CAP4

DISCHARGE OF
FIREARMS
Republic Act No. 10591
Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Fifteenth Congress
Third Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday,
the twenty-third day of July, two thousand
twelve.
[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10591]
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A
COMPREHENSIVE LAW ON FIREARMS
AND AMMUNITION AND PROVIDING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS
THEREOF
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
ARTICLE I
TITLE, DECLARATION OF POLICY AND
DEFINITION OF TERMS
SECTION 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be
known as the “Comprehensive Firearms and
Ammunition Regulation Act”.
SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy. – It is the
policy of the State to maintain peace and order
and protect the people against violence. The
State also recognizes the right of its qualified
citizens to self-defense through, when it is the
reasonable means to repel the unlawful
aggression under the circumstances, the use of
firearms. Towards this end, the State shall
provide for a comprehensive law regulating the
ownership, possession, carrying, manufacture,
dealing in and importation of firearms,
ammunition, or parts thereof, in order to
provide legal support to law enforcement
agencies in their campaign against crime, stop
the proliferation of illegal firearms or weapons
and the illegal manufacture of firearms or
weapons, ammunition and parts thereof.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this
Act:
(a) Accessories refer to parts of a firearm which
may enhance or increase the operational
efficiency or accuracy of a firearm but will not
constitute any of the major or minor internal
parts thereof such as, hut not limited to, laser
scope, telescopic sight and sound suppressor or
silencer.
(b) Ammunition refers to a complete unfixed
unit consisting of a bullet, gunpowder,
cartridge case and primer or loaded shell for
use in any firearm.
(c) Antique firearm refers to any: (1) firearm
which was manufactured at least seventy-five
(75) years prior to the current date but not
including replicas; (2) firearm which is
certified by the National Museum of the
Philippines to be curio or relic of museum
interest; and (3) any other firearm which
derives a substantial part of its monetary value
from the fact that it is novel, rare, bizarre or
because of its association with some historical
figure, period or event.
(d) Arms smuggling refers to the import,
export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or
transfer of firearms, their parts and components
and ammunition, from or across the territory of
one country to that of another country which
has not been authorized in accordance with
domestic law in either or both
country/countries.
(e) Authority to import refers to a document
issued by the Chief of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) authorizing the importation of
firearms, or their parts, ammunition and other
components.
(f) Authorized dealer refers to any person, legal
entity, corporation, partnership or business
entity duly licensed by the Firearms and
Explosive Office (FEO) of the PNP to engage
in the business of buying and selling
ammunition, firearms or parte thereof, at
wholesale or retail basis.
(g) Authorized importer refers to any person,
legal entity, corporation, partnership or
business duly licensed by the FEO of the PNP
to engage in the business of importing
ammunition and firearms, or parts thereof into
the territory of the Republic of the Philippines
for purposes of sale or distribution under the
provisions of this Act.
(h) Authorized manufacturer refers to any
person, legal entity, corporation, or partnership
duly licensed by the FEO of the PNP to engage
in the business of manufacturing firearms, and
ammunition or parts thereof for purposes of
sale or distribution.
(i) Confiscated firearm refers to a firearm that
is taken into custody by the PNP, National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), and all other
law enforcement agencies by reason of their
mandate and must be necessarily reported or
turned over to the PEO of the PNP.
(j) Demilitarized firearm refers to a firearm
deliberately made incapable of performing its
main purpose of firing a projectile.
(k) Duty detail order refers to a document
issued by the juridical entity or employer
wherein the details of the disposition of firearm
is spelled-out, thus indicating the name of the
employee, the firearm information, the specific
duration and location of posting or assignment
and the authorized bonded firearm custodian
for the juridical entity to whom such firearm is
turned over after the lapse of the order.
(l) Firearm refers to any handheld or portable
weapon, whether a small arm or light weapon,
that expels or is designed to expel a bullet,
shot, slug, missile or any projectile, which is
discharged by means of expansive force of
gases from burning gunpowder or other form of
combustion or any similar instrument or
implement. For purposes of this Act, the barrel,
frame or receiver is considered a firearm.
(m) Firearms Information Management System
(FIMS) refers to the compilation of all data and
information on firearms ownership and
disposition for record purposes.
(n) Forfeited firearm refers to a firearm that is
subject to forfeiture by reason of court order as
accessory penalty or for the disposition by the
FEO of the PNP of firearms considered as
abandoned, surrendered, confiscated or revoked
in compliance with existing rules and
regulations.
(o) Gun club refers to an organization duly
registered with and accredited in good standing
by the FEO of the PNP which is established for
the purpose of propagating responsible and safe
gun ownership, proper appreciation and use of
firearms by its members, for the purpose of
sports and shooting competition, self-defense
and collection purposes.
(p) Gunsmith refers to any person, legal entity,
corporation, partnership or business duly
licensed by the FEO of the PNP to engage in
the business of repairing firearms and other
weapons or constructing or assembling
firearms and weapons from finished or
manufactured parts thereof on a per order basis
and not in commercial quantities or of making
minor parts for the purpose of repairing or
assembling said firearms or weapons.
(q) Imitation firearm refers to a replica of a
firearm, or other device that is so substantially
similar in coloration and overall appearance to
an existing firearm as to lead a reasonable
person to believe that such imitation firearm is
a real firearm.
(r) Licensed citizen refers to any Filipino who
complies with the qualifications set forth in this
Act and duly issued with a license to possess or
to carry firearms outside of the residence in
accordance with this Act.
(s) Licensed, juridical entity refers to
corporations, organizations, businesses
including security agencies and local
government units (LGUs) which are licensed to
own and possess firearms in accordance with
this Act.
(t) Light weapons are: Class-A Light weapons
which refer to self-loading pistols, rifles and
carbines, submachine guns, assault rifles and
light machine guns not exceeding caliber
7.62MM which have fully automatic mode; and
Class-B Light weapons which refer to weapons
designed for use by two (2) or more persons
serving as a crew, or rifles and machine guns
exceeding caliber 7.62MM such as heavy
machine guns, handheld underbarrel and
mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-
aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless
rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile
and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-
aircraft missile systems, and mortars of a
caliber of less than 100MM.
(u) Long certificate of registration refers to
licenses issued to government agencies or
offices or government-owned or -controlled
corporations for firearms to be used by their
officials and employees who are qualified to
possess firearms as provider in this Act,
excluding security guards.
(v) Loose firearm refers to an unregistered
firearm, an obliterated or altered firearm,
firearm which has been lost or stolen, illegally
manufactured firearms, registered firearms in
the possession of an individual other than the
licensee and those with revoked licenses in
accordance with the rules and regulations.
(w) Major part or components of a firearm
refers to the barrel, slide, frame, receiver,
cylinder or the bolt assembly. The term also
includes any part or kit designed and intended
for use in converting a semi-automatic burst to
a full automatic firearm.
(x) Minor parts of a firearm refers to the parts
of the firearm other than the major parts which
are necessary to effect and complete the action
of expelling a projectile by way of combustion,
except those classified as accessories.
(y) Permit to carry firearm outside of residence
refers to a written authority issued to a licensed
citizen by the Chief of the PNP which entitles
such person to carry his/her registered or
lawfully issued firearm outside of the residence
for the duration and purpose specified in the
authority.
(z) Permit to transport firearm refers to a
written authority issued to a licensed citizen or
entity by the Chief of the PNP or by a PNP
Regional Director which entitles such person or
entity to transport a particular firearm from and
to a specific location within the duration and
purpose in the authority.
(aa) Residence refers to the place or places of
abode of the licensed citizen as indicated in
his/her license.
(bb) Shooting range refers to a facility
established for the purpose of firearms training
and skills development, firearm testing, as well
as for sports and competition shooting either
for the exclusive use of its members or open to
the general public, duly registered with and
accredited in good standing by the FEO of the
PNP.
(cc) Short certificate of registration refers to a
certificate issued by the FEO of the PNP for a
government official or employee who was
issued by his/her employer department, agency
or government-owned or -controlled
corporation a firearm covered by the long
certificate of registration.
(dd) Small arms refer to firearms intended to be
or primarily designed for individual use or that
which is generally considered to mean a
weapon intended to be fired from the hand or
shoulder, which are not capable of fully
automatic bursts of discharge, such as:
(1) Handgun which is a firearm intended to be
fired from the hand, which includes:
(i) A pistol which is a hand-operated firearm
having a chamber integral with or permanently
aligned with the bore which may be self-
loading; and
(ii) Revolver which is a hand-operated firearm
with a revolving cylinder containing chambers
for individual cartridges.
(2) Rifle which is a shoulder firearm or
designed to be fired from the shoulder that can
discharge a bullet through a rifled barrel by
different actions of loading, which may be
classified as lever, bolt, or self-loading; and
(3) Shotgun which is a weapon designed, made
and intended to fire a number of ball shots or a
single projectile through a smooth bore by the
action or energy from burning gunpowder.
(ee) Sports shooting competition refers to a
defensive, precision or practical sport shooting
competition duly authorized by the FEO of the
PNP.
(ff) Tampered, obliterated or altered firearm
refers to any firearm whose serial number or
other identification or ballistics characteristics
have been intentionally tampered with,
obliterated or altered without authority or in
order to conceal its source, identity or
ownership.
(gg) Thermal weapon sight refers to a battery
operated, uncooled thermal imaging device
which amplifies available thermal signatures so
that the viewed scene becomes clear to the
operator which is used to locate and engage
targets during daylight and from low light to
total darkness and operates in adverse
conditions such as light rain, light snow, and
dry smoke or in conjunction with other optical
and red dot sights.
ARTICLE II
OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF
FIREARMS
SEC. 4. Standards and Requisites for Issuance
of and Obtaining a License to Own and
Possess Firearms. – In order to qualify and
acquire a license to own and possess a firearm
or firearms and ammunition, the applicant must
be a Filipino citizen, at least twenty-one (21)
years old and has gainful work, occupation or
business or has filed an Income Tax Return
(ITR) for the preceding year as proof of
income, profession, business or occupation.
In addition, the applicant shall submit the
following certification issued by appropriate
authorities attesting the following:
(a) The applicant has not been convicted of any
crime involving moral turpitude:
(b) The applicant has passed the psychiatric test
administered by a PNP-accredited psychologist
or psychiatrist;
(c) The applicant has passed the drug test
conducted by an accredited and authorized drug
testing laboratory or clinic;
(d) The applicant has passed a gun safety
seminar which is administered by the PNP or a
registered and authorized gun club;
(e) The applicant has filed in writing the
application to possess a registered firearm
which shall state the personal circumstances of
the applicant;
(f) The applicant must present a police
clearance from the city or municipality police
office; and
(g) The applicant has not been convicted or is
currently an accused in a pending criminal case
before any court of law for a crime that is
punishable with a penalty of more than two (2)
years.
For purposes of this Act, an acquittal or
permanent dismissal of a criminal case before
the courts of law shall qualify the accused
thereof to qualify and acquire a license.
The applicant shall pay the reasonable licensing
fees as may be provided in the implementing
rules and regulations of this Act.
An applicant who intends to possess a firearm
owned by a juridical entity shall submit his/her
duty detail order to the FEO of the PNP.
SEC. 5. Ownership of Firearms and
Ammunition by a Juridical Entity. – A juridical
person maintaining its own security force may
be issued a regular license to own and possess
firearms and ammunition under the following
conditions:
(a) It must be Filipino-owned and duly
registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC);
(b) It is current, operational and a continuing
concern;
(c) It has completed and submitted all its
reportorial requirements to the SEC; and
(d) It has paid all its income taxes for the year,
as duly certified by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue.
The application shall be made in the name of
the juridical person represented by its President
or any of its officers mentioned below as duly
authorized in a board resolution to that effect:
Provided, That the officer applying for the
juridical entity, shall possess all the
qualifications required of a citizen applying for
a license to possess firearms.
Other corporate officers eligible to represent
the juridical person are: the vice president,
treasurer, and board secretary.
Security agencies and LGUs shall be included
in this category of licensed holders but shall be
subject to additional requirements as may be
required by the Chief of the PNP.
SEC. 6. Ownership of Firearms by the
National Government. – All firearms owned by
the National Government shall be registered
with the FEO of the PNP in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines. Such registration
shall be exempt from all duties and taxes that
may otherwise be levied on other authorized
owners of firearms. For reason of national
security, firearms of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), Coast Guard and other law
enforcement agencies shall only be reported to
the FEO of the PNP.
SEC. 7. Carrying of Firearms Outside of
Residence or Place of Business. – A permit to
carry firearms outside of residence shall be
issued by the Chief of the PNP or his/her duly
authorized representative to any qualified
person whose life is under actual threat or
his/her life is in imminent danger due to the
nature of his/her profession, occupation or
business.
It shall be the burden of the applicant to prove
that his/her life is under actual threat by
submitting a threat assessment certificate from
the PNP.
For purposes of this Act, the following
professionals are considered to be in imminent
danger due to the nature of their profession,
occupation or business:
(a) Members of the Philippine Bar;
(b) Certified Public Accountants;
(c) Accredited Media Practitioners;
(d) Cashiers, Bank Tellers;
(e) Priests, Ministers, Rabbi, Imams;
(f) Physicians and Nurses;
(g) Engineers; and
(h) Businessmen, who by the nature of their
business or undertaking, are exposed to high
risk of being targets of criminal elements.
ARTICLE III
REGISTRATION AND LICENSING
SEC. 8. Authority to Issue License. – The Chief
of the PNP, through the FEO of the PNP, shall
issue licenses to qualified individuals and to
cause the registration of firearms.
SEC. 9. Licenses Issued to Individuals. –
Subject to the requirements set forth in this Act
and payment of required fees to be determined
by the Chief of the PNP, a qualified individual
may be issued the appropriate license under the
following categories;
Type 1 license – allows a citizen to own and
possess a maximum of two (2) registered
firearms;
possess a maximum of five (5) registered
firearms;
possess a maximum of ten (10) registered
firearms;
possess a maximum of fifteen (15) registered
firearms; and
Type 5 license – allows a citizen, who is a
certified gun collector, to own and possess
more than fifteen (15) registered firearms.
For Types 1 to 5 licenses, a vault or a container
secured by lock and key or other security
measures for the safekeeping of firearms shall
be required.
For Types 3 to 5 licenses, the citizen must
comply with the inspection and bond
requirements.
SEC. 10. Firearms That May Be Registered. –
Only small arms may be registered by licensed
citizens or licensed juridical entities for
ownership, possession and concealed carry. A
light weapon shall be lawfully acquired or
possessed exclusively by the AFP, the PNP and
other law enforcement agencies authorized by
the President in the performance of their duties:
Provided, That private individuals who already
have licenses to possess Class-A light weapons
upon the effectivity of this Act shall not be
deprived of the privilege to continue possessing
the same and renewing the licenses therefor, for
the sole reason that these firearms are Class
“A” light weapons, and shall be required to
comply with other applicable provisions of this
Act.
SEC. 11. Registration of Firearms. – The
licensed citizen or licensed juridical entity shall
register his/her/its firearms so purchased with
the FEO of the PNP in accordance with the
type of license such licensed citizen or licensed
juridical entity possesses. A certificate of
registration of the firearm shall be issued upon
payment of reasonable fees.
For purposes of this Act, registration refers to
the application, approval, record-keeping and
monitoring of firearms with the FEO of the
PNP in accordance with the type of license
issued to any person under Section 9 of this
Act.
SEC. 12. License to Possess Ammunition
Necessarily Included. – The licenses granted to
qualified citizens or juridical entities as
provided in Section 9 of this Act shall include
the license to possess ammunition with a
maximum of fifty (50) rounds for each
registered firearm: Provided; That the FEO of
the PNP may allow more ammunition to be
possessed by licensed sports shooters.
SEC. 13. Issuance of License to Manufacture
or Deal In Firearms and Ammunition. – Any
person desiring to manufacture or deal in
firearms, parts of firearms or ammunition
thereof, or instruments and implements used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of
firearms, parts of firearms or ammunition, shall
make an application to:
(a) The Secretary of the Department of the
Interior and Local Government (DILG) in the
case of an application for a license to
manufacture; and
(b) The Chief of the PNP in the case of a
license to deal in firearms and firearms parts,
ammunition and gun repair.
The applicant shall state the amount of
capitalization for manufacture or cost of the
purchase and sale of said articles intended to be
transacted by such applicant; and the types of
firms, ammunition or implements which the
applicant intends to manufacture or purchase
and sell under the license applied for; and such
additional information as may be especially
requested by the Secretary of the DILG or the
Chief of the PNP.
The Secretary of the DILG or the Chief of the
PNP may approve or disapprove such
application based on the prescribed guidelines.
In the case of approval, the Secretary of the
DILG or the Chief of the PNP shall indicate the
amount of the bond to be executed by the
applicant before the issuance of the license and
the period of time by which said license shall
be effective, unless sooner revoked by their
authority.
Upon approval of the license to manufacture or
otherwise deal in firearms by the Secretary of
the DILG or the Chief of the PNP as the case
may be, the same shall be transmitted to the
FEO of the PNP which shall issue the license in
accordance with the approved terms and
conditions, upon the execution and delivery by
the applicant of the required bond conditioned
upon the faithful compliance on the part of the
licensee to the laws and regulations relative to
the business licensed.
SEC. 14. Scope of License to Manufacture
Firearms and Ammunition. – The scope of the
License to Manufacture firearms and
ammunition shall also include the following:
(a) The authority to manufacture and assemble
firearms, ammunition, spare parts and
accessories, ammunition components, and
reloading of ammunitions, within sites, areas,
and factories stated therein. The Secretary of
the DILG shall approve such license;
(b) The license to deal in or sell all the items
covered by the License to Manufacture, such as
parts, firearms or ammunition and components;
(c) The authority to subcontract the
manufacturing of parts and accessories
necessary for the firearms which the
manufacturer is licensed to manufacture:
Provided, That the subcontractor of major parts
or major components is also licensed to
manufacture firearms and ammunition; and
(d) The authority to import machinery,
equipment, and firearm parts and ammunition
components for the manufacture thereof.
Firearm parts and ammunition components to
be imported shall, however, be limited to those
authorized to be manufactured as reflected in
the approved License to Manufacture. The
Import Permit shall be under the administration
of the PNP.
A licensed manufacturer of ammunition is also
entitled to import various reference firearms
needed to test the ammunition manufactured
under the License to Manufacture. A licensed
manufacturer of firearms, on the other hand, is
entitled to import various firearms for
reference, test and evaluation for manufacture
of similar, types of firearms covered by the
License to Manufacture.
An export permit shall, however, be necessary
to export manufactured parts or finished
products of firearms and ammunition. The
Export Permit of firearms and ammunition
shall be under the administration of the PNP.
SEC. 15. Registration of Locally Manufactured
and Imported Firearms. – Local manufacturers
and importers of firearms and major parts
thereof shall register the same as follows:
(a) For locally manufactured firearms and
major parts thereof, the initial registration shall
be done at the manufacturing facility:
Provided, That firearms intended for export
shall no longer be subjected to ballistic
identification procedures; and
(b) For imported firearms and major parts
thereof, the registration shall be done upon
arrival at the FEO of the PNP storage facility.
SEC. 16. License and Scope of License to Deal.
– The License to Deal authorizes the purchase,
sale and general business in handling firearms
and ammunition, major and minor parts of
firearms, accessories, spare parts, components,
and reloading machines, which shall be issued
by the Chief of the PNP.
SEC. 17. License and Scope of License for
Gunsmiths. – The license for gunsmiths shall
allow the grantee to repair registered firearms.
The license shall include customization of
firearms from finished or manufactured parts
thereof on per order basis and not in
commercial quantities and making the minor
parts thereof, i.e. pins, triggers, trigger bows,
sights and the like only for the purpose of
repairing the registered firearm. The license for
gunsmiths shall be issued by the Chief of the
PNP.
SEC. 18. Firearms for Use in Sports and
Competitions. – A qualified individual shall
apply for a permit to transport his/her
registered firearm/s from his/her residence to
the firing range/s and competition sites as may
be warranted.
SEC. 19. Renewal of Licenses and
Registration. – All types of licenses to possess
a firearm shall be renewed every two (2) years.
Failure to renew the license on or before the
date of its expiration shall cause the revocation
of the license and of the registration of the
firearm/s under said licensee.
The registration of the firearm shall be renewed
every four (4) years. Failure to renew the
registration of the firearm on or before the date
of expiration shall cause the revocation of the
license of the firearm. The said firearm shall be
confiscated or forfeited in favor of the
government after due process.
The failure to renew a license or registration
within the periods stated above on two (2)
occasions shall cause the holder of the firearm
to be perpetually disqualified from applying for
any firearm license. The application for the
renewal of the license or registration may be
submitted to the FEO of the PNP, within six (6)
months before the date of the expiration of such
license or registration.
SEC. 20. Inspection and Inventory. – The Chief
of the PNP or his/her authorized representative
shall require the submission of reports, inspect
or examine the inventory and records of a
licensed manufacturer, dealer or importer of
firearms and ammunition during reasonable
hours.
ARTICLE IV
ACQUISITION, DEPOSIT OF FIREARMS,
ABANDONED,
DEMILITARIZED AND ANTIQUE
FIREARMS
SEC. 21. Acquisition or Purchase and Sale of
Firearms and Ammunition. – Firearms and
ammunition may only be acquired or purchased
from authorized dealers, importers or local
manufacturers and may be transferred or sold
only from a licensed citizen or licensed
juridical entity to another licensed citizen or
licensed juridical entity: Provided, That, during
election periods, the sale and registration of
firearms and ammunition and the issuance of
the corresponding licenses to citizens shall be
allowed on the condition that the transport or
delivery thereof shall strictly comply with the
issuances, resolutions, rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commission on Elections.
SEC. 22. Deposit of Firearms by Persons
Arriving From Abroad. – A person arriving in
the Philippines who is legally in possession of
any firearm or ammunition in his/her country
of origin and who has declared the existence of
the firearm upon embarkation and
disembarkation but whose firearm is not
registered in the Philippines in accordance with
this Act shall deposit the same upon written
receipt with the Collector of Customs for
delivery to the FEO of the PNP for
safekeeping, or for the issuance of a permit to
transport if the person is a competitor in a
sports shooting competition. If the importation
of the same is allowed and the party in question
desires to obtain a domestic firearm license, the
same should be undertaken in accordance with
the provisions of this Act. If no license is
desired or leave to import is not granted, the
firearm or ammunition in question shall remain
in the custody of the FEO of the PNP until
otherwise disposed of in-accordance with law.
SEC. 23. Return of Firearms to Owner upon
Departure from the Philippines. – Upon the
departure from the Philippines of any person
whose firearm or ammunition is in the custody
of the FEO of the PNP, the same shall, upon
timely request, be delivered to the person
through the Collector of Customs. In the case
of a participant in a local sports shooting
competition, the firearm must be presented to
the Collector of Customs before the same is
allowed to be loaded on board the carrier on
which the person is to board.
SEC. 24. Safekeeping of Firearms and
Ammunition. – Any licensee may deposit a
registered firearm to the FEO of the PNP, or
any Police Regional Office for safekeeping.
Reasonable fees for storage shall be imposed.
SEC. 25. Abandoned Firearms and
Ammunition. – Any firearm or ammunition
deposited in the custody of the FEO of the PNP
pursuant to the provisions of this Act, shall be
deemed to have been abandoned by the owner
or his/her authorized representative if he/she
failed to reclaim the same within five (5) years
or failed to advise the FEO of the PNP of the
disposition to be made thereof. Thereafter, the
FEO of the PNP may dispose of the same after
compliance with established procedures.
SEC. 26. Death or Disability of Licensee. –
Upon the death or legal disability of the holder
of a firearm license, it shall be the duty of
his/her next of kin, nearest relative, legal
representative, or other person who shall
knowingly come into possession of such
firearm or ammunition, to deliver the same to
the FEO of the PNP or Police Regional Office,
and such firearm or ammunition shall be
retained by the police custodian pending the
issuance of a license and its registration in
accordance, with this Act. The failure to deliver
the firearm or ammunition within six (6)
months after the death or legal disability of the
licensee shall render the possessor liable for
illegal possession of the firearm.
SEC. 27. Antique Firearm. – Any person who
possesses an antique firearm shall register the
same and secure a collector’s license from the
FEO of the PNP. Proper storage of antique
firearm shall be strictly imposed.
Noncompliance of this provision shall be
considered as illegal possession of the firearm
as penalized in this Act.
ARTICLE V
PENAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 28. Unlawful Acquisition, or Possession
of Firearms and Ammunition. – The unlawful
acquisition, possession of firearms and
ammunition shall be penalized as follows:
(a) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium
period shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully acquire or possess a small
arm;
(b) The penalty of reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if three (3)
or more small arms or Class-A light weapons
are unlawfully acquired or possessed by any
person;
(c) The penalty of prision mayor in its
maximum period shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess
a Class-A light weapon;
(d) The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon any person who shall,
unlawfully acquire or possess a Class-B light
weapon;
(e) The penalty of one (1) degree higher than
that provided in paragraphs (a) to (c) in this
section shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully possess any firearm under any
or combination of the following conditions:
(1) Loaded with ammunition or inserted with a
loaded magazine;
(2) Fitted or mounted with laser or any gadget
used to guide the shooter to hit the target such
as thermal weapon sight (TWS) and the like;
(3) Fitted or mounted with sniper scopes,
firearm muffler or firearm silencer;
(4) Accompanied with an extra barrel; and
(5) Converted to be capable of firing full
automatic bursts.
(f) The penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon any
a major part of a small arm;
(g) The penalty of prision mayor in its
ammunition for a small arm or Class-A light
weapon. If the violation of this paragraph is
committed by the same person charged with the
unlawful acquisition or possession of a small
arm, the former violation shall be absorbed by
the latter;
(h) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium
shall unlawfully acquire or possess a major part
of a Class-A light weapon;
(i) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium
shall unlawfully acquire or possess ammunition
for a Class-A light weapon. If the violation of
this paragraph is committed by the same person
charged with the unlawful acquisition or
possession of a Class-A light weapon, the
former violation shall be absorbed by the latter;
(j) The penalty of prision mayor in its
a major part of a Class-B light weapon; and
(k) The penalty of prision mayor in its
ammunition for a Class-B light weapon. If the
violation of this paragraph is committed by the
same person charged with the unlawful
acquisition or possession of a Class-B light
weapon, the former violation shall be absorbed
by the latter.
SEC. 29. Use of Loose Firearm in the
Commission of a Crime. – The use of a loose
firearm, when inherent in the commission of a
crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code
or other special laws, shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance: Provided, That if the
crime committed with the use of a loose
firearm is penalized by the law with a
maximum penalty which is lower than that
prescribed in the preceding section for illegal
possession of firearm, the penalty for illegal
possession of firearm shall be imposed in lieu
of the penalty for the crime charged: Provided,
further, That if the crime committed with the
use of a loose firearm is penalized by the law
with a maximum penalty which is equal to that
imposed under the preceding section for illegal
possession of firearms, the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed
in addition to the penalty for the crime
punishable under the Revised Penal Code or
other special laws of which he/she is found
guilty.
If the violation of this Act is in furtherance of,
or incident to, or in connection with the crime
of rebellion of insurrection, or attempted coup
d’ etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an
element of the crime of rebellion or
insurrection, or attempted coup d’ etat.
If the crime is committed by the person without
using the loose firearm, the violation of this Act
shall be considered as a distinct and separate
offense.
SEC. 30. Liability of Juridical Person. – The
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum to
prision mayor in its medium period shall be
imposed upon the owner, president, manager,
director or other responsible officer of/any
public or private firm, company, corporation or
entity who shall willfully or knowingly allow
any of the firearms owned by such firm,
company, corporation or entity to be used by
any person or persons found guilty of violating
the provisions of the preceding section, or
willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use
unregistered firearm or firearms without any
legal authority to be carried outside of their
residence in the course of their employment.
SEC. 31. Absence of Permit to Carry Outside
of Residence. – The penalty of prision
correccional and a fine of Ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person
who is licensed to own a firearm but who shall
carry the registered firearm outside his/her
residence without any legal authority therefor.
SEC. 32. Unlawful Manufacture, Importation,
Sale or Disposition of Firearms or Ammunition
or Parts Thereof, Machinery, Tool or
Instrument Used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms, Ammunition or Parts
Thereof. – The penalty of reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully engage in the
manufacture, importation, sale or disposition of
a firearm or ammunition, or a major part of a
firearm or ammunition, or machinery, tool or
instrument used or intended to be used by the
same person in the manufacture of a firearm,
ammunition, or a major part thereof.
The possession of any machinery, tool or
instrument used directly in the manufacture of
firearms, ammunition, or major parts thereof by
any person whose business, employment or
activity does not lawfully deal with the
possession of such article, shall be prima facie
evidence that such article is intended to be used
in the unlawful or illegal manufacture of
firearms, ammunition or parts thereof.
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period to prision mayor in its medium period
shall be imposed upon any laborer, worker or
employee of a licensed firearms dealer who
shall unlawfully take, sell or otherwise dispose
of parts of firearms or ammunition which the
company manufactures and sells, and other
materials used by the company in the
manufacture or sale of firearms or ammunition.
The buyer or possessor of such stolen part or
material, who is aware that such part or
material was stolen, shall suffer the same
penalty as the laborer, worker or employee.
If the violation or offense is committed by a
corporation, partnership, association or other
juridical entity, the penalty provided for in this
section shall be imposed upon the directors,
officers, employees or other officials or persons
therein who knowingly and willingly
participated in the unlawful act.
SEC. 33. Arms Smuggling. – The penalty of
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any
person who shall engage or participate in arms
smuggling as defined in this Act.
SEC. 34. Tampering, Obliteration or Alteration
of Firearms Identification. – The penalty of
prision correccional to prision mayor in its
person who shall tamper, obliterate or alter
without authority the barrel, slide, frame,
receiver, cylinder, or bolt assembly, including
the name of the maker, model, or serial number
of any firearm, or who shall replace without
authority the barrel, slide, frame, receiver,
cylinder, or bolt assembly, including its
individual or peculiar identifying
characteristics essential in forensic examination
of a firearm or light weapon.
The PNP shall place this information, including
its individual or peculiar identifying
characteristics into the database of integrated
firearms identification system of the PNP
Crime Laboratory for future use and
identification of a particular firearm.
SEC. 35. Use of an Imitation Firearm. – An
imitation firearm used in the commission of a
crime shall be considered a real firearm as
defined in this Act and the person who
committed the crime shall be punished in
accordance with this Act: Provided, That
injuries caused on the occasion of the conduct
of competitions, sports, games, or any
recreation activities involving imitation
firearms shall not be punishable under this Act.
SEC. 36. In Custodia Legis. – During the
pendency of any case filed in violation of this
Act, seized firearm, ammunition, or parts
thereof, machinery, tools or instruments shall
remain in the custody of the court. If the court
decides that it has no adequate means to safely
keep the same, the court shall issue an order to
turn over to the PNP Crime Laboratory such
firearm, ammunition, or parts thereof,
machinery, tools or instruments in its custody
during the pendency of the case and to produce
the same to the court when so ordered. No bond
shall be admitted for the release of the firearm,
ammunition or parts thereof, machinery, tool or
instrument. Any violation of this paragraph
shall be punishable by prision mayor in its
minimum period to prision mayor in its
medium period.
SEC. 37. Confiscation and Forfeiture. – The
imposition of penalty for any violation of this
Act shall carry with it the accessory penalty of
confiscation and forfeiture of the firearm,
ammunition, or parts thereof, machinery, tool
or instrument in favor of the government which
shall be disposed of in accordance with law.
SEC. 38. Liability for Planting Evidence. – The
penalty of prision mayor in its maximum
shall willfully and maliciously insert; place,
and/or attach, directly or indirectly, through any
overt or covert act, any firearm, or ammunition,
or parts thereof in the person, house, effects, or
in the immediate vicinity of an innocent
individual for the purpose of implicating or
incriminating the person, or imputing the
commission of any violation of the provisions
of this Act to said individual. If the person
found guilty under this paragraph is a public
officer or employee, such person shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
SEC. 39. Grounds for Revocation,
Cancellation or Suspension of License or
Permit. – The Chief of the PNP or his/her
authorized representative may revoke, cancel or
suspend a license or permit on the following
grounds:
(a) Commission of a crime or offense involving
the firearm, ammunition, of major parts
thereof;
(b) Conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude or any offense where the penalty
carries an imprisonment of more than six (6)
years;
(c) Loss of the firearm, ammunition, or any
parts thereof through negligence;
(d) Carrying of the firearm, ammunition, or
major parts thereof outside of residence or
workplace without, the proper permit to carry
the same;
(e) Carrying of the firearm, ammunition, or
major parts thereof in prohibited places;
(f) Dismissal for cause from the service in case
of government official and employee;
(g) Commission of any of the acts penalized
under Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known
as the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002”;
(h) Submission of falsified documents or
misrepresentation in the application to obtain a
license or permit;
(i) Noncompliance of reportorial requirements;
and
(j) By virtue of a court order.
SEC. 40. Failure to Notify Lost or Stolen
Firearm or Light Weapon. – A fine of Ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00) shall be imposed
upon any licensed firearm holder who fails to
report to the FEO of the PNP that the subject
firearm has been lost or stolen within a period
of thirty (30) days from the date of discovery.
Likewise, a fine of Five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person
holding a valid firearm license who changes
residence or office address other than that
indicated in the license card and fails within a
period of thirty (30) days from said transfer to
notify the FEO of the PNP of such change of
address.
SEC. 41. Illegal Transfer/Registration of
Firearms. – It shall be unlawful to transfer
possession of any firearm to any person who
has not yet obtained or secured the necessary
license or permit thereof.
The penalty of prision correccional shall be
imposed upon any person who shall violate the
provision of the preceding paragraph. In
addition, he/she shall be disqualified to apply
for a license to possess other firearms and all
his/her existing firearms licenses whether for
purposes of commerce or possession, shall be
revoked. If government-issued firearms,
ammunition or major parts of firearms or light
weapons are unlawfully disposed, sold or
transferred by any law enforcement agent or
public officer to private individuals, the penalty
of reclusion temporal shall be imposed.
Any public officer or employee or any person
who shall facilitate the registration of a firearm
through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation or
submission of falsified documents shall suffer
the penalty of prision correccional.
ARTICLE VI
FINAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 42. Firearms Repository. – The FEO of
the PNP shall be the sole repository of all
firearms records to include imported and
locally manufactured firearms and ammunition.
Within one (1) year upon approval of this Act,
all military and law enforcement agencies,
government agencies, LGUs and government-
owned or -controlled corporations shall submit
an inventory of all their firearms and
ammunition to the PNP.
SEC. 43. Final Amnesty. – Persons in
possession of unregistered firearms and holders
of expired license or unregistered firearms shall
register and renew the same through the Final
General Amnesty within six (6) months from
the promulgation of the implementing rules and
regulations of this Act. During the interim
period of six (6) months, no person applying
for license shall be charged of any delinquent
payment accruing to the firearm subject for
registration. The PNP shall conduct an
intensive nationwide campaign to ensure that
the general public is properly informed of the
provisions of this Act.
SEC. 44. Implementing Rules and Regulations.
– Within one hundred twenty (120) days from
the effectivity of this Act, the Chief of the PNP,
after public hearings and consultation with
concerned sectors of society shall formulate the
necessary rules and regulations for the effective
implementation of this Act to be published in at
least two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation.
SEC. 45. Repealing Clause. – This Act repeals
Sections 1, 2, 5 and 7 of Presidential Decree
No. 1866, as amended, and Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 8294 and all other laws,
executive orders, letters of instruction,
issuances, circulars, administrative orders, rules
or regulations that are inconsistent herewith.
SEC. 46. Separability Clause. – If any
provision of this Act or any part hereof is held
invalid or unconstitutional, the remainder of the
law or the provision not otherwise affected
shall remain valid and subsisting.
SEC. 47. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect
after fifteen (15) days from its publication in a
newspaper of nationwide circulation.
Approved,
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 136149-51. September 19, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL alias
WARPAN, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Republic Act No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal
possession of firearms, provided that the person
arrested committed no other crime.
Furthermore, if the person is held liable for
murder or homicide, illegal possession of
firearms is an aggravating circumstance, but
not a separate offense. Hence, where an
accused was convicted of direct assault with
multiple attempted homicide for firing an
unlicensed M-14 rifle at several policemen who
were about to serve a search warrant, he cannot
be held guilty of the separate offense of illegal
possession of firearms. Neither can such
unlawful act be considered to have aggravated
the direct assault.
The Case
Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil, also known as

Warpan, appeals before us the September 17,
1998 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 16), which
found him guilty of three out of the four
charges lodged against him.
Filed against appellant were four Informations,
[2] all signed by Assistant Regional State
Prosecutor Ricardo G. Cabaron and dated
September 25, 1997. The first Information[3]
was for maintaining a den for the use of
regulated drugs. It reads as follows:
That on or about September 24, 1997, in the
City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, Walpan Ladjaalam being then
the owner of a residential house located at Rio
Hondo,[4] this City, conspiring and
confederating together, mutually aiding and
assisting x x x his co-accused wife Nur-in
Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, maintain said house as a den,
where regulated drug [was] used in any
form.[5]
The second Information[6] charged appellant
with illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. We quote it below:
named accused, conspiring and confederating
together, mutually aiding and assisting with one
another, without any justifiable reason or
purpose other than to use it in the commission
of crime, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously have in their
possession and under their custody and control,
the following weapons, to wit: one (1) M14
rifle with SN 1555225 with magazines and
seven (7) rounds of live ammunition; two (2)
magazines with twenty (20) and twenty[-one]
(21) rounds of live [ammunition]; one (1)
homemade caliber .38 revolver with five (5)
live ammunition; one (1) M-79 (single) rifle
with pouch and with five (5) empty shell[s];
one (1) home made caliber .38 with SN-311092
with five live ammunition and one empty shell
of [a] cal. 38 x x x Smith and Wesson; two (2) .
38 Caliber paltik revolver with Serial Number
311092 and one defaced M79 grenade launcher
paltik, without first having obtained the
necessary license and or permit therefor from
authorities concerned, in flagrant violation of
the aforementioned law.[7]
The third Information,[8] for multiple attempted
murder with direct assault, was worded thus:
named accused being then armed with M-14
Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and
other assorted firearms and explosives,
conspiring and confederating together,
mutually aiding and assisting x x x one another
and with intent to kill, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously try and
attempt to kill SPO1 WILLIAM B. JONES,
JR., PO3 ENRIQUE C. RIVERA[,] SPO1
AMADO A. MIRASOL, JR., and SPO1
RICARDO J. LACASTESANTOS, in the
following manner, to wit: by then and there
firing their M-14 x x x Armalite Rifles, M-16
Armalite Rifles and other assorted firearms and
explosives, aimed and directed at the fatal parts
of the bodies of the above-named police
officers, well known to the accused as members
of the Philippine National Police, Zamboanga
City Police Office, and as such, agents of a
person in authority, who at the time of the
attack were engaged in the performance of their
duties, that is, on the occasion when said
officers were about to serve the Search Warrant
legally issued by the Regional Trial Court, this
City, to the person of the accused thus
commencing the commission of crime of
multiple murder directly by overt acts, and if
the accused did not accomplish their unlawful
purpose, that is, to kill the above-named Police
Officers, it was not by reason of their own
voluntary desistance but rather because of the
fact that all the above-named police officers
were able to seek cover during the firing and
were not hit by the bullets and explosives fired
by the accused and also by the fact said police
officers were able to wrestle with two (2) of the
accused namely: Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil
a.k.a. Warpan and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajairani,
who were subdued and subsequently placed
under arrest; whereas accused PO2 Nurhakim
T. Hadjula was able to make good his escape
and has remained at-large.[9]
In the fourth Information, appellant was
charged with illegal possession of drugs.[10]
On December 21, 1997, the cases against Nur-
in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini
were dismissed upon motion of the Office of
the City Prosecutor, which had conducted a
reinvestigation of the cases as ordered by the
lower court. The accused were consequently
released from jail.
The arraignment of appellant on all four (4)
charges took place on January 6, 1998, during
which he entered a plea of not guilty.[11] After
pretrial, the assailed Decision was rendered, the
dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused
WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL a.k.a.
WARPAN -
1. in Criminal Case No. 14636, GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of
Violation of Section 15-A, Article III, of
Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and
SENTENCES said accused to the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine
of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P500,000.00) and to pay the costs;
2. In Criminal Case No. 14637, NOT GUILTY
of Violation of Section 16, Article III, in
relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic
Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and
ACQUITS him of said crime with costs de
oficio;
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the
crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition penalized under Presidential
Decree No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act.
No. 8294, and SENTENCES said accused to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6)
YEARS of prision correccional as minimum to
EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor as
maximum and to pay a fine [of] THIRTY
THOUSAND (P30,000.00) and pay the costs;
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the
crime of Direct Assault with Multiple
Attempted Homicide and SENTENCES said
accused to an indeterminate penalty of TWO
(2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of
prision correccional as minimum to SIX (6)
YEARS of prision correccional as maximum
and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND
(P1,000.00) and to pay the costs. (emphasis in
the original)
Hence, this appeal.[12]
The Facts
Prosecutions Version
In its Brief,[13] the Office of the Solicitor
General presents the facts in this wise:
At 1:45 p.m. of September 24, 1997, PO3 Allan
Marcos Obut filed an application for the
issuance of a search warrant against appellant,
his wife and some John Does (Exh. C). After
the search warrant was issued about 2:30 p.m.
of the same day, a briefing was conducted
inside the office of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics
Unit of the Zamboanga City Police Office in
connection with the service of the search
warrant. The briefing was conducted by SPO2
Felipe Gaganting, Chief of the Anti-
Vice/Narcotics Unit. During the briefing, PO3
Renato Dela Pea was assigned as presentor of
the warrant. SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos and
PO3 Enrique Rivera were designated to
conduct the search. Other policemen were
assigned as perimeter guards (TSN, March 3,
1998, pp. 33-36).
After the briefing, more than thirty (30)
policemen headed by Police Superintendent
Edwin Soledad proceeded to the house of
appellant and his wife at Rio Hondo on board
several police vehicles (TSN, March 4, 1998, p.
32; April 22, 1998, p. 54). Before they could
reach appellants house, three (3) persons sitting
at a nearby store ran towards the house
shouting, [P]olice, raid, raid (Ibid., March 3,
1998, pp. 41, 43-44; April 23, 1998, p. 4).
When the policemen were about ten (10)
meters from the main gate of the house, they
were met by a rapid burst of gunfire coming
from the second floor of the house. There was
also gunfire at the back of the house (Ibid.,
March 5, 1998, pp. 14-16).
SPO1 Mirasol, SPO2 Lacastesantos, PO3
Rivera, and PO3 Dela Pea who were with the
first group of policemen saw appellant fire an
M14 rifle towards them. They all knew
appellant. When they were fired upon, the
group, together with SPO2 Gaganting, PO3
Obut and Superintendent Soledad, sought cover
at the concrete fence to observe the movements
at the second floor of the house while other
policemen surrounded the house (Ibid., March
4, 1998, pp. 50-51).
In front of the house was an extension building
connected to the concrete fence (Ibid., pp. 45-
46, 57-59, 73-76). Gaganting, Mirasol,
Lacastesantos, Gregorio, and Obut entered the
door of the extension building. Gaganting
opened the main (steel) gate of the house. The
other members of the team then entered.
Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered the house
through the main door and went inside the sala
of the ground floor while other policemen
surrounded the house. Two (2) old women were
in the sala together with a young girl and three
(3) children. One of the old women took the
children to the second floor while the young
girl remained seated at the corner (Ibid., pp. 19-
21).
Lacastesantos and Mirasol proceeded to the
second floor where they earlier saw appellant
firing an M14 rifle at them through the
window. While they were going upstairs,
appellant noticed their presence. He went
inside the bedroom and, after breaking and
removing the jalousies, jumped from the
window to the roof of a neighboring house.
Seeing this, Mirasol rushed downstairs and
asked help from the other members of the
raiding team to arrest appellant. Lacastesantos
went to the second floor and shouted to the
policemen outside not to fire in the direction of
the second floor because there were children.
Mirasol and SPO1 Cesar Rabuya arrested
appellant at the back of his house after a brief
chase (Ibid., pp. 21-23).
At the second floor, Lacastesantos saw an M14
rifle (Exh. B-3) with magazine on top of the
sofa at the sala on the second floor (Ibid., P.
27). The rifle bore Serial No. 1555225. He
removed the magazine from the rifle and the
bullet inside the chamber of the rifle. He
counted seventeen (17) live ammunition inside
the magazine. He saw two (2) more M14 rifle
magazines on the sofa, one with twenty (20)
live ammunition (Exh. G-3) and another with
twenty-one (21) live ammunition (Exh. G-4).
He likewise saw three (3) M16 rifle magazines
(Exh. G-2) in a corner at the second floor
(TSN, March 5, 1998, pp. 23-32, 53-57).
After Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered
appellants house, Rivera, Dela Pea, Gregorio
and Obut followed and entered the house. After
identifying themselves as members of the PNP
Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit, Obut presented to the
old women a copy of the search warrant. Dela
Pea and Rivera then searched appellants room
on the ground floor in the presence of Punong
Barangay Elhano (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 41-
43). On top of a table was a pencil case (Exh. J)
with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils inside
(Exhs. J-1 to J-50), each containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Other items were found during the search,
namely, assorted coins in different
denominations (Exh. W; TSN, April 28, 1998,
pp. 23-25), one (1) homemade .38 caliber
revolver (Exh. B-2) with five (5) live
[ammunition], one (1) M79 single rifle with [a]
pouch containing five (5) empty shells of an
M79 rifle (Exh. B-4), and one (1) empty shell
of an M14 rifle (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 30-
32).
Rino Bartolome Locson was an informer of the
Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga
Police. [O]n the morning of September 24,
1997, he was instructed by SPO2 Gaganting to
go to appellants house to buy shabu. Locson
knew appellant as a seller of shabu (TSN, April
22, 1998, p. 5) and had been to appellants
house about fifteen (15) times before. He went
to Rio Hondo and arrived at appellants house at
3:20 p.m. He bought P300.00 worth of shabu
from appellant. The latter got three (3) decks of
shabu from his waist bag. Appellant instructed
Locson to go behind the curtain where there
was a table. There were six (6) persons already
smoking. There was a lighted kerosene lamp
made of a medicine bottle placed on the table.
They asked Locson to smoke shabu and Locson
obliged. He placed the three (3) decks of shabu
he bought on the table (Ibid., pp. 8-15).
While they were smoking shabu, Locson heard
gunfire coming from appellants house. They all
stood and entered appellants compound but
were instructed to pass [through] the other side.
They met appellant at the back of his house.
Appellant told them to escape because the
police are already here. They scampered and
ran away because there were already shots.
Locson jumped over the fence and ran towards
the seashore. Upon reaching a place near the
Fisheries School, he took a tricycle and went
home (Ibid., pp. 17-19).
The following day, September 25, 1997, he
went to the police station and executed an
affidavit (Exh. M) narrating what transpired at
appellants house [o]n the afternoon of
September 24, 1997.
After the search and before returning to the
police station, P03 Dela Pea prepared a Receipt
for Property Seized (Exh. P & 3) listing the
properties seized during the search. The receipt
was signed by Dela Pea as the seizure officer,
and by Punong Barangay Hadji Hussin Elhano
and radio reporter Jun Cayona as witnesses. A
copy of the receipt was given to appellant but
he refused to acknowledge the properties seized
(TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 11-12).
An examination conducted by Police Inspector
Mercedes D. Diestro, Forensic Chemist of the
PNP Crime Laboratory Service Office 9, on the
paraffin casts taken from both hands of
appellant yielded positive for gunpowder
nitrates (Exh. A-3), giving rise to the possibility
that appellant had fired a gun before the
examination (TSN, March 3, 1998, p. 11).
Gunpowder residue examinations conducted on
September 26, 1997 showed that the following
firearms were fired (Exh. B-5): a .38 caliber
revolver (homemade) with Serial No. 311092
(Exh. B-1), another .38 caliber revolver
(homemade) without a serial number (Exh. B-
2), a Cal. 7.62 mm M14 U.S. rifle with Serial
No. 1555225 (Exh. B-3), and an M79 rifle
without a serial number (Exh. B-4). They were
fired within five (5) days prior to the
examination (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 16-21).
With respect to the crystalline substances, an
examination conducted by Police Inspector
Susan M. Cayabyab, likewise a Forensic
Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service
Office 9, on the fifty (50) pieces of folded
aluminum foils each containing white
crystalline granules with a total weight of
1.7426 grams (Exh. J-1 to J-50) yielded
positive results for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) (Exh.
L). However, the examination of one (1)
crystalline stone weighing 83.2674 grams (Exh.
K) yielded negative results for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (Exh. L).
The records of the Regional Operation and
Plans Division of the PNP Firearm and
Explosive Section show that appellant had not
applied/filed any application for license to
possess firearm and ammunition or x x x been
given authority to carry [a] firearm outside of
his residence (Exh. X)[14]
Defenses Version
Appellant Ladjaalam agrees with the narration

of facts given by the lower court.[15] Hence, we
quote the pertinent parts of the assailed
Decision:
Accused Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a.
Warpan, 30 years old, married, gave his
occupation as smuggling (tsn, p. 2, May 4,
1998). He used to go to Labuan in Malaysia
and bring cigarettes to the Philippines without
paying taxes (tsn, pp. 40-41, id). He said that
his true name [was] Abdul Nasser Abdurakman
and that Warpan or Walpan Ladjaalam [was]
only his alias. However, he admitted that more
people kn[e]w him as Walpan Ladjaalam rather
than Abdul Nasser Abdurakman (tsn. pp. 39-40;
46-47, id). He testified that [o]n the afternoon
of September 24, 1997, when he was arrested
by the police, he was sleeping in the house of
Dandao, a relative of his wife. He was alone.
He slept in Dandaos house and not in his house
because they ha[d] a sort of a conference as
Dandaos daughter was leaving for Saudi
Arabia. He noticed the presence of policemen
in his neighborhood at Aplaya, Rio Hondo
when he heard shots. He woke up and went out
of the house and that was the time that he was
arrested. He said he was arrested xxx [at] the
other side of my house; at the other side of the
fence where I was sleeping. xxx. At the back of
my house (tsn, p. 7, id.). He does not know who
arrested him considering that the one who
arrested me does not have nameplate. He was
arrested by four (4) persons. Not one of those
who arrested him testified in Court. He was
handcuffed and placed inside a jeep parked at
Rio Hondo Elementary School. According to
him, he did not fire a gun at the policemen
from [t]he second floor of his house. He said
the policemen [were] the one[s] who fire[d] at
us (tsn, p. 5, id.). If he fired a gun at the
policemen for sure they [would] die [b]ecause
the door is very near x x x the vicinity of my
house. He does not own the M14 rifle (Exh. B-
3) which according to policemen, he used in
firing at them. The gun does not belong to him.
He does not have a gun like that (tsn, p. 15,
id.). A policeman also owns an M14 rifle but he
does not know the policeman (tsn, pp. 16-17,
id). He said that the M79 rifle (Exh. B-4), the
three (3) empty M16 rifle magazines (Exh. G;
G-1 to G-2), the two (2) M14 magazines with
live ammunition (Exh. G-3; G-4); the two (2)
caliber .38 revolvers (Exhs. B-1; B-2), the fifty
(50) aluminum foils each containing shabu
(Exhs. J-1 to J-50) placed inside a pencil case
(Exh. J, the assorted coins placed inside a blue
bag (Exh. W) and the white crystalline stone
(Exh. K) all do not belong to him. He said that
the policemen just produced those things as
their evidence. The firearms do not belong to
him. They were brought by the policemen (tsn,
p. 43, May 4, 1998). Regarding the blue bag
containing assorted coins, he said: that is not
ours, I think this (is) theirs, xxx they just
brought that as their evidence (tsn, pp. 15-24,
id.)
Walpan Ladjaalam declared there were
occupants who were renting his extension
house. He affirmed that he owns that house.
Four (4) persons were staying in the extension
house. He could only recognize the husband
whose name is Momoy. They are from Jolo.
They left the place already because they were
afraid when the police raided the place. (tsn,
pp. 8-10, May 4, 1998). He does not know
prosecution witness Rino Locson y Bartolome.
Although Locson recognized him, in his case
he does not know Locson and he does not
recognize him (tsn, p.11, id). He did not sell
anything to Locson and did not entertain him.
He is not selling shabu but he knows for a fact
that there are plenty of person who are
engaged in selling shabu in that place, in that
area known as Aplaya, Rio Hondo. One of
them is Hadji Agbi (tsn, pp.11-14, id).
After his arrest Walpan Ladjaalam was brought
to the police station where he stayed for one
day and one night before he was transferred to
the City jail. While at the police station, he was
not able to take a bath. He smokes two packs of
cigarette a day. While he was at the police
station, he smoked [a] cigarette given to him by
his younger sister. He lighted the cigarettes
with [a] match. From the police station, he was
brought to the PNP Regional Office at R.T. Lim
Boulevard where he was subject to paraffin
examination (tsn, pp. 24-26, May 4, 1998).
During the raid conducted on his house, his
cousin Boy Ladjaalam, Ating Sapadi, and Jecar
(Sikkal) Usman, the younger brother of his wife
were killed. Walpan Ladjaalam said that he saw
that it was the policeman who shot them[,] only
I do not know his name. They were killed at the
back of his house. He said that no charges were
filed against the one responsible for their death
(tsn, pp. 30-33- May 4, 1998).
Anilhawa Ahamad, more or less 80 years old, a
widow was in the house of Walpan Ladjaalam
whom he calls Hadji Id at the time the police
raided the house. She is the mother of Ahma
Sailabbi. She was together with Babo Dandan,
two small children and a helper when soldiers
entered the house. (W)hen they arrived, they
kept on firing (their guns) even inside the
house (tsn, p.5, May 5, 1998). They were
armed with short and long firearms. They
searched the house and scattered things and got
what they wanted. They entered the room of
Walpan Ladjaalam. They tried to open a bag
containing jewelry. When Anilhawa tried to
bring the bag outside the room, they grabbed
the bag from her and poked a gun at her. At that
time Walpan Ladjaalam was not in the house.
Ahamad Sailabbi was also not in the house. A
Search Warrant was shown to Anilhawa after
the search was conducted and just before the
policemen left the place. Anilhawa Ahamad
said that it was already late in the afternoon[;]
before they left that was the time the Search
Warrant (was) given to us by xxx Barangay
Captain Hussin Elhano (tsn, pp.6-8, May 5,
1998). Barangay Chairman Elhano arrived
already late in the afternoon, almost sundown
(tsn, p. 9, id). Anilhaw declared that aside from
a bag containing jewelry and a bag full of
money, she had not seen anything else that was
taken from Walpan Ladjaalams house (tsn, pp.
9-12, id).
Akmad (Ahmad) Sailabbi, 37 years old,
married testified that about 4:00 oclock [o]n the
afternoon of September 24, 1997, ha was
standing in front of his house when policemen
arrived and immediately arrested him. He was
about to go to the City Proper to buy articles he
was intending to bring to Sabah. He had
around P50,000.00 placed inside a waist bag
tied around his waist. The policemen told him
to lie down in prone position and a policeman
searched his back. They pulled his waist bag
and took his DiaStar wrist watch. He was shot
three times and was hit on the forehead leaving
a scar. His injury was not treated. He was taken
to the police station where he was detained for
one day and one night. He was detained at the
City Jail for three months and five days after
which he was released (tsn, pp. 25-29, May 5,
1998).
Melba Usma, 20 years old, a widow, testified
that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997,
she was in the house of her parents lying
together with her husband Sikkal Usma. There
is only one house between her parents house
and the house of Walpan Ladjaalam. Her
husband Sikkal Usman is the brother of Nur-in
Ladjaalam, Walpans wife. When Melba heard
shots, she went downstairs. A policeman was
looking for her husband. The policeman called
her husband. When her husband went down, he
was instructed by the policeman to lie down in
prone position. Then the policeman shot her
husband. The policeman had two other
companions who also shot her husband while
he was lying down in prone position (tsn, pp.2-
7, May 5, 1998).
Murkisa Usman, 30 years old, married,
declared that [o]n the afternoon of September
24, 1997, she was sitting at the door of her
house watching her children playing when a
motorcyle, driven by a person, stopped near her
house. The driver was Gaganting whom she
called a soldier. He went down from his
motorcycle, pulled a gun and poked it at
Murkisa. Murkisa stood up and raised her
hands. She got her children and when she was
about to enter the room of her house,
Gaganting again poked a gun at her and there
was a shot. As a result of firing, three persons
died, namely, Sikkal Usman, Boy Ladjaalam
and Atip Sapali Sali (tsn, pp. 8-10, May 5,
1998).
Barangay Captain Hadji Hussin Elhano, 51
years old, testified that about 4:00 o clock [o]n
the afternoon of September 24, 1997, he was
fetched by two policemen at Catabangan where
he was attending a seminar. Because of traffic
along the way, they arrived at the Rio Hondo
already late in the afternoon. He saw policemen
were already inside the house. Upon entering
the gate, he saw Walpan at the gate already
handcuffed. Walpan called him but the police
advised him not to approach Walpan. The
search was already over and things were
already taken inside the house. When he went
inside the house, he saw the things that they
(policemen) searched, the firearms and the
shabu (tsn, p. 17. May 8, 1998). He did not see
the Search Warrant. What was shown to him
were the things recovered during the search
which were being listed. They were being
counted and placed on a table. Upon seeing the
things that were recovered during the search, I
just signed the receipt (Exh. P; P-1) of the
things x x x taken during the search (tsn, pp.
17-18. May 8, 1998). He saw three dead bodies
at the side of the fence when he went to the
other side of the house. The three persons were
killed outside the fence of Walpan Ladjaalam
(tsn, p. 18, id).[16]
The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court observed that the house of

appellant was raided on September 24, 1997 by
virtue of Search Warrant No. 20 issued on the
same day. However, the lower court nullified
the said Warrant because it had been issued for
more than one specific offense,[17] in violation
of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.[18]
The court a quo ruled:
It should be stated at the outset that Search
Warrant No. 20 is totally null and void because
it was issued for more than one specific offense
x x x contrary to Section 3, Rule 1[2]6 of the
Rules of Court which provides that A search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense
xxx. In Tambasan vs. People, 246 SCRA 184
(1995), the Supreme Court ruled that a search
warrant for more than one offense - a scatter
shot warrant - violates Section 3, Rule 126 of
the [R]evised Rules of Court and is totally null
and void.[19] (emphasis in the original)
Nevertheless, the trial court deemed appellants
arrest as valid. It emphasized that he had shot at
the officers who were trying to serve the void
search warrant. This fact was established by the
testimonies of several police officers,[20] who
were participants in the raid, and confirmed by
the laboratory report on the paraffin tests
conducted on the firearms and appellant.[21]
Additionally, the judge noted that Appellant
Ladjaalam, based on his statements in his
Counter Affidavit, impliedly contradicted his
assertions in open court that there had been no
exchange of gunfire during the raid.[22] The trial
court concluded that the testimonies of these
officers must prevail over appellants narration
that he was not in his house when the raid was
conducted.
Prescinding from this point, the court a quo
validated the arrest of appellant, reasoning
thus:
Under the circumstances, the policemen had
authority to pursue and arrest Walpan
Ladjaalam and confiscate the firearm he used
in shooting at the policemen and to enter his
house to effect said arrest and confiscation of
the firearm. Under Rule 113, Section 5 (a), of
the Rules of Court, A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person
xxx (w)hen in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense. An
offense is committed in the presence or within
the view of an officer, within the meaning of
the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant,
when the officer sees the offense, although at a
distance, or hears the disturbances created
thereby and proceeds at once to the scene
thereof. At the time the policemen entered the
house of accused Walpan Ladjaalam after he
had fired shots at the policemen who intended
to serve the Search Warrant to him, the accused
was engaged in the commission of a crime, and
was pursued and arrested after he committed
the crime of shooting at the policemen who
were about to serve the Search Warrant.[23]
As a consequence of the legal arrest, the
seizure of the following was also deemed valid:
the M14 rifle (with a magazine containing
seventeen live ammunition)[24] used by appellant
against the police elements, two M14
magazines, and three other M16 rifle
magazines.[25] The trial court observed that these
items were in plain view of the pursuing police
officers. Moreover, it added that these same
items were evidence [of] the commission of a
crime and/or contraband and therefore, subject
to seizure[26] since appellant had not applied for
a license to possess firearm and had not been
given authority to carry firearm outside his
residence.[27]
For being incredible and unsupported by
evidence, appellants claim that the items that
were seized by the police officers had been
planted was disbelieved by the trial court. It
ruled that if the police officers wanted to plant
evidence to incriminate him, they could have
done so during the previous raids or those
conducted after his arrest. To its mind, it was
unbelievable that they would choose to plant
evidence, when they were accompanied by the
barangay chairman and a radio reporter who
might testify against them. It then dismissed
these allegations, saying that frame-up, like
alibi, was an inherently weak defense.[28]
The trial court also convicted the accused of the
crime of maintaining a drug den. It reasoned as
follows:
The testimony of Rino Bartolome Locson,
corroborated by SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos
and SPO1 Amado Mirasol, Jr. clearly
established that Walpan Ladjaalam operated
and maintained a drug den in his extension
house where shabu or methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug, was sold, and
where persons or customers bought and used
shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride by
burning the said regulated drug and sniffing its
smoke with the use of an aluminum foil tooter.
A drug den is a lair or hideaway where
prohibited or regulated drugs are used in any
form or are found. Its existence [may be]
proved not only by direct evidence but may
also be established by proof of facts and
circumstances, including evidence of the
general reputation of the house, or its general
reputation among police officers. The
uncorroborated testimony of accused Walpan
Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan that he did not
maintain an extension house or a room where
drug users who allegedly buy shabu from him
inhales or smokes shabu cannot prevail over
the testimonies of Locson, SPO1
Lacastesantos, and SPO1 Mirasol. He admitted
that he is the owner of the extension house but
he alleged that there were four (4) occupants
who rented that extension house. He knew the
name of only one of the four occupants who are
allegedly from Jolo, a certain Momoy, the
husband. Aside from being uncorroborated,
Walpans testimony was not elaborated by
evidence as to when or for how long was the
extension house rented, the amount of rental
paid, or by any other document showing that
the extension house was in fact rented. The
defense of denial put up by accused Walpan
Ladjaalam a.k.a. 'Warpan is a weak defense.
Denial is the weakest defense and cannot
prevail over the positive and categorical
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, are negative and self-
serving evidence which deserve no weight in
law and cannot be given evidentiary weight
over the testimony of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters. As between the
positive declaration of the prosecution
witnesses and the negative statements of the
accused, the former deserve more credence.[29]
In conclusion, the trial court explained
appellants liability in this manner:
x x x. The act of the accused in firing an M14
rifle to the policemen who were about to enter
his house to serve a search warrant constitutes
the crime of direct assault with multiple
attempted homicide[,] not multiple attempted
murder with direct assault[,] considering that
no policeman was hit and injured by the
accused and no circumstance was proved to
qualify the attempted killing to attempted
murder.
The accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan
cannot be held liable [for] the crime of
Violation of Section 16, Article III, in relation
to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act 6425
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1992, as amended, because the fifty (50)
pieces of folded aluminum foils having a total
weight of 1.7426 grams all containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu
allegedly found in his house are inadmissible as
evidence against him considering that they
were seized after [a] search conducted by virtue
of Search Warrant No. 20 which is totally null
and void as it was issued for more than one
offense, and were not found in plain view of the
police officers who seized them. Neither could
the accused be held liable for illegal possession
of firearms and ammunition except for the (1)
M14 rifle with Serial Number 1555225 and
with magazine containing fifteen (15) live
ammunition and two more M14 rifle magazines
with twenty (20) and twenty-one (21) live
ammunition respectively considering that the
policemen who recovered or seized the other
firearms and ammunition did not testify in
court. The blue bag containing assorted coins
cannot be returned to the accused Walpan
Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan because according to
the accused the blue bag and assorted coins do
not belong to him[;] instead the said assorted
coins should be turned over to the National
Treasury.[30]
The Issues
In his Brief, appellant submits the following

Assignment of Errors:
I
The trial court erred when it concluded that
appellant Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil [had]
fired first at the police officers who went to his
house to serve a search warrant upon him
which led to an exchange of fire between
Ladjaalam and the police officer.
II
The trial court erred when it denied the
appellant the right and opportunity for an
ocular inspection of the scene of the firefight
and where the house of the appellant [was]
located.
III
The trial court erred when it ruled that the
presumption of regularity in the performance of
their duties [excluded] the claim of the
appellant that the firearms and
methamphetamine hydrochloride (i.e. shabu)
were planted by the police.[31]
In the interest of simplicity, we shall take up
these issues seriatim: (a) denial of the request
for ocular inspection, (b) credibility of the
prosecution witnesses, and (c) the defense of
frame-up. In addition, we shall also discuss the
proper crimes and penalties to be imposed on
appellant.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal has no merit.

First Issue: Denial of Request for Ocular Inspection
Appellant insists that the trial court erred in

denying his request for an ocular inspection of
the Ladjaalam residence. He argues that an
ocular inspection would have afforded the
lower court a better perspective and an idea
with respect to the scene of the crime.[32] We do
not agree.
We fail to see the need for an ocular inspection
in this case, especially in the light of the clear
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.[33] We
note in particular that the defense had even
requested SPO1 Amado Mirasol Jr. to sketch
the subject premises to give the lower court a
fairly good idea of appellants house.[34] Viewing
the site of the raid would have only delayed the
proceedings.[35] Moreover, the question whether
to view the setting of a relevant event has long
been recognized to be within the discretion of
the trial judge.[36] Here, there is no reason to
disturb the exercise of that discretion.[37]
Second Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses
Appellant, in essence, questions the credibility

of the prosecution witnesses.[38] Suffice it to
state that the trial courts assessment of their
credibility is generally accorded respect, even
finality.[39] After carefully examining the records
and finding no material inconsistencies to
support appellants claim, we cannot exempt
this case from the general rule.[40] Quite the
contrary, the testimonies of these witnesses
positively showed that appellant had fired upon
the approaching police elements, and that he
had subsequently attempted to escape. SPO1
Amado Mirasol Jr.[41] testified thus:
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: And, this trail is towards the front of the
house of the accused?
A: Yes.
Q: And its there where you were met by a
volley of fire?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q: How far were you from the concrete fen[c]e
when you were met by a volley of fire? ... You
said you were fired upon?
A: More or less, five (5) meters.
xxxxxxxxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: Now, you said you were able to enter the
house after the gate was opened by your
colleague Felipe Gaganting ... I will reform that
question.
Q: Who opened the gate Mr. Witness?
A: SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Efren Gregorio and
Allan Marcos Obut.
Q: And, at that time you were hiding at the
concrete fence?
A: Yes.
Q: Now, when this gate was opened, you said
you went inside the house, right?
A: Yes.
Q: What did you see inside the house?
A: I, together with SPO1 Ricardo
Lacastesantos, entered the main door of the
house of Walfran [sic] Ladjaalam at the ground
floor. We went inside the sala on the ground
floor of his house[;] I saw two old woman.
xxxxxxxxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: Now, what did you do with these two old
women?
A: I did not mind those two old women
because those two women were sitting on the
ground floor. I was concentrating on the second
floor because Ladjaalam was firing towards our
group so, I, together with Ricardo
Lacastesantos, went upstairs to the second floor
of the house.
Q: Were you able to go to the second floor of
the house?
A: Yes.
Q: What happened when you were already on
the second floor?
A: While we were proceeding to the second
floor, Walfan [sic] Ladjaalam, noticed our
presence and immediately went inside the
bedroom [o]n the second floor and he went
immediately and jumped from the window of
his house x x x leading to the roof of the
neighbors house.
xxxxxxxxx
COURT:
Reform. That is leading
Q: What happened when you entered and he
jumped to the roofing of the neighbors house?
A: Immediately, I myself, we immediately went
downstairs and asked the assistance of the
members of the raiding team to arrest Walfan
Ladjaalam.
xxxxxxxxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: Were you able to go down?
A: Yes.
Q: What happened when you were there?
A: We immediately went out and I asked the
assistance of the members of the raiding team
and the investigator of the unit especially SPO1
Cesar Rabuya. I was able to manage to arrest
Walfan Ladjaalam.[42]
What happened thereafter was narrated by
Senior Police Officer Ricardo Lacastesantos,[43]
as follows:
Q: What did you notice [o]n the second floor?
A: I went where the firing came from, so, I saw
[an] M14 rifle and I shouted from the outside,
do not fire at the second floor because there
[are] a lot of children here.
Q: Now, that rifle you said [was an] M14,
where did you find this?
A: At the sala set.
Q: This sala set where is this located?
A: Located [on] the second floor of the house.
Q: Is there a sala [o]n the second floor?
A: Yes.
Q: Can you still identify that M14 rifle which
you said you recovered from the sale set?
A: Yes.
Q: Why can you identify that?
A: The Serial No. of M14 is 1555225 and I
marked it with my initial.
Q: Now, I have here M14 rifle[;] will you
please tell us where is the Serial No. of this?
A: 1555225 and I put my initial, RJL.
FISCAL NUVAL:
This is already marked as our Exhibit B-3 with
magazine, one magazine and seven round
[ammunition].
Q: After recovering this, what did you do with
this firearm?
A: When I recovered it I removed the bullets
inside the chamber[.] I removed the magazine
and I turned it over to the investigator.
Q: Where did you turn it over?
A: At the crime scene.
Q: Now, that magazine, can you still identify
this?
A: Yes.
Q: Why?
A: I put x x x markings.
xxxxxxxxx
COURT:
So, a[si]de from the magazine attached to the
M14 rifle you found six more magazines?
A: Yes, so, all in all six magazines, three empty
M16 rifle magazines and three M14.
Q: The M16 magazines [were] empty?
A: Empty.
Q: How about the M14?
A: Found with [ammunition].
xxxxxxxxx
Q: So, where are the three M16 magazines?
A: In the corner.
Q: What did you do with [these] three
magazines of M16?
A: I turned [them] over to the investigator.
Q: Can you identify them?
A: Yes, because of my initials[.]
Q: Where are your initials?
A: On the magazines.
Q: RJL?
A: RJL.[44]
These were confirmed by the results of the
paraffin tests conducted on appellant and on the
weapons seized during the raid. Both of his
hands as well as the weapons, particularly the
M-14 which he had used, were positive for
gunpowder nitrate. Police Inspector Mercedes
Delfin-Diestro explained in open court:
Q: Okay. Now, what was the result of your
examination, Madam Witness?
A: The result of the examination [was] that
both hands of the subject person, ha[d]
presence of gun powder nitrates.
Q: What do you mean Madam Witness, what
does that indicate?
A: It indicates there is presence of powder
nitrates.
Q: Can we conclude that he fired a gun?
A: I cannot conclude that he fired a gun
because there are so many circumstances
[why] a person [would be] positive on his
hands for gun powder nitrates.
Q: But, most likely, he fired a gun?
A: Yes.
xxxxxxxxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: What about, Madam Witness this Exhibit B-
3, which is the M14 rifle. What did you do with
this?
A: SPO3 Abu did the swabbing both in the
chamber and the barrel wherein I observed
there [were] black and traces of brown residue
on the bolt, chamber and in the barrel.
Q: And, that indicates Madam Witness...?
A: It indicates that the gun was fired.
Q: Recently?
A: Because of the traces of brown residue, it
could be possible that the gun was fired before
the incident x x x.
COURT:
Q: There is also black residue?
A: Yes.
Q: What does it indicate?
A: It indicates that the firearm was recently
fired.
Q: And, where is this swab used at the time of
the swabbing of this Exhibit?
A: This one.
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
May we ask that this be marked as Exhibit B-3-
A.
COURT:
Q: The firing there indicates that the gun was
recently fired, during the incident?
A: Yes.
Q: And also before the incident it was fired
because of the brown residue?
A: Yes, Your Honor.[45] (emphasis supplied)
Duly proven from the foregoing were the two
elements[46] of the crime of illegal possession of
firearms. Undoubtedly, the established fact that
appellant had fired an M-14 rifle upon the
approaching police officers clearly showed the
existence of the firearm or weapon and his
possession thereof. Sufficing to satisfy the
second element was the prosecutions
Certification[47] stating that he had not filed any
application for license to possess a firearm, and
that he had not been given authority to carry
any outside his residence.[48] Further, it should
be pointed out that his possession and use of an
M-14 rifle were obviously unauthorized
because this weapon could not be licensed in
favor of, or carried by, a private individual.[49]
Third Issue: Defense of Frame-up
From the convoluted arguments strewn before

us by appellant, we gather that the main
defense he raises is frame-up. He claims that
the items seized from his house were planted,
and that the entire Zamboanga police force was
out to get him at all cost.
This Court has invariably held that the defense
of frame-up is inherently weak, since it is easy
to fabricate, but terribly difficult to disprove.[50]
Absent any showing of an improper motive on
the part of the police officers,[51] coupled with
the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duty, such defense cannot
be given much credence.[52] Indeed, after
examining the records of this case, we conclude
that appellant has failed to substantiate his
claim. On the contrary, his statements in his
Counter Affidavit are inconsistent with his
testimony during the trial.[53] He testified thus:
Q Now, Mr. Witness, do you remember having
executed an Affidavit/ a Counter-Affidavit?
A I could not remember.
Q I have here a Counter-Affidavit and it was
signed before this representation on the 8th day
of December 1997[;] tell us whose signature is
this appearing above the typewritten name
FISCAL NUVAL:
Q . . . . Walpan Ladjaalam, whose signature is
this?
(Showing)
A Yes, Sir. This is mine.
Q Now, in paragraph[s] 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 and 8; you
stated in this Counter-Affidavit which I quote:
that I was resting and sleeping when I heard the
gunshots and I noticed that the shots were
directed towards our house.. and I inspected
and x x x we were attacked by armed persons..
and I was apprehended by the persons who
attacked x x x our house; [the] house you are
referring to [in] this paragraph, whose house
[are you] referring to, is this [what] you are
referring to [as] your house or the house of
your neighbors [from] which you said you
heard gunshots?
A Our house.
Q Now, in paragraph 6 of your Counter-
Affidavit you stated and I quote: that [o]n that
afternoon of September 24, 1997, I was at
home in my house Aplaya, Riohondo, Bo.
Campo Muslim, my companions in my house
[were] the two old women and my children, is
this correct?
A They were not there.
Q Now, in that statement Mr. Witness, you said
that you were at home in [your] house at
Aplaya, Riohondo, Bo. Campo Muslim[;]
which is which now, you were in your house or
you were in your neighbors[] house at that time
when you heard gunshots?
A I was in the house near my house.
Q So, your statement particularly paragraph 6
of your Counter-Affidavit that you were at
home in [your] house at Aplaya Riohondo Bo.
Campo Muslim, is x x x not correct?
A Yes, Sir. This is not correct.[54]
Crime and Punishment
The trial court convicted appellant of three
crimes: (1) maintenance of a drug den, (2)
direct assault with attempted homicide, and (3)
illegal possession of firearms. We will discuss
each of these.
Maintenance of a Drug Den
We agree with the trial court that appellant was

guilty of maintenance of a drug den, an offense
for which he was correctly sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. His guilt was clearly
established by the testimony of Prosecution
Witness Rino Bartolome Locson, who himself
had used the extension house of appellant as a
drug den on several occasions, including the
time of the raid. The formers testimony was
corroborated by all the raiding police officers
who testified before the court. That appellant
did not deny ownership of the house and its
extension lent credence to the prosecutions
story.
Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide
The trial court was also correct in convicting
appellant of direct assault[55] with multiple
counts of attempted homicide. It found that
[t]he act of the accused [of] firing an M14 rifle
[at] the policemen[,] who were about to enter
his house to serve a search warrant x x x
constituted such complex crime.[56]
We note that direct assault with the use of a
weapon carries the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum
periods, while attempted homicide carries the
penalty of prision correccional.[57] Hence, for
the present complex crime, the penalty for
direct assault, which constitutes the most
serious crime, should be imposed and applied
in its maximum period.[58]
Illegal Possession of Firearms
Aside from finding appellant guilty of direct

assault with multiple attempted homicide, the
trial court convicted him also of the separate
offense of illegal possession of firearms under
PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, and
sentenced him to 6 years of prision
correccional to 8 years of prision mayor.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
disagrees, on the ground that the trial court
should not have applied the new law. It
contends that under the facts of the case, the
applicable law should have been PD 1866, as
worded prior to its amendment by RA 8294.
The trial courts ruling and the OSGs
submission exemplify the legal communitys
difficulty in grappling with the changes brought
about by RA 8294. Hence, before us now are
opposing views on how to interpret Section 1
of the new law, which provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree
No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale,
Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of
Firearms or Ammunition Instruments Used or
Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of
Firearms or Ammunition. -- The penalty of
prision correccional in its maximum period
and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand
pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal
in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low
powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380
or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower,
part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool
or instrument used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of any firearm or ammunition:
Provided, That no other crime was committed.
period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is
classified as high powered firearm which
includes those with bores bigger in diameter
than .30 caliber and 9 millimeter such as
caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser
calibered firearms but considered powerful
such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 centerfire
magnum and other firearms with firing
capability of full automatic and by burst of two
or three: Provided, however, That no other
crime was committed by the person arrested.
If homicide or murder is committed with the
use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance
of or incident to, or in connection with the
crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or
attempted coup detat, such violation shall be
absorbed as an element of the crime of
rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted
coup detat.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon the
owner, president, manager, director or other
responsible officer of any public or private
firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall
willfully or knowingly allow any of the
firearms owned by such firm, company,
corporation or entity to be used by any person
or persons found guilty of violating the
provisions of the preceding paragraphs or
willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use
unlicensed firearms or firearms without any
legal authority to be carried outside of their
residence in the course of their employment.
The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed
upon any person who shall carry any licensed
firearm outside his residence without legal
authority therefor.
Citing People v. Jayson,[59] the OSG argues that
the foregoing provision does not cover the
specific facts of this case. Since another crime
-- direct assault with multiple unlawful
homicide -- was committed, appellant cannot
be convicted of simple illegal possession of
firearms under the second paragraph of the
aforecited provision. Furthermore, since there
was no killing in this case, illegal possession
cannot be deemed as an aggravating
circumstance under the third paragraph of the
provision. Based on these premises, the OSG
concludes that the applicable law is not RA
8294, but PD 1866 which, as worded prior the
new law, penalizes simple illegal possession of
firearms even if another crime is committed at
the same time.[60]
Applying a different interpretation, the trial
court posits that appellant should be convicted
of illegal possession of firearms, in addition to
direct assault with multiple attempted
homicide. It did not explain its ruling, however.
Considering that it could not have been
ignorant of the proviso[61] in the second
paragraph, it seemed to have construed no other
crime as referring only to homicide and murder,
in both of which illegal possession of firearms
is an aggravating circumstance. In other words,
if a crime other than murder or homicide is
committed, a person may still be convicted of
illegal possession of firearms. In this case, the
other crime committed was direct assault with
multiple attempted homicide; hence, the trial
court found appellant guilty of illegal
possession of firearms.
We cannot accept either of these interpretations
because they ignore the plain language of the
statute. A simple reading thereof shows that if
an unlicensed firearm is used in the
commission of any crime, there can be no
separate offense of simple illegal possession of
firearms. Hence, if the other crime is murder or
homicide, illegal possession of firearms
becomes merely an aggravating circumstance,
not a separate offense. Since direct assault with
multiple attempted homicide was committed in
this case, appellant can no longer be held liable
for illegal possession of firearms.
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in
favor of the accused.[62] In this case, the plain
meaning of RA 8294s simple language is most
favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other
interpretation is justified, for the language of
the new law demonstrates the legislative intent
to favor the accused.[63] Accordingly, appellant
cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of
illegal possession of firearms and direct assault
with attempted homicide. Moreover, since the
crime committed was direct assault and not
homicide or murder, illegal possession of
firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating
circumstance.
We reject the OSGs contention that PD 1866,
as worded prior to its amendment by RA 8294,
should be applied in this case. When the crime
was committed on September 24, 1997, the
original language of PD 1866 had already been
expressly superseded by RA 8294 which took
effect on July 6, 1997.[64] In other words, no
longer in existence was the earlier provision of
PD 1866, which justified a conviction for
illegal possession of firearms separate from any
other crime. It was replaced by RA 8294 which,
among other amendments to PD 1866,
contained the specific proviso that no other
crime was committed.
Furthermore, the OSGs reliance on People v.
Jayson[65] is misplaced. True, this Court
sustained the conviction of appellant for illegal
possession of firearms, although he had also
committed homicide. We explained, however,
that the criminal case for homicide [was] not
before us for consideration.
Just as unacceptable is the interpretation of the
trial court. We find no justification for limiting
the proviso in the second paragraph to murder
and homicide. The law is clear: the accused can
be convicted of simple illegal possession of
firearms, provided that no other crime was
committed by the person arrested. If the
intention of the law in the second paragraph
were to refer only to homicide and murder, it
should have expressly said so, as it did in the
third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not
distinguish, neither should we.
The Court is aware that this ruling effectively
exonerates appellant of illegal possession of an
M-14 rifle, an offense which normally carries a
penalty heavier than that for direct assault.
While the penalty for the first is prision mayor,
for the second it is only prision correccional.
Indeed, the accused may evade conviction for
illegal possession of firearms by using such
weapons in committing an even lighter offense,
[66] like alarm and scandal[67] or slight physical
injuries,[68] both of which are punishable by

arresto menor.[69] This consequence, however,
necessarily arises from the language of RA
8294, whose wisdom is not subject to the
Courts review. Any perception that the result
reached here appears unwise should be
addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has
no discretion to give statutes a new meaning
detached from the manifest intendment and
language of the legislature. Our task is
constitutionally confined only to applying the
law and jurisprudence[70] to the proven facts,
and we have done so in this case.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that appellant is found guilty only of two
offenses: (1) direct assault and multiple
attempted homicide with the use of a weapon,
for which he is sentenced to 2 years and 4
months to 6 years of prision correccional; and
(2) maintaining a drug den, for which he was
correctly sentenced by the trial court to
reclusion perpetua. Costs against appellant.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
Congress of the Philippines for a possible
review, at its sound discretion, of RA 8294.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 76338-39 February 26, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
RENATO TAC-AN Y HIPOS, accused-
appellant.
The Office of the Solicitor General for
plaintiff-appellee.
Amadeo D. Seno for accused-appellant.
FELICIANO, J.:
Accused Renato Tac-an appeals from the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Tagbilaran City, convicting him of qualified
illegal possession of a firearm and
ammunition in Criminal Case No. 4007 and
of murder in Criminal Case No. 4012 and
imposing upon him the penalty of death in
both cases.
On 18 December 1984, appellant was
charged with violation of Section 1,
paragraph (2), of Presidential Decree No.
1866, committed as follows:
That, on or about the 14th day of
December 1984, in the City of
Tagbilaran Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, while
acting under the influence of drugs
and without any license or permit
from the proper authorities, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have ill his possession,
custody and control an unlicensed
firearm, a SMITH & WESSON
Airweight caliber .38 revolver with
Serial Number 359323 with Five (5)
spent shells and Five (5) live
ammunitions and without any
justifiable cause and with intent to
kill, used the said firearm and
ammunitions to shoot one Francis
Ernest Escano III hitting and inflicting
upon the latter the following gunshot
wounds or injuries, to wit:
MULTIPLE GUNSHOT
WOUNDS — Head & Chest
(through and through);
Head Entrance — 1.4 x 2.2
cm., Left Fronto-Temporal
Area; Port — 1.3 x 0.3 cm.;
Right Cheek. 3.5 cm. above
the right external meatus;
Chest Entrance — 0.3 x 1 cm.
— Right Infrascapular Area at
the level of the 7th Intercostal
Rib (Back); Exist — 0.3 cm.
dia; above the right nipple;
Y-shape laceration, check at
the right angle of the mouth,
Right
Dimensions: 3 x 1.2 cm. x 1.8
which gunshot wounds or injuries
directly caused his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Acts committed contrary to the
provisions of Section 1, paragraph 2
of the Presidential Decree No. 1866.
1
On 11 January 1985, an amended

information 2 for murder was also filed
against appellant reading as follows:
That, on or about the 14th day of
December, 1984 in the City of
Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused,
without any justifiable cause and with
intent to kill, evident pre-meditation
treachery, while acting under the
influence of drugs, with cruelty and
deliberately augmenting the suffering
of the victim, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shot one Francis
Ernest Escano with the use of an
unlicensed SMITH & WESSON
Airweight caliber .38 revolver with
Serial Number 359323 hitting and
inflicting upon the latter the following
gunshot wounds or injuries, to wit:
MULTIPLE GUNSHOT
WOUNDS — Head and Chest
(Through & Through);
Head Entrance — 14 x 2.2
cm., Left Fronto-temporal
Area; Port — l.3 x 0.3 cm.,
Right Cheek, 3.5 cm., above
the right external meatus;
Chest Entrance — 0.3 x 1 cm.
— right Infrascapular Area at
the level of the 7th Inter-Costal
Rib (back); exit — 0.3 cm. dia;
above the right nipple
Y-shape laceration, cheek at
the angle of the mouth, Right
Dimensions: 3 x 1.2 cm. x 1.8.
which gunshot wounds or injuries
directly caused his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of
the deceased namely: Judge & Mrs.
Francisco Rey H. Escano, in the
amount to be proved during the trial
of the case.
Acts committed contrary to the
provisions of Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Section 17 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
179, with the qualifying aggravating
circumstances of evident
premeditation, treachery and acting
under the influence of dangerous
drugs and cruelty.
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty in
both cases. The two (2) criminal cases
were consolidated upon motion of the
prosecution and tried jointly. On 31 July
1986, the trial court rendered a decision 3
convicting appellant under both
informations. The dispositive portion of the
decision read as follows:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing
premises considered, decision is
hereby rendered in Criminal Case
No. 4007 finding the accused Renato
Tac-an y Hipos GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Illegal
Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions qualified with Murder
under Section 1, paragraphs 1 and 2
of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and
hereby sentences said Renato Tac-
an y Hipos to suffer the penalty of
DEATH. Further, decision is also
rendered in Criminal Case No. 4012
finding the same accused Renato
Tac-an y Hipos GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, in relation to Batas Pambansa
Blg. 179 and P.D. 1866. Appreciating
the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation (treachery
used to qualify the crime to murder)
and the special aggravating
circumstances of acting while under
the influence of dangerous drugs
and with the use of an unlicensed
firearm and with insult to a person in
authority and there being no
mitigating circumstance to offset
them, and sentences the said
Renato Tac-an y Hipos to suffer the
penalty of DEATH. The accused is
likewise ordered to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Francis Ernest
Escano in the amount of THIRTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00);
to pay actual compensatory
damages in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED EIGHT THOUSAND
THREE HUNDRED TEN PESOS
(P108,310.00); to pay moral
damages to Judge Francisco
Escano, Jr., the sum of ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P100,000.00) and to Mrs. Lydia
Escano the sum of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00)
for the mental anguish and suffering
each experienced because of the
death of Francis Ernest. All such
amount shall earn legal interest from
the time this decision shall become
final and executory until fully
satisfied. The accused shall also pay
the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Immediately after promulgation of the
decision, appellant signified his intention to
appeal to this Court, although the same
was subject to automatic review by this
Court.
In his brief, appellant assigned the
following as errors allegedly committed by
the trial court:
I. The lower court erred in believing
the prosecution's version of the case
instead of according full faith and
credence to the defendant's version.
II. The trial court erred in not holding
that Renato Tac-an was justified in
shooting the deceased.
III. The trial court erred in not holding
that in (sic) the least the defendant
acted in incomplete self-defense in
shooting the deceased.
IV. The trial court erred in not holding
that P.D. 1866 is inapplicable to the
defendant inasmuch as said decree
was enforceable only during the
existence of the Martial Law Regime.
V. The trial court erred in not holding
that the defendant was placed twice
in jeopardy for having been
prosecuted for violation of P.D. 1866
despite his being prosecuted for
murder in an information which
alleges that the accused used an
unlicensed firearm in killing the
deceased.
VI. The trial court erred in not
adjudging the defendant innocent of
murder.
From the record, the facts may be collated
and summarized as follows:
Appellant Renato Tac-an, then eighteen
(18) years and seven (7) months of age,
and the deceased Francis Ernest Escano
III, fifteen (15) years old, were classmates
in the third year of high school of the Divine
Word College in Tagbilaran City. They were
close friends, being not only classmates
but also members of the same gang, the
Bronx gang. Renato had been to the house
where Francis and his parents lived, on
one or two occasions. On those occasions,
Francis' mother noticed that Renato had a
handgun with him. Francis was then
advised by his mother to distance himself
from Renato. 4
Francis withdrew from the Bronx gang. The
relationship between Renato and Francis
turned sour. Sometime in September 1984,
Renato and Francis quarrelled with each
other, on which occasion Francis bodily
lifted Arnold Romelde from the ground.
Arnold was friend and companion to
Renato. The quarrel resulted in Renato
and Francis being brought to the high
school principal's office. The strained
relationship between the two (2) erstwhile
friends was aggravated in late November
1984 when Francis teamed that Renato,
together with other members of the Bronx
gang, was looking for him, apparently with
the intention of beating him up. Further
deterioration of their relationship occurred
sometime in the first week of December
1984, when graffiti appeared on the wall of
the third year high school classroom and
on the armrest of a chair in that classroom,
deprecating the Bronx gang and describing
Renato as "bayot" (homosexual) 5 Renato
attributed the graffiti to Francis.
At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 14
December 1984, Renato entered Room 15
of the high school building to attend his
English III class. Renato placed his
scrapbook prepared for their Mathematics
class on his chair, and approached the
teacher, Mrs. Liliosa Baluma, to raise a
question. Upon returning to his chair, he
found Francis sitting there, on the
scrapbook. Renato was angered by what
he saw and promptly kicked the chair on
which Francis was seated. Francis,
however, explained that he had not
intentionally sat down on Renato's
scrapbook. A fistfight would have ensued
but some classmates and two (2) teachers,
Mrs. Baluma and Mr. Damaso Pasilbas,
intervened and prevented them from
assaulting each other. After the two (2) had
quieted down and apparently shaken
hands at the instance of Mrs. Baluma, the
latter resumed her English III class. Francis
sat on the last row to the extreme right of
the teacher while Renato was seated on
the same last row at the extreme left of the
teacher. While the English III class was still
going on, Renato slipped out of the
classroom and went home to get a gun. He
was back at the classroom approximately
fifteen (15) minutes later. 6
The Mathematics class under Mr. Damaso
Pasilbas scheduled for 3:00 p.m. had just
started in Room 15 when Renato suddenly
burst into the room, shut the door and with
both hands raised, holding a revolver,
shouted "Where is Francis?" Upon sighting
Francis seated behind and to the light of
student Ruel Ungab, Renato fired at
Francis, hitting a notebook, a geometry
book and the armrest of Ruel's chair.
Francis and Ruel jumped up and with
several of their classmates rushed forward
towards the teacher's platform to seek
protection from their teacher. Renato fired
a second time, this time hitting the
blackboard in front of the class. Francis
and the other students rushed back
towards the rear of the room. Renato
walked towards the center of the
classroom and fired a third time at Francis,
hitting the concrete wall of the classroom.
Francis and a number of his classmates
rushed towards the door, the only door to
and from Room 15. Renato proceeded to
the teacher, s platform nearest the door
and for the fourth time fired at Francis as
the latter was rushing towards the door.
This time, Francis was hit on the head and
he fell on the back of Ruel and both fell to
the floor. Ruel was pulled out of the room
by a friend; Francis remained sprawled on
the floor bleeding profusely. 7
Renato then went out of Room 15, and
paced between Rooms 14 and 15. A
teacher, Mr. Pablo Baluma, apparently
unaware that it was Renato who had
gunned down Francis, approached Renato
and asked him to help Francis as the latter
was still alive inside the room. Renato
thereupon re-entered Room 15, closed the
door behind him, saying: "So, he is still
alive. Where is his chest?" Standing over
Francis sprawled face down on the
classroom floor, Renato aimed at the chest
of Francis and fired once more. The bullet
entered Francis' back below the right
shoulder, and exited on his front chest just
above the right nipple. 8
Renato then left with two (2) remaining
students and locked Francis alone inside
Room 15. Renato proceeded to the ground
floor and entered the faculty room. There,
he found some teachers and students and
ordered them to lock the door and close
the windows, in effect holding them as
hostages. He also reloaded his gun with
five (5) bullets. After some time, a team of
Philippine Constabulary troopers led by
Capt. Larino Lazo arrived and surrounded
the faculty room. With a hand-held public
address device, Capt. Lazo called upon
Renato to surrender himself Renato did not
respond to this call. Renato's brother
approached Capt. Lazo and volunteered to
persuade his brother to give up. Renato's
father who, by this time had also arrived,
pleaded with Renato to surrender himself
Renato then turned over his gun to his
brother through an opening in the
balustrade of the faculty room. Capt. Lazo
took the gun from Renato's brother, went to
the door of the faculty room, entered and
placed Renato under arrest. 9
Meantime, as soon as Renato left Room
15, some teachers and students came to
rescue Francis but could not open the door
which Renato had locked behind him. One
of the students entered the room by
climbing up the second floor on the outside
and through the window and opened the
door from the inside. The teachers and
students brought Francis down to the
ground floor from whence the PC soldiers
rushed him to the Celestino Gallares
Memorial Hospital. 10 Francis died before
reaching the hospital.
Capt. Lazo brought Renato to the PC
Headquarters at Camp Dagohoy,
Tagbilaran City. The officer deposited the
revolver recovered from Renato which was
an Airweight Smith and Wesson .38 caliber
revolver, with Serial No. 359323, as well as
the five (5) live bullets removed from the
said revolver, and the five (5) empty
cartridges which Renato had turned over to
him. Ballistic examination conducted by
Supervising Ballistician, Artemio
Panganiban, National Bureau of
Investigation, Cebu, showed that the
empty cartridge cases had been fired from
the revolver recovered from Renato. 11
Appellant at the outset assails the trial
court for having believed the prosecution's
version of the facts instead of the version
offered by the appellant. The trial court
took into account, inter alia, the positive
and direct testimony of:
1. Mrs. Liliosa Baluma who testified
as to, among other things, the events
which took place inside her English
III classroom immediately before the
shooting;
2. Ruel Ungab — a fifteen (15) year
old classmate of Renato and
Francis, who had fallen on the floor
with Francis when the latter was
finally hit by Renato;
3. Damaso Pasilbas — the
Mathematics teacher who was
holding his class when Renato had
burst into Room 15 and started firing
at Francis; and
4. Napoleon Jumauan — another
sixteen (16) year old, classmate of
Renato and Francis who was inside
the classroom when Renato had
started firing at Francis and who was
only about a foot away from the head
of Francis when Renato, having re-
entered Room 15, had fired at
Francis as the latter was sprawled
on the floor of the classroom.
After careful examination of the record, we
find no reason to disagree with the
conclusion of the trial court that Renato
had indeed shot and killed Francis under
the circumstances and in the manner
described by these witnesses.
1. The claim of self-defense.
Renato claimed that he was acting in self-
defense, or at least in incomplete self-
defense, when he shot Francis. For a claim
of self-defense to be sustained, the
claimant must show by clear and
convincing evidence that the following
requisites existed:
a) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim;
b) reasonable necessity of the
means employed by the accused to
repel the aggression; and
c) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the accused. 12
Testifying in his own behalf, Renato said
that a few minutes before the end of Mrs.
Baluma's English III class, Francis had
approached him:
(Atty. Seno, Defense Counsel)
Q: How did it happened (sic)
that you had a conversation
with Francis?
(Renato)
A: While the class was going
on, Mrs. Baluma was writing
on the blackboard.
Q: Then what happened?
A: While our teacher was
writing on the blackboard
Francis suddenly got near me.
Q: And what happened when
Francis approached you?
A: He said, 'So you are brave
now you had a (sic) guts to
fight against me.'
Q: And what else did he say?
A: He said, 'Go home, get your
firearm because I will go home
to get a gun.'
Q: Was that all that he told
you?
A: He further said, 'You go
home get your firearm, if you
won't go home and get a gun,
I will go to your place and kill
you including your parents,
brothers and sisters.'
Q: And after that where did
Francis go?
A: Before the bell rang he went
ahead. 13
(Emphasis supplied)
We note at the outset that there was no
evidence before the Court, except
Renato's own testimony, that Francis had
uttered the above statements attributed to
him by Renato. Although there had been
about twenty-five (25) other students, and
the teacher, in the classroom at the time,
no corroborating testimony was offered by
the defense. In the second place,
assuming (arguendo merely) that Francis
had indeed made those statements, such
utterances cannot be regarded as the
unlawful aggression which is the first and
most fundamental requirement of self-
defense. Allegedly uttered in a high school
classroom by an obviously unarmed
Francis, such statements could not
reasonably inspire the "well grounded and
reasonable belief" claimed by Renato that
"he was in imminent danger of death or
bodily harm." 14 Unlawful aggression refers
to an attack that has actually broken out or
materialized or at the very least is clearly
imminent: it cannot consist in oral threats
or a merely threatening stance or posture.
15 Further as pointed out by the Solicitor
General, Francis was obviously without a
firearm or other weapon when Renato
returned and burst into Room 15
demanding to know where Francis was
and forthwith firing at him repeatedly,
without the slightest regard for the safety of
his other classmates and of the teacher.
There being no unlawful aggression, there
simply could not be self-defense whether
complete or incomplete, 16 and there is
accordingly no need to refer to the other
requirements of lawful self-defense.
2. The claim that P.D. No. 1866 is
inapplicable.
As pointed out at the outset, appellant was
charged with unlawful possession of an
unlicensed firearm, a Smith and Wesson
Airweight.38 caliber revolver with five (5)
spent bullets and five (5) live ones and with
having used such firearm and ammunition
to shoot to death Francis Ernest Escano III,
in violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866.
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 provides, in
relevant part, that:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture,
Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or
Possession of Firearms or
Ammunition or Instruments Used or
Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. — The penalty of
reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in,
acquire, dispose, or possess any
firearms, part of firearm, ammunition,
or machinery, tool or instrument used
or intended to be used in the
manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed
with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, the penalty of death shall be
imposed. (Emphasis supplied)
Appellant urges that P.D. No. 1866 is
inapplicable to him "considering that the
reason for its [P.D. No. 1866] issuance no
longer exists." He argues that P.D. No.
1866 was enforceable only during the
existence of martial law, and that when
martial law was "lifted in 1979," the reason
for the "existence" of P.D. No. 1866 faded
away, with the result that the "original law
on firearms, that is, Section 2692 of the
[Revised] Administrative Code, together
with its pre-martial law amendments, came
into effect again thereby replacing P.D. No.
1866." 17
There is nothing in P.D. No. 1866 (which
was promulgated on 29 June 1983) which
suggests that it was intended to remain in
effect only for the duration of the martial
law imposed upon the country by former
President Marcos. Neither does the statute
contain any provision that so prescribes its
lapsing into non-enforceability upon the
termination of the state or period of martial
law. On the contrary, P.D. No. 1866 by its
own terms purported to "consolidate, codify
and integrate" all prior laws and decrees
penalizing illegal possession and
manufacture of firearms, ammunition and
explosives in order "to harmonize their
provisions as well as to update and revise
certain provisions and prior statutes "in
order to more effectively deter violators of
the law on firearms, ammunitions and
explosives." 18 Appellant's contention is
thus without basis in fact.
3. The claim of double jeopardy.
It is also contended by appellant that
because he had already been charged with
illegal possession of a firearm and
ammunition in Criminal Case No. 4007,
aggravated by the use of such unlicensed
firearm to commit a homicide or murder, he
was unconstitutionally placed in jeopardy
of punishment for the second time when he
was charged in Criminal Case No. 4012
with murder "with the use of an unlicensed
[firearm]," in violation of Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Section
17 of B.P. Blg. 179.
It is elementary that the constitutional right
against double jeopardy protects one
against a second or later prosecution for
the same offense, and that when the
subsequent information charges another
and different offense, although arising from
the same act or set of acts, there is no
prohibited double jeopardy. In the case at
bar, it appears to us quite clear that the
offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4007
is that of unlawful possession of an
unlicensed firearm penalized under a
special statute, while the offense charged
in Criminal Case No. 4012 was that of
murder punished under the Revised Penal
Code. It would appear self-evident that
these two (2) offenses in themselves are
quite different one from the other, such that
in principle, the subsequent filing of
Criminal Case No. 4012 is not to be
regarded as having placed appellant in a
prohibited second jeopardy.
We note that the information in Criminal
Case No. 4007 after charging appellant
with unlawful possession of an unlicensed
firearm and ammunition, went on to state
that said firearm and ammunition had been
used to shoot to death Francis Ernest
Escaño III. We note also that the amended
information in Criminal Case No. 4012 after
charging appellant with the unlawful killing
of Francis Ernest Escaño III, stated that the
killing had been done with the use of an
unlicensed firearm. We believe these
additional allegations in the two (2)
informations did not have the effect of
charging appellant with having committed
the same offense more than once.
However, in sentencing Renato to suffer
the penalty of death for the crime of
murder, the trial court did take into account
as a "special aggravating circumstance"
the fact that the killing of Francis had been
done "with the use of an unlicensed
firearm." In so doing, we believe and so
hold, the trial court committed error. There
is no law which renders the use of an
unlicensed firearm as an aggravating
circumstance in homicide or murder. Under
an information charging homicide or
murder, the fact that the death weapon
was an unlicensed firearm cannot be used
to increase the penalty for the second
offense of homicide or murder to death (or
reclusion perpetua under the 1987
Constitution). The essential point is that the
unlicensed character or condition of the
instrument used in destroying human life or
committing some other crime, is not
included in the inventory of aggravating
circumstances set out in Article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code. 19
In contrast, under an information for
unlawful possession (or manufacture,
dealing in, acquisition or disposition) of a
firearm or ammunition, P.D. No. 1866
authorizes the increase of the imposable
penalty for unlawful possession or
manufacture, etc. of the unlicensed firearm
where such firearm was used to destroy
human life. Although the circumstance that
human life was destroyed with the use of
the unlicensed firearm is not an
aggravating circumstance under Article 14
of the Revised Penal Code, it may still be
taken into account to increase the penalty
to death (reclusion perpetua, under the
1987 Constitution) because of the explicit
provisions of P.D. No. 1866. As noted
earlier, the unlawful possession of an
unlicensed firearm or ammunition is an
offense punished under a special law and
not under the Revised Penal Code.
4. The claim that there was no
treachery.
Appellant contends that there was no
treachery present because before any shot
was fired, Renato had shouted "where is
Francis?" Appellant in effect suggests his
opening statement was a warning to
Francis and that the first three (3) shots he
had fired at Francis were merely warning
shots. Moreover, building upon his own
testimony about the alleged threat that
Francis had uttered before he (Renato) left
his English III class to go home and get a
gun, appellant argues that Francis must
have anticipated his return and thus had
sufficient time to prepare for the coming of
the appellant. 20 Appellant's contention,
while ingenious, must be rejected. The trial
court made a finding of treachery taking
explicit account of the following factors:
1. Room 15 of the Divine Word
College High School Department
Tagbilaran City, is situated in the
second floor of the building. It is a
corner room and it has only one (1)
door which is the only means of
entry and exit;
2. At the time of the attack, the
deceased was seated on his chair
inside his classroom and was writing
on the armrest of his chair and also
talking to Ruel Ungab and while their
teacher, Mr. Damaso Pasilbas was
checking the attendance. The
deceased was not aware of any
impending assault neither did he
have any means to defend himself;
3. The accused used an airweight
Smith & Wesson .38 caliber revolver
in shooting to death the defenseless
and helpless Francis Ernest Escaño;
4. The attack was so sudden and so
unexpected. the accused
consciously conceived that mode of
attack;
5. The accused fired at Francis again
and again and did not give him a
chance to defend himself. After the
deceased was hit on the head and
fell to the floor while he was already
sprawled and completely
defenseless the accused fired at him
again and the deceased was hit on
the chest;
6. The deceased was not armed. He
was totally defenseless. He was
absolutely not aware of any coming
attack. 21
The Court also pointed out that Renato
must have known that Francis while inside
Room 15 had no means of escape there
being only one (1) door and Room 15
being on the second floor of the building.
Renato in effect blocked the only exit open
to Francis as he stood on the teacher's
platform closest to the door and fired as
Francis and Ruel sought to dash through
the door. Renato's question "where is
Francis?" cannot reasonably be regarded
as an effort to warn Francis for he shot at
Francis the instant he sighted the latter,
seated and talking to Ruel Ungab. That
Renato fired three (3) shots before hitting
Francis with the fourth shot, can only be
ascribed to the indifferent markmanship of
Renato and to the fact that Francis and the
other students were scurrying from one
part of the room to the other in an effort to
evade the shots fired by Renato. The
cumulative effect of the circumstances
underscored by the trial court was that the
attack upon Francis had been carried out
in a manner which disabled Francis from
defending himself or retaliating against
Renato. Finally, the circumstance that
Renato, having been informed that Francis
was still alive, re-entered Room 15 and
fired again at Francis who lay on the floor
and bathed with his own blood, manifested
Renato's conscious choice of means of
execution which directly and especially
ensured the death of his victim without risk
to himself. 22 We are compelled to agree
with the trial court that treachery was here
present and that, therefore, the killing of
Francis Ernest Escaño III was murder.
5. The claim that there was no
evident premeditation.
The trial court also found the presence of
evident premeditation and appreciated the
same as a generic aggravating
circumstance. Here, it is the urging of the
appellant that the requisites of evident
premeditation had not been sufficiently
shown. In order that evident premeditation
may be taken into account, there must be
proof of (a) the time when the offender
formed his intent to commit the crime; (b)
an action manifestly indicating that the
offender had clung to his determination to
commit the crime; and (c) of the passage
of a sufficient interval of time between the
determination of the offender to commit the
crime and the actual execution thereof, to
allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. 23 The defense
pointed out that barely fifteen (15) minutes
had elapsed from the time Renato left his
English III class and the time he returned
with a gun. While there was testimony to
the fact that before that fatal day of 14
December 1984, anger and resentment
had welled up between Francis and
Renato, there was no evidence adequately
showing when Renato had formed the
intention and determination to take the life
of Francis. Accordingly, we must discard
evident premeditation as an aggravating
circumstance.
6. The claim that the killing was not
done under the influence of a
dangerous drug.
Section 17 of B.P. Blg. 179 which was
promulgated on 2 March 1982 provides as
follows:
SEC. 17. The provisions of any law
to the contrary notwithstanding,
when a crime is committed by an
offender who is under the influence
of dangerous drugs, such state shall
be considered as a qualifying
aggravating circumstance in the
definition of a crime and the
application of the penalty provided
for in the Revised Penal Code.
The trial court found that Francis was killed
by Renato while the later was under the
influence of a dangerous drug, specifically
marijuana, and took that into account as a
"special aggravating circumstance". No
medical evidence had been submitted by
the prosecution to show that Renato had
smoked marijuana before gunning down
Francis. Fourteen (14) days had elapsed
after December 14, 1984 before Renato
was medically examined for possible
traces of marijuana; the results of the
examination were negative. Defense
witness Dr. Rogelio Ascona testified that in
order to have a medically valid basis for
determining the presence of marijuana in
the human system, the patient must be
examined within twenty-four (24) hours
from the time he is supposed to have
smoked marijuana. 24 The prosecution had
presented Orlando Balaba, a student at the
Divine Word College, High School
Department, who testified that he found
Renato and one Jaime Racho inside the
men's room of the High School Department
sucking smoke from a hand-rolled thing
that look like a cigarette, that he had asked
Renato what that was and that Renato had
replied damo (marijuana). 25 While the
testimony of Orlando Balaba was
corroborated by two (2) other prosecution
witnesses, we believe that Orlando
Balaba's testimony was incompetent to
show that what Renato and Jaime Racho
were smoking inside the men's room was
indeed marijuana. It was pointed out by
apellant that Orlando Balaba had never
smoked nor smelled marijuana.
In the absence of medical evidence, the
Court took into account certain detailed
factors as circumstantial evidence
supporting the testimony of Orlando
Balaba. These circumstances were:
The circumstance of place where the
killing was committed, the
circumstance of the manner of the
attack, the circumstance of holding
hostage some teachers and students
inside the faculty room, the
circumstance of terrifying an entire
school, the circumstance that sitting
on a scrapbook is too insignificant as
to arouse passion strong enough to
motivate a killing, are circumstantial
evidences that gave the court no
room for doubt that prosecution
witnesses Orlando Balaba, Benjamin
Amper and Allan de la Serna
truthfully told the court that they saw
the accused smoking marijuana
inside the comfort room at 1:45 in
the afternoon of December 14, 1984.
... . 26
The above circumstances pointed to by the
trial court may be indicative of passionate
anger on the part of Renato; we do not
believe that they necessarily show that
Renato had smoked marijuana before
entering his English III class. In the
absence of competent medical or other
direct evidence of ingestion of a dangerous
drug, courts may be wary and critical of
indirect evidence, considering the severe
consequences for the accused of a finding
that he had acted while under the influence
of a prohibited drug. The Court considers
that the evidence presented on this point
was simply inadequate to support the
ruling of the trial court that Renato had
shot and killed Francis while under the
influence of a prohibited drug.
7. The claim that appellant had
voluntarily surrendered.
Appellant contends that he had voluntarily
surrendered and that the trial court should
have considered that mitigating
circumstance in his favor. The trial court
did not, and we consider that it correctly
refused to do so. Firstly, Renato
surrendered his gun, not himself, 27 by
handing over the weapon through the
balustrade of the faculty room. Secondly,
he surrendered the gun to his brother, who
was not in any case a person in authority
nor an agent of a person in authority. 28
Thirdly, Renato did not surrender himself
he was arrested by Capt. Lazo. The fact
that he did not resist arrest, did not
constitute voluntary surrender. 29 Finally, if
it be assumed that Renato had
surrendered himself, such surrender
cannot be regarded as voluntary and
spontaneous. Renato was holed up in the
faculty room, in effect holding some
teachers and students as hostages. The
faculty room was surrounded by Philippine
Constabulary soldiers and there was no
escape open to him. He was not entitled to
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.
8. Whether or not the crime was
committed in contempt of or with
insult to the public authorities.
The trial court held that the shooting to
death of Francis had been done "in
contempt of or with insult to the public
authorities:
Under Republic Act 1978, as
amended, a teacher of a public or
private school is considered a
person in authority. The fact that Mr.
Damaso Pasilbas, the teacher in
mathematics, was already checking
the attendance did not deter the
accused from pursuing his evil act,
The accused ignored his teacher's
presence and pleas. Not yet satisfied
with the crime and terror he had
done to Francis and the entire
school, the accused entered the
faculty room and held hostage the
teachers and students who were
inside that room. To the court, this
act of the accused was an insult to
his teachers and to the school, an
act of callus disregard of other's
feelings and safety and completely
reprehensible. 30
We believe the trial court erred in so
finding the presence of a generic
aggravating circumstance. Article 152 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 1978 and Presidential
Decree No. 299, provides as follows:
Art. 152. Persons in authority and
agents of persons in authority. —
Who shall be deemed as such. — In
applying the provisions of the
preceding and other articles of this
Code, any person directly vested
with jurisdiction, whether as an
individual or as a member of some
court or government corporation,
board, or commission, shall be
deemed a person in authority. A
barrio captain and a barangay
chairman shall also be deemed a
person in authority.
A person who by direct provision of
law or by election or by appointment
by competent authority, is charged
with the maintenance of public order
and the protection and security of life
and property, such as a barrio
councilman, barrio policeman and
barangay leader and any person
who comes to the aid of persons in
authority, shall be deemed an agent
of a person in authority.
In applying the provisions of Articles
148 and 151 of this Code, teachers,
professors and persons charged with
the supervision of public or duly
recognized private schools, colleges
and universities, and lawyers in the
actual performance of their
professional duties or on the
occasion of such performance, shall
be deemed persons in authority. (As
amended by P.D. No. 299,
September 19, 1973 and Batas
Pambansa Blg. 873, June 12, 1985).
Careful reading of the last paragraph of
Article 152 will show that while a teacher or
professor of a public or recognized private
school is deemed to be a "person in
authority," such teacher or professor is so
deemed only for purposes of application of
Articles 148 (direct assault upon a person
in authority), and 151 (resistance and
disobedience to a person in authority or
the agents of such person) of the Revised
Penal Code. In marked contrast, the first
paragraph of Article 152 does not identify
specific articles of the Revised Penal Code
for the application of which any person
"directly vested with jurisdiction, etc." is
deemed "a person in authority." Because a
penal statute is not to be given a longer
reach and broader scope than is called for
by the ordinary meaning of the ordinary
words used by such statute, to the
disadvantage of an accused, we do not
believe that a teacher or professor of a
public or recognized private school may be
regarded as a "public authority" within the
meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code, 31 the provision the
trial court applied in the case at bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial
court dated 31 July 1986 is hereby
MODIFIED in the following manner and to
the following extent only:
1. In Criminal Case No. 4007,
appellant shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua;
2. In Criminal Case No. 4012 — (a)
the aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation and of having
acted with contempt of or insult to
the public authorities shall be
DELETED and not taken into
account; and (b) the special
aggravating circumstances of acting
while under the influence of
dangerous drugs and with the use of
an unlicensed firearm shall similarly
be DELETED and not taken into
account. There being no generic
aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances present, the appellant
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
The two (2) penalties of reclusion perpetua
shall be served successively in accordance
with the provisions of Article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code. As so modified, the
decision of the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. 159703 March 3, 2008
CEDRIC SAYCO y VILLANUEVA,
petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the May 23, 2003 Resolution1 of the
Court Appeals (CA) which affirmed the
conviction of Cedric Sayco y Villanueva2
(petitioner) for violation of Section 1,
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294; as
well as the August 7, 2003 CA Resolution3
which denied his Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts are not disputed.
Petitioner was charged before the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bais City with
illegal possession of firearms under an
Information which reads:
The undersigned Prosecutor II hereby
accuses ZEDRIC SAYCO Y
VILLANUEVA of the crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions
penalized and defined under Section 1 of
Presidential Decree Number 1866 as
amended by Republic Act Number 8294,
committed as follows:
That on or about January 3, 1999, at Bais
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously possess and
carry away one (1) caliber 9MM marked
"SIGSAUER P229" with fourteen (14) live
ammunitions and with Serial Number AE
25171, without first having obtained the
proper license or authority to possess the
same.
An act contrary.4
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of
"Not Guilty".5
On August 2, 2002, the MTCC rendered a
Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Court finds that the evidence presented has
sufficiently established the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The
accused Zedric V. Sayco is convicted for
violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree
No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No.
8294. There being no modifying
circumstances, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court
sentences the accused to a prison term
ranging from THREE YEARS, SIX
MONTHS AND TWENTY DAYS of
Prision Correccional Medium as minimum,
to FIVE YEARS, FOUR MONTHS and
TWENTY DAYS of Prision Correccional
Maximum as maximum, and to pay a fine of
FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS. The
firearm (Exhibit A) and the ammunitions
(Exhibit B) are forfeited in favor of the
government, to be disposed of in
accordance with law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.6
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Bais City issued a Decision dated March 14,
2003, affirming the conviction of petitioner but
lowering his penalty as follows:
Judgment dated August 2, 2002 rendered by
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bais
City in Criminal Case No. 99-001 is hereby
affirmed in all respects subject only to the
modification with respect to the penalty
imposed by the trial court. The herein
accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of
arresto mayor as maximum [sic] to two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional as maximum [sic].
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for
Review but the same was denied in the May 23,
2003 CA Resolution assailed herein.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration8 was
also denied by the CA in its August 7, 2003
Resolution.
Hence, the present Petition raising the
following issues:
I
Whether the lower court erred in convicting
the petitioner for violation of P.D. 1866, as
amended by RA 8294, despite the latter's
proof of authority to possess the subject
firearm.
II
Whether the prosecution's evidence proved
the petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.9
As summarized by the RTC and MTCC, the
evidence for the prosecution consisted of the
following:
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION
The first prosecution witness in the person
of PO3 Mariano Labe testified on January
17, 2002. He declared that on or about 3:35
in the afternoon of January 3, 1999, while
they were at the Police Station, they
received a telephone call from a concerned
citizen from Tavera Street, Bais City,
informing them that one unidentified person
was inside Abueva's Repair Shop located at
Tavera Street, tucking a handgun on his
waist. They immediately went to the
aforementioned place, and upon their arrival
thereat, they saw one unidentified person
tucking a handgun on his right side
waistline. They approached the
unidentified person and asked him if he
had a license to possess said firearm, but
the answer was in the negative. At this
juncture, they immediately effected the
arrest, and confiscated from his possession
and custody a Caliber 9MM marked
"SIGSAUER P299" with 14 live
ammunitions with Serial No. AE 25171.
The arrested person was identified as Zedric
Sayco y Villanueva, a resident of
Binalbagan, Negros Occidental.
SPO2 VALENTINO ZAMORA, member of
the PNP Bais City, testified on February 26,
2002. He was presented to corroborate the
testimony of Mariano Labe. He further
declared that during the incident, they
talked to the accused in Cebuano, but they
found out then that the latter is an Ilonggo,
so they spoke to him in English.
SPO2 VICENTE DORADO also testified
on February 26, 2002. He corroborated the
testimony of SPO2 Valentino Zamora and
PO2 Mariano Labe.
The following exhibits were admitted as
part of the evidence of the prosecution:
Exhibit A - one (1) 9 mm pistol with serial
no. 25171.
Exhibit B - fourteen (14) pieces live
ammunition and one (1) magazine placed in
a black plastic bag.
Exhibit C - Joint Affidavit of the police
officers.10 (Emphasis supplied)
For his defense, petitioner does not deny that
he was in possession of the subject firearm and
ammunitions when he was apprehended on
January 3, 1999 in Bais City, but he insists that
he had the requisite permits to carry the same,
specifically:
1) Memorandum Receipt for Equipment
(Non-expendable Property), which reads:
Hqs Field Station 743, 7ISU, ISG, PA,
Camp Montelibano Sr., Bacolod City,
Philippines, 01 January 1999. I
acknowledge to have received from
MAJOR RICARDO B. BAYHON (INF)
PA, Commanding Officer, FS743, 7ISU,
ISG, PA the following property for
which I am responsible, subject to the
provision of the accounting law and
which will be used in the office of FS
7431.
QT U NAME OF CLA UNIT TOT
Y NI DESCRIPTI SSI PRIC AL
T ON FICA E
TIO
N
1 ea Cal 9mm Pistol
(SIG
SAUER)
SN: AE
25171
2 ea Mags for
Cal 9mm
pistol
24 ea Ctgs for
9mm Ammo
x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-
NOTHING FOLLOWS -x-x-x-x-x-x-x-
x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x
Basis: For use of subject EP in
connection with his official
duties/mission in the AOR.
NOTED APPROVED
BY: BY:
Nolasco B. RICARDO B
James BAYHON
(SGD) (SGD)
SSg (Inf) Major (INF)
PA PA
FS Supply Commanding
NCO Officer
CA Zedric V.
Zayco (SGD)
Confidential
Agent;11
and 2) Mission Order dated January 1,
1999, thus:
Mission Orders
Number: FS743-A-241
TO: CA Cedric V. Zayco
I. DESTINATION Negros Island
II. PURPOSE C O N F I D E N T I A L
III. DURATION 01 January 1999 to 31
March 1999
IV. AUTHORIZED ATTIRE/UNIFORM
GOA ( ) BDA ( ) Civilian (x)
V. AUTHORIZED TO CARRY
FIREARMS: (x) Yes ( ) No.
Cali Mak Kin Serial MR/Lice Nr
ber e d Nr nse Nr Amm
o
9m Sig Pist AE25 ISG Prop 24
m Sau ol 171 rds
er
VI. SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS:
a. For personnel in uniform, the
firearms shall be placed in holster
securely attached to the belt.
Personnel in uniform without holster
and personnel in civilian attire will
ensure that their firearms are
concealed unless in actual and lawful
use.
xxxx
RICARDO B. BAYHON
(SGD)
Major (INF) PA
FS 743 Commander12
The RTC and MTCC gave no significance to
the foregoing documents. The MTCC held that
the Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order
do not constitute the license required by law
because "they were not issued by the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Firearms and Explosives
Unit, but by the Commanding Officer of the
Philippine Army who is not authorized by law
to issue licenses to civilians to possess firearms
and ammunitions."13 The RTC added that, as
held in Pastrano v. Court of Appeals14and
Belga v. Buban,15 said documents cannot take
the place of the requisite license.16
The CA wholly concurred with both courts.
In the present Petition, petitioner insists that he
is a confidential agent of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP), and it was in that
capacity that he received the subject firearm
and ammunitions from the AFP. As said firearm
and ammunitions are government property duly
licensed to the Intelligence Security Group
(ISG) of the AFP, the same could not be
licensed under his name;17instead, what he
obtained were a Memorandum Receipt and a
Mission Order whereby ISG entrusted to him
the subject firearm and ammunitions and
authorized him to carry the same around
Bacolod City. Petitioner further argues that he
merely acted in good faith when he relied on
the Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order
for authority to carry said firearm and
ammunitions; thus, it would be a grave
injustice if he were to be punished for the
deficiency of said documents.18
The Solicitor General filed his
Comment,19pointing out that good faith is not a
valid defense in the crime of illegal possession
of firearms.20
The arguments of petitioner are not tenable.
The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal
possession of firearms is the accused's lack of
license or permit to possess or carry the
firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by
law.21 To establish the corpus delicti, the
prosecution has the burden of proving that the
firearm exists and that the accused who owned
or possessed it does not have the corresponding
license or permit to possess or carry the
same.22
There is no dispute over these key facts: first,
that the subject firearm and ammunitions exist;
second, that petitioner had possession thereof at
the time of his apprehension; third, that
petitioner is a confidential agent of the ISG-
AFP; fourth, that petitioner lacks a license
issued by the Firearms and Explosives Unit of
the PNP; and fifth, that petitioner holds a
Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order
covering the subject firearm and ammunitions.
Thus, the issue to be resolved is confined to
whether petitioner's Memorandum Receipt and
Mission Order constitute sufficient authority
for him to possess the subject firearm and
ammunitions and carry the same outside of his
residence, without violating P.D. No. 1866, as
amended by R.A. No. 8294.
As correctly cited by the Solicitor General, it is
a settled jurisprudence that a memorandum
receipt and mission order cannot take the place
of a duly issued firearms license,23 and an
accused who relies on said documents cannot
invoke good faith as a defense against a
prosecution for illegal possession of firearms,
as this is a malum prohibitum.24 Petitioner
interposed no new argument that would
convince this Court to abandon a deep-rooted
jurisprudence.
However, rather than outrightly dismiss the
present petition in the light of existing
jurisprudence, this Court finds it opportune to
examine the rules governing the issuance of
memorandum receipts and mission orders
covering government-owned firearms to special
and confidential civilian agents, in order to
pave the way for a more effective regulation of
the proliferation of such firearms and the
abatement of crimes, such as extra-judicial
killings, attendant to such phenomenon.
In 1901, the United States Philippine
Commission enacted Act No. 175, providing
for the organization of an Insular Constabulary.
Section 6 vested in the Chief of the Insular
Constabulary the following authority over the
distribution of firearms:
Section 6. The Insular Chief shall prescribe
for the Insular Constabulary suitable arms,
uniform, and equipment and shall report to
the Commission, through the Civil
Governor, his action in this regard, together
with a statement of the cost, to the end that
appropriation may be made to defray the
cost thereof. The guns, revolvers, and
ammunitions needed to equip the insular
and municipal police shall be purchased
by the Insular Purchasing Agent on the
order of the Chief of Insular
Constabulary, by whom they shall be
distributed to the provinces and
municipalities as they may be needed.
The Chief of the Insular Constabulary
shall keep a record of the guns and
revolvers distributed, by their numbers,
to municipalities and provinces x x x.
(Emphasis supplied)
Firearms owned by the government may
therefore be distributed by the Chief of the
Insular Constabulary to the members of the
insular and municipal police, with merely a
record of the distribution being required.
Shortly, the Philippine Commission enacted
Act No. 178025 regulating possession of
firearms:
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any
person, firm, or corporation, for purposes of
sale, to import, buy or otherwise acquire,
dispose of, possess, or have the custody of
any rifle, musket, carbine, shotgun,
revolver, pistol, or air rifle, except air rifles
of small caliber and limited range used as
toys, or any other deadly weapon x x x
unless and until such person, firm, or
corporation shall secure a license, pay the
license fee, and execute a bond and
otherwise comply with the requirements of
this Act and the rules and regulations issued
in executive orders by the Governor-
General pursuant to the provisions of this
Act x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
but exempted therefrom the following
government-owned firearms:
Section 16. The foregoing provisions of this
Act shall not apply to firearms and
ammunition therefor regularly and lawfully
issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or
marines of the United States Army and
Navy, the Constabulary, guards in the
employ of the Bureau of Prisons, the
police force of the City of Manila,
provincial prisoners and jails when such
firearms are in possession of such officials
and public servants for use in the
performance of their official duties.
(Emphasis supplied)
The 1917 Revised Administrative
Code26retained the foregoing exemption:
Section 879. Exemption as to firearms and
ammunition used by military and naval
forces or by peace officers. - This article
shall not apply to firearms and
ammunition regularly and lawfully
issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or
marines of the Unites States Army and
Navy, the Philippine Constabulary,
guards in the employment of the Bureau
of Prisons, municipal police, provincial
governors, lieutenant governors,
provincial treasurers, municipal police,
provincial governors, lieutenant
governors, provincial treasurers,
municipal treasurers, municipal
presidents, and guards of provincial
prisoners and jails, when such firearms
are in possession of such officials and
public servants for use in the
performance of their official duties.
(Emphasis supplied)
In People of the Philippines v. Macarandang,27
we interpreted Section 879 of the 1917 Revised
Administrative Code as applicable to a secret
agent appointed by a governor as said agent
holds a position equivalent to that of peace
officer or member of the municipal police. We
reiterated this ruling in People of the
Philippines v. Licera.28
In People v. Asa,29 we acquitted a civilian
guard from a charge of illegal possession of
firearms on the ground that he acted in good
faith in bearing the firearms issued to him by
his superior.
Two years later, in People v. Mapa,30the Court,
speaking through Justice Fernando, overhauled
its interpretation of Section 879, thus:
The law is explicit that except as thereafter
specially allowed, "it shall be unlawful for
any person to x x x possess any firearm,
detached parts of firearms or ammunition
therefor, or any instrument or implement
used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms,
or ammunition." The next section provides
that "firearms and ammunition regularly
and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers,
sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines], the Philippine
Constabulary, guards in the employment of
the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police,
provincial governors, lieutenant governors,
provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers,
municipal mayors, and guards of provincial
prisoners and jails," are not covered "when
such firearms are in possession of such
officials and public servants for use in the
performance of their official duties."
The law cannot be any clearer. No
provision is made for a secret agent. As
such he is not exempt. Our task is equally
clear. The first and fundamental duty of
courts is to apply the law. "Construction and
interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible
or inadequate without them." The
conviction of the accused must stand. It
cannot be set aside.
Accused however would rely on People v.
Macarandang, where a secret agent was
acquitted on appeal on the assumption that
the appointment "of the accused as a secret
agent to assist in the maintenance of peace
and order campaigns and detection of
crimes, sufficiently put him within the
category of a "peace officer" equivalent
even to a member of the municipal police
expressly covered by section 879." Such
reliance is misplaced. It is not within the
power of this Court to set aside the clear
and explicit mandate of a statutory
provision. To the extent therefore that
this decision conflicts with what was held
in People v. Macarandang, it no longer
speaks with authority.31 (Emphasis
supplied)
We also abandoned the view that good faith is a
defense against a prosecution for illegal
possession of firearms.32
On June 29, 1983, P.D. No. 1866 was issued,
imposing stiffer penalties on illegal possession
of firearms. It also added the following separate
requirement for carrying firearms:
Section 1. Unlawful manufacture, sale,
acquisition, disposition or possession of
firearms and ammunition or implements
used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of firearms or ammunition. - x
x x The penalty of prision mayor shall be
imposed upon any person who shall carry
any licensed firearm outside his residence
without legal authority therefor.
xxxx
Section 7. Unauthorized issuance of
authority to carry firearms and/or
ammunition outside of residence. - The
penalty of prision correccional shall be
imposed upon any person, civilian or
military, who shall issue authority to carry
firearm and/or ammunition outside of
residence without authority therefor.
P.D. No. 1866 was later amended by R.A. No.
8294,33 which lowered the imposable penalties
for illegal possession of firearm when no other
crime is committed. However, neither law
amended or repealed Section 879 of the 1917
Revised Administrative Code. Even Executive
Order No. 292, otherwise known as the 1987
Administrative Code,34 left Section 879
untouched.
As matters stand, therefore, Section 879, as
construed by this Court in Mapa and Neri, and
reinforced by paragraph 6, Section 1 of P.D.
No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, is
still the basic law on the issuance, possession
and carrying of government-owned firearms.
In exercise of its rule-making authority under
Section 835of P.D. No. 1866, the Chief of the
Philippine Constabulary issued The
Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D.
No. 1866, which includes the following
provisions salient to the issuance, possession
and carrying of government-owned firearms:
Section 1. Definition of terms. - For
purposes of Presidential Decree No. 1866,
the following terms shall mean and be
interpreted as hereinafter defined:
xxxx
d. "Mission Order" - is a written directive or
order issued by government authority as
enumerated in Section 5 hereof to persons
who are under his supervision and control
for a definite purpose or objective during a
specified period and to such place or places
as therein mentioned which may entitle the
bearer thereof to carry his duly issued or
licensed firearm outside of his residence
when so specified therein.
e. "Permit to Carry Firearm Outside of
Residence" - is a written authority issued to
any person by the Chief of Constabulary
which entitles such person to carry his
licensed or lawfully issued firearms
outside of residence for the duration and
purpose specified therein.
f. "Residence" - refers to that place where
the firearm and ammunition are being
permanently kept. It includes the office or
house where they are kept and the premises
of the house enclosed by walls and gates
separating said premises from adjacent
properties. For firearms covered by a
regular license or special permit, their
residence shall be that specified in the
license or permit; and those covered by a
Certificate of Registration ora
Memorandum Receipt, their residence in
the office/station to which the grantee
belongs.
xxxx
Section 5. Authority to issue mission order
involving the carrying of firearm. - The
following are authorized to issue mission
orders with provisions which may entitle
the bearer thereof to carry his
issued/licensed firearm and ammunition for
the duration of such mission:
a. For officers, men and regular civilian
agents of the Ministry of National Defense
(MOND)/Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) including members of the ICHDF:
xxxx
(8) Provincial commanders,
METRODISCOM commanders, company
commanders and their equivalent in the
Philippine Air Force and Philippine Navy.
xxxx
Section 6. Specific guidelines in the
carrying of firearms outside of residence. -
The following specific guidelines shall be
strictly observed in the carrying of firearm
outside of residence:
a. Lawful Holders of Firearm – Lawful
holders of firearm (regular licenses, special
permit, certificate of registration or M/R)
are prohibited from carrying their firearms
outside of residence except when they have
been issued by the Chief of Constabulary a
permit to carry firearm outside of their
residence as provided for in Section hereof
or in actual performance of duty or
official mission under Section 4 and 5
hereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 6 (a) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations was later amended to read as
follows:
a-1. Mission Order. - x x x No Mission
Order shall be issued to any civilian agent
authorizing the same to carry firearms
outside of residence unless he/she is
included in the regular plantilla of the
government agency involved in law
enforcement and is receiving regular
compensation for the services he/she is
rendering in the agency. Further, the civilian
agent must be included in a specific law
enforcement/police/intelligence project
proposal or special project which
specifically requires the use of firearm(s) to
insure its accomplishment and that the
project is duly approved at the PC Regional
Command level or its equivalent level in
other major services of the AFP, INP and
NBI, or at higher level of command.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Ministry of Justice also issued
Memorandum Circular No. 8 dated October 16,
1986, further strengthening the foregoing
Implementing Rules and Regulations, to wit:
x x x It is unlawful for any person or office
to issue a mission order authorizing the
carrying of firearms by any person unless
the following conditions are met:
1. That the AFP officer is authorized by the
law to issue the mission order.
2. That the recipient or addressee of the
mission order is also authorized by the law
to have a mission order, i.e., he must be an
organic member of the command/unit of the
AFP officer issuing the mission order.If
mission orders are issued to civilians (not
members of the uniformed service), they
must be civilian agents included in the
regular plantilla of the government
agency involved in law enforcement and
are receiving regular compensation for
services they are rendering. (Emphasis
supplied)
Earlier, a Letter Directive dated May 19,
198436 was issued to the Chief of Staff of the
AFP, prohibiting the issuance of government-
owned firearms to civilians, viz:
4. The Implementing Rules and Regulations
of P.D. 1866 which codifies all the laws on
firearms and explosives clarify the
following:
xxxx
b. Section 5 identifies the officials/officers
of the MOND/AFP who are authorized to
issue Mission Orders to enable AFP
officers, men and regular civilian agents
carry their firearms in the performance of
their duties. Regular civilian agents are
those who are covered by Permanent or
Temporary Civil Service attested
appointments in the plantilla of civilian
employees. Special or confidential civilian
agents or the like are not regular civilian
agents and are therefore violating the law
when they carry firearms (personal-
owned or government-issued) with
Mission Orders.
c. There are no other laws or AFP
regulations authorizing the loan of AFP-
owned firearms to private firms and
individuals. (Emphasis supplied)
It is noted that the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of P.D. No. 1866, as amended,
allude to "memorandum receipts" covering
government-owned firearms. While said rules
do not define the term, we can derive its
meaning from Section 492 of the Government
Auditing and Accounting Manual (Volume I:
Government Auditing Rules and Regulations)37
to wit:
Section 492. Issues of equipment to officers
and employees. - Equipment issued by the
property officer for official use of officials
and employees shall be covered by
Memorandum Receipt for Equipment
(MR) which shall be renewed every
January of the third year after issue. MRs
not renewed after three years shall not be
considered in making physical count of the
equipment. (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing discussion, therefore, the
rules governing memorandum receipts and
mission orders covering the issuance to and the
possession and/or carrying of government-
owned firearms by special or confidential
civilian agents may be synthesized as follows:
First, special or confidential civilian agents
who are not included in the regular plantilla of
any government agency involved in law
enforcement or receiving regular compensation
for services rendered are not exempt from the
requirements under P.D. No. 1866, as amended
by R.A. No. 8294, of a regular license to
possess firearms and a permit to carry the same
outside of residence;
Second, said special or confidential civilian
agents are not qualified to receive, obtain and
possess government-owned firearms. Their
ineligibility will not be cured by the issuance of
a memorandum receipt for equipment covering
said government-owned firearms. Neither will
they qualify for exemption from the
requirements of a regular firearms license and a
permit to carry firearms by the mere issuance to
them of a government-owned firearms covered
by a memorandum receipt; and
Third, said special or confidential civilian
agents do not qualify for mission orders to
carry firearms (whether private-owned or
government-owned) outside of their residence.
The foregoing rules do not apply to special or
confidential civilian agents in possession of or
bearing private-owned firearms that are duly
licensed and covered by permits to carry the
same outside of residence.
Set against the foregoing rules, it is clear that
petitioner is not authorized to possess and carry
the subject firearm and ammunition,
notwithstanding the memorandum receipt and
mission order which were illegally issued to
him. Petitioner is a planter38 who was recruited
to assist in the counter-insurgency campaign of
the AFP.39 However, as he offered no evidence
that he is in the regular plantilla of the AFP or
that he is receiving regular compensation from
said agency, he cannot be considered a regular
civilian agent but a mere confidential civilian
agent as defined under Section 6(a) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D.
No. 1866. As such, he was not authorized to
receive the subject government-owned firearm
and ammunitions. The memorandum receipt he
signed to account for said government
properties did not legitimize his possession
thereof.
Neither was petitioner authorized to bear the
subject firearm and ammunitions outside of his
residence. The mission order issued to
petitioner was illegal, given that he is not a
regular civilian agent but a mere confidential
civilian agent. Worse, petitioner was not even
acting as such confidential civilian agent at the
time he was carrying the subject firearm and
ammunitions. Petitioner testified that at that
time, he was not on an official mission in Bais
City but had merely visited the place to attend
to a family emergency.40
While this Court sustains the conviction of
petitioner for illegal possession of firearms, we
re-examine the imprisonment term to which
petitioner was sentenced by the RTC, as
affirmed by the CA.
The MTCC imposed on petitioner the penalty
of imprisonment for three (3) years, six (6)
months and twenty (20) days of prision
correccional medium as minimum, to five (5)
years, four (4) months and twenty (20) days of
prision correccional maximum as maximum.41
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
RTC lowered the penalty to four (4) months of
arresto mayor as minimum, to two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as maximum.42 The CA affirmed
the RTC.
A further revision of the penalty is warranted in
view of the special provision in the
Indeterminate Sentence Law applicable to
crimes penalized by a special law, to wit:
Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison
sentence for an offense punished by the
Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the
court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term
of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the said Code,
and the minimum which shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense; and
if the offense is punished by any other
law, the court shall sentence the accused
to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed
the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the
minimum term prescribed by the same.
(Emphasis supplied)
P.D. No. 1866 imposed the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua for illegal possession of firearms.
R.A. No. 8294 lowered the penalty, as follows:
Section 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree
No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
Acquisition, Disposition or Possession
of Firearms or Ammunition or
Instruments Used or Intended to be
Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. - The penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period and
a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand
pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon
any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose,
or possess any low powered firearm,
such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and
other firearm of similar firepower, part
of firearm, ammunition, or machinery,
tool or instrument used or intended to be
used in the manufacture of any firearm
or ammunition: Provided, That no other
crime was committed. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Under Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code,
prision correccional in its maximum period
ranges from four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day, to six (6) years. As prescribed
under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the appropriate penalty that can be
imposed on petitioner should keep within said
range. Thus, there being no attendant
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, and
considering that petitioner accepted the subject
firearm and ammunitions from the government
under the erroneous notion that the
memorandum receipt and mission order issued
to him legitimized his possession thereof, the
appropriate indeterminate penalty is four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day as
minimum to five (5) years, four (4) months and
twenty-one (21) days as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
However, for reasons stated in the text of
herein Decision, the Resolutions dated May 23,
2003 and August 7, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 27228 together
with the Decision dated March 14, 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court of Bais City are
MODIFIED insofar only as the penalty of
imprisonment is concerned. Petitioner Cedric
Sayco y Villanueva is sentenced to serve an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional
as minimum, to five (5) years, four (4) months
and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
TEOFILO G.R. No.
EVANGELISTA, 163267
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus- BRION,
DEL
CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.
THE PEOPLE OF Promulgated:

THE ,
Respondent. May 5, 2010
x--------------------------------
---------------------------------
--x
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
To be guilty of the crime of illegal possession
of firearms and ammunition, one does not have
to be in actual physical possession thereof. The
law does not punish physical possession alone
but possession in general, which includes
constructive possession or the subjection of the
thing to the owners control.[1]
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[2]
assails the October 15, 2003 Decision[3] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
21805 which affirmed the January 23, 1998
Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasay City, Branch 109 convicting petitioner
Teofilo Evangelista for violation of Section 1,
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1866,[5] as
amended, as well as the April 16, 2004
Resolution which denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents
In an Information[6] dated , petitioner was
charged with violation of Section 1 of PD 1866
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 30th day of January 1996,

at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport,
Pasay City, Philippines, and within the
named accused, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control the following
items:
1. One (1) Unit 9mm Jericho Pistol,
with SN F-36283 with one (1) magazine;
2. One (1) Unit Mini-Uzi 9mm Israel
Submachine gun with SN 931864 with two (2)
magazines;
3. Nineteen (19) 9mm bullets.
without the corresponding permit or license
from competent authority.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
After posting his bail, petitioner filed on an
Urgent Motion for (a) Suspension of
Proceedings and (b) the Holding of A
Preliminary Investigation.[7] The RTC granted
the motion and, accordingly, the State
Prosecutor conducted the preliminary
investigation.
In a Resolution[8] dated , the State Prosecutor
found no probable cause to indict petitioner and
thus recommended the reversal of the
resolution finding probable cause and the
dismissal of the complaint. Thereafter, a
Motion to Withdraw Information[9] was filed
but it was denied by the trial court in an
Order[10] dated , viz:
Acting on the Motion to Withdraw Information
filed by State Prosecutor Aida Macapagal on
the ground that [there exists] no probable cause
to indict the accused, the Information having
been already filed in Court, the matter should
be left to the discretion of the Court to assess
the evidence, hence, for lack of merit, the same
is hereby denied. Let the arraignment of the
accused proceed.
When arraigned on , petitioner pleaded not
guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
In the morning of , Maximo Acierto, Jr.
(Acierto), a Customs Police assigned at the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA)
District Command, was informed by his
superior that a certain passenger of Philippine
Airlines (PAL) Flight No. 657 would be
arriving from bringing with him firearms and
ammunitions. Shortly after lunch, Acierto,
together with Agents Cuymo and Fuentabella,
proceeded to the tube area where they were met
by a crewmember who introduced to them
herein petitioner. Acierto asked petitioner if he
brought firearms with him and the latter
answered in the affirmative adding that the
same were bought in . Thereupon, Acierto was
summoned to the cockpit by the pilot, Capt.
Edwin Nadurata (Capt. Nadurata), where the
firearms and ammunitions were turned over to
him. Petitioner was then escorted to the arrival
area to get his luggage and thereafter proceeded
to the examination room where the luggage
was examined and petitioner was investigated.
In open court, Acierto identified the firearms
and ammunitions.
During the investigation, petitioner admitted
before Special Agent Apolonio Bustos (Bustos)
that he bought the subject items in but the same
were confiscated by the authorities, which
turned over the same to a PAL personnel in .
Upon inquiry, the Firearms and Explosive
Office (FEO) in certified that petitioner is
neither registered with said office[11] nor
licensed holder of aforesaid firearms and
ammunitions. Bustos likewise verified from the
Bureau of Customs, but his effort yielded no
record to show that the firearms were legally
purchased. Among the documents Bustos had
gathered during his investigation were the
Arrival Endorsement Form[12] and Customs
Declaration Form.[13] A referral letter[14] was
prepared endorsing the matter to the
Department of Justice. Bustos admitted that
petitioner was not assisted by counsel when the
latter admitted that he bought the firearms in .
SPO4 Federico Bondoc, Jr. (SPO4 Bondoc), a
member of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) and representative of the FEO, upon
verification, found that petitioner is not a
licensed/registered firearm holder. His office
issued a certification[15] to that effect which he
identified in court as Exhibit A.
After the prosecution rested its case, petitioner,
with leave of court, filed his Demurrer to
Evidence,[16] the resolution of which was
deferred pending submission of petitioners
evidence.[17]
Version of the Defense
The defense presented Capt. Nadurata whose
brief but candid and straightforward narration
of the event was synthesized by the CA as
follows:
x x x On January 30, 1996, he was approached
by the PAL Station Manager in Dubai, who
informed him that a Filipino contract worker
from Angola who is listed as a passenger of
PAL flight from Dubai to Manila, was being
detained as he was found in possession of
firearms; that if said passenger will not be able
to board the airplane, he would be imprisoned
in Dubai; and that the Arabs will only release
the passenger if the Captain of PAL would
accept custody of the passenger [herein
petitioner] and the firearms. Capt. Nadurata
agreed to take custody of the firearms and the
passenger, herein appellant, so that the latter
could leave . The firearms were deposited by
the Arabs in the cockpit of the airplane and
allowed the appellant to board the airplane.
Upon arrival in , Capt. Nadurata surrendered
the firearms to the airport authorities.
Meanwhile, in view of the unavailability of the
defenses intended witness, Nilo Umayaw
(Umayaw), the PAL Station Manager in , the
prosecution and the defense agreed and
stipulated on the following points:
1. That PAL Station Manager Mr. Nilo
Umayaw was told by a Dubai Police that
firearms and ammunitions were found in the
luggage of a Filipino passenger coming from
going to the ;
2. That he was the one who turned over
the subject firearms to Captain Edwin
Nadurata, the Pilot in command of PAL Flight
657;
3. That the subject firearms [were]
turned over at ;
4. That the said firearms and
ammunitions were confiscated from the
accused Teofilo Evangelista and the same
[were] given to the PAL Station Manager who
in turn submitted [them] to the PAL Pilot, Capt.
Edwin Nadurata who has already testified;
5. That [these are] the same firearms
involved in this case.[18]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On , the RTC rendered its Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds
accused TEOFILO E. EVANGELISTA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sec.
1, P.D. 1866 as amended (Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunitions: (One (1) Unit
Mini-Uzi 9mm Israel submachine gun with SN-
931864 with two (2) magazines and nineteen
(19) 9mm bullets) and hereby sentences him to
imprisonment of Seventeen (17) Years and
Four (4) Months to Twenty (20) Years.
The above-mentioned firearms are hereby
ordered forfeited in favor of the government
and is ordered transmitted to the National
Bureau of Investigation, for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.[19]
On , petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial[20]
which the RTC granted.[21] Forthwith,
petitioner took the witness stand narrating his
own version of the incident as follows:
On , he was at waiting for his flight to the . He
came from , where he was employed as a
seaman at Oil International Limited. While at
the airport in , Arab policemen suddenly
accosted him and brought him to their
headquarters where he saw guns on top of a
table. The Arabs maltreated him and forced him
to admit ownership of the guns. At this point,
PAL Station Manager Umayaw came and
talked to the policemen in Arabian dialect.
Umayaw told him that he will only be released
if he admits ownership of the guns. When he
denied ownership of the same, Umayaw
reiterated that he (petitioner) will be released
only if he will bring the guns with him to the .
He declined and insisted that the guns are not
his. Upon the request of Umayaw, petitioner
was brought to the Duty Free area for his flight
going to the . When he was inside the plane, he
saw the Arab policemen handing the guns to
the pilot. Upon arrival at the NAIA, he was
arrested by the Customs police and brought to
the arrival area where his passport was stamped
and he was made to sign a Customs Declaration
Form without reading its contents. Thereafter,
he was brought to a room at the ground floor of
the NAIA where he was investigated. During
the investigation, he was not represented by
counsel and was forced to accept ownership of
the guns. He denied ownership of the guns and
the fact that he admitted having bought the
same in .
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After new trial, the RTC still found petitioner
liable for the offense charged but modified the
penalty of imprisonment. The dispositive
portion of the Decision dated reads:
In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds
accused TEOFILO E. EVANGELISTA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sec.
1, P.D. 1866 as amended (Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunitions: One (1) Unit 9mm
Jerico Pistol, Israel with SN F-36283 with one
(1) magazine; One (1) Unit Mini-Uzi 9mm
Israel submachine gun with SN-931864 with
two (2) magazines and nineteen (19) 9mm
bullets and hereby sentences him to
imprisonment of Six (6) Years and One (1) Day
to Eight (8) Years and a fine of P30,000.00.
The above-mentioned firearms are hereby
ordered forfeited in favor of the government
and [are] ordered transmitted to the National
Bureau of Investigation, for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.[22]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of
the trial court in its Decision dated . It ruled
that the stipulations during the trial are binding
on petitioner. As regards possession of subject
firearms, the appellate court ruled that Capt.
Naduratas custody during the flight from to
was for and on behalf of petitioner. Thus, there
was constructive possession.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration[23]
but it was denied by the appellate court in its
Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
Issues
Petitioner assigns the following errors:
a. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in not
acquitting Evangelista from the charge of
Presidential Decree No. 1866, Illegal
Possession of Firearms.
b. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in not
holding that Evangelista was never in
possession of any firearm or ammunition
within Philippine jurisdiction and he therefore
could not have committed the crime charged
against him.
c. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in
holding that Evangelista committed a
continuing crime.
d. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in
disregarding the results of the preliminary
investigation.[24]
We find the appeal devoid of merit.
At the outset, we emphasize that under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, a petition for review on
certiorari shall only raise questions of law
considering that the findings of fact of the CA
are, as a general rule, conclusive upon and
binding on the Supreme Court.[25] In this
recourse, petitioner indulges us to calibrate
once again the evidence adduced by the parties
and to re-evaluate the credibility of their
witnesses. On this ground alone, the instant
petition deserves to be denied outright.
However, as the liberty of petitioner is at stake
and following the principle that an appeal in a
criminal case throws the whole case wide open
for review, we are inclined to delve into the
merits of the present petition.
In his bid for acquittal, petitioner argues that he
could not have committed the crime imputed
against him for he was never in custody and
possession of any firearm or ammunition when
he arrived in the . Thus, the conclusion of the
appellate court that he was in constructive
possession of the subject firearms and
ammunitions is erroneous.
We are not persuaded. As correctly found by
the CA:
Appellants argument that he was never found in
ammunitions within Philippine jurisdiction is
specious. It is worthy to note that at the hearing
of the case before the court a quo on , the
defense counsel stipulated that the subject
firearms and ammunitions were confiscated
from appellant and the same were given to PAL
Station Manager Nilo Umayaw who, in turn,
turned over the same to Capt. Edwin Nadurata.
Such stipulation of fact is binding on appellant,
for the acts of a lawyer in the defense of a case
are the acts of his client. Granting that Nilo
Umayaw was merely told by the Dubai
authorities that the firearms and ammunitions
were found in the luggage of appellant and that
Umayaw had no personal knowledge thereof,
however, appellants signature on the Customs
Declaration Form, which contains the entry 2
PISTOL guns SENT SURRENDER TO
PHILIPPINE AIRLINE, proves that he was the
one who brought the guns to Manila. While
appellant claims that he signed the Customs
Declaration Form without reading it because of
his excitement, however, he does not claim that
he was coerced or persuaded in affixing his
signature thereon. The preparation of the
Customs Declaration Form is a requirement for
all arriving passengers in an international
flight. Moreover, it cannot be said that
appellant had already been arrested when he
signed the Customs Declaration Form. He was
merely escorted by Special Agent Acierto to the
arrival area of the NAIA. In fact, appellant
admitted that it was only after he signed the
Customs Declaration Form that he was brought
to the ground floor of NAIA for investigation.
Consequently, appellant was in constructive
possession of the subject firearms. As held in
People v. Dela Rosa, the kind of possession
punishable under PD 1866 is one where the
accused possessed a firearm either physically
or constructively with animus possidendi or
intention to possess the same. Animus
possidendi is a state of mind. As such, what
goes on into the mind of the accused, as his real
intent, could be determined solely based on his
prior and coetaneous acts and the surrounding
circumstances explaining how the subject
firearm came to his possession.
Appellants witness, Capt. Nadurata, the PAL
pilot of Flight No. PR 657 from to on , testified
that he accepted custody of the firearms and of
appellant in order that the latter, who was being
detained in for having been found in possession
of firearms, would be released from custody. In
other words, Capt. Naduratas possession of the
firearm during the flight from to was for and on
behalf of appellant.[26]
We find no cogent reason to deviate from the
above findings, especially considering
petitioners admission during the clarificatory
questioning by the trial court:
Court: So, it is clear now in the mind of the
Court, that the firearms and ammunitions will
also be with you on your flight to , is that
correct?
A: Yes, your honor.
Court: [You] made mention of that condition,
that the police agreed to release you provided
that you will bring the guns and ammunitions
with you? Is that the condition of the Dubai
Police?
A: Yes, your honor.
Court: The condition of his release was that he
will have to bring the guns and ammunitions to
the and this arrangement was made by the PAL
Supervisor at and it was Mr. Umayaw the PAL
Supervisor, who interceded in his behalf with
the Dubai Police for his flight in the .[27]
To us, this constitutes judicial admission of his
ammunitions. This admission, the veracity of
which requires no further proof, may be
controverted only upon a clear showing that it
was made through palpable mistake or that no
admission was made.[28] No such
controversion is extant on record.
Moreover, we cannot ignore the Customs
Declaration Form wherein it appeared that
petitioner brought the firearms with him upon
his arrival in the . While there was no showing
that he was forced to sign the form, petitioner
can only come up with the excuse that he was
excited. Hardly can we accept such pretension.
We are likewise not swayed by petitioners
contention that the lower court erroneously
relied on the Customs Declaration Form since
it is not admissible in evidence because it was
accomplished without the benefit of counsel
while he was under police custody.
The accomplishment of the Customs
Declaration Form was not elicited through
custodial investigation. It is a customs
requirement which petitioner had a clear
obligation to comply. As correctly observed by
the CA, the preparation of the Customs
Declaration Form is a requirement for all
arriving passengers in an international flight.
Petitioner was among those passengers.
Compliance with the constitutional procedure
on custodial investigation is, therefore, not
applicable in this case. Moreover, it is
improbable that the customs police were the
ones who filled out the declaration form. As
will be noted, it provides details that only
petitioner could have possibly known or
supplied. Even assuming that there was prior
accomplishment of the form which contains
incriminating details, petitioner could have
easily taken precautionary measures by not
affixing his signature thereto. Or he could have
registered his objection thereto especially when
no life threatening acts were being employed
against him upon his arrival in the country.
Obviously, it was not only the Customs
Declaration Form from which the courts below
based their conclusion that petitioner was in
constructive possession of subject firearms and
ammunitions. Emphasis was also given on the
stipulations and admissions made during the
trial. These pieces of evidence are enough to
show that he was the owner and possessor of
these items.
Petitioner contends that the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the case filed against him. He
claims that his alleged possession of the subject
firearms transpired while he was at the and his
possession thereof has ceased when he left for
the . He insists that since is outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the and his situation is
not one of the exceptions provided in Article 2
of the Revised Penal Code, our criminal laws
are not applicable. In short, he had not
committed a crime within the .
Indeed it is fundamental that the place where
the crime was committed determines not only
the venue of the action but is an essential
element of jurisdiction.[29] In order for the
courts to acquire jurisdiction in criminal cases,
the offense should have been committed or any
one of its essential ingredients should have
taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court. If the evidence adduced during the
trial shows that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the
action for want of jurisdiction.[30]
Contrary to the arguments put forward by
petitioner, we entertain no doubt that the crime
of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition for which he was charged was
committed in the . The accomplishment by
petitioner of the Customs Declaration Form
upon his arrival at the NAIA is very clear
evidence that he was already in possession of
the subject firearms in the .
And more than mere possession, the
prosecution was able to ascertain that he has no
license or authority to possess said firearms. It
bears to stress that the essence of the crime
penalized under PD 1866, as amended, is
primarily the accuseds lack of license to
possess the firearm. The fact of lack or absence
of license constitutes an essential ingredient of
the offense of illegal possession of firearm.
Since it has been shown that petitioner was
already in the when he was found in possession
of the subject firearms and determined to be
without any authority to possess them, an
essential ingredient of the offense, it is beyond
reasonable doubt that the crime was perpetrated
and completed in no other place except the .
Moreover, the jurisdiction of a court over the
criminal case is determined by the allegations
in the complaint or information. In this case,
the information specifically and categorically
alleged that on or about petitioner was in
possession, custody and control of the subject
firearms at the , , , certainly a territory within
the jurisdiction of the trial court.
In contrast, petitioner failed to establish by
sufficient and competent evidence that the
present charge happened in . It may be well to
recall that while in , petitioner, even in a
situation between life and death, firmly denied
possession and ownership of the firearms.
Furthermore, there is no record of any criminal
case having been filed against petitioner in in
connection with the discovered firearms. Since
there is no pending criminal case when he left ,
it stands to reason that there was no crime
committed in . The age-old but familiar rule
that he who alleges must prove his allegation
applies.[31]
Petitioner finally laments the trial courts denial
of the Motion to Withdraw Information filed by
the investigating prosecutor due to the latters
finding of lack of probable cause to indict him.
He argues that such denial effectively deprived
him of his substantive right to a preliminary
investigation.
Still, petitioners argument fails to persuade.
There is nothing procedurally improper on the
part of the trial court in disregarding the result
of the preliminary investigation it itself
ordered. Judicial action on the motion rests in
the sound exercise of judicial discretion. In
denying the motion, the trial court just followed
the jurisprudential rule laid down in Crespo v.
Judge Mogul[32] that once a complaint or
information is filed in court, any disposition of
the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or
acquittal of the accused rests on the sound
discretion of the court. The court is not
dutifully bound by such finding of the
investigating prosecutor. In Solar Team
Entertainment, Inc v. Judge How[33] we held:
It bears stressing that the court is
however not bound to adopt the
resolution of the Secretary of
Justice since the court is
mandated to independently
evaluate or assess the merits of
the case, and may either agree or
disagree with the
recommendation of the Secretary
of Justice. Reliance alone on the
resolution of the Secretary of
Justice would be an abdication of
the trial courts duty and
jurisdiction to determine prima
facie case.
Consequently, petitioner has no valid basis to
insist on the trial court to respect the result of
the preliminary investigation it ordered to be
conducted.
In fine, we find no reason not to uphold
petitioners conviction. The records substantiate
the RTC and CAs finding that petitioner
possessed, albeit constructively, the subject
firearms and ammunition when he arrived in
the on . Moreover, no significant facts and
circumstances were shown to have been
overlooked or disregarded which if considered
would have altered the outcome of the case.
In the prosecution for the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition, the
Court has reiterated the essential elements in
People v. Eling[34] to wit: (1) the existence of
subject firearm; and, (2) the fact that the
accused who possessed or owned the same
does not have the corresponding license for it.
In the instant case, the prosecution proved
beyond reasonable doubt the elements of the
crime. The existence of the subject firearms
and the ammunition were established through
the testimony of Acierto. Their existence was
likewise admitted by petitioner when he
entered into stipulation and through his
subsequent judicial admission. Concerning
petitioners lack of authority to possess the
firearms, SPO4 Bondoc, Jr. testified that upon
verification, it was ascertained that the name of
petitioner does not appear in the list of
registered firearm holders or a registered owner
thereof. As proof, he submitted a certification
to that effect and identified the same in court.
The testimony of SPO4 Bondoc, Jr. or the
certification from the FEO would suffice to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the second
element.[35]
A final point. Republic Act (RA) No. 8294[36]
took effect on or after the commission of the
crime on . However, since it is advantageous to
the petitioner, it should be given retrospective
application insofar as the penalty is concerned.
Section 1 of PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294
provides:
Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of
Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used
or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of
Firearms or Ammunition. x x x
period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) shall be imposed if the firearm is
classified as high powered firearm which
includes those with bores bigger in diameter
than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as
caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser
calibered firearms but considered powerful
such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire
magnum and other firearms with firing
capability of full automatic and by burst of two
or three: Provided, however, That no other
crime was committed by the person arrested.
Prision mayor in its minimum period ranges
from six years and one day to eight years.
Hence, the penalty imposed by the RTC as
affirmed by the CA is proper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 21805 affirming the January
23, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasay City, Branch 109 dated January 23,
1998, convicting petitioner Teofilo Evangelista
of violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree
No. 1866, as amended, and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six years
and one day to eight years and to pay a fine of
P30,000.00 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ARTICLE 256
TO 257
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-42819 April 15, 1935
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CRISPIN GENOVES, defendant-appellant.
Leodegario Alba for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for
appellee.
HULL, J.:
Appellant was convicted in the Court of First
Instance of Occidental Negros of the complex
crime of homicide with abortion.
In the morning of the 28th of May, 1934,
appellant and deceased Soledad Rivera were
laborers in adjoining cane fields. Soledad
claimed that the yoke of the plow which
appellant was repairing belonged to her and
tried to take it by force. Appellant struck her
with his fist, causing her to fall to the ground.
She got up and returned to the fray, whereupon
she received another blow with the fist on the
left cheek which caused her again to fall to the
ground. Immediately after the incident
deceased proceeded to the municipal building,
a distance of about four kilometers, and
complained to the chief of police about the
maltreatment. At the time Soledad was heavy
with child, and as she complained to the chief
of police of pain in the abdomen, she was seen
by the president of the sanitary district.
According to testimony deceased was in good
health the day before.
From the time of the incident there was
hemorrhage and pain which were symptoms of
premature delivery. Deceased remained in this
condition until June 10, 1934. On that date the
condition culminated in the painful and
difficult premature delivery of one of the twin
babies that she way carrying, but the other baby
could be delivered. Both babies were dead.
The first assignment of error is the contention
of appellant that the death of the offended party
was not the direct result of the assault upon her
by the defendant. It is generally known that a
fall is liable to cause premature delivery, and
the evidence shows a complete sequel of events
from the assault to her death. The accused must
be held responsible for the natural
consequences of his act.
The other defense is that the accused did not
strike the deceased, but this fact is clearly
established by the prosecution. We find the
mitigating circumstances of lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong as that inflicted and
provocation, as the offended party by force
induced the appellant to use force on his
part.1ªvvphïl.nët
The abortion in this case is unintentional
abortion denounced by article 257 of the
Revised Penal Code. On the whole case, the
period of confinement is fixed at twelve years
and one day to fourteen years, eight months
and one day of reclusion temporal. The
indemnity is fixed at P1,000.
The sentence, as thus modified, is affirmed,
with costs against appellant. So ordered.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-50884 March 30, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FILOMENO SALUFRANIA, defendant-
appellant.
PADILLA, J.:
In an information, dated 7 May 1976,
Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman was
charged before the Court of First Instance
of Camarines Norte, Branch I, with the
complex crime of parricide with intentional
abortion, committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of
December, 1974, in Tigbinan, Labo,
Camarines Norte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court the accused
Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously attack, assault and
use personal violence on
MARCIANA ABUYO-SALUFRANIA,
the lawfully wedded wife of the
accused, by then and there boxing
and stranging her, causing upon her
injuries which resulted in her
instantaneous death; and by the
same criminal act committed on the
person of the wife of the accused,
who was at the time 8 months on the
family way, the accused likewise did
then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously cause the death of
the child while still in its maternal
womb, thereby committing both
crimes of PARRICIDE and
INTENTIONAL ABORTION as
defined and punished under Art. 246
and Art. 256, paragraph I, of the
Revised Penal Code, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of said
woman and child in the amount as
the Honorable Court shall assess.
CONTRARY TO LAW
Upon arraignment, the accused, assisted
by counsel de officio, pleaded not guilty to
the offenses charged.
After trial the lower court rendered a
decision ** dated 9 August 1978, the
dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused
Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, of the
complex crime of Parricide with
Intentional Abortion, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of
DEATH, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Marciano Abuyo in the
sum of P12,000.00 and to pay the
costs. "For unselfish, valuable and
exemplary service rendered by
counsel de oficio, Atty. Marciano C.
Dating, Jr., a compensation of
P500.00 is hereby recommended for
him subject to the availability of
funds
SO ORDERED.
The accused having been sentenced to
suffer the penalty of death, this case is on
automatic review before this Court.
At the trial in the court a quo, the
prosecution presented the following
witnesses: Dr. Juan L. Dyquiangco Jr.,
Pedro Salufrania and Narciso Abuyo.
Dr. Juan L. Dyquiangco Jr., who was then
Rural Health Officer of Talisay, Camarines
Norte, testified that, after passing the
Board Examination, he was employed as a
Resident Physician of La Union Provincial
Hospital, then as Junior Resident
Physician of Bethane Hospital in San
Fernando, La Union and that later, he
joined the government service, starting
from 1968 up to the time of the trial; that as
a Doctor of Medicine, he had performed
about ten (10) post mortem examinations;
that he was called upon by the Municipal
Judge of Talisay to examine the corpse of
Marciana Abuyo-Salufrania that was
exhumed from its grave in the Municipal
Cemetery of Talisay at around 11:00
o'clock in the morning of 11 December
1974; that his post mortem examination
lasted from 12:30 o'clock to 2:00 o'clock in
the afternoon of the same day. He reduced
his findings of injuries into writing. (Exhibit
"A"), which, together with their probable
cause, as testified to by him, are as
follows:
Injury Cause
1) "Blunt
Multiple object or
abrasion friction by
s with
contusio hard
n, left object"
leg, (tsn., Aug.
middle 20,
part, posterior
covering 1976, p. 7)
an area
of
about 2
& 1/2 by
5 inches.
2) Friction on
Abrasion a hard
s, 1/2 by object"
2
inches, (tsn., Aug.

medial 20, 1976,
side of p. 7)
the cubi
tal fossa
(back
left leg)
3) Hard
Multiple pinhead
pinhead sized
sized material
wounds, (tsn., Aug.

right 20, 1976,
face, p. 7)
starting
from the
side of
the right
eye
down to
mandibu
lar bone
(right
check)
4) Upper No cause
right given
eyelid
more
promine
nt than
the left
eyelid
("the
right
upper
eyelid a
little bit
bulging
than the
left
eye
"and"
sort of
"swollen
") (tsn.,
Aug. 20,
1976,
pp. 7-8)
5) Usually,
Tongue the main
protrudin cause of
g bet
ween protruding
the lips, tongue
about 1 during
inch
teeth
line. death is
(by)
strangulati
on.
(tsn., Aug.
20, 1976,
p. 8)
6)
Decease
d is
pregnant
with a
baby
boy
about 7-
8
months
old (tsn.,
Aug. 20,
1976, p.
8).
Dr. Dyquiangco testified that after
conducting the post mortem examination,
he issued a certification thereof (Exhibit
"A"); that he issued a death certificate
(Exhibit "B") for the deceased Marciano
Abuyo-Salufrania, bearing the date of 5
December 1974, made on the basis of the
information relayed by a certain Leonila
Loma to his nurse before the burial, without
mentioning the cause of death; that the
cause of death, as cardiac arrest, was
indicated on said death certificate only
after the post mortem examination on 11
December 1974.
The other witness for the prosecution was
Pedro Salufrania, son of herein appellant
and of the deceased. The lower court's
decision states that, by reason of interest
and relationship, before Pedro Salufrania
was allowed to testify against his father-
accused Filomeno Salufrania, he was
carefully examined by the prosecuting
officer and the defense counsel under the
careful supervision of the court a quo, to
determine whether, at his age of 13 years
old, he was already capable of receiving
correct impressions of facts and of relating
them truly and, also, whether he was
compelled and/or threatened by anybody
to testify against his father-accused. 1
The lower court found Pedro Salufrania to
be determined and intelligent. He
convincingly declared that he was not
threatened by any of his uncles on his
mother's side to testify against his father,
because it was true that the latter killed his
mother. Then, formally testifying as the
prosecution's lone eyewitness, he stated
that his father Filomeno Salufrania and his
mother Marciana Abuyo quarrelled at about
6:00 o'clock in the evening of 3 December
1974, in their small house at a far away
sitio in barrio Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines
Norte; that during said quarrel, he saw his
father box his pregnant mother on the
stomach and, once fallen on the floor, his
father strangled her to death; that he saw
blood ooze from the eyes and nose of his
mother and that she died right on the spot
where she fell.
Pedro Salufrania further testified that after
killing his mother, the accused- appellant
went out of the house to get a hammock;
that his brother Alex and he were the only
ones who witnessed how the accused
killed their mother because his sister and
other brothers were already asleep when
the horrible incident happened; that his
brothers Celedonio, Danilo and sister Merly
woke up after the death of their mother and
kept watch at their mothers body while
their father was away; that their father
arrived early the next morning with the
hammock and after placing their dead
mother on the hammock, the accused
carried her on his shoulder and brought the
cadaver to the house of his sister
Conching, located at a populated section
of Tigbinan that from Tigbinan the corpse
was transferred to Gabon, Talisay,
Camarines Norte for burial.
Continuing his testimony, Pedro Salufrania
stated that he is now living with his uncle
Eduardo Abuyo and had refused and still
refused to live with his father-accused,
because the latter has threatened to kill
him and his other brothers and sister
should he reveal the true cause of his
mother's death.
The third witness for the prosecution was
Narciso Abuyo, a resident of Gabon,
Talisay, Camarines Norte. He testified that
the accused Filomeno Salufrania and his
sister, the deceased Marciana Abuyo, were
lawfully wedded husband and wife as
evidenced by a marriage contract (Exhibit
"C"). He declared that his sister was more
or less seven (7) months pregnant when
she died; that he first came to know about
his sister's death on 4 December 1974 thru
his nephews Pedro and Alex Salufrania
who first informed him that their mother
died of stomach ailment and headache;
that he went to Tigbinan to request for the
body of his sister so that it may be buried
in Talisay, Camarines Norte and, as
intended, Marciana Abuyo was buried in
the Talisay Cemetery on 6 December
1974.
Narciso Abuyo also declared that after the
burial of Marciana Abuyo, the three (3)
children of his deceased sister went to his
house and refused to go home with their
father Filomeno Salufrania; that when
asked for the reason why, his nephew Alex
Salufraña told him that the real cause of
death of their mother was not stomach
ailment and headache, rather, she was
boxed on the stomach and strangled to
death by their father; that immediately after
learning of the true cause of death of his
sister, he brought the matter to the
attention of the police authorities of Talisay,
Camarines Norte, who investigated Alex
and Pedro Salufirania and later, to that of
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Camarines Norte.
The defense had for witnesses Geronimo
Villan, Juanito Bragais, Angeles Liling
Balce and the accused Filomeno
Salufrania.
Geronimo Villan testified that he was a
neighbor of Filomeno Sulfrania. He
declared that Marciana Abuyo died at
around 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 4
December 1974 in her house at Sitio
Kapagisahan Tigbinan Labo, Camarines
Norte; that he happened to pass by said
house because his attention was attracted
by the bright light in the fireplace and he
saw Filomeno Salufrania boiling "ikmo" and
garlic as medicine for his wife who was
about to deliver a child; that he helped the
accused by applying "ikmo" to the different
parts of the body of Marciana Abuyo and
by administering the native treatment
known as "bantil", that is, by pinching and
pulling the skin with two fingers of his
closed fist; that when the condition of
Marciana Abuyo worsened, he told
Filomeno Salufrania to go and get Juanita
Bragais who is known as a healer but the
latter arrived at about 7:00 o'clock in the
morning of 4 December 1974 and that at
that time Marciana Abuyo was already
dead.
Witness Juanita Bragais testified that he
was fetched by Felipe Salufrania, another
son of Filomeno Salufrania at about 6:00
o'clock in the morning of 4 December
1974. He further testified that when he
reached the house of the Salufranias,
Marciana Abuyo was already dead so he
just helped Filomeno Salufrania in
transferring the body of his wife to the
house of the latter's brother-in-law at
Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte.
Angeles Liling Balce, who claimed to be a
former resident of Kapagisahan Tigbinan,
Labo, Camarines Norte testified that she
arrived in the house of Filomeno Salufrania
at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 4
December 1974 after being called by one
of the latter's sons; that she saw Marciana
still in a coma lying on the lap of her
husband who informed her that Marciana
was suffering from an old stomach ailment.
The accused Filomeno Salufrania admitted
that he was that lawful husband of the
deceased Marciana Abuyo; that at around
9:00 o'clock in the morning of 3 December
1974, Marciana arrived home from Talisay
where she had earlier stayed for about a
week; that she was hungry upon her
arrival, so he allegedly cooked their food
and after eating their lunch, he proceeded
to his work while his wife rested in their
house; that when he returned home at 3:00
o'clock in the afternoon of that same day,
his wife complained to him of stomach pain
and he was told to prepare the beddings
because she was already sleepy; that at
about 4:00 o'clock in the morning of 4
December 1974, he was awakened by his
wife who was still complaining of stomach
pain, and that she asked for a drink of hot
water; that while he was boiling water,
Geronimo Villan arrived and assisted him
in administering to his wife the native
treatments known as "hilot" or massaging
and "banti" that Geronimo Villan and
Francisco Repuya alternately applied
"bantil" to his wife but when her condition
worsened, he woke up his children, Pedro
and Alex to fetch Rico Villanueva who
might be able to ,save the life of their
mother; that his children left and returned
without Rico Villanueva but the latter
arrived a little later.
Accused-appellant then went on to say that
he sent for Juanito Bragais but the latter
was not able to cure his wife, since the
latter was already dead when he arrived;
that after the death of his wife, he ordered
his children to get the hammock of Kaloy
Belardo whose house was about two (2)
kilometers away from their house, and
upon the arrival of the hammock, he placed
the body of his wife thereon and brought it
to the house of his sister Consolacion
Salufrania in Tigbinan; that while the
corpse of Marciana Abuyo was at Tigbinan
he sent Chiding and his elder son to inform
the brothers and sisters of his wife at
Talisay about her death and that Leonila
Abuyo and Salvador Abuyo came; that he
informed the Barangay Captain of Tigbinan
of the cause of death of his wife; that upon
the suggestion of the brothers and sisters
of Marciana Abuyo, especially Salvador
Abuyo, the body of their sister was brought
home to Talisay and thereafter buried at
the Talisay Cemetery; that there was no
quarrel between him and his wife that
preceded the latter's death, and that during
the lifetime of the deceased, they loved
each other; that after her burial, his son
Pedro Salufrania was taken by his brother-
in-law Narciso Abuyo and since then, he
was not able to talk to his son until during
the trial; and that at the time of death of his
wife, aside from the members of his family,
Geronimo Villan Francisco Repuya and
Liling Angeles Balce were also present.
The case was considered submitted for
decision by the trial court on 18 July 1978.
As aforestated, the trial court found the
appellant guilty of the crimes charged and
sentenced him to the penalty of death.
The appellant assigns the following errors
allegedly committed by the trial court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON THE
BASIS OF THE TESTIMONY OF AN
INCOMPETENT WITNESS, AND ON
INCONSISTENT AND INSUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION,
THEREBY VIOLATING THE RULE THAT
THE ACCUSED IS ENTITLED TO AN
ACQUITTAL UNLESS HIS GUILT IS
SHOWN BEYOND ANY REASONABLE
DOUBT.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION IS
CREDIBLE AND SUFFICIENT, THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED OF THE COMPLEX CRIME OF
PARRICIDE WITH INTENTIONAL
ABORTION.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
DISCREDITING THE EVIDENCE FOR
THE ACCUSED.
Appellant alleges that the trial court failed
to determine the competence of Pedro
Salufrania before he was allowed to testify.
Since Pedro was allegedly a child of tender
age, being only thirteen (13) years old
when he testified, and only eleven (11)
years old when the offense charged
occurred, he is presumed incompetent
under Rule 130 Sec. 19 (b) of the Revised
Rules of Court, which includes among
those who cannot be witnesses:
Children who appear to the court to
be of such tender age and inferior
capacity as to be incapable of
receiving correct impressions of the
facts respecting which they are
examined, or of relating them truly.
Therefore, according to appellant, for
failure of the trial court to determine
Pedro's competence, the presumption of
incompetency was not rebutted and
Pedro's testimony should not have been
admitted. Moreover, appellant stresses that
there is no basis for the trial court's finding
that Pedro is intelligent.
Appellant's contention is without merit. The
record shows that the trial court
determined Pedro Salufrania's competency
before he was allowed to testify under
oath. 2 The trial court's conclusion that
Pedro was intelligent and competent is fully
supported by Pedro's responsiveness to
the questions propounded to him when he
was already under oath:
A. Did you go here in court to
testify voluntarily?
Q. Yes, Your Honor.
A. Were you not forced by
your uncle to testify in his
case?
Q. No, I was not forced by my
uncle.
xxx xxx xxx
A. The accused is your father?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. Do you love him?
Q. No, sir.
A. Your father is accused now
of crime which carries the
penalty of death, are you still
willing to testify against him?
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Why did you say that you
don't love your father
A. Because he killed my
mother.
Q. And that is the reason why
you hate your father now?
A. Yes, sir. (tsn., pp. 3, 7,17,
Nov. 12, 1976).
Pedro's strong sense of moral duty to tell
the truth, even though it should lead to his
father's conviction, shows that he fully
appreciated the meaning of an oath, which
likewise proves that he was no longer a
child of tender years at the time of his
testimony.
Appellant also alleges that, since Pedro
changed his answer from no to yes when
he was asked whether he was threatened
by his uncle to testify against his father,
shows that Pedro was lying and proves
that he did not appreciate the meaning of
an oath at all. 3
Again, this contention is without merit,
Pedro became confused when the trial
court ordered that the original question be
reformed. Pedro's confusion is apparent
from the fact that when asked the third
time, he affirmed his first answer,
Q. Isn't it that your uncle
threatened you with bodily
harm if you will not give
statement before the police?
A. No, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. But later you actually went
with your uncle to the police
because you were threatened
by him with bodily harm if you
will not follow him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is it true that your uncle
threatened you with bodily
harm if you will not give
statement to the police?
A. No, sir. (tsn., pp. 6, 7, Nov.
12, 1976)
Appellant next lists the following alleged
inconsistencies to discredit the testimony
of Pedro. First, Pedro testified on direct
examination that his mother died in the
evening of December 3. while on cross-
examination he said that she died in the
morning of December 4. It must be noted
that he affirmed twice during cross-
examination that his mother died on
December 3, just as he had testified during
direct examination. Significantly, he did not
mention December 4 as the date when she
died, as appellant would make it appear.
Pedro merely answered 'yes' to the
question "And isn't it that your mother died
in the early morning on that day
(December 4) and not on the evening of
December 3?" 4 Thus, Pedro's answer
could have resulted only from a
misapprehension of the a question, and for
no other reason.
Second, appellant alleges that Pedro
testified on direct examination that he saw
appellant leave the house to get a
hammock after strangling the victim and
then came back the following morning.
However, upon cross-examination, Pedro
testified that appellant left at noon or in the
afternoon of December 4. Moreover, Pedro
allegedly testified on re-direct that he saw
appellant sleep beside the dead body of
his mother. Again Pedro misapprehended
the question propounded to him. Ajudicious
reading of the transcript will bear this out:
Q. When did your father leave
to get the hammock?
A. In the afternoon.
Q. That may be when the body
was brought to Talisay. When
your father, rather, when you
said that your father left to get
a hammock so that your
mother may be brought to
Tigbinan what time was that?
A. About 12:00 o'clock noon.
(Tsn, p. 16, Nov. 12, 1976)
One may discern that the court itself
noticed that there was a missapprehension
when it commented "that maybe when the
body was brought to Talisay" after Pedro
answered "In the afternoon". When Pedro
answered "about 12:00 noon' he must
have been referring to the time when
appellant carried his dead wife to Tigbinan.
It must be noted that the question was so
worded that it could have misled Pedro to
think that what was being asked was the
time when appellant brought his dead wife
to Tigbinan. In fact, there is nothing
inconsistent with Pedro's testimony that he
saw his father leave in the evening of
December 3 and again saw him asleep
and thus not noticed appellant's coming
back after securing a hammock and
sleeping beside the deceased. Pedro was
therefore telling the truth when he said
that, upon waking up, he saw his father
sleeping beside his dead mother. By then,
appellant had already returned with the
hammock.
Third, Pedro allegedly testified on direct
examination that the corpse was carried to
Tigbinan in the morning of December 4,
while on cross-examination, he said it was
in the evening. 5 It must be pointed out that
Pedro merely answered "yes" to a question
purportedly mentioning the time when the
victim's body was transferred to Tigbinan.
The question is as follows: "The corpse of
your mother was brought to the Tigbinan
proper when the vigil was had in the
evening of December 4, is that right?" It is
to be noted that the question's thrust is
whether or not the victim's body was
brought to Tigbinan. The time it was
brought was merely incidental. Thus,
Pedro may not have paid attention to the
part of the question involving time.
Moreover, the phrase "in the evening" may
have referred either to the time of transport
of the body or to the vigil, which could have
definitely confused Pedro.
Fourth, Pedro allegedly testified on direct
examination that he, together with his
brothers and sister, kept vigil beside their
mother's dead body that night, while on
cross-examination, he testified that they
just kept lying down and pretended to
sleep. 6 There is nothing inconsistent here.
The children could have kept vigil while
lying down with their deceased mother.
Appellant further cites other alleged
improbabilities to discredit Pedro's
testimony. Appellant contends that it was
improbable for Pedro to have seen the
attack on his mother since he testified that
the room was dimly lighted, and that, while
the attach was going on, he closed his
eyes pretending to sleep. 7 This contention
is without merit. Even though the room was
dimly lighted, Pedro was only two (2)
meters away from his parents; thus, he
could easily see, as he saw, the attack on
his mother. 8 Also, although he pretended
to be asleep, it was unlikely that he kept
his eyes closed all the while, as he was
aware that a fight was going on. Rather, it
was to be expected that he had his eyes
open and, thus, he saw the heinous crime
unfold and ultimately consumated.
Appellant alleges that he does not believe
that it was fear of him that caused the
delay in Pedro's divulging the real cause of
his mother's death until 10 December
1974. According to appellant, such fear
could no longer have influenced Pedro
from December 6, the date he started to
live separately from him. This contention is
untenable. Even though Pedro started to
live separately from his father from
December 6, it cannot be said that the
influence of appellant's threat suddenly
ceased from that time. It must be noted
that Pedro was young and was still very
much under appellant's influence and
control. The thought and memory of his
father's viciousness were still too fresh
even after three days from his mother's
death. The fear that he too could be killed
by appellant in like manner must have
deterred him from divulging the truth
earlier.
Appellant also alleges that it was
improbable for Pedro to have just watched
the killing of his mother. This contention is
untenable. At that moment, when his
mother was being assaulted and strangled,
Pedro must have been so shocked as to
be rendered immobile and powerless to do
anything. This is a normal reaction in such
a situation. Besides, it is a fact of life that
different people react differently to the
same types of situations. 9 One cannot
overlook that there is no standard form of
behaviour when one is confronted by a
shocking occurrence. 10
Appellant next alleges that since the
prosecution has failed without satisfactory
explanation to present Pedro's brother Alex
who is alleged to be also an eyewitness to
the killing of the victim, it is presumed that
Alex's testimony would be adverse to the
prosecution if presented. This contention is
without merit. First, Alex, who is younger
than Pedro by 3 years, may not have been
competent to testify due to his tender age.
Second, even assuming that he was
competent to testify, his testimony could be
merely corroborative. Corroboration is not
necessary in this case because the details
of the crime have already been testified to
by Pedro with sufficient clarity. The failure
to present all the eyewitnesses to an act
does not necessarily give rise to an
unfavorable presumption, especially when
the testimony of the witness sought to be
presented is merely corroborative. 11
Witnesses are to be weighed, not
numbered, and it is a well established rule
that the testimony of a single witness, even
if uncorroborated, but positive and
credible, is sufficient to support a
conviction. 12 In any event, it is not for the
appellant to say how many witnesses the
prosecution should have presented. 13
The inconsistencies magnified by appellant
in the testimony of Pedro Salufrania have
been satisfactorily explained. In fact, some
of them are not material since they neither
touch upon the manner of death of the
victim nor question the identity of the killer,
both of which were unwaveringly testified
upon by Pedro. Thus, with the alleged
inconsistencies and improbabilities
explained away, Pedro's testimony remains
unperturbed. Even if there were
discrepancies, such discrepancies were
minor and may be considered as earmarks
of verisimilitude. 14
The trial court's assessment of Pedro's
testimony, as quoted hereunder, deserves
more than passing consideration:
... The testimony of eye-witness
Pedro Salufrania, 13-year old son of
the victim Marciana Abuyo and her
killer-spouse Filomeno Salufrania,
appears to be very clear, convincing
and truthful. It is vivid as to the
details of the horrible occurence that
took place at about 6:00 o'clock in
the evening of December 3, 1974 in
their small house at a far away sitio
of Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte,
resulting in the untimely and cruel
death of her (sic) mother. He and his
brother Alex were the only
eyewitnesses to the gory crime
committed by their father. The
credibility of this witness (Pedro
Salufrania) and his testimony was
invested when, despite rigid cross-
examination, the veracity of his
testimony in chief was not
impeached. He remained firm and on
the verge of crying, when he pointed
an accusing finger at his father
during the trial. He was unshaken
notwithstanding a long and detailed
cross-examination. And, there is
reason to bestow complete credence
to his testimony because he had the
opportunity to closely observe how
his father had deliberately and
cruelly ended the life of his mother.
Despite his tender age and apparent
childish innocence, this Court
believes that he can clearly perceive
and perceiving, make known his
perception, precluding the possibility
of coaching or tutoring by someone.
His declaration as to when, where
and how the horrible incident
complained of happened is the
believable version. 15
Appellant questions the competence of Dr.
Dyquiangco as an expert witness, since
this is the first time that the doctor
conducted an autopsy on a cadaver which
had been buried for about a week. It must
be noted, however, that although this was
the doctor's first autopsy under
circumstances present in this case, he had,
however, conducted similar post-mortem
examinations on ten (10) other occasions.
This would constitute sufficient experience.
Significantly, appellant did not object to the
doctor's expression of medical opinions
during the trial. Being an expert in his field,
the doctor is presumed to have taken all
pertinent factors into consideration with
regard to the autopsy, including embalming
and the state of the cadaver's
decomposition. Dr. Juan Dyquiangco Jr.,
was a disinterested witness in the case,
and a reputable public official in whose
favor the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties must be
applied.
Appellant further alleges that the findings
of Dr. Dyquiangco and the testimony of
Pedro Salufrania do not tally. Suffice it to
say that the Court finds no inconsistencies
between the findings of Dr. Dyquiangco
and Pedro Salufrania's testimony. Both are
consistent on material points. Thus, the
Court sees no reason to disturb the
conclusions reached by the trial court
insofar as their credibility and the
appellant's guilt are concerned.
Appellant's third assignment of error
alleges that the trial court erred in
discrediting his evidence simply because
the testimonies of the defense witnesses
were consistent on material points.
Moreover, there is no showing, according
to the appellant, that said testimonies were
rehearsed so as to dovetail with each
other.
This contention is without merit. The Court
notes, first of all, that appellant did not
even bother to discuss his defense in order
to refute the massive evidence against
him. This is tantamount to an admission
that he could not adequately support his
version of Marciana Abuyo's death. The
trial court's reasons for rejecting the
defense version, as hereunder quoted, are
tenable and sound. Thus —
On the contrary, the testimonies of
defense witnesses Geronimo Villan,
Angeles Liling Balce and the
accused Filomeno Salufrania
suspiciously dove-tailed in every
detail as to when, where and how
.Marciana Abuyo died at 6:00 o'clock
in the morning of 4 December 1974,
in their house at sitio Kapagisahan
Tigbinan Labo, Carnarines Norte, of
stomach pain. On these points,
these witnesses and the accused
made statements which seemed to
be very fresh and clear in their
minds, despite the lapse of four long
years. Their exact and uniform
declarations on these points, their
phenomenal recollections, without
sufficient special or uncommon
reason to recall, rendered their
testimonies unconvincing. If at all,
their testimonies appeared to this
Court to be an eleventh hour
concoction. And, as defense
witnesses, after observing them and
their declarations on the witness
stand, they appeared to the Court to
be untruthful and unreliable. For,
despite the synchronization of time
when, the place where and how the
incidence happened, their
testimonies on other material points
revealed their tendency to
exaggerate and their propensity to
falsehood, thus-Aside from the
accused Filomeno Salufrania, there
are three other witnesses for the
defense Geronimo Villan Angeles
Liling Balce and Juanita Bragais.
There is nothing in the testimony of
Juanito Bragais because he did not
witness how and when Marciana
Abuyo died. Francisco Repuya, who
was also alleged by Filomeno
Salufrania to be present when
Marciana Abuyo died, did not testify.
Accused Filomeno Salufrania never
claimed that he summoned for
Angeles Liling Balce. According to
him Angeles Liling Balce was not
present during the moment of death
of Marciana Abuyo, for she was
fetched by him only after the death of
his wife. Logically, therefore, there is
no basis for the presentation of
Angeles Liling Balce that she was
present during the moment of death
of Marciana Abuyo. She was merely
play-acting. Geronimo Villan who
claimed he passed-by the house of
Filomeno Salufrania and saw the
latter boiling water with "ikmo" and
garlic, as medicine for his wife
Marciana Abuyo, who was about to
give birth was discredited by
accused himself who declared he
was merely boiling water for the hot
drink of his wife, who was suferring
from her old stomach ailment. In like
manner, witness Geronimo Villan
discredited the accused Filomeno
Salufrania, about the presence of
Francisco Repuya, who allegedly
alternated with Geronimo Villan in
applying the native treatments of
'hilot' and 'bantil' to Marciana Abuyo,
when throughout his testimony he
(Geronimo Villan) never mentioned
the presence of Francisco Repuya.
After closely observing defense
witnesses Geronimo Villan and
Angeles Liling Balce, this Court is
convinced that their testimonies and
accounts of the incident are
fabricated, untruthful and not worth
of credence. Certainly, they were not
present immediately before and
during the moment of death of
Marciana Abuyo. ...
Added to these, there is one
scandalous circumstance, which to
the mind of this Court, betrays the
guilty conscience of the accused. If
there was nothing revealing in the
face of the deceased Marciana
Abuyo, why was her face covered by
a piece of cloth by the accused. ...
Trial judges are in the best position to
ascertain the truth and detect falsehoods in
the testimony of witnesses. This Court will
normally not disturb the findings of the trial
court on the credibility of witnesses, in view
of its advantage in observing first hand
their demeanor in giving their testimony. 16
Such rule applies in the present case.
Lastly, appellant alleges that, assuming he
indeed killed his wife, there is no evidence
to show that he had the intention to cause
an abortion. In this contention, appellant is
correct. He should not be held guilty of the
complex crime of Parricide with Intentional
Abortion but of the complex crime of
Parricide with Unintentional Abortion. The
elements of Unintentional Abortion are as
follows:
1. That there is a pregnant woman.
2. That violence is used upon such
pregnant woman without intending
an abortion.
3. That the violence is intentionally
exerted.
4. That as a result of the violence the
foetus dies, either in the womb or
after having been expelled
therefrom. 17
The Solicitor General's brief makes it
appear that appellant intended to cause an
abortion because he boxed his pregnant
wife on the stomach which caused her to
fall and then strangled her. We find that
appellant's intent to cause an abortion has
not been sufficiently established. Mere
boxing on the stomach, taken together with
the immediate strangling of the victim in a
fight, is not sufficient proof to show an
intent to cause an abortion. In fact,
appellant must have merely intended to kill
the victim but not necessarily to cause an
abortion.
The evidence on record, therefore,
establishes beyond reasonable doubt that
accused Filomeno Salufrania committed
and should be held liable for the complex
crime of parricide with unintentional
abortion. The abortion, in this case, was
caused by the same violence that caused
the death of Marciana Abuyo, such
violence being voluntarily exerted by the
herein accused upon his victim.
It has also been clearly established (a) that
Marciana Abuyo was seven (7) to eight (8)
months pregnant when she was killed; (b)
that violence was voluntarily exerted upon
her by her husband accused; and (c) that,
as a result of said violence, Marciana
Abuyo died together with the foetus in her
womb. In this afternoon, Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code states that the
accused should be punished with the
penalty corresponding to the more serious
came of parricide, to be imposed in its
maximum period which is death. However,
by reason of the 1987 Constitution which
has abolished the death penalty, appellant
should be sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, as modified, the judgment
appealed from is AFFIRMED. Accused-
appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
indemnity of P12,000. 00 awarded to the
heirs of the deceased Marciana Abuyo is
increased to P30,000.00 in line with the
recent decisions of the Court. With costs
against the appellant,
SO ORDERED.
ARTICLE 262
TO 266
THIRD DIVISION
GLORIA PILAR S. G. R. No. 170723
AGUIRRE,
Present:
Petitioner,
YNARES-
- versus - SANTIAGO,
SECRETARY OF Chairperson,
THE
AUSTRIA-
DEPARTMENT
MARTINEZ,
OF JUSTICE,
MICHELINA S. CORONA,*
AGUIRRE- CHICO-
OLONDRIZ, NAZARIO, and
PEDRO B.
AGUIRRE, DR. REYES, JJ.
JUVIDO AGATEP
and DR. Promulgated:
MARISSA B.
March 3, 2008
PASCUAL,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------
------------------x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, petitioner Gloria Pilar S. Aguirre
(Gloria Aguirre) seeks the reversal of the 21
July 2005 Decision[2] and 5 December 2005
Resolution,[3] both of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 88370, entitled Gloria Pilar
S. Aguirre v. Secretary of the Department of
Justice, Michelina S. Aguirre-Olondriz, Dr.
Juvido Agatep, Dra. Marissa B. Pascual,
Pedro B. Aguirre and John and Jane Does.
The Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Secretary of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) when the latter
issued the twin resolutions dated 11 February
2004[4] and 12 November 2004,[5]
respectively, which in turn affirmed the 8
January 2003 Resolution[6] of the Office of the
City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City.
The Assistant City Prosecutor for the OCP of
Quezon City recommended the dismissal of the
criminal complaint, docketed as I.S. No. 02-
12466, for violation of Articles 172
(Falsification by Private Individuals and Use of
Falsified Documents) and 262 (Mutilation),
both of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act, for insufficiency of evidence.
The case stemmed from a complaint filed by
petitioner Gloria Aguirre against respondents
Pedro B. Aguirre (Pedro Aguirre), Michelina S.
Aguirre-Olondriz (Olondriz), Dr. Juvido
Agatep (Dr. Agatep), Dr. Marissa B. Pascual
(Dr. Pascual) and several John/Jane Does for
falsification, mutilation and child abuse.
The antecedents of the present petition are:
Laureano Larry Aguirre[7] used to be a charge
of the Heart of Mary Villa, a child caring
agency run by the Good Shepherd Sisters and
licensed by the Department of Social Work and
Development (DSWD). Sometime in 1978,
respondent Pedro Aguirre; the latters spouse,
Lourdes S. Aguirre (Lourdes Aguirre); and
their four daughters, who included petitioner
Gloria Aguirre and respondent Olondriz, came
to know Larry, who was then just over a year
old. The Aguirres would have Larry spend a
few days at their home and then return him to
the orphanage thereafter. In June 1980, Larry,
then two years and nine months of age,
formally became the ward of respondent Pedro
Aguirre and his spouse Lourdes Aguirre by
virtue of an Affidavit of Consent to Legal
Guardianship executed in their favor by Sister
Mary Concepta Bellosillo, Superior of the
Heart of Mary Villa. On 19 June 1986, the
Aguirre spouses guardianship of Larry was
legalized when the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 3 of Balanga, Bataan, duly appointed
them as joint co-guardians over the person and
property of Larry.
As Larry was growing up, the Aguirre spouses
and their children noticed that his
developmental milestones were remarkably
delayed. His cognitive and physical growth did
not appear normal in that at age 3 to 4 years,
Larry could only crawl on his tummy like a
frog x x x;[8] he did not utter his first word
until he was three years of age; did not speak in
sentences until his sixth year; and only learned
to stand up and walk after he turned five years
old. At age six, the Aguirre spouses first
enrolled Larry at the Colegio de San Agustin,
Dasmarias Village, but the child experienced
significant learning difficulties there. In 1989,
at age eleven, Larry was taken to specialists for
neurological and psychological evaluations.
The psychological evaluation[9] done on Larry
revealed the latter to be suffering from a mild
mental deficiency.[10] Consequent thereto, the
Aguirre spouses transferred Larry to St. John
Ma. Vianney, an educational institution for
special children.
In November of 2001, respondent Dr. Agatep, a
urologist/surgeon, was approached concerning
the intention to have Larry, then 24 years of
age, vasectomized. Prior to performing the
procedure on the intended patient, respondent
Dr. Agatep required that Larry be evaluated by
a psychiatrist in order to confirm and validate
whether or not the former could validly give his
consent to the medical procedure on account of
his mental deficiency.
In view of the required psychiatric clearance,
Larry was brought to respondent Dr. Pascual, a
psychiatrist, for evaluation. In a psychiatric
report dated 21 January 2002, respondent Dr.
Pascual made the following recommendation:
[T]he responsibility of decision making may be
given to his parent or guardian.[11]
the full text of which reads
PSYCHIATRY REPORT
GENERAL DATA
LAUREANO AGUIRRE, 24 years old, male,
high school graduate of [Marie Vianney], was
referred for psychiatric evaluation to determine
competency to give consent for vasectomy.
CLINICAL SUMMARY
Larry was adopted at age 3 from an orphanage
and prenatal history is not known to the
adoptive family except that abortion was
attempted. Developmental milestones were
noted to be delayed. He started to walk and
speak in single word at around age 5. He was
enrolled in Colegio de San Agustin at age 6
where he showed significant learning
difficulties that he had to repeat 1st and 4th
grades. A consult was done in 1989 when he
was 11 years old. Neurological findings and
EEG results were not normal and he was given
Tecretol and Encephabol by his neurologist.
Psychological evaluation revealed mild to
moderate mental retardation, special education
training was advised and thus, he was
transferred to St. John Marie Vianney. He
finished his elementary and secondary
education in the said school. He was later
enrolled in a vocational course at Don Bosco
which he was unable to continue. There has
been no reported behavioral problems in school
and he gets along relatively well with his
teachers and some of his classmates.
Larry grew up with a very supportive adoptive
family. He is the youngest in the family of four
sisters. Currently, his adoptive parents are
already old and have medical problem and thus,
they could no longer monitor and take care of
him like before. His adoptive mother has
Bipolar Mood Disorder and used to physically
maltreat him. A year ago, he had an episode of
dizziness, vomiting and headaches after he was
hit by his adoptive mother. Consult was done in
and several tests were done, results of which
were consistent with his developmental
problem. There was no evidence of acute
insults. The family subsequently decided that
he should stay with one of his sisters to avoid
similar incident and the possibility that he
would retaliate although he has never hurt
anybody. There has been no episode of violent
outburst or aggressive behavior. He would
often keep to himself when sad, angry or
frustrated.
He is currently employed in the company of his
sister and given assignment to do some
photocopying, usually in the mornings. He
enjoys playing billiards and basketball with his
nephews and, he spends most of his leisure
time watching TV and listening to music. He
could perform activities of daily living without
assistance except that he still needs supervision
in taking a bath. He cannot prepare his own
meal and never allowed to go out and run
errands alone. He does not have friends and it
is only his adoptive family whom he has
significant relationships. He claims that he
once had a girlfriend when he was in high
school who was more like a best friend to him.
He never had sexual relations. He has learned
to smoke and drink alcohol few years ago
through his cousins and the drivers. There is no
history of abuse of alcohol or any prohibited
substances.
MEDICAL STATUS EXAMINATION
The applicant was appropriately dressed. He
was cooperative and he had intermittent eye
contact. Speech was spontaneous, soft, and
relevant. He responded to questions in single
words or simple sentences. He was anxious
specially at the start of the interview, with full
affect appropriate to mood and thought content.
There was no apparent thought or perceptual
disturbance. No suicidal/homicidal thoughts
elicited. He was oriented to time, place and
person. He has intact remote and recent
memory. He could do simple calculation. He
could write his name and read simple words.
His human figure was comparable to a 7-8 year
old. He demonstrated fair judgment and poor
insight. He had fair impulse control.
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS
Psychological tests done on (Dr. Lourdes
Ledesma) and on (Dr. Ma. Teresa Gustilo-
Villaosor) consistently revealed mild to
moderate mental deficiency.
SIGNIFICANT LABORATORY EXAMS
RESULTS
CT scan done showed nonspecific right deep
parietal subcortical malacia. No localized mass
lesion in the brain.
MRI done on showed bilateral parietal x x x
volume loss, encephalomalacia, gliosis and
ulegyria consistent with sequela of postnatal or
neonatal infarcts. Ex-vacuo dilatation of the
atria of lateral ventricles associated thinned
posterior half of the corpus callosum.
ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION
Axis I None
Axis II Mental Retardation, mild to moderate
type
Axis III None
Axis IV None at present
Axis V Current GAF = 50-60
Larrys mental deficiency could be associated
with possible perinatal insults, which is
consistent with the neuroimaging findings.
Mental retardation associated with neurological
problems usually has poorer prognosis. Larry is
very much dependent on his family for his
needs, adaptive functioning, direction and in
making major life decisions. At his capacity, he
may never understand the nature, the
foreseeable risks and benefits, and
consequences of the procedure (vasectomy)
that his family wants for his protection. Thus,
the responsibility of decision making may be
given to his parent or guardian.
Marissa B. Pascual, M.D.
Psychiatrist[12]
Considering the above recommendation,
respondent Pedro Aguirres written consent was
deemed sufficient in order to proceed with the
conduct of the vasectomy. Hence, on 31
January 2002, respondent Dr. Agatep
performed a bilateral vasectomy on Larry.
On 11 June 2002, petitioner Gloria Aguirre,
respondent Pedro Aguirres eldest child,
instituted a criminal complaint for the violation
of the Revised Penal Code, particularly Articles
172 and 262, both in relation to Republic Act
No. 7610 against respondents Pedro Aguirre,
Olondriz, Dr. Agatep, Dr. Pascual and several
John/Jane Does before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City.
The Complaint Affidavit,[13] docketed as I.S.
No. 02-12466, contained the following
allegations:
2. x x x Dr. Agatep and Dra. Pascual were (sic)
medical practitioners specializing in urology
and psychiatry respectively; while respondent
Pedro B. Aguirre is my father; Michelina S.
Aguirre-Olondriz is my sister, and the victim
Laureano Larry Aguirre xxx is my common
law brother. JOHN and JANE DOES were the
persons who, acting upon the apparent
instructions of respondents Michelina Aguirre-
Olondriz and/or Pedro B. Aguirre, actually
scouted, prospected, facilitated, solicited and/or
procured the medical services of respondents
Dra. Pascual and Dr. Agatep vis--vis the
intended mutilation via bilateral vasectomy of
my common law brother Larry Aguirre subject
hereof.
xxxx
4. Sometime in March 2002, however, the
Heart of Mary Villa of the Good Shepherd
Sisters was furnished a copy of respondent Dra.
Pascuals Psychiatry Report dated by the
DSWD, in which my common law brother
Larry was falsely and maliciously declared
incompetent and incapable of purportedly
giving his own consent to the MUTILATION
VIA BILATERAL VASECTOMY intended to
be performed on him by all the respondents.
xxxx
6. Based on the foregoing charade and false
pretenses invariably committed by all of the
respondents in conspiracy with each other, on
31 January 2002, my common law brother
Larry Aguirre, although of legal age but
conspiratorially caused to be declared by
respondents to be mentally deficient and
incompetent to give consent to his
BILATERAL VASECTOMY, was then
intentionally, unlawfully, maliciously,
feloniously and/or criminally placed thereafter
under surgery for MUTILATION VIA
BILATERAL VASECTOMY x x x, EVEN
WITHOUT ANY AUTHORIZATION ORDER
from the GUARDIANSHIP COURT, nor
personal consent of Larry Aguirre himself.
In addition to the above, the complaint included
therein an allegation that
v. x x x without a PRIOR medical examination,
professional interview of nor verification and
consultation with my mother, Lourdes Sabino-
Aguirre, respondent Dra. Pascual baselessly,
fraudulently and with obvious intent to defame
and malign her reputation and honor, and
worse, that of our Sabido family, falsely
concluded and diagnosed, via her falsified
Psychiatry Report, that my mother Lourdes
Sabido-Aguirre purportedly suffers from
BIPOLAR MOOD DISORDER x x x.
To answer petitioner Gloria Aguirres
accusations against them, respondents Pedro
Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual
submitted their respective Counter-Affidavits.
In her defense,[14] respondent Olondriz denied
that she prospected, scouted, facilitated,
solicited and/or procured any false statement,
mutilated or abused her common-law brother,
Larry Aguirre. Further, she countered that:
3. x x x While I am aware and admit that Larry
went through a vasectomy procedure, there is
nothing in the Complaint which explains how
the vasectomy amounts to a mutilation.
xxxx
5. In any case, as I did not perform the
vasectomy, I can state with complete
confidence that I did not participate in any way
in the alleged mutilation.
6. Neither did I procure or solicit the services
of the physician who performed the vasectomy,
Dr. Juvido Agatep x x x. It was my father,
Pedro Aguirre, Larrys guardian, who obtained
his services. I merely acted upon his
instructions and accompanied my brother to the
physician, respondents Dra. Marissa B. Pascual
x x x.
xxxx
10. Neither does the Complaint explain in what
manner the Complainant is authorized or has
any standing to declare that Larrys consent was
not obtained. Complainant is not the guardian
or relative of Larry. While she argues that
Larrys consent should have been obtained the
Complaint does not dispute the psychiatrists
findings about Larrys inability to give consent.
xxxx
13. x x x the Complaint does not even state
what alleged participation was falsified or the
portion of the psychiatric report that allegedly
states that someone participated when in fact
that person did not so participate.
xxxx
15. Again, I had no participation in the
preparation of the report of Dr. Pascual x x x.
xxxx
17. x x x the Complaint does not dispute that he
(Larry) is mentally deficient or incompetent to
give consent.
xxxx
19. x x x I verified that the effect of a
vasectomy operation was explained to him
(Larry) by both respondent doctors.
20. x x x I accompanied Larry and obeyed my
father on the belief that my father continues to
be the legal guardian of Larry. I know of no
one else who asserts to be his legal guardian x
x x.[15]
Alleging the same statement of facts and
defenses, respondent Pedro Aguirre argues
against his complicity in the crime of
mutilation as charged and asserts that:
5. In any case, as I did not perform the
vasectomy, I can state with complete
confidence that I did not participate in any way
in the alleged mutilation.[16]
Nevertheless, he maintains that the vasectomy
performed on Larry does not in any way
amount to mutilation, as the latters
reproductive organ is still completely intact.
[17] In any case, respondent Pedro Aguirre
explains that the procedure performed is
reversible through another procedure called
Vasovasostomy, to wit:
8. I understand that vasectomy is reversible
through a procedure called Vasovasostomy. I
can also state with confidence that the
procedure enables men who have undergone a
vasectomy to sire a child. Hence, no permanent
damage was caused by the procedure.
Respondent Pedro Aguirre challenges the
charge of falsification in the complaint, to wit:
14. x x x I did not make it appear that any
person participated in any act or proceeding
when that person did not in fact participate x x
x.
xxxx
16. x x x I had no participation in the
preparation of the report of Dra. Pascual. She
arrived at her report independently, using her
own professional judgment x x x.
xxxx
31. What I cannot understand about Petitas
Complaint is how Larry is argued to be legally
a child under the definition of one law but
nonetheless and simultaneously argued to be
capacitated to give his consent as fully as an
adult.[18]
Respondent Pedro Aguirre further clarifies that
co-guardianship over Larry had been granted to
himself and his wife, Lourdes Aguirre, way
back on 19 June 1986 by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 3 of Balanga, Bataan.
Respondent Pedro Aguirre contends that being
one of the legal guardians, consequently,
parental authority over Larry is vested in him.
But assuming for the sake of argument that
Larry does have the capacity to make the
decision concerning his vasectomy, respondent
Pedro Aguirre argues that petitioner Gloria
Aguirre has no legal personality to institute the
subject criminal complaint, for only Larry
would have the right to do so.
Just as the two preceding respondents did,
respondent Dr. Agatep also disputed the
allegations of facts stated in the Complaint.
Adopting the allegations of his co-respondents
insofar as they were material to the charges
against him, he vehemently denied failing to
inform Larry of the intended procedure. In his
counter-statement of facts he averred that:
(b) x x x I scheduled Larry for consultative
interview x x x wherein I painstakingly
explained what vasectomy is and the
consequences thereof; but finding signs of
mental deficiency, x x x I advised his relatives
and his nurse who accompanied him to have
Larry examined by a psychiatrist who could
properly determine whether or not Larry x x x
can really give his consent, thus I required
them to secure first a psychiatric evaluation and
clearance prior to the contemplated procedure.
(c) On , I was furnished a copy of a psychiatric
report prepared by Dr. Marissa Pascual x x x.
In her said report, Dr. Pascual found Larry to
suffer from mental retardation, mild to
moderate type and further stated that at his
capacity, he may never understand the nature,
the foreseeable risks and benefits and
consequences of the procedure (vasectomy) x x
x, thus the responsibility of decision making
may be given to his parent or guardian x x x.
(d) x x x I was likewise furnished a copy of an
affidavit executed by Pedro Aguirre stating that
he was the legal guardian of Larry x x x Pedro
Aguirre gave his consent to vasectomize Larry
x x x.
(e) Only then, specifically , vasectomy was
performed with utmost care and diligence.[19]
In defense against the charge of falsification
and mutilation, respondent Dr. Agatep argued
that subject complaint should be dismissed for
the following reasons:
1. The complainant has no legal personality to
file this case. As mentioned above, she is only a
common law sister of Larry who has a legal
guardian in the person of Pedro Aguirre, one of
the herein respondents x x x.
2. x x x [t]he allegations in the complaint
clearly centers on the condition of
complainants mother, Lourdes Aguirre, her
reputation, and miserably fails to implicate the
degree of participation of herein respondent. x
xx
xxxx
(b) Falsification. x x x I strongly aver that this
felony does not apply to me since it clearly
gives reference to co-respondent, Dr. Marissa
Pascuals Psychiatry Report, dated , in relation
with her field of profession, an expert opinion.
I do not have any participation in the
preparation of said report, x x x neither did I
utilized (sic) the same in any proceedings to the
damage to another. x x x I also deny using a
falsified document x x x.
(c) Mutilation. x x x Vasectomy does not in
anyway equate to castration and what is
touched in vasectomy is not considered an
organ in the context of law and medicine, it is
quite remote from the penis x x x.
(d) Child Abuse. x x x the complaint-affidavit
is very vague in specifying the applicability of
said law. It merely avers that Laureano Larry
Aguirre is a child, and alleges his father, Pedro
Aguirre, has parental authority over him x x x.
[20]
Similarly, respondent Dr. Pascual denied the
criminal charges of falsification and mutilation
imputed to her. She stands by the contents of
the assailed Psychiatric Report, justifying it
thus:
x x x My opinion of Larry Aguirres mental
status was based on my own personal
observations, his responses during my
interview of him, the results of the two (2)
psychological tests conducted by clinical
psychologists, the results of laboratory tests,
including a CT Scan and MRI, and his personal
and family history which I obtained from his
sister, Michelina Aguirre-Olondriz x x x.
5. x x x the reference in my report concerning
Mrs. Lourdes Aguirre is not a statement of my
opinion of Mrs. Aguirres mental status, x x x.
Rather, it is part of the patients personal and
family history as conveyed to me by Mrs.
Aguirre-Olondriz.
6. x x x An expression of my opinion,
especially of an expert opinion, cannot give rise
to a charge for falsification. A contrary opinion
by another expert only means that the experts
differ, and does not necessarily reflect on the
truth or falsity of either opinion x x x.
7. x x x I never stated that I examined Mrs.
Aguirre, because I never did x x x.
8. I had no participation in the surgery
performed on Larry Aguirre except to render an
opinion on his capacity to give informed
consent to the vasectomy x x x.
9. Without admitting the merits of the
complaint, I submit that complainants are not
the proper persons to subscribe to the same as
they are not the offended party, peace officer or
other public officer charged with the
enforcement of the law violated x x x.[21]
The Assistant City Prosecutor held that the
circumstances attendant to the case did not
amount to the crime of falsification. He held
that
[T]he claim of the complainant that the
Psychiatric Report was falsified, because
consent was not given by Larry Aguirre to the
vasectomy and/or he was not consulted on said
operation does not constitute falsification. It
would have been different if it was stated in the
report that consent was obtained from Larry
Aguirre or that it was written therein that he
was consulted on the vasectomy, because that
would mean that it was made to appear in the
report that Larry Aguirre participated in the act
or proceeding by giving his consent or was
consulted on the matter when in truth and in
fact, he did not participate. Or if not, the entry
would have been an untruthful statement. But
that is not the case. Precisely (sic) the report
was made to determine whether Larry Aguirre
could give his consent to his intended
vasectomy. Be that as it may, the matter of
Larrys consent having obtained or not may nor
be an issue after all, because complainants (sic)
herself alleged that Larrys mental condition is
that of a child, who can not give consent. Based
on the foregoing consideration, no falsification
can be established under the circumstances.[22]
Even the statement in the Psychiatric Report of
respondent Dr. Pascual that Lourdes Aguirre
had Bipolar Mood Disorder cannot be
considered falsification since
The report did not state that Lourdes Aguirre
was in fact personally interviewed by
respondent Dr. Pascual and that the latter
concluded that Lourdes Aguirre has Bipolar
Mood Disorder. The report merely quoted other
sources of information with respect to the
condition of Lourdes Aguirre, in the same
manner that the fact that Lourdes Aguirre was
physically abusing Larry Aguirre was also not
of Dra. Pascual personal knowledge. But the
fact that Dra. Pascual cited finding, which is
not of her own personal knowledge in her
report does not mean that she committed
falsification in the process. Her sources may be
wrong and may affect the veracity of her report,
but for as long as she has not alleged therein
that she personally diagnosed Lourdes Aguirre,
which allegation would not then be true, she
cannot be charged of falsification. Therefore, it
goes without saying that if the author of the
report is not guilty, then with more reason the
other respondents are not liable.[23]
Respecting the charge of mutilation, the
Assistant City Prosecutor also held that the
facts alleged did not amount to the crime of
mutilation as defined and penalized under
Article 262 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e.,
[t]he vasectomy operation did not in any way
deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ,
which is still very much part of his physical
self. He ratiocinated that:
While the operation renders him the inability
(sic) to procreate, the operation is reversible
and therefore, cannot be the permanent damage
contemplated under Article 262 of the Revised
Penal Code.[24]
The Assistant City Prosecutor,[25] in a
Resolution[26] dated 8 January 2003, found no
probable cause to hold respondents Pedro
liable for the complaint of falsification and
mutilation, more specifically, the violation of
Articles 172 and 262 of the Revised Penal
Code, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610.
Accordingly, the Assistant City Prosecutor
recommended the dismissal of petitioner Gloria
Aguirres complaint for insufficiency of
evidence. The dispositive portion of the
resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, it is recommended that the
above-entitled case be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.[27]
On 18 February 2003, petitioner Gloria Aguirre
appealed the foregoing resolution to the
Secretary of the DOJ by means of a Petition for
Review.[28]
In a Resolution dated 11 February 2004, Chief
State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo, for the
Secretary of the DOJ, dismissed the petition. In
resolving said appeal, the Chief State
Prosecutor held that:
Under Section 12, in relation to Section 7, of
Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000,
the Secretary of Justice may, motu proprio,
dismiss outright the petition if there is no
showing of any reversible error in the
questioned resolution or finds the same to be
patently without merit.
We carefully examined the petition and its
attachments and found no error that would
justify a reversal of the assailed resolution
which is in accord with the law and evidenced
(sic) on the matter.[29]
Petitioner Gloria Aguirres Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied with
finality by the DOJ in another Resolution dated
12 November 2004.
Resolute in her belief, petitioner Gloria Aguirre
went to the Court of Appeals by means of a
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, as amended.
On 21 July 2005, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its Decision dismissing petitioner
Gloria Aguirres recourse for lack of merit.
The fallo of the assailed decision reads:
present petition is hereby DENIED DUE
COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED for
lack of merit. Consequently, the assailed
Resolutions dated February 11, 2004 and
November 12, 2004 of the Secretary of Justice
in I.S. No. 02-12466 are hereby AFFIRMED.[30]
Petitioner Gloria Aguirres motion for
reconsideration proved futile as it was denied
by the appellate court in a Resolution dated 5
December 2005.
Hence, the present petition filed under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, as amended, premised on
the following arguments:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS, GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE
ERRORS OF LAW WHEN IT CONCLUDED,
BASED PURPORTEDLY ON THE
INTERNET WHICH RUNS AMUCK WITH
OUR SYSTEM OF THE RULE OF LAW
AND THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, THAT
BILATERAL VASECTOMY IS
PURPORTEDLY 100% REVERSIBLE BY A
FUTURE MEDICAL PROCEDURE HENCE
NOT AMOUNTING TO MUTILATION, X X
X; AND
xxxx
II.
WORSE, THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE, SERIOUS AND
REVERSIBLE ERRORS OF LAW WHEN IT
REFUSED TO DIRECT THE INDICTMENT
OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR
MUTILATION AND FALSIFICATION
DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF
SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE
THEREFOR X X X.[31]
The foregoing issues notwithstanding, the more
proper issue for this Courts consideration is,
given the facts of the case, whether or not the
Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the DOJ
did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when the latter affirmed the public prosecutors
finding of lack of probable cause for
respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr.
Agatep and Dr. Pascual to stand trial for the
criminal complaints of falsification and
mutilation in relation to Republic Act No.
7610.
In ruling that the DOJ did not commit grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals explained
that:
Evidently, the controversy lies in the
permanency of sterilization as a result of a
vasectomy operation, and the chances of
restoring fertility with a reversal surgery x x x.
We sustain the DOJ in ruling that the bilateral
vasectomy performed on Larry does not
constitute mutilation even if intentionally and
purposely done to prevent him from siring a
child.
xxxx
Sterilization is to be distinguished from
castration: in the latter act the reproductive
capacity is permanently removed or damaged.
[32]
It then concluded that:
The matter of legal liability, other than
criminal, which private respondents may have
incurred for the alleged absence of a valid
consent to the vasectomy performed on Larry,
is certainly beyond the province of this
certiorari petition. Out task is confined to the
issue of whether or not the Secretary of Justice
and the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City committed grave abuse of
discretion in their determining the existence or
absence of probable cause for filing criminal
cases for falsification and mutilation under
Articles 172 (2) and 262 of the Revised Penal
Code.[33]
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre, however, contends
that the Court of Appeals and the DOJ failed to
appreciate several important facts: 1) that
bilateral vasectomy conducted on petitioners
brother, Larry Aguirre, was admitted[34]; 2)
that the procedure caused the perpetual
destruction of Larrys reproductive organs of
generation or conception;[35] 3) that the
bilateral vasectomy was intentional and
deliberate to deprive Larry forever of his
reproductive organ and his capacity to
procreate; and 4) that respondents, in
conspiracy with one another, made not only
one but two (2) untruthful statements, and not
mere inaccuracies when they made it appear in
the psychiatry report[36] that a) Larrys consent
was obtained or at the very least that the latter
was informed of the intended vasectomy; and
b) that Lourdes Aguirre was likewise
interviewed and evaluated. Paradoxically,
however, petitioner Gloria Aguirre does not in
any way state that she, instead of respondent
Pedro Aguirre, has guardianship over the
person of Larry. She only insists that
respondents should have obtained Larrys
consent prior to the conduct of the bilateral
vasectomy.
In contrast, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), for public respondent DOJ, argues that
the conduct of preliminary investigation to
determine the existence of probable cause for
the purpose of filing (an) information is the
function of the public prosecutor.[37] More
importantly, the element[s] of castration or
mutilation of an organ necessary for generation
is completely absent as he was not deprived of
any organ necessary for reproduction, much
less the destruction of such organ.[38]
Likewise, in support of the decision of the
Court of Appeals, respondents Pedro Aguirre
and Olondriz assert that, fundamentally,
petitioner Gloria Aguirre has no standing to file
the complaint, as she has not shown any injury
to her person or asserted any relationship with
Larry other than being his common law sister;
further, that she cannot prosecute the present
case, as she has not been authorized by law to
file said complaint, not being the offended
party, a peace officer or a public officer charged
with the enforcement of the law. Accordingly,
respondents Pedro Aguirre and Olondriz posit
that they, together with the other respondents
Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual, may not be charged
with, prosecuted for and ultimately convicted
of: 1) mutilation x x x since the bilateral
vasectomy conducted on Larry does not
involve castration or amputation of an organ
necessary for reproduction as the twin elements
of the crime of mutilation x x x are absent[39];
and 2) falsification x x x since the acts
allegedly constituting falsification involve
matters of medical opinion and not matters of
fact,[40] and that petitioner Gloria Aguirre
failed to prove damage to herself or to any
other person.
Respondent Dr. Agatep, in the same vein,
stresses that vasectomy is not mutilation. He
elucidates that vasectomy is merely the
excision of the vas deferens, the duct in testis
which transport semen[41]; that it is the penis
and the testis that make up the male
reproductive organ and not the vas deferens;
and additionally argues that for the crime of
mutilation to be accomplished, Article 262 of
the Revised Penal Code necessitates that there
be intentional total or partial deprivation of
some essential organ for reproduction. Tubes,
seminal ducts, vas deferens or prostatic urethra
not being organs, respondent Dr. Agatep
concludes, therefore, that vasectomy does not
correspond to mutilation.
Anent the charge of falsification of a private
document, respondent Dr. Agatep asseverates
that he never took part in disclosing any
information, data or facts as contained in the
contentious Psychiatric Report.
For her part, respondent Dr. Pascual insists that
the assailed Psychiatry Report was the result of
her independent exercise of professional
judgment. Rightly or wrongly, (she) diagnosed
Larry Aguirre to be incapable of giving
consent, based on interviews made by the
psychiatrist on Larry Aguirre and persons who
interacted with him.[42] And supposing that
said report is flawed, it is, at most, an erroneous
medical diagnosis.
The petition has no merit.
Probable cause has been defined as the
existence of such facts and circumstances as
would excite belief in a reasonable mind, acting
on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty
of the crime for which he was prosecuted.[43]
The term does not mean actual and positive
cause nor does it import absolute certainty.[44]
It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief;[45] that is, the belief that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. A finding of probable cause merely
binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a
pronouncement of guilt.[46]
The executive department of the government is
accountable for the prosecution of crimes, its
principal obligation being the faithful execution
of the laws of the land. A necessary component
of the power to execute the laws is the right to
prosecute their violators,[47] the responsibility
of which is thrust upon the DOJ. Hence, the
determination of whether or not probable cause
exists to warrant the prosecution in court of an
accused is consigned and entrusted to the DOJ.
And by the nature of his office, a public
prosecutor is under no compulsion to file a
particular criminal information where he is not
convinced that he has evidence to prop up the
averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand
points to a different conclusion.
Put simply, public prosecutors under the DOJ
have a wide range of discretion, the discretion
of whether, what and whom to charge, the
exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of
factors which are best appreciated by (public)
prosecutors.[48] And this Court has
consistently adhered to the policy of non-
interference in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, and to leave to the investigating
prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in
the determination of what constitutes sufficient
evidence as will establish probable cause for
the filing of an information against the
supposed offender.[49]
But this is not to discount the possibility of the
commission of abuses on the part of the
prosecutor. It is entirely possible that the
investigating prosecutor may erroneously
exercise the discretion lodged in him by law.
This, however, does not render his act
amenable to correction and annulment by the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, absent any
showing of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction.[50]
Prescinding from the above, the courts duty in
an appropriate case, therefore, is confined to a
determination of whether the assailed executive
determination of probable cause was done
without or in excess of jurisdiction resulting
from a grave abuse of discretion. For courts of
law to grant the extraordinary writ of
certiorari, so as to justify the reversal of the
finding of whether or not there exists probable
cause to file an information, the one seeking
the writ must be able to establish that the
investigating prosecutor exercised his power in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and it must be
patent and gross as would amount to an evasion
or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.
Grave abuse of discretion is not enough.[51]
Excess of jurisdiction signifies that he had
jurisdiction over the case but has transcended
the same or acted without authority.[52]
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the
present petition, the reasons of the Assistant
City Prosecutor in dismissing the criminal
complaints for falsification and mutilation, as
affirmed by the DOJ, is determinative of
whether or not he committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
In ruling the way he did that no probable cause
for falsification and mutilation exists - the
Assistant City Prosecutor deliberated on the
factual and legal milieu of the case. He found
that there was no sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case for the crimes
complained of as defined and punished under
Articles 172, paragraph 2, and 262 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act
No. 7610, respectively. Concerning the crime
of falsification of a private document, the
Assistant City Prosecutor reasoned that the
circumstances attendant to the case did not
amount to the crime complained of, that is, the
lack of consent by Larry Aguirre before he was
vasectomized; or the fact that the latter was not
consulted. The lack of the two preceding
attendant facts do not in any way amount to
falsification, absent the contention that it was
made to appear in the assailed report that said
consent was obtained. That would have been an
untruthful statement. Neither does the fact that
the Psychiatric Report state that Lourdes
Aguirre has Bipolar Mood Disorder by the
same token amount to falsification because said
report does not put forward that such finding
arose after an examination of the concerned
patient. Apropos the charge of mutilation, he
reasoned that though the vasectomy rendered
Larry unable to procreate, it was not the
permanent damage contemplated under the
pertinent provision of the penal code.
We agree. Grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the DOJ and the Assistant City Prosecutor was
not shown in the present case.
In the present petition, respondents Pedro
are charged with violating Articles 172 and 262
of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Republic Act No. 7610. Article 172, paragraph
2 of the Revised Penal Code, defines the crime
of falsification of a private document, viz
Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals
and use of falsified documents. The penalty of
prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine of not more than
5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
xxxx
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third
party, or with the intent to cause such damage,
shall in any private document commit any of
the acts of falsification enumerated in the next
preceding article.
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre charges respondents
with falsification of a private document for
conspiring with one another in keeping Larry in
the dark about the foregoing (vasectomy) as the
same was concealed from him by the
respondents x x x,[53] as well as for falsely
concluding and diagnosing Lourdes Aguirre to
be suffering from Bipolar Mood Disorder.
A scrutiny, however, of Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code which defines the acts
constitutive of falsification, that is
Art. 171. x x x shall falsify a document by
committing any of the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting,
signature, or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have
participated in any act or proceeding when they
did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated
in an act or proceeding statements other than
those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration
of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a
genuine document which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document
purporting to be a copy of an original document
when no such original exists, or including in
such copy a statement contrary to, or different
from, that of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative
to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or
official book.
vis--vis the much criticized Psychiatric Report,
shows that the acts complained of do not in any
manner, by whatever stretch of the imagination,
fall under any of the eight (8) enumerated acts
constituting the offense of falsification.
In order to properly address the issue presented
by petitioner Gloria Aguirre, it is necessary that
we discuss the elements of the crime of
falsification of private document under the
Revised Penal Code, a crime which all the
respondents have been accused of perpetrating.
The elements of said crime under paragraph 2
of Article 172 of our penal code are as follows:
1) that the offender committed any acts of
falsification, except those in par. 7, enumerated
in Article 171; 2) that the falsification was
committed in any private document; and 3) that
the falsification caused damage to a third party
or at least the falsification was committed with
intent to cause such damage. Under Article
171, paragraph 2, a person may commit
falsification of a private document by causing it
to appear in a document that a person or
persons participated in an act or proceeding,
when such person or persons did not in fact so
participate in the act or proceeding. On the
other hand, falsification under par. 3 of the
same article is perpetrated by a person or
persons who, participating in an act or
proceeding, made statements in that act or
proceeding and the offender, in making a
document, attributed to such person or persons
statements other than those in fact made by
such person or persons. And the crime defined
under paragraph 4 thereof is committed when
1) the offender makes in a document statements
in a narration of facts; 2) he has a legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts
narrated by him; 3) the facts narrated by the
offender are absolutely false; and 4) the
perversion of truth in the narration of facts was
made with the wrongful intent of injuring a
third person.
Applying the above-stated elements of the
crime to the case at bar, in order that
respondent Dr. Pascual, and the rest acting in
conspiracy with her, to have committed the
crime of falsification under par. 3 and 4 of
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, it is
essential that that there be prima facie evidence
to show that she had caused it to appear that
Larry gave his consent to be vasectomized or at
the very least, that the proposed medical
procedure was explained to Larry. But in the
assailed report, no such thing was done. Lest it
be forgotten, the reason for having Larry
psychiatrically evaluated was precisely to
ascertain whether or not he can validly consent
with impunity to the proposed vasectomy, and
not to obtain his consent to it or to oblige
respondent Dr. Pascual to explain to him what
the import of the medical procedure was.
Further, that Larrys consent to be vasectomized
was not obtained by the psychiatrist was of no
moment, because nowhere is it stated in said
report that such assent was obtained. At any
rate, petitioner Gloria Aguirre contradicts her
very own allegations when she persists in the
contention that Larry has the mental age of a
child; hence, he was legally incapable of
validly consenting to the procedure.
In the matter of the supposed incorrect
diagnosis of Lourdes Aguirre, with regard to
paragraph 2 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code, we quote with approval the succinct
statements of the Assistant City Prosecutor:
[T]he fact that Dra. Pascual cited finding,
which is not of her own personal knowledge in
her report does not mean that she committed
falsification in the process. Her sources may be
wrong and may affect the veracity of her report,
but for as long as she has not alleged therein
that she personally diagnosed Lourdes Aguirre,
which allegation would not then be true, she
cannot be charged of falsification. Therefore, it
goes without saying that if the author of the
report is not guilty, then with more reason the
other respondents are not liable.[54]
As to the charge of mutilation, Art. 262 of the
Revised Penal Code defines the crime as
Art. 262. Mutilation. The penalty of reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon any person who shall
intentionally mutilate another by depriving
him, either totally or partially, of some essential
organ for reproduction.
Any other intentional mutilation shall be
punished by prision mayor in its medium and
maximum periods.
A straightforward scrutiny of the above
provision shows that the elements[55] of
mutilation under the first paragraph of Art. 262
of the Revised Penal Code to be 1) that there be
a castration, that is, mutilation of organs
necessary for generation; and 2) that the
mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately,
that is, to deprive the offended party of some
essential organ for reproduction. According to
the public prosecutor, the facts alleged did not
amount to the crime of mutilation as defined
and penalized above, i.e., [t]he vasectomy
operation did not in any way deprived (sic)
Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still
very much part of his physical self. Petitioner
Gloria Aguirre, however, would want this
Court to make a ruling that bilateral vasectomy
constitutes the crime of mutilation.
This we cannot do, for such an interpretation
would be contrary to the intentions of the
framers of our penal code.
A fitting riposte to the issue at hand lies in
United States v. Esparcia,[56] in which this
Court had the occasion to shed light on the
implication of the term mutilation. Therein we
said that:
The sole point which it is desirable to discuss is
whether or not the crime committed is that
defined and penalized by article 414 of the
Penal Code. The English translation of this
article reads: "Any person who shall
intentionally castrate another shall suffer a
penalty ranging from reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua." The Spanish text, which
should govern, uses the word "castrare,"
inadequately translated into English as
"castrate." The word "capar," which is
synonymous of "castrar," is defined in the
Royal Academic Dictionary as the destruction
of the organs of generation or conception.
Clearly it is the intention of the law to punish
any person who shall intentionally deprived
another of any organ necessary for
reproduction. An applicable construction is that
of Viada in the following language:
"At the head of these crimes, according to their
order of gravity, is the mutilation known by the
name of 'castration' which consists of the
amputation of whatever organ is necessary for
generation. The law could not fail to punish
with the utmost severity such a crime, which,
although not destroying life, deprives a person
of the means to transmit it. But bear in mind
that according to this article in order for
'castration' to exist, it is indispensable that the
'castration' be made purposely. The law does
not look only to the result but also to the
intention of the act. Consequently, if by reason
of an injury or attack, a person is deprived of
the organs of generation, the act, although
voluntary, not being intentional to that end, it
would not come under the provisions of this
article, but under No. 2 of article 431." (Viada,
Codigo Penal, vol. 3, p. 70. See to same effect,
4 Groizard, Codigo Penal, p. 525.)
Thus, the question is, does vasectomy deprive a
man, totally or partially, of some essential
organ of reproduction? We answer in the
negative.
In the male sterilization procedure of
vasectomy, the tubular passage, called the vas
deferens, through which the sperm (cells) are
transported from the testicle to the urethra
where they combine with the seminal fluid to
form the ejaculant, is divided and the cut ends
merely tied.[57] That part, which is cut, that is,
the vas deferens, is merely a passageway that is
part of the duct system of the male reproductive
organs. The vas deferens is not an organ, i.e., a
highly organized unit of structure, having a
defined function in a multicellular organism
and consisting of a range of tissues.[58] Be that
as it may, even assuming arguendo that the
tubular passage can be considered an organ, the
cutting of the vas deferens does not divest or
deny a man of any essential organ of
reproduction for the simple reason that it does
not entail the taking away of a part or portion
of the male reproductive system. The cut ends,
after they have been tied, are then dropped
back into the incision.[59]
Though undeniably, vasectomy denies a man
his power of reproduction, such procedure does
not deprive him, either totally or partially, of
some essential organ for reproduction. Notably,
the ordinary usage of the term mutilation is the
deprivation of a limb or essential part (of the
body),[60] with the operative expression being
deprivation. In the same manner, the word
castration is defined as the removal of the
testies or ovaries.[61] Such being the case in
this present petition, the bilateral vasectomy
done on Larry could not have amounted to the
crime of mutilation as defined and punished
under Article 262, paragraph 1, of the Revised
Penal Code. And no criminal culpability could
be foisted on to respondent Dr. Agatep, the
urologist who performed the procedure, much
less the other respondents. Thus, we find
sufficient evidence to explain why the Assistant
City Prosecutor and the DOJ ruled the way they
did. Verily, We agree with the Court of Appeals
that the writ of certiorari is unavailing; hence,
should not be issued.
It is once more apropos to pointedly apply the
Courts general policy of non-interference in the
conduct of preliminary investigations. As it has
been oft said, the Supreme Court cannot order
the prosecution of a person against whom the
prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to
support at least a prima facie case.[62] The
courts try and absolve or convict the accused
but, as a rule, have no part in the initial
decision to prosecute him.[63] The possible
exception to this rule is where there is an
unmistakable showing of a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction that will justify judicial intrusion
into the precincts of the executive. But that is
not the case herein.
instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
The assailed 21 July 2005 Decision and 5
December 2005 Resolution, both of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88370 are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner
Gloria Aguirre.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 80399-404. November 13, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. PERMONETTE JOY FORTICH
and RUDY GAID, accused-appellants.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Accused-appellants Permonette Joy Fortich and
Rudy Gaid were each charged with two counts
of forcible abduction with rape,[1] one count of
robbery with frustrated homicide[2] and one
count of robbery.[3]
I. In Criminal Case No. 3809 - Forcible
Abduction with Rape
That on or about March 31, 1983 in the
evening, in the City of Cagayan de Oro,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with violence and intimidation, and with the
use of an unlicensed firearm, conspiring,
confederating together with one Rudy Gaid
alias Boy Gaid, who is presently at large, and
mutually helping one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
abduct the herein complainant, Marilou
Nobleza by then and there taking and carrying
her away with her sister, Maritess Nobleza, and
loading said complainant on board a stolen
pick-up, against her will and consent and with
lewd designs, and brought her from Alta Tierra,
Carmen Hill, this city, to Malasag, this city, and
while at Malasag, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge (by accused Permonette Joy
Fortich) of the herein complainant, against her
will and consent, to her great damage and
prejudice.
Contrary to Article 342 in relation to Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code.
II. In Criminal Case No. 3877 - Forcible
Abduction with Rape
That on or about March 31, 1983, in the
with violence and intimidation and with the use
of an unlicensed firearm, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping
one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously abduct the
complainant Maritess Nobleza, by then and
there taking and carrying her away with her
sister, Marilou Nobleza, and loading in a stolen
pick-up with her sister, against her will and
consent and and (sic) with lewd designs, and
brought her from Alta Tierra, Carmen Hill, this
City, to Malasag, this city, and while at
Malasag, this city (sic) did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means
of violence and intimidation have carnal
knowledge (by accused Permonette Joy
Fortich) of the complainant, against her will
and consent, to her great damage and prejudice.
III. In Criminal Case No. 3878 - Forcible
Abduction with Rape
That on or about March 31, 1983, in the
Honorable Court, the above-named (accused),
with violence and intimidation, and with the
use of an unlicensed firearm, and a motor
vehicle, conspiring, confederating together and
mutually helping one another did then and
abduct the complainant Maritess Nobleza, by
then and there taking and carrying her away
with her sister, Marilou Nobleza, and loading in
a stolen pick-up with her sister, against her will
and consent and with lewd designs, and
brought her from Alta Tierra, Carmen Hill, this
city, to Malasag, this city, and while at
Malasag, this city (sic), did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means
of violence and intimidation have carnal
knowledge (by accused Rudy Gaid alias Boy)
of the said complainant, against her will and
consent, to her great damage and prejudice.
IV. In Criminal Case No. 3896 - Forcible
Abduction with Rape
That on or about March 11, 1983 (sic), in the
with violence and intimidation and with the use
of an unlicensed firearm, and motor vehicle,
conspiring, confederating together and
mutually helping with (sic) one another, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously abduct the complainant Marilou
Nobleza, by then and there taking and carrying
her away with her sister, Maritess Nobleza, and
loading in a stolen pick-up with her sister,
against her will and consent and with lewd
designs, and brought her from Alta Tierra,
Carmen Hill, this city to Malasag, this city
(sic), and while at Malasag, this city, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
by means by violence and intimidation have
carnal knowledge (by accused Rudy Gaid alias
Boy) of the complainant, against her will and
consent, to her great damage and prejudice.
V. In Criminal Case No. 3977 - Robbery with
Frustrated Homicide
That on or about March 31, 1983, at Carmen
Hill, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, armed with firearms,
with violence and intimidation upon persons,
with intent of gain and against the will of the
owner thereof, conspiring, confederating
together with one Rudy Gaid alias Boy Gaid,
and mutually helping one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
rob and carry away a polo shirt, pants while
being worn by Luis S. Tumang and a cash
worth P160.00, a wrist watch (Elgin) worth
P500.00, valued all in all in the total amount of
P660.00, to the damage and prejudice of the
said owner in the aforesaid sum; that on the
occasion of the robbery and to enable them to
facilitate the taking and robbing (sic) the
offended party, and to carry out with ease the
commission of the offense, accused Permonette
Joy Fortich with intent to kill, did then and
attacked and mauled the said Luis S. Tumang,
struck and hit him with a firearm, thereby
inflicting the following injuries, to wit: fracture
depressed type left perietat (sic) bone;
contussion (sic) hematoma left temporal area;
abrasion behind left ear; multiple linear
abrasion both thigh and leg, which ordinarily
would cause the death of the said offended
party, thus performing all the acts of execution
which would produce the crime of Homicide,
as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of some cause
independent of his will, that is, by the timely
and able medical attendance rendered to the
offended party which prevented his death.
249 and Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
VI. In Criminal Case No. 4162 - Robbery
That on or about March 31, 1983, more or less
10:30 in the evening at Carmen Hill, Cagayan
de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
named accused, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping one another, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent of gain by means of
violence and intimidation on the person take,
steal and carry away polo shirt and pants while
being worn by one Rolly (I)mperio and a
wallect (sic) contained (sic) P85.00 in cash,
who was at the same time attacked and beaten
up by the said accused, inflicting upon him
physical injuries, to wit: Laceration of parietal
area, 2 cm. in length, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party.
Contrary to Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded
not guilty to all the charges.
On November 25, 1983, the six criminal cases,
upon agreement of the prosecution and the
defense, were consolidated and tried jointly.
The evidence for the prosecution elicited the
following facts:
On March 31, 1983, at about 8:00 oclock in the
evening, after attending mass at St. Augustine
Church, Cagayan de Oro City, sisters Marilou
and Maritess Nobleza, together with their
friends Rolly Imperio and Luis Tumang,
proceeded to Alta Tierra Hotel in Carmen Hill
using an Isuzu pick-up owned by the latters
mother. After a while the group decided to go
home. Suddenly, two men armed with
handguns who were later identified as
appellants emerged from the rear end of the
vehicle and fired a single shot which hit the left
side of the pick-up. They introduced
themselves as members of the New Peoples
Army (NPA) and ordered the sisters to get
inside the vehicle while Imperio and Tumang
were instructed to strip.
Gaid thumped Imperio on the head with a .38
caliber revolver causing him to fall down,
while Tumang was hit several times by Fortich
in various parts of the body and momentarily
lost consciousness. Tumang was divested of his
wallet containing one hundred sixty pesos
(P160.00) in cash, five U.S. dollars (P70.00),
six Saudi Arabian Riyals (P30.42), one 12K
gold wristwatch worth P500.00, pants valued at
P140.00, and shoes worth P125.00. All of these
items were not recovered.[4] Imperio, on the
other hand, was stripped of his pants valued at
P135.00, a wallet worth P45.00 containing
P85.00 in cash, a pair of shoes, and one t-shirt.
[5]
Appellants drove the pick-up, with Marilou and

Maritess at the back seat, towards Acua Beach
some ten kilometers away from the city, but
found it to be closed for the night. While
traversing the highway leading to Barangay
Puerto, appellants spotted a military checkpoint
along the highway, made a hasty U-turn, and
returned to the city. All the time, the sisters
were consistently threatened with summary
execution. Marilou pleaded for their freedom
and told them to just take the pick-up. The plea,
however, fell on deaf ears. Appellants detoured
and entered a dirt road leading to Malasag
where they parked the vehicle. At this juncture,
Gaid had transferred to the backseat with
Marilou while Maritess was made to sit up in
front with Fortich. Gaid poked his gun at the
right side of Marilous neck and ordered her to
remove her pants under pain of death. Aware
that she was biding her time, he himself
removed her pants with the gun still pointed at
her. She implored that she be spared but Gaid,
who was obviously much stronger, forced her
legs apart, positioned himself on top of her,
kissed and fondled her, and succeeded in
consummating his bestial act. Maritess, on the
other hand, was ravaged by Fortich. Appellants
switched victims twice before divesting them
of their watches, a handbag containing P15.00
in cash, a shirt, toilet tissue and toothbrush, and
the pick-ups stereo and tools. They then drove
down the highway and left the sisters at a
gasoline station some three kilometers from the
city. Unable to contact the police, the victims
proceeded to the Cagayan de Oro Medical
Center (CMC) and submitted themselves to
medical examination.
Meanwhile, soon after appellants left Carmen
Hill with the two sisters, Imperio and Tumang
ran to the City Hall and reported the robbery
incident. Acting on this report, the police
immediately scoured the city for the suspects
but this proved unavailing. The victims
proceeded to the Northern Mindanao Regional
Training Hospital in Cagayan de Oro City
where Imperios injury was examined and
treated.
Prosecution witness Jaime Rivera testified that
appellants went to his house at about 4:00
oclock in the morning of April 1, 1983,
bringing with them a revolver and a bag
containing a car stereo, watch and wallet. He
was apparently asked to sell the revolver for
not less than P300.00, with a promise that he
would receive a fifty percent commission. In
the course of selling the firearm, he was
apprehended by the police and detained at the
City Hall for six days.
Police investigator Eulalio Rafesora of the
Cagayan de Oro Integrated National Police
(INP) testified that upon Fortichs arrest, the
latter was apprised of his constitutional rights
which he, however, expressly waived.
Accordingly, on April 4, 1983, an interrogation
conducted by the police ensued and statements
elicited therein were reduced to writing and
sworn to before another prosecution witness,
Deputy City Clerk of Court Aurelio I. Zaldivar,
who also reminded him of his rights.
Dr. Socrates Sabanal of CMC declared that he
examined Marilou Nobleza and found her to be
suffering from the following injuries, viz.:
superficial abrasions (R) inner aspect, labia
minora, hematoma, antero-medial aspect P/3
(R) thigh. He stated that the abrasions on the
labia minora were caused by the forceful
penetration of a penis into the vagina. As
regards Maritess, Dr. Sabanal revealed the
extent of her injuries suffered as labial skin
discoloration, probably caused by a penis or a
finger.
CMC Medical Director Dr. Francisco L. Oh
testified that he treated Luis Tumang for the
following injuries, to wit: (1) fracture,
depressed type left parietal bone; (2) contusion
hematoma left temporal area; (3) abrasion
behind left ear; and (4) multiple linear
abrasions on both thighs and legs. A neuro-
surgeon of CMC, a certain Dr. Valmores,
advised Tumang to seek further treatment in
another hospital as the head injury could have
fatally affected the brain. Tumang was admitted
at the Medical City General Hospital in
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, from April 7 to
16, 1983, under the care of Dr. Bienvenido B.
Aldanese, incurring a total expense of
P22,603.85.
Contrary to the foregoing facts, the defense
relied on the uncorroborated testimonies of
appellants.
Appellant Fortich, a 20-year old driver residing
at Buenavista Village, Cagayan de Oro City,
recounted that at about 8:30 in the evening of
March 31, 1983, he left Barangay Gusa for the
city and there met Gaid with whom he has
applied for a driving job. He was invited to
dinner and a few drinks at Gaids house. After
sometime, they allegedly got drunk and hied
off to Carmen Hill to appreciate its cool and
breezy atmosphere. Thereafter, a pick-up
arrived from which a group of two men and
two women alighted. They then laid a mat on
the grass behind their vehicle. Appellants were
ten meters away from them when suddenly the
two men, piqued by their presence, furiously
rushed towards them. Fortich allegedly
defended himself by striking one of them with
a flashlight causing the latter to fall down.
To escape the wrath of the two men, appellants
drove the pick-up with the two sisters and
headed towards Acua beach which, however,
was closed for the night. Fortich alleged that
after conversing with the sisters for some time,
the latter alighted at Marcos Bridge while Gaid
drove him to his house in Patag.
Fortich denied, among other things, that he
sexually violated Marilou or that he even
possessed a firearm, as alleged by Tumang and
Imperio. As regards the affidavit taken during
the custodial investigation, he admitted that the
signature appearing therein was his but the
same was obtained through duress.
Appellant Gaid had a slightly different version
of what transpired on March 31, 1983. He
narrated that after consuming hard liquor, both
of them proceeded to Carmen Hill. Upon
reaching said place, they noticed a pick-up with
a male and female inside and another couple at
the open rear end of the vehicle. As the two
pairs were allegedly caressing and kissing, they
stood watching for almost thirty minutes. Later,
the couple inside emerged from the vehicle and
joined the other two at the back. All of them
were naked and engaged in sexual congress on
a mat lying on the grassy spot. The women,
later identified as sisters Marilou and Maritess,
noticed them and immediately grabbed their
clothing and scampered inside the pick-up,
while their male partners confronted the
appellants. A scuffle ensued. After throwing
several punches, Gaid darted towards the pick-
up and saw Fortich already seated on the
drivers seat with the sisters at the back seat.
Fortich drove towards Acua beach at Baloy.
During the trip, Gaid chatted with Maritess
who appeared to be an old acquaintance of his.
Apparently, it was Maritess who urged them to
proceed to Acua beach. The sisters even drank
bottles of beer and smoked three sticks of
marijuana.
It was past midnight when they reached Acua
beach and after having gone through a horrible
night, they decided to park the vehicle to rest.
Fortich fell asleep while Maritess vomitted.
When the latter felt better, Gaid drove the
sisters to somewhere in Licoan and Fortich, to
his house in Patag. While traversing the Patag-
Carmen road, he observed that a police vehicle
was following him. Alarmed, he hurriedly
accelerated his speed. When he passed a
military check-point, he was fired upon.
Fortunately, only the rear portion of the vehicle
was hit.
Gaid reached Kamarok, an interior barangay of
Opol, at about 2:00 oclock in the morning and
repaired to the house of his mother-in-law
Beatrice Rivera. He told his brother-in-law
Jaime Rivera, a witness for the prosecution, the
details of what allegedly transpired in the night.
Two days thereafter, he slipped back into the
city by passing through another town and
resumed driving his passenger jeep.
In its decision dated August 15, 1984,[6] the trial
court convicted appellants in the following
manner:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing
consideration, the court(:)
(1) FINDS, in CRIMINAL CASE NO. 3977
both accused PERMONETTE JOY FORTICH
and RUDY (Boy) GAID, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals, of the crime of
simple ROBBERY as defined and penalized
under Article 294, paragraph five (5) of the
Revised Penal Code, with the mitigating
circumstance of drunkenness, which is not
habitual and not offset by any aggravating
circumstance, and applying the
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW, hereby
imposes upon each of them the indeterminate
penalty of Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months
of PRISION CORRECCIONAL, as minimum,
to Six (6) Years, One (1) Month and Ten (10)
Days, of PRISION MAYOR, as maximum, and
to pay the costs; and to indemnify Luis S.
Tumang, the amounts of One Thousand
Twenty-Five (P1,025.42) Pesos and Forty-two
Centavos, for the cash and articles stolen; and
the total amount of Twenty Two Thousand Six
Hundred Three Pesos and 85/100 (P22,603.85)
for plane fare, hospitalization and medical
expenses; and the further sum of P5,000.00, for
moral damages. Accused shall be credited with
the period of their preventive imprisonment.
The home-made revolver .22 cal., (Exh. A) is
hereby forfeited in favor of the Government;
(2) FINDS, in CRIMINAL CASE NO. 4162,
both accused Permonette Joy Fortich and Rudy
(Boy) Gaid, guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as
principals of the crime of Simple ROBBERY,
as defined and penalized under Article 294,
paragraph five (5) of the Revised Penal Code,
with the sole mitigating circumstance of
drunkenness, which is not habitual, and not
offset by any aggravating circumstance, and
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
hereby imposes upon each of them the
indeterminate penalty of Four (4) Years and
Two (2) Months of PRISION
CORRECCIONAL, as minimum, to Six (6)
Years, One (1) Month and Ten (10) Days of
PRISION MAYOR, as maximum; and to pay
the costs; and to indemnify ROLLY IMPERIO
the amount of Two Hundred Sixty Five
(P265.00), value of the cash and articles stolen;
and Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) for moral
damages. Accused shall be credited with the
full period of their preventive imprisonment.
The .22 caliber homemade Revolver (Exh. A)
is hereby confiscated in favor of the
Government; likewise, the ammunitions, Exhs.
A-1 to A-8.
and RUDY (Boy) GAID guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of
FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE, with
the use of a deadly weapon as defined and
penalized in Article 342, in relation to Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, with the lone
mitigating circumstance of drunkenness, which
is not habitual and with no aggravating
circumstance to offset the same, hereby
imposes upon each of them the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA; and to indemnify
MARILOU NOBLEZA, the amount of Twenty
Four (P24,000) Thousand Pesos; and the costs.
The .22 cal. Revolver (Exh. A) is hereby
forfeited in favor of the Government. Accused
shall be credited with the period of their
preventive imprisonment. Likewise, the
ammunitions, Exhs. A-1 to A-8 are confiscated
in favor of the government.
(4) FINDS, in CRIMINAL CASE NOS. (sic)
3896, that the crime herein charged is already
included in the aforementioned Crim. Case No.
3809, hence the same is dismissed, with costs
de oficio.
AND RUDY (Boy) GAID guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of
FORCIBLE ABDUCTION, as defined and
penalized under Article 342 of the Revised
Penal Code, with the sole mitigating
circumstance of drunkenness, which is not
habitual, and with no aggravating circumstance
to offset the same, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby imposes
upon each of them the indeterminate penalty of
EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, of
PRISION MAYOR, as minimum, to TWELVE
(12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY OF
RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as maximum; and
to pay the costs; and to indemnify MARITESS
NOBLEZA the amount of TWELVE
THOUSAND (P12,000.00) Pesos. The
Revolver (Exh. A) is forfeited in favor of the
Government; likewise the ammunitions, Exhs.
A-1 to A-8.
that the crime charged herein is already
included in the aforementioned Criminal Case
No. 3877, hence the same is hereby
DISMISSED, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.[7]
From this judgment, appellants interposed the
instant appeal, raising the following assignment
of errors:
1. The trial court erred in admitting the
extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant
Permonette Joy Fortich despite the fact that it
was taken in violation of his constitutional right
to counsel.
2. The trial court erred in convicting herein
accused-appellants despite failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.[8]
We find no reversible error impelling a reversal
of the trial courts decision.
We cannot sustain the argument for the defense
that the extra-judicial confession of Fortich
obtained without the assistance of counsel is
inadmissible in evidence.
The doctrine that an uncounseled waiver of the
right to counsel is not to be given legal effect
was first pronounced on April 26, 1983, in
Morales v. Enrile[9] and reiterated in People v.
Galit[10] on March 20, 1985. While the Morales-
Galit doctrine eventually became part of
Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution, it
affords no relief to appellants, for the
requirements and restrictions outlined therein
have no retroactive effect and do not affect
waivers made prior to April 26, 1983.
In the instant case, the extra-judicial confession
and waiver were executed on April 4, 1983.
The trial court correctly admitted the same for
there was at that time no pronounced
guidelines requiring that the waiver of counsel
by accused can be properly made only with the
presence and assistance of counsel.[11] If indeed
Fortichs confession was extracted from him as
a result of coercion by policemen at the police
station, he could have informed Deputy Clerk
of Court Zaldivar and his counsel Atty. Leo
Roa of the maltreatment he suffered.
Thus, the Court has ruled that where one who
has made a confession fails to present any
evidence of compulsion or duress or violence
on his person for purposes of extracting a
confession; where he failed to complain to the
officers who administered the oaths, such as the
fiscal in this case; where he did not institute
any criminal or administrative action for
maltreatment against his alleged intimidators;
where he did not have himself examined by a
reputable physician to buttress his claim of
maltreatment; and where the assailed
confession is replete with details which could
not have been known to the police officers if
they had merely concocted the confession,
since the statements were inculpatory in
character, the extrajudicial confession may be
admitted, with the above circumstances being
considered as factors indicative of
voluntariness.[12] Accordingly, the extra-judicial
confession and waiver voluntarily and
intelligently made by Fortich are admissible in
evidence.
Appellants anchor their defense solely on the
denial of the charges imputed to them.
It is an established doctrine that the defense of
denial cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused.[13] The court is
convinced that Marilou did recognize the
physical features of her tormentors as she was
in a supine position when appellants
successively mounted her. The victims
recognition of appellant as her attacker cannot
be doubted for she had ample opportunity to
see the face of the man who ravaged her during
the carnal act.[14] She was as close to the
appellants as was physically possible, for a man
and a woman cannot be physically closer to
each other than during a sexual act.[15] Marilou
had ample opportunity to observe appellants
while she was being terrorized and,
subsequently raped. Thus, there is no reason to
doubt the veracity of her statement where she
declared that she recognized appellants as her
transgressors. Moreover, the latter failed to
show any reason why Marilou would impute
such a serious charge against them. Needless to
state, a straightforward, clear and positive
testimony, coupled with the absence of any
motive to fabricate or to falsely implicate the
accused, may be enough to convict the
appellant.[16]
Aside from being positively identified, the
different versions presented by appellants are
contrary to ordinary human experience.
The following declaration of the trial court that
the testimonies of appellants are incredulous is
well taken.
The claim of the accused that the departure
from Alta Tierra, on the pick-up to Acua beach
was the idea of Maritess Nobleza does not
inspire belief. Marilou testified that it was the
idea of one of the two accused. The sisters,
Marilou and Maritess, are single, presumably
virgins, and absent contrary proof, (the accused
having adduced none) are presumed to be
modest and chaste in keeping with traditional
Filipina disposition. The court cannot believe
that in a gunshot-filled atmosphere, almost
chameleon-like (-) the girls would transfer their
promiscuous desires (if ever they were) from
their erstwhile male companions (Tumang and
Imperio) in a brief encounter and stoically
abandon the two companions and in turn seek
pleasure somewhere with new partners who
had earlier allegedly come upon them in the act
of making love on a mat behind the pick-up.
The court cannot believe that Maritess and
Marilou - sisters as they are - would be so
promiscuous and profiligately (sic) libidinous
that they would make love with two male
companions, in the presence, and within sight
of each other.[17]
It should be noted that Maritess Nobleza, for
unknown reasons, did not testify for the
prosecution. Marilous assertion that her sister
was simultaneously violated, however, supports
a finding of appellants guilt. Time and again,
the Court has declared that in crimes of rape,
conviction or acquittal virtually depends
entirely on the credibility of the victims
testimony because of the fact that usually only
the participant can testify to its occurrence.[18]
The case at bar presents an unlikely situation
wherein two sisters were simultaneously
ravaged in the presence of, and in plain view,
of the other. Accordingly, the failure of one to
declare in court her ordeal may be adequately
proved by the other. In light of this factual
setting, there is, therefore, no doubt that
Maritess was likewise a victim of multiple
rapes.
As regards Criminal Cases No. 3977 and 4162
for robbery with frustrated homicide and
robbery, respectively, Article 293 of the
Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 293. Who are guilty of robbery. - Any
person who, with intent to gain, shall take any
personal property belonging to another, by
means of violence against or intimidation of
any person or using force upon anything shall
be guilty of robbery.
The trial court, however, erred in designating
the crime committed as robbery with frustrated
homicide. There is no such crime.[19] There
should have been two separate informations:
one for robbery and another for frustrated
homicide. Notwithstanding the erroneous
charge in the information, the Court finds no
reason to overturn the conviction of appellants
for the crime of simple robbery.
The asportation by appellants of the personal
properties was done by means of violence
against or intimidation upon the persons of
Imperio and Tumang. It appears further that
Imperio suffered cranial injury which allegedly
required three stitches to repair. Inasmuch as
the doctor who issued the medical certificate
did not testify thereon, said certificate is
hearsay evidence as to the nature of the injuries
inflicted and, therefore, inadmissible in
evidence. In People v. Pesena,[20] it was ruled
that when there is no evidence of actual
incapacity of the offended party for labor or of
the required medical attendance, it is only
slight physical injuries.
As regards the injuries suffered by Tumang, we
subscribe to the finding of the lower court that,
notwithstanding the non-presentation of Dr.
Aldanese of the Medical City General Hospital
at the trial, Tumangs credible testimony
bolstered by documentary evidence, such as
progress payments and professional fees for
neurological management and craniatomy
excision of depressed fracture, proved that the
latter suffered less serious physical injuries, as
defined in Article 265[21] of the Revised Penal
Code.
With respect to the charge of frustrated
homicide in Criminal Case No. 3977, the trial
court correctly observed that the element of
intent to kill was not present. It must be
stressed that while Fortich was armed with a
handgun, he never shot Tumang but merely hit
him on the head with it. In Mondragon v.
People,[22] it was held that the intent to kill being
an essential element of the offense of frustrated
or attempted homicide, said element must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence and
with the same degree of certainty as is required
of the other elements of the crime. The
inference of intent to kill should not be drawn
in the absence of circumstances sufficient to
prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt.
The physical injuries inflicted upon Imperio
and Tumang by reason of or on the occasion of
the robbery are penalized under Article 294,
paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons. - Penalties. - Any
person guilty of robbery with the use of
violence against or intimidation of any person
shall suffer.
xxxxxxxxx
5. The penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its
medium period in other cases.[23]
The trial court correctly disregarded the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime,
uninhabited place, and use of a motor vehicle.
The mitigating circumstance of intoxication,
however, was erroneously appreciated in favor
of both appellants.
Nocturnity is an aggravating circumstance
when it is deliberately sought to prevent the
accused from being recognized or to ensure his
unmolested escape.[24] There must be proof that
this was intentionally sought to insure the
commission of the crime and that appellants
took advantage thereof. In the instant case,
there is paucity of evidence that the peculiar
advantage of nighttime was purposely and
deliberately sought by the accused; the fact that
the offense was committed at night will not
suffice to sustain nocturnidad.[25]
Neither can the use of a motor vehicle be
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. In
the case at bar, the offenses of robbery and
forcible abduction with rape could have been
effected even without the aid of a motor
vehicle. In the case of People v. Mil,[26] it was
held that use of a motor vehicle is not
aggravating where it was not used to facilitate
the crime or that the crime could not have been
committed without it. In People v. Garcia,[27] the
use of motor vehicle was deemed
unaggravating if its use was merely incidental
and was not purposely sought to facilitate the
commission of the offense or to render the
escape of the offender easier and his
apprehension difficult.
As regards the aggravating circumstance of
uninhabited place, the records do not show that
appellants actually sought an isolated place to
better execute their purpose. The evidence
needed to support its application are
insufficient. Accordingly, this circumstance
should not be considered against appellants.
The lower court, however, erred in appreciating
intoxication as a generic mitigating
circumstance. Under the Revised Penal Code,
intoxication is mitigating when it is not
habitual or delinquent, that is, not subsequent
to the plan to commit the crime. In People v.
Apduhan, Jr.,[28] it was held that to be
mitigating, the accuseds state of intoxication
must be proved. Once intoxication is
established by satisfactory evidence, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, it is presumed
to be non-habitual or unintentional. In the case
at bar, appellants merely alleged that when the
offenses were committed, they were already
drunk. This self-serving statement stands
uncorroborated. Obviously, it is devoid of any
probative value.[29]
The trial court found ample evidence to support
a finding of conspiracy. Conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it.[30] Direct proof
is not essential to show conspiracy as its
existence could be inferred from the conduct of
the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime, showing that the
accused had acted in unison with each other,
evincing a common purpose or design.[31] It is
not necessary to show that two or more persons
met together and entered into an explicit
agreement setting out the details of an unlawful
scheme or the details by which an illegal
objective is to be carried out.[32] Conviction is
proper upon evidence showing that appellants
acted in concert, each of them doing his part in
the commission of the offense. In People v.
Gundran,[33] it was held that in such a case, the
act of one becomes the act of all and each of
the accused will thereby be deemed equally
guilty of the crime committed.
In the case at bar, the evidence revealed that
appellants arrived together at Carmen Hill and,
at gunpoint, forcibly took Imperio and
Tumangs personal belongings and fled with the
sisters on board the stolen pick-up. After
fleeing, appellants successively abused Marilou
and Maritess inside the vehicle. These acts
manifestly disclose their joint purpose and
design, concerted action and community of
interest.[34]
The Court is, therefore, convinced that
appellants criminal culpability of every charge
was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
In the case of People v. Julian,[35] however, it
was ruled that when the first act of rape was
committed by appellant, the complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape was then
consummated. Any subsequent acts of
intercourse would be only separate acts of rape
and can no longer be considered separate
complex crimes of forcible abduction with
rape. Accordingly, a modification of trial courts
decision is in order.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court
dated August 15, 1984 is hereby MODIFIED
as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 3809: Forcible Abduction
with Rape
Appellants Permonette Joy Fortich and Rudy
Gaid are hereby convicted of the crime of
forcible abduction with rape and, likewise, of
three counts of rape as defined and penalized in
Article 342, in relation to Article 335, of the
Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, appellants
shall each suffer four terms of reclusion
perpetua. In line with recent jurisprudence,[36]
appellants are further ordered to indemnify
Marilou Nobleza in the amount of P200,000.00
each as moral damages.
In Criminal Case No. 3877: Forcible Abduction
with Rape
forcible abduction with rape and, likewise, of
three counts of rape as defined and penalized in
Article 342, in relation to Article 335, of the
Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, appellants
shall each suffer four terms of reclusion
perpetua. In line with recent jurisprudence,
appellants are further ordered to indemnify
Maritess Nobleza in the amount of P200,000.00
each as moral damages.
In Criminal Cases No. 3977 and 4162: Robbery
simple robbery as defined and penalized under
Article 294, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal
Code. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, appellants shall each suffer twice the
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6)
years, one (1) month and ten (10) days, of
prision mayor and shall solidarily indemnify
Luis S. Tumang in the amount of (1) P1,025.42
for the cash and articles stolen; (2) the
aggregate amount of P22,603.85 for the plane
fare and medical expenses; (3) and the further
sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages.
Appellants shall likewise pay Rolly Imperio the
amount of P265.00 for the cash and articles
stolen and P10,000.00 as moral damages.
The .22 caliber revolver and ammunitions are
FORFEITED in favor of the Government.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
ANTI HAZING
LAW
REPUBLIC ACT No. 8049
AN ACT REGULATING HAZING AND
OTHER FORMS OF INITIATION RITES
IN FRATERNITIES, SORORITIES, AND
OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES THEREFOR
Section 1. Hazing, as used in this Act, is an
initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for
admission into membership in a fraternity,
sorority or organization by placing the recruit,
neophyte or applicant in some embarrassing or
humiliating situations such as forcing him to do
menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or
activities or otherwise subjecting him to
physical or psychological suffering or injury.
The term "organization" shall include any club
or the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
Philippine National Police, Philippine Military
Academy, or officer and cadet corp of the
Citizen's Military Training and Citizen's Army
Training. The physical, mental and
psychological testing and training procedure
and practices to determine and enhance the
physical, mental and psychological fitness of
prospective regular members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police as approved ny the Secretary of
National Defense and the National Police
Commission duly recommended by the Chief
of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Director General of the Philippine National
Police shall not be considered as hazing for the
purposes of this Act.
Section 2. No hazing or initiation rites in any
form or manner by a fraternity, sorority or
organization shall be allowed without prior
written notice to the school authorities or head
of organization seven (7) days before the
conduct of such initiation. The written notice
shall indicate the period of the initiation
activities which shall not exceed three (3) days,
shall include the names of those to be subjected
to such activities, and shall further contain an
undertaking that no physical violence be
employed by anybody during such initiation
rites.
Section 3. The head of the school or
organization or their representatives must
assign at least two (2) representatives of the
school or organization, as the case may be, to
be present during the initiation. It is the duty of
such representative to see to it that no physical
harm of any kind shall be inflicted upon a
recruit, neophyte or applicant.
Section 4. If the person subjected to hazing or
other forms of initiation rites suffers any
physical injury or dies as a result thereof, the
officers and members of the fraternity, sorority
or organization who actually participated in the
infliction of physical harm shall be liable as
principals. The person or persons who
participated in the hazing shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua (life
imprisonment) if death, rape, sodomy or
mutilation results there from.
2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period (17 years, 4 months and 1
day to 20 years) if in consequence of the
hazing the victim shall become insane,
imbecile, impotent or blind.
medium period (14 years, 8 months and one
day to 17 years and 4 months) if in
consequence of the hazing the victim shall
have lost the use of speech or the power to
hear or to smell, or shall have lost an eye, a
hand, a foot, an arm or a leg or shall have
lost the use of any such member shall have
become incapacitated for the activity or
work in which he was habitually engaged.
minimum period (12 years and one day to
14 years and 8 months) if in consequence of
the hazing the victim shall become
deformed or shall have lost any other part of
his body, or shall have lost the use thereof,
or shall have been ill or incapacitated for
the performance on the activity or work in
which he was habitually engaged for a
period of more than ninety (90) days.
5. The penalty of prison mayor in its
maximum period (10 years and one day to
12 years) if in consequence of the hazing
the victim shall have been ill or
incapacitated for the performance on the
activity or work in which he was habitually
engaged for a period of more than thirty
(30) days.
medium period (8 years and one day to 10
years) if in consequence of the hazing the
victim shall have been ill or incapacitated
for the performance on the activity or work
in which he was habitually engaged for a
period of ten (10) days or more, or that the
injury sustained shall require medical
assistance for the same period.
minimum period (6 years and one day to 8
years) if in consequence of the hazing the
victim shall have been ill or incapacitated
for the performance on the activity or work
in which he was habitually engaged from
one (1) to nine (9) days, or that the injury
sustained shall require medical assistance
for the same period.
8. The penalty of prison correccional in its
maximum period (4 years, 2 months and
one day to 6 years) if in consequence of the
hazing the victim sustained physical injuries
which do not prevent him from engaging in
his habitual activity or work nor require
medical attendance.
The responsible officials of the school or of the
police, military or citizen's army training
organization, may impose the appropriate
administrative sanctions on the person or the
persons charged under this provision even
before their conviction. The maximum penalty
herein provided shall be imposed in any of the
following instances:
(a) when the recruitment is accompanied by
force, violence, threat, intimidation or
deceit on the person of the recruit who
refuses to join;
(b) when the recruit, neophyte or applicant
initially consents to join but upon learning
that hazing will be committed on his person,
is prevented from quitting;
(c) when the recruit, neophyte or applicant
having undergone hazing is prevented from
reporting the unlawful act to his parents or
guardians, to the proper school authorities,
or to the police authorities, through force,
violence, threat or intimidation;
(d) when the hazing is committed outside of
the school or institution; or
(e) when the victim is below twelve (12)
years of age at the time of the hazing.
The owner of the place where hazing is
conducted shall be liable as an accomplice,
when he has actual knowledge of the hazing
conducted therein but failed to take any action
to prevent the same from occurring. If the
hazing is held in the home of one of the officers
or members of the fraternity, group, or
organization, the parents shall be held liable as
principals when they have actual knowledge of
the hazing conducted therein but failed to take
any action to prevent the same from occurring.
The school authorities including faculty
members who consent to the hazing or who
have actual knowledge thereof, but failed to
take any action to prevent the same from
occurring shall be punished as accomplices for
the acts of hazing committed by the
perpetrators.
The officers, former officers, or alumni of the
organization, group, fraternity or sorority who
actually planned the hazing although not
present when the acts constituting the hazing
were committed shall be liable as principals. A
fraternity or sorority's adviser who is present
when the acts constituting the hazing were
committed and failed to take action to prevent
the same from occurring shall be liable as
principal.
The presence of any person during the hazing is
prima facie evidence of participation therein as
principal unless he prevented the commission
of the acts punishable herein.
Any person charged under this provision shall
not be entitled to the mitigating circumstance
that there was no intention to commit so grave
a wrong.
This section shall apply to the president,
manager, director or other responsible officer
of a corporation engaged in hazing as a
requirement for employment in the manner
provided herein.
Section 5. If any provision or part of this Act is
declared invalid or unconstitutional, the other
parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid
and effective.
Section 6. All laws, orders, rules or regulations
which are inconsistent with or contrary to the
provisions of this Act are hereby amended or
repealed accordingly.
Section 7. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15)
calendar days after its publication in at least
two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation.
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
ARTEMIO G.R. No.
VILLAREAL, 151258
Petitioner, G.R. No.
154954
- versus -
G.R. No.
PEOPLE OF THE
155101
PHILIPPINES,
G.R. Nos.
Respondent.
178057 &
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 178080
-----------x
Present:
PEOPLE OF THE
CARPIO, J.,
PHILIPPINES,
Chairperson,
Petitioner,
BRION,
- versus -
PEREZ,
THE HONORABLE
SERENO, and
COURT OF
APPEALS, REYES, JJ.
ANTONIO Promulgated:
MARIANO
February 1, 2012
ALMEDA,
DALMACIO LIM,
JR., JUNEL
ANTHONY AMA,
ERNESTO JOSE
MONTECILLO,
VINCENT
TECSON,
ANTONIO
GENERAL,
SANTIAGO
RANADA III,
NELSON
VICTORINO,
JAIME MARIA
FLORES II,
ZOSIMO
MENDOZA,
MICHAEL
MUSNGI,
VICENTE
VERDADERO,
ETIENNE
GUERRERO, JUDE
FERNANDEZ,
AMANTE
PURISIMA II,
EULOGIO
SABBAN,
PERCIVAL
BRIGOLA, PAUL
ANGELO SANTOS,
JONAS KARL B.
PEREZ, RENATO
BANTUG, JR.,
ADEL ABAS,
JOSEPH LLEDO,
and RONAN DE
GUZMAN,
Respondents.
x--------------
-----------x
FIDELITO DIZON,
Petitioner,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
x--------------
-----------x
GERARDA H.
VILLA,
Petitioner,
- versus -
MANUEL
LORENZO
ESCALONA II,
MARCUS JOEL
CAPELLAN
RAMOS,
CRISANTO CRUZ
SARUCA, JR., and
ANSELMO
ADRIANO,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------
------------------x
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
The public outrage over the death of Leonardo
Lenny Villa the victim in this case on 10
February 1991 led to a very strong clamor to
put an end to hazing.[1] Due in large part to the
brave efforts of his mother, petitioner Gerarda
Villa, groups were organized, condemning his
senseless and tragic death. This widespread
condemnation prompted Congress to enact a
special law, which became effective in 1995,
that would criminalize hazing.[2] The intent of
the law was to discourage members from
making hazing a requirement for joining their
sorority, fraternity, organization, or association.
[3] Moreover, the law was meant to counteract
the exculpatory implications of consent and
initial innocent act in the conduct of initiation
rites by making the mere act of hazing
punishable or mala prohibita.[4]
Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not

discourage hazing activities in the country.[5]
Within a year of his death, six more cases of
hazing-related deaths emerged those of
Frederick Cahiyang of the University of
Visayas in Cebu; Raul Camaligan of San Beda
College; Felipe Narne of Pamantasan ng
Araullo in Cabanatuan City; Dennis Cenedoza
of the Cavite Naval Training Center; Joselito
Mangga of the Philippine Merchant Marine
Institute; and Joselito Hernandez of the
University of the Philippines in Baguio City.[6]
Although courts must not remain indifferent to

public sentiments, in this case the general
condemnation of a hazing-related death, they
are still bound to observe a fundamental
principle in our criminal justice system [N]o
act constitutes a crime unless it is made so by
law.[7] Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege.
Even if an act is viewed by a large section of
the populace as immoral or injurious, it cannot
be considered a crime, absent any law
prohibiting its commission. As interpreters of
the law, judges are called upon to set aside
emotion, to resist being swayed by strong
public sentiments, and to rule strictly based on
the elements of the offense and the facts
allowed in evidence.
Before the Court are the consolidated cases

docketed as G.R. No. 151258 (Villareal v.
People), G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of
Appeals), G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People),
and G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v.
Escalona).
FACTS
The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court

of Appeals (CA)[8] and the trial court,[9] are as
follows:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students

of the Ateneo de Manila University School of
Law signified their intention to join the Aquila
Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They
were Caesar Bogs Asuncion, Samuel Sam
Belleza, Bienvenido Bien Marquez III, Roberto
Francis Bert Navera, Geronimo Randy Recinto,
Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo Lenny Villa
(neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes
were met by some members of the Aquila
Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo
Law School. They all proceeded to Rufos
Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they
went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an
Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to
expect during the initiation rites. The latter
were informed that there would be physical
beatings, and that they could quit at any time.
Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for
three days. After their briefing, they were
brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan
City for the commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they

had already received threats and insults from
the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted
from the van and walked towards the pelota
court of the Almeda compound, some of the
Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The
neophytes were then subjected to traditional
forms of Aquilan initiation rites. These rites
included the Indian Run, which required the
neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows
of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the
neophytes; the Bicol Express, which obliged
the neophytes to sit on the floor with their
backs against the wall and their legs
outstretched while the Aquilans walked,
jumped, or ran over their legs; the Rounds, in
which the neophytes were held at the back of
their pants by the auxiliaries (the Aquilans
charged with the duty of lending assistance to
neophytes during initiation rites), while the
latter were being hit with fist blows on their
arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two
Aquilans; and the Auxies Privilege Round, in
which the auxiliaries were given the
opportunity to inflict physical pain on the
neophytes. During this time, the neophytes
were also indoctrinated with the fraternity
principles. They survived their first day of
initiation.
On the morning of their second day 9 February

1991 the neophytes were made to present
comic plays and to play rough basketball. They
were also required to memorize and recite the
Aquila Fraternitys principles. Whenever they
would give a wrong answer, they would be hit
on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the
Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and
proceeded to torment them physically and
psychologically. The neophytes were subjected
to the same manner of hazing that they endured
on the first day of initiation. After a few hours,
the initiation for the day officially ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni

fraternity members[10] Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that
the rites be reopened. The head of initiation
rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially
refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and
Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation
rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon
and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to
paddling and to additional rounds of physical
pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one
of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to
the ground. The neophytes heard him
complaining of intense pain and difficulty in
breathing. After their last session of physical
beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had
to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport.
Again, the initiation for the day was officially
ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner.
They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were

suddenly roused by Lennys shivering and
incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and
Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they
thought he was just overacting. When they
realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling
cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him.
They removed his clothes and helped him
through a sleeping bag to keep him warm.
When his condition worsened, the Aquilans
rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was

filed against the following 35 Aquilans:
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)

1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda
(Almeda)
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
16. Antonio General (General)
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo
(Montecillo)
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
25. Adel Abas (Abas)
26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)
In Criminal Case No. C-38340
1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
5. Reynaldo Concepcion
(Concepcion)
6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in
Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly
tried.[11] On the other hand, the trial against
the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case
No. C-38340 was held in abeyance due to
certain matters that had to be resolved first.[12]
On 8 November 1993, the trial court

rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-
38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
[13] A few weeks after the trial court rendered
its judgment, or on 29 November 1993,
Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the
remaining nine accused commenced anew.[14]
On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No.

15520)[15] set aside the finding of conspiracy
by the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-
38340(91) and modified the criminal liability
of each of the accused according to individual
participation. Accused De Leon had by then
passed away, so the following Decision applied
only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
1. Nineteen of the accused-
appellants Victorino, Sabban, Lledo,
Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De Guzman,
Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo,
Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima,
Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino
et al.) were acquitted, as their individual
guilt was not established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants
Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama,
Antonio Mariano Almeda, and Renato
Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) were found
guilty of the crime of slight physical
injuries and sentenced to 20 days of
arresto menor. They were also ordered to
jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum
of ₱30,000 as indemnity.
3. Two of the accused-appellants

Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal
were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of homicide under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
Having found no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, the CA
sentenced them to an indeterminate
sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to
17 years of reclusion temporal. They
were also ordered to indemnify, jointly
and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in
the sum of ₱50,000 and to pay the
additional amount of ₱1,000,000 by way
of moral damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal

Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against
accused Concepcion on the ground of violation
of his right to speedy trial.[16] Meanwhile, on
different dates between the years 2003 and
2005, the trial court denied the respective
Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.[17] On 25
October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos.
89060 & 90153[18] reversed the trial courts
Orders and dismissed the criminal case against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the
basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.
[19]
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five

(5) consolidated Petitions were individually
brought before this Court.
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
The instant case refers to accused Villareals

Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45. The Petition raises two reversible errors
allegedly committed by the CA in its Decision
dated 10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520
first, denial of due process; and, second,
conviction absent proof beyond reasonable
doubt.[20]
While the Petition was pending before this
Court, counsel for petitioner Villareal filed a
Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011.
According to the Notice, petitioner Villareal
died on 13 March 2011. Counsel thus asserts
that the subject matter of the Petition
previously filed by petitioner does not survive
the death of the accused.
G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People
Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for

Review on Certiorari, questioning the CAs
Decision dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution
dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520.
[21] Petitioner sets forth two main issues first,
that he was denied due process when the CA
sustained the trial courts forfeiture of his right
to present evidence; and, second, that he was
deprived of due process when the CA did not
apply to him the same ratio decidendi that
served as basis of acquittal of the other
accused.[22]
As regards the first issue, the trial court made a

ruling, which forfeited Dizons right to present
evidence during trial. The trial court expected
Dizon to present evidence on an earlier date
since a co-accused, Antonio General, no longer
presented separate evidence during trial.
According to Dizon, his right should not have
been considered as waived because he was
justified in asking for a postponement. He
argues that he did not ask for a resetting of any
of the hearing dates and in fact insisted that he
was ready to present
evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule,
and not on an earlier hearing date.
Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends

that he should have likewise been acquitted,
like the other accused, since his acts were also
part of the traditional initiation rites and were
not tainted by evil motives.[23] He claims that
the additional paddling session was part of the
official activity of the fraternity. He also points
out that one of the neophytes admitted that the
chairperson of the initiation rites decided that
[Lenny] was fit enough to undergo the
initiation so Mr. Villareal proceeded to do the
paddling.[24] Further, petitioner echoes the
argument of the Solicitor General that the
individual blows inflicted by Dizon and
Villareal could not have resulted in Lennys
death.[25] The Solicitor General purportedly
averred that, on the contrary, Dr. Arizala
testified that the injuries suffered by Lenny
could not be considered fatal if taken
individually, but if taken collectively, the result
is the violent death of the victim.[26]
Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA

that he was motivated by ill will. He claims that
Lennys father could not have stolen the parking
space of Dizons father, since the latter did not
have a car, and their fathers did not work in the
same place or office. Revenge for the loss of
the parking space was the alleged ill motive of
Dizon. According to petitioner, his utterances
regarding a stolen parking space were only part
of the psychological initiation. He then cites the
testimony of Lennys co-neophyte witness
Marquez who admitted knowing it was not true
and that he was just making it up.[27]
Further, petitioner argues that his alleged

motivation of ill will was negated by his show
of concern for Villa after the initiation rites.
Dizon alludes to the testimony of one of the
neophytes, who mentioned that the former had
kicked the leg of the neophyte and told him to
switch places with Lenny to prevent the latters
chills. When the chills did not stop, Dizon,
together with Victorino, helped Lenny through
a sleeping bag and made him sit on a chair.
According to petitioner, his alleged ill
motivation is contradicted by his manifestation
of compassion and concern for the victims
well-being.
G.R. No. 154954 People v. Court of Appeals
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65

seeks the reversal of the CAs Decision dated 10
January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August
2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520, insofar as it
acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.) and convicted 4
(Tecson et al.) of the accused Aquilans of the
lesser crime of slight physical injuries.[28]
According to the Solicitor General, the CA
erred in holding that there could have been no
conspiracy to commit hazing, as hazing or
fraternity initiation had not yet been
criminalized at the time Lenny died.
In the alternative, petitioner claims that the

ruling of the trial court should have been
upheld, inasmuch as it found that there was
conspiracy to inflict physical injuries on Lenny.
Since the injuries led to the victims death,
petitioner posits that the accused Aquilans are
criminally liable for the resulting crime of
homicide, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised
Penal Code.[29] The said article provides:
Criminal liability shall be incurred [b]y any
person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.
Petitioner also argues that the rule on double

jeopardy is inapplicable. According to the
Solicitor General, the CA acted with grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, in setting aside the trial
courts finding of conspiracy and in ruling that
the criminal liability of
all the accused must be based on their
individual participation in the commission of
the crime.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 Villa v.
Escalona
Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for

Review on Certiorari, praying for the reversal
of the CAs Decision dated 25 October 2006
and Resolution dated 17 May 2007 in CA-G.R.
S.P. Nos. 89060 and 90153.[30] The Petition
involves the dismissal of the criminal charge
filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano.
Due to several pending incidents, the trial court

ordered a separate trial for accused Escalona,
Saruca, Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion,
De Vera, S. Fernandez, and Cabangon
(Criminal Case No. C-38340) to commence
after proceedings against the 26 other accused
in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) shall have
terminated. On 8 November 1993, the trial
court found the 26 accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. As a result, the proceedings
in Criminal Case No. C-38340 involving the
nine other co-accused recommenced on 29
November 1993. For various reasons, the initial
trial of the case did not commence until 28
March 2005, or almost 12 years after the
arraignment of the nine accused.
Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal of the

criminal case involving 4 of the 9 accused,
namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
She argues that the accused failed to assert their
right to speedy trial within a reasonable period
of time. She also points out that the prosecution
cannot be faulted for the delay, as the original
records and the required evidence were not at
its disposal, but were still in the appellate court.
We resolve herein the various issues that we

group into five.
ISSUES
1. Whether the forfeiture of petitioner

Dizons right to present evidence constitutes
denial of due process;
2. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for
violation of the right of the accused to speedy
trial;

discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of
conspiracy by the trial court and adjudicated
the liability of each accused according to
individual participation;
4. Whether accused Dizon is guilty of

homicide; and
discretion when it pronounced Tecson, Ama,
Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight
physical injuries.
DISCUSSION
Resolution on Preliminary Matters
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while

the Petition was pending resolution, this Court
took note of counsel for petitioners Notice of
Death of Party.
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal

Code, criminal liability for personal penalties is
totally extinguished by the death of the convict.
In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary
penalties is extinguished if the offender dies
prior to final judgment. The term personal
penalties refers to the service of personal or
imprisonment penalties,[31] while the term
pecuniary penalties (las pecuniarias) refers to
fines and costs,[32] including civil liability
predicated on the criminal offense complained
of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto).[33] However,
civil liability based on a source of obligation
other than the delict survives the death of the
accused and is recoverable through a separate
civil action.[34]
Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner

Villareal extinguished his criminal liability for
both personal and pecuniary penalties,
including his civil liability directly arising from
the delict complained of. Consequently, his
Petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal
case against him deemed closed and
terminated.
G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)
In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court

set the dates for the reception of evidence for
accused-petitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and
22nd of September; and the 5th and 12 of

October 1993.[35] The Order likewise stated
that it will not entertain any postponement and
that all the accused who have not yet presented
their respective evidence should be ready at all
times down the line, with their evidence on all
said dates. Failure on their part to present
evidence when required shall therefore be
construed as waiver to present evidence.[36]
However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for

another accused manifested in open court that
his client Antonio General would no longer
present separate evidence. Instead, the counsel
would adopt the testimonial evidence of the
other accused who had already testified.[37]
Because of this development and pursuant to
the trial courts Order that the parties should be
ready at all times down the line, the trial court
expected Dizon to present evidence on the next
trial date 25 August 1993 instead of his
originally assigned dates. The original dates
were supposed to start two weeks later, or on 8
September 1993.[38] Counsel for accused
Dizon was not able to present evidence on the
accelerated date. To address the situation,
counsel filed a Constancia on 25 August 1993,
alleging that he had to appear in a previously
scheduled case, and that he would be ready to
present evidence on the dates originally
assigned to his clients.[39] The trial court
denied the Manifestation on the same date and
treated the Constancia as a motion for
postponement, in violation of the three-day-
notice rule under the Rules of Court.[40]
Consequently, the trial court ruled that the
failure of Dizon to present evidence amounted
to a waiver of that right.[41]
Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he

was deprived of due process of law when the
trial court forfeited his right to present
evidence. According to him, the postponement
of the 25 August 1993 hearing should have
been considered justified, since his original
pre-assigned trial dates were not supposed to
start until 8 September 1993, when he was
scheduled to present evidence. He posits that he
was ready to present evidence on the dates
assigned to him. He also points out that he did
not ask for a resetting of any of the said hearing
dates; that he in fact insisted on being allowed
to present evidence on the dates fixed by the
trial court. Thus, he contends that the trial court
erred in accelerating the schedule of
presentation of evidence, thereby invalidating
the finding of his guilt.
The right of the accused to present evidence is

guaranteed by no less than the Constitution
itself.[42] Article III, Section 14(2) thereof,
provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel This constitutional right
includes the right to present evidence in ones
defense,[43] as well as the right to be present
and defend oneself in person at every stage of
the proceedings.[44]
In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,[45] the

Sandiganbayan set the hearing of the defenses
presentation of evidence for 21, 22 and 23 June
1995. The 21 June 1995 hearing was cancelled
due to lack of quorum in the regular
membership of the Sandiganbayans Second
Division and upon the agreement of the parties.
The hearing was reset for the next day, 22 June
1995, but Crisostomo and his counsel failed to
attend. The Sandiganbayan, on the very same
day, issued an Order directing the issuance of a
warrant for the arrest of Crisostomo and the
confiscation of his surety bond. The Order
further declared that he had waived his right to
present evidence because of his nonappearance
at yesterdays and todays scheduled hearings. In
ruling against the Order, we held thus:
Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c),

Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, Crisostomos
non-appearance during the 22 June 1995
trial was merely a waiver of his right to be
present for trial on such date only and not
for the succeeding trial dates
xxxxxxxxx
Moreover, Crisostomos absence on the 22 June
1995 hearing should not have been deemed as
a waiver of his right to present evidence.
While constitutional rights may be waived,
such waiver must be clear and must be
coupled with an actual intention to
relinquish the right. Crisostomo did not
voluntarily waive in person or even through his
counsel the right to present evidence. The
Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver due to the
agreement of the prosecution, Calingayan, and
Calingayan's counsel.
In criminal cases where the imposable penalty
may be death, as in the present case, the court
is called upon to see to it that the accused is
personally made aware of the consequences
of a waiver of the right to present evidence.
In fact, it is not enough that the accused is
simply warned of the consequences of
another failure to attend the succeeding
hearings. The court must first explain to the
accused personally in clear terms the exact
nature and consequences of a waiver.
Crisostomo was not even forewarned. The
Sandiganbayan simply went ahead to deprive
Crisostomo of his right to present evidence
without even allowing Crisostomo to explain
his absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing.
Clearly, the waiver of the right to present
evidence in a criminal case involving a grave
penalty is not assumed and taken lightly. The
presence of the accused and his counsel is
indispensable so that the court could personally
conduct a searching inquiry into the waiver x x
x.[46] (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court should not have deemed the
failure of petitioner to present evidence on 25
August 1993 as a waiver of his right to present
evidence. On the contrary, it should have
considered the excuse of counsel justified,
especially since counsel for another accused
General had made a last-minute adoption of
testimonial evidence that freed up the
succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon was not
scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At
any rate, the trial court pre-assigned five
hearing dates for the reception of evidence. If it
really wanted to impose its Order strictly, the
most it could have done was to forfeit one out
of the five days set for Dizons testimonial
evidence. Stripping the accused of all his pre-
assigned trial dates constitutes a patent denial
of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due
process.
Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident

guilty plea, an invalid waiver of the right to
present evidence and be heard does not per se
work to vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal
case or to enforce an automatic remand of the
case to the trial court.[47] In People v. Bodoso,
we ruled that where facts have adequately been
represented in a criminal case, and no
procedural unfairness or irregularity has
prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense
as a result of the invalid waiver, the rule is that
a guilty verdict may nevertheless be upheld if
the judgment is supported beyond reasonable
doubt by the evidence on record.[48]
We do not see any material inadequacy in the

relevant facts on record to resolve the case at
bar. Neither can we see any procedural
unfairness or irregularity that would
substantially prejudice either the prosecution or
the defense as a result of the invalid waiver. In
fact, the arguments set forth by accused Dizon
in his Petition corroborate the material facts
relevant to decide the matter. Instead, what he
is really contesting in his Petition is the
application of the law to the facts by the trial
court and the CA. Petitioner Dizon admits
direct participation in the hazing of Lenny Villa
by alleging in his Petition that all actions of the
petitioner were part of the traditional rites, and
that the alleged extension of the initiation rites
was not outside the official activity of the
fraternity.[49] He even argues that Dizon did
not request for the extension and he
participated only after the activity was
sanctioned.[50]
For one reason or another, the case has been

passed or turned over from one judge or justice
to another at the trial court, at the CA, and even
at the Supreme Court. Remanding the case for
the reception of the evidence of petitioner
Dizon would only inflict further injustice on
the parties. This case has been going on for
almost two decades. Its resolution is long
overdue. Since the key facts necessary to
decide the case have already been determined,
we shall proceed to decide it.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v.

Escalona)
Petitioner Villa argues that the case against

Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano should
not have been dismissed, since they failed to
assert their right to speedy trial within a
reasonable period of time. She points out that
the accused failed to raise a protest during the
dormancy of the criminal case against them,
and that they asserted their right only after the
trial court had dismissed the case against their
co-accused Concepcion. Petitioner also
emphasizes that the trial court denied the
respective Motions to Dismiss filed by Saruca,
Escalona, Ramos, and Adriano, because it
found that the prosecution could not be faulted
for the delay in the movement of this case
when the original records and the evidence it
may require were not at its disposal as these
were in the Court of Appeals.[51]
The right of the accused to a speedy trial has
been enshrined in Sections 14(2) and 16,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.[52] This
right requires that there be a trial free from
vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays.[53]
The right is deemed violated when the
proceeding is attended with unjustified
postponements of trial, or when a long period
of time is allowed to elapse without the case
being tried and for no cause or justifiable
motive.[54] In determining the right of the
accused to speedy trial, courts should do more
than a mathematical computation of the number
of postponements of the scheduled hearings of
the case.[55] The conduct of both the
prosecution and the defense must be weighed.
[56] Also to be considered are factors such as
the length of delay, the assertion or non-
assertion of the right, and the prejudice
wrought upon the defendant.[57]
We have consistently ruled in a long line of

cases that a dismissal of the case pursuant to
the right of the accused to speedy trial is
tantamount to acquittal.[58] As a consequence,
an appeal or a reconsideration of the dismissal
would amount to a violation of the principle of
double jeopardy.[59] As we have previously
discussed, however, where the dismissal of the
case is capricious, certiorari lies.[60] The rule
on double jeopardy is not triggered when a
petition challenges the validity of the order of
dismissal instead of the correctness thereof.[61]
Rather, grave abuse of discretion amounts to
lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction
prevents double jeopardy from attaching.[62]
We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the

CAs dismissal of the case against accused
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the
basis of the violation of their right to speedy
trial. The court held thus:
An examination of the procedural history of

this case would reveal that the following
factors contributed to the slow progress of the
proceedings in the case below:
xxxxxxxxx
5) The fact that the records of the case were
elevated to the Court of Appeals and the
prosecutions failure to comply with the order of
the court a quo requiring them to secure
certified true copies of the same.
xxxxxxxxx
While we are prepared to concede that some of
the foregoing factors that contributed to the
delay of the trial of the petitioners are
justifiable, We nonetheless hold that their right
to speedy trial has been utterly violated in this
case x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
[T]he absence of the records in the trial
court [was] due to the fact that the records of
the case were elevated to the Court of
Appeals, and the prosecutions failure to
comply with the order of the court a quo
requiring it to secure certified true copies of
the same. What is glaring from the records is
the fact that as early as September 21, 1995, the
court a quo already issued an Order requiring
the prosecution, through the Department of
Justice, to secure the complete records of the
case from the Court of Appeals. The
prosecution did not comply with the said Order
as in fact, the same directive was repeated by
the court a quo in an Order dated December 27,
1995. Still, there was no compliance on the part
of the prosecution. It is not stated when such
order was complied with. It appears, however,
that even until August 5, 2002, the said
records were still not at the disposal of the
trial court because the lack of it was made the
basis of the said court in granting the motion to
dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
It is likewise noticeable that from December
27, 1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a period
of almost seven years, there was no action at
all on the part of the court a quo. Except for
the pleadings filed by both the prosecution
and the petitioners, the latest of which was on
January 29, 1996, followed by petitioner
Sarucas motion to set case for trial on August
17, 1998 which the court did not act upon, the
case remained dormant for a considerable
length of time. This prolonged inactivity
whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that
the constitution frowns upon x x x.[63]
(Emphasis supplied)
This Court points out that on 10 January 1992,

the final amended Information was filed against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez,
Adriano, Cabangon, Concepcion, and De Vera.
[64] On 29 November 1993, they were all
arraigned.[65] Unfortunately, the initial trial of
the case did not commence until 28 March
2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.[66]
As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v.

Sandiganbayan, the unexplained interval or
inactivity of the Sandiganbayan for close to
five years since the arraignment of the accused
amounts to an unreasonable delay in the
disposition of cases a clear violation of the
right of the accused to a speedy disposition of
cases.[67] Thus, we held:
The delay in this case measures up to the

unreasonableness of the delay in the disposition
of cases in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman,
where the Court found the delay of six years
by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal
complaints to be violative of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy
disposition of cases; similarly, in Roque vs.
Office of the Ombudsman, where the Court held
that the delay of almost six years disregarded
the Ombudsman's duty to act promptly on
complaints before him; and in Cervantes vs.
Sandiganbayan, where the Court held that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
in not quashing the information which was
filed six years after the initiatory complaint
was filed and thereby depriving petitioner of
his right to a speedy disposition of the case.
So it must be in the instant case, where the
reinvestigation by the Ombudsman has
dragged on for a decade already.[68]
(Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing principles, we affirm the
ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89060 that
accused Escalona et al.s right to speedy trial
was violated. Since there is nothing in the
records that would show that the subject of this
Petition includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez,
Cabangon, and De Vera, the effects of this
ruling shall be limited to accused Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)
The rule on double jeopardy is one of the

pillars of our criminal justice system. It dictates
that when a person is charged with an offense,
and the case is terminated either by acquittal or
conviction or in any other manner without the
consent of the accused the accused cannot
again be charged with the same or an identical
offense.[69] This principle is founded upon the
law of reason, justice and conscience.[70] It is
embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in
idem found in the common law of England and
undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence.
[71] It found expression in the Spanish Law, in
the Constitution of the United States, and in our
own Constitution as one of the fundamental
rights of the citizen,[72] viz:
Article III Bill of Rights

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If
an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act.
Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court,
which implements this particular constitutional
right, provides as follows:[73]
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double

jeopardy. When an accused has been convicted
or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express
consent by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon a valid complaint or information or other
formal charge sufficient in form and substance
to sustain a conviction and after the accused
had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or
acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the
case shall be a bar to another prosecution for
the offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in
the former complaint or information.
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the
state from appealing the judgment in order to
reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty
imposed either through a regular appeal under
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an
appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law
under Rule 45 of the same Rules.[74] The
requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the
following: (a) there is a valid complaint or
information; (b) it is filed before a competent
court; (c) the defendant pleaded to the charge;
and (d) the defendant was acquitted or
convicted, or the case against him or her was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
defendants express consent.[75]
As we have reiterated in People v. Court of

Appeals and Galicia, [a] verdict of acquittal is
immediately final and a reexamination of the
merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate
courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the
same offense. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine
has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it
prevents the State from using its criminal
processes as an instrument of harassment to
wear out the accused by a multitude of cases
with accumulated trials. It also serves the
additional purpose of precluding the State,
following an acquittal, from successively
retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a
conviction. And finally, it prevents the State,
following conviction, from retrying the
defendant again in the hope of securing a
greater penalty.[76] We further stressed that an
acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of
repose as a direct consequence of the finality of
his acquittal.[77]
This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The

state may challenge the lower courts acquittal
of the accused or the imposition of a lower
penalty on the latter in the following
recognized exceptions: (1) where the
prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to
prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a
deprivation of due process;[78] (2) where there
is a finding of mistrial;[79] or (3) where there
has been a grave abuse of discretion.[80]
The third instance refers to this Courts judicial

power under Rule 65 to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.[81] Here, the party asking for the
review must show the presence of a whimsical
or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction; a patent and gross abuse
of discretion amounting to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation
of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility;[82] or a blatant abuse of authority to a
point so grave and so severe as to deprive the
court of its very power to dispense justice.[83]
In such an event, the accused cannot be
considered to be at risk of double jeopardy.[84]
The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition

for Certiorari, which seeks the reversal of (1)
the acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the
conviction of Tecson et al. for the lesser crime
of slight physical injuries, both on the basis of a
misappreciation of facts and evidence.
According to the Petition, the decision of the
Court of Appeals is not in accordance with law
because private complainant and petitioner
were denied due process of law when the
public respondent completely ignored the a)
Position Paper x x x b) the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration x x x and c) the petitioners
Comment x x x.[85] Allegedly, the CA ignored
evidence when it adopted the theory of
individual responsibility; set aside the finding
of conspiracy by the trial court; and failed to
apply Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[86]
The Solicitor General also assails the finding
that the physical blows were inflicted only by
Dizon and Villareal, as well as the appreciation
of Lenny Villas consent to hazing.[87]
In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we

reexamine, reassess, and reweigh the probative
value of the evidence presented by the parties.
[88] In People v. Maquiling, we held that grave
abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a
court simply because it allegedly
misappreciated the facts and the evidence.[89]
Mere errors of judgment are correctible by an
appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, and not by an application
for a writ of certiorari.[90] Therefore, pursuant
to the rule on double jeopardy, we are
constrained to deny the Petition contra
Victorino et al. the 19 acquitted fraternity
members.
We, however, modify the assailed judgment as

regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug the
four fraternity members convicted of slight
physical injuries.
Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the

rule on double jeopardy similarly applies when
the state seeks the imposition of a higher
penalty against the accused.[91] We have also
recognized, however, that certiorari may be
used to correct an abusive judgment upon a
clear demonstration that the lower court
blatantly abused its authority to a point so
grave as to deprive it of its very power to
dispense justice.[92] The present case is one of
those instances of grave abuse of discretion.
In imposing the penalty of slight physical

injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug,
the CA reasoned thus:
Based on the medical findings, it would appear

that with the exclusion of the fatal wounds
inflicted by the accused Dizon and Villareal,
the injuries sustained by the victim as a
result of the physical punishment heaped on
him were serious in nature. However, by
reason of the death of the victim, there can be
no precise means to determine the duration
of the incapacity or the medical attendance
required. To do so, at this stage would be
merely speculative. In a prosecution for this
crime where the category of the offense and the
severity of the penalty depend on the period of
illness or incapacity for labor, the length of this
period must likewise be proved beyond
reasonable doubt in much the same manner as
the same act charged [People v. Codilla, CA-
G.R. No. 4079-R, June 26, 1950]. And when
proof of the said period is absent, the crime
committed should be deemed only as slight
physical injuries [People v. De los Santos, CA,
59 O.G. 4393, citing People v. Penesa, 81 Phil.
398]. As such, this Court is constrained to rule
that the injuries inflicted by the appellants,
Tecson, Ama, Almeda and Bantug, Jr., are only
slight and not serious, in nature.[93] (Emphasis
supplied and citations included)
The appellate court relied on our ruling in
People v. Penesa[94] in finding that the four
accused should be held guilty only of slight
physical injuries. According to the CA, because
of the death of the victim, there can be no
precise means to determine the duration of the
incapacity or medical attendance required.[95]
The reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced.
A review of that case would reveal that the
accused therein was guilty merely of slight
physical injuries, because the victims injuries
neither caused incapacity for labor nor required
medical attendance.[96] Furthermore, he did
not die.[97] His injuries were not even serious.
[98] Since Penesa involved a case in which the
victim allegedly suffered physical injuries and
not death, the ruling cited by the CA was
patently inapplicable.
On the contrary, the CAs ultimate conclusion

that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug were
liable merely for slight physical injuries grossly
contradicts its own findings of fact. According
to the court, the four accused were found to
have inflicted more than the usual
punishment undertaken during such initiation
rites on the person of Villa.[99] It then adopted
the NBI medico-legal officers findings that the
antecedent cause of Lenny Villas death was the
multiple traumatic injuries he suffered from the
initiation rites.[100] Considering that the CA
found that the physical punishment heaped
on [Lenny Villa was] serious in nature,[101]
it was patently erroneous for the court to limit
the criminal liability to slight physical injuries,
which is a light felony.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates

that the perpetrator shall be liable for the
consequences of an act, even if its result is
different from that intended. Thus, once a
person is found to have committed an initial
felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of
physical injuries that results in the death of the
victim, courts are required to automatically
apply the legal framework governing the
destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and
not subject to discretion.
The CAs application of the legal framework

governing physical injuries punished under
Articles 262 to 266 for intentional felonies and
Article 365 for culpable felonies is therefore
tantamount to a whimsical, capricious, and
abusive exercise of judgment amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. According to the Revised Penal
Code, the mandatory and legally imposable
penalty in case the victim dies should be based
on the framework governing the destruction of
the life of a person, punished under Articles
246 to 261 for intentional felonies and Article
365 for culpable felonies, and not under the
aforementioned provisions. We emphasize that
these two types of felonies are distinct from
and legally inconsistent with each other, in that
the accused cannot be held criminally liable for
physical injuries when actual death occurs.
[102]
Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal

and Dizon as if only their acts, in and of
themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa is
contrary to the CAs own findings. From proof
that the death of the victim was the cumulative
effect of the multiple injuries he suffered,[103]
the only logical conclusion is that criminal
responsibility should redound to all those who
have been proven to have directly participated
in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny.
The accumulation of bruising on his body
caused him to suffer cardiac arrest.
Accordingly, we find that the CA committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama,
Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for slight
physical injuries. As an allowable exception to
the rule on double jeopardy, we therefore give
due course to the Petition in G.R. No. 154954.
Resolution on Ultimate Findings
According to the trial court, although hazing

was not (at the time) punishable as a crime, the
intentional infliction of physical injuries on
Villa was nonetheless a felonious act under
Articles 263 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, in ruling against the accused, the court a
quo found that pursuant to Article 4(1) of the
Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity
members were guilty of homicide, as it was the
direct, natural and logical consequence of the
physical injuries they had intentionally
inflicted.[104]
The CA modified the trial courts finding of

criminal liability. It ruled that there could have
been no conspiracy since the neophytes,
including Lenny Villa, had knowingly
consented to the conduct of hazing during their
initiation rites. The accused fraternity members,
therefore, were liable only for the
consequences of their individual acts.
Accordingly, 19 of the accused Victorino et al.
were acquitted; 4 of them Tecson et al. were
found guilty of slight physical injuries; and the
remaining 2 Dizon and Villareal were found
guilty of homicide.
The issue at hand does not concern a typical

criminal case wherein the perpetrator clearly
commits a felony in order to take revenge
upon, to gain advantage over, to harm
maliciously, or to get even with, the victim.
Rather, the case involves an ex ante situation in
which a man driven by his own desire to join a
society of men pledged to go through
physically and psychologically strenuous
admission rituals, just so he could enter the
fraternity. Thus, in order to understand how our
criminal laws apply to such situation absent the
Anti-Hazing Law, we deem it necessary to
make a brief exposition on the underlying
concepts shaping intentional felonies, as well
as on the nature of physical and psychological
initiations widely known as hazing.
Intentional Felony and Conspiracy
Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the

classical school of thought.[105] The classical
theory posits that a human person is essentially
a moral creature with an absolute free will to
choose between good and evil.[106] It asserts
that one should only be adjudged or held
accountable for wrongful acts so long as free
will appears unimpaired.[107] The basic
postulate of the classical penal system is that
humans are rational and calculating beings who
guide their actions with reference to the
principles of pleasure and pain.[108] They
refrain from criminal acts if threatened with
punishment sufficient to cancel the hope of
possible gain or advantage in committing the
crime.[109] Here, criminal liability is thus
based on the free will and moral blame of the
actor.[110] The identity of mens rea defined as
a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or
criminal intent is the predominant
consideration.[111] Thus, it is not enough to do
what the law prohibits.[112] In order for an
intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that
the act be committed by means of dolo or
malice.[113]
The term dolo or malice is a complex idea

involving the elements of freedom, intelligence,
and intent.[114] The first element, freedom, refers
to an act done with deliberation and with power
to choose between two things.[115] The second
element, intelligence, concerns the ability to
determine the morality of human acts, as well
as the capacity to distinguish between a licit
and an illicit act.[116] The last element, intent,
involves an aim or a determination to do a
certain act.[117]
The element of intent on which this Court shall

focus is described as the state of mind
accompanying an act, especially a forbidden
act.[118] It refers to the purpose of the mind and
the resolve with which a person proceeds.[119] It
does not refer to mere will, for the latter
pertains to the act, while intent concerns the
result of the act.[120] While motive is the moving
power that impels one to action for a definite
result, intent is the purpose of using a particular
means to produce the result.[121] On the other
hand, the term felonious means, inter alia,
malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from
an evil heart or purpose.[122] With these elements
taken together, the requirement of intent in
intentional felony must refer to malicious
intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state
of mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated
otherwise, intentional felony requires the
existence of dolus malus that the act or
omission be done willfully, maliciously, with
deliberate evil intent, and with malice
aforethought.[123] The maxim is actus non facit
reum, nisi mens sit rea a crime is not
committed if the mind of the person performing
the act complained of is innocent.[124] As is
required of the other elements of a felony, the
existence of malicious intent must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt.[125]
In turn, the existence of malicious intent is

necessary in order for conspiracy to attach.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides that conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it is to be interpreted to refer
only to felonies committed by means of dolo or
malice. The phrase coming to an agreement
connotes the existence of a prefaced intent to
cause injury to another, an element present only
in intentional felonies. In culpable felonies or
criminal negligence, the injury inflicted on
another is unintentional, the wrong done being
simply the result of an act performed without
malice or criminal design.[126] Here, a person
performs an initial lawful deed; however, due
to negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight, or
lack of skill, the deed results in a wrongful act.
[127] Verily, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful
act, which is a requisite in conspiracy, is
inconsistent with the idea of a felony
committed by means of culpa.[128]
The presence of an initial malicious intent to

commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in
establishing the commission of the intentional
felony of homicide.[129] Being mala in se, the
felony of homicide requires the existence of
malice or dolo[130] immediately before or
simultaneously with the infliction of injuries.[131]
Intent to kill or animus interficendi cannot and
should not be inferred, unless there is proof
beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.[132]
Furthermore, the victims death must not have
been the product of accident, natural cause, or
suicide.[133] If death resulted from an act
executed without malice or criminal intent but
with lack of foresight, carelessness, or
negligence the act must be qualified as reckless
or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in
homicide.[134]
Hazing and other forms of initiation rites

The notion of hazing is not a recent
development in our society.[135] It is said that,
throughout history, hazing in some form or
another has been associated with organizations
ranging from military groups to indigenous
tribes.[136] Some say that elements of hazing
can be traced back to the Middle Ages, during
which new students who enrolled in European
universities worked as servants for
upperclassmen.[137] It is believed that the
concept of hazing is rooted in ancient Greece,
[138] where young men recruited into the
military were tested with pain or challenged to
demonstrate the limits of their loyalty and to
prepare the recruits for battle.[139] Modern
fraternities and sororities espouse some
connection to these values of ancient Greek
civilization.[140] According to a scholar, this
concept lends historical legitimacy to a
tradition or ritual whereby prospective
members are asked to prove their worthiness
and loyalty to the organization in which they
seek to attain membership through hazing.[141]
Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity

system, custom requires a student wishing to
join an organization to receive an invitation in
order to be a neophyte for a particular chapter.
[142] The neophyte period is usually one to
two semesters long.[143] During the program,
neophytes are required to interview and to get
to know the active members of the chapter; to
learn chapter history; to understand the
principles of the organization; to maintain a
specified grade point average; to participate in
the organizations activities; and to show dignity
and respect for their fellow neophytes, the
organization, and its active and alumni
members.[144] Some chapters require the
initiation activities for a recruit to involve
hazing acts during the entire neophyte stage.
[145]
Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an

initiation rite or ritual that serves as
prerequisite for admission to an organization.
[146] In hazing, the recruit, pledge, neophyte,
initiate, applicant or any other term by which
the organization may refer to such a person is
generally placed in embarrassing or humiliating
situations, like being forced to do menial, silly,
foolish, or other similar tasks or activities.[147]
It encompasses different forms of conduct that
humiliate, degrade, abuse, or physically
endanger those who desire membership in the
organization.[148] These acts usually involve
physical or psychological suffering or injury.
[149]
The concept of initiation rites in the country is

nothing new. In fact, more than a century ago,
our national hero Andres Bonifacio organized a
secret society named Kataastaasan
Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga Anak
ng Bayan (The Highest and Most Venerable
Association of the Sons and Daughters of the
Nation).[150] The Katipunan, or KKK, started
as a small confraternity believed to be inspired
by European Freemasonry, as well as by
confraternities or sodalities approved by the
Catholic Church.[151] The Katipunans
ideology was brought home to each member
through the societys initiation ritual.[152] It is
said that initiates were brought to a dark room,
lit by a single point of illumination, and were
asked a series of
questions to determine their fitness, loyalty,
courage, and resolve.[153] They were made to
go through vigorous trials such as pagsuot sa
isang lungga or [pagtalon] sa balon.[154] It
would seem that they were also made to
withstand the blow of pangherong bakal sa
pisngi and to endure a matalas na punyal.[155]
As a final step in the ritual, the neophyte
Katipunero was made to sign membership
papers with the his own blood.[156]
It is believed that the Greek fraternity system

was transported by the Americans to the
Philippines in the late 19th century. As can be

seen in the following instances, the manner of
hazing in the United States was jarringly
similar to that inflicted by the Aquila Fraternity
on Lenny Villa.
Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point
Academy forced the fourth classmen to do
exhausting physical exercises that sometimes
resulted in permanent physical damage; to eat
or drink unpalatable foods; and in various ways
to humiliate themselves.[157] In 1901, General
Douglas MacArthur got involved in a
congressional investigation of hazing at the
academy during his second year at West Point.
[158]
In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville,

decided in 1985, the candidate-victim was
injured during the shriners hazing event, which
was part of the initiation ceremonies for Hejaz
membership.[159] The ritual involved what was
known as the mattress-rotating barrel trick.[160] It
required each candidate to slide down an eight
to nine-foot-high metal board onto connected
mattresses leading to a barrel, over which the
candidate was required to climb.[161] Members of
Hejaz would stand on each side of the
mattresses and barrel and fun-paddle
candidates en route to the barrel.[162]
In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine

paratroopers in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina,
were seen performing a ceremony in which
they pinned paratrooper jump wings directly
onto the neophyte paratroopers chests.[163] The
victims were shown writhing and crying out in
pain as others pounded the spiked medals
through the shirts and into the chests of the
victims.[164]
In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast

Missouri State University chapter of Kappa
Alpha Psi invited male students to enter into a
pledgeship program.[165] The fraternity members
subjected the pledges to repeated physical
abuse including repeated, open-hand strikes at
the nape, the chest, and the back; caning of the
bare soles of the feet and buttocks; blows to the
back with the use of a heavy book and a cookie
sheet while the pledges were on their hands and
knees; various kicks and punches to the body;
and body slamming, an activity in which active
members of the fraternity lifted pledges up in
the air and dropped them to the ground.[166] The
fraternity members then put the pledges
through a seven-station circle of physical
abuse.[167]
In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the

pledge-victim went through hazing by
fraternity members of the Kappa Alpha Order
at the Auburn University in Alabama.[168] The
hazing included the following: (1) having to
dig a ditch and jump into it after it had been
filled with water, urine, feces, dinner leftovers,
and vomit; (2) receiving paddlings on the
buttocks; (3) being pushed and kicked, often
onto walls or into pits and trash cans; (4) eating
foods like peppers, hot sauce, butter, and yerks
(a mixture of hot sauce, mayonnaise, butter,
beans, and other items); (5) doing chores for
the fraternity and its members, such as cleaning
the fraternity house and yard, being designated
as driver, and running errands; (6) appearing
regularly at 2 a.m. meetings, during which the
pledges would be hazed for a couple of hours;
and (7) running the gauntlet, during which the
pledges were pushed, kicked, and hit as they
ran down a hallway and descended down a
flight of stairs.[169]
In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided

in 1999, the victim Sylvester Lloyd was
accepted to pledge at the Cornell University
chapter of the Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity.[170]
He participated in initiation activities, which
included various forms of physical beatings and
torture, psychological coercion and
embarrassment.[171]
In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity,

decided in 2002, the initiate-victim suffered
injuries from hazing activities during the
fraternitys initiation rites.[172] Kenner and the
other initiates went through psychological and
physical hazing, including being paddled on the
buttocks for more than 200 times.[173]
In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones a university

student in Florida sought initiation into the
campus chapter of the Kappa Alpha Psi
Fraternity during the 2005-06 academic year.
[174] The pledges efforts to join the fraternity
culminated in a series of initiation rituals
conducted in four nights. Jones, together with
other candidates, was blindfolded, verbally
harassed, and caned on his face and buttocks.
[175] In these rituals described as
preliminaries, which lasted for two evenings,
he received approximately 60 canings on his
buttocks.[176] During the last two days of the
hazing, the rituals intensified.[177] The pledges
sustained roughly 210 cane strikes during the
four-night initiation.[178] Jones and several
other candidates passed out.[179]
The purported raison dtre behind hazing

practices is the proverbial birth by fire, through
which the pledge who has successfully
withstood the hazing proves his or her worth.
[180] Some organizations even believe that
hazing is the path to enlightenment. It is said
that this process enables the organization to
establish unity among the pledges and, hence,
reinforces and ensures the future of the
organization.[181] Alleged benefits of joining
include leadership opportunities; improved
academic performance; higher self-esteem;
professional networking opportunities; and the
esprit dcorp associated with close, almost filial,
friendship and common cause.[182]
Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.

The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in
1874 in response to hazing in the military.[183]
The hazing of recruits and plebes in the armed
services was so prevalent that Congress
prohibited all forms of military hazing, harmful
or not.[184] It was not until 1901 that Illinois
passed the first state anti-hazing law,
criminalizing conduct whereby any one
sustains an injury to his [or her] person
therefrom.[185]
However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s,

due in large part to the efforts of the Committee
to Halt Useless College Killings and other
similar organizations, that states increasingly
began to enact legislation prohibiting and/or
criminalizing hazing.[186] As of 2008, all but
six states had enacted criminal or civil statutes
proscribing hazing.[187] Most anti-hazing laws
in the U.S. treat hazing as a misdemeanor and
carry relatively light consequences for even the
most severe situations.[188] Only a few states
with anti-hazing laws consider hazing as a
felony in case death or great bodily harm
occurs.[189]
Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A

misdemeanor, except hazing that results in
death or great bodily harm, which is a Class 4
felony.[190] In a Class 4 felony, a sentence of
imprisonment shall be for a term of not less
than one year and not more than three years.
[191] Indiana criminal law provides that a
person who recklessly, knowingly, or
intentionally
performs hazing that results in serious bodily
injury to a person commits criminal
recklessness, a Class D felony.[192]
The offense becomes a Class C felony if

committed by means of a deadly weapon.[193]
As an element of a Class C felony criminal
recklessness resulting in serious bodily injury,
death falls under the category of serious bodily
injury.[194] A person who commits a Class C
felony is imprisoned for a fixed term of
between two (2) and eight (8) years, with the
advisory sentence being four (4) years.[195]
Pursuant to Missouri law, hazing is a Class A
misdemeanor, unless the act creates a
substantial risk to the life of the student or
prospective member, in which case it becomes
a Class C felony.[196] A Class C felony
provides for an imprisonment term not to
exceed seven years.[197]
In Texas, hazing that causes the death of

another is a state jail felony.[198] An individual
adjudged guilty of a state jail felony is
punished by confinement in a state jail for any
term of not more than two years or not less than
180 days.[199] Under Utah law, if hazing
results in serious bodily injury, the hazer is
guilty of a third-degree felony.[200] A person
who has been convicted of a third-degree
felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for a
term not to exceed five years.[201] West
Virginia law provides that if the act of hazing
would otherwise be deemed a felony, the hazer
may be found guilty thereof and subject to
penalties provided therefor.[202] In Wisconsin,
a person is guilty of a Class G felony if hazing
results in the death of another.[203] A
Class G felony carries a fine not to exceed
$25,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 10
years, or both.[204]
In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing

were left with limited remedies, as there was no
hazing statute.[205] This situation was
exemplified in Ballou v. Sigma Nu General
Fraternity, wherein Barry Ballous family
resorted to a civil action for wrongful death,
since there was no anti-hazing statute in South
Carolina until 1994.[206]
The existence of animus

interficendi or intent to kill
not proven beyond
reasonable doubt
The presence of an ex ante situation in this
case, fraternity initiation rites does not
automatically amount to the absence of
malicious intent or dolus malus. If it is proven
beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators
were equipped with a guilty mind whether or
not there is a contextual background or factual
premise they are still criminally liable for
intentional felony.
The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor

General are all in agreement that with the
exception of Villareal and Dizon accused
Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug did not have
the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny
Villa or the other neophytes. We shall no longer
disturb this finding.
As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA

modified the Decision of the trial court and
found that the two accused had the animus
interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa, not
merely to inflict physical injuries on him. It
justified its finding of homicide against Dizon
by holding that he had apparently been
motivated by ill will while beating up Villa.
Dizon kept repeating that his fathers parking
space had been stolen by the victims father.[207]
As to Villareal, the court said that the accused
suspected the family of Bienvenido Marquez,
one of the neophytes, to have had a hand in the
death of Villareals brother.[208] The CA then
ruled as follows:
The two had their own axes to grind against

Villa and Marquez. It was very clear that they
acted with evil and criminal intent. The
evidence on this matter is unrebutted and so for
the death of Villa, appellants Dizon and
Villareal must and should face the
consequence of their acts, that is, to be held
liable for the crime of homicide.[209]
(Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.
The appellate court relied mainly on the

testimony of Bienvenido Marquez to determine
the existence of animus interficendi. For a full
appreciation of the context in which the
supposed utterances were made, the Court
deems it necessary to reproduce the relevant
portions of witness Marquezs testimony:
Witness We were brought up into [Michael

Musngis] room and we were briefed as to what
to expect during the next three days and we
were told the members of the fraternity and
their batch and we were also told about the
fraternity song, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness We were escorted out of [Michael
Musngis] house and we were made
to ride a van and we were brought
to another place in Kalookan City
which I later found to be the place
of Mariano Almeda, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness Upon arrival, we were instructed to
bow our head down and to link our arms and
then the driver of the van and other members of
the Aquilans who were inside left us inside the
van, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness We heard voices shouted outside the
van to the effect, Villa akin ka, Asuncion
Patay ka and the people outside pound the
van, rock the van, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall in what tone
of voice and how strong a voice these remarks
uttered upon your arrival?
Witness Some were almost shouting, you could
feel the sense of excitement in their voices, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar During all these times that the
van was being rocked through and
through, what were the voices or
utterances that you heard?
Witness Villa akin ka, Asuncion patay ka,
Recinto patay ka sa amin, etc., sir.
Atty. Tadiar And those utterances and threats,
how long did they continue during the rocking
of the van which lasted for 5 minutes?
xxxxxxxxx
Witness Even after they rocked the van, we
still kept on hearing voices, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar During the time that this rounds [of
physical beating] were being inflicted, was
there any utterances by anybody?
Witness Yes sir. Some were piercing, some
were discouraging, and some were
encouraging others who were pounding and
beating us, it was just like a fiesta
atmosphere, actually some of them enjoyed
looking us being pounded, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Do you recall what were those
voices that you heard?
Witness One particular utterance always said
was, they asked us whether matigas pa yan,
kayang-kaya pa niyan.
Atty. Tadiar Do you know who in particular
uttered those particular words that you quote?
Witness I cannot particularly point to because
there were utterances simultaneously, I could
not really pin point who uttered those words,
sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar Were there any utterances that you
heard during the conduct of this Bicol Express?
Witness Yes, sir I heard utterances.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall to this
Honorable Court what were the utterances that
you remember?
Witness For example, one person particularly
Boyet Dizon stepped on my thigh, he would
say that and I quote ito, yung pamilya nito
ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko, so that would
in turn sort of justifying him in inflicting more
serious pain on me. So instead of just walking,
he would jump on my thighs and then after on
was Lenny Villa. He was saying to the effect
that this guy, his father stole the parking
space of my father, sir. So, thats why he
inflicted more pain on Villa and that went on,
sir.
Atty. Tadiar And you were referring to which
particular accused?
Witness Boyet Dizon, sir.
Atty. Tadiar When Boyet Dizon at that
particular time was accusing you of having
your family have his brother killed, what was
your response?
Witness Of course, I knew sir that it was not
true and that he was just making it up sir.
So he said that I knew nothing of that incident.
However, he just in fact after the Bicol Express,
he kept on uttering those words/statements so
that it would in turn justify him and to give me
harder blows, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar You mentioned about Dizon in
particular mentioning that Lenny Villas
father stole the parking space allotted for his
father, do you recall who were within
hearing distance when that utterance was
made?
Witness Yes, sir. All of the neophytes heard that
utterance, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness There were different times made this
accusation so there were different people who
heard from time to time, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar Can you tell the Honorable Court
when was the next accusation against Lenny
Villas father was made?
Witness When we were line up against the
wall, Boyet Dizon came near to us and when
Lenny Villas turn, I heard him uttered those
statements, sir.
Atty. Tadiar What happened after he made this
accusation to Lenny Villas father?
Witness He continued to inflict blows on Lenny
Villa.
Atty. Tadiar How were those blows inflicted?
Witness There were slaps and he knelt on
Lenny Villas thighs and sometime he stand up
and he kicked his thighs and sometimes jumped
at it, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar We would go on to the second day
but not right now. You mentioned also that
accusations made by Dizon you or your
family had his brother killed, can you
inform this Honorable Court what exactly
were the accusations that were charged
against you while inflicting blows upon you
in particular?
Witness While he was inflicting blows upon
me, he told me in particular if I knew that his
family who had his brother killed, and he said
that his brother was an NPA, sir so I knew that
it was just a story that he made up and I said
that I knew nothing about it and he
continued inflicting blows on me, sir. And
another incident was when a talk was being
given, Dizon was on another part of the pelota
court and I was sort of looking and we saw that
he was drinking beer, and he said and I quote:
Marquez, Marquez, ano ang tinitingin-tingin
mo diyan, ikaw yung pamilya mo ang
nagpapatay sa aking kapatid, yari ka sa
akin, sir.
Atty. Tadiar What else?
Witness Thats all, sir.
Atty. Tadiar And on that first night of February
8, 1991, did ever a doctor or a physician came
around as promised to you earlier?
Witness No, sir.[210] (Emphasis supplied)
On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido
Marquez testified thus:
Judge Purisima When you testified on direct

examination Mr. Marquez, have you stated that
there was a briefing that was conducted
immediately before your initiation as regards to
what to expect during the initiation, did I hear
you right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima Who did the briefing?
Witness Mr. Michael Musngi, sir and Nelson
Victorino.
Judge Purisima Will you kindly tell the
Honorable Court what they told you to expect
during the initiation?
Witness They told us at the time we would be
brought to a particular place, we would be
mocked at, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you expected to be
mocked at, ridiculed, humiliated etc., and
the likes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima You were also told beforehand
that there would be physical contact?
Witness Yes, sir at the briefing.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness Yes, sir, because they informed that we
could immediately go back to school. All the
bruises would be limited to our arms and legs,
sir. So, if we wear the regular school uniforms
like long sleeves, it would be covered actually
so we have no thinking that our face would be
slapped, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you mean to say that
beforehand that you would have bruises on
your body but that will be covered?
Witness Yes, sir.
JudgePurisima So, what kind of physical
contact or implements that you expect that
would create bruises to your body?
Witness At that point I am already sure that
there would be hitting by a paddling or paddle,
sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Judge Purisima Now, will you admit Mr.
Marquez that much of the initiation
procedures is psychological in nature?
Witness Combination, sir.[211] (Emphasis
supplied)
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Jimenez The initiation that was conducted
did not consist only of physical initiation,
meaning body contact, is that correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Part of the initiation was the
so-called psychological initiation, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez And this consisted of making
you believe of things calculated to terrify
you, scare you, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, the initiating
masters made belief situation intended to, I
repeat, terrify you, frighten you, scare you
into perhaps quitting the initiation, is this
correct?
Witness Sometimes sir, yes.
Atty. Jimenez You said on direct that while Mr.
Dizon was initiating you, he said or he was
supposed to have said according to you that
your family were responsible for the killing of
his brother who was an NPA, do you remember
saying that?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez You also said in connection with
that statement said to you by Dizon that you
did not believe him because that is not true,
correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, he was only
psychologizing you perhaps, the purpose as I
have mentioned before, terrifying you,
scaring you or frightening you into quitting
the initiation, this is correct?
Witness No, sir, perhaps it is one but the
main reason, I think, why he was saying
those things was because he wanted to inflict
injury.
Atty. Jimenez He did not tell that to you. That
is your only perception, correct?
Witness No, sir, because at one point, while he
was telling this to Villareal, he was hitting me.
Atty. Jimenez But did you not say earlier that
you [were] subjected to the same forms of
initiation by all the initiating masters? You said
that earlier, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Are you saying also that the
others who jumped on you or kicked you said
something similar as was told to you by Mr.
Dizon?
Witness No, sir.
Atty. Jimenez But the fact remains that in the
Bicol Express for instance, the masters would
run on your thighs, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez This was the regular procedure
that was followed by the initiating masters not
only on you but also on the other neophytes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, it is fair to say
that whatever forms of initiation was
administered by one master, was also
administered by one master on a neophyte,
was also administered by another master on
the other neophyte, this is correct?
Witness Yes, sir.[212] (Emphasis supplied)
According to the Solicitor General himself, the

ill motives attributed by the CA to Dizon and
Villareal were baseless,[213] since the
statements of the accused were just part of the
psychological initiation calculated to instill fear
on the part of the neophytes; that [t]here is no
element of truth in it as testified by Bienvenido
Marquez; and that the harsh words uttered by
Petitioner and Villareal are part of tradition
concurred and accepted by all the fraternity
members during their initiation rites.[214]
We agree with the Solicitor General.
The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez

reveals a glaring mistake of substantial
proportion on the part of the CA it mistook the
utterances of Dizon for those of Villareal. Such
inaccuracy cannot be tolerated, especially
because it was the CAs primary basis for
finding that Villarreal had the intent to kill
Lenny Villa, thereby making Villareal guilty of
the intentional felony of homicide. To repeat,
according to Bienvenido Marquezs testimony,
as reproduced above, it was Dizon who uttered
both accusations against Villa and Marquez;
Villareal had no participation whatsoever in the
specific threats referred to by the CA. It was
Boyet Dizon [who] stepped on [Marquezs]
thigh; and who told witness Marquez, [I]to,
yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid
ko. It was also Dizon who jumped on Villas
thighs while saying, [T]his guy, his father stole
the parking space of my father. With the
testimony clarified, we find that the CA had no
basis for concluding the existence of intent to
kill based solely thereon.
As to the existence of animus interficendi on

the part of Dizon, we refer to the entire factual
milieu and contextual premise of the incident to
fully appreciate and understand the testimony
of witness Marquez. At the outset, the
neophytes were briefed that they would be
subjected to psychological pressure in order to
scare them. They knew that they would be
mocked, ridiculed, and intimidated. They heard
fraternity members shout, Patay ka, Recinto,
Yari ka, Recinto, Villa, akin ka, Asuncion,
gulpi ka, Putang ina mo, Asuncion, Putang ina
nyo, patay kayo sa amin, or some other words
to that effect.[215] While beating the
neophytes, Dizon accused Marquez of the
death of the formers purported NPA brother,
and then blamed Lenny Villas father for
stealing the parking space of Dizons father.
According to the Solicitor General, these
statements, including those of the accused
Dizon, were all part of the psychological
initiation employed by the Aquila Fraternity.
[216]
Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizons

way of inflicting psychological pressure was
through hurling make-believe accusations at
the initiates. He concocted the fictitious stories,
so that he could justify giving the neophytes
harder blows, all in the context of fraternity
initiation and role playing. Even one of the
neophytes admitted that the accusations were
untrue and made-up.
The infliction of psychological pressure is not

unusual in the conduct of hazing. In fact,
during the Senate deliberations on the then
proposed Anti-Hazing Law, former Senator
Lina spoke as follows:
Senator Lina. -- so as to capture the intent that

we conveyed during the period of
interpellations on why we included the phrase
or psychological pain and suffering.
xxxxxxxxx
So that if no direct physical harm is inflicted
upon the neophyte or the recruit but the recruit
or neophyte is made to undergo certain acts
which I already described yesterday, like
playing the Russian roulette extensively to test
the readiness and the willingness of the
neophyte or recruit to continue his desire to
be a member of the fraternity, sorority or
similar organization or playing and putting a
noose on the neck of the neophyte or recruit,
making the recruit or neophyte stand on the
ledge of the fourth floor of the building facing
outside, asking him to jump outside after
making him turn around several times but the
reality is that he will be made to jump towards
the inside portion of the building these are the
mental or psychological tests that are
resorted to by these organizations, sororities
or fraternities. The doctors who appeared
during the public hearing testified that such
acts can result in some mental aberration, that
they can even lead to psychosis, neurosis or
insanity. This is what we want to prevent.[217]
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt,
Dizons behavior must not be automatically
viewed as evidence of a genuine, evil
motivation to kill Lenny Villa. Rather, it must
be taken within the context of the fraternitys
psychological initiation. This Court points out
that it was not even established whether the
fathers of Dizon and Villa really had any
familiarity with each other as would lend
credence to the veracity of Dizons threats. The
testimony of Lennys co-neophyte, Marquez,
only confirmed this view. According to
Marquez, he knew it was not true and that
[Dizon] was just making it up.[218] Even the
trial court did not give weight to the utterances
of Dizon as constituting intent to kill: [T]he
cumulative acts of all the accused were not
directed toward killing Villa, but merely to
inflict physical harm as part of the fraternity
initiation rites x x x.[219] The Solicitor General
shares the same view.
Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the
accused Dizon guilty of homicide under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of
the existence of intent to kill. Animus
interficendi cannot and should not be inferred
unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt
of such intent.[220] Instead, we adopt and
reinstate the finding of the trial court in
part, insofar as it ruled that none of the
fraternity members had the specific intent to
kill Lenny Villa.[221]
The existence of animus

iniuriandi or malicious
intent to injure not proven
beyond reasonable doubt
The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there
was an intent to inflict physical injuries on
Lenny Villa. Echoing the Decision of the trial
court, the Solicitor General then posits that
since all of the accused fraternity members
conspired to inflict physical injuries on Lenny
Villa and death ensued, all of them should be
liable for the crime of homicide pursuant to
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
In order to be found guilty of any of the

felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the
Revised Penal Code,[222] the employment of
physical injuries must be coupled with dolus
malus. As an act that is mala in se, the
existence of malicious intent is fundamental,
since injury arises from the mental state of the
wrongdoer iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat.
If there is no criminal intent, the accused
cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony.
Thus, in case of physical injuries under the
Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific
animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do
wrong against the physical integrity or well-
being of a person, so as to incapacitate and
deprive the victim of certain bodily functions.
Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of
inflicting physical injuries per se merely
satisfies the elements of freedom and
intelligence in an intentional felony. The
commission of the act does not, in itself, make
a man guilty unless his intentions are.[223]
Thus, we have ruled in a number of

instances[224] that the mere infliction of
physical injuries, absent malicious intent, does
not make a person automatically liable for an
intentional felony. In Bagajo v. People,[225]
the accused teacher, using a bamboo stick,
whipped one of her students behind her legs
and thighs as a form of discipline. The student
suffered lesions and bruises from the corporal
punishment. In reversing the trial courts finding
of criminal liability for slight physical injuries,
this Court stated thus: Independently of any
civil or administrative responsibility [w]e are
persuaded that she did not do what she had
done with criminal intent the means she
actually used was moderate and that she was
not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any
malevolent intent. Considering the applicable
laws, we then ruled that as a matter of law,
petitioner did not incur any criminal liability
for her act of whipping her pupil. In People v.
Carmen,[226] the accused members of the
religious group known as the Missionaries of
Our Lady of Fatima under the guise of a ritual
or treatment plunged the head of the victim into
a barrel of water, banged his head against a
bench, pounded his chest with fists, and
stabbed him on the side with a kitchen knife, in
order to cure him of nervous breakdown by
expelling through those means the bad spirits
possessing him. The collective acts of the
group caused the death of the victim. Since
malicious intent was not proven, we reversed
the trial courts finding of liability for murder
under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code and
instead ruled that the accused should be held
criminally liable for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide under Article 365 thereof.
Indeed, the threshold question is whether the

accuseds initial acts of inflicting physical pain
on the neophytes were attended by animus
iniuriandi amounting to a felonious act
punishable under the Revised Penal Code,
thereby making it subject to Article 4(1)
thereof. In People v. Regato, we ruled that
malicious intent must be judged by the action,
conduct, and external acts of the accused.[227]
What persons do is the best index of their
intention.[228] We have also ruled that the
method employed, the kind of weapon used,
and the parts of the body on which the injury
was inflicted may be determinative of the intent
of the perpetrator.[229] The Court shall thus
examine the whole contextual background
surrounding the death of Lenny Villa.
Lenny died during Aquilas fraternity initiation

rites. The night before the commencement of
the rites, they were briefed on what to expect.
They were told that there would be physical
beatings, that the whole event would last for
three days, and that they could quit anytime.
On their first night, they were subjected to
traditional initiation rites, including the Indian
Run, Bicol Express, Rounds, and the Auxies
Privilege Round. The beatings were
predominantly directed at the neophytes arms
and legs.
In the morning of their second day of initiation,

they were made to present comic plays and to
play rough basketball. They were also required
to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternitys
principles. Late in the afternoon, they were
once again subjected to traditional initiation
rituals. When the rituals were officially
reopened on the insistence of Dizon and
Villareal, the neophytes were subjected to
another traditional ritual paddling by the
fraternity.
During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries
were assigned to the neophytes. The auxiliaries
protected the neophytes by functioning as
human barriers and shielding them from those
who were designated to inflict physical and
psychological pain on the initiates.[230] It was
their regular duty to stop foul or excessive
physical blows; to help the neophytes to pump
their legs in order that their blood would
circulate; to facilitate a rest interval after every
physical activity or round; to serve food and
water; to tell jokes; to coach the initiates; and
to give them whatever they needed.
These rituals were performed with Lennys

consent.[231] A few days before the rites, he
asked both his parents for permission to join
the Aquila Fraternity.[232] His father knew that
Lenny would go through an initiation process
and would be gone for three days.[233] The CA
found as follows:
It is worth pointing out that the neophytes

willingly and voluntarily consented to
undergo physical initiation and hazing. As
can be gleaned from the narration of facts, they
voluntarily agreed to join the initiation rites to
become members of the Aquila Legis
Fraternity. Prior to the initiation, they were
given briefings on what to expect. It is of
common knowledge that before admission in a
fraternity, the neophytes will undergo a rite of
passage. Thus, they were made aware that
traditional methods such as mocking,
psychological tests and physical punishment
would take place. They knew that the
initiation would involve beatings and other
forms of hazing. They were also told of their
right and opportunity to quit at any time
they wanted to. In fact, prosecution witness
Navera testified that accused Tecson told him
that after a week, you can already play
basketball. Prosecution witness Marquez for
his part, admitted that he knew that the
initiates would be hit in the arms and legs,
that a wooden paddle would be used to hit
them and that he expected bruises on his
arms and legs. Indeed, there can be no
fraternity initiation without consenting
neophytes.[234] (Emphasis supplied)
Even after going through Aquilas grueling

traditional rituals during the first day, Lenny
continued his participation and finished the
second day of initiation.
Based on the foregoing contextual background,

and absent further proof showing clear
malicious intent, we are constrained to rule that
the specific animus iniuriandi was not present
in this case. Even if the specific acts of
punching, kicking, paddling, and other modes
of inflicting physical pain were done
voluntarily, freely, and with intelligence,
thereby satisfying the elements of freedom and
intelligence in the felony of physical injuries,
the fundamental ingredient of criminal intent
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. On
the contrary, all that was proven was that the
acts were done pursuant to tradition. Although
the additional rounds on the second night were
held upon the insistence of Villareal and Dizon,
the initiations were officially reopened with the
consent of the head of the initiation rites; and
the accused fraternity members still
participated in the rituals, including the
paddling, which were performed pursuant to
tradition. Other than the paddle, no other
weapon was used to inflict injuries on Lenny.
The targeted body parts were predominantly
the legs and the arms. The designation of roles,
including the role of auxiliaries, which were
assigned for the specific purpose of lending
assistance to and taking care of the neophytes
during the initiation rites, further belied the
presence of malicious intent. All those who
wished to join the fraternity went through the
same process of traditional initiation; there is
no proof that Lenny Villa was specifically
targeted or given a different treatment. We
stress that Congress itself recognized that
hazing is uniquely different from common
crimes.[235] The totality of the circumstances
must therefore be taken into consideration.
The underlying context and motive in which

the infliction of physical injuries was rooted
may also be determined by Lennys continued
participation in the initiation and consent to the
method used even after the first day. The
following discussion of the framers of the 1995
Anti-Hazing Law is enlightening:
SENATOR GUINGONA. Most of these acts, if
not all, are already punished under the Revised
Penal Code.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr.
President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If hazing is done at
present and it results in death, the charge would
be murder or homicide.
President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result
in death, it may be frustrated homicide or
serious physical injuries.
President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who
commits sexual abuse does so it can be
penalized under rape or acts of lasciviousness.
President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the
rationale for making a new offense under this
definition of the crime of hazing?
SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or
group of persons either composing a sorority,
fraternity or any association from making this
requirement of initiation that has already
resulted in these specific acts or results, Mr.
President.
That is the main rationale. We want to send a
strong signal across the land that no group or
association can require the act of physical
initiation before a person can become a
member without being held criminally liable.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would
be the rationale for that imposition? Because
the distinguished Sponsor has said that he is not
punishing a mere organization, he is not
seeking the punishment of an initiation into a
club or organization, he is seeking the
punishment of certain acts that resulted in
death, et cetera as a result of hazing which are
already covered crimes.
The penalty is increased in one, because we
would like to discourage hazing, abusive
hazing, but it may be a legitimate defense for
invoking two or more charges or offenses,
because these very same acts are already
punishable under the Revised Penal Code.
That is my difficulty, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. x x x
Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is
a very telling difference: When a person or
group of persons resort to hazing as a
requirement for gaining entry into an
organization, the intent to commit a wrong is
not visible or is not present, Mr. President.
Whereas, in these specific crimes, Mr.
President, let us say there is death or there is
homicide, mutilation, if one files a case, then
the intention to commit a wrong has to be
proven. But if the crime of hazing is the
basis, what is important is the result from
the act of hazing.
To me, that is the basic difference and that is
what will prevent or deter the sororities or
fraternities; that they should really shun this
activity called hazing. Because, initially, these
fraternities or sororities do not even consider
having a neophyte killed or maimed or that
acts of lasciviousness are even committed
initially, Mr. President.
So, what we want to discourage is the so-called
initial innocent act. That is why there is need
to institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang
nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang sorority ay
magre-recruit. Wala talaga silang intensiyong
makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay
pa iyong kaso. Pero dito sa anim o pito na
namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang
intensiyong patayin talaga iyong neophyte. So,
kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang
natin isasakdal ng murder kung namatay na, ay
after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin
natin sa mga kabataan na: Huwag ninyong
gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at
kung mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa
inyo.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty
motives, Mr. President, of the distinguished
Sponsor. But I am again disturbed by his
statement that the prosecution does not have
to prove the intent that resulted in the death,
that resulted in the serious physical injuries,
that resulted in the acts of lasciviousness or
deranged mind. We do not have to prove the
willful intent of the accused in proving or
establishing the crime of hazing. This seems,
to me, a novel situation where we create the
special crime without having to go into the
intent, which is one of the basic elements of
any crime.
If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the
intent were merely to initiate, then there is
no offense. And even the distinguished
Sponsor admits that the organization, the
intent to initiate, the intent to have a new
society or a new club is, per se, not
punishable at all. What are punishable are
the acts that lead to the result. But if these
results are not going to be proven by intent,
but just because there was hazing, I am
afraid that it will disturb the basic concepts
of the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of
hazing, precisely, is being criminalized
because in the context of what is happening
in the sororities and fraternities, when they
conduct hazing, no one will admit that their
intention is to maim or to kill. So, we are
already criminalizing the fact of inflicting
physical pain. Mr. President, it is a criminal act
and we want it stopped, deterred, discouraged.
If that occurs, under this law, there is no
necessity to prove that the masters intended to
kill or the masters intended to maim. What is
important is the result of the act of hazing.
Otherwise, the masters or those who inflict
the physical pain can easily escape
responsibility and say, We did not have the
intention to kill. This is part of our initiation
rites. This is normal. We do not have any
intention to kill or maim.
This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as
well have been charged therefore with the
ordinary crime of homicide, mutilation, et
cetera, where the prosecution will have a
difficulty proving the elements if they are
separate offenses.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President,
assuming there was a group that initiated and a
person died. The charge is murder. My question
is: Under this bill if it becomes a law, would
the prosecution have to prove conspiracy or not
anymore?
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person
is present during hazing x x x
SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are
present. First, would the prosecution have to
prove conspiracy? Second, would the
prosecution have to prove intent to kill or not?
SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second
question, Mr. President, if that occurs, there is
no need to prove intent to kill.
SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is
murder.
SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it
should not be murder. It should be hazing, Mr.
President. [236] (Emphasis supplied)
During a discussion between Senator Biazon
and Senator Lina on the issue of whether to
include sodomy as a punishable act under the
Anti-Hazing Law, Senator Lina further clarified
thus:
SENATOR BIAZON. Mr. President, this

Representation has no objection to the
inclusion of sodomy as one of the conditions
resulting from hazing as necessary to be
punished. However, the act of sodomy can be
committed by two persons with or without
consent.
To make it clearer, what is being punished here
is the commission of sodomy forced into
another individual by another individual. I
move, Mr. President, that sodomy be modified
by the phrase without consent for purposes of
this section.
SENATOR LINA. I am afraid, Mr. President,
that if we qualify sodomy with the concept that
it is only going to aggravate the crime of
hazing if it is done without consent will change
a lot of concepts here. Because the results
from hazing aggravate the offense with or
without consent. In fact, when a person joins
a fraternity, sorority, or any association for
that matter, it can be with or without the
consent of the intended victim. The fact that
a person joins a sorority or fraternity with
his consent does not negate the crime of
hazing.
This is a proposed law intended to protect the
citizens from the malpractices that attend
initiation which may have been announced with
or without physical infliction of pain or injury,
Mr. President. Regardless of whether there is
announcement that there will be physical
hazing or whether there is none, and
therefore, the neophyte is duped into joining
a fraternity is of no moment. What is
important is that there is an infliction of
physical pain.
The bottom line of this law is that a citizen
even has to be protected from himself if he
joins a fraternity, so that at a certain point in
time, the State, the individual, or the parents
of the victim can run after the perpetrators
of the crime, regardless of whether or not
there was consent on the part of the victim.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, I understand
the position taken by the distinguished
Gentleman from Cavite and Metro Manila. It is
correct that society sometimes adopts new
mores, traditions, and practices.
In this bill, we are not going to encroach into
the private proclivities of some individuals
when they do their acts in private as we do not
take a peek into the private rooms of couples.
They can do their thing if they want to make
love in ways that are not considered acceptable
by the mainstream of society. That is not
something that the State should prohibit.
But sodomy in this case is connected with
hazing, Mr. President. Such that the act may
even be entered into with consent. It is not only
sodomy. The infliction of pain may be done
with the consent of the neophyte. If the law
is passed, that does not make the act of hazing
not punishable because the neophyte accepted
the infliction of pain upon himself.
If the victim suffers from serious physical
injuries, but the initiator said, Well, he
allowed it upon himself. He consented to it.
So, if we allow that reasoning that sodomy
was done with the consent of the victim, then
we would not have passed any law at all.
There will be no significance if we pass this
bill, because it will always be a defense that
the victim allowed the infliction of pain or
suffering. He accepted it as part of the
initiation rites.
But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing
that we would want to prohibit. That the
defense of consent will not apply because the
very act of inflicting physical pain or
psychological suffering is, by itself, a
punishable act. The result of the act of hazing,
like death or physical injuries merely
aggravates the act with higher penalties. But
the defense of consent is not going to nullify
the criminal nature of the act.
So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy
can only aggravate the offense if it is
committed without consent of the victim,
then the whole foundation of this proposed
law will collapse.
SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr.
President.
SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to
the committee amendment? (Silence.) The
Chair hears none; the same is approved.[237]
(Emphasis supplied)
Realizing the implication of removing the
states burden to prove intent, Senator Lina, the
principal author of the Senate Bill, said:
I am very happy that the distinguished Minority

Leader brought out the idea of intent or
whether there it is mala in se or mala prohibita.
There can be a radical amendment if that is the
point that he wants to go to.
If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we
can just make this a special law on hazing.
We will not include this anymore under the
Revised Penal Code. That is a possibility. I
will not foreclose that suggestion, Mr.
President.[238](Emphasis supplied)
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict
between the proposed law and the core
principle of mala in se adhered to under the
Revised Penal Code, Congress did not simply
enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it created
a special law on hazing, founded upon the
principle of mala prohibita. This dilemma
faced by Congress is further proof of how the
nature of hazing unique as against typical
crimes cast a cloud of doubt on whether society
considered the act as an inherently wrong
conduct or mala in se at the time. It is safe to
presume that Lennys parents would not have
consented[239] to his participation in Aquila
Fraternitys initiation rites if the practice of
hazing were considered by them as mala in se.
Furthermore, in Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we

noted through Associate Justice (now retired
Chief Justice) Hilario Davide that in our
nations very recent history, the people have
spoken, through Congress, to deem conduct
constitutive of hazing, [an] act[] previously
considered harmless by custom, as criminal.
[240] Although it may be regarded as a simple
obiter dictum, the statement nonetheless shows
recognition that hazing or the conduct of
initiation rites through physical and/or
psychological suffering has not been
traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995
Anti-Hazing Law, there was to some extent a
lacuna in the law; hazing was not clearly
considered an intentional felony. And when
there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal
laws, all must be resolved in favor of the
accused. In dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of

law, the Court is constrained to rule against the
trial courts finding of malicious intent to inflict
physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no
proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence
of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries or
animus iniuriandi as required in mala in se
cases, considering the contextual background
of his death, the unique nature of hazing, and
absent a law prohibiting hazing.
The accused fraternity

members guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in
homicide
The absence of malicious intent does not
automatically mean, however, that the accused
fraternity members are ultimately devoid of
criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also
punishes felonies that are committed by means
of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof,
there is fault when the wrongful act results
from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight,
or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of

a voluntary act done without malice, from
which an immediate personal harm, injury or
material damage results by reason of an
inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on
the part of the person committing it.[241] In
this case, the danger is visible and consciously
appreciated by the actor.[242] In contrast,
simple imprudence or negligence comprises an
act done without grave fault, from which an
injury or material damage ensues by reason of a
mere lack of foresight or skill.[243] Here, the
threatened harm is not immediate, and the
danger is not openly visible. [244]
The test[245] for determining whether or not a

person is negligent in doing an act is as
follows: Would a prudent man in the position
of the person to whom negligence is attributed
foresee harm to the person injured as a
reasonable consequence of the course about to
be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer
the duty to take precaution against the
mischievous results of the act. Failure to do so
constitutes negligence.[246]
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to

avoid being charged with recklessness, the
degree of precaution and diligence required
varies with the degree of the danger involved.
[247] If, on account of a certain line of
conduct, the danger of causing harm to another
person is great, the individual who chooses to
follow that particular course of conduct is
bound to be very careful, in order to prevent or
avoid damage or injury.[248] In contrast, if the
danger is minor, not much care is required.
[249] It is thus possible that there are countless
degrees of precaution or diligence that may be
required of an individual, from a transitory
glance of care to the most vigilant effort.[250]
The duty of the person to employ more or less
degree of care will depend upon the
circumstances of each particular case.[251]
There was patent recklessness in the hazing of
Lenny Villa.
According to the NBI medico-legal officer,

Lenny died of cardiac failure secondary to
multiple traumatic injuries.[252] The officer
explained that cardiac failure refers to the
failure of the heart to work as a pump and as
part of the circulatory system due to the lack of
blood.[253] In the present case, the victims
heart could no longer work as a pumping organ,
because it was deprived of its requisite blood
and oxygen.[254] The deprivation was due to
the channeling of the blood supply from the
entire circulatory system including the heart,
arteries, veins, venules, and capillaries to the
thigh, leg, and arm areas of Lenny, thus causing
the formation of multiple hematomas or blood
clots.[255] The multiple hematomas were wide,
thick, and deep,[256] indicating that these
could have resulted mainly from injuries
sustained by the victim from fist blows, knee
blows, paddles, or the like.[257] Repeated
blows to those areas caused the blood to
gradually ooze out of the capillaries until the
circulating blood became so markedly
diminished as to produce death. [258] The
officer also found that the brain, liver, kidney,
pancreas, intestines, and all other organs seen
in the abdominals, as well as the thoracic organ
in the lungs, were pale due to the lack of blood,
which was redirected to the thighs and
forearms.[259] It was concluded that there was
nothing in the heart that would indicate that the
victim suffered from a previous cardiac arrest
or disease.[260]
The multiple hematomas or bruises found in

Lenny Villas arms and thighs, resulting from
repeated blows to those areas, caused the loss
of blood from his vital organs and led to his
eventual death. These hematomas must be
taken in the light of the hazing activities
performed on him by the Aquila Fraternity.
According to the testimonies of the co-
neophytes of Lenny, they were punched,
kicked, elbowed, kneed, stamped on; and hit
with different objects on their arms, legs, and
thighs.[261] They were also paddled at the back of
their thighs or legs;[262] and slapped on their
faces.[263] They were made to play rough
basketball.[264] Witness Marquez testified on
Lenny, saying: [T]inamaan daw sya sa spine.
[265] The NBI medico-legal officer explained that
the death of the victim was the cumulative
effect of the multiple injuries suffered by the
latter.[266] The relevant portion of the testimony
is as follows:
Atty. Tadiar Doctor, there was, rather, it was

your testimony on various cross examinations
of defense counsels that the injuries that you
have enumerated on the body of the deceased
Lenny Villa previously marked as Exhibit G-1
to G-14 individually by themselves would not
cause the death of the victim. The question I
am going to propound to you is what is the
cumulative effect of all of these injuries marked
from Exhibit G-1 to G-14?
Witness All together nothing in concert to
cause to the demise of the victim. So, it is not
fair for us to isolate such injuries here because
we are talking of the whole body. At the same
manner that as a car would not run minus one
(1) wheel. No, the more humane in human
approach is to interpret all those injuries in
whole and not in part.[267]
There is also evidence to show that some of the
accused fraternity members were drinking
during the initiation rites.[268]
Consequently, the collective acts of the

fraternity members were tantamount to
recklessness, which made the resulting death of
Lenny a culpable felony. It must be
remembered that organizations owe to their
initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury
in the process.[269] With the foregoing facts, we
rule that the accused are guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the
NBI medico-legal officer found that the victims
death was the cumulative effect of the injuries
suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to all
those who directly participated in and
contributed to the infliction of physical injuries.
It appears from the aforementioned facts that

the incident may have been prevented, or at
least mitigated, had the alumni of Aquila
Fraternity accused Dizon and Villareal
restrained themselves from insisting on
reopening the initiation rites. Although this
point did not matter in the end,
as records would show that the other fraternity
members participated in the reopened initiation
rites having in mind the concept of seniority in
fraternities the implication of the presence of
alumni should be seen as a point of review in
future legislation. We further note that some of
the fraternity members were intoxicated during
Lennys initiation rites. In this light, the Court
submits to Congress, for legislative
consideration, the amendment of the Anti-
Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication
and the presence of non-resident or alumni
fraternity members during hazing as
aggravating circumstances that would increase
the applicable penalties.
It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly

or unwittingly impose the misery of hazing and
employ appalling rituals in the name of
brotherhood. There must be a better way to
establish kinship. A neophyte admitted that he
joined the fraternity to have more friends and to
avail himself of the benefits it offered, such as
tips during bar examinations.[270] Another initiate
did not give up, because he feared being looked
down upon as a quitter, and because he felt he
did not have a choice.[271] Thus, for Lenny Villa
and the other neophytes, joining the Aquila
Fraternity entailed a leap in the dark. By giving
consent under the circumstances, they left their
fates in the hands of the fraternity members.
Unfortunately, the hands to which lives were
entrusted were barbaric as they were reckless.
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony

of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
shall cover only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda,
Bantug, and Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law
been in effect then, these five accused fraternity
members would have all been convicted of the
crime of hazing punishable by reclusion
perpetua (life imprisonment).[272] Since there
was no law prohibiting the act of hazing when
Lenny died, we are constrained to rule
according to existing laws at the time of his
death. The CA found that the prosecution failed
to prove, beyond reasonable doubt,
Victorino et al.s individual participation in the
infliction of physical injuries upon Lenny Villa.
[273] As to accused Villareal, his criminal
liability was totally extinguished by the fact of
his death, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be

interpreted without prejudice to the
applicability of the Anti-Hazing Law to
subsequent cases. Furthermore, the
modification of criminal liability from slight
physical injuries to reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide shall apply only with
respect to accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and
Tecson.
The accused liable to pay

damages
The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs

of Lenny Villa in the amounts of ₱50,000 as
civil indemnity ex delicto and ₱1,000,000 as
moral damages, to be jointly and severally paid
by accused Dizon and Villareal. It also awarded
the amount of ₱30,000 as indemnity to be
jointly and severally paid by accused Almeda,
Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically

awarded for the sole fact of death of the victim.
[274] In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,
[275] we sustain the CAs award of indemnity in
the amount of ₱50,000.
The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or

compensatory damages, including expenses
incurred in connection with the death of the
victim, so long as the claim is supported by
tangible documents.[276] Though we are prepared
to award actual damages, the Court is
prevented from granting them, since the
records are bereft of any evidence to show that
actual expenses were incurred or proven during
trial. Furthermore, in the appeal, the Solicitor
General does not interpose any claim for actual
damages.[277]
The heirs of the deceased may recover moral

damages for the grief suffered on account of
the victims death.[278] This penalty is pursuant to
Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code, which
provides that the spouse, legitimate and
illegitimate descendants and the ascendants of
the deceased may demand moral damages for
mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased.[279] Thus, we hereby we affirm the
CAs award of moral damages in the amount of
₱1,000,000.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in

G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito
Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby
MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The
appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 finding
Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama,
Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty
of the crime of slight physical injuries is also
MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART.
Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano
Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug,
Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide defined and
penalized under Article 365 in relation to
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. They
are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum. In addition,
accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to
pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex
delicto in the amount of ₱50,000, and moral
damages in the amount of ₱1,000,000, plus
legal interest on all damages awarded at the
rate of 12% from the date of the finality of this
Decision until satisfaction.[280] Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954,

acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby
AFFIRMED. The appealed Judgments in G.R.
Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the
criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise
AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1)
of the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R.
No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the
criminal case against Artemio Villareal deemed
CLOSED and TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the

Senate President and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives for possible consideration of
the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to
include the fact of intoxication and the
presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity
members during hazing as aggravating
circumstances that would increase the
applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.

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DISCHARGE OF

Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil, also known as

Appellant Ladjaalam agrees with the narration

The trial court observed that the house of

In his Brief, appellant submits the following

The appeal has no merit.

Appellant insists that the trial court erred in

Appellant, in essence, questions the credibility

From the convoluted arguments strewn before

We agree with the trial court that appellant was

Aside from finding appellant guilty of direct

injuries,[68] both of which are punishable by

On 11 January 1985, an amended

THE PEOPLE OF Promulgated:

That on or about the 30th day of January 1996,

inches, (tsn., Aug.

wounds, (tsn., Aug.

Appellants drove the pick-up, with Marilou and

Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not

Although courts must not remain indifferent to

Before the Court are the consolidated cases

The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court

In February 1991, seven freshmen law students

Even before the neophytes got off the van, they

On the morning of their second day 9 February

After a while, accused non-resident or alumni

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was

In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)

On 8 November 1993, the trial court

On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No.

3. Two of the accused-appellants

On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal

From the aforementioned Decisions, the five

G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People

The instant case refers to accused Villareals

G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People

Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for

As regards the first issue, the trial court made a

Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends

Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA

Further, petitioner argues that his alleged

G.R. No. 154954 People v. Court of Appeals

This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65

In the alternative, petitioner claims that the

Petitioner also argues that the rule on double

Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for

Due to several pending incidents, the trial court

Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal of the

We resolve herein the various issues that we

1. Whether the forfeiture of petitioner

3. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of

4. Whether accused Dizon is guilty of

Resolution on Preliminary Matters

G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People

In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while

According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal

Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner

G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)

In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court

accused-petitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and

22nd of September; and the 5th and 12 of

However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for