2.

ESTRADA VS DESIERTO; ARROYO

Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March 2 2001

[Immunity from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable controversy]

FACTS:

It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and other forms of
corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was
impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious
allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators,
sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial
was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his
vote against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called
for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that
he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada
“constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th
President. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for
WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not
until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of
the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.

ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.
RULING:

1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."

Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:

EDSA I EDSA II

exercise of people power of freedom

of speech and freedom of assemblyto
exercise of the people power of petition the government for redress of
revolution which overthrew the whole grievances which only affected the
government. office of the President.

extra constitutional and the legitimacy

intra constitutional and the
of the new government that resulted
resignation of the sitting President that
from it cannot be the subject of judicial
it caused and the succession of the
review
Vice President as President are subject
to judicial review.

presented a political question; involves legal questions.

The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of
certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of governmental powers
under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve
the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.

2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were present when President
Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing material relevant issues—President
Estrada is deemed to have resigned— constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving Malacañan Palace. In
the press release containing his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process (he did not say that
he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability
disappears);

3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President (without doubt referring to the past
opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service of the country;

5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission before, during and after January 20, 2001.

3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the
Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice
President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear
is that both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the
inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability.

The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by
constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a
President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress
and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this
Court.

4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no
stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged
mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit
criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not
acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.

5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also, since our justice system does not
use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere
publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has
influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against Estrada were
still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge and
that the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less with prosecution.
4. FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTEATIVES G.R. NO. 160261

FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide.
The justiciable controversy in this case was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert
the rules of impeachment provided for by law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the
House of Representatives is constitutional, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question — h; as resulted in a
political crisis.

HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House
of Representativesare unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

REASONING:In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth
that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no
means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the
sovereign people.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to
temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-
equality. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and “one
section is not to be allowed to defeat another.” Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor
proposing that “A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment
proceedings,” this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate
impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint
to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with
the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint
has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.

The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the
impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule.
Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turnjusticiable issues out of
decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two
great branches of the government.

5. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 451 SCRA 570 (2005)

Melchor Carandang, Paul Elmer Clemente and Jose Tereso De Jesus, Jr., were appointed Graft Investigation Officers III of the
Office of the Ombudsman. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) approved the appointments on the condition that for the
appointees to acquire security of tenure, they must first obtain a Career Executive Service (CES). The Ombudsman requested to
the CSC for the change of status from temporary to permanent, of the appointments of Carandang, Clemente and De Jesus,
emphasizing that since the Office of the Ombudsman is not governed by the Career Executive Service Board, security of tenure
can be granted despite the absence of CES eligibility. CSC changed the status of Carandang‘s and Clemente‘sappointments to
permanent but not with respect to De Jesus on the ground that he “has not met the eligibility requirements. Hence, this
petition for ceritiorari filed by the Office of the Ombudsman seeking to nullify the CSC Resolution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the general power of the Civil Service Commission to administer civil service cannot validly curtail the specific
discretionary power of appointment including the grant of security of tenure by the Office of the Ombudsman
HELD:

Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides persons occupying positions in the CES are presidential
appointees. A person occupying the position of Graft Investigation Officer III is not, however, appointed by the President but
by the Ombudsman as provided in Article IX of the Constitution. To classify the position of Graft Investigation Officer III as
belonging to the CES and require an appointee thereto to acquire CES or CSE eligibility before acquiring security of tenure
would be absurd as it would result either in 1) vesting the appointing power for said position in the President, in violation of
the Constitution; or 2) including in the CES a position not occupied by a presidential appointee, contrary to the Administrative
Code. It bears emphasis that that under P.D. No 807, Sec. 9(h) which authorizes the CSC to approveappointments to positions
in the civil service, except those specified therein, its authority is limited “only to [determine] whether or not the appointees
possess the legal qualifications and the appropriate eligibility, nothing else.”11 It is not disputed that, except for his lack of CES
or CSE eligibility, De Jesus possesses the basic qualifications of a Graft Investigation Officer III, as provided in the earlier quoted
Qualification Standards. Such being the case, the CSC has the ministerial duty to grant the request of the Ombudsman
that appointment be made permanent effective December 18, 2002. To refuse to heed the request is a clear encroachment on
the discretion vested solely on the Ombudsman as appointing authority. It goes without saying that the status of
the appointmentsof Carandang and Clemente, who were conferred CSE eligibility pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 03-
0665 dated June 6, 2003, should be changed to permanent effective December 18, 2002 too.

6. Zaldivar Vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 79690-707

February 1, 1989

Facts: The case stemmed from the resolution of the Supreme Court stopping the respondent from investigating graft cases
involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar. The Court ruled that since the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, respondent’s powers
as Tanodbayan have been superseded by the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman, he however becomes the Special
Prosecutor of the State, and can only conduct an investigation and file cases only when so authorized by the Ombudsman. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent wherein he included statements which were unrelated in the Issue
raised in the Court. This include: (a)That he had been approached twice by a leading member of the court and he was asked to
'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him; (b) That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the
COA report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass the Court;" and (c) that in several
instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss
the cases against two Members of the Court." Statements of the respondent saying that the SC’s order '"heightens the
people's apprehension over the justice system in this country, especially because the people have been thinking that only the
small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free” was publicized in leading newspapers.

Now, the Court Resolved to require respondent to explain in writing why he should not be punished for contempt of court for
making such public statements reported in the media. Respondent then sought to get some members of the Court to inhibit
themselves in the resolution of the Zaldivar case for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked the
whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the Issue involved in proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due process from this Court, that the
Court has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. The Court found respondent guilty of contempt of court and
indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. Now, he assails said conviction, invoking his freedom of speech. Counsel for
respondent urges that it is error "for this Court to apply the "visible tendency" rule rather than the "clear and present danger"
rule in disciplinary and contempt charges."

Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom of speech/expression.

Held: There was no violation. The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it was simply
paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct
including: "any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice."

Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," the Court held that the statements made
by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend
the permissible limits of free speech. What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a
"substantive evil" consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of
the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards of professional
conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the courts, which has some implications to the society.

8. FELICITO S. MACALINO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

[G.R. Nos. 140199-200. February 6, 2002]

Facts:

On September 16, 1992, two informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner,being then the Assistant
Manager of the Treasury Division and the Head of the Loans Administration & Insurance Section of the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC), a government-controlled corporation, and his wife, Liwayway S. Tan, charging them with
estafa through falsification of official documents and frustrated estafa through falsification of mercantile documents. Upon
arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges.

However, during the initial presentation of evidence for the defense, petitioner moved for leave to file a motion to dismiss on
the ground that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him since he is not a public officer because the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC), formerly the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP), is not a
government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter.

On August 5, 1999, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss for lack of merit.

The Issue:

Whether petitioner, an employee of the PNCC, is a public officer within the coverage of R. A. No. 3019, as amended.

Ruling:

Inasmuch as the PNCC has no original charter as it was incorporated under the general law on corporations, it follows
inevitably that petitioner is not a public officer within the coverage of R. A. No. 3019, as amended. Thus, the Sandiganbayan
has no jurisdiction over him. The only instance when the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual is when the
complaint charges him either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer who has been charged with a crime
within the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.

9. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. GERTRUDES MADRIAGA and ANA MARIE BERNARDO

503 SCRA 631 (2006), THIRD DIVISION

FACTS: Respondents Gertrudes Madriaga, school principal of San Juan Elementary School and Ana Marie Bernardo, school
teacher and canteen manager of the same school was charged with violation of Section 1 of Rule IV and Section 1 of Rule VI of
the Rules Implementing Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees. Graft Investigation Officer found them guilty of violation of Section 5(a) of R.A. No.6713 and also of
conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service, accordingly penalizes respondents with six months of suspension.
Having been denied for their motion for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation, they elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
via petition for certiorari. The appellate court declared that the penalty imposed by the Office of the Ombudsman is merely
"recommendatory" to the Department of Education, it (Office of the Ombudsman) having "only the power to investigate
possible misconduct of a government official or employee in the performance of his functions, and thereafter recommend to
the disciplining authority the appropriate penalty to be meted out; and that it is the disciplining authority that has the power
or prerogative to impose such penalty.”

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not the suspension meted out by the Office of the Ombudsman to respondent Madriaga and Bernardo is
merely recommendatory to the Department of Education.

RULING: We note that Section 15(3) of R.A. No. 6770 echoes the constitutional grant (Article XI, Section 13 of the 1987
Constitution) to petitioner of the power to recommend the imposition of penalty on erring public officials and employees and
ensure compliance therewith. That said provision qualifies the order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute"
an officer or employee akin to the questioned issuances in the case at bar. That the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to
comply with such an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is a
strong indication that the Ombudsman's "recommendation" is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within
the bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority of the head of office or
any officer concerned. It has long been settled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act
or omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense
charged. By stating therefore that the Ombudsman recommends the action to be taken against an erring officer or employee,
the provisions in the Constitution and in RA 6770 intended that the implementation of the order be coursed through the
proper officer,

CA’s DECISION is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

10. La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. Vs Ramos

G.R. No. 127882; January 27, 2004

FACTS:
This petition for prohibition and mandamus challenges the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942 (The Philippine Mining
Act of 1995), its implementing rules and regulations and the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated March
30, 1995 by the government with Western Mining Corporation(Philippines) Inc. (WMCP).
Accordingly, the FTAA violated the 1987 Constitution in that it is a service contract and is antithetical to the principle of
sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to
the prejudice of the Filipino nation.

ISSUE:
What is the proper interpretation of the phrase “Agreements involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance” contained in
paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

HELD:
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its implementing rules and regulations – insofar
as they relate to financial and technical agreements as well as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement.
Full control is not anathematic to day-to-day management by the contractor, provided that the State retains the power to
direct overall strategy; and to set aside, reverse or modify plans and actions of the contractor. The idea of full control is similar
to that which is exercised by the board of directors of a private corporation, the performance of managerial, operational,
financial, marketing and other functions may be delegated to subordinate officers or given to contractual entities, but the
board retains full residual control of the business.

11. Francisco Chavez vs Public Estates Authority

The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It
took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR (Department of Environmental and Natural Resources) insofar as
reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.

PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation, a private corporation, of the ownership of
77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to Amari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.

HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to Amari as private lands will sanction
a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.

The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by
certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of
Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain. The transfer (as embodied in a joint venture
agreement) to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, is void for being contrary to
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to Amari ownership of 290.156 hectares of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

12. Chavez vs. National Housing Authority (NHA)

Facts: Former Solicitor General Frank Chavez files a case against BHA for prohibition to enjoin the NHA from implementing
the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) entered into by NHA with R-II Builders for the reclamation and development of the
Smokey Mountain area in Tondo. Chavez imputes certain constitutional infirmities against the JVA, for instance that the NHA
had no authority to order reclamation, the DENR’s approval was not secured, etc. Chavez also filed for Mandamus for the
disclosure of papers and documents related to the project.

Issue: Whether or not prohibition is proper

Held: No. It was not shown that the NHA exercises quasi-judicial or judicial functions I relation to the project. It must be noted
that under the ROC, among the entities mentioned are quasi-judicial or judicial agencies.

It was not shown that there is no plain, adequate or speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law. It appears that Chavez could
have filed administrative remedies against the NHA.

Lastly, prohibition does not lie against acts which are already fait accompli. Note that the project has already been partially
completed.

13. BENJAMIN V. GUIANG and NATIVIDAD H. GUIANG; AURELIO B. HIQUIANA andPASTORA O. HIQUIANA, petitioners, vs.
FILOMENO C. KINTANAR and CORAZONB. KINTANAR; CORA ANN B. KINTANAR, CORA LOU B. KINTANAR, FIL ROGERB.
KINTANAR, private respondents, and Hon. Judge SERGIO APOSTOL, Quezon CityCourt of First Instance, Branch XVI, Quezon
City, respondent.

FACTS:Petition filed on January 15, 1979 for certiorari and mandamus seeking the setting asideof the decision and the two
orders subsequent thereto of respondent judge dated August 20, 1975and November 14, 1978 and December 27, 1978,
respectively, as acts committed in grave abuseof discretion, the compromise agreement on which said decision was based
being allegedly incontravention of the Constitution and the Public Land Act, hence the execution thereof under thetwo
questioned subsequent orders had no legal basis.

ISSUE:Whether or not compromise agreement approved by the trial court under which one partyconveys to the other an area
of land, previously acquired from the Government, of more than 24hectares, especially where the transferee already owns 29
hectares acquired under the PublicLand Act, is null and void ab initio

RULING:YES. The compromise agreement, executed on August 20, 1975, provides for the transferof a total of 146 hectares. It
inevitably follows then that said compromise agreement contravenesnot only a statute but the fundamental law of the land.
Adding to its being contrary to law, whichundoubtedly is also covered by the public policy expressed in the Constitution, is the
fact thatprivate respondents, the Kintanars, already owned at the time of the agreement a lot of 29hectares which they had
acquired also from the government pursuant to the Public Land Act.Such being the situation, it is incontestable that under
Paragraph (1) of Article 1409 of the CivilCode said agreement is "inexistent and void from the beginning" since its "object or
purpose iscontrary to law—or public policy".

14. THOMAS C. CHEESMAN, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT andESTELITA PADILLA, respondents.

FACTS: This appeal concerns the attempt by an American citizen (petitioner Thomas Cheesman)to annul—for lack of consent
on his part—the sale by his Filipino wife (Criselda) of a residentiallot and building to Estelita Padilla, also a Filipino.Thomas
Cheesman and Criselda P. Cheesman were married on December 4, 1970 buthave been separated since February 15, 1981.

ISSUE:Whether or not sale to aliens of residential land is valid.

RULING:NO. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit an alien to have. An equally decisive consideration is that
Estelita Padilla is a purchaser in good faith, boththe Trial Court and the Appellate Court having found that Cheesman’s own
conduct had led herto believe the property to be exclusive property of the latter’s wife, freely disposable by herwithout his
consent or intervention. An innocent buyer for value, she is entitled to the protectionof the law in her purchase, particularly as
against Cheesman, who would assert rights to theproperty denied him by both letter and spirit of the Constitution itself.

15. HEIRS OF LORENZO YAP, namely SALLY SUN YAP, MARGARET YAP-UY and MANUEL YAP, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RAMONYAP and BENJAMIN YAP, respondents.

FACTS:The controversy started when herein petitioners, advised respondents of the former’sclaim of ownership over the
property and demanded that respondents execute the proper deednecessary to transfer the title to them. At about the same
time, petitioners filed a case forejectment against one of the bonafide tenants of the property.Assessing the evidence before
it, the trial court found for the respondents and adjudgedBenjamin Yap to be the true and lawful owner of the disputed
property.On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and debunked theclaim of petitioners that
Ramon Yap was merely so used as a dummy by Lorenzo Yap.

ISSUE:Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it holdsthat defendants-appellants father
Lorenzo Yap, being Chinese cannot enter into a trust agreementand the existence of a trust agreement cannot be proven being
Chinese.

RULING:Unfortunately for petitioners, the issues they submit in the case at bar boil down to theappreciation of the evidence
presented. The Court of Appeals, sustaining the court a quo, hasfound the evidence submitted by petitioners to be utterly
wanting, consisting mainly of the self-serving testimony of Sally Yap. She herself admitted that the business establishment of
herhusband Lorenzo was razed by fire in 1964 that would somehow place to doubt the claim that heindeed had the means to
purchase the subject land about two years later from the Nery spouses.Upon the other hand, Ramon Yap was by then an
accountant with apparent means to buy theproperty himself. At all events, findings of fact by the Court of Appeals, particularly
whenconsistent with those made by the trial court, should deserve utmost regard when not devoid ofevidentiary support. No
cogent reason had been shown by petitioners for the Court to now holdotherwise.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.

16. EPIFANIA SARSOSA VDA. DE BARSOBIA and PACITA W. VALLER, petitioners, vs.VICTORIANO T. CUENCO, respondent.

FACTS:The lot in controversy is a one-half portion (on the northern side) of two adjoiningparcels of coconut land located at
Barrio Mancapagao, Sagay, Camiguin, Misamis Oriental (nowCamiguin province), with an area of 29,150 square meters, more
or less.The entire land wasowned previously by a certain LeocadiaBalisado, who had sold it to the spouses PatricioBarsobia
(now deceased) and EpifaniaSarsosa, one of the petitioners herein. They are Filipinocitizens.On September 5, 1936,
EpifaniaSarsosa, then a widow, sold the land to a Chinese, OngKing Po, for the sum of P1, 050.00, who took actual possession
and enjoyed the fruits thereof.Respondent filed a Forcible Entry case against Epifania before the Municipal Court ofSagay,
Camiguin. The case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction since, as the laws then stood,the question of possession could not
be properly determined without first settling that of ownership.

17. FILOMENA GERONA DE CASTRO VS. JOAQUIN TENG QUEEN TAN

GR # L-31956 April 30 1984 (Law on Natural Resources)

FACTS: A residential lot was sold by petitioner Filomena De Castro to Tan Tai, a Chinese, who died leaving herein respondents-
heirs, his widow and children. In an extra-judicial settlement of estate with sale executed by the respondents after Tan Tai’s
death, the parcel of land in question was allotted in its entirety to Joaquin, one of Tan Tai’s sons who became a naturalized
Filipino before the latter’s death. Petitioner filed a complaint against the respondents, contending that the sale be annulled for
violation of the 1935 Constitution, to which respondents moved to dismiss.

ISSUE: Whether or not a contract of sale can be annulled on the basis that it is in violation of the 1935 Constitution prohibiting
the sale of land to aliens.

HELD: No, independently of the doctrine of pari delicto, the petitioner cannot have the sale annulled. While the vendee was an
alien at the time of sale, the land has since become the property, of respondent Joaquin Teng, a naturalized Philippine citizen,
who is constitutionally qualified to own a land.

18. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATECOURT, ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF
LUCENA, represented by Msgr. Jose T.Sanchez, and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH LIII, LUCENA CITY, respondents.
FACTS:“On February 2, 1979, the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena, represented byMsgr. Jose T. Sanchez, filed an
application for confirmation of title to four (4) parcels of land.Three of said parcels, denominated as Lots 1, 2 and 3,
respectively, of plan PSU-65686 aresituated in Barrio Masin, Municipality of Candelaria, Quezon Province. The fourth parcels
underplan PSU-112592 is located in Barrio Bucal (Taguan), same municipality and province. As basis for the application, the
applicant claimed title to the various properties through either purchase ordonation dating as far back as 1928.The court
ordered the registration of the four parcels together with the improvementsthereon ‘in the name of the ROMAN CATHOLIC
BISHOP OF LUCENA, INC., a religiouscorporation sole duly registered and existing under the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines.”

ISSUES:Whether or not the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena, as a corporation sole is qualifiedto apply for confirmation of its
title to the four (4) parcels of land subject of this case.

RULING:There is no doubt that a corporation sole by the nature of its incorporation is vested withthe right to purchase and
hold real estate and personal property. It need not therefore be treatedas an ordinary private corporation because
whether or not it is so treated as such, theConstitutional provision involved will, nevertheless, be not applicable.The
lands subjects of this petition were already private property at the time theapplication for confirmation of title
was filed in 1979. There is therefore no cogent reason todisturb the findings of the appellate court.WHEREFORE, the petition is
dismissed for lack of merit and the appealed decision andResolution of the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby AFFIRMED

20. TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS, Administratrix, petitioner-appellee, vs.
MARCELLE D. VDA.DE RAMIREZ, ET AL.,oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors-appellants

FACTS: Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, withonly his widow as compulsory heir.
His will was admitted to probate by the Court of FirstInstance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa
Palacios was appointedadministratrix of the estate. On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as
follows: theproperty of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow “enplenodominio” in
satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or “free portion” shall go to Jorgeand Roberto Ramirez “en nudapropriedad.”
Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion ischarged with the widow’s usufruct and the remaining two-third (2/3) with a
usufruct in favor ofWanda.

ISSUE:Does the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands extend totestamentary succession?

RULING:NO. The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the groundthat the Constitution covers not
only succession by operation of law but also testamentarysuccession. The Constitutional provision which enables aliens to
acquire private lands does notextend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught
andmeaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to aPhilippine landowner in exchange
for a devise of a piece of land.

21. LLANTINO V. CO LIONG CHONG (1990)

Facts:Co Liong Chong entered a contract with Llantino Sps for a lease of land for a period of 60 years.Note that Co Liong Chong
was naturalized as a Filipino citizen (changed name to JuanMolina).Llantino sps wanted to recover the property from Co Liong
Chong.

Issue:WON the lease contract is INvalid because at the time of its execution, he was a Chinese?

Held:NO. it was VALID. Lease contracts with Aliens allowed since an alien's stay in RP is temporary,they may be granted
temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not prohibited by theconstitution-the lease contract is valid as long as there
are no circumstances attendant to its executionwhich are used to circumvent the constitutional prohibition such as an option
to buy the contractor a lease for more than 50 years.An exception to this exception is when the alien subsequentlyacquires
Philippine Citizenship.

Capacity of the person to transfer or acquire real property is governed by law of the place where property is located:
Constitution allows an alien to use lands for residential purposes for a reasonable period (i.e. through lease); so is an option
giving an alien the right to buy real property on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship.

22. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GSIS

FACTS: The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization
program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation. In a close bidding held on
18September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-
Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of
the necessary contracts, matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. On 17 October 1995, perhaps
apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregardedthe tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be
hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and
mandamus.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the Constitutional provision of
Filipino First policy and is therefore null and void

RULING: The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder
solely for the sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic
repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy
provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of
being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution. It was thus
ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of
the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do
such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.

23. Francisco Tatad vs Jesus Garcia

In 1989, the government planned to build a railway transit line along EDSA. No bidding was made but certain corporations
were invited to prequalify. The only corporation to qualify was the EDSA LRT Consortium which was obviously formed for this
particular undertaking. An agreement was then made between the government, through the Department of Transportation
and Communication (DOTC), and EDSA LRT Consortium. The agreement was based on the Build-Operate-Transfer scheme
provided for by law (RA 6957, amended by RA 7718). Under the agreement, EDSA LRT Consortium shall build the facilities, i.e.,
railways, and shall supply the train cabs. Every phase that is completed shall be turned over to the DOTC and the latter shall
pay rent for the same for 25 years. By the end of 25 years, it was projected that the government shall have fully paid EDSA LRT
Consortium. Thereafter, EDSA LRT Consortium shall sell the facilities to the government for $1.00.

However, Senators Francisco Tatad, John Osmeña, and Rodolfo Biazon opposed the implementation of said agreement as they
averred that EDSA LRT Consortium is a foreign corporation as it was organized under Hongkong laws; that as such, it cannot
own a public utility such as the EDSA railway transit because this falls under the nationalized areas of activities. The petition
was filed against Jesus Garcia, Jr. in his capacity as DOTC Secretary.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition shall prosper.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court made a clarification. The SC ruled that EDSA LRT Consortium, under the agreement, does not
and will not become the owner of a public utility hence, the question of its nationality is misplaced. It is true that a foreign
corporation cannot own a public utility but in this case what EDSA LRT Consortium will be owning are the facilities that it will
be building for the EDSA railway project. There is no prohibition against a foreign corporation to own facilities used for a public
utility. Further, it cannot be said that EDSA LRT Consortium will be the one operating the public utility for it will be DOTC that
will operate the railway transit. DOTC will be the one exacting fees from the people for the use of the railway and from the
proceeds, it shall be paying the rent due to EDSA LRT Consortium. All that EDSA LRT Consortium has to do is to build the
facilities and receive rent from the use thereof by the government for 25 years – it will not operate the railway transit.
Although EDSA LRT Consortium is a corporation formed for the purpose of building a public utility it does not automatically
mean that it is operating a public utility. The moment for determining the requisite Filipino nationality is when the entity
applies for a franchise, certificate or any other form of authorization for that purpose.

24. Albano vs. Reyes (175 SCRA 264)

 Facts: The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) board directed the PPA management to prepare for the public bidding of the
development, management and operation of the Manila International Container Terminal (MICT) at the Port of Manila. A
Bidding Committee was formed by the DOTC for the public bidding. After evaluation of several bids, the Bidding Committee
recommended the award of the contract to respondent International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI). Accordingly,
Rainerio Reyes, then DOTC secretary, declared the ICTSI consortium as the winning bidder.

On May 18, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved the same with directives that PPA shall still have the responsibility
for planning, detailed engineering, construction, expansion, rehabilitation and capital dredging of the port, as well as the
determination of how the revenues of the port system shall be allocated for future works; and the contractor shall not collect
taxes and duties except that in the case of wharfage or tonnage dues.

Petitioner Albano, as taxpayer and Congressman, assailed the legality of the award and claimed that since the MICT is a public
utility, it needs a legislative franchise before it can legally operate as a public utility.

ISSUE: Whether a franchise is needed for the operation of the MICT?

Held: No. While the PPA has been tasked under E.O. No. 30 with the management and operation of the MICT and to
undertake the provision of cargo handling and port related services thereat, the law provides that such shall be “in accordance
with P.D. 857 and other applicable laws and regulations”. P.D. 857 expressly empowers the PPA to provide services within Port
Districts “whether on its own, by contract, or otherwise”.

Even if the MICT is considered a public utility, its operation would not necessarily need a franchise from the legislature because
the law has granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant licenses for or to authorize the operation of public
utilities. Reading E.O. 30 and P.D. 857 together, it is clear that the lawmaker has empowered the PPA to undertake by itself the
operation and management of the MICP or to authorize its operation and management by another by contract or other means,
at its option.

Doctrine: The law granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant licenses for the operation of public utilities.
Theory that MICT is a “wharf” or a “dock”, as contemplated under the Public Service Act, would not necessarily call for a
franchise from the Legislative Branch.

25. National Development Corporation vs Philippine Veterans Bank

192 SCRA 257 [GR No. 84132-33 December 10, 1990

Facts: The particular enactment in question is Presidential Decree No. 1717, which ordered the rehabilitation of the Agrix
Group of Companies to be administered mainly by the National Development Company. The law outlined the procedure for
filling claims against the Agrix Companies and created a claims committee to process these claims. Especially relevant to this
case, and noted at the outset, is section 4(1) thereof providing that “all mortgages and other liens presently attaching to any of
the assets of the dissolved corporations are hereby extinguished.” Earlier, the Agrix Marketing Inc. had executed in favor of
private respondent Philippine Veterans Bank a real estate mortgage dated July 7, 1978 over three parcels of land situated in
Los Baños, Laguna. During the existence of the mortgage, Agrix went bankrupt. It was the expressed purpose of salvaging this
and the other Agrix companies that the aforementioned decree was issued by President Marcos. A claim for the payment of its
loan credit was filed by PNB against herein petitioner, however the latter alleged and invoked that the same was extinguished
by PD 1717.

Issue: Whether or not Philippine Veterans Bank as creditor of Agrix is still entitled for payment without prejudice to PD 1717.

Held: Yes. A mortgage lien is a property right derived from contract and so comes under the protection of Bill of rights so do
interests on loans, as well s penalties and charges, which are also vested rights once they accrue. Private property cannot
simply be taken by law from one person and given to another without just compensation and any known public purpose. This
is plain arbitrariness and is not permitted under the constitution.

The court also feels that the decree impairs the obligation of the contract between Agrix and the private respondent without
justification. While it is true that the police power is superior to the impairment clause, the principle will apply only where the
contract is so related to the public welfare that it will be considered congenitally susceptible to change by the legislature in the
interest of greater number.
Our finding in sum, is that PD 1717 is an invalid exercise of the police power, not being in conformity with the traditional
requirements of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The extinction of the mortgage and other liens and of the interest and
other charges pertaining to the legitimate creditors of Agrix constitutes taking without due process of law, and this is
compounded by the reduction of the secured creditors to the category of unsecured creditors in violation of the equal
protection clause. Moreover, the new corporation being neither owned nor controlled by the government, should have been
created only by general and not special law. And in so far as the decree also interferes with purely private agreements without
any demonstrated connection with the public interest, there is likewise an impairment of the obligation of the contract.

27. UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES vs. NLRC and NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC.

G.R. No. 91025 : December 19, 1990.

FACTS: On June 22, 1988, the petitioner Union of the Filipro Employees, the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-
and-file employees of Nestle Philippines, (private respondent) filed a Notice of Strike at the DOLE raising the issues of CBA
deadlock and unfair labor practice. Private respondent assailed the legal personality of the proponents of the said notice of
strike to represent the Nestle employees, before the NCMB. This notwithstanding, the NCMB proceeded to invite the parties to
attend the conciliation meetings and to which private respondent failed to attend contending that it will deal only with a
negotiating panel duly constituted and mandated in accordance with the UFE Constitution and By-laws. Thereafter, Company
terminated from employment all UFE Union officers, and all the members of the negotiating panel for instigating and
knowingly participating in a strike staged at the Makati, Alabang, Cabuyao and Cagayan de Oro on September 11, 1987 without
any notice of strike filed and a strike vote obtained for the purpose. The union filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. LA upheld
the validity of the dismissal; NLRC en banc affirmed. Subsequently, company concluded separate CBAs with the general
membership of the union at Cebu/Davao and Cagayan de Oro units; Assailing the validity of these agreements, the union filed
a case of ULP against the company with the NLRC-NCR Arbitration Branch Efforts to resolve the dispute amicably were taken by
the NCMB but yielded negative result. Petitioner filed a motion asking the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over the
dispute of deadlock in collective bargaining between the parties. On October 28, 1988, Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon
“certified” to the NLRC the said dispute between the UFE and Nestle, Philippines.. which reads as follows: xxx “The NLRC is
further directed to call all the parties immediately and resolve the CBA deadlock within twenty (20) days from submission of
the case for resolution.” Second Division of the NLRC promulgated a resolution granting wage increase and other benefits to
Nestle’s employees, ruling on non-economic issues, as well as absolving the private respondent of the Unfair Labor Practice
charge. Petitioner finds said resolution to be inadequate and accordingly, does not agree therewith. It filed a motion for
reconsideration, denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: (relative to the topic) WON WHETHER OR NOT THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE NLRC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN
RENDERING THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION, THE SAME BEING RENDERED ONLY BY A DIVISION OF THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT AND
NOT BY EN BANC;

HELD: This case was certified on October 28, 1988 when existing rules prescribed that, it is incumbent upon the Commission en
banc to decide or resolve a certified dispute. However, R.A. 6715 took effect during the pendency of this case. Aside from
vesting upon each division the power to adjudicate cases filed before the Commission, said Act further provides that the
divisions of the Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases within their respective territorial jurisdiction.
Section 5 of RA 6715 provides as follows: xxxx The Commission may sit en banc or in five (5) divisions, each composed of three
(3) members. The Commission shall sit en banc only for purposes of promulgating rules and regulations governing the hearing
and disposition of cases before any of its divisions and regional branches and formulating policies affecting its administration
and operations. The Commission shall exercise its adjudicatory and all other powers, functions and duties through its divisions.
xxxx In view of the enactment of Republic Act 6715, the aforementioned rules requiring the Commission en banc to decide or
resolve a certified dispute have accordingly been repealed. Confirmed in Administrative Order No. 36 (Series of 1989)
promulgated by the Secretary under his delegated rule-making power. Moreover, it is to be emphasized and it is a matter of
judicial notice that since the effectivity of R.A. 6715, many cases have already been decided by the 5 divisions of the NLRC. We
find no legal justification in entertaining petitioner’s claim considering that the clear intent of the amendatory provision is to
expedite the disposition of labor cases filed before the Commission. To rule otherwise would not be congruous to the proper
administration of justice. ACCORDINGLY, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions of the NLRC,
dated June 5, 1989 and August 8, 1989 are AFFIRMED, except insofar as the ruling absolving the private respondent of unfair
labor practice which is declared SET ASIDE

28. Luz Farms vs Sec of DAR

FACTS:

 Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by
the enforcement of some provisions of CARP.

 Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to apply to it:

(a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise
or Agricultural Activity.

(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and
swine raising . . ."

(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.

(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily determine the just
compensation to be paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law

(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13

". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are distributed within sixty (60) days of
the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation
they currently receive xxx

ISSUE: The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its
coverage

HELD:

 Said provisions are unconstitutional.

 The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word
"agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and
poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.

 Commissioner Tadeo: Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner Regalado na hindi namin inilagay ang agricultural worker sa
kadahilanang kasama rito ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers. Ang inilagay namin dito ay farm worker kaya hindi
kasama ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers.

 It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands
devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the
extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the
State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform.