ARTICLE 39 AND 40: ACTION OR
DEFENSE FOR DECLARATION OF
ABSOLUTE NULLITY; JUDICIAL
DECLARATION
 ATIENZA VS. BRILLANTES
FACTS:
This a complaint by Lupo Atienza for
gross immorality and appearance of impropriety
against Judge Brillantes.
Lupo Alleges that he has 2 children
with Yolanda de Castro, who are living together
in a home purchased by him in 1987 in Manila.
On 1991, Lupo saw Brillantes sleeping on his
bed. Upon inquiry, the houseboy told that
Brillantes had been cohabiting with de Castro.
Lupo left the home without confronting
Brillantes. Thereafter, respondent prevented him
from visiting his children and even alienated the
affection of his children from him. Lupo claims
that Brillantes is married to Ongkiko with whom
he has 5 children. Brillantes on his part, alleged
that Lupo was not married to de Castro and that
he is not married to Ongkiko although he admits
having 5 children with her. Brillantes claims that
when he married de Castro in 1991 at California,
he believed in all good faith and with all legal
intents and purposes, that he was single because
her first marriage was solemnized without a
marriage license.
Brillantes argues that the provision of
Art. 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him
considering that his first marriage took place in
1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the
Philippines while the second marriage which took
place in 1991 was governed by the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Art. 40 of the Family Code does
not apply to Brillantes.
HELD:
Art. 40 is applicable to remarriages
entered into after the effectivity of the Family
Code in 1988 regardless of date of the first
marriage. Besides, Art. 256 of the Family Code
said Art. 15 is given “retroactive effect” insofar
as it does prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with Civil Code or other
laws. The retroactive application of procedural
laws is not violative of any right of a person who
may feel that he is adversely affected.
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke
good faith. He made a mockery of the institution
of marriage and employed deceit to be able to
cohabit with a woman.
 DOMINGO VS. CA
A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage
is now explicitly required either as a cause of
action or a ground for defense.
FACTS:
Private respondent Delia Soledad Domingo and
petitioner Roberto Domingo got married while
the marriage of Roberto with one Emerlina dela
Paz was still subsisting. Hence, Emerlina sued
Roberto for bigamy. Thereafter, Delia filed a
petition for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Roberto and separation of
property. Roberto filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground that the marriage being void ab initio,
the petition for the declaration of its nullity is
unnecessary. The trial court denied the motion.
Roberto then filed a special civil action of
certiorari and mandamus, which was dismissed
by the CA. Roberto contended that the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage can be
maintained only if it is for the purpose of
remarriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration
of a void marriage is necessary for the recovery
and the separation of properties.
RULING:
Yes. The Family Code has settled once and for
all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is
now explicitly required either as a cause of action
or a ground for defense. In fact, the requirement
for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage
is also for the protection of the spouse who,
believing that his or her marriage is illegal and
void, marries again. With the judicial declaration
of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the
person who marries again cannot be charged with
bigamy.
Article 40 of the Family Code denotes that such
final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void need not be obtained only for purposes of
remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of
other instances where a party might well invoke
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for
purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of
an action for liquidation, partition, distribution
and separation of property between the erstwhile
spouses, as well as an action for the custody and
support of their common children and the
delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In
such cases, evidence needs must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a previous
marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be
limited solely to an earlier final ju dgment of a
court declaring such previous marriage void.
Hence, in the instance where a party who has
previously contracted a marriage which remains
subsisting desires to enter into another marriage
which is legally unassailable, he is required by
law to prove that the previous one was an absolute
nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of
a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.
 MERCADO VS. TAN
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage is necessary before a subsequent one
can be legally contracted. One who enters into a
subsequent marriage without first obtaining such
judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy.
FACTS:
Vincent Mercado married Consuelo Tan while
his marriage with Ma. Thelma Oliva was still
subsisting. Hence, Tan filed a complaint for
bigamy against Mercado. Subsequently,
Mercado filed a petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage against Oliva. The petition
was granted and the marriage between Mercado
and Oliva was declared null and void.
Nevertheless, the RTC convicted Mercado of the
crime of bigamy.
Mercado contended that since his previous
marriage had been declared null and void, he
cannot be convicted of the crime of bigamy as
there was no first marriage to speak of.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the element of previous legal
marriage is present in order to convict petitioner.
RULING:
Yes. Article 40 of the Family Code expressly
requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the
previous marriage before that person can marry
again; otherwise, the second marriage will also be
void. It is now settled that the fact that the first
marriage is void from the beginning is not a
defense in a bigamy charge. One who enters into
a subsequent marriage without first obtaining
such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statute as void.
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second
marriage although there was yet no judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact,
he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage
declared void only after complainant had filed a
letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By
contracting a second marriage while the first was
still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already
been consummated by then.
 CARINO VS. CARINO
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, for
purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior
judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter
into a second marriage, otherwise, the second
marriage would also be void.
FACTS:
The late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño contracted two
marriages during his lifetime. The first was with
petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño, and the second
was with respondent Susan Yee Cariño. SPO4
Cariño passed away under the care of respondent,
who spent for his medical and burial expenses.
Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for
monetary benefits and financial assistance
pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies. Respondent filed a case
for collection of sum of money against petitioner
praying that petitioner be ordered to return to her
at least one-half of the P146,000.00 “death
benefits” which petitioner received from various
government agencies. Respondent admitted that
her marriage to the deceased took place during
the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a
judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage
between petitioner and the deceased. She,
however, claimed to be in good faith since she
had no knowledge of the previous marriage. To
bolster her action for collection of sum of money,
respondent contended that the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio
because the same was solemnized without the
required marriage license. The trial court ruled in
favor of respondent, which the CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between SPO4
Santiago Cariño and petitioner Susan Nicdao
Cariño is valid, thereby entitling her to the entire
subject death benefits.
RULING:
No. Under the Civil Code, which was the law in
force when the marriage of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969,
a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage,
and the absence thereof, subject to certain
exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio.
The records reveal that the marriage contract of
petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage
license number and, as certified by the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their
office has no record of such marriage license. It
is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage
between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the
necessary marriage license, and not being one of
the marriages exempt from the marriage license
requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, for
purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior
judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter
into a second marriage, otherwise, the second
marriage would also be void. Accordingly, the
declaration in the instant case of nullity of the
previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner
Susan Nicdao does not validate the second
marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan
Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was
solemnized without first obtaining a judicial
decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the
marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the
deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
Considering that the marriage of respondent
Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous
marriage, having been solemnized during the
subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed
to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased),
the application of Article 148 of the Family Code
is therefore in order. The disputed P146,000.00
from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association,
Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and
PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and
benefits from governmental agencies earned by
the deceased as a police officer. Unless
respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the
contrary, it could not be said that she contributed
money, property or industry in the acquisition of
these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not
owned in common by respondent and the
deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and
respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the
same.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the
Family Code governs. Even if the disputed
“death benefits” were earned by the deceased
alone as a government employee, Article 147
creates a co-ownership in respect thereto,
entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof.
As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present
case, both parties of the first marriage are
presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of
the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall
go to the petitioner as her share in the property
regime, and the other half pertaining to the
deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his
legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan
Nicdao.
 JARILLO VS. PEOPLE
(601 SCRA 236)- FULL CASE
 ABLAZA VS. REPUBLIC
FACTS:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in RTC
Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration
of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted
on December 26, 1949 between his late brother
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between
Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated
without a marriage license, due to such license
being issued only on January 9, 1950. He insisted
that his being the surviving brother of
Cresenciano who had died without any issue
entitled him to one-half of the real properties
acquired by Cresenciano before his death,
thereby making him a real party in interest; and
that any person, himself included, could impugn
the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano
and Leonila at any time, even after the death of
Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab
initio.
The RTC dismissed the petition for the following
reasons: 1) petition is filed out of time (action had
long prescribed) and 2) petitioner is not a party to
the marriage.
The CA affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC,
thus:
While an action to declare the nullity of a
marriage considered void from the beginning
does not prescribe, the law nonetheless requires
that the same action must be filed by the proper
party, which in this case should be filed by any of
the parties to the marriage. xxxx
Certainly, a surviving brother of the
deceased spouse is not the proper party to file the
subject petition. More so that the surviving wife,
who stands to be prejudiced, was not even
impleaded as a party to said case.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is a real party-in-interest
in the action to seek the declaration of nullity of
the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized
under the regime of the old Civil Code
HELD: YES
A valid marriage is essential in order to create the
relation of husband and wife and to give rise to
the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising
out of such relation. The law prescribes the
requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity
of a marriage is tested according to the law in
force at the time the marriage is contracted. As a
general rule, the nature of the marriage already
celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent
amendment of the governing law. Thus, a Civil
Code marriage remains void, considering that the
validity of a marriage is governed by the law in
force at the time of the marriage ceremony.
Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the
impact to the issue posed herein of
Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC
(Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003.
Section 2 (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly
provides the limitation that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such
limitation demarcates a line to distinguish
between marriages covered by the Family Code
and those solemnized under the regime of the
Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
extends only to marriages covered by the Family
Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but,
being a procedural rule that is prospective in
application, is confined only to proceedings
commenced after March 15, 2003.
Based on Carlos v. Sandoval the following
actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a
marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:
1) Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the
effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and
2) Those filed in relation to marriages celebrated
during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those
celebrated under the regime of the Family Code
prior to March 15, 2003.
Considering that the marriage between
Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on
December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the
old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on
the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as
having the right to initiate the action for
declaration of nullity of the marriage under AM
02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the
petitioner.
The old and new Civil Codes contain no
provision on who can file a petition to declare the
nullity of a marriage, and when. Accordingly, in
Niñal v. Bayadog, the children were allowed to
file after the death of their father a petition for the
declaration of the nullity of their father’s
marriage to their stepmother contracted on
December 11, 1986 due to lack of a marriage
license. There, the Court distinguished between a
void marriage and a voidable one, and explained
how and when each might be impugned, thus
wise:
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no
judicial decree is necessary in order to establish
the nullity of a marriage. “Under ordinary
circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage.......is as though no marriage had
ever taken place. And therefore, being good
for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact
of marriage may be material, either direct or
collateral.” xxx
It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be
collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding
instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that
on the death of either, the marriage cannot be
impeached, and is made good ab initio. But
Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides
that there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage, though void,
before a party can enter into a second marriage
and such absolute nullity can be based only on a
final judgment to that effect. For the same reason,
the law makes either the action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either
party would extinguish the cause of action or the
ground for defense, then the same cannot be
considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage,
no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes......the court may pass upon the validity
of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted
to question the same so long as it is essential to
the determination of the case.
However, that the absence of a provision in the
old and new Civil Codes cannot be construed as
giving a license to just any person to bring an
action to declare the absolute nullity of a
marriage. According to Carlos v. Sandoval, the
plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be
benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law
that every action must be prosecuted and
defended in the name of the real party in interest.
Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a
“proper interest” can file the action. Interest
within the meaning of the rule means material
interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by
the decree or judgment of the case, as
distinguished from mere curiosity about the
question involved or a mere incidental interest.
Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late
Cresenciano’s brother and surviving heir.
Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed
himself to be, then he has a material interest in the
estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely
affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a
brother like the petitioner, albeit not a
compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has
the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased
brother under the conditions stated in Article
1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code, as
follows:
Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their
children survive with the widow or widower, the
latter shall be entitled to one half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their
children to the other half.
Article 1003. If there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased in accordance
with the following articles.
Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner
to bring the action hinges upon a prior
determination of whether Cresenciano had any
descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate
or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was
the late Cresenciano’s surviving heir. Such prior
determination must be made by the trial court, for
the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.
Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not
implead Leonila, who, as the late Cresenciano’s
surviving wife, stood to be benefited or
prejudiced by the nullification of her own
marriage. She was truly an indispensable party
who must be joined herein. We take note, too, that
the petitioner and Leonila were parties in Heirs of
Cresenciano Ablaza, namely: Leonila G. Ablaza,
and Leila Ablaza Jasul v. Spouses Isidro and
Casilda Ablaza, an action to determine who
between the parties were the legal owners of the
property involved therein. As a defendant in that
action, the petitioner is reasonably presumed to
have knowledge that the therein plaintiffs,
Leonila and Leila, were the wife and daughter,
respectively, of the late Cresenciano. As such,
Leila was another indispensable party whose
substantial right any judgment in this action will
definitely affect. The petitioner should likewise
implead Leila.
WHEREFORE, the case is reinstated, and its
records are returned to RTC Masbate, for further
proceedings, with instructions to first require the
petitioner to amend his initiatory pleading in
order to implead Leonila Honato and her
daughter Leila Ablaza Jasul as parties-
defendants.
 JARILLO VS PEOPLE
(622 SCRA 24)- FULL CASE
 CHAN-TAN VS. TAN- FULL CASE
 LASANAS VS. PEOPLE
THE FACTS:
Noel Lasanas (petitioner), and Socorro were
married by Judge Carlos Salazar in 1968, without
the benefit of a marriage license or an affidavit of
cohabitation. They renewed their marriage vows
in a religious ceremony before Fr. Rodolfo
Tamayo in Iloilo City, again without attaching a
marriage license or an affidavit of cohabitation.
They separated in 1982, however, due to
irreconcilable differences. Noel then married
Josefa Esteban in a religious ceremony
solemnized by Fr. Ramon Sequito in Iloilo City.
Noel’s marriage status was indicated in the
marriage certificate as “single”. On July 26,
1996, Noel filed a complaint for annulment of
marriages and damages against Socorro, alleging
that the latter employed deceit, misrepresentation
and fraud in securing his consent to their
marriage. Soccoro then filed a criminal case for
bigamy against Noel, and the corresponding
information filed against him. His complaint for
declaration of nullity was dismissed on
November 24, 1998. Meanwhile, in the criminal
case for bigamy, Noel was convicted by the
Regional Trial Court as charged. He appealed to
the CA, but the latter affirmed the RTC judgment.
Thus, Noel filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari with the Supreme Court. He argues that
the first element of bigamy was not duly proved,
as his marriage to Socorro was null and void for
lack of marriage license or affidavit of
cohabitation; he acted in good faith; and had the
honest belief that there was no need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage before
he could contract a subsequent marriage. He
argues that the RTC and the CA incorrectly
applied the provisions of Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, asserting that the civil law
rule embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code
requiring a judicial declaration of nullity before
one could contract a subsequent marriage should
not apply in this purely criminal prosecution; that
even if Article 40 of the Family Code was
applicable, he should still be acquitted because
his subsequent marriage was null and void for
being without a recorded judgment of nullity of
marriage, as provided in Article 53 in relation to
Article 52 of the Family Code; that,
consequently, an essential element of the crime of
bigamy, i.e. that the subsequent marriage be
valid, was lacking; and that his good faith and
lack of criminal intent were sufficient to relieve
him of criminal liability.
THE ISSUE:
Whether or not Noel should be held liable for
bigamy.
THE RULING:
The appeal lacks merit.
The law on bigamy is found in Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Article 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision
mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are as
follows: (1) that the offender has been legally
married; (2) that the marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code; (3) that he or she
contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all
the essential requisites for validity.⁠1
The CA specifically observed:
This Court concedes that the marriage between
accused-appellant Lasanas and private
complainant Patingo was void because of the
absence of a marriage license or of an affidavit of
cohabitation. The ratificatory religious wedding
ceremony could not have validated the void
marriage. Neither can the church wedding be
treated as a marriage in itself for to do so, all the
essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage
should be present. One of these requisites is a
valid marriage license except in those instances
when this requirement may be excused. There
having been no marriage license nor affidavit of
cohabitation presented to the priest who presided
over the religious rites, the religious wedding
cannot be treated as a valid marriage in itself.
But then, as the law and jurisprudence say,
petitioner should have first secured a judicial
declaration of the nullity of his void marriage to
private complainant Patingo before marrying
Josefa Eslaban. Actually, he did just that but after
his marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he
violated the law on bigamy.
Accused’s reliance on the cases of People v.
Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 and People v. Aragon, 100
Phil. 1033 is misplaced because the ruling in
these cases have already been abandoned per
Relova v. Landico, supra, and Wiegel v. Sempio-
Diy, 143 SCRA 499. The petitioner also cited
Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229 which
resurrected the Aragon and Mendoza doctrine but
Yap’s ruling too had been overtaken by Art. 40 of
the Family Code and by Domingo v. Court of
Appeals and Te v. Court of Appeals, supra.
Regarding accused-appellant’s defense of good
faith, the same is unavailing pursuant to Mañozca
v. Domagas, 248 SCRA 625.
This Court, therefore concludes that the appealed
Decision is correct in all respect.⁠2
Based on the findings of the CA, this case has all
the foregoing elements attendant.
The first and second elements of bigamy were
present in view of the absence of a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage between the
accused and Socorro. The requirement of
securing a judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage prior to contracting a subsequent
marriage is found in Article 40 of the Family
Code, to wit:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
The reason for the provision was aptly discussed
in Teves v. People:⁠3
x x x The Family Code has settled once and for
all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is
now explicitly required either as a cause of action
or a ground for defense. Where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity
is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void.
The Family Law Revision Committee and the
Civil Code Revision Committee which drafted
what is now the Family Code of the Philippines
took the position that parties to a marriage should
not be allowed to assume that their marriage is
void even if such be the fact but must first secure
a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage before they can be allowed to marry
again.
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of
absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the
protection of the spouse who, believing that his or
her marriage is illegal and void, marries again.
With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his
or her marriage, the person who marries again
cannot be charged with bigamy.
In numerous cases, this Court has consistently
held that a judicial declaration of nullity is
required before a valid subsequent marriage can
be contracted; or else, what transpires is a
bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
If petitioner’s contention would be allowed, a
person who commits bigamy can simply evade
prosecution by immediately filing a petition for
the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage
and hope that a favorable decision is rendered
therein before anyone institutes a complaint
against him. We note that in petitioner’s case the
complaint was filed before the first marriage was
declared a nullity. It was only the filing of the
Information that was overtaken by the declaration
of nullity of his first marriage. Following
petitioner’s argument, even assuming that a
complaint has been instituted, such as in this case,
the offender can still escape liability provided
that a decision nullifying his earlier marriage
precedes the filing of the Information in court.
Such cannot be allowed. To do so would make the
crime of bigamy dependent upon the ability or
inability of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to
immediately act on complaints and eventually file
Informations in court. Plainly, petitioner’s
strained reading of the law is against its simple
letter.
Pursuant to Teves, the accused’s conviction for
bigamy is affirmed. The crime of bigamy was
consummated from the moment he contracted the
second marriage without his marriage to Socorro
being first judicially declared null and void,
because at the time of the celebration of the
second marriage, his marriage to Socorro was still
deemed valid and subsisting due to such marriage
not being yet declared null and void by a court of
competent jurisdiction.⁠4 “What makes a person
criminally liable for bigamy,” according to
People v. Odtuhan:⁠5
x x x is when he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage. Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for
the same must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and
so long as there is no such declaration, the
presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.
The accused’s defense of acting in good faith
deserves scant consideration especially because
the records show that he had filed a complaint for
the annulment of his marriage with Socorro prior
to the institution of the criminal complaint against
him but after he had already contracted his second
marriage with Josefa. But even such defense
would abandon him because the RTC (Branch
39) dismissed his complaint for annulment of
marriage after the information for bigamy had
already been filed against him, thus confirming
the validity of his marriage to Socorro.
Considering that the accused’s subsequent
marriage to Josefa was an undisputed fact, the
third element of bigamy was established.
Nonetheless, he submits that his marriage to
Josefa was invalid because of lack of a recorded
judgment of nullity of marriage. Such argument
had no worth, however, because it was he himself
who failed to secure a judicial declaration of
nullity of his previous marriage prior to
contracting his subsequent marriage. In Tenebro
v. Court of Appeals⁠6, the Court has explained
that “[s]ince a marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically
void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per
se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of
[Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code],
therefore, would indicate that the provision
penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage.⁠7 The Court has further observed
in Nollora, Jr. v. People:⁠8
x x x Nollora may not impugn his [subsequent]
marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate
himself from criminal liability; otherwise, we
would be opening the doors to allowing the
solemnization of multiple flawed marriage
ceremonies. As we stated in Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals:
There is therefore a recognition written into the
law itself that such a marriage, although void ab
initio, may still produce legal consequences.
Among these legal consequences is incurring
criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise
would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy
completely nugatory, and allow individuals to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be
flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages,
while beguiling throngs of hapless women with
the promise of futurity and commitment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. With neither
an aggravating nor a mitigating circumstance
attendant in the commission of the crime, the
imposable penalty is the medium period of
prision mayor,⁠9 which ranges from eight years
and one day to 10 years. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence should be within the
range of prision correccional, the penalty next
lower than that prescribed for the offense, which
is from six months and one day to six years.
Accordingly, the indeterminate sentence of two
years and four months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight years and one day of prision
mayor as maximum, as imposed by the RTC, was
proper.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision
of the Court of Appeals promulgated on August
29, 2002; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the
costs of suit.