abusive
arguments.
2. Timeframe perms are just another way of adding to and taking away from parts of the plan.
They are still severance/intrinsic, but the aff tries to hide the fact by saying “do this now, and that
later.”
3. Fairness- the aff could always solve for any DA impact and do any CP in the future. This
makes it impossible for the neg to win, killing fairness.
4. Explodes aff bias- the aff speaks first, last, and has infinite prep time. They have no need for
an illegitimate permutation: they should be prepared to defend their plan and its merits without
gaining extra ground for bad offensive arguments.
16
WaRu 2009-2010
Cummings
Ontology is the ground of all human understanding. The question of being is essential to real
practical and political thought, as well as authentic freedom. Meaning no matter what is said in
the round you will always evaluate the counterplan first.
Gelven 89 (Michael A Commentary on Heidegger’s
Being and Time, 1989, p. 29-32)
17
WaRu 2009-2010
Cummings
2NR Overview
1. Our argument is that modern day thought rejects all alternative methods of thinking,
which is analogous to Cartesian ontology. Which is the rejection of everything besides
science even the method which science is obtained is rejected. It is a war on humanity
and inevitably leads to technological thought processes this is bad for a few reasons.
a. It reduces everything around it to standing reserve- When thought processes are
simply reduced to a few accepted methods of thought everything on earth including
beings are reduced to standing reserve and lose all ontological value.
b. In a world without ontology death is preferable- When beings literally have no value
on earth except to be utilized as seen fit there is not point of life. Life seizes to have
any meaning.
c. Evaluate Ontology before you look at anything else that’s gelvin, Ontology is the
ground of all human understanding. The question of being is essential to real practical
and political thought, as well as authentic freedom.
18
WaRu 2009-2010
Cummings
2NC Overview
1. Our argument is that by disconnecting the affirmative from context essentially
removing the author, we un limit the full potential of the text. We break down the
doors of causality and common methods of thinking.
2. We will now continue down our path of breaking down all the common methods of
thinking further.
19

Death of The Author CP

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originalbeschreibung:

Originaltitel

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Death of The Author CP

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

WaRu 2009-2010

1NC shell….. 2-5

all fundamental positions of subjectivity are enabled and

A/T you give our plan text context

A/T non competitive

Armstrong 2000 (Isobel, The Radical Aesthetic, 2000, p. 9-10)

Multiple Perms Bad:

2. RECIPROCITY: THIS IS FUNCTIONALLY LIKE HAVING MULTIPLE ALTS

3. COUNTERINTERP: THE AFF GETS ONE PERM EXCLUSIVELY AS A TEST OF

4. Education- When the affirmative constantly changes advocacies, it becomes impossible to

4. Education- When the affirmative constantly changes advocacies, it becomes impossible to

4. Education- When the affirmative constantly changes advocacies, it becomes impossible to

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen