Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
SYLLABUS
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J : p
As above stated, however, and the lower court conceded, plaintiff's president did
not know until 1949 that Lot 378 was the very land occupied by the provincial
hospital. Moreover, there is a total absence of evidence that this fact was known
to Carlos P. Benares before 1949. Neither may such knowledge be deduced from
the circumstances that he is a son of its former owner, Jose Benares, for even the
latter appears not to be well-posted on the status of his properties. Indeed, Jose
Benares did not apparently know that there were two (2) expropriation proceedings
affecting said properties; that the P12,000 received by him from the Government
was not meant for Lot 378; and that this lot was one of the properties mortgaged
by him to the Bank.
Upon the other hand, the main purpose of the Torrens System is to avoid possible
conflicts of title in and to real estate, and to facilitate transactions relative thereto
by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title
and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party
concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry (Tiburcio vs. PHHC, L-
13479, October 31, 1959; Revilla vs. Galindez, G.R. No. L-19940, March 30, 1960;
Mañacop, Jr. vs. Cansino, G.R. No. L-13971, February 27, 1961). In the case at
bar plaintiff had no such actual knowledge, it being an established fact that he was
not aware until 1949 that the land on which the provincial hospital stood was Lot
378. Furthermore, since the year 1921, or before the expropriation case for the
hospital site had begun, said lot was mortgaged to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.,
and the mortgage, duly registered, as well as annotated on the corresponding
certificate of title, was not cancelled until September 28, 1935. Prior to this date,
or on December 26, 1926, Lot 378 was subjected to a second mortgage in
favor of the Bank, which acquired title thereto, thru foreclosure proceedings, in
1934. When the Bank agreed on November 8, 1935, to sell the property to Carlos
P. Benares and the latter, subsequently, conveyed his rights to plaintiff herein, as
well as when the Bank executed the deed of absolute sale in plaintiff's favor on
September 20, 1949, the title to the property was in the name of the Bank.
Considering that sugar centrals as well as banks are known to have an
array of experienced and competent lawyers, it cannot be said that plaintiff was
not justified in assuming that said institutions had scrutinized the background of Lot
378 and were satisfied that the same belonged to the mortgagor when said
mortgages were constituted, and to the Bank when said deed of sale was
executed. In short, we find that plaintiff herein is a purchaser in good faith and for
value.
As regards the compensation that, as such, it may collect from the defendant, we
are of the opinion, and so hold, that, since the latter's right to expropriate Lot 378
is not contested, and is seemingly conceded, the plaintiff may demand what is due
by reason of the expropriation of said lot. In short, plaintiff is entitled to recover
from the defendant the fair and full equivalent of Lot 378, as of the time when
possession thereof was actually taken by the defendant, plus consequential
damages — including attorney's fees — from which consequential damages the
consequential benefits, if any, should be deducted, with interest, at the legal rate,
on the aggregate sum due to the plaintiff, from and after the date of said actual
taking. The case should be remanded, therefor, to the lower court for the
reception of evidence on the date of said actual taking and the
amount of compensation collectible from the defendant, and the rendition,
thereafter, of the corresponding decision thereon.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the records
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, as above stated, with costs
against the defendant. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C . J ., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ ., concur.
Makalintal, J ., took no part.
THIRD DIVISION
SYLLABUS
DECISION
MELO, J :p
The late Doña Demetria Cacho applied for the registration of two parcels of land
situated in what was then Lanao, Moro Province. Both parcels were within the
limits of Military Reservation No. 43, known as "Camp Overton".
The petitions were docketed as GLRO Record No. 6908 & 6909 and were jointly
tried and decided by Judge Jesse Jorge on December 10, 1912.
In the said decision, which was affirmed in toto by this Court in Cacho
vs. Government of the United States (28 Phil. 616 [1914]) the trial court made the
following pronouncements:
Re: Case No. 6908
The parcel object of Case No. 6908 is small. It was purchased by the
applicant, Doña Demetria Cacho y Soriano from Gabriel Salzos. The title
of Gabriel Salzos is founded on a deed of sale in his favor, executed and
signed by a Moro woman named Alanga, who acted for her husband, a
Moro named Dorondon. It appears that the husband of Alanga, Datto
Dorondon is alive yet and before admitting this parcel to registration, it is
ordered that a deed from Dorondon be presented, renouncing all his rights
in the small parcel of land object of Case No. 6908. It is further ordered
that the applicant present the corresponding deed from Datto Dorondon
on or before March 30, 1913.
Re: Case No. 6909
The parcel of land claimed by the applicant in Case No. 6909 is the larger
of two parcels and contains 37.87 hectares or more than 90 acres. This
was purchased by the applicant from the Moro Datto Bunglay.
Datto Bunglay claims to have acquired part of it by inheritance from his
uncle Datto Anandog who died without issue and the balance by his own
possession and cultivation.
A tract of land, 37 hectares in area, is larger than is cultivated by the
Christian Filipinos. In the Zamboanga cadastral case of thousands of
parcels now on trial before this court, the average size of the parcels is
not above 3 or 4 hectares, and the court doubts very much if a Moro with
all his family could cultivate as extensive a parcel of land as the one in
question.
The court therefore finds that the applicant Doña Demetria Cacho is owner
of the portion of land occupied and planted by the deceased Datto
Anandog in the southern part of the large parcel object of expediente No.
6909 only; and her application as to all the rest of the land solicited in said
case is denied.
On the 8th day of December, the court was at Camp Overton and had
another ocular inspection for the purpose of fixing the limits of the part
cultivated by Datto Anandog. The court set stakes marking the N.E., S.E.,
& N.W. corners of the land found to have been cultivated by Anandog.
And it is ordered that the new survey be made in accordance with the
points mentioned. It is further ordered that one half of the costs of the new
survey be paid by the applicant and the other half by the Government of
the United States.
Re: Cases 6908 & 6909
Final decision in these cases is reserved until the presentation of the said
deed and the new plan.
On June 29, 1978, Teofilo Cacho, herein petitioner, as the son and sole heir of the
late Doña Demetria Cacho, filed a petition for reconstitution of two original
certificates of title under Republic Act 26, and docketed under the original GLRO
Record No. 6908 and 6909.
The petition was opposed by herein respondents Republic of the Philippines,
National Steel Corporation (NSC), and the City of Iligan.
Acting on the motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence filed by the Republic
and the NSC, the lower court dismissed the petition because it found the evidence
inadequate to show the prior existence of the titles sought to be restored. The
same order stated further that the proper remedy was for the reconstitution of
decrees since it is undisputed that in Cases No. 6908 and 6909, Decrees No.
10364 and 18969, respectively, were already issued. The same trial court
specifically found that since the decrees had, in fact, been issued, the judgment of
this Court in Cacho vs. U.S., supra, although by itself expressly dependent upon
some conditions, must have indisputably become final.
Thus, petitioner filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file and to admit
amended petition, but this was denied. Petitioner elevated the matter to this Court
(docketed as Teofilo Cacho vs. Hon. Manindiara P. Mangotara, G.R. No. 85495)
but we resolved to remand the case to the lower court, ordering the latter to accept
the amended petition and to hear it as one for re-issuance of decrees under the
following guidelines:
Considering the doctrines in Sta. Ana vs. Menla, 1 SCRA 1297 (1961)
and Heirs of Cristobal Marcos vs. de Banuvar, 25 SCRA 315 (1968), and
the lower court findings that the decrees had in fact been issued, the
omnibus motion should have been heard as a motion to re-issue the
decrees in order to have a basis for the issuance of the titles and the
respondents being heard in their opposition.
Considering the foregoing, we resolve to order the lower court to accept
the amended petition subject to the private respondents being given the
opportunity to answer and to present their defenses. The evidence already
on record shall be allowed to stand but opportunity to controvert existing
evidence shall be given the parties.
(p. 59, Rollo.)
Thus, the lower court accepted the amended petition and heard it as one for re-
issuance of the decrees.
In their "Consolidated Answer and/or Opposition" to the amended petition,
respondents Republic of the Philippines and NSC raised the defenses that the
petition suffered from jurisdictional infirmities; that petitioner was not the real party-
in-interest; that petitioner was guilty of laches; that Demetria Cacho was not the
registered owner of the subject parcels of land; that no decrees covering the
properties were ever issued in the name of Demetria Cacho; and that the issuance
of the decrees was dubious and irregular.
On June 9, 1993, the lower court (RTC-City of Iligan, Branch 1) rendered its
decision decreeing the reconstitution and re-issuance of Decrees No. 10364 and
18969. The pertinent portion of the said decision reads:
The third issue is whether sufficient legal and factual basis exist for the
issuance of the subject decrees.
This Court has already ruled that Decree Nos. 10364 and 18959 were
issued in these LRC Cases Nos. 6908 and 6909, respectively, and that
the issuance of the decrees presupposed a prior judgment that had
already become final. Oppositors never disputed the cited
pronouncements and therefore these should now be considered final and
conclusive
In fine, the Land Registration Commission (now) National Land Titles and
Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA), through its then Acting
Commissioner Santiago M. Kapunan, its Deputy Clerk of Court III, the
Head Geodetic Engineer, and the Chief of Registration, all certified that
according to the Record Book of Decrees for Ordinary Land Registration
Case, Decree No. 18969 was issued in GLRO Record No. 6909 and
Decree No. 10364 was issued in GLRO Record No. 6908. (Exhibits "C",
"D", "E" and "M").
In the manifestation submitted by the then Acting LRC Commissioner
Santiago Kapunan in compliance with an order of this Court, confirmed
that the proceedings undertaken by the LRC in the original petition for
reconstitution have been regularly and properly done based on existing
records; that Decrees 10364 and 18969 have been issued and recorded
in LRC's Record Book of Decrees; that the plan and technical description
of the lots involved were found to be correct, approved by the LRC and
transmitted to this Court, (Exh. "M").
On Record also is the decision in the Military Reservation Nos. 43 and 63
in which this Court affirmed the issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969
in the name of Demetria Cacho.
Moreover, the testimony by way of deposition of one Ricardo A. Arandilla,
Deputy Clerk of Court of the LRC which identified and validated the report
of the LRC to this Court on the present petition, (Exh. "M"), shows that the
decrees registry of the LRC had recorded the fact and date of issuance of
Decrees No. 10364 and 18969 in GLRO Rec. No. 6908 and 6909 and the
approval of the plans and corresponding technical descriptions of the lots
involved in the aforesaid record numbers and decrees (Exh. "T"). aisadc
1.) Re: Case 6908, ". . . before admitting this parcel to registration, it is
ordered that a deed from Dorondon . . . be presented, renouncing all his
rights in the small parcel of land object of Case No. 6908" (28 Phil. 629).
2.) Re: Case No. 6909, "the parcel of land claimed by the applicant in
Case No. 6909 is the larger of two parcels and contains 37.87 hectares .
. . (28 Phil. 619). The court therefore finds that the applicant Doña
Demetria Cacho is owner of the portion of land occupied and planted by
the deceased Datto Anandog in the southern part of the large parcel
object of expediente No. 6909 only; and her application as to all the rest
of the land solicited in said case is denied." (28 Phil. 629) On the 8th day
of December, the court was at Camp Overton and had another ocular
inspection for the purpose of fixing the limits of the part cultivated by Datto
Anandog . . . with previous notice to the applicant and her husband and
representative Señor Vidal. Having arrived late, Señor Vidal did not assist
in the ocular inspection . . . But the court, nevertheless, set stakes marking
the N.E., S.E., and N.W. corners of the land found to have been cultivated
by the deceased Anandog" (28 Phil. 630); "And it is ordered that the new
survey be made in accordance with the points mentioned . . ." (28 Phil.
630).
The Court notes that the plan and technical description referred to in the
Manifestation dated November 2, 1978 of the Acting Commissioner of the
Land Registration Commission and the plan submitted by Demetria Cacho
in Case No. 6909 are the same as to the area, which is 37.87 hectares,
and as to the date of approval, which is November 15, 1910. Since the
Supreme Court decision in Cacho vs. US "ordered that the new survey be
made in accordance with the points mentioned"; that applicant Demetria
Cacho is owner only of the portion of land occupied and planted by the
deceased Datto Anandog; and that her application as to all the rest of the
land solicited in Case No. 6909 is denied, it follows that the new survey, if
it was made, must have a smaller area and a later date of approval.
As it is, although there is proof that Decree No. 18969 was issued in GLRO
No. 6909, re-issuance of the decree cannot be made in the absence of
the "new survey" on which to base the area and technical description of
the parcel of land in Case No. 6909.
Second. While a person may not acquire title to registered property
through continuous adverse possession, in derogation of the title of the
original registered owner, the heir of the latter, however, may lose his right
to recover back the possession of such property and the title thereto, by
reason of laches.
According to appellee, appellants failed to prove:
a. any conduct on their part that would have impelled appellee to
act earlier;
b. that they were misled by appellee's inaction into believing that
appellee would not assert the right on which he bases his suit;
c. the nature of extent of injury or prejudice that would accrue to
them in the event that relief is accorded to the appellee or that the
suit is not held barred; and
d. that their claims fall within the metes and bounds of the property
covered by the decree.
The above need not be proven by appellants. Under the Regalian
doctrine, all lands of whatever classification belong to the state.
The rule applies even to privately owned unregistered lands which, unless
the contrary is shown, are presumed to be public lands, under the principle
that all "lands belong to the Crown which have not been granted by (the
King), or in his name, or by the kings who preceded him.
Finally, petitioner failed to establish his identity and existence and that he
is a real party in interest. To qualify a person to be a real party in interest
in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the
present real owner of the right sought to be enforced.
(pp. 50-53, Rollo.)
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied, he filed the present
petition because allegedly, the Court of Appeals decided questions of substance
in a way not in accord with the law and applicable decisions of this Court:
First: Respondent Court of Appeals erroneously embarked upon a
reopening of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969 issued on May 9, 1913 and
July 8, 1915, respectively, when it required proof of compliance with
conditions for their issuance. These conditions are conclusively presumed
to have been complied with before the original decrees were issued and
can no longer be inquired into.
Second: Respondent Court of Appeals contravened settled and standing
doctrines pronounced in Sta. Ana v. Menla, 1 SCRA 1297 and Heirs of
Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuvar, 25 SCRA 315, when it applied laches as
a bar to the reissuance of decrees.
Third: Respondent Court of Appeals ignored standing decisions of this
Honorable Court when it applied laches despite the total absence of proof
to establish the requisite elements for its application.
Fourth: Respondent Court of Appeals erroneously applied the "Regalian
doctrine" to dispense with proof of the essential elements of laches.
Fifth: Respondent Court of Appeals abjured the judicial responsibility to
uphold the stability and integrity of the Torrens system.
Sixth: Respondent Court of Appeals ignored uncontroverted proof on the
identity and existence of petitioner and allowed itself to be swayed by wild
and gratuitous allusions to the contrary.
(pp. 21-22, Rollo.)
The petition having been given due course and the parties having filed their
respective memoranda, we shall now resolve the case.
We vote to grant the petition.
A land registration proceeding is "in rem," and, therefore, the decree of registration
is binding upon and conclusive against all persons including the Government and
its branches, irrespective of whether or not they were personally notified of the
filing of the application for registration or have appeared and filed an answer to
said application, because all persons are considered as notified by the publication
required by law.
Furthermore, a decree of registration that has become final shall be deemed
conclusive not only on the questions actually contested and determined but also
upon all matters that might be litigated or decided in the land registration
proceedings. With the certification duly issued by the then Land Registration
Commission, now National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration
(NALTDRA), through then Acting Commissioner Santiago M. Kapunan (now a
distinguished member of this Court), its Deputy Clerk of Court III, the Head
Geodetic Engineer, and the Chief of Registration, the lower court and the Court of
Appeals correctly found there is no doubt that decrees of registration had in fact
been issued in the case at bench. It is likewise beyond dispute that such decrees
attained finality upon the lapse of one year from entry thereof. To allow the final
decrees to once again be subject to the conditions set forth in the 1914 case
of Cacho vs. U.S. would be tantamount to setting aside the decrees which cannot
be reopened after the lapse of one year from the entry thereof (Lapore vs. Pascual,
107 Phil. 695 [1960]). Such action would definitely run counter to the very purpose
of the Torrens System.
Moreover, to sustain the Court of Appeals ruling as regards requiring petitioners to
fulfill the conditions set forth in Cacho vs. U.S. would constitute a derogation of the
doctrine of res judicata. Significantly, the issuance of the subject decrees
presupposes a prior final judgment because the issuance of such decrees is a
mere ministerial act on part of the Land Registration Commission (now the
NALTDRA), upon presentation of a final judgment. It is also worth noting that the
judgment in Cacho vs. U.S. could not have acquired finality without the prior
fulfillment of the conditions in GLRO Record No. 6908, the presentation of the
corresponding deed of sale from Datto Dorondon on or before March 30, 1913
(upon which Decree No. 10364 was issued on May 9, 1913); and in GLRO Record
No. 6909, the presentation of a new survey per decision of Judge Jorge on
December 10, 1912 and affirmed by this Court on December 10, 1914 (upon which
Decree No. 18969 was issued on July 8, 1915).
Requiring the submission of a new plan as a condition for the re-issuance of the
decree would render the finality attained by the Cacho vs. U.S. case nugatory,
thus, violating the fundamental rule regarding res judicata. It must be stressed that
the judgment and the resulting decree are res judicata, and these are binding upon
the whole world, the proceedings being in the nature of proceedings in rem.
Besides, such a requirement is an impermissible assault upon the integrity and
stability of the Torrens System of registration because it also effectively renders
the decree inconclusive.
As to the issue of laches, suffice it to state that the settled doctrine in this
jurisdiction is that laches cannot bar the issuance of a decree. The reason therefor
may be gleaned from Sta. Ana vs. Menla (1 SCRA 1294 [1961]):
. . . This provision of the Rules (Sec. 6, Rule 39) refers to civil actions and
is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case.
This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a
judgment that is secured against the adverse party, and his failure to act
to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules
makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special
proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land
registration proceedings, the ownership of a parcel of land is sought to be
established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by
judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is
necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in
possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him
therefrom.
. . . There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court
may order or issue a decree. The reason is . . . that the judgment is merely
declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or enforced
against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a
ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration
Commission . . .
(p. 1297-1298)
Thus, it was held in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos vs. de Banuver (25 SCRA 316
[1968]) that a final decision in land registration cases can neither be rendered
inefficacious by the statute of limitations nor by laches. This was reiterated
in Vda. De Barroga vs. Albano (157 SCRA 131 [1988]).
Finally, anent the issue of identity and existence of petitioner and his being a real
party-in-interest, records show that petitioner has sufficiently established his
existence and identity as well as his legal interest.
By an Affidavit of Adjudication as sole heir of Demetria Cacho, the property in
question were adjudicated in favor of petitioner under Doc. 1355, Page 128, Series
of 1985 of the Consulate General of the Philippines in Chicago. The fact of
adjudication of the estate of Demetria Cacho was published in the Times Journal.
Petitioner also appeared personally before Vice Consul Stephen V. David of the
Philippine Consulate General of the Republic of the Philippines in Chicago and
executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Atty. Godofredo Cabildo to
represent him in this case.
The execution of public documents, as in the case of the Affidavit of Adjudication,
is entitled to a presumption of regularity and proof is required to assail and
controvert the same. Thus, the burden of proof rests upon him who alleges the
contrary and respondents cannot shift the burden to petitioner by merely casting
doubt as to his existence and his identity without presenting preponderant
evidence to controvert such presumption. With more reason shall the same rule
apply in the case of the Special Power of Attorney duly sworn before the Philippine
Consulate General of the Republic of the Philippines in Chicago, the act of the
administering oath being of itself a performance of duty by a public official.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The decision of Branch I of the Regional Trial Court of the Twelfth Judicial
Region stationed at the City of Iligan, in its LRC Case No. CLR (GLRO) Record
Nos. 6908 and 6909 dated June 9, 1993, is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
(Cacho v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123361, [March 3, 1997], 336 PHIL 154-
|||
168)
THIRD DIVISION
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTIONS; NOTICE OF LIS
PENDENS; PURPOSE. — "Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real
rights of the party causing the registration thereof. With the lis pendens duly
recorded, he could rest secure that he would not lose the property or any part of it.
For, notice of lis pendensserves as a warning to a prospective purchaser or
incumbrancer that the particular property is in litigation; and that he should keep
his hands off the same, unless of course he intends to gamble on the results of the
litigation. (Section 24, Rule 14, Rules of Court; Jamora v. Duran, et al., 69 Phil. 3,
11; I Martin, Rules of Court, p. 415, footnote 3, citing cases.)" (Nataño v. Esteban,
18 SCRA 481, 485-485).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DISCRETIONARY POWER OF THE COURT TO CANCEL LIS
PENDENS; DELAYING TACTICS OF PARTY IN CASE AT BAR IS A GROUND
FOR CANCELLATION. — A notice of lis pendens of Civil Case No. 15871 was
annotated on petitioner's Certificate of Title No. 106098 covering Lot No. 4517,
Sta. Barbara Cadastre. It appears, however, that private respondents in filing said
case were trying to delay the full implementation of the final decisions in G.R. No.
62042 as well as G.R. No. 64432 wherein this Court ordered the immediate
implementation of the writs of possession and demolition in the reconstitution
proceedings involving said lot. The foregoing facts necessitate the application of
the rule enunciated in the cases of Victoriano v. Rovira (55 Phil. 1000), Municipal
Council of Parañaque v. Court of First Instance of Rizal (70 Phil. 363)
and Sarmiento v. Ortiz (10 SCRA 158), to the effect that: "We have once held that
while ordinarily a notice of pendency which has been filed in a proper case, cannot
be cancelled while the action is pending and undetermined, the proper court has
the discretionary power to cancel it under peculiar circumstances, as for instance,
where the evidence so far presented by the plaintiff does not bear out the main
allegations of his complaint, and where the continuances of the trial, for which the
plaintiff is responsible, are unnecessarily delaying the determination of the case to
the prejudice of the defendant. Victoriano v. Rovira, supra;The Municipal Council
of Parañaque v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, supra)"
3. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; P.D. NO. 1529; ALLOWS
CANCELLATION OF LIS PENDENS UPON PROOF THAT THE PURPOSE OF
NOTICE IS TO MOLEST THE ADVERSE PARTY; FAILURE TO CANCEL
NOTICE PURSUANT THERETO, AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — Respondent
Judge Tito Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the respondent Acting
Register of Deeds' stand that the notice of lis pendens in the certificates of titles of
the petitioners over Lot No. 4571, Barbara Cadastre cannot be cancelled on the
ground of pendency of Civil Case No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals. In
upholding the position of the Acting Register of Deeds based on Section 77
ofPresidential Decree No. 1529, he conveniently forgot the first paragraph thereof
which provides: "Cancellation of lis pendens. — Before final judgment, a notice of
lis pendens may be cancelled upon Order of the Court after proper showing that
the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not
necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It may
also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party who
caused the registration thereof."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY OF REGISTER OF DEEDS IS MINISTERIAL. — Under
Sections 10 and 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the function of a Register of
Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds encumbrance, instruments and
the like is ministerial in nature.
5. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES; WHERE WORDS ARE CLEAR
AND UNEQUIVOCAL STATUTES MUST BE TAKEN TO MEAN EXACTLY WHAT
IT DAYS; P.D. NO. 1529 IS CLEAR. — The elementary rule in statutory
construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and
the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Aparri v. Court of Appeals,
127 SCRA 231; Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union [IBAAEU] v.
Inciong, 132 SCRA 663) The statute concerning the function of the Register of
Deeds to register instruments in a torrens certificate of title is clear and leaves no
room for construction.
6. ID.; ID.; MEANING OF WORD "SHALL". — According to Webster's Third
International Dictionary of the English Language — the word shall means "ought
to, must, . . . obligation - used to express a command or exhortation, used in laws,
regulations or directives to express what is mandatory."
7. CRIMINAL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; P.D. NO. 1529; A REGISTER OF
DEEDS HAS NO LEGAL STANDING TO FILE A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION; OPINION OF COMMISSIONER MUST BE SOUGHT IN
CASE OF DOUBT. — The respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not have any
legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order
directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of
titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land. In case of doubt as to the
proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed . . . or other instrument presented
to him, he should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration
now, the Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds Registration
Administration in accordance with Section 117 ofPresidential Decree No. 1529.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; JUDGMENT; EXECUTION; DELAY IN THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF COURT'S FINAL RESOLUTION; RESPONSIBILITY
FALLS ON THE RESPONDENT JUDGE. — In the ultimate analysis, however, the
responsibility for the delays in the full implementation of this Court's already final
resolutions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 which includes the cancellation
of the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners
over Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre falls on the respondent Judge. He
should never have allowed himself to become part of dilatory tactics, giving as
excuse the wrong impression that Civil Case No. 15871 filed by the private
respondents involves another set of parties claiming Lot No. 4517 under their own
Torrens Certificate of Title.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J : p
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia were the petitioners in G.R. No. 64432
and the private respondents in G.R. No. 62042. The subject matter of these two
(2) cases and the instant case is the same — a parcel of land designated as Lot
No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 6406.
The present petition arose from the same facts and events which triggered the
filing of the earlier petitions. These facts and events are cited in our resolution
dated December 29, 1983 in G.R. No. 64432, as follows:
". . . This case has its origins in a petition for reconstitution of title filed with
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo involving a parcel of land known as Lot
No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 6406 in the name of Romana Hitalia. Eventually, Original
Certificate of Title No. 6406 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 106098 was issued in the names of Alfonso Hitalia and Eduardo
S. Baranda. The Court issued a writ of possession which Gregorio Perez,
Maria P. Gotera and Susana Silao refused to honor on the ground that
they also have TCT No. 25772 over the same Lot No. 4517. The Court,
after considering the private respondents' opposition and finding TCT No.
25772 fraudulently acquired, ordered that the writ of possession be carried
out. A motion for reconsideration having been denied, a writ of demolition
was issued on March 29, 1982. Perez and Gotera filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On August 6, 1982,
the Court of Appeals deemed the petition. Perez and Gotera filed the
petition for review on certiorari denominated as G.R. No. 62042 before the
Supreme Court. As earlier stated the petition was denied in a resolution
dated January 7, 1983. The motion for reconsideration was denied in
another resolution dated March 25, 1983, which also stated that the denial
is final. This decision in G.R. No. 62042, in accordance with the entry of
judgment, became final on March 25, 1983. The petitioners in the instant
case — G.R. No. 64432 — contend that the writs of possession and
demolition issued in the respondent court should now be implemented;
that Civil Case No. 00827 before the Intermediate Appellate Court was
filed only to delay the implementation of the writ; that counsel for the
respondent should be held in contempt of court for engaging in a
concerted but futile effort to delay the execution of the writs of possession
and demolition and that petitioners are entitled to damages because of
prejudice caused by the filing of this petition before the Intermediate
Appellate Court. On September 26, 1983, this Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order to maintain the status quo, both in the Intermediate
Appellate Court and in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo. Considering that
— (1) there is merit in the instant petition for indeed the issues discussed
in G.R. No. 64432 as raised in Civil Case No. 00827 before the respondent
court have already been passed upon in G.R. No. 62042; and (2) the
Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Intermediate Appellate Court
was only intended not to render the petition moot and academic pending
the Court's consideration of the issues, the Court RESOLVED to DIRECT
the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court not to take cognizance of
issues already resolved by this Court and accordingly DISMISS the
petition in Civil Case No. 00827. Immediate implementation of the writs of
possession and demolition is likewise ordered." (pp. 107-108, Rollo —
G.R. No. 64432)
On May 9, 1984, the Court issued a resolution denying with finality a motion for
reconsideration of the December 29, 1983 resolution in G.R. No. 64432. On this
same date, another resolution was issued, this time in G.R. No. 62042, referring
to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo the ex-parte motion of the private respondents
(Barandaand Hitalia) for execution of the judgment in the resolutions dated
January 7, 1983 and March 9, 1983. In the meantime, the then Intermediate
Appellate Court issued a resolution dated February 10, 1984, dismissing Civil Case
No. 00827 which covered the same subject matter as the Resolutions abovecited
pursuant to our Resolution dated December 29, 1983. The resolution dated
December 29, 1983 in G.R. No. 64432 became final on May 20, 1984.
Upon motions of the petitioners, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23
presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued the following order:
"Submitted are the following motions filed by movants Eduardo
S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia through counsel dated August 28, 1984:
"(a) Reiterating Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolutions dated
January 7, 1983 and March 9, 1983 Promulgated by Honorable Supreme
Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 62042;
"(b) Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolution dated December 29,
1983 Promulgated by Honorable Supreme Court (First Division) in G.R.
No. 64432;
"(c) The Duties of the Register of Deeds are purely ministerial under Act
496, therefore she must register all orders, judgment, resolutions of this
Court and that of Honorable Supreme Court.
"Finding the said motions meritorious and there being no opposition
thereto, the same is hereby GRANTED.
"WHEREFORE, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby
declared null and void and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106098 is
hereby declared valid and subsisting title concerning the ownership of
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, all of Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
"The Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo is further ordered to register the
Subdivision Agreement of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia as
prayed for." (p. 466, Rollo - G.R. No. 64432).
The above order was set aside on October 8, 1984 upon a motion for
reconsideration and manifestation filed by the Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo,
Atty. Helen P. Sornito on the ground that there was a pending case before this
Court, an Action for Mandamus, Prohibition, Injunction under G.R. No. 67661 filed
by Atty. EduardoBaranda, against the former which remained unresolved.
In view of this development, the petitioners filed in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No.
64432 ex-parte motions for issuance of an order directing the Regional Trial Court
and Acting Register of Deeds to execute and implement the judgments of this
Court. They prayed that an order be issued:
"1. Ordering both the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo Branch XXIII, under
Hon. Judge Tito G. Gustilo and the acting Register of Deeds Helen P.
Sornito to register the Order dated September 5, 1984 of the lower court;
"2. To cancel No. T-25772. Likewise to cancel No. T-106098 and once
cancelled to issue new certificates of title to each of Eduardo
S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia;
Plus other relief and remedies equitable under the premises." (p. 473,
64432 Rollo)
Acting on these motions, we issued on September 17, 1986 a Resolution in G.R.
No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 granting the motions as prayed for. Acting on
another motion of the same nature filed by the petitioners, we issued another
Resolution dated October 8, 1986 referring the same to the Court Administrator for
implementation by the judge below.
In compliance with our resolutions, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23
presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued two (2) orders dated November 6, 1986
and January 6, 1987 respectively, to wit:
"O R D E R
"This is an Ex-parte Motion and Manifestation submitted by the movants
through counsel on October 20, 1986; the Manifestation of Atty. Helen
Sornito, Register of Deeds of the City of Iloilo, and formerly acting register
of deeds for the Province of Iloilo dated October 23, 1986 and the
Manifestation of Atty. Avito S. Saclauso, Acting Register of Deeds,
Province of Iloilo dated November 5, 1986.
"Considering that the motion of movants Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and
Alfonso Hitalia dated August 12, 1986 seeking the full implementation of
the writ of possession was granted by the Honorable Supreme Court,
Second Division per its Resolution dated September 17, 1986, the present
motion is hereby GRANTED.
"WHEREFORE, the Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo, is hereby
ordered to register the Order of this Court dated September 5, 1984 as
prayed for.
xxx xxx xxx
"O R D E R
"This is a Manifestation and Urgent Petition for the Surrender of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-25772 submitted by the petitioners Atty. Eduardo
S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia on December 2, 1986 in compliance with
the order of this Court dated November 25, 1986, a Motion for Extension
of Time to File Opposition filed by Maria Provido Gotera through counsel
on December 4, 1986 which was granted by the Court pursuant to its
Order dated December 15, 1986. Considering that no Opposition was filed
within the thirty (30) days period granted by the Court finding the petition
tenable, the same is hereby GRANTED.
"WHEREFORE, Maria Provido Gotera is hereby ordered to surrender
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 to this Court within ten (10) days
from the date of this order, after which period, Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-25772 is hereby declared annulled and the Register of Deeds of
Iloilo is ordered to issue a new Certificate of Title in lieu thereof in the
name of petitioners Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, which
certificate shall contain a memorandum of the annulment of the
outstanding duplicate." (pp. 286-287, Rollo 64432)
On February 9, 1987, Atty. Hector Teodosio, the counsel of Gregorio Perez, private
respondent in G.R. No. 64432 and petitioner in G.R. No. 62042, filed a motion for
explanation in relation to the resolution dated September 17, 1986 and
manifestation asking for clarification on the following points:
"a. As to the prayer of Atty. Eduardo Baranda for the cancellation of TCT
T-25772, should the same be referred to the Court of Appeals (as
mentioned in the Resolution of November 27, 1985) or is it already
deemed granted by implication (by virtue of the Resolution dated
September 17, 1986)?
"b. Does the Resolution dated September 17, 1986 include not only the
implementation of the writ of possession but also the cancellation of TCT
T-25772 and the subdivision of Lot 4517?" (p. 536, Rollo — 64432).
Acting on this motion and the other motions filed by the parties, we issued a
resolution dated May 25, 1987 noting all these motions and stating therein:
xxx xxx xxx
"Since entry of judgment in G.R. No. 62042 was made on January 7, 1983
and in G.R. No. 64432 on May 30, 1984, and all that remains is the
implementation of our resolutions, this COURT RESOLVED to refer the
matters concerning the execution of the decisions to the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City for appropriate action and to apply disciplinary
sanctions upon whoever attempts to trifle with the implementation of the
resolutions of this Court. No further motions in these cases will be
entertained by this Court." (p. 615, Rollo - 64432)
In the meantime, in compliance with the Regional Trial Court's orders dated
November 6, 1986 and January 6, 1987, Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso
annotated the order declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 as null and
void, cancelled the same and issued new certificates of titles numbers T-111560,
T-111561 and T-111562 in the name of petitioners Eduardo S. Baranda and
Alfonso Hitalia in lieu of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106098.
However, a notice of lis pendens "on account of or by reason of a separate case
(Civil Case No. 15871) still pending in the Court of Appeals" was carried out and
annotated in the new certificates of titles issued to the petitioners. This was upheld
by the trial court after setting aside its earlier order dated February 12, 1987
ordering the cancellation of lis pendens.
This prompted the petitioners to file another motion in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R.
No. 64432 to order the trial court to reinstate its order dated February 12, 1987
directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens in the
new certificates of titles.
In a resolution dated August 17, 1987, we resolved to refer the said motion to the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23 for appropriate action.
Since respondent Judge Tito Gustilo of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch
23 denied the petitioners' motion to reinstate the February 12, 1987 order in
another order dated September 17, 1987, the petitioners filed this petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction to compel the
respondent judge to reinstate his order dated February 12, 1987 directing the
Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the new
certificates of titles issued in the name of the petitioners.
The records show that after the Acting Register of Deeds annotated a notice of lis
pendens on the new certificates of titles issued in the name of the petitioners, the
petitioners filed in the reconstitution case an urgent ex-parte motion to immediately
cancel notice of lis pendens annotated thereon.
In his order dated February 12, 1987, respondent Judge Gustilo granted the
motion and directed the Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel the lis
pendens found on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-106098; T-111560; T-
111561 and T-111562.
Respondent Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso filed a motion for
reconsideration of the February 12, 1987 order stating therein:
"That the undersigned hereby asks for a reconsideration of the said order
based on the second paragraph of Section 77 of P.D. 1529, to wit:
The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases
of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from
the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says.
(Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231; Insular Bank of Asia and America
Employees' Union [IBAAEU] v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663) The statute concerning
the function of the Register of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens certificate
of title is clear and leaves no room for construction. According to Webster's Third
International Dictionary of the English Language — the word shall means "ought
to, must, . . . obligation - used to express a command or exhortation, used in laws,
regulations or directives to express what is mandatory." Hence, the function of a
Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds encumbrances,
instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting Register of
Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the
respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis
pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject
parcel of land. In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of
any deed . . . or other instrument presented to him, he should have asked the
opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration now, the Administrator of the
National Land Title and Deeds Registration Administration in accordance with
Section 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
In the ultimate analysis, however, the responsibility for the delays in the full
implementation of this Court's already final resolutions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R.
No. 64432 which includes the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated
in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara
Cadastre falls on the respondent Judge. He should never have allowed himself to
become part of dilatory tactics, giving as excuse the wrong impression that Civil
Case No. 15871 filed by the private respondents involves another set of parties
claiming Lot No. 4517 under their own Torrens Certificate of Title.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The February 12, 1987 order of
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 is REINSTATED. All subsequent
orders issued by the trial court which annulled the February 12, 1987 order are
SET ASIDE. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
||| (Baranda v. Gustilo, G.R. No. 81163, [September 26, 1988], 248 PHIL 205-220)
EN BANC
SYLLABUS
DECISION
MAKALINTAL, J : p
It appears that there is a case pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur
(CC No. 2221), wherein the civil status of the donor Cornelio Balbin and the
character ofthe land in question are in issue, as well as the validity of the different
conveyances executed by him. The matter of registration of the deed of donation
may well await the outcome of that case, and in the meantime the rights of the
interested parties could be protected by filing the proper notices of lis pendens.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decisions of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos
Sur and that of the Commissioner of Land Registration are affirmed. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Reyes, J.B.L. (Acting C.J.), Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando,
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Capistrano J., did not take part.
Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., are on leave.
Footnotes
*Section 43. Certificates where land registered in names of two or more
persons. Where two or more persons are registered owners as tenants in
common, or otherwise, duplicate may be issued to each for his undivided share.
(Balbin v. Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur, G.R. No. L-20611, [May 8, 1969], 138
|||
PHIL 12-18)
EN BANC
SYLLABUS
DECISION
CASTRO, J : p
On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land
situated in the municipality of Esperanza, province of Agusan, and covered by
original certificate of title P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to
Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went to the
office of the Register of Deeds ofAgusan in Butuan City to register the
deed of sale and to secure in his name a transfer certificate of title. Registration
was refused by the Register of Deeds upon the following grounds, inter alia, stated
in his letter of May 21, 1962:
"1. That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the
name of Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal
presumption, is considered conjugal property;
"2. That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the
effectivity of the New Civil Code it is necessary that both spouses sign the
document; but
"3. Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the sale was
made, the surviving husband can not dispose of the whole property
without violating the existing law (LRC Consulta No. 46 dated June 10,
1958).
"To effect the registration of the aforesaid deed of absolute Sale, it is
necessary that the property be first liquidated and transferred in the
name of the surviving spouses and the heirs of the deceased wife by
means of extrajudicial settlement or partition and that the consent of such
other heir or heirs must be procured by means of another document
ratifying this sale executed by their father."
In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan on a
petition for mandamus (sp. civ. case 151), to compel
the Register of Deeds to registerthe deed of sale and to issue to him the
corresponding transfer certificate of title, and to recover P5,000 in moral damages
and P1,000 attorney's fees and expenses oflitigation. It is Almirol's assertion that
it is but a ministerial duty of the respondent to perform the acts required of him,
and that he (Almirol) has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
In his answer with counterclaim for P10,000 damages, the respondent reiterated
the grounds stated in his letter of May 21, 1962, averred that the petitioner has
"other legal, plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law by appealing the
decision of the respondent to the Honorable Commissioner of Land Registration,"
and prayed for dismissal of the petition.
In its resolution of October 16, 1963 the lower court, declaring that "mandamus
does not lie . . . because the adequate remedy is that provided by Section 4 of Rep.
Act 1151," dismissed the petition, with costs against the petitioner.
Hence the present appeal by Almirol.
The only question of law tendered for resolution is whether mandamus will lie to
compel the respondent to register the deed of sale in question.
Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent evince a sincere desire on his
part to maintain inviolate the law on succession and transmission of rights over
real properties, these do not constitute legal grounds for his refusal to register the
deed. Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds to
determine; this function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction. 1
"Whether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not
the duty of Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent
jurisdiction." (Gabriel vs.Register of Deeds of Rizal, et al., L- 17956, Sept.
30, 1963).
". . . the supposed invalidity of the contracts of lease is no valid objection
to their registration, because invalidity is no proof of their non-existence
or a valid excuse for denying their registration. The law on registration
does not require that only valid instruments shall be registered. How can
parties affected thereby be supposed to know their invalidity before they
become aware, actually or constructively, of their existence or of their
provisions? If the purpose of registration is merely to give notice, then
questions regarding the effect or invalidity of instruments are expected to
be decided after, not before, registration. It must follow as a necessary
consequence that registration must first be allowed, and validity or effect
litigated afterwards." (Gurbax Singh Pablo & Co. vs. Reyes and Tantoco,
92 Phil. 182-183).
Indeed, a register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act
1151 from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted with
the problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is
invalid. For under the said section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be
taken with respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for
registration, all that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the question to
the Commissionerof Land Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter
an order prescribing the step to be taken on the doubtful question. Section
4 of R.A. 1151 reads as follows:
"Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. —
When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to
be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed,
mortgage, or other instrument presented to him for registration, or where
any party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds with
reference to any such matter, the question shall be submitted to the
Commissioner of Land Registration either upon the
certification ofthe Register of Deeds, stating the question upon which he
is in doubt, or upon the suggestion in writing by the party in interest; and
thereupon the Commissioner, after consideration of the matter shown by
the records certified to him, and in case of registered lands, after notice to
the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be
taken or memorandum to be made. His decision in such cases shall be
conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided, further,
That when a party in interest disagrees with the ruling or resolution of the
Commissioner and the issue involves a question of law, said decision may
be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty days from and after
receipt of the notice thereof."
The foregoing notwithstanding, the court a quo correctly dismissed the petition for
mandamus. Section 4 abovequoted provides that "where any party in interest does
not agree with the Register of Deeds .. the question shall be submitted to the
Commissioner of Land Registration," who thereafter shall "enter an order
prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made," which shall be
"conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds." This administrative
remedy must be resorted to by the petitioner before he can have recourse to the
courts.
ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of the lower court of October 16, 1963 is affirmed,
at petitioner's cost.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,
Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.
Sanchez, J., concurs in the result.
Footnotes
1.In re Consulta filed by Francisco on behalf of Cabantog, 67 Phil. 222, 228; Smith Bell
& Co., Ltd. vs. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 61; Register of Deeds,
Pasig, Rizal vs. Heirs of Hi Caiji, et al., 99 Phil. 25, 29-31; Mendoza vs. Abrera,
et al., L- 10519, April 30, 1959; Agricultural Credit Cooperative
Association of Hinibiran vs. Yulo Yusay, et al., L-13313, April 28, 1960; Dulay, et
al. vs. Herrera, L-17084, August 30, 1962.
(Almirol v. Register of Deeds of Agusan, G.R. No. L-22486, [March 20, 1968],
|||
7. FIRST DIVISION
PARAS, J : p
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside or reverse the
decision * of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) promulgated
on May 22, 1984 in AC-G.R. CV No. 69946 entitled Meliton Gallardo and Teresa
Villanueva v. Marta Villanueva vda. de Agana, et al. (Rollo, p. 37) affirming the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna 8th Judicial District, Branch II,
**
Sta. Cruz, Laguna (now Regional Trial Court, Sta. Cruz, Laguna) dated January
20, 1982, which dismissed the complaint for Quieting of Title in Civil Case No. SC-
1492 and declared the plaintiff's (petitioner's herein) Reconstituted Transfer
Certificate of Title RT-6293 (No. 23350) as null and void (Record on Appeal, pp.
215-216).
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is in full accord with the evidence
and the law and is hereby therefore affirmed in all its part. Costs against
plaintiffs-appellants.
SO ORDERED."
The subject matter of this controversy involves a parcel of land situated in Cavinti,
Laguna consisting of 81,300 square meters, more or less, initially covered by an
original Certificate of Title No. 2262, issued on April 2, 1924 owned and registered
in the name of the late Pedro Villanueva (former Justice of the Peace of the
Municipal Court, Cavinti, Laguna), pursuant to Decree No. 150562 issued in L.R.C.
Cadastral Record No. 136, Cad. Case No. 1 (Record on Appeal; Answer, p. 28). prcd
Petitioners were nephew and niece of the late Pedro Villanueva and first cousin of
the private respondent Marta Villanueva vda. de Agana, the latter being the
daughter of Pedro Villanueva.
On August 10, 1937, petitioner claimed that the aforestated land was sold to them
in a private document, an unnotarized deed of sale written in Tagalog (Annex "B"
of the complaint) that was allegedly signed by the late Pedro Villanueva conveying
and transferring the property in question in favor of the petitioners (Record on
Appeal, Exhibit "B", pp. 9-10) which deed is reproduced as follows:
"Ako, Pedro Villanueva, 66 taong gulang, balo at nananahanan sa
municipio ng Cavinti, lalawigang Laguna at Kapuluang Pilipinas, alang-
alang sa halagang LIMANG DAANG PISO (P500.00) salaping filipino, na
sa akin ibinayad ng mag-asawa ni Meliton Gallardo at Teresa Villanueva,
tagarito rin sa nasabing municipio, lalawigang at kapuluan, sa hinaharap
ng kasulatan ay sinasaysay ko na aking inililiwat at pinagbili ng biling
patuluyan sa nasabing mag-asawa Meliton Gallardo at Teresa Villanueva,
sampo na sa kanilay mangagmamana at hahalili, ang aking isang palagay
na lupa na nabubuo sa limang luang na tubigan, punlang kalahating
kabang palay at saka dalatan o katihan na may isang kabang palay na
hasik, tumatayo sa nayon ng Kanlurang Talaongan, sakop nitong
municipio ng Cavinti at napapaloob sa mga hangganang sumusunod:
HILAGAAN, Braulio Villanueva at Modesto Ribera.
SILANGAN, Braulio Villanueva.
TIMUGAN, Braulio Villanueva, Ilog Kaliraya at Jacinto Toque.
KANLURAN, Jacinto Toque.
Ang pagaaring ito ay tunay kong pananarili sapagkat aking nabili sa
magkakapatid na Aniano Gallardo, Zacarias Gallardo at Perfecto Gallardo
at natatala sa Registro ng Amillarmiento dito sa Cavinti sa ilalim ng Blg.
22888, at walang ano mang ipinagkakautang ni pinanagutan kaya at
magagamit na nitong aking pinagbilhan ang kanilang matwid na
maipamana at mailiwa sa iba. Gayon ding sinasaysay ko na akoy
umaakong mananagutan dito sa aking pinagbilhan, tungkol sa pagaaring
ito na ang katibayay aking ipagsasanggalang laban sa kanino mang
maghahabol.
"Dapat tantoin, gayon man, na ang pagaaring ito ay registrado na sa
Registro de la Propiedad nitong lalawigang Laguna, subalit at sa isang
kamalian ng pagkakasukat tungkol sa lawak at laki, ay hindi pa natutubos
ang kanyang titulo, kaya at kung maisaayos na ang nasabing titulo ay
saka na ipatatala sa pangalan nitong aking pinagbilhan upang lalong
malagay sa katahimikan itong aking pinagbilhan.
"At sa katunayan ay nilagdaan ko ang kasulatang ito dito sa municipio ng
Cavinti, Laguna, ngayong ika sampung araw ng Agosto taong isanglibo
siyam na daan at tatlompu at pito (1937).
"(LGD) PEDRO VILLANUEVA.
"Nagpirma sa hinaharap ni:
"(LGD) BALTAZAR VILLANUEVA.
"JUAN VILLANUEVA"
Subsequently, the Original Certificate of Title was cancelled on the basis of the
private document of sale (Exhibit "B") and a new certificate of title was issued in
the name of the petitioners covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-6293
(No. 23350) on January 4, 1944, particularly describing the land as follows:
"A parcel of land (Lot No. 401 of the Cadastral Survey of Cavinti), with the
improvements thereon, situated in the municipality of Cavinti. Bounded on
the N and NE., by Lot No. 403; on the SE., by Lot No. 393 and the Caliraya
River; and on the SW., by Lot No. 515. Area — Eighty One Thousand and
Three Hundred (81,300) Square Meters, more or less." (Record on
Appeal, Annex "A," pp. 7 and 9).
During the Second World War, the records as well as the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Laguna, where the original of the new transfer certificate of title was kept,
were completely burned. Accordingly, by virtue of an Affidavit of Reconstitution
dated December 2, 1958 (Record on Appeal, Annex "DD," pp. 41-42) and upon
presentation of the Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title, the title was
administratively reconstituted and the Register of Deeds of Laguna issued Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-6293 (No. 23350) in the name of the petitioners (Record
on Appeal, Annex "B", pp. 7-9).
On November 17, 1976, defendant Marta Villanueva together with Pedro
Villanueva, Jr., and Restituto R. Villanueva executed and filed an Affidavit of
Adverse Claim with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna (Record on
Appeal, Annex "C", pp. 10-13). However, on December 6, 1976 a joint affidavit
was filed by Pedro G. Villanueva, Jr. and Restituto Villanueva withdrawing their
adverse claim on the said parcel of land, with the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Laguna (Record on Appeal, Annex "D," pp. 13-14).
When petitioners learned of this Affidavit of Adverse Claim, attempt was made to
settle said controversy amicably. Several demands made by herein petitioners
upon private respondents Marta Vda. de Agana to withdraw her adverse claim,
failed.
On December 9, 1976, said private respondent executed a Deed of Conveyance
and Release of Claim (Record on Appeal and Annex "AA", p. 35) wherein the
parties agreed, among other things, to the following:
"That in consideration of the said transfer and conveyance over a 1,000
square meter portion mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, the
VENDEE (Marta V. Agana) does hereby withdraw the adverse claim
mentioned above;" (Rollo, p. 119).
However, when private respondent Marta Villanueva vda. de Agana refused to sign
an Affidavit of Quitclaim (Exhibit "9;" Record on appeal, p. 195), petitioners
instituted court suit against the private respondent and her husband, Dr. Marcelo
S. Agana, Sr. by filing a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages with the Court
of First Instance of Laguna on February 3, 1977, demanding that their title over the
questioned land be fortified by a declaration of ownership in their favor and
avoiding the aforecited Deed of Conveyance and Release of Claim (Record on
Appeal, pp. 1-7). Accordingly, private respondents in their answer countered that
the Deed of Sale in Tagalog and petitioners' title over the land be declared void ab
initio, among other demands (Record on Appeal, pp. 16-35).
On January 20, 1982, the Court of First Instance of Laguna rendered its decision
declaring the deed of sale of August 10, 1937, as well as the reconstituted transfer
certificate of title of petitioners, void ab initio Record on Appeal, pp. 208-216). prLL
Consequently, the crux of the matter now centers on whether or not the
unnotarized deed of sale purportedly executed on August 10, 1937 by the primitive
owner Pedro Villanueva, in favor of petitioners, can be considered as a valid
instrument for effecting the alienation by way of sale of a parcel of land registered
under the Torrens System. Corollary thereto, it becomes necessary to examine
other matters surrounding the execution of the alleged document of sale (Exhibit
B).
Petitioners claim that the sale although not in a public document, is nevertheless
valid and binding citing this Court's rulings in the cases of Cauto v. Cortes, 8 Phil.
459, 460; Guerrero v. Miguel, 10 Phil. 52, 53; Bucton v. Gabar, 55 SCRA 499
wherein this Court ruled that even a verbal contract of sale of real estate produces
legal effects between the parties.
The contention is unmeritorious.
As the respondent court aptly stated in its decision:
"True, as argued by appellants, a private conveyance of registered
property is valid as between the parties. However, the only right the
vendee of registered property in a private document is to compel through
court processes the vendor to execute a deed of conveyance sufficient in
law for purposes of registration. Plaintiffs-appellants' reliance on Article
1356 of the Civil Code is unfortunate. The general rule enunciated in said
Art. 1356 is that contracts are obligatory, in whatever form they may have
been entered, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are
present. The next sentence provides the exception, requiring a contract to
be in some form when the law so requires for validity or enforceability.
Said law is Section 127 of Act 496 which requires, among other things,
that the conveyance be executed 'before the judge of a court of record or
clerk of a court of record or a notary public or a justice of the peace, who
shall certify such acknowledgment substantially in form next herein after
stated.'
"Such law was violated in this case. The action of the Register of Deeds
of Laguna in allowing the registration of the private deed of sale was
unauthorized and did not lend a bit of validity to the defective private
document of sale."
With reference to the special law, Section 127 of the Land Registration
Act, Act 496 (now Sec. 112 of P.D. No. 1529) provides:
"Sec. 127. Deeds of Conveyance. . . . effecting lands, whether registered
under this act or unregistered shall be sufficient in law when made
substantially in accordance with the following forms, and shall be as
effective to convey, encumber, . . . or bind the lands as though made in
accordance with the more prolix forms heretofore in use: Provided, That
every such instrument shall be signed by the person or persons executing
the same, in the presence of two witnesses, who shall sign the instrument
as witnesses to the execution thereof, and shall be acknowledged to be
his or their free act and deed by the person or persons executing the
same, before the judge of a court of record, or clerk of a court of record,
or a notary public, or a justice of the peace, who shall certify to such
acknowledgment substantially in the form next hereinafter stated."
(Emphasis supplied).
It is therefore evident that Exhibit "E" in the case at bar is definitely not registerable
under the Land Registration Act.
Likewise noteworthy is the case of Pornellosa and Angels v. Land Tenure
Administration and Guzman, 110 Phil. 986, where the Court ruled:
"The deed of sale (Exhibit A), allegedly executed by Vicente San Jose in
favor of Pornellosa is a mere private document and does not conclusively
establish their right to the parcel of land. While it is valid and binding upon
the parties with respect to the sale of the house erected thereon, yet it is
not sufficient to convey title or any right to the residential lot in litigation.
Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission,
modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property
must appear in a public document."
Upon consideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of
the assailed document, the trial court found that said private document (Exhibit
"B") was null and void and that it was signed by somebody else not Pedro
Villanueva. Such findings of fact besides being based on the records, were
sustained by the Court of Appeals. LLpr
After a careful perusal of the case, there appears to be no cogent reason to disturb
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the findings of the trial
court.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of
the Intermediate Appellate Court is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (C.J.), Narvasa, Cruz and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
||| (Gallardo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-67742, [October 29, 1987])
8. FIRST DIVISION
Ibarra L. Bisnar for himself and for and in behalf of co-private respondent Amelia
Bisnar.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J : p
Petitioner Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, seeks a review of the
decision dated May 27, 1988, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66426,
entitled "Ibarra Bisnar, et al. vs. Director of Lands," affirming in toto the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Capiz, granting the private respondents' application
for confirmation and registration of their title to two (2) parcels of land in LRC Cad.
Rec. 1256. cdll
In their joint application for registration of title to two (2) parcels of land filed on July
20, 1976, the applicants Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar claimed to be the owners in fee
simple of Lots 866 and 870 of the Pilar Cadastre Plan AP-06-000869, respectively
containing an area of 28 hectares (284,424 sq.m.) and 34 hectares (345,385
sq.m.) situated in barrio Gen. Hizon, Municipality of President Roxas, Province of
Capiz (p. 14, Rollo). The applicants alleged that they inherited those parcels of
land (p. 41, Rollo) and they had been paying the taxes thereon (p. 40, Rollo).
On December 16, 1976, the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of
Forest Development, opposed the application on the grounds that:
"1. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest possess
sufficient title to acquire ownership in fee simple of the land or lots applied
for, the same not having been acquired by any of the various types of title
issued by the Spanish Government, such as, (1) 'titulo real' or royal grant,
(2) the 'concession especial' or special grant, (3) the 'composicion con el
estado titulo' or adjustment title, (4) the 'titulo de compra' or title by
purchase, and (5) the 'informacion possessoria' or possessory information
under the Royal Decree of 13 February 1894, or any other recognized
mode of acquisition of title over realty under pertinent applicable laws.
"2. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the land in question for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the
filing of the application.
"3. The properties in question are a portion of the public domain belonging
to the Republic of the Philippines, not subject to private appropriation, (pp
17-19, Record on Appeal)." (pp. 14-15, Rollo.)
On February 24, 1977, the applicants filed an amended application, which was
approved on March 14, 1977, and included the following allegation:
"Should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable to the case,
they hereby apply for the benefits of Chapter 8, Commonwealth Act 141,
as amended, as they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the land as owners for more than fifty (50) years." (p. 16,
Rollo.)
After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the title of the lots in the
names of the applicants, herein private respondents. It found that applicants and
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and
adverse possession of the subject parcels of land under bona fide claims of
ownership for more than eighty (80) years (not only 30) prior to the filing of the
application for registration, introduced improvements on the lands by planting
coconuts, bamboos and other plants, and converted a part of the land into
productive fishponds (p. 68, Rollo).
On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision. It held that the
classification of the lots as timberland by the Director of Forestry cannot prevail in
the absence of proof that the said lots are indeed more valuable as forest land than
as agricultural land, citing as authority the case of Ankron vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10). In this petition, the government alleges that:
1. the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or
disposable agricultural land, mineral land or forest land is a prerogative of
the Executive Department of the government and not of the courts;
2. that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
private ownership; and
3. that an applicant for registration of title has the burden of proving that
he meets the requirements of Section 48 of Com. Act No. 141, as
amended. (p. 19, Rollo.)
The principal issue in this appeal is whether the lots in question may be registered
under Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended.
The petition is impressed with merit.
In the case of Bureau of Forestry vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 351, we ruled:
"As provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141, which was
lifted from Act 2874, the classification or reclassification of public lands
into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative
of the Executive Department of the government and not the courts. With
these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court
which determines the classification of lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of the government,
through the Office of the President. Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse
of discretion for respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that
(1) the disputed area is within a timberland block, and (2) as certified to
by the then Director of Forestry, the area is needed for forest purposes."
(pp. 21-22, Rollo.)
It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is needed to declassify
land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499). Unless and
until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect
so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain,
the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply (Amunategui vs. Director
of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689;
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701; Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 148 SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA
679).
Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership (Vano vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable vs. Director of
Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]). A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the
cadastral court to register under the Torrens System (Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of
Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984]). Cdpr
(Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83609, [October 26, 1989], 258-
|||
A PHIL 492-497)
9. THIRD DIVISION
SYLLABUS
DAVIDE, JR., J : p
From an adverse decision of the then Court of First Instance (now RTC) Laguna
dated 3 June 1968 in a special civil action for declaratory relief with injunction, Civil
Case No. SC-650 entitled International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the
Philippines vs. University of the Philippines and Jose Campos, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of petitioner
and against the respondents:
(a) Declaring that Rep. Act No. 3990 does not empower the University of
the Philippines, in lieu of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of
Forestry, to scale, measure and seal the timber cut by the petitioner within
the tract of land referred to in said Act, and collect the corresponding forest
charges prescribed by the National Internal Revenue Code therefor; and
(b) Dismissing the respondents' counterclaim."
respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as
C.A.-G.R. No. 49409-R.
After the parties filed their respective Briefs in 1971, the Court of Appeals (Sixth
Division) promulgated on 28 December 1979 a resolution elevating the case to this
Court as the "entire case hinges on the interpretation and construction of Republic
Act 3990 as it applies to a set of facts which are not disputed by the parties and
therefore, is a legal question." 1
Civil Case No. SC-650 was filed by petitioner Hardwood before the trial court on
28 June 1966. 2 Petitioner seeks therein a declaration that respondent University
of the Philippines (hereafter referred to as UP) does not have the right to supervise
and regulate the cutting and removal of timber and other forest products, to scale,
measure and seal the timber cut and/or to collect forest charges, reforestation fees
and royalties from petitioner and/or impose any other duty or burden upon the latter
in that portion of its concession, covered by License Agreement No. 27-A issued
on 1 February 1963, ceded in full ownership to the UP by Republic Act No. 3990;
asks that respondents be enjoined from committing the acts complained of; and
prays that respondents be required to pay petitioner the sum of P100,000.00 as
damages and costs of the suit.
Its motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue having been unfavorably
acted upon, and pursuant to the order of the trial court of 26 August 1967,
respondents filed their Answer on 13 September 1987, 3 wherein they interpose
the affirmative defenses of, among others, improper venue and that the petition
states no cause of action; they further set up a counterclaim for the payment of it
by petitioner of forest charges on the forest products cut and felled within the area
ceded to UP under R.A. No. 3990 from 18 June 1964, with surcharges and
interests as provided in the National Internal Revenue Code.
Petitioner filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim. 4 On 18 October 1967, the
parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Joint Submission of the Case for
Judgment, 5 which reads as follows:
"COME NOW the parties in the above-entitled case, by the undersigned
counsel, and respectfully submit the following JOINT STIPULATION OF
FACTS AND JOINT SUBMISSION OF THE CASE FOR JUDGMENT,
without prejudice to the presentation of evidence by either party:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Plaintiff is, among others, engaged in the manufacture, processing and
exportation of plywood and was, for said purpose, granted by the
Government an exclusive license for a period of 25 years expiring on
February 1, 1985, to cut, collect and remove timber from that portion of
timber land located in the Municipalities of Infanta, Mauban and
Sampaloc, Province of Quezon and in the Municipalities of Siniloan,
Pangil, Paete, Cavinti and Calauan, Province of Laguna under License
Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) issued and promulgated by the
Government through the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
on January 11, 1960. . . .;
3. That aforementioned Timber License No. 27-A (Amendment) is a
renewal of the Timber License Agreement No. 27-A previously granted by
the Government to the plaintiff on June 4, 1953 to February 1, 1963. . . .;
4. Plaintiff, since June 4, 1953, continuously up to the present, has been
in peaceful possession of said timber concession and had been felling,
cutting and removing timber therefrom pursuant to the aforementioned
Timber License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960;
Please take note of page '2' of the enclosed letter of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue on the official ruling of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
to the following points raised by the University:
1. That the University of the Philippines may now directly
collect forest charges from INTERWOOD, the existing logging
concessionaire.
2. That forest charges paid by INTERWOOD to the Bureau
of Forestry from June, 1964 up to April, 1966 shall be refunded to
the University of the Philippines. In this manner, INTERWOOD is
requested to file a claim for the refund in the amount heretofore
paid by it to be remitted to the University of the Philippines.
LLjur
These issues bring the matter within the scope of an action for declaratory relief
under Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court and render meaningless the appeal
to the rule laid down in Sarmiento, et al. vs. Caparas, et al., 6 that declaratory relief
cannot be joined by injunction, because herein petitioner, for all legal intents and
purposes, abandoned it by its failure to raise it in the Stipulation of Facts. Thus,
what attains is an amendment to both pleadings (the complaint and the answer),
which is authorized by Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. Said section
pertinently provides:
"SECTION 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of
evidence. — When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express
or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respect, as if
they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings
as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to
raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time,
even after judgment; but failure to so amend does not affect the result of
the trial by these issues. . . ."
The stipulation of facts and the agreement as to the issues unquestionably satisfy
the requisites for declaratory relief: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b)
the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the
party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and
(d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination. 7
There is a justiciable controversy where there is an actual controversy, or the
ripening seeds of one exists between the parties, all of whom are sui juris and
before the court, and that the declaration sought will help in ending the controversy.
A doubt becomes a justiciable controversy when it is translated into a claim of right
which is actually contested. 8
2. On the second assigned error, respondents assert that: (a) Under R.A. No.
3990, the Republic of the Philippines may effect collection of forest charges
through the University of the Philippines because the License Agreement does not
expressly provide that the forest charges shall be paid to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue; in the absence of a specific contractual provision limiting it to a particular
agency in collecting forest charges owing to it, the Republic may effect such
collection through another agency. (b) Having been vested with administrative
jurisdiction over and being the owner of the tract of land in question, the UP
acquired full control and benefit of the timber and other resources within the area.
Timber areas within the ceded property but outside the concession of petitioner
can be fully exploited by UP. However, in respect to timber areas within the ceded
property but covered by the concession of petitioner, only forest charges (or more
appropriately, royalties) may be enjoyed by UP until the expiration of petitioner's
license. To deny it such charges would render its "full ownership" empty and futile.
(c) The UP is clearly entitled to the income derived from the tract of land ceded to
it, for Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990 expressly provides:
"All operations and activities carried on in the central experiment station
shall be exempt from taxation, local or general, any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, and any incidental receipts or income therefrom
shall pertain to the general fund of the University of the Philippines."
(italics supplied for emphasis).
(d) As provided by R.A. No. 3990, the UP is duty bound to operate and maintain
a central experiment station; since this law does not provide for appropriations
for such purpose, it is clearly the legislative intention that the establishment and
maintenance thereof must be financed by the earnings or income from the area,
which can only come from the timber and the royalties or charges payable
therefrom. This is in accordance with the general principle that a grant of
authority or Jurisdiction extends to all incidents that may arise in connection
with the matter over which jurisdiction is exercised. (e) Supervision of the
License Agreement in favor of petitioner by UP was intended by R.A. No. 3990.
(f) Finally, the two government agencies affected by R.A. No. 3990 have issued
specific rulings recognizing the authority of UP to collect royalties or charges
and to supervise petitioner's logging operations.
Petitioner refutes the foregoing arguments of respondents by asserting that: (a)
The UP has not been granted by R.A. No. 3990 the authority to collect forest
charges or the authority to supervise the operation by the petitioner of the timber
concession affected by said Act.
The rule is well-settled that legislative grants must be construed strictly in favor of
the public and most strongly against the grantee, and nothing will be included in
the grant except that which is granted expressly or by clear implication. Under
Section 262 of the Tax Code, as amended, the duties incident to the measuring of
forest products and the collection of the charges thereon shall be discharged by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue under the regulations of the Department of
Finance. The reforestation fee shall be collected by the Bureau of Forestry. 9 The
supervision and regulation of the use of forest products and of the cutting and
removal of forest products are vested upon the Bureau of Forestry. 10 R.A. No.
3990 does not expressly, or even impliedly, grant the UP any authority to collect
from the holders of timber concessions on the area ceded to it forest charges due
and payable to the Government under the Tax Code, or to enforce its provisions
relating to charges on forest products or to supervise the operations of the
concessions by the holders thereof. (b) The cession in full ownership of the land in
question was expressly made "subject to any concession, if any", and that
petitioner's concession would continue until 1 February 1985; the UP then would
acquire full ownership and exclusive jurisdiction to control and administer the
property only after 1 February 1985. The position of UP is akin to that of a donee
of a parcel of land subject to usufruct. (c) The rulings of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and the Acting Director of the Bureau of Forestry are patently
incorrect; moreover, said agencies do not have the power to interpret the law,
which is primarily a function of the judiciary. (d) Finally, it has acquired a vested
right to operate the timber concession under the supervision and control of the
Bureau of Forestry.
There is merit in the second assigned error.
Under Proclamation No. 791, dated 25 September 1961, a parcel of land of the
public domain described therein, with an area of 3,500 hectares, which is the very
parcel of land subject of R.A. No. 3990, was withdrawn from sale or settlement and
was reserved for the College of Agriculture of the UP as experiment station for the
proposed Dairy Research and Training Institute and for research and production
studies of said college, subject however to private rights, if any, and to the condition
that the disposition of timber and other forest products found thereon shall be
subject to forestry laws and regulations.
The above reservation is within the area covered by petitioner's timber license.
Pursuant, however, to R.A. No. 3990 which establishes a central experiment
station for the use of the UP in connection with its research and extension
functions, particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine
and College of Arts and Sciences, the above "reserved" area was "ceded and
transferred in full ownership to the University of the Philippines subject to any
existing concessions, if any."
When it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic of the Philippines
completely removed it from the public domain and, more specifically, in respect to
the areas covered by the timber license of petitioner, removed and segregated it
from a public forest; it divested itself of its rights and title thereto and relinquished
and conveyed the same to the UP; and made the latter the absolute owner thereof,
subject only to the existing concession. That the law intended a transfer of
the absoluteownership is unequivocally evidenced by its use of the word "full" to
describe it. Full means entire, complete, or possessing all particulars, or not
wanting in any essential quality. 11 The proviso regarding existing concessions
refers to the timber license of petitioner. All that it means, however, is that the right
of petitioner as a timber licensee must not be affected, impaired or diminished; it
must be respected. But, insofar as the Republic of the Philippines is concerned, all
its rights as grantor of the license were effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed
to UP as a consequence of the above transfer of full ownership. This is further
borne out by Section 3 ofR.A. No. 3990 which provides, inter alia, that "any
incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the
University of the Philippines." Having been effectively segregated and removed
from the public domain or from a public forest and, in effect, converted into a
registered private woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry
over it were likewise terminated. This is obvious from the fact that the condition
in Proclamation No. 791 to the effect that the disposition of timber shall be subject
to forestry laws and regulations is not reproduced in R.A. No. 3990. The latter does
not likewise provide that it is subject to the conditions set forth in the proclamation.
An owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without other limitations
than those established by law. 12 The right to enjoy includes the jus utendi or the
right to receive from the thing what it produces, and the jus abutendi, or the right
to consume the thing by its use. 13 As provided for in Article 441 of the Civil Code,
to the owner belongs the natural fruits, the industrial fruits and the civil fruits. There
are, however, exceptions to this rules, as where the property is subject to a
usufruct, in which case the usufructuary gets the fruits. 1 4 In the instant case, that
exception is made for the petitioner as licensee or grantee of the concession, which
has been given the license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the area ceded
and transferred to UP until 1 February 1985. However, it has the correlative duty
and obligation to pay the forest charges, or royalties, to the new owner, the UP, at
the same rate as provided for in the Agreement. The charges should not be paid
anymore to the Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of Internal Revenue
because of the very nature of the transfer as aforestated. Consequently, even the
Bureau of Internal Revenue automatically lost its authority and jurisdiction to
measure the timber cut from the subject area and to collect forestry charges and
other fees due thereon.
The foregoing disposes of the contention of petitioner that R.A. No. 3990 does not
grant the UP the authority to collect forest charges and to supervise the operations
of its concession insofar as the property of the UP within it is concerned. Its
argument that it has acquired vested rights to operate its concession under the
supervision and control of the Bureau of Forestry is preposterous. The grantor,
Republic of the Philippines, was by no means bound under the License to
perpetuate the Bureau as its agent. Neither is there force to its contention that
legislative grants must be construed strictly in favor of the public and most strongly
against the grantee. The grant under R.A. No. 3990 is transfer of absolute, full and
entire ownership which leaves no room for a strict interpretation against the
grantee, the UP. The reservation therein made is in favor of the private party
pursuant to the license, which is nevertheless protected. It is the concession in
favor of the petitioner which should, on the contrary, be bound by the rule.
It follows then that respondent UP is entitled to supervise, through its duly
appointed personnel, the logging, felling, and removal of timber within the area
covered byR.A. No. 3990.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
REVERSING the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. C-650, rendered on 3
June 1968; DECLARING that forest charges due from and payable by petitioner
for timber cut pursuant to its License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) within the
area ceded and transferred to the University of the Philippine pursuant to R.A. No.
3990 shall be paid to the University of the Philippines; DECLARING that the
University of the Philippines is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed
personnel, the logging, felling, and removal of timber within the aforesaid area
covered by R.A. No. 3990.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C .J ., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ ., concur.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J : p
The two petitions for review on certiorari before us question the decision of the
Court of Appeals which declared the disputed property as forest land, not subject
to titling in favor of private persons.
These two petitions have their genesis in an application for confirmation of
imperfect title and its registration filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The
parcel of land sought to be registered is known as Lot No. 885 of the Cadastral
Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of 645,703 square meters. LexLib
Roque Borre, petitioner in G.R. No, L-30035, and Melquiades Borre, filed the
application for registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui, petitioners
in G.R. No. L-27873 filed an opposition to the application of Roque and Melquiades
Borre. At the same time, they prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of
Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747 square meters be confirmed and registered in
the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui.
The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an
opposition to the application for registration of title claiming that the land was
mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of the public
domain.
Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of Lot
No. 885 containing 117,956 square meters was concerned and prayed that title to
said portion be confirmed and registered in his name.
During the progress of the trial, applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold whatever
rights and interests he may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan. The latter also
filed an opposition, claiming that he is entitled to have said lot registered in his
name.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square meters
to Emeterio Bereber and the rest of the land containing 527,747 square meters
was adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to
Melquiades Borre.
Only the Heirs of Jose Amunategui and the Director of Forestry filed their
respective appeals with the Court of Appeals, The case was docketed as CA-G.R.
No. 34190-R.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals held:
". . . the conclusion so far must have to be that as to the private litigants
that have been shown to have a better right over Lot 885 are, as to the
northeastern portion of a little less than 117,956 square meters, it was
Emeterio Bereber and as to the rest of 527,747 square meters, it was the
heirs of Jose Amunategui; but the last question that must have to be
considered is whether after all, the title that these two (2) private litigants
have shown did not amount to a registerable one in view of the opposition
and evidence of the Director of Forestry; . . .
". . . turning back the clock thirty (30) years from 1955 when the application
was filed which would place it at 1925, the fact must have to be accepted
that during that period, the land was a classified forest land so much so
that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensee before 1926 and
after that; that even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a
license to cut timber within the area; and this can only mean that the
Bureau of Forestry had stood and maintained its ground that it was a forest
land as indeed the testimonial evidence referred to above persuasively
indicates, and the only time when the property was converted into a
fishpond was sometime after 1950; or a bare five (5) years before the filing
of the application; but only after there had been a previous warning by the
District Forester that that could not be done because it was classified as
a public forest; so that having these in mind and remembering that even
under Republic Act 1942 which came into effect in 1957, two (2) years
after this case had already been filed in the lower Court, in order for
applicant to be able to demonstrate a registerable title he must have
shown.
"'open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years,
preceding the filing of the application;'
the foregoing details cannot but justify the conclusion that not one of the
applicants or oppositors had shown that during the required period of thirty
(30) years prescribed by Republic Act 1942 in order for him to have shown
a registerable title for the entire period of thirty (30) years before filing of
the application, he had been in
"'open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain',
it is evident that the Bureau of Forestry had insisted on its claim all
throughout that period of thirty (30) years and even before and applicants
and their predecessors had made implicit recognition of that; the result
must be to deny all these applications; this Court stating that it had felt
impelled notwithstanding, just the same to resolve the conflicting positions
of the private litigants among themselves as to who of them had
demonstrated a better right to possess because this Court foresees that
this litigation will go all the way to the Supreme Court and it is always
better that the findings be as complete as possible to enable the Highest
Court to pass final judgment;
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision must have to be as it is hereby
reversed; the application as well as all the oppositions with the exception
of that of the Director of Forestry which is hereby sustained are dismissed;
no more pronouncement as to costs."
A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui
contending that the disputed lot had been in the possession of private persons for
over thirty years and therefore in accordance with Republic Act No. 1942, said lot
could still be the subject of registration and confirmation of title in the name of a
private person in accordance with Act No. 496 known as the Land Registration Act.
On the other hand, another petition for review on certiorari was filed by Roque
Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, contending that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing their complaint against the Heirs of Jose
Amunategui. The Borre complaint was for the annulment of the deed of absolute
sale of Lot No. 885 executed by them in favor of the Heirs of Amunategui. The
complaint was dismissed on the basis of the Court of Appeals' decision that the
disputed lot is part of the public domain. The petitioners also question the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in passing upon the relative rights of the parties
over the disputed lot when its final decision after all is to declare said lot a part of
the public domain classified as forest land. LLpr
The need for resolving the questions raised by Roque Borre and Encarnacion
Delfin in their petition depends on the issue raised by the Heirs of Jose
Amunategui, that is, whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable
of registration in the names of the private applicants.
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as
forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a "mangrove swamp". Although
conceding that a "mangrove swamp" is included in the classification of forest land
in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the
petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of said Code as first,
second and third groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they
contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land
registration proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of
private persons for many years, and therefore, said land was already "private land"
better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not
required by the public interests to be kept under forest classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass
or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not
have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may
also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature
or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation
to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muñoz (23 SCRA
1184) that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private
ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on
the ground that the area covered by the patent and title was not disposable public
land, it being a part of the forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void
ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to
declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
The findings of the Court of Appeals are particularly well-grounded in the instant
petition.
The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative
Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such land of its being classified as
forest land, much less as land of the public domain. The appellate court found that
in 1912, the land must have been a virgin forest as stated by Emeterio Bereber's
witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as 1926, it must have been a thickly
forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of the Director of
Forestry was strengthened by the appellate court's finding that timber licenses had
to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the
trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in
1950 that the property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous
warning from the District Forester that the same could not be done because it was
classified as "public forest."
LibLex
SYLLABUS
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J : p
From an adverse decision of the then Court of First Instance (now RTC) Laguna
dated 3 June 1968 in a special civil action for declaratory relief with injunction, Civil
Case No. SC-650 entitled International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the
Philippines vs. University of the Philippines and Jose Campos, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of petitioner
and against the respondents:
(a) Declaring that Rep. Act No. 3990 does not empower the University of
the Philippines, in lieu of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of
Forestry, to scale, measure and seal the timber cut by the petitioner within
the tract of land referred to in said Act, and collect the corresponding forest
charges prescribed by the National Internal Revenue Code therefor; and
(b) Dismissing the respondents' counterclaim."
respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as
C.A.-G.R. No. 49409-R.
After the parties filed their respective Briefs in 1971, the Court of Appeals (Sixth
Division) promulgated on 28 December 1979 a resolution elevating the case to this
Court as the "entire case hinges on the interpretation and construction of Republic
Act 3990 as it applies to a set of facts which are not disputed by the parties and
therefore, is a legal question." 1
Civil Case No. SC-650 was filed by petitioner Hardwood before the trial court on
28 June 1966. 2 Petitioner seeks therein a declaration that respondent University
of the Philippines (hereafter referred to as UP) does not have the right to supervise
and regulate the cutting and removal of timber and other forest products, to scale,
measure and seal the timber cut and/or to collect forest charges, reforestation fees
and royalties from petitioner and/or impose any other duty or burden upon the latter
in that portion of its concession, covered by License Agreement No. 27-A issued
on 1 February 1963, ceded in full ownership to the UP by Republic Act No. 3990;
asks that respondents be enjoined from committing the acts complained of; and
prays that respondents be required to pay petitioner the sum of P100,000.00 as
damages and costs of the suit.
Its motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue having been unfavorably
acted upon, and pursuant to the order of the trial court of 26 August 1967,
respondents filed their Answer on 13 September 1987, 3 wherein they interpose
the affirmative defenses of, among others, improper venue and that the petition
states no cause of action; they further set up a counterclaim for the payment of it
by petitioner of forest charges on the forest products cut and felled within the area
ceded to UP under R.A. No. 3990 from 18 June 1964, with surcharges and
interests as provided in the National Internal Revenue Code.
Petitioner filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim. 4 On 18 October 1967, the
parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Joint Submission of the Case for
Judgment, 5 which reads as follows:
"COME NOW the parties in the above-entitled case, by the undersigned
counsel, and respectfully submit the following JOINT STIPULATION OF
FACTS AND JOINT SUBMISSION OF THE CASE FOR JUDGMENT,
without prejudice to the presentation of evidence by either party:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Plaintiff is, among others, engaged in the manufacture, processing and
exportation of plywood and was, for said purpose, granted by the
Government an exclusive license for a period of 25 years expiring on
February 1, 1985, to cut, collect and remove timber from that portion of
timber land located in the Municipalities of Infanta, Mauban and
Sampaloc, Province of Quezon and in the Municipalities of Siniloan,
Pangil, Paete, Cavinti and Calauan, Province of Laguna under License
Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) issued and promulgated by the
Government through the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
on January 11, 1960. . . .;
3. That aforementioned Timber License No. 27-A (Amendment) is a
renewal of the Timber License Agreement No. 27-A previously granted by
the Government to the plaintiff on June 4, 1953 to February 1, 1963. . . .;
4. Plaintiff, since June 4, 1953, continuously up to the present, has been
in peaceful possession of said timber concession and had been felling,
cutting and removing timber therefrom pursuant to the aforementioned
Timber License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960;
Please take note of page '2' of the enclosed letter of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue on the official ruling of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
to the following points raised by the University:
1. That the University of the Philippines may now directly
collect forest charges from INTERWOOD, the existing logging
concessionaire.
2. That forest charges paid by INTERWOOD to the Bureau
of Forestry from June, 1964 up to April, 1966 shall be refunded to
the University of the Philippines. In this manner, INTERWOOD is
requested to file a claim for the refund in the amount heretofore
paid by it to be remitted to the University of the Philippines.
LLjur
These issues bring the matter within the scope of an action for declaratory relief
under Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court and render meaningless the appeal
to the rule laid down in Sarmiento, et al. vs. Caparas, et al., 6 that declaratory relief
cannot be joined by injunction, because herein petitioner, for all legal intents and
purposes, abandoned it by its failure to raise it in the Stipulation of Facts. Thus,
what attains is an amendment to both pleadings (the complaint and the answer),
which is authorized by Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. Said section
pertinently provides:
"SECTION 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of
evidence. — When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express
or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respect, as if
they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings
as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to
raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time,
even after judgment; but failure to so amend does not affect the result of
the trial by these issues. . . ."
The stipulation of facts and the agreement as to the issues unquestionably satisfy
the requisites for declaratory relief: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b)
the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the
party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and
(d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination. 7
There is a justiciable controversy where there is an actual controversy, or the
ripening seeds of one exists between the parties, all of whom are sui juris and
before the court, and that the declaration sought will help in ending the controversy.
A doubt becomes a justiciable controversy when it is translated into a claim of right
which is actually contested. 8
2. On the second assigned error, respondents assert that: (a) Under R.A. No.
3990, the Republic of the Philippines may effect collection of forest charges
through the University of the Philippines because the License Agreement does not
expressly provide that the forest charges shall be paid to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue; in the absence of a specific contractual provision limiting it to a particular
agency in collecting forest charges owing to it, the Republic may effect such
collection through another agency. (b) Having been vested with administrative
jurisdiction over and being the owner of the tract of land in question, the UP
acquired full control and benefit of the timber and other resources within the area.
Timber areas within the ceded property but outside the concession of petitioner
can be fully exploited by UP. However, in respect to timber areas within the ceded
property but covered by the concession of petitioner, only forest charges (or more
appropriately, royalties) may be enjoyed by UP until the expiration of petitioner's
license. To deny it such charges would render its "full ownership" empty and futile.
(c) The UP is clearly entitled to the income derived from the tract of land ceded to
it, for Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990 expressly provides:
"All operations and activities carried on in the central experiment station
shall be exempt from taxation, local or general, any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, and any incidental receipts or income therefrom
shall pertain to the general fund of the University of the Philippines."
(italics supplied for emphasis).
(d) As provided by R.A. No. 3990, the UP is duty bound to operate and maintain
a central experiment station; since this law does not provide for appropriations
for such purpose, it is clearly the legislative intention that the establishment and
maintenance thereof must be financed by the earnings or income from the area,
which can only come from the timber and the royalties or charges payable
therefrom. This is in accordance with the general principle that a grant of
authority or Jurisdiction extends to all incidents that may arise in connection
with the matter over which jurisdiction is exercised. (e) Supervision of the
License Agreement in favor of petitioner by UP was intended by R.A. No. 3990.
(f) Finally, the two government agencies affected by R.A. No. 3990 have issued
specific rulings recognizing the authority of UP to collect royalties or charges
and to supervise petitioner's logging operations.
Petitioner refutes the foregoing arguments of respondents by asserting that: (a)
The UP has not been granted by R.A. No. 3990 the authority to collect forest
charges or the authority to supervise the operation by the petitioner of the timber
concession affected by said Act.
The rule is well-settled that legislative grants must be construed strictly in favor of
the public and most strongly against the grantee, and nothing will be included in
the grant except that which is granted expressly or by clear implication. Under
Section 262 of the Tax Code, as amended, the duties incident to the measuring of
forest products and the collection of the charges thereon shall be discharged by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue under the regulations of the Department of
Finance. The reforestation fee shall be collected by the Bureau of Forestry. 9 The
supervision and regulation of the use of forest products and of the cutting and
removal of forest products are vested upon the Bureau of Forestry. 10 R.A. No.
3990 does not expressly, or even impliedly, grant the UP any authority to collect
from the holders of timber concessions on the area ceded to it forest charges due
and payable to the Government under the Tax Code, or to enforce its provisions
relating to charges on forest products or to supervise the operations of the
concessions by the holders thereof. (b) The cession in full ownership of the land in
question was expressly made "subject to any concession, if any", and that
petitioner's concession would continue until 1 February 1985; the UP then would
acquire full ownership and exclusive jurisdiction to control and administer the
property only after 1 February 1985. The position of UP is akin to that of a donee
of a parcel of land subject to usufruct. (c) The rulings of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and the Acting Director of the Bureau of Forestry are patently
incorrect; moreover, said agencies do not have the power to interpret the law,
which is primarily a function of the judiciary. (d) Finally, it has acquired a vested
right to operate the timber concession under the supervision and control of the
Bureau of Forestry.
There is merit in the second assigned error.
Under Proclamation No. 791, dated 25 September 1961, a parcel of land of the
public domain described therein, with an area of 3,500 hectares, which is the very
parcel of land subject of R.A. No. 3990, was withdrawn from sale or settlement and
was reserved for the College of Agriculture of the UP as experiment station for the
proposed Dairy Research and Training Institute and for research and production
studies of said college, subject however to private rights, if any, and to the condition
that the disposition of timber and other forest products found thereon shall be
subject to forestry laws and regulations.
The above reservation is within the area covered by petitioner's timber license.
Pursuant, however, to R.A. No. 3990 which establishes a central experiment
station for the use of the UP in connection with its research and extension
functions, particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine
and College of Arts and Sciences, the above "reserved" area was "ceded and
transferred in full ownership to the University of the Philippines subject to any
existing concessions, if any."
When it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic of the Philippines
completely removed it from the public domain and, more specifically, in respect to
the areas covered by the timber license of petitioner, removed and segregated it
from a public forest; it divested itself of its rights and title thereto and relinquished
and conveyed the same to the UP; and made the latter the absolute owner thereof,
subject only to the existing concession. That the law intended a transfer of
the absoluteownership is unequivocally evidenced by its use of the word "full" to
describe it. Full means entire, complete, or possessing all particulars, or not
wanting in any essential quality. 11 The proviso regarding existing concessions
refers to the timber license of petitioner. All that it means, however, is that the right
of petitioner as a timber licensee must not be affected, impaired or diminished; it
must be respected. But, insofar as the Republic of the Philippines is concerned, all
its rights as grantor of the license were effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed
to UP as a consequence of the above transfer of full ownership. This is further
borne out by Section 3 ofR.A. No. 3990 which provides, inter alia, that "any
incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the
University of the Philippines." Having been effectively segregated and removed
from the public domain or from a public forest and, in effect, converted into a
registered private woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry
over it were likewise terminated. This is obvious from the fact that the condition
in Proclamation No. 791 to the effect that the disposition of timber shall be subject
to forestry laws and regulations is not reproduced in R.A. No. 3990. The latter does
not likewise provide that it is subject to the conditions set forth in the proclamation.
An owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without other limitations
than those established by law. 12 The right to enjoy includes the jus utendi or the
right to receive from the thing what it produces, and the jus abutendi, or the right
to consume the thing by its use. 13 As provided for in Article 441 of the Civil Code,
to the owner belongs the natural fruits, the industrial fruits and the civil fruits. There
are, however, exceptions to this rules, as where the property is subject to a
usufruct, in which case the usufructuary gets the fruits. 1 4 In the instant case, that
exception is made for the petitioner as licensee or grantee of the concession, which
has been given the license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the area ceded
and transferred to UP until 1 February 1985. However, it has the correlative duty
and obligation to pay the forest charges, or royalties, to the new owner, the UP, at
the same rate as provided for in the Agreement. The charges should not be paid
anymore to the Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of Internal Revenue
because of the very nature of the transfer as aforestated. Consequently, even the
Bureau of Internal Revenue automatically lost its authority and jurisdiction to
measure the timber cut from the subject area and to collect forestry charges and
other fees due thereon.
The foregoing disposes of the contention of petitioner that R.A. No. 3990 does not
grant the UP the authority to collect forest charges and to supervise the operations
of its concession insofar as the property of the UP within it is concerned. Its
argument that it has acquired vested rights to operate its concession under the
supervision and control of the Bureau of Forestry is preposterous. The grantor,
Republic of the Philippines, was by no means bound under the License to
perpetuate the Bureau as its agent. Neither is there force to its contention that
legislative grants must be construed strictly in favor of the public and most strongly
against the grantee. The grant under R.A. No. 3990 is transfer of absolute, full and
entire ownership which leaves no room for a strict interpretation against the
grantee, the UP. The reservation therein made is in favor of the private party
pursuant to the license, which is nevertheless protected. It is the concession in
favor of the petitioner which should, on the contrary, be bound by the rule.
It follows then that respondent UP is entitled to supervise, through its duly
appointed personnel, the logging, felling, and removal of timber within the area
covered byR.A. No. 3990.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
REVERSING the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. C-650, rendered on 3
June 1968; DECLARING that forest charges due from and payable by petitioner
for timber cut pursuant to its License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) within the
area ceded and transferred to the University of the Philippine pursuant to R.A. No.
3990 shall be paid to the University of the Philippines; DECLARING that the
University of the Philippines is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed
personnel, the logging, felling, and removal of timber within the aforesaid area
covered by R.A. No. 3990.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C .J ., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ ., concur.
(International Hardwood and Veneer Co. of the Philippines v. University of the
|||
Philippines, G.R. No. 52518, [August 13, 1991], 277 PHIL 636-658)
DECISION
PARAS, J : p
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul and set aside; (a)
the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated March 13, 1989 in CA-G.R No. SP No.
13528 entitled "Liwan Consi vs. Hon. Judge Ruben C. Ayson, et al." declaring that
both the petitioner and private respondent hold possessory titles to the land in
question, and (b) the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Fredia Mineral claim of about nine (9) hectares situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet,
was located sometime between December 25, 1930 and December 31, 1930, a
period of six (6) days, by A.I. Reynolds in accordance with the provisions of the
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, better known as the Philippine Bill of 1902, in a
so-called Declaration of Location. The said Declaration of Location of mineral claim
was duly recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder sometime on January 2,
1931. Fredia mineral claim, together with other mineral claims, was sold by A.I.
Reynolds to Big Wedge Mining Company, the earlier corporate name of Atok Big
Wedge Mining Company, Inc. (Atok for short; herein petitioner) in a Deed of Sale
executed on November 2, 1931. Since then petitioner Atok has been in continuous
and exclusive ownership and possession of said claim up to the present (Rollo,
Annex "B", p. 21).prcd
Atok has paid the realty taxes and occupation fees for the Fredia mineral claim.
The Fredia mineral claim together with other mineral claims owned by Atok has
been declared under Tax Declaration No. 9535 and that in view of Presidential
Decree No. 1214 an application for lease was filed by Atok covering the Fredia
mineral claim (Rollo, Ibid., p. 22).
On the other hand, private respondent Liwan Consi has a lot below the land of a
certain Mr. Acay at Tuding Slide, Itogon, Benguet. He constructed a house thereon
sometime in 1964. The lot is covered by Tax Declaration No. 9462. When he first
constructed his house below the lot of Mr. Acay he was told that it was not
necessary for him to obtain a building permit as it was only a nipa hut. And no one
prohibited him from entering the land so he was constructing a house thereon. It
was only in January 1984 when private respondent Consi repaired the said house
that people came to take pictures and told him that the lot belongs to Atok. Private
respondent Consi has been paying taxes on said land which his father before him
had occupied (Rollo, Ibid., p. 22).
On January 1984, the security guards of Atok informed Feliciano Reyes, Security
Officer of Atok, that a construction was being undertaken at the area of the Fredia
mineral claim by private respondent Liwan Consi. Feliciano Reyes instructed the
cashier to go and take pictures of the construction. Feliciano Reyes himself and
other security guards went to the place of the construction to verify and then to the
police to report the matter (Rollo, Ibid.).
On March 1, 1984, Atok filed a complaint for forcible entry and detainer against
Liwan Consi (Rollo, Annex "C", p. 32).
On January 29, 1987, after due hearing, the Municipal Trial Court of Itogon,
presided over by Judge Irving rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, this case against Liwan Consi is hereby ordered
dismissed." (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 20).
Petitioner ATOK appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio
and Benguet, Branch VI, presided over by Judge Ruben Ayson (Rollo, Petition, p.
3). On December 5, 1987, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing the decision of the Municipal
Trial Court of Itogon dated January 29, 1987 appealed from is hereby
reversed and set aside and a new one entered in its place ordering the
defendant Liwan Consi and all those claiming under him to vacate the
premises of the Fredia Mineral claim at Tuding, Itogon, Benguet
immediately, and to restore possession thereof to the plaintiff Atok Big
Wedge Mining Company.
"The defendant, Liwan Consi, is further ordered to remove and demolish
his house constructed in the premises of the land of Fredia mineral claim
at Tuding, Benguet, and to pay the costs.
"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 30).
From said decision, Liwan Consi filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review
(Rollo, Petition, p. 4). On March 13, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the subject
forcible entry action. Costs against private respondent.
"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, Annex "C", p. 48).
The Court of Appeals further ruled in part to wit:
"The determination of whether the subject lot is mineral land or agricultural
awaits the decision of the Secretary of Natural Resources in a proceeding
called for that purpose. Thus, there is a chance that the subject property
may be classified as alienable agricultural land. At any rate, the mining
company may not so readily describe Liwan Consi as a 'squatter' as he
also has possessory rights over the property. Such rights may mature into
ownership on the basis of long-term possession under the Public Land
Law. cdphil
"Thus it is Our holding, that both Consi and ATOK are of equal legal
footing with regards the subject lot. Both hold possessory titles to the land
in question — the petitioner through his long term occupancy of the same;
the respondent mining firm by virtue of its being the claim locator and
applicant for a lease on the mineral claim within which the subject lot is
found. But it was established that the petitioner has been in actual and
beneficial possession of the subject lot since before the Second World
War in the concept of owner and in good faith." (Rollo, Annex "C", pp. 47-
48).
On June 16, 1989, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed
by petitioner ATOK (Rollo, Annex "D", p. 50).
Hence, the petition.
The main issue in this case is whether or not an individual's long term occupation
of land of the public domain vests him with such rights over the same as to defeat
the rights of the owner of that claim.
The petition is impressed with merit.
It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as held
in the Gold Creek Mining Corporation case, for all physical purposes of ownership,
the owner is not required to secure a patent as long as he complies with the
provisions of the mining laws; his possessory right, for all practical purposes of
ownership, is as good as though secured by patent (Republic v. Court of Appeals,
160 SCRA 228 [1988]).
In the case at bar, the evidence on record pointed that the petitioner Atok has
faithfully complied with all the requirements of the law regarding the maintenance
of the said Fredia Mineral Claim.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and
under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. By such act, the
locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the government,
without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention
of a patent over it. As the land had become the private property of the locators,
they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok (Ibid.).
As in the instant petition, the record shows that the lot in question was acquired
through a Deed of Sale executed between Atok and Fredia Mineral Claim.
"The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to
segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator the
beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefor upon
compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law. Where there
is a valid location of mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the
public and the property of the locator. When a location of a mining claim
is perfected it has the effect of a grant by the United States of the right of
present and exclusive possession, with the right to the exclusive
enjoyment of all the surface ground as well as of all the minerals within
the lines of the claim, except as limited by the extralateral right of adjoining
locators; and this is the locator's right before as well as after the issuance
of the patent. While a lode locator acquires a vested right by virtue of his
location made in compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains in the
government until patent issues." (St. Louis Mining & Mineral Co. v.
Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 605, 655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322)
It is, therefore, evident that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property
in question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired
before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public
domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its
adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the private
respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared
simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral
purposes (Ibid). LibLex
Since the subject lot is mineral land, private respondent's possession of the subject
lot no matter how long did not confer upon him possessory rights over the same.
Furthermore, Article 538 of the New Civil Code provides:
"Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in
two different personalities except in the cases of co-possession. Should a
question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor
shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one longer in
possession; if the dates of the possession are the same, the one who
presents a title; and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be
placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or
ownership through proper proceedings."
Since 1931 up to the present, petitioner ATOK has been in continuous and
exclusive possession of the Fredia mineral claim while private respondent's
possession started only sometime in 1964 when he constructed a house thereon.
Clearly, ATOK has superior possessory rights than private respondent, Liwan
Consi, the former being "the one longer in possession."
It is therefore clear that from the legal viewpoint it was really petitioner who was in
actual physical possession of the property. Having been deprived of this
possession by the private respondent, petitioner has every right to sue for
ejectment.
With this ruling enunciated by the Court, it can further be declared and held that
petitioner Atok has the exclusive right to the property in question.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision
of the Court of Appeals dated March 13, 1989 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio and Benguet dated June 16,
1989 is REINSTATED. LibLex
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera , Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., took no part, petitioner used to be my client before my appointment
to the Court.
(Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88883, [January
|||
DECISION
PARAS, J : p
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the April 26, 1984 Decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court * reversing the February 6, 1976 Decision of the then
Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch VI, in Civil Case No. 2044.
The antecedental facts of this case, as found by the then Intermediate Appellate
Court, are as follows:
"Sometime in 1951, the late Modesto Castillo applied for the registration
of two parcels of land, Lots 1 and 2, located in Banadero, Tanauan,
Batangas, described in Plan Psu-119166, with a total area of 39,755
square meters. In a decision dated August 31, 1951, the said
Modesto Castillo, married to Amanda Lat, was declared the true and
absolute owner of the land with the improvements thereon, for which
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-665 was issued to him by the Register of
Deeds at Batangas, Batangas, on February 7, 1952. By virtue of an
instrument dated March 18, 1960, the said Lots 1 and 2 covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-665, together with Lot No. 12374 covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3254-A and Lot No. 12377 covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3251-A, were consolidated and sub-
divided into Lots 1 to 9 under Pcs-1046. After the death of
Modesto Castillo, or on August 31, 1960, Amanda Lat Vda. de Castillo, et
al., executed a deed of partition and assumption of mortgage in favor of
Florencio L. Castillo, et al., as a result of which Original Certificate of Title
No. D-665 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, new transfer certificates of
title were issued to Florencio L. Castillo, et al., to wit: Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 21703 (Lot 4) (and) Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21704 to
FlorencioCastillo (Lot 5); Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21708 to
Carlos L. Castillo (Lot 7); Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21712 to
Mariano L. Castillo (Lot 6); Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21713 to
Jose L. Castillo (Lot 9); Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21718 to Aida
C. Herrera (Lot 2); and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21727 to Teresita
L. Castillo (Lot 8).
"The Republic of the Philippines filed Civil Case No. 2044 with the lower
court for the annulment of the certificates of title issued to defendants
Amanda Lat Vda. deCastillo, et al., as heirs/successors of
Modesto Castillo, and for the reversion of the lands covered thereby (Lots
1 and 2, Psu-119166) to the State. It was alleged that said lands had
always formed part of the Taal Lake, washed and inundated by the waters
thereof, and being of public ownership, it could not be the subject of
registration as private property. Appellants herein, defendants below,
alleged in their answer that the Government's action was already barred
by the decision of the registration court; that the action has prescribed;
and that the government was estopped from questioning the ownership
and possession of appellants."
After trial, the then Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch VI, presided over
by Honorable Benjamin Relova, in a Decision dated February 6, 1976 (Record on
Appeal, pp. 62-69), ruled in favor of herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
The decretal portion of the said decision, reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Register of Deeds of Batangas is hereby ordered to
cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 0-665 in the name of
Modesto Castillo and the subsequent Transfer of Certificates of Title
issued over the property in the names of the defendants. Lots Nos. 1 and
2 of Plan Psu-119166 are hereby declared public lands belonging to the
state. Without pronouncement as to costs."
The Court of Appeals, on appeal, in a Decision promulgated on April 26, 1984,
reversed and set aside the appealed decision, and dismissed the complaint
(Record, pp. 31-41). Herein petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Record,
pp. 42-51), but the same was denied in a Resolution promulgated on October 12,
1984 (Record, p. 52). Hence, the instant petition. cdll
The sole issue raised in this case is whether or not the decision of the Land
Registration Court involving shore lands constitutes res adjudicata.
There is no question that one of the requisites of res judicata is that the court
rendering the final judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter
(Ramos v. Pablo, 146 SCRA 24 [1986]; that shores are properties of the public
domain intended for public use (Article 420, Civil Code) and, therefore, not
registrable. Thus, it has long been settled that portions of the foreshore or of the
territorial waters and beaches cannot be registered. Their inclusion in a certificate
of title does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title
upon the registrant (Republic v. Ayala y Cia, 14 SCRA, 259 [1965], citing the cases
of Dizon, et al. v. Bayona, et al., 98 Phil. 943; and Dizon, et al. v. Rodriguez, et al.,
13 SCRA 704).
But an important bone of contention is the nature of the lands involved in this case.
Petitioner contends "that 'Lots 1 and 2, PSU-119166 had always formed part of the
Taal Lake, washed and inundated by the waters thereof. Consequently, the same
were not subject to registration, being outside the commerce of men; and that since
the lots in litigation are of public domain (Art. 502), par. 4 Civil Code) the
registration court (of 1951) did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate said lands as
private property, hence, res judicata does not apply. (Rollo, pp. 37-38).
The Government presented both oral and documentary evidence.
As summarized by the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals), the
testimonies of the witnesses for the petitioner are as follows:
"1. Rosendo Arcenas, a Geodetic Engineer connected with the Bureau of
Lands since 1951, testified to the effect that Lots 1 and 2 Psu-119166,
which are the lots in question, adjoin the cadastral survey of Tanauan,
Batangas (Cad. 168); that the original boundary of the original cadastral
survey was foreshore land as indicated on the plan; that the cadastral
survey of Tanauan was executed sometime in 1923; that the first survey
executed of the land after 1923 was the one executed in 1948 under Plan
Psu-119166; that in the relocation survey of the disputed lots in 1962
under SWO-40601, said lots were annotated on the plan as claimed by
the Republic of the Philippines in the same manner that it was so
annotated in Plan Psu-119166, thus showing that the Government was
the only claimant of the land during the survey in 1948; that during the
relocation survey made in 1962, old points cannot be identified or located
because they were under water by about forty centimeters; that during the
ocular inspection of the premises on November 23, 1970, he found that 2
monuments of the lots in question were washed out by the waters of the
Baloyboy Creek; that he also found duck pens along the lots in question;
that there are houses in the premises as well as some camotes and
bananas; and that he found also some shells ('suso') along the banks of
the Taal lake (Tsn, Nov. 16, 1970, pp. 13-21; Feb. 16, 1971, pp. 4-36).
"2. Braulio Almendral testified to the effect that he is a resident of
Tanauan, Batangas, near the Taal lake; that like himself there are other
occupants of the land among whom are Atanacio Tironas, Gavino
Mendoza, Juliano Tirones, Agapito Llarena, etc.; that it was they who filled
up the area to make it habitable; that they filled up the area with shells and
sand; that their occupation is duck raising; and that the Castillos never
stayed in or occupied the premises (Tsn, Nov. 16, 1970, pp. 32-50).
"3. Arsenio Ibay, a Geodetic Engineer connected with the Bureau of Lands
since 1968, also testified to the effect that in accordance with the cadastral
plan of Tanauan, the only private claim of Sixto Castillo referred to Lots
1006 to 1008; that the Castillos never asserted any private claim to the
lots in question during the cadastral survey; that in the preparation of plan
Psu-119166, Lots 12374 and 12377 were made as reference to conform
to previously approved plans; that lot 12374 is a portion of cadastral lot
10107, SWO-86738 while Lot 22377 is a portion of Lot 10108 of the same
plan (Tsn, Nov. 25, 1970, pp. 115-137). LLjur
"4. Jose Isidro, a Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands, testified to the
effect that pursuant to the order of the Director of Lands, he, together with
Engineer Rufino Santiago and the barrio captain of Tanauan, Batangas,
conducted an investigation of the land in question; that he submitted a
report of investigation, dated October 19, 1970 (Exh. H-1); that portions of
the lot in question were covered by public land applications filed by the
occupants thereof; that Engineer Santiago also submitted a report (Exh.
H-8); that he had notified Dr. Mariano Castillo before conducting the
investigation (Tsn, Nov. 25, 1970, pp. 137-162).
"5. Rufino Santiago, another Geodetic Engineer connected with the
Bureau of Lands, testified to the effect that on October 19, 1970, he
submitted a report of investigation regarding the land in question; that he
noted on the plan Exhibit H-9 the areas on which the houses of Severo
Alcantara and others were built; that he found that the land was planted
to coconuts which are about 15 years old; that the land is likewise
improved with rice paddies; that the occupants thereof are duck raisers;
that the area had been elevated because of the waste matters and duck
feeds that have accumulated on the ground through the years (Tsn, Nov.
26, 1970, pp. 163-196).
"Another theory to bolster and support this idea is the actual location now
in the verification-relocation survey of a known geographic point were
Barrio Boundary Monument (BBM N. 22) is under water level quite for
sometimes as evidence by earthworks (collection of mud) that amount
over its surface by eighty (80) centimeters below the ground, see notation
appearing on verification-relocation plan previously submitted." (Re-
Verification-Relocation Survey Exhibits, pp. 64-65).
Said surveys were further confirmed by the testimonies of witnesses to the effect
that from 1950 to 1969, during rainy season, the water of Taal lake even went
beyond the questioned lots; and that the water, which was about one (1) foot,
stayed up to more or less two (2) to three (3) months (Testimonies of Braulio
Almendral and Anastacio Tirones, both residents of Banadero, Tanauan, Batangas
(Hearing of Nov. 16, 1970, TSN, pp. 41-42 and Hearing of Nov. 23, 1970, TSN,
pp. 93, 98-99, respectively). In the Relocation Survey of 1962, there were no
definite boundary or area of Lots 1 and 2 because a certain point is existing which
was under water by 40 centimeters (Testimony of Engineer Arcena, Hearing of
Nov. 16, 1970, TSN, p. 20).
Lakeshore land or lands adjacent to the lake, like the lands in question must be
differentiated from foreshore land or that part of the land adjacent to the sea which
is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides (Castillo, Law on
Natural Resources, Fifth Edition, 1954, p. 67).
Such distinction draws importance from the fact that accretions on the bank of a
lake, like Laguna de Bay, belong to the owners of the estate to which they have
been added (Gov't. v. Colegio de San Jose, 53 Phil. 423) while accretion on a sea
bank still belongs to the public domain, and is not available for private ownership
until formally declared by the government to be no longer needed for public use
(Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]).
But said distinction will not help private respondents because there is no accretion
shown to exist in the case at bar. On the contrary, it was established that the
occupants of the lots who were engaged in duck raising filled up the area with
shells and sand to make it habitable.
The defense of long possession is likewise not available in this case because, as
already ruled by this Court, mere possession of land does not by itself
automatically divest the land of its public character (Cuevas v. Pineda, 143 SCRA
674 [1968]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the April 26, 1984 Decision of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court is hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED and the February 6, 1976
Decision of the then Court of First Instance of Batangas is hereby AFFIRMED and
REINSTATED. prLL
SO ORDERED.
(Republic v. Vda. de Castillo, G.R. No. 69002, [June 30, 1988], 246 PHIL 294-
|||
304)
15. EN BANC
SYLLABUS
DECISION
BENGZON, J.P., J : p
Dr. Jose Hilario was the registered owner of a large tract of land — around 49
hectares in area — located at Barrio Guinayang, in San Mateo, Rizal. 1 Upon his
death this property was inherited by his son, herein plaintiff-appellant Jose Hilario,
Jr., to whom a new certificate of title 2 was issued.
During the lifetime of plaintiff's father, the Hilario estate was bounded on the
western side by the San Mateo River. 3 To prevent its entry into the land, a bamboo
and lumber post dike or ditch was constructed on the northwestern side. This was
further fortified by a stonewall built on the northern side. For years, these
safeguards served their purpose. However, in 1937, a great and extraordinary
flood occurred which inundated the entire place including the neighboring barrios
and municipalities. The River destroyed the dike on the northwest, left its original
bed and meandered into the Hilario estate, segregating from the rest thereof a
lenticular piece of land. The disputed area is on the eastern side of this lenticular
strip which now stands between the old riverbed site and the new course. 4
In 1945, the U.S. Army opened a sand and gravel plant within the premises 5 and
started scraping, excavating and extracting soil, gravel and sand from the nearby
areas along the River. The operations eventually extended northward into this
strip of land. Consequently, a claim for damages was filed with the U.S. War
Department by Luis Hidalgo, the then administrator of Dr. Hilario's estate. The U.S
Army paid. 6 In 1947, the plant was turned over to herein defendants- appellants
and appellee who took over its operations and continued the extractions and
excavations of gravel and sand from the strip of land along an area near the River.
On October 22, 1949, plaintiff filed his complaint 7 for injunction and damages
against the defendants City Engineer of Manila, District Engineer of Rizal, the
Director of Public Works, and Engr. Busuego, the Engineer-incharge of the plant.
It was prayed that the latter be restrained from excavating, bulldozing and
extracting gravel, sand and soil from his property and that they solidarily pay to
him P5,000.00 as damages. Defendants' answer alleged, in affirmative defense,
that the extractions were made from the riverbed while counter claiming with a
prayer for injunction against plaintiff — who, it was claimed, was preventing them
from operations.
Subsequently, the Bureau of Mines and Atty. Maximo Calalang were respectively
allowed to join the litigation as intervenors. The former complained that the
disputed area was within the bed of the River so that plaintiff should not only be
enjoined from making extractions therefrom but should also be ordered to pay the
fees and penalties for the materials taken by him. On the other hand, the latter
claimed that he was authorized by plaintiff to extract materials from the disputed
area but this notwithstanding, the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal collected from him
a sand and gravel fee which would be an illegal exaction if the disputed area turns
out to be private ownership. Answers to the two complaints in intervention were
duly filed by the affected parties.
On March 14, 1954, defendants filed a petition for injunction against plaintiff and
intervenor Calalang in the same case, alleging that the latter have fenced off the
disputed area in contravention of an agreement 8 had between the latter and the
Director of Public Works wherein the defendants were allowed to continue their
operations but subject to the final outcome of the pending suit. It was prayed that
plaintiff and intervenor Calalang be ordered to remove the fence and allow
defendants' men to continue their operations unhampered. Opposition to this
petition was filed by the other side, with a prayer for counter injunction. On March
23, 1954, the lower court issued an order maintaining the status quo and allowing
the defendants to continue their extractions from the disputed area provided a
receipt 9in plaintiff's favor be issued for all the materials taken.
On May 13, 1954, plaintiff amended his complaint. Impleaded as additional
defendants were the City of Manila, 10 the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal, 11 and
Engr. Eulogio Sese, the new Engineer-in-charge of the plant. Plaintiff also
converted his claim to one purely for damages directed against
the City of Manila and the Director of Public Works, solidarily, in the
amount of P1,000,000.00, as the cost of materials taken since 1949, as well as
those to be extracted therefrom until defendants stop their operations.
Came the separate amended answers of the several
defendants. Manila City denied ownership of the plant and claimed that
the City Engineer acted merely as a deputyof the Public Works Director. The other
defendants 12 put up, as special defense, the agreement between plaintiff and the
Public Works Director, and asserted a P1.2 million counterclaim for damages
against plaintiff. The rest 13 renewed the same defense: that the disputed area was
part of the public domain, since it was situated on the riverbanks.
On November 3, 1954, the defendant City Engineer of Manila filed a petition to
delimit the area of excavation and asked the lower court to authorize his men to
extend their operations west of the camachile tree in the disputed area. This met
vigorous opposition from plaintiff and intervenor Calalang. On May 27, 1955, the
petition was denied.
Finally, on December 21, 1956, the lower court rendered its decision on the merits.
The dispositive portion provided: 14
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered against the
defendants City of Manila and the Director of Public Works, to pay
solidarily the herein plaintiff the sum ofP376,989.60, as the cost of gravel
and sand extracted from plaintiff's land, plus costs. Judgment is likewise
hereby rendered against the defendant Provincial Treasurerof Rizal,
ordering him to reimburse to intervenor Maximo Calalang the
amount of P236.80 representing gravel fees illegally collected. Finally,
defendants herein are perpetually enjoined from extracting any sand or
gravel from plaintiff's property which is two-fifths northern portion of the
disputed area.
"IT IS SO ORDERED."
None of the parties litigants seemed satisfied with this decision and they all sought
a reconsideration of the same. On August 30, 1957, the lower court resolved the
motions to reconsider with an order, the dispositive portion of which provided: 15
"WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the motion for reconsideration
filed by plaintiff and intervenor Calalang; dismisses the complaint with
respect to defendant Cityof Manila; holds that the northern two-fifths
portion of the area in controversy belongs to the plaintiff with right to the
immediate possession thereof and hereby enjoins the defendants and
intervenor Bureau of Mines to vacate the same and to stop from extracting
gravel thereon. The Court however hereby dismisses the case against the
defendant Bureau of Public Works and its agents and employees insofar
as the claim for money is concerned without prejudice to plaintiffs taking
such action as he may deem proper to enforce said claim against the
proper party in accordance with law.
"IT IS SO ORDERED."
Still unsatisfied, plaintiff and intervenor Calalang filed a second motion for
reconsideration. The lower court stood firm on its ruling of August 30, 1957. 16
Hence, this appeal. 17 The defendants Director of Public
Works, City Engineer of Manila, and Engrs. Bosuego and Sese have also
appealed from the declaration made by the lower court that the northern two-
fifths of the disputed area belongs to plaintiff Hilario.
The parties herein have presented before this Court mixed questions of law and
fact for resolution and adjudication. Foremost among them is this legal query; when
a river, leaving its old bed, changes its original course and opens a new one
through private property, would the new riverbanks lining said course be of public
ownership also? 18
The defendants answer in the affirmative. They claim that under the
Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, the riverbanks are, by definition, considered
part of the riverbed which is always of public ownership. On the other hand,
plaintiff would have the question resolved in the negative. He maintains that not all
riverbanks are of public ownership because: (1) Art. 372 of the old Civil Code,
which governs this particular case, speaks only of the new bed; nothing is said
about the new banks; (2) Art. 372 ofthe Law of Waters which defines the phrase
"banks of a river" cannot be applied in the case at bar in conjunction with the other
articles cited by defendants since that article applies only to
banks of natural riverbeds and the present River is not in its natural bed; and (3) if
all banks were of public ownership, then Art. 553 of the old Civil Code and the
second sentence, first paragraph of Art. 73 of the Law of Waters can never have
any application.
Since the change in the course of the River took place in 1937, long before the
present Civil Code took effect, 19 the question before Us should be determined in
accordance with the provisions of the old Civil Code and those of the
Law of Waters of August 3, 1866.
We agree with defendants that under the cited laws, all riverbanks are of public
ownership — including those formed when a river leaves its old bed and opens a
new course through a private estate. Art. 339 of the old Civil Code is very clear.
Without any qualifications, it provides:
"Property of public ownership is —
"1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and
that of a similar character;" (Italics supplied)
Moreover, as correctly contended by defendants, the riverbank is part of the
riverbed. Art. 73 of the Law of Waters which defines the phrase "banks of a river"
provides:
"By the phrase 'banks of a river' is understood those lateral
strips of zones of its beds which are washed by the stream only during
such high floods as do not cause inundations . . ." (Italics supplied)
The use of the words "of its bed [de sus alveos]" clearly indicates the intent of the
law to consider the banks — for all legal purposes — as part of the riverbed. The
lower court also ruled — correctly — that the banks of the River are part of its
bed. 20 Since undeniably all beds of river are of public ownership, 21 it follows that
the banks, which form part of them, are also of public ownership.
Plaintiff's contention that Arts. 70 and 73 of the Law of Waters cannot apply
because Art. 372 of the old Civil Code mentions only the new bed but omits the
banks, and that said articles only apply to natural — meaning original — bed and
banks is untenable. Art. 70, which defines beds of rivers and creeks, provides:
"The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by
its waters during the highest [ordinary] floods." 22 (Italics supplied)
Art. 372 of the old Civil Code which provides that —
"Whenever a navigable or floatable river changes its course from natural
causes and opens a new bed through a private estate, the new bed shall
be of public ownership, but the owner of the estate shall recover it in the
event that the waters leave it dry again either naturally or as the
result of any work legally authorized for this purpose" (Italics supplied)
did not have to mention the banks because it was unnecessary. The
nature of the banks always follows that of the bed and the running waters of the
river. A river is a compound concept consisting of three elements; (1) the
running waters, (2) the bed and (3) the banks. 23 All these constitute the river.
American authorities are in accord with this view:
"'River' consists of water, bed and banks." 24
"A 'river' consists of water, a bed and banks, these several parts
constituting the river, the whole river. It is a compound idea; it cannot exist
without all its parts. Evaporate the water, and you have a dry hollow. If you
could sink the bed, instead of a river you would have a fathomless gulf.
Remove the banks, and you have, a boundless flood." 25
Since a river is but one compound concept, it should have only one nature, i.e., it
should either be totally public or completely private. And since rivers are of public
ownership, 26 it is implicit that all the three component elements be of the same
nature also. As Manresa commented:
"Realmente no puede imaginarse un rio sin alveo y sin ribera; de suerte
que al decir el Codigo Civil que los rios son de dominio publico, parece
que debe ir implicito el dominio publica de aquellos tres elementos que
integran el rio." 27
However, to dispel all possible doubts, the law expressly makes all three elements
public. Thus, riverbanks and beds are public under Arts. 339 and 407,
respectively, ofthe Code, while the flowing waters are declared so under Art. 33,
par. 2 of the Law of Waters of 1866.
Articles 70, 72 and 73 of the Law of Waters speak of natural beds and their banks.
Plaintiff now equates the term "natural with the word "original" so that a change in
the course of a river would render those articles inapplicable. However, the
premise is incorrect. Diccionario De La Real Academia Española defines the word
natural" as follows:
"NATURAL — perteneciente a la naturaleza o coforme a la calidad o
propriedad de las cosas; nativo, originario de un pueblo o nacion; hecho
con verdad, ni artificio, mezcla ni compocision alguna, ingenuo y sin
doblez en su modo de proceder; di cese tambien de las cosas que imitar
a la naturaleza con propiedad; regular y que comunmente sucede, y par
eso, facilmente creible; que se produce por solas las fuerzas de la
naturaleza, como contrapuesto a sobre natural y milagroso," (Emphasis
supplied)
"Natural" is not made synonymous to "original" or "prior condition". On the
contrary, even if a river should leave its original bed so long as it is due to the
force ofnature, the new course would still fall within the scope of the definition
provided above. Hence, the law must have used the word "natural" only
because it is in keeping with the ordinary nature and concept of a river always
to have a bed and banks.
Plaintiff's third point is not lightly to be taken. Indeed, it would seem possible to
acquire private ownership of banks under Art. 553 of the old Civil Code which
provides:
"Las riberas de los rios, aun cuando sean de dominio privado, estan
sujetas en toda su extension y en sus margenes, en una zona de tres
metros, a la servidumbre de uso publico en interes general de la
navegacion, la flotacion, la pesca y el salvamento." (Italics supplied)
And plaintiff is not without jurisprudential backing for in Commonwealth vs.
Gungun, 28 it was said that the private ownership of the banks was not prohibited.
His point is then neatly brought home with the proposition that it is precisely when
a river changes its course and opens a new bed through a private estate that there
can be private ownership of the banks.
A study of the history of Art. 583 will however reveal that it was never intended to
authorize the private acquisition of river banks. That could not have been legally
possible in view of the legislative policy clearly enunciated in Art. 339 of the Code
that all riverbanks were of public ownership. The article merely recognized and
preserved the vested rights of riparian owners who, because of prior law or
custom, were able to acquire ownership over the banks. This was possible under
the Siete Partidas which was promulgated in 1384 yet. 29 Under Law 6, Title 28,
Partida 3, the banks of rivers belonged to the riparian owners, following the
Roman Law rule. 30 In other words, they were privately owned then. But
subsequent legislation radically changed this rule. By the Law of Waters of August
3, 1866, riverbanks became ofpublic ownership, albeit impliedly only because
considered part of the bed — which was public — by statutory definition. 31 But this
law, while expressly repealing all prior inconsistent laws left undisturbed all vested
rights then existing. 32 So privately owned banks then continued to be so under the
new law, but they were subjected by the latter to an easement for public use. As
Art. 73 provides:
"Se entienden por riberas de un rio las fajas o zonas laterales de sus
alveos que solamente son bañadas por las aguas en las crecidas qua no
causan inundacion. El dominio privado de las riberas esta sujeto a la
servidumbre de tres metros de zona para uso publico, en el interes
general de la navegacion, la flotacion, la pesca y el salvamento." . . .
(Italics supplied)
This was perhaps the reconciliation effected between the private ownership of the
banks, on the one hand, and the policy of the law, on the other hand, to devote all
banks to public use. 33 The easement would preserve the private ownership of the
banks and still effectuate the policy of the law. So, the easement in Art. 73 only
recognized and preserved existing privately owned banks; it did not authorize
future private appropriation of riverbanks.
Defendants have presented several witnesses who testified on the extent reached
by the ordinary flood waters. David Ross, a bulldozer operator at the plant since
1945, testified 60 that from 1945 to 1949, when the River was still passing along
the site where the camachile tree is located, the annual flood waters reached up
to the "secondary bank" line. These floods usually took from 3 to 5 days to recede,
during which time their work was suspended. Corroboration is supplied by Macario
Suiza, a crane operator in the plant since 1945, and by Fidel Villafuerte, a plant
employee since 1946. Suiza stated 61 that from 1947 to 1949, the area enclosed
within the blue lines and marked as Exh. 54-B — which includes the New Accretion
Area — was always covered by water when it rained hard and they had to stop
work temporarily. The western extremity of this area reaches up to the "secondary
bank" line. Villafuerte stated 62 that in the ordinary floods when the water was just
50 cm. below the topof the "primary bank", the waters would go beyond the
camachile tree by as much as 100 meters westward and just about reach the
"secondary bank" line. Further corroboration is supplied by plaintiff's own
evidence. Exh. 1 — Calalang states that from 1947 to 1949, based on the casual
observations made by geologist David Cruz, the area between the "primary" and
"secondary" banks were always covered by the non- inundating ordinary floods.
From 1950 to 1952, We have the testimony of Ross who stated 63 that there were
still floods but they were not as big anymore, except one flood in 1952, since the
River had already moved to the east. Engr. Ricardo Pacheco, who made a
survey of the disputed area in November 1952, and who conducted actual
observations of the extent of the water reach when the river was swollen,
testified 64 that the non-inundating floods regularly reached up to the blue zigzag
line along the disputed area, as shown in Exh. 1-City Engineer Manila. This blue
line, at the point where it intersects line BB, 65 is about 140 meters west of the
waterline and about 20 meters west of the camachile tree. His testimony was
based on three floods 66 which he and his men actually recorded. Corroboration is
again supplied by Exh. 1-Calalang. According to Cruz' report, the floods in 1950
and 1951 barely covered the disputed area. During the normal days of the rainy
season, the waters of the swollen river did not reach the higher portions of the
gravel pit which used to be submerged. One cause for this was the lesser
amount of rainfall from 1949 to 1951. But two floods occurred from October 16 to
28, 1952, which overflowed the whole area and inundated the banks.
From 1953 to 1955, when the River was farther away to the east, the flood waters
still covered the west side. 67 Testifying on the extent reached by the water during
the rainy season in 1954, Ross stated 68 that it reached up to the camachile tree
only. The last and latest data comes from Engr. Magbayani Leaño, the Engineer-
in-charge ofthe plant from August 1954. He testified 69 that as of December 1955,
when the disputed area was underwater, the water reach was about 20 meters or
less to the east from the camachile tree.
From all the foregoing, it can be safely concluded: (1) that from 1945 to 1949, the
west bank of the River extended westward up to the "secondary bank" line; (2) that
from 1950 to 1952, this bank had moved, with the River, to the east, its lateral
borders running along a line just 20 meters west of the camachile tree; and (3) that
from 1953 to 1955, the extremities of the west bank further receded eastward
beyond the camachile tree, until they lay just about 20 meters east of said tree.
To counteract the testimonies of the defense witnesses, plaintiff presented two
rebuttal witnesses 70 who told a somewhat different story. However, their
testimonies are not convincing enough to offset the dovetailing testimonies of the
defense witnesses who were much better qualified and acquainted with the actual
situs of the floods. And said defense witnesses were corroborated by plaintiffs'
own evidence which contradicts the aforesaid rebuttal witnesses.
However, plaintiff maintains that the floods which cover the area in question are
merely accidental and hence, under Art. 77 of the Law of Waters, 71 and following
the ruling in Government vs. Colegio de San Jose, 72 he is deemed not to have
lost the inundated area. This is untenable. Plaintiff's own evidence 73 shows that
the River floods with annual regularity during the rainy season. These floods can
hardly be called "accidental". The Colegio de San Jose case is not exactly in point.
What was mainly considered there was Art. 74 of the Law of Waters relating to
lakes, ponds and pools. In the case at bar, none of these is involved.
Also untenable is plaintiff's contention that the regular flooding of the disputed area
was due to the continuous extraction of materials by defendants which had
lowered the level of said area and caused the consequent widening of the channel
and the river itself. The excavations and extractions of materials, even from the
American period, have been made only on the strip of land west of the
River. 74 Under the "following-the nature-of-things" argument advanced by plaintiff,
the River should have moved westward, where the level of the ground had been
lowered. But the movement has been in the opposite direction instead. Therefore,
it cannot be attributed to defendants' operations. Moreover, plaintiff's own evidence
indicates that the movement eastward was all due to natural causes. Thus, Exh. I
- Calalang shows that the movement eastward of the channel by as much as 31
meters, from 1950 to 1953, was due to two typhoons which caused the
erosion of the east bank and the depositing of materials on the west side which
increased its level from as much to .93 to 2 meters.
Plaintiff's assertion that the defendants also caused the unnatural widening of the
River is unfounded. Reliance is made on the finding by the lower court that in 1943,
the river was only 60 meters wide as shown in Exh. D-2, whereas in 1950, it was
already 140 meters wide as shown in Exh. D. However, Exh. D-2 only shows the
width ofthe River near the southwestern boundary of the Hilario estate. It does not
indicate how wide it was in the other parts, especially up north. And Eligio Lorenzo,
plaintiff's own witness, admitted 75 on cross-examination that the width of the new
river was not uniform. This is confirmed by Exh. D and D-1 which show that the
new river was wider by as much as 50 percent up north than it was down south.
The 140-meter distance in Exh. D was at the widest part up north whereas down
south, near the mouth of the Bulobok River, it was only 70 meters wide. Lastly, the
scale in Exh. 3-Calalang will show that in January 1953, the River near the same
point also, was less than 50 meters wide.
The only remaining question now is to determine if the defendants have really
confirmed their operations within the banks of the River as alleged by them. To
resolve this, We have to find out from what precise portion in the disputed area the
defendants have extracted gravel and sand since they did not extract
indiscriminately from within the entire area. None of the parties' briefs were very
helpful but the evidence on record discloses that defendants made their extractions
only within specified areas during definite periods.
From 1947 to the early part of 1949, the defendants conducted their operations
only in the New Accretion Area along a narrow longitudinal zone contiguous to the
watercourse then. This zone, marked as Exh. 2-City Engineer Manila, is about one
(1) km. long and extends northward up to pt. 50.35 in Exh. 54. However, no
extractions nor excavations were undertaken west of this zone, i.e., above the
"temporary bank" line. 76 These facts are corroborated by plaintiff's witnesses.
That the extractions were near the river then finds support in Vicente Vicente's
testimony 77 while Leon Angeles and Mrs. Salud Hilario confirm the fact that
defendants have not gone westward beyond the "temporary bank" line. 78 This line
is located east of the "secondary bank" line, the lateral extremity of the west bank
then.
In the later part of 1949, plaintiff prohibited the defendants from extracting along
the New Accretion Area and constructed a fence across the same. This forced the
defendants to go below — southeast of — the "Excavated Area" and the New
Accretion Area sites in Exh. 54. 79 Engr. Bosuego, testifying 80 in 1952, indicated
their areaof extraction as that enclosed within the red dotted line in Exh. D-1 which
lies on the south end of the strip of land. Only a small portion of the southeastern
boundaryof the disputed area is included. The ocular inspection conducted on
June 15, 1951, confirms this. 81 Exh. 4- Calalang shows the total
amount of materials taken from within the area from 1949 to 1951. 82 Thus, from
1950 up to 1953, although the defendants were able to continue their operations
because of the agreement between the plaintiff and the Director of Public
Works, 83 they were confined only to the southeastern portion of the disputed area.
On the other hand, the lateral extremities ofthe west bank then ran along a line
about 20 meters west of the camachile tree in the New Accretion Area.
From 1954 to 1955, defendants' area of operation was still farther east of the New
Accretion Area. They were working within a confined area along the west waterline,
the northern and western boundaries of which were 20 meters away east from the
camachile tree. 84 Ross indicated 85 this zone in Exh. 54 as that portion on the
southern end of the disputed area between the blue lines going through the words
"MARIKINA RIVER BED" and the red zigzag line indicating the watercourse then.
Engr. Leaño even stated 86 that they got about 80 percent of the materials from the
river itself and only 20 percent from the dry bed. The sand and gravel covered by
Exhs. LL to LL-55 were all taken from here. The foregoing facts are not only
corroborated by Mrs. Hilario 87 but even admitted by the plaintiff in his
opposition 88 to defendants' petition to extend their area of operation west of the
camachile tree. And because their petition was denied, defendants could not, and
have not, 89 gone beyond the lateral line about 20 meters east from said tree, which
has already been established as the lateral extremity of the west bank during the
period.
159)
SYLLABUS
DECISION
FERNAN, J : p
Petitioners Adriano Maneclang, et al. filed before the then Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan, Branch XI a complaint for quieting of title over a certain fishpond
located within the four [4] parcels of land belonging to them situated in Barrio
Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan, and the annulment of Resolutions Nos. 38 and
95 ofthe Municipal Council of Bugallon,
Pangasinan. The trial court dismissed the complaint in a decision dated August
15, 1975 upon a finding that the body of water traversing the titled properties of
petitioners is a creek constituting a tributary of the Agno River; therefore public in
nature and not subject to private appropriation. Thelower court likewise held that
Resolution No. 38, ordering an ocular inspection of the Cayangan Creek situated
between Barrios Salomague Sur and Salomague Norte, and Resolution No. 95
authorizing public bidding for the lease of all municipal ferries and fisheries,
including the fishpond under consideration, were passed by respondents herein as
members of the Municipal Council of Bugallon, Pangasinan in the exercise of their
legislative powers.
Petitioners appealed said decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which
affirmed the same on April 29, 1983. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. cdll
Acting on the petition, the Court required the respondents to comment thereon.
However, before respondents could do so, petitioners manifested that for lack of
interest on the part of respondent Alfredo Maza, the awardee in the public bidding
of the fishpond, the parties desire to amicably settle the case by submitting
to theCourt a Compromise Agreement praying that judgment be rendered
recognizing the ownership of petitioners over the land the body of water found
within their titled properties, stating therein, among other things, that "to
pursue the case, the same will not amount to any benefit of the parties,
on the other hand it is to the advantage and benefit of the municipality
if the ownership of the land and the water found therein belonging to petitioners be
recognized in their favor as it is now clear that afterthe National Irrigation
Administration [NIA] had built the dike around the land, no water gets in or out
of the land. 1
The stipulations contained in the Compromise Agreement partake of the nature of
an adjudication of ownership in favor of herein petitioners of the fishpond in
dispute, which, as clearly found by the lower and appellate courts, was originally a
creek forming a tributary of the Agno River. Considering that as held in the case
of Mercadovs. Municipal President of Macabebe, 59 Phil. 592 [1934], a creek,
defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and
flow of the sea, is a property belonging to the public domain which is not
susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, and as a public
water, it cannot be registered under the Torrens System in the name of any
individual [Diego v. Court of Appeals, 102 Phil. 494; Mangaldan v. Manaoag, 38
Phil. 455]; and considering further that neither the mere construction of irrigation
dikes by the National Irrigation Administration which prevented the water from
flowing in and out of the subject fishpond, nor its conversion into a fishpond, alter
or change the nature of the creek as a property of the public
domain, the Court finds the Compromise Agreement null and voidand of no legal
effect, the same being contrary to law and public policy.
The finding that the subject body of water is a creek belonging to the public domain
is a factual determination binding upon this Court. The Municipality of Bugallon,
acting thru its duly-constituted municipal council is clothed with authority to pass,
as it did the two resolutions dealing with its municipal waters, and it cannot be said
that petitioners were deprived of their right to due process as mere publication
of the notice of the public bidding suffices as a constructive notice to the whole
world.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolved to set aside the Compromise
Agreement and declare the same null and void for being contrary to law and public
policy. The Court further resolved to DISMISS the instant petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr. and Paras, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
(Maneclang v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-66575, [September 30,
|||
DECISION
PARAS, J : p
This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction seeking the annulment of
the Order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, 7th Judicial District, Branch VI,
Pasig, Rizal dated December 16, 1968 in Civil Case No. 10047 entitled Godofredo
R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara vs. Director of Lands.
The dispositive portion of the questioned order reads:
"Wherefore, the orders of this court dated May 8, 1968, June 29, 1968 and
August 27, 1968 are hereby set aside and the Motion to Admit Petition to
Reopen Proceedings is hereby denied."
The undisputed facts of this case are as follows:
Sometime on April 17, 1956 respondents Urbano C. Lara and Godofredo R.
Eusebio filed with the Bureau of Lands their Free Patent Applications for the
parcels of land designated as Free Patent Applications Nos. 7-207 and 7-208 for
Lot No. 1 (10.3629 hectares) and Lot No. 2 (15.2892 hectares), Psu-152606,
respectively, situated in Napindan, Taguig, Rizal. After the posting of notices and
upon favorable recommendation of a representative of the Bureau of Lands, said
free patent applications were approved on June 14, 1956 as shown by the order
of approval of applications and issuance of patents. Thus, on June 16, 1956, Free
Patent Nos. V-45853 and V-45854 were issued to respondents Godofredo R.
Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara, which patents were transcribed and registered on
June 21, 1956 by the respondent Register of Deeds of Rizal in the Registration
Book for the Province of Rizal in accordance with Section 122 of Act No. 496, as
amended, as Original Certificates of Title Nos. 140 and 139, respectively. cdll
By virtue of the findings of the Anti-Graft and Corruption Board of the Bureau of
Lands, the affidavits and the surrender of the owner's copy of the certificate of title,
the herein petitioner, represented by the Director of Lands, as plaintiff, filed
separate complaints against herein respondents Godofredo R. Eusebio and
Urbano C. Lara and the respondent Register of Deeds of Rizal as defendants,
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and
6748 in said court, for the cancellation of Free Patent Nos. V-45853 and V-45854
and Original Certificates of Titles Nos. 140 and 139 (Rollo, pp. 15-20).
Accordingly, summons together with copies of the complaints were duly served
upon all the defendants in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748 as shown by the returns
(Rollo, pp. 21-22) dated August 16, 1961 submitted by the Provincial Sheriff of
Rizal to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. However, notwithstanding their receipt
of the summons and copies of the complaint, the defendants, herein respondents
Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara, failed to file their answers to the
complaint. As a result thereof and upon proper motion of the plaintiff (herein
petitioner) the Court of First Instance of Rizal, 7th Judicial Region, Branch II, Pasig,
Rizal, entered an order on November 25, 1961 (Rollo, p. 23) declaring defendants
(herein respondents) in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748 in default. On October 6,
1962, on the basis of evidence submitted by the plaintiff (herein petitioner) the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, rendered separate decisions * declaring null and
void Free Patent Nos. V-45853 and V-45854 and their corresponding Certificates
of Title Nos. 140 and 139 and ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel
said patents and titles (Rollo, pp. 24-29) and for failure of defendants to move for
reconsideration or appeal, said decisions became final and executory (Rollo, p. 5).
On December 12, 1962, respondent Register of Deeds addressed separate and
identical letters to respondents Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara,
informing them of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Cases
Nos. 6747 and 6748 and advising them to surrender their owner's duplicate copy
of Original Certificates of Titles Nos. 139 and 140 for cancellation pursuant to the
directive of the Court (Rollo, pp. 30-31). On December 27, 1962, said respondents
wrote a letter to the Register of Deeds stating that the owner's duplicate of title
called for had long been surrendered to Atty. Eduardo Javier of the Investigation
Section of the Bureau of Lands (Rollo, p. 32).
On June 3, 1967, after the lapse of almost five (5) years, respondents Godofredo
R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara, this time, as plaintiffs, instituted Civil Case No.
10047 against the Director of Lands, as defendant (herein petitioner) for the
annulment of the aforementioned decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch II in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748, alleging as grounds therefor that the
Court had not acquired jurisdiction over their persons and that the decision was
procured through fraud (Rollo, pp. 33-36).
Although, the records show that the Director of Lands had not been properly
served with summons in Civil Case No. 10047, the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
7th Judicial District, Branch VI, acting upon an Ex-Parte Motion to Declare
Defendant in Default filed by herein respondents Godofredo R. Eusebio and
Urbano C. Lara declared defendant (herein petitioner) Director of Lands in default
and allowed the plaintiffs (respondents herein) to adduce their evidence before the
Special Clerk of Court (Rollo, p. 38).LLjur
On July 6, 1967, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, 7th Judicial District, Branch
VI, rendered a decision declaring the decision dated October 6, 1962 of the Court
of First Instance, 7th Judicial District, Branch II in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748
null and void. The decretal portion of said decision reads as follows:
"Wherefore, the decision rendered in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748 is
hereby declared null and void and the Director of Lands is hereby ordered
to reinstate Free Patents Nos. V-45853 and V-45854 issued in the names
of Urbano C. Lara and Godofredo R. Eusebio respectively, and the
Register of Deeds of Rizal is likewise ordered to reinstate OCT No. 139
and 140 issued in the names of the patentees pursuant to the aforesaid
patents.
"SO ORDERED."
On March 14, 1968, a Motion to Admit Petition to Reopen Proceedings with
Additional Parties was filed by defendant (herein petitioner) Director of Lands in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, wherein it alleged that the said court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant (petitioner) among
other things (Rollo, pp. 43-44). On the same day, the Director of Lands filed A
Petition to Reopen Proceedings in the same court (Rollo, pp. 45-48). The
aforestated petition averred that on July 3, 1967, even before the promulgation of
the aforementioned decision and notwithstanding the fact that their patents and
certificates of title had long been declared null and void in Civil Cases Nos. 6747
and 6748, respondents Eusebio and Lara, in consideration of P10,000.00 for their
respective parcels of land, executed separate deeds of absolute sale involving the
alleged lands in question in favor of respondents Gil Venzuela, Rodolfo Cenidoza
and Ramon Orosa (Rollo, p. 46). Subsequently, on August 9, 1967, immediately
upon securing the certification of the Clerk of Court that the decision in the instant
case had become final and executory, respondents caused the cancellation of
Original Certificates of Titles Nos. 139 and 140 and the issuance in lieu thereof of
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 196349 and 196348, respectively, in the names
of respondents Gil Venzuela, Rodolfo Cenidoza and Ramon Orosa. Accordingly,
on August 22, 1967, in consideration of P25,000.00 for each alleged parcel,
respondents Gil Venzuela and Rodolfo Cenidoza executed separate deeds of
transfer of rights in favor of respondents spouses Ramon Orosa and Josefina
Orosa, as a consequence of which Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 196348 and
196349 were cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-
211957 and T-211958 to respondents spouses Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa.
Respondents spouses, Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa, in consideration of a
loan in the amount of P800,000.00 executed a deed of mortgage of the aforestated
on December 27, 1967 in favor of respondent Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank (Rollo, pp. 46-47).
On March 28, 1968, intervenors spouses, Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa filed
their motion for leave to intervene in opposition to the Motion to Admit Petition to
reopen proceedings with additional parties filed by the Director of Lands on March
16, 1968 (Rollo, p. 178) and the Intervenors' Opposition on the aforesaid petition
to reopen proceedings of the petitioner (Rollo, p. 181). Respondent Gil, Venzuela
filed his opposition on April 17, 1968 (Rollo, p. 104) and his Supplemental
Opposition while respondent Rodolfo Cenidoza filed his separate opposition to the
petition to reopen proceedings on June 3, 1968 (Rollo, p. 239). LLphil
The Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, after consideration of the motion to
admit petition to reopen proceedings with additional parties as well as the
oppositions interposed thereto granted the motion on May 8, 1968 (Rollo, p. 49).
Motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order by the court was filed by the
intervenors spouses Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa on May 27, 1968 (Rollo,
p. 190) while respondent Gil Venzuela filed his urgent manifestation and motion
for reconsideration on June 6, 1968 (Rollo, p. 114). On June 8, 1968, the Director
of Lands (petitioner herein) filed his opposition to the intervenors' and Gil
Venzuela's motion for reconsideration of the Order dated May 8, 1968 (Rollo, p.
195). Consequently on June 12, 1968 the intervenors spouses Ramon Orosa and
Josefina Orosa filed their Intervenors' Reply to the Defendants' Opposition (Rollo,
p. 203).
On June 29, 1986, the Court of First Instance of Rizal denied, in an order, the
motion for reconsideration filed by the intervenors and set the hearing on July 29,
1968 (Rollo, p. 50). A motion for Clarification and/or Reconsideration of the Order
of June 29, 1968 and Motion for Second Reconsideration of the Order of May 8,
1960 was filed by the intervenors on July 22, 1968 (Rollo, p. 205). However this
was denied by the court in an order dated August 27, 1968 (Rollo, p. 51).
Meanwhile, the intervenors filed their third motion for reconsideration of the order
of May 8, 1968 and/or Clarification and Reconsideration of the Order of August 27,
1968 on November 2, 1968 (Rollo, p. 217), which was opposed by herein petitioner
in its Opposition to Intervenors' Third Motion for Reconsideration on November 23,
1968 (Rollo, p. 228).
On December 16, 1968, the Court of First Instance of Rizal granting the said third
motion for reconsideration, set aside its Orders dated May 8, 1968, June 29, 1968
and August 27, 1968 and denied the Motion to Admit Petition to Reopen
Proceedings. The court ruled that the petition is not the proper course of action
available to the Director of Lands, who has not availed of the remedies provided
by the Rules of Court or the Land Registration Court such as relief from the order
of default or appeal from judgment or review thereof, and has consequently lost
his personality when he was declared in default, and the Court, its jurisdiction to
entertain the afore-mentioned Petition to Reopen (Rollo, pp. 52-53).
Hence, this petition.
Notice of lis pendens was given to the Register of Deeds on March 10, 1969 (Rollo,
p. 57). On March 11, 1969, in a resolution promulgated by this Court, the
respondents were required to file their answers and a writ of preliminary injunction
was issued without bond (Rollo, p. 60). Respondents except the Register of Deeds
of Rizal were restrained from entering into any transaction in connection with
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-211957 and T-211958 and specifically
prohibited the respondent Register of Deeds of Rizal to accept, record, transcribe
and register any transaction concerning the free patents and certificates of title
subject matter of Civil Cases Nos. 6747-48 (Rollo, pp. 60-61).
On March 26, 1969, respondent spouses Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa
manifested that they be furnished with a copy of the petition for certiorari so that
they may file their answer thereto (Rollo, pp. 65-66). Respondent Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank filed its answer on April 2, 1969 (Rollo, pp. 71-73)
while respondent Gil Venzuela and respondent spouses, Ramon Orosa and
Josefina Orosa filed their answers on April 24, 1969 and April 16, 1969,
respectively (Rollo, pp. 95-103; 120-137). Respondent Rodolfo A. Cenidoza filed
his answer on May 2, 1969 (Rollo, pp. 236-238), but respondents patentees
Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara did not file their answers.
In the Resolution of May 12, 1969, the hearing of these cases was set for June 18,
1969 (Rollo, p. 235). At said hearing, counsel for petitioner was given twenty (20)
days within which to submit its memorandum in lieu of oral argument while counsel
for respondents was granted leave to submit a reply thereto and petitioner was
allowed to submit a rejoinder (Rollo, p. 242). The Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Director of Lands filed its memorandum on August 16, 1969
(Rollo, p. 253). Respondent spouses, Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa filed their
reply memorandum on October 21, 1971 (Rollo, p. 315) while a supplemental reply
was filed by Gil Venzuela on October 30, 1971 (Rollo, p. 394). On June 26, 1987,
respondent spouses Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa filed an urgent motion to
resolve (Rollo, p. 409).LLjur
In his memorandum the Director of Lands assails the following acts of respondent
Judge as constituting grave abuse of discretion:
"A. Taking cognizance of and giving due course to the complaint of
Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara against the Director of Lands
instead of dismissing the complaint outright.
"B. Declaring the Director of Lands in default notwithstanding non-service
of summons and a copy of the complaint upon said defendant.
"C. Setting aside and declaring null and void the two (2) previous, valid,
final and fully implemented decisions of the same Court in Civil Cases
Nos. 6747 and 6748.
"D. Granting, after two (2) previous denials thereof, the third pro
forma motion for reconsideration of respondents Orosa spouses.
"E. Denying the Motion to Admit Petition to Reopen Proceedings of the
Director of Lands after having previously granted said motion." (Rollo, p.
262).
The pivotal issue in this petition is whether or not a decision which has long
become final and executed, can be annulled on the grounds that the Court lacks
jurisdiction over the persons of the defendant and that the decision was procured
through fraud.
The petition is impressed with merit.
There is no question that the Court acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendants, respondents herein, Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara in
Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748, respectively, as clearly adduced from the
evidence presented that personal service was made on them. As shown by the
Sheriff's returns, in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748, respondent Godofredo R.
Eusebio was duly served with summons and a copy of the complaint in Civil Case
No. 6747, while Urbano C. Lara was personally served with summons and a copy
of the complaint in Civil Case No. 6748. Both services were made on August 16,
1961 upon the respondents at Bambang, Pasig, Rizal — their recorded address
(Rollo, pp. 265-266).
Apart from the fact that Deputy Sheriff Maximo de Silva enjoys the presumption
that he had regularly performed his duty, the records amply show that, contrary to
respondents Eusebio's and Lara's claim that they were completely unaware of the
proceedings, they were duly summoned in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748 on
August 16, 1961; that copies of the decisions in these cases were furnished them
by the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Rizal; that the Register of
Deeds in separate letters informed them of the decisions in these cases and in
reply to the request of the Register of Deeds to surrender their owners' duplicate
certificates of OCT Nos. 140 and 139, they alleged in a joint letter that they had
long surrendered their owner's duplicates certificates to the Bureau of Lands
(Rollo, p. 267). Jurisdiction over the person of a defendant is acquired when he
actually receives the summons (Fuentes vs. Bautista, 53 SCRA 420 [1979]). prcd
Thus, it is beyond dispute that all the proceedings in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and
6748 are regular and that the trial court rendered valid judgment on the aforestated
cases which have become final and executory and are res adjudicata. This Court
ruled in the case of (Zansibarian Residents Association vs. Municipality of Makati,
135 SCRA 235 [1985]), that once judgment has become final, the issue therein
should be laid at rest. Final judgment was promulgated and a writ of execution was
issued. Respondents herein did not avail of any remedies available to them until
after five (5) long years when they filed Civil Case No. 10047 in another court.
As held by this Court in Bayer Philippines, Inc. vs. Agana, 63 SCRA 355 [1975],
"Once a court renders a final judgment, all the issues between or among the parties
before it are deemed resolved and its judicial function as regards any matter
related to the controversy litigated comes to an end. The execution of its judgment
is purely a ministerial phase of adjudication. Indeed the nature of its duty to see to
it that the claim of the prevailing party is fully satisfied from the properties of the
loser is generally ministerial." A judgment whether correct or not becomes final
when the plaintiff did not appeal said judgment (Malia vs. IAC, 138 SCRA 116
[1985]) and courts are without jurisdiction over the case once judgment has
become final (Vda. de Emmas vs. Emmas, 95 SCRA 470 [1979]). The doctrine of
finality of judgment is grounded on Fundamental considerations of public policy
and sound practice that at the risk of occasional errors, the judgment of the courts
must become final at some definite date fixed by law (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines,
Inc. vs. Arciaga, 148 SCRA 433 [1987]).
Hence, the filing of Civil Case No. 10047 is improper and there can be no
justification for respondent Judge's taking cognizance of and giving due course to
the complaint filed therein by respondents Eusebio and Lara against the Director
of Lands; much less his setting aside of final, executory and fully implemented
judgments resulting in the cancellation of original certificates of titles issued by
respondent Register of Deeds of Rizal. Where judgment had long become final
and executory and absent a showing that respondents were deprived of due
process or that said judgment was procured by extrinsic or collateral fraud, the
judgment can no longer be set aside (Gaba vs. Castro, 120 SCRA 505 [1983]).
While it is true that a bank is not required, before accepting a mortgage, to make
an investigation of the title of the property being given as security (Philippine
National Cooperative Bank vs. Carandang-Villalon, 139 SCRA 570 [1985]), and
that where the torrens title of the land was in the name of the mortgagor and later
given as security for a bank loan, the subsequent declaration of said Title as null
and void is not a ground for nullifying the mortgage rights of the bank which has
acted in good faith (Philippine National Cooperative Bank vs. Carandang-
Villalon, supra; Penullar vs. PNB, 120 SCRA 171 [1983]), it is apparent that the
law on innocent purchasers for value does not apply insofar as non-disposable
public lands are concerned.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We hereby rule that: (1) the decision dated July 6,
1967 and order dated December 16, 1968 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE; (2)
the decisions in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748 dated October 6, 1962 are
reinstated; (3) the Register of Deeds of Rizal is directed to cancel all Certificates
of Titles issued in connection with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 10047; and
(4) the real estate mortgage executed by the respondent spouses Orosa in favor
of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank is SET ASIDE, but their
indebtedness must be paid to the Bank.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. L-30263-5, [October 30, 1987])
DECISION
MARTIN, J : p
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in its CA-
G.R. No. 39577-R, raising the question of whether or not petitioner Mindanao
Medical Center has registerable title over a full 12.8081-hectare land by virtue of
an executive proclamation in 1956 reserving the area for medical center site
purposes. LexLib
A certain Arsenio Suazo likewise filed his opposition to the registration on the claim
that the 2-hectare portion on the northeastern part of Lot 1176-B-2 belongs to him.
After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of Davao rendered judgment on
September 2, 1966, directing "the registration of the title to Lot No. 1176-B-2 of
Subdivision Plan Bsd-5134, shown on Plan Ap-6512, situated in the Barrio of
Central, City of Davao, and containing an area of 128,081 square meters in the
name of the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department
of Health."cdrep
The two oppositors, Alejandro de Jesus and Arsenio Suazo, excepted from the
judgment of the trial court and appealed the case to the respondent Court of
Appeals.
On July 2, 1974, the Appellate Court held:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby modified insofar as it
denies the claim of appellant Arsenio Suazo, the same is hereby affirmed,
in regard the appeal of appellant Alejandro Y. de Jesus, registration Lot
1176-B-2, situated in Barrio Central, Davao City, and containing an area
of 12.8081 square meters, is hereby decreed in the name of said
appellants, but said appellant is hereby ordered to relinquish to the
appellee that portion of Lot 1176-B-2 which is occupied by the medical
center and nervous disease pavilion and their reasonable appurtenances,
no costs."
On July 5, 1974, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center moved for reconsideration,
maintaining ownership over the entire area of 12.8081 hectares, but the Appellate
Court in a Special Division of Five denied the motion on June 17, 1975. 8
Forthwith, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center elevated the matter to Us thru the
present appeal.
We find petitioner's appeal to be meritorious.
1. Petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over the whole
contested area of 12.8081 hectares, designated as Lot No. 1176-B-2, and not only
on a portion thereof occupied by the Medical Center, its nervous disease pavilion
and their reasonable appurtenances. Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9,
1956, of President Magsaysay legally effected a land grant to the Mindanao
Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health, of the whole
lot, validly sufficient for initial registration under the Land Registration Act. Such
land grant is constitutive of a "fee simple" title or absolute title in favor of petitioner
Mindanao Medical Center. Thus, Section 122 of the Act, which governs the
registration of grants or patents involving public lands, provides that "Whenever
public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the United
States or to the Government of the Philippines are alienated, granted, or conveyed
to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith
under the operation of this Act [Land Registration Act, Act 496] and shall become
registered lands." 9 It would be completely absurd to rule that, on the basis of
Proclamation No. 350, the Medical Center has registerable title on the portion
occupied by it, its nervous disease pavilion and the reasonable appurtenances,
and not on the full extent of the reservation, when the Proclamation explicitly
reserved the entire Lot 1176-B-2 of 12.8081 hectares to the Center. cdll
Certainly, Proclamation No. 350 is free of any legal infirmity. It proceeds from the
recognized competence of the President to reserve by executive proclamation
alienable lands of the public domain for a specific public use or service. 10 Section
64 (e) of the Revised Administrative Code empowers the President "(t)o reserve
from sale or other disposition and for specific public uses or service, any land
belonging to the private domain of the Government of the Philippines, the use of
which is not otherwise directed by law". The land reserved "shall be used for the
specific purposes directed by such executive order until otherwise provided by
law." Similarly, Section 83 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) authorizes the
President to "designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public
domain as reservations for the use of the Commonwealth of the Philippines or of
any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, . . . or for quasi-public uses or
purposes when the public interest requires it, including reservations for . . . other
improvements for the public benefit."
However, We observe that in the public bidding of October 4, 1934, the successful
bidder, submitted a bid of P100.50 per hectare and made a cash deposit of only
P221.00, which amount represents 10% of the purchase price of the land. 13 At
P100.50 per hectare the purchase would be P2,221.00 for 22 hectares, 10%
deposit of which amounts to P221.00 For 33 hectares, the total purchase price
would be P3,316.50 at P100.50 per hectare and the 10% deposit would
be P331.65, not P221.00, as what was actually deposited by sales applicant
Eugenio de Jesus. Withal, if Eugenio de Jesus was really awarded 33 hectares in
that public bidding, he should have made the required 10% deposit of P331.65.
That he merely deposited P221.00 strongly suggests that what was bidden for and
awarded to him was only 22 hectares and not 33 hectares as applied for. As a
matter of fact, his last payment of P660.45 on November 29, 1939 for the 8th to
10th installment intended only to cover 20.6400 hectares, the remaining area after
the amendment of the Sales Application on August 28, 1936, excluding "the
military camp site [Lot 1176-B-2 of 12.8081 hectares] for the reason that the said
site, at the time of last installment was already excluded from Sale Application SA-
5436 of Eugenio de Jesus, as ordered . . . by the Director of Lands." 14
But, respondent Appellate Court reasons out that if the area bidden for and
awarded in 1934 was only 22 hectares and since two years thereafter the Director
of Lands ordered an amendment excluding the military camp site of 12.8081
hectares, then only 10 hectares would have been left to applicant Eugenio de
Jesus and not 20.6400 hectares, as what was granted to him in the Sales Patent.
The Appellate Court's reasoning is premised on wrong assumption. What was
ordered amended was the Sales Application for 33 hectares and not the Order of
22 hectares or 20.6400 hectares. The Order states: "Order: Amendment of
Application." Necessarily so, because the amendment was already reflected in the
Order of Award, since only an area of 22 hectares was awarded. LLjur
3. The phrase "whole tract" in the Sales Award 15 cannot be licitly seized upon as
basis for the conclusion that the area awarded to applicant Eugenio de Jesus was
the applied area of 33 hectares. Such general description of "whole tract" cannot
prevail over the specific description delineating the area in quantity and in
boundaries. Thus, the Sales Award specifies the area awarded as 22 hectares,
located at Central, Davao, Davao, and bounded on the north by the property of
Maria Villa Abrille and Arsenio Suazo; on the southwest by a provincial road and
the property by Mary Gohn; on the southwest by a public land; and on the west by
a municipal road. 16Specific description is ordinarily preferred to general
description, or that which is more certain to that which is less certain. 17 More so,
when it is considered that the series of executive proclamations (Proclamation
Nos. 85, 328, 350) continuously maintained the intent of the Government to
reserve the subject land for a specific purpose or service. cdrep
Besides, patents and land grants are construed favorably to the Government, and
most strongly against the grantee. 18 Any doubt as to the intention or extent of the
grant, or the intention of the Government, is to be resolved in its favor. 19 In
general, the quantity of the land granted must by ascertained from the description
in the patent, because the description in the patent is exclusive evidence of the
land conveyed. 20 And courts do not usually go beyond a description of a tract in a
patent and determine the tract and quantity of land apart from the patent itself. 21
4. We cannot share the view of respondent Appellate Court that Eugenio de
Jesus's alleged occupation, cultivation and improvement of the 33-hectare land
(including the 12-hectare camp site) since 1916 vested in him a right of preference
or pre-emptive right in the acquisition of the land, which right was converted into
"a special proprietary right" when the Sales Award was issued to him in 1934. Not
only for the earlier reasons that the Sales Award was only for 22 hectares (later
found to be 20.6400 hectares upon actual survey) and not for 33 hectares confers
no contractual or vested right in the lands occupied and the authority of the
President to withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by the public, or to reserve
them for public use, prior to the divesting by the government of title thereof stands,
even though this may defeat the imperfect right of a settler. 22 Lands covered by
reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be
acquired. 23 The claims of persons who have settled on, occupied, and improved
a parcel of public land which is later included in a reservation are considered
worthy of protection and are usually respected, but where the President, as
authorized by law, issues a proclamation reserving certain lands, and warning all
persons to depart therefrom, this terminates any rights previously acquired in such
lands by a person who has settled thereon in order to obtain a preferential right of
purchase. 24 And patents for lands which have been previously granted, reserved
from sale, or appropriated, are void. 25
It is true that Proclamation No. 350 states that the same is subject to "private rights,
if any there be," but Eugenio de Jesus or his son Alejandro de Jesus failed to prove
any private rights over the property reserved. Well-settled is the rule that unless
the applicant has shown by clear and convincing evidence that a certain portion of
the public domain was acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title
from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title, or any other
means for the acquisition of public lands, such as grants or patents, the property
must be held to be part of the public domain. 26 Nor could respondent Alejandro
de Jesus legitimately claim to have obtained title by prescription over the disputed
12.8081 hectares, inasmuch as by applying for the sale thereof (assuming
hypothetically that the 12.8080-hectare lot was included in the original sales
application for 33 hectares), his father, Eugenio de Jesus, necessarily admits that
the portions applied for are part of the public domain, against which no acquisitive
prescription may lie 27 except as provided in Section 48(b) of C.A. 141, as
amended.
5. Respondent Appellate Court mistakenly sustained Eugenio de Jesus's pretense
that the military "camp site" (Lot 1176-B-2) had been donated by him to the
Philippine Army, thru Secretary Serafin Marabut of the Department of National
Defense, sometime in 1936 subject to the condition that it would be returned to
him when the Philippine Army would no longer need it. As found by the trial court,
in 1936, the Department of National Defense was not yet in existence, so that no
Defense Secretary by the name of Serafin Marabut could have entered into a deed
of donation with Eugenio de Jesus over Lot 1176-B-2 consisting of 12.8081
hectares. The Department of National Defense was only organized in 1939.
Nonetheless, respondent Alejandro de Jesus, would prove by secondary evidence
the existence of such donation thru the testimony of persons who supposedly saw
it. In this regard, the Rules provides that before the terms of a transaction in realty
may be established by secondary evidence, it is necessary that the due execution
and subsequent loss of the original instrument evidencing the transaction be
proved. For it is the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss that
would constitute the foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence to prove
the contents of such document. And the due execution of the document would be
proved through the testimony of (1) the person or persons who executed it; (2) the
person before whom its execution was acknowledged; or (3) any person who was
present and saw it executed and delivered, or who, after its execution and delivery,
saw it and recognized the signatures, or by a person to whom the parties to the
instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof. 28 None of these
modes of proof was ever followed by respondent Alejandro de Jesus. His
predecessor-in-interest, Eugenio de Jesus, merely made a broad statement that
he executed a deed of donation in 1936 with Defense Secretary Marabut when at
that time the Defense Department was not yet in existence. The notary public who
presumptively acknowledged the donation or the witnesses to the instrument were
never presented. It has been ruled that the failure of the party to present the notary
public and those persons who must have seen the signing of the document as
witnesses to testify on its execution interdicts the admission of a secondary
evidence of the terms of the deed. 29 This is especially true in realty donations
where Art. 748 of the new Civil Code requires the accomplishment thereof in a
public document in order to be valid. The testimony of Marcelo Belendres
that Sesinando de Jesus, brother of Eugenio de Jesus, showed him a copy of the
"paper" signed by Secretary Marabut and Eugenio de Jesus; of Jose Tinio, Acting
Register of Deeds of Davao, that in May or June 1937, Col. Simeon de Jesus went
to his office to register a "document" executed by Eugenio de Jesus and Secretary
Marabut; of former Secretary Brigido Valencia that Col. Simeon de Jesus showed
him a deed of donation signed by Eugenio de Jesus and Serafin Marabut, hardly
suffice to satisfy the requisites of the Rules, as to which very strict compliance is
imposed because of the importance of the document involved. 30 First, none of
these persons was a witness to the instrument, nor any of them saw the document
after its execution and delivery and recognized the signatures of the parties, nor to
whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed the execution;
second, the reference to a "paper" or "document" is ambiguous as to be
synonymous with a "deed of donation;" and third, the persons who showed the
deed, Sesinando de Jesus and Col. Simeon de Jesus, were not parties to the
instrument. Respondent Alejandro de Jesus's narration of the existence and loss
of the document equally deserves no credence. As found by the trial court, he
testified that the copy of the deed which his father kept was sent to him in Manila
thru his uncle, Sesinando de Jesus, in July 1942, while his father himself, Eugenio
de Jesus, declared that his copy of the deed was burned in Davao during the
Japanese occupation. The replies of the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Acting Executive Secretary that the property was "still needed
for military purposes" and may not therefore be released from the reservation
cannot substitute the proof so required. These replies are not confirmatory of the
existence of such donation much less official admissions thereof. LLphil
Even on the gratuitous assumption that a donation of the military "camp site" was
executed between Eugenio de Jesus and Serafin Marabut, such donation would
anyway be void, because Eugenio de Jesus held no dominical rights over the site
when it was allegedly donated by him in 1936. In that year, Proclamation No. 85
of President Quezon already withdrew the area from sale or settlement and
reserved it for military purposes. Respondent Appellate Court, however,
rationalizes that the subject of the donation was not the land itself but "the
possessory and special proprietary rights" of Eugenio de Jesus over it. We
disagree. It is true that the gratuitous disposal in donation may consist of a thing
or right. 31 But, the term "right" must be understood in a "proprietary" sense, over
which the possessor has the jus disponendi 32 This is because, in true donations,
there results a consequent impoverishment of the donor or dimunition of his
assets. 33 Eugenio de Jesus cannot be said to be possessed of that "proprietary"
right over the whole 33 hectares in 1936 including the disputed 12.8081 hectares
for at that time this 12.8081-hectare lot had already been severed from the mass
of disposable public lands by Proclamation No. 85 and excluded in the Sales
Award. Impoverishment of Eugenio's assets as a consequence of such donation
is therefore farfetched. In fact, even if We were to assume in gratia argumenti that
the 12.8081-hectare lot was included in the Sales Award, still the same may not
be the subject of donation. In Sales Award, what is conferred on the applicant is
merely the right "to take possession of the land so that he could comply with the
requirements prescribed by law." 34 In other words, the right granted to the sales
awardee is only "possessory right" as distinguished from "proprietary right," for the
fundamental reason that prior to the issuance of the sales patent and registration
thereof, title to the land is retained by the State. 35Admittedly, the land applied for
may be considered "disposed of by the Government" upon the issuance of the
Sales Award, but this has the singular effect of withdrawing the land from the public
domain that is "disposable" by the Director of Lands under the Public Land Act.
Moreover, the disposition is merely provisionalbecause the applicant has still to
comply with the requirements of the law before any patent is issued. It is only after
compliance with such requirements to the satisfaction of the Director of Lands that
the patent is issued and the land applied for considered "permanently disposed of
by the Government." This again is a circumstance that demeans
the irrevocable nature of donation, because the mere desistance of the sales
applicant to pursue the requirements called for would cause the virtual revocation
of the donation.prLL
142-161)
20. EN BANC
DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J : p
The records show that on 26 November 1965 herein appellants petitioned the
Court of First Instance of Davao for registration of nine (9) parcels of land located
in barrio Zaragosa, municipality of Manay, province of Davao, one half of which
having been acquired by appellant Toribia Moralizon allegedly by inheritance, and
the other half by purchase and by continuous, open, public and adverse
possession in the concept of owner. One of the said parcels of land is identified as
lot No. 2228, plan SWO-36856, Manay Cadastre.
The petition was opposed by Emilio Dayanghirang, Jr., who alleged that lands
belonging to him and his wife were included in the application for registration,
mentioning specifically Lot No. 2228 which was said to be already covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. P-6055 in the name of oppositor's wife. The Director
of Lands also filed an opposition to the petition, contending that the applicants or
their predecessors-in-interest never had sufficient title over the parcels of land
sought to be registered, nor have they been in open, continuous, and notorious
possession thereof for at least 30 years.
On 14 June 1967, counsel for the private oppositor filed a motion for correction of
the number of the certificate of title covering Lot No. 2228, erroneously referred to
as OCT No. P-6055, when it should properly be OCT No. P-6053. It is likewise
prayed in the same motion that the petition be dismissed insofar as it includes Lot
No. 2228, for the reason that said lot was already registered and titled in the name
of oppositor's wife as of 21 June 1956. In its order of 18 June 1957, which was
amended on 29 June 1967, the court granted the oppositor's motion and directed
the dismissal of the petition as regards Lot No. 2228, on the ground that it having
been previously registered and titled, said parcel of land can no longer be the
subject of adjudication in another proceeding. Hence, this appeal by the
petitioners.
It may be recalled that the action filed by petition appellants in the lower court on
26 November 1965 was original registration of certain parcels of land, including
Lot No. 2228 of the Manay Cadastre. It is not here denied by appellants that said
Lot No. 2228 was the subject of a public land grant in favor of the oppositor's wife,
and by virtue of which grant or patent Original Certificate of Title No. P-6053 was
issued in her name on 21 June 1956. Appellants, however, try to make a case
against the dismissal-order of the lower court by contending that the patent issued
to oppositor's wife was procured by fraud, because appellants, the alleged actual
occupants of the land, were not notified of the application for patent therefor and
of its adjudication. Thus, according to appellants, since they were the actual
occupants of the property, the government could not have awarded it to oppositor's
wife, and the patent issued to the latter, as well as the original certificate of title
subsequently obtained by her, were null and void.
The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and the character of the
certificate of title that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted
by the government to a private individual, the corresponding patent therefor is
recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is
automatically brought within the operation of the Land Registration Act 1 , the title
issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards provided in Section
38 of the said Act. 2 In other words, upon expiration of one year from its issuance,
the certificate of title shall become irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate
issued in a registration proceeding. 3
In the present case, Lot No. 2228 was registered and titled in the name of
oppositors' wife as of 21 June 1956, nine (9) years earlier. Clearly, appellants'
petition for registration of the same parcel of land on 26 November 1965, on the
ground that the first certificate of title (OCT No. P-6053) covering the said property
is a nullity, can no longer prosper. Orderly administration of justice precludes that
Lot 2228, of the Manay Cadastre, should be the subject of two registration
proceedings. Having become registered land under Act 496, for all legal purposes,
by the issuance of the public land patent and the recording thereof, further
registration of the same would lead to the obviously undesirable result of two
certificates of title being issued for the same piece of land, even if both certificates
should be in the name of the same person. And if they were to be issued to different
persons, the indefeasibility of the first title, which is the most valued characteristic
of Torrens titles, would be torn away. For this reason, this Court has ruled in
Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558, that in a cadastral case the court has no
jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier
case; and that a second decree for the same land would be null and void. 4 Of
course, if the patent had been issued during the pendency of the registration
proceedings, the situation would be different. 5
Even assuming arguendo, that there indeed exists a proper case for cancellation
of the patent for intrinsic fraud the action for review of the decree should have been
filed before the one year period had elapsed. 6 Thereafter, the proper party to bring
the action would only be the person prejudiced by the alleged fraudulent act — the
owner and grantor, 7 and not another applicant or claimant. Furthermore, the relief
provided by the law in such instance may be secured by the aggrieved party, not
in another registration, for land already registered in the name of a person can not
be the subject of another registration8 , but in an appropriate action such as one
for reconveyance or reversion9 , or for damages in case the property has passed
into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. 10
As regards the complaint against the alleged correction of the number of the
certificate of title covering Lot No. 2228 which was erroneously stated in the
oppositor's motion as OCT No. P-6055, when it should properly be OCT No. P-
6053, it appearing that the motion was intended to rectify a clearly typographical
mistake, there is nothing irregular in the lower court's order granting the same.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the order appealed from, the same is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the appellants.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
(Spouses Lahora v. Dayanghirang, Jr., G.R. No. L-28565, [January 30, 1971],
|||
The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, acting as a land registration court granted
a decree of registration of a parcel of land sought by herein petitioner spouses.
After the finality of the decision, the trial court, on Motion of petitioners, issued an
order requiring LRA to issue the corresponding decree of Registration. However
the LRA refused contending that to issue decree of registration of the subject land
would result in the duplication of titles over the same, and thus contravene the
policy and purpose of the Torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of
the same as verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Rizal yields that the lot in question is already covered by a TCT. Hence,
petitioners filed this action for mandamus.
It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration
of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case.
A second decree for the same land would be null and void, since the principle
behind original registration is to register a parcel of land only once. Thus, if it is
proven that the land which petitioners are seeking to register has already been
registered in 1904 and 1905, the issuance of a decree of registration to petitioners
will run counter to said principle. The issuance of a decree of registration is part of
the judicial function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act which may be
compelled through mandamus.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J : p
The Case
These are the questions confronting this Court in this special civil action for
mandamus 1 under Rule 65 which asks this Court to direct the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of registration in Land
Registration Case (LRC) No. N-11022. 2
The Facts
Petitioners were the applicants in LRC Case No. N-11022 for the registration of
Lot 3-A, Psd-1372, located in Mandaluyong City. On January 8, 1991, the trial
court, acting as a land registration court, rendered its decision disposing thus: 3
"WHEREFORE, finding the application meritorious and it appearing that
the applicants, Spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda Laburada, have a
registrable title over the parcel of land described as Lot 3A, Psd-1372, the
Court declares, confirms and orders the registration of their title thereto.
As soon as this decision shall become final, let the corresponding decree
be issued in the name of spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda Laburada,
both of legal age, married, with residence and postal address at No. 880
Rizal Ave., Manila."
After the finality of the decision, the trial court, upon motion of petitioners, issued
an order 4 dated March 15, 1991 requiring the LRA to issue the corresponding
decree of registration. However, the LRA refused. Hence, petitioners filed this
action for mandamus. 5
Attached to the LRA's comment on the petition is a report dated April 29, 1992
signed by Silverio G. Perez, director of the LRA Department of Registration, which
explained public respondent's refusal to issue the said decree: 6
"In connection with the Petition for Mandamus filed by Petitioners through
counsel, dated August 27, 1991 relative to the above-noted case/record,
the following comments are respectfully submitted;
On March 6, 1990, an application for registration of title of a parcel of land
Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372 a portion of Lot 3, Block No. 159,
Swo-7237, situated in the Municipality of San Felipe Neri, Province of
Rizal was filed by Spouses Marciano [sic] Laburada and Erlinda
Laburada;
After plotting the aforesaid plan sought to be registered in our Municipal
Index Sheet, it was found that it might be a portion of the parcels of land
decreed in Court of Land Registration (CLR) Case Nos. 699, 875 and 817,
as per plotting of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-319932, a copy of said
subdivision plan is Annex 'A' hereof;
The records on file in this Authority show that CLR Case Nos. 699, 875 &
917 were issued Decree Nos. 240, 696 and 1425 on August 25, 1904,
September 14, 1905 and April 26, 1905, respectively;
On May 23, 1991, a letter of this Authority was sent to the Register of
Deeds, Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex 'B' hereof, requesting for a
certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title No. 355, issued in the
name of Compania Agricola de Ultramar;
On May 20, 1991, a certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 355 was received by this Authority, a copy is Annex 'C' hereof,
per unsigned letter of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy
is Annex 'D' hereof;
After examining the furnished OCT NO. 355, it was found that the
technical description of the parcel of land described therein is not
readable, that prompted this Authority to send another letter dated April
15, 1992 to the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex
'E' hereof, requesting for a certified typewritten copy of OCT No. 355, or
in lieu thereof a certified copy of the subsisting certificate of title with
complete technical description of the parcel of land involved therein. To
date, however, no reply to our letter has as yet been received by this
Authority;
After verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Rizal, it was found that Lot 3-B of the subdivision plan Psd-
1372 being a portion of Lot No. 3, Block No. 159, Plan S.W.O. -7237, is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of
Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor, a copy is attached as Annex 'F' hereof.
Said TCT No. 29337 is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No.
6595. However, the title issued for Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-
1372 cannot be located because TCT No. 6595 consisting of several
sheets are [sic] incomplete.
"SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse
claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse claim and proper
for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered.
Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto,
subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular
Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in
the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description
'To all whom it may concern.' Such decree shall not be opened by reason
of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby,
nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees;
subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any
estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file
in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one
year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value
has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year,
every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this section
shall be incontrovertible. If there is any such purchaser, the decree of
registration shall not be opened, but shall remain in full force and effect
forever, subject only to the right of appeal hereinbefore
provided: Provided, however, That no decree or certificate of title issued
to persons not parties to the appeal shall be cancelled or annulled. But
any person aggrieved by such decree in any case may pursue his remedy
by action for damages against the applicant or any other person for fraud
in procuring the decree. Whenever the phrase 'innocent purchaser for
value' or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Act, it shall be deemed to
include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.
(As amended by Sec. 3, Act No. 3621; and Sec. 1, Act No. 3630, and PD
1529, Sec 39)."
However, we must point out that the letters of Silverio G. Perez and Felino M.
Cortez, dated April 29, 1992 and November 27, 1995, respectively, clearly stated
that, after verification from the records submitted by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal,
the property which petitioners are seeking to register — Lot 3-A of Subdivision Plan
Psd-1372 — is a portion of Lot No. 3, Block 159, Plan S.W.O.-7237, over which
TCT No. 6595 has already been issued. Upon the other hand, in regard to Lot 3-B
of said Lot 3, TCT No. 29337 was issued in lieu of TCT No. 6595. Thus, the LRA's
refusal to issue a decree of registration is based on documents which, if verified,
may render the judgment of the trial court void.
It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration
of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case.
A second decree for the same land would be null and void, 19 since the principle
behind original registration is to register a parcel of land only once. 2 0 Thus, if it is
proven that the land which petitioners are seeking to register has already been
registered in 1904 and 1905, the issuance of a decree of registration to petitioners
will run counter to said principle. As ruled in Duran vs. Olivia: 21
"As the title of the respondents, who hold certificates of title under the
Land Registration Act becomes indefeasible, it follows that the Court of
First Instance has no power or jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for the
registration of the same parcels of land covered by the certificates of title
of the respondents. Such has been our express ruling in the case of Rojas,
et al. v. The City of Tagaytay, et al., G.R. No. L-13333, prom. November
24, 1959, in which this Court, through Mr. Justice Barrera, said:
'As thus viewed, the pivotal issue is one of jurisdiction on the part
of the lower court. All the other contentions of respondent regarding
possession in good faith, laches or claims of better right, while
perhaps valid in an appropriate ordinary action, as to which we here
express no opinion, can not avail in the case at bar if the court a
quo, sitting as land registration court, had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter in decreeing on June 30, 1957, the registration, in
favor of respondent city, of a lot already previously decreed and
registered in favor of the petitioners.
'In a quite impressive line of decisions, it has been well-settled that
a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the
registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration
case and a second decree for the same land is null and void. This
is so, because when once decreed by a court of competent
jurisdiction, the title to the land thus determined is already a res
judicata binding on the whole world, the proceedings being in rem.
The court has no power in a subsequent proceeding (not based on
fraud and within the statutory period) to adjudicate the same title in
favor of another person. Furthermore, the registration of the
property in the name of first registered owner in the Registration
Book is a standing notice to the world that said property is already
registered in his name. Hence, the latter applicant is chargeable
with notice that the land he applied for is already covered by a title
so that he has no right whatsoever to apply for it. To declare the
later title valid would defeat the very purpose of the Torrens system
which is to quiet title to the property and guarantee its
indefeasibility. It would undermine the faith and confidence of the
people in the efficacy of the registration law."
Third: Issuance of a Decree Is Not a Ministerial Act
The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial function of courts and
is not a mere ministerial act which may be compelled through mandamus. Thus,
this Court held in Valmonte and Jacinto vs. Nable: 22
"Moreover, after the rendition of a decision by a registration or cadastral
court, there remain many things to be done before the final decree can be
issued, such as the preparation of amended plans and amended
descriptions, especially where the decision orders a subdivision of a lot,
the segregation therefrom of a portion being adjudicated to another party,
to fit the said decision. As said by this Court in the case of De los Reyes
vs. De Villa, 48 Phil., 227, 234:
'Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of registration must
be stated in convenient form for transcription upon the certificate of
title and must contain an accurate technical description of the land.
This requires trained technical men. Moreover, it frequently occurs
that only portions of a parcel of land included in an application are
ordered registered and that the limits of such portions can only be
roughly indicated in the decision of the court. In such cases
amendments of the plans and sometimes additional surveys
become necessary before the final decree can be entered. That
can hardly be done by the court itself; the law very wisely charges
the chief surveyor of the General Land Registration Office with
such duties (Administrative Code, section 177).'
Furthermore, although the final decree is actually prepared by the Chief
of the General Land Registration Office, the administrative officer, the
issuance of the final decree can hardly be considered a ministerial act for
the reason that said Chief of the General Land Registration Office acts not
as an administrative officer but as an officer of the court and so the
issuance of a final decree is a judicial function and not an administrative
one (De los Reyes vs. De Villa, supra). . . " (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, it is well-settled that the issuance of such decree is not compellable by
mandamus because it is a judicial act involving the exercise of
discretion. 23 Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the
petitioners' legal right to the performance of the particular act which is sought to
be compelled is clear and complete.24 Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear
legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter
of law. If the right is clear and the case is meritorious, objections raising merely
technical questions will be disregarded. 25 But where the right sought to be
enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot
issue. prcd
SO ORDERED.
(Spouses Laburada v. Land Registration Authority, G.R. No. 101387, [March 11,
|||
FIRST DIVISION
The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, acting as a land registration court granted
a decree of registration of a parcel of land sought by herein petitioner spouses.
After the finality of the decision, the trial court, on Motion of petitioners, issued an
order requiring LRA to issue the corresponding decree of Registration. However
the LRA refused contending that to issue decree of registration of the subject land
would result in the duplication of titles over the same, and thus contravene the
policy and purpose of the Torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of
the same as verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Rizal yields that the lot in question is already covered by a TCT. Hence,
petitioners filed this action for mandamus.
It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration
of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case.
A second decree for the same land would be null and void, since the principle
behind original registration is to register a parcel of land only once. Thus, if it is
proven that the land which petitioners are seeking to register has already been
registered in 1904 and 1905, the issuance of a decree of registration to petitioners
will run counter to said principle. The issuance of a decree of registration is part of
the judicial function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act which may be
compelled through mandamus.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J : p
The Case
These are the questions confronting this Court in this special civil action for
mandamus 1 under Rule 65 which asks this Court to direct the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of registration in Land
Registration Case (LRC) No. N-11022. 2
The Facts
Petitioners were the applicants in LRC Case No. N-11022 for the registration of
Lot 3-A, Psd-1372, located in Mandaluyong City. On January 8, 1991, the trial
court, acting as a land registration court, rendered its decision disposing thus: 3
"WHEREFORE, finding the application meritorious and it appearing that
the applicants, Spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda Laburada, have a
registrable title over the parcel of land described as Lot 3A, Psd-1372, the
Court declares, confirms and orders the registration of their title thereto.
As soon as this decision shall become final, let the corresponding decree
be issued in the name of spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda Laburada,
both of legal age, married, with residence and postal address at No. 880
Rizal Ave., Manila."
After the finality of the decision, the trial court, upon motion of petitioners, issued
an order 4 dated March 15, 1991 requiring the LRA to issue the corresponding
decree of registration. However, the LRA refused. Hence, petitioners filed this
action for mandamus. 5
Attached to the LRA's comment on the petition is a report dated April 29, 1992
signed by Silverio G. Perez, director of the LRA Department of Registration, which
explained public respondent's refusal to issue the said decree: 6
"In connection with the Petition for Mandamus filed by Petitioners through
counsel, dated August 27, 1991 relative to the above-noted case/record,
the following comments are respectfully submitted;
On March 6, 1990, an application for registration of title of a parcel of land
Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372 a portion of Lot 3, Block No. 159,
Swo-7237, situated in the Municipality of San Felipe Neri, Province of
Rizal was filed by Spouses Marciano [sic] Laburada and Erlinda
Laburada;
After plotting the aforesaid plan sought to be registered in our Municipal
Index Sheet, it was found that it might be a portion of the parcels of land
decreed in Court of Land Registration (CLR) Case Nos. 699, 875 and 817,
as per plotting of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-319932, a copy of said
subdivision plan is Annex 'A' hereof;
The records on file in this Authority show that CLR Case Nos. 699, 875 &
917 were issued Decree Nos. 240, 696 and 1425 on August 25, 1904,
September 14, 1905 and April 26, 1905, respectively;
On May 23, 1991, a letter of this Authority was sent to the Register of
Deeds, Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex 'B' hereof, requesting for a
certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title No. 355, issued in the
name of Compania Agricola de Ultramar;
On May 20, 1991, a certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 355 was received by this Authority, a copy is Annex 'C' hereof,
per unsigned letter of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy
is Annex 'D' hereof;
After examining the furnished OCT NO. 355, it was found that the
technical description of the parcel of land described therein is not
readable, that prompted this Authority to send another letter dated April
15, 1992 to the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex
'E' hereof, requesting for a certified typewritten copy of OCT No. 355, or
in lieu thereof a certified copy of the subsisting certificate of title with
complete technical description of the parcel of land involved therein. To
date, however, no reply to our letter has as yet been received by this
Authority;
After verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Rizal, it was found that Lot 3-B of the subdivision plan Psd-
1372 being a portion of Lot No. 3, Block No. 159, Plan S.W.O. -7237, is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of
Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor, a copy is attached as Annex 'F' hereof.
Said TCT No. 29337 is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No.
6595. However, the title issued for Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-
1372 cannot be located because TCT No. 6595 consisting of several
sheets are [sic] incomplete.
"SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse
claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse claim and proper
for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered.
Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto,
subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular
Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in
the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description
'To all whom it may concern.' Such decree shall not be opened by reason
of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby,
nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees;
subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any
estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file
in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one
year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value
has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year,
every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this section
shall be incontrovertible. If there is any such purchaser, the decree of
registration shall not be opened, but shall remain in full force and effect
forever, subject only to the right of appeal hereinbefore
provided: Provided, however, That no decree or certificate of title issued
to persons not parties to the appeal shall be cancelled or annulled. But
any person aggrieved by such decree in any case may pursue his remedy
by action for damages against the applicant or any other person for fraud
in procuring the decree. Whenever the phrase 'innocent purchaser for
value' or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Act, it shall be deemed to
include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.
(As amended by Sec. 3, Act No. 3621; and Sec. 1, Act No. 3630, and PD
1529, Sec 39)."
However, we must point out that the letters of Silverio G. Perez and Felino M.
Cortez, dated April 29, 1992 and November 27, 1995, respectively, clearly stated
that, after verification from the records submitted by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal,
the property which petitioners are seeking to register — Lot 3-A of Subdivision Plan
Psd-1372 — is a portion of Lot No. 3, Block 159, Plan S.W.O.-7237, over which
TCT No. 6595 has already been issued. Upon the other hand, in regard to Lot 3-B
of said Lot 3, TCT No. 29337 was issued in lieu of TCT No. 6595. Thus, the LRA's
refusal to issue a decree of registration is based on documents which, if verified,
may render the judgment of the trial court void.
It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration
of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case.
A second decree for the same land would be null and void, 19 since the principle
behind original registration is to register a parcel of land only once. 2 0 Thus, if it is
proven that the land which petitioners are seeking to register has already been
registered in 1904 and 1905, the issuance of a decree of registration to petitioners
will run counter to said principle. As ruled in Duran vs. Olivia: 21
"As the title of the respondents, who hold certificates of title under the
Land Registration Act becomes indefeasible, it follows that the Court of
First Instance has no power or jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for the
registration of the same parcels of land covered by the certificates of title
of the respondents. Such has been our express ruling in the case of Rojas,
et al. v. The City of Tagaytay, et al., G.R. No. L-13333, prom. November
24, 1959, in which this Court, through Mr. Justice Barrera, said:
'As thus viewed, the pivotal issue is one of jurisdiction on the part
of the lower court. All the other contentions of respondent regarding
possession in good faith, laches or claims of better right, while
perhaps valid in an appropriate ordinary action, as to which we here
express no opinion, can not avail in the case at bar if the court a
quo, sitting as land registration court, had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter in decreeing on June 30, 1957, the registration, in
favor of respondent city, of a lot already previously decreed and
registered in favor of the petitioners.
'In a quite impressive line of decisions, it has been well-settled that
a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the
registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration
case and a second decree for the same land is null and void. This
is so, because when once decreed by a court of competent
jurisdiction, the title to the land thus determined is already a res
judicata binding on the whole world, the proceedings being in rem.
The court has no power in a subsequent proceeding (not based on
fraud and within the statutory period) to adjudicate the same title in
favor of another person. Furthermore, the registration of the
property in the name of first registered owner in the Registration
Book is a standing notice to the world that said property is already
registered in his name. Hence, the latter applicant is chargeable
with notice that the land he applied for is already covered by a title
so that he has no right whatsoever to apply for it. To declare the
later title valid would defeat the very purpose of the Torrens system
which is to quiet title to the property and guarantee its
indefeasibility. It would undermine the faith and confidence of the
people in the efficacy of the registration law."
Third: Issuance of a Decree Is Not a Ministerial Act
The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial function of courts and
is not a mere ministerial act which may be compelled through mandamus. Thus,
this Court held in Valmonte and Jacinto vs. Nable: 22
"Moreover, after the rendition of a decision by a registration or cadastral
court, there remain many things to be done before the final decree can be
issued, such as the preparation of amended plans and amended
descriptions, especially where the decision orders a subdivision of a lot,
the segregation therefrom of a portion being adjudicated to another party,
to fit the said decision. As said by this Court in the case of De los Reyes
vs. De Villa, 48 Phil., 227, 234:
'Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of registration must
be stated in convenient form for transcription upon the certificate of
title and must contain an accurate technical description of the land.
This requires trained technical men. Moreover, it frequently occurs
that only portions of a parcel of land included in an application are
ordered registered and that the limits of such portions can only be
roughly indicated in the decision of the court. In such cases
amendments of the plans and sometimes additional surveys
become necessary before the final decree can be entered. That
can hardly be done by the court itself; the law very wisely charges
the chief surveyor of the General Land Registration Office with
such duties (Administrative Code, section 177).'
Furthermore, although the final decree is actually prepared by the Chief
of the General Land Registration Office, the administrative officer, the
issuance of the final decree can hardly be considered a ministerial act for
the reason that said Chief of the General Land Registration Office acts not
as an administrative officer but as an officer of the court and so the
issuance of a final decree is a judicial function and not an administrative
one (De los Reyes vs. De Villa, supra). . . " (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, it is well-settled that the issuance of such decree is not compellable by
mandamus because it is a judicial act involving the exercise of
discretion. 23 Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the
petitioners' legal right to the performance of the particular act which is sought to
be compelled is clear and complete.24 Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear
legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter
of law. If the right is clear and the case is meritorious, objections raising merely
technical questions will be disregarded. 25 But where the right sought to be
enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot
issue. prcd
SO ORDERED.
(Spouses Laburada v. Land Registration Authority, G.R. No. 101387, [March 11,
|||
SYNOPSIS
SYLLABUS
DECISION
ESGUERRA, J : p
This case was originally appealed to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed
as CA-G.R. No. 47438-R. The Court of Appeals certified it to this Court for final
consideration and resolution of the pure question of law involved.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On May 9, 1969, a Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Title was filed by the
Republic of the Philippines. (represented by the Director of Lands), with the Court
of First Instance of Davao, Branch I, alleging, among others, the following:
"3. That defendant Commissioner of Land Registration and defendant
Register of Deeds of Davao City whose Offices are at España Extension,
Quezon City and Davao City, respectively, are included in this complaint,
the first being the public Official charged under the law with the approval
of subdivision surveys of private lands while the second is the Official
vested with the authority to issue certificates of titles, pursuant to the
provisions of Act 496, as amended, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Law;
"4. That defendant Estate of Luisa Villa Abrille (now Heirs of Luisa Villa
Abrille) is the owner of a parcel of land in the City of Davao containing an
area of FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
FIFTY-TWO SQUARE METERS (525,652), more or less, under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-1439 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao City,
issued in her name;
"5. That deceased Luisa Villa Abrille during her lifetime caused the
subdivision of the aforesaid parcel of land into two lots designated as Lots
Nos. 379-B-2-B-1 and 379-B-2-B-2 under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-
9322 which was approved by the Land Registration Commissioner on
March 17, 1967;
"6. That under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, Lot No. 379-B-2-B-1
contains an area of 30,100 Square Meters while Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2
contains an area of 577,679 Square Meters or a total area of 607,779
Square Meters, which is 82,127 Square Meters more than the original
area covered in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439 in the name of said
defendant Luisa Villa Abrille;
"7. That on March 27, 1967 or ten days after the approval by the Land
Registration Commissioner, said Luisa Villa Abrille was able to secure an
order from the Court of First Instance of Davao in LRC (GLRO) Doc. No.
9969, directing the Register of Deeds for the City of Davao and Province
of Davao, to correct the area of Certificate of Title No. T-1439 and
thereafter to cancel the same and issue in lieu thereof TCT Nos. T-18886
and T-18887;
"8. That on March 30, 1967, the Register of Deeds concerned registered
Lot 379-B-2-B-1 and issued TCT No. 18886 therefor, in the name of Luisa
Villa-Abrille and on the same date registered Lot No. 3 79-B-2-B-2 and
issued TCT No. 18887 in the name of Luisa Villa-Abrille;
"9. That the registration of Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2, which includes the
aforementioned excess area of 82,127 Square Meters, was not in
accordance with law for lack of the required notice and publication as
prescribed in Act 496, as amended, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Law;
"10. That the excess or enlarged area of 82,127 Square Meters as a result
of the approval of the subdivision survey (LRC) Psd-69322 was formerly
a portion of the Davao River which dried up by reason of the change of
course of the said Davao River; hence a land belonging to the public
domain; and
"11. That as a consequence thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
18887 which covers Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2 of Subdivision Survey (LRC)
Psd-69322, wherein the excess. area of land belong to the public domain
(not private land) is null and void ab initio."
On June 10, 1969, defendant Register of Deeds of Davao City filed her answer
averring that she, "in the performance of her ministerial duty, honestly and in good
faith effected the registration of Subdivision Lot No. 379-B-2-B-1 and Lot No. 379-
B-2-B-2 and the issuance of corresponding TCT No. 18886 and TCT No. 18887
therefor, respectively, in view of the approval of the Land Registration
Commissioner of Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, and in view of the Order of
the Court of First Instance of Davao to correct the area in Certificate of Title No. T-
1439, to cancel the same and to issue in lieu thereof TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-
18887". LibLex
"COME NOW the parties assisted by their respective attorneys, and unto
the Honorable Court, most respectfully submit the following stipulation of
facts and allege:
"1. That Lot 379-B-2-B was originally registered on June 28, 1916 in the
Registry Book of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga as Vol. A-27, Page
40 under Original Certificate of Title No. 5609, Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Rec.
No. 317, in the name of Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna, father of Luisa
Villa Abrille;
"2. That upon the death of the original owner, the said property was
inherited by Luisa Villa Abrille and transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439
was issued in the name of said Luisa Villa Abrille;
"3. That subsequently, by virtue of an approved subdivision plan Psd-
69322 by the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. T- 18886 and 18887 were issued by the defendant,
Register of Deeds of Davao, copy of which subdivision plan is hereto
attached as Annex "A", and made integral part hereof;
"4. That Transfer Certificate of Title. No. T-18886 was subsequently
concern by virtue of deed of sale, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
19077 was issued in the name of Gaudencio Consunji, a purchaser in
good faith and for value;
"5. That the said subdivision plan Annex "A" was also approved by the
Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV, through an Order dated March
27, 1967, copy of which order is hereto attached as Annex "B" and made
part hereof;
"6. That the said Order Annex "B" was issued by the Court of First
Instance of Davao, Branch IV, on the strength of the Report of the
defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, copy of which report is
hereto attached as Annex "C" and made integral part hereof;
"7. That much later on, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18887 was, by
virtue of an Order of the Court of First Instance, Branch I, in Special
Proceedings No. 1357, entitled: In the Matter of the Testate Estate of
Luisa Villa Abrille, approving a project of partition cancelled, and in lieu
thereof, the following Transfer Certificates of Title were issued to the
following named persons, to wit:
(a) T-20690 - Huang Siu Sin;
(b) T-20692 - Huang Siu Sin;
(c) T-20701 - Josefino Huang;
(d) T-20702 - Josefino Huang;
(e) T-20703 - Josefino Huang;
(f) T-20732 - Huang Siu Sin, et al.;
(g) T-20733 - Huang Siu Sin, et al.;
(h) T-20713 - Miguel Huang;
(i) T-20715 - Miguel Huang;
(j) T-20725 - Milagros Huang;
(k) T-20726 - Milagros Huang;
which certificates of title were issued on the basis of a subdivision
plan LRC Psd-71236 duly approved by the defendant, Land
Registration Commissioner, copy of which subdivision plan (LRC)
Psd-71236 is hereto attached as Annex "D" and made integral part
hereof;
"8. That the parties admit that there was an increase in the area of Lot
379-B-2-B, but the same was with the knowledge of the defendant, Land
Registration Commissioner and the Court of First Instance of Davao,
Branch IV;
"9. That the parties admit that no registered owner has been affected or
prejudiced in the increase in area as only Luisa Villa Abrille as the
registered owner holds property adjacent to the parcel of land in question;
"10. That the portion of land subject of the increase adjoins Lot 379-B-2-
B and abuts the Davao River;
"11. That the parcel of land subject of the increase is fully planted with
coconuts, bananas and other seasonal crops by the defendants, through
their predecessor-in-interest;
"12. That the increase in area could have taken place very long time ago
as the coconuts planted thereon had long been fruit bearing;
"13. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18886 does not contain any
portion of the increase in area;
"14. That of the certificates of title issued based under subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-71236, only Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725; T-
20701; T-20713; and T-20690 contain the increase in area; while all the
other certificates of title issued under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236
do not contain any increase in area;
"15. That the parties agree that the issuance of the Order Annex "B" was
without notice to the Director of Lands."
The trial court thereafter rendered its decision dated January 27, 1970, which
reads as follows:
"This is an ordinary civil action for annulment of certificate of title instituted
by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands,
against the Estate of Luisa Abrille, represented by Huang Siu Sin,
Administrator, the Land Registration Commissioner and the Register of
Deeds of the City of Davao. Because the residue of the intestate estate of
Luisa Villa Abrille had been divided among Huang Siu Sin, Josefino
Huang, Milagros Huang, Miguel Huang and lap Tong Ha, heirs, they were
directed to appear and to substitute for the intestate estate and they did. LLphil
Defendant-appellant maintains that the lower court erred in holding the approval
of Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322 of no legal effect merely on ground of lack
of notice to interested persons, and in ordering the cancellation of Certificates of
Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713, and T-20690. It is the contention of the
defendant-appellant that since the government agencies having to do with lands
know all the time the increase in area in subdivision plan Psd-69322, and the
government agencies concerned tolerated if not abetted the ultimate inclusion of
the involved increase in area, defendant-appellant should not be made to suffer
the effect of the allegedly wrong procedure or step taken in the approval of the
aforementioned subdivision plan. Besides, defendant-appellant claims that it is
their honest belief that the legal remedy taken by them in seeking the approval of
their subdivision plan concern was well within the law, particularly the provision of
Section 44 of Act 496, as amended.
Plaintiff-appellee, on the other hand, maintains that the approval of the subdivision
plan, with the increase in area, by the defendant-appellant Land Registration
Commission does not lend validity to the said subdivision plan; and that the
issuance of the four transfer certificates of title (Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713
and T-20690) over the increased area in question is improper and invalid
notwithstanding the conformity of the Land Registration Commissioner and the
subsequent order of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV, approving the
subdivision plan concerned, as the required giving of notice to all parties interested
in defendant-appellant's petition for approval of subdivision plan was not at all
followed.
Before Us, therefore, for consideration and final resolution, in order to arrive at
judicious disposition of the case at bar, is whether or not the lower court erred in
ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701,
T-20713 and T-20690 which cover the increased area in question totalling 82,127
square meters.
After a careful and thorough deliberation of the matter in controversy, We are of
the opinion and so hold that the lower court acted correctly in ordering the
cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and
T-20690 which admittedly covered the increased area of 82,127 square meters
under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-71236 (and formerly under Psd-69322) for the
City of Davao.
Certainly, the step taken by defendant-appellant in petitioning the court for the
approval of their Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322 and then Psd-71236 to include
the questioned increased area of 82,127 square meters is, to say the least,
unwarranted and irregular. This is so for the increased area in question, which is
not a registered land but formerly a river bed, is so big as to give allowance for a
mere mistake in area of the original registration of the tracts of land of the
defendant-appellant formerly belonging to and registered in the name of their
grandfather, Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna. In order to bring this increase in area,
which the parties admitted to have been a former river bed of the Davao River,
under the operation and coverage of the Land Registration Law, Act 496,
proceedings in registrations of land title should have been filed instead of an
ordinary approval of subdivision plan.
It should be remembered that recourse under Section 44 of Act 496, which the
predecessor-in-interest (Luisa Villa Abrille) of the herein defendant-appellant took,
is good only insofar as it covers previously registered lands. In the instant case,
part of the tracts of land, particularly the area of 82,127 square meter, has not yet
been brought under the operation of the Torrens System. Worse still, the approval
of Subdivision Plans (LRC) Psd-09322 and Psd-71236 was without notice to all
parties in interest, more particularly the Director of Lands. For an applicant to have
his imperfect or incomplete title or claim to a land to be originally registered under
Act 496, the following requisites should all be satisfied:LLpr
||| (Republic v. Heirs of Abrille, G.R. No. L-39248, [May 7, 1976], 162 PHIL 913-929)
23. EN BANC
SYLLABUS
DECISION
BARRERA, J : p
This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia
Grande, from the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G. R. No. 25169-R)
reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Isabela (Civil Case No. 1171), and
dismissing petitioners' action against respondents Domingo and Esteban
Calalung, to quiet title to and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly
occupied by the latter without petitioners' consent.
The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners
of a parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan,
municipality of Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), province of Isabela, by inheritance
from their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who inherited it from her parents Isidro
Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name said land appears registered, as shown by
Original Certificate of Title No. 2982, issued on June 9, 1934). Said property is
identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-83342. When it was surveyed for purposes of
registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River
(the same boundary stated in the (title). Since then, and for many years thereafter,
a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by action of the current of
the Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a
distance of about 105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964
square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added to the registered
area (Exh. C-1).
On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First
Instance of Isabela against respondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964
square meters) formed by accretion, alleging in their complaint (docketed as Civil
Case No. 1171) that they and their predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in
peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when
respondents entered upon the land under claim of ownership. Petitioners also
asked for damages corresponding to the value of the fruits of the land as well as
attorney's fees and costs. In their answer (dated February 18, 1958), respondents
claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous, open,
and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to the
present.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a
decision adjudging the ownership of the portion in question to petitioners, and
ordering respondents to vacate the premises and deliver possession thereof to
petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.00 as damages and costs. Said decision,
in part, reads:
"It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was
formed by the gradual deposit of alluvium brought about by the action of
the Cagayan River, a navigable river. We are inclined to believe that the
accretion was formed on the northeastern side of the land covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 after the survey of the registered land
in 1931, because the surveyors found out that the northeastern boundary
of the land surveyed by them was the Cagayan River, and not the land in
question. Which is indicative of the fact that the accretion has not yet
started or began in 1931. And, as declared by Pedro Laman, defendants'
witness and the boundary owner on the northwest of the registered land
of the plaintiffs, the accretion was a little more than one hectare, including
the stony portion, in 1940 or 1941. Therefore, the declarations of the
defendant Domingo Calalung and his witness, Vicente C. Bacani, to the
effect that the land in question was formed by accretion since 1933 do not
only contradict the testimony of defendants' witness Pedro Laman, but
could not overthrow the incontestable fact that the accretion with an area
of 4 hectares, more or less, was formed in 1948, reason for which, it was
only declared in that same year for taxation purposes by the defendants
under Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. '2') when they entered upon the land. We
could not give credence to defendants' assertion that Tax Dec. No. 257
(Exh. '2') cancelled Tax Dec. No. 28226 (Exh. '1'), because Exh. "2" says
that 'tax under this declaration begins with the year 1948. But, the fact that
defendants declared the land for taxation purposes since 1948, does not
mean that they become the owner of the land by mere occupancy, for it is
a new provision of the New Civil Code that ownership of a piece of land
cannot be acquired by occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in
question being an accretion to the mother or registered land of the
plaintiffs, the accretion belongs to the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code;
Art. 366, Old Civil Code). Assuming, arguendo, that the accretion has
been occupied by the defendants since 1948, or earlier, is of no moment,
because the law does not require any act of possession on the part of the
owner of the riparian owner, from the moment the deposit becomes
manifest (Roxas vs. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil.
567). Further, no act of appropriation on the part of the riparian owner is
necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation, as the
law does not require the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326).
"This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants,
granting that they have been in possession of the alluvium since 1948,
could have acquired the property by prescription. Assuming that they
occupied the land in September, 1948, but considering that the action was
commenced on January 25, 1958, they have not been in possession of
the land for ten (10) years; hence, they could not have acquired the land
by ordinary prescription (Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover,
as the alluvium is, by law, part and parcel of the registered property, the
same may be considered as registered property, within the meaning of
Section 46 of Act No. 496; and, therefore, it could not be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession by another person."
Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on
September 14, 1960, the decision adverted to at the beginning of this opinion,
partly stating:
"That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process
of alluvion, which started in the early thirties, is a fact conclusively
established by the evidence for both parties. By law, therefore, unless
some superior title has supervened, it should properly belong to the
riparian owners, specifically in accordance with the rule of natural
accession in Article 366 of the old Civil Code (now Article 457), which
provides that 'to the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs
the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current
of the water.' The defendants, however, contend that they have acquired
ownership through prescription. This contention poses the real issue in
this case. The Court a quo, has resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs, on two
grounds: First, since by accession, the land in question pertains to the
original estate, and since in this instance the original estate is registered,
the accretion, consequently, falls within the purview of Section 46 of Act
No. 496, which states that 'no title to registered land in derogation to that
of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession'; and, second, the adverse possession of the defendant began
only in the month of September, 1948, or less than the 10-year period
required for prescription before the present action was instituted.
"As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not
quite correct. An accretion to registered land, while declared by specific
provision of the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land as a natural
accession thereof, does not ipso jure become entitled to the protection of
the rule of imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration
Act. Such protection does not extend beyond the area given and
described in the certificate. To hold otherwise, would be productive of
confusion. It would virtually deprive the title, and the technical description
of the land given therein, of their character of conclusiveness as to the
identity and area of the land that is registered. Just as the Supreme Court,
albeit in a negative manner, has stated that registration does not protect
the riparian owner against the erosion of the area of his land through
gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream (Payatas Estate
Development Co. vs. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so registration does not entitle
him to all the rights conferred by the Land Registration Act, in so far as
the area added by accretion is concerned. What rights he has, are
declared not by said Act, but by the provisions of the Civil Code on
accession; and these provisions do not preclude acquisition of the
additional area by another person through prescription. This Court has
held as much in the case of Galindez, et al. vs. Baguisa, et al., CA-G. R.
No. 19249-R, July 17, 1959.
"We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial
court, regarding the length of time that the defendants have been in
possession. Domingo Calalung testified that he occupied the land in
question for the first time in 1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the plaintiffs.
The area under occupancy gradually increased as the years went by. In
1946, he declared the land for purposes of taxation (Exhibit 1). This tax
declaration was superseded in 1948 by another (Exhibit 2), after the name
of the municipality wherein it is located was changed from Tumauini to
Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is corroborated by two witnesses, both
owners of properties nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years of age, who was
Municipal president of Tumauini for three terms, said that the land in
question adjoins his own on the south, and that since 1940 or 1941, he
has always known it to be in the peaceful possession of the defendants.
Vicente C. Bacani testified to the same effect, although, he said that the
defendants' possession started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area
thereof, he said, was then less than one hectare.
"We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater
weight and credence than that of the plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone
witness, Laureana Rodriguez. The first stated that the defendants
occupied the land in question only in 1948; that he called the latter's
attention to the fact that the land was his, but the defendants, in turn,
claimed that they were the owners; that the plaintiffs did not file an action
until 1958, because it was only then that they were able to obtain the
certificate of title from the surveyor, Domingo Parlan; and that they never
declared the land in question for taxation purposes or paid the taxes
thereon. Pedro Grande admitted that the defendants had the said land
surveyed in April, 1958, and that he tried to stop it, not because he claimed
the accretion for himself and his co-plaintiffs, but because the survey
included a portion of the property covered by their title. This last fact is
conceded by the defendants who, accordingly, relinquished their
possession to the part thus included, containing an area of some 458
square meters.
"The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their
possession — from 1933 to 1958 — is not only preponderant in itself, but
is, moreover, supported by the fact that it is they and not the plaintiffs who
declared the disputed property for taxation, and by the additional
circumstance that if the plaintiffs had really been in prior possession and
were deprived thereof in 1948, they would have immediately taken steps
to recover the same. The excuse they gave for not doing so, namely, that
they did not receive their copy of the certificate of title to their property until
1958 for lack of funds to pay the fees of the surveyor Domingo Parlan, is
too flimsy to merit any serious consideration. The payment of the
surveyor's fees had nothing to do with their right to obtain a copy of the
certificate. Besides, it was not necessary for them to have it in their hands,
in order to file an action to recover the land which was legally theirs by
accession and of which, as they allege, they had been illegally deprived
by the defendants. We are convinced, upon consideration of the evidence,
that the latter, were really in possession since 1934, immediately after the
process of alluvion started, and that the plaintiffs woke up to their rights
only when they received their copy of the title in 1958. By then, however,
prescription had already supervened in favor of the defendants."
It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by
us.
The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired
the alluvial property in question through prescription.
There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the new Civil Code and
Article 366 of the old, petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as
they are the registered owners of the land to which it adjoins. The question is
whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land just because the lot
which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property
imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an
unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land does
not, by extension, become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land
is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is quite
another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is
governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the
registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does
not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the
title already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of
third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the
operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been
provided. The fact remains, however, that petitioners never sought registration of
said alluvial property (which was formed sometime after petitioners' property
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was registered on June 9, 1934)
up to the time they instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of
Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore, never became registered property, and
hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by
registered property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to
acquisition through prescription by third persons.
The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through acquisitive
prescription? This is a question which requires determination of facts: physical
possession and dates or duration of such possession. The Court of Appeals, after
analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-appellees were in possession of
the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a
claim of ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958. This finding of the existence
of these facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an examination of the
evidence presented by the parties, is conclusive as to them and can not be
reviewed by us.
The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not
the provisions of the Civil Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when
the pertinent articles of the Old Civil Code were not in force and before the
effectivity of the New Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the Court of
Appeals that the respondents acquired the alluvial lot in question by acquisitive
prescription is in accordance with law.
The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the petitions. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., Regala and Makalintal, JJ., took no part.
(Grande v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-17652, [June 30, 1962], 115 PHIL 521-
|||
529)
SYLLABUS
DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J : p
This petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks the reversal of the decision
of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) dated October 15, 1985
in AC-G.R. CV No. 03852 entitled "Domingo Apostol, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
Leonida Cureg, et al., Defendants-Appellants", which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Isabela, Branch XXII declaring private respondent Domingo
Apostol the absolute owner of a parcel of land, situated in Barangay Casibarag-
Cajel, Cabagan, Isabela, more particularly described as follows:
". . . , containing an area of 5.5000 hectares, and bounded, on the north,
by Cagayan River; on the east, by Domingo Guingab; on the south,
by Antonio Carniyan; and on the west, by Sabina Mola, with an assessed
value of P3,520." (par. 9 of complaint, p. 4, Record; emphasis ours)
On November 5, 1982, private respondents Domingo Apostol, Soledad Gerardo,
Rosa Gerardo, Nieves Gerardo, Flordeliza Gerardo and Lilia Maquinad, filed a
complaint for quieting of title and damages with preliminary injunction against
herein petitioners Leonida, Romeo, Pepito, Hernando, Manuel, Antonio and
Elpidio, all surnamed Carniyan with the Regional Trial Court of Isabela and
docketed as Civil Case No. Br. 111-373. A temporary restraining order was issued
by the trial court on November 12, 1982.
The complaint alleged that private respondents, except Domingo Apostol, are the
legal and/or the forced heirs of the late Domingo Gerardo, who died in February
1944, the latter being the only issue of the late Francisco Gerardo, who died before
the outbreak of the second world war; that since time immemorial and/or before
July 26, 1894, the late Francisco Gerardo, together with his predecessors-in-
interest have been in actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession, under
a bona fide claim of ownership and adverse to all other claimants, of a parcel of
land (referred to as their "motherland"), situated in Casibarag-Cajel, Cabagan,
Isabela, more particularly described as follows: cdrep
The application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was denied on
July 28, 1983 (pp. 244-250, Rollo) on the ground that the defendants were in actual
possession of the land in litigation prior to September 1982.
In a decision rendered on July 6, 1984, the trial court held that respondent Domingo
Apostol, thru his predecessors-in-interest had already acquired an imperfect title
to the subject land and accordingly, rendered judgment: 1. declaring Domingo
Apostol its absolute owner; 2. ordering the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction against herein petitioners; 3. ordering that the writ be made permanent;
and 4. ordering herein petitioners to pay private respondents a reasonable
attorney's fee of P5,000.00, litigation expenses of P1,500.00 and costs (pp. 143-
145, Rollo).
On July 17, 1984, petitioners appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court
which affirmed the decision of the trial court on October 15, 1985. Petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration was denied on January 8, 1986. Hence, this petition
for review on the following assigned errors:
"A. It erred in ruling that the subject land or "accretion" (which is bounded
on the north by the Cagayan River) belongs to the private respondents
and not to the petitioners when the petitioners' Original Certificate of Title
No. 19093 states clearly that the petitioners' land is bounded on its north
by the Cagayan River.
"B. It erred in construing the tax declarations against the interest of the
herein petitioners who are only the heirs of the late Antonio Carniyan since
the late Francisco (supposed predecessor of the respondents) could not
have executed the recently acquired tax declarations (Exhibits "A" to "A-
2") as he died long before World War II and since the late Antonio
Carniyan could no longer stand up to explain his side.
"C. Contrary to the evidence and the finding of the Regional Trial Court, it
wrongly ruled that petitioners have never been in possession of the land
(p. 7 of Annex "A", ibid.).
"D. It erred in awarding the accretion of 3.5 hectares to the private
respondents who incredibly claimed that the accretion occurred only in
1982 and is a "gift from the Lord." (pp. 24-25, Rollo)
This petition is impressed with merit.
The object of the controversy in this case is the alleged "motherland" of private
respondents together with the accretion of about 3.5 hectares, the totality of which
is referred to in this decision as the "subject land."
In this case, petitioners claimed to be riparian owners who are entitled to the
"subject land" which is an accretion to the registered land while private
respondents claimed to be entitled to the 3.5 hectares accretion attached to their
"motherland."
It should be noted that the herein private respondents' claim of ownership of their
alleged two and a half (2 & 1/2) hectare "motherland" is anchored mainly on four
(4) tax declarations (Exhibits "A", "A-1", "A-2" and "B", pp. 191, 192, 193,
194, Rollo). This Court has repeatedly held that the declaration of ownership for
purposes of assessment on the payment of the tax is not sufficient evidence to
prove ownership. (Evangelista v. Tabayuyong, 7 Phil. 607; Elumbaring v.
Elumbaring, 12 Phil. 384; cited in Camo v. Riosa Bayco, 29 Phil. 437, 444). For
their part, petitioners relied on the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of their
Original Certificate of Title No. P-19093, dated November 25, 1968 (Exhibit "3", p.
189, Rollo) issued in the name of Antonio Carniyan (petitioners' predecessor-in-
interest) pursuant to Free Patent No. 399431 dated May 21, 1968, clearly showing
that the boundary of petitioners' land on the north is Cagayan River and not the
"motherland" claimed by respondents. The said registered land was bought by the
late Antonio Carniyan from his father-in-law, Marcos Cureg, on October 5, 1956,
as evidenced by an Absolute Deed of Sale (Exhibit "8", p. 195, Rollo) which states
that the land is bounded on the north by Cagayan River.
In the case of Ferrer-Lopez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50420, May 29, 1987,
150 SCRA 393, 401-402, We ruled that as against an array of proofs consisting of
tax declarations and/or tax receipts which are not conclusive evidence of
ownership nor proof of the area covered therein, an original certificate of title
indicates true and legal ownership by the registered owners over the disputed
premises. Petitioners' OCT No. P-19093 should be accorded greater weight as
against the tax declarations (Exhibit "A", dated 1979; Exhibit "A-1" undated and
Exhibit "A-2" dated 1967, pp. 191, 192, 193, Rollo) offered by private respondents
in support of their claim, which declarations are all in the name of private
respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Francisco Gerardo, and appear to have
been subscribed by him after the last war, when it was established during the trial
that Francisco Gerardo died long before the outbreak of the last war.
Anent Tax Declaration No. 13131, in the name of Antonio Carniyan (Exhibit "C", p.
203, Rollo), which the appellate court considered as an admission by him that his
land is bounded on the north by the land of Domingo Gerardo and that he
(Carniyan) is now estopped from claiming otherwise, We hold that said tax
declaration, being of an earlier date cannot defeat an original certificate of title
which is of a later date. Since petitioner's original certificate of title clearly stated
that subject land is bounded on the north by the Cagayan River, private
respondents' claim over their "motherland," allegedly existing between petitioners'
land and the Cagayan River, is deemed barred and nullified with the issuance of
the original certificate of title.
It is an elemental rule that a decree of registration bars all claims and rights which
arose or may have existed prior to the decree of registration (Ferrer-Lopez v. CA,
supra., p. 404). By the issuance of the decree, the land is bound and title thereto
quieted, subject only to exceptions stated in Section 39, Act 496 (now Sec. 44 of
PD No. 1529). Moreover, the tax declarations of the late Antonio Carniyan
subsequent to the issuance of OCT P-19093 (Exhibit "D", p. 204, Rollo) already
states that its northern boundary is Cagayan River. In effect, he has repudiated
any previous acknowledgment by him, granting that he caused the
accomplishment of the tax declarations in his name before the issuance of OCT
No. P-19093, of the existence of Francisco Gerardo's land. prLL
Finally, the trial court concluded that petitioners have never been in possession of
the "subject land" but the evidence on record proves otherwise. First, the trial court
on page 11 of its Decision (p. 121, Rollo), stated the reason for denying private
respondents' petition for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, that is, ". . . the
defendants (petitioners herein) were in actual possession of the land in litigation
prior to September, 1982" (p. 121, Rollo). Second, witness for private respondents,
Esteban Guingab, boundary owner on the east of the land in question and whose
own land is bounded on the north of Cagayan River, on cross-examination,
revealed that when his property was only more than one (1) hectare in 1958, (now
more than 4 hectares) his boundary on the west is the land of Antonio Carniyan
(T.S.N., 5 May 1983, pp. 19-20). Third, witness Rogelio C. Albano, a geodetic
engineer, on direct examination stated that in 1974, the late Antonio Carniyan
requested him to survey the land covered by his title and the accretion attached to
it, but he did not pursue the same because he learned from the Office of the
Director of the Bureau of Lands that the same accretion is the subject of an
application for homestead patent of one Democrata Aguila, (T.S.N., May 18, 1984,
pp. 12-13) contrary to the statement of the trial court and the appellate court that
Albano "made three attempts to survey the land but he did not continue to survey
because persons other than defendants were in possession of the land," which
statement appears only to be a conclusion (p. 7, Rollo). Fourth, We note Exhibit
"20" (p. 273, Rollo) for petitioners which is an order by the Director of Lands dated
August 14, 1980 in connection with the Homestead Application of Democrata
Aguila of an accretion situated in Catabayungan, Cabagan, Isabela. Aguila's
application was disapproved because in an investigation conducted by the Bureau
of Lands of the area applied for which is an accretion, the same was found to be
occupied and cultivated by, among others, Antonio Carniyan, who claimed it as an
accretion to his land. It is worthy to note that none of the private respondents nor
their predecessors-in-interest appeared as one of those found occupying and
cultivating said accretion.
On the other hand, the allegation of private respondents that they were in
possession of the "motherland" through their predecessors-in-interest had not
been proved by substantial evidence. The assailed decision of the respondent
court, which affirmed the decision of the trial court, stated that since the
"motherland" exists, it is alsopresumed that private respondents were in
possession of the "subject land" through their predecessors-in-interest since prior
to July 26, 1894. The trial court relied on the testimony of Soledad Gerardo, one
of the private respondents in this case, an interested and biased witness, regarding
their possession of the "motherland." From her testimony on pedigree, the trial
court presumed that the source of the property, the late Francisco Gerardo, was in
possession of the same since prior to July 26, 1894 (pp. 137-140, Rollo).
The foregoing considerations indubitably show that the alleged "motherland"
claimed by private respondents is non-existent. The "subject land" is an alluvial
deposit left by the northward movement of the Cagayan River and pursuant to
Article 457 of the New Civil Code: prcd
"To the owners of land adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters."
However, it should be noted that the area covered by OCT No. P-19093 is only
four thousand five hundred eighty four (4,584) square meters. The accretion
attached to said land is approximately five and a half (5.5) hectares. The increase
in the area of petitioners' land, being an accretion left by the change of course or
the northward movement of the Cagayan River does not automatically become
registered land just because the lot which receives such accretion is covered by a
Torrens title. (See Grande v. Court of Appeals, L-17652, June 30, 1962). As such,
it must also be placed under the operation of the Torrens System.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision appealed from is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING Civil
Case No. Br. III-373 for quieting of title and damages.
25. EN BANC
SYLLABUS
DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J : p
In the recent case of Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, 5 it was declared by this Court
that "persons who claim to be in possession of a tract of public land and have
applied with the Bureau of Lands for its purchase have the necessary personality
to oppose registration". An examination of the facts of the said case, however, not
only reveals that the subject land was already determined to be public, but that the
application was opposed by the Directors of Lands and of Forestry as well as by
the private oppositor, who likewise alleged possession that "is open, continuous,
notorious and under the claim of ownership" for at least 60 years. Moreover, it was
not shown that the sale application of private oppositor therein was subject to the
restrictions on entry and improvement found in the sales applications of the
petitioners in the case at bar. Manifestly, the proper step for petitioners herein
would have been to urge the Director of Lands to oppose the application for
registration of the applicant Juan Borromeo.
But the dismissal of the oppositions to the registration application did not warrant
the respondent court's order to demolish the houses and improvements of herein
petitioners in the controverted land. The reason is obvious: there is as yet no
decision, much less a decree of registration, in favor of applicant Borromeo; neither
is there any showing that the land authorities had complained of petitioners'
occupancy. Even if their land sales applications forbade entry before approval, the
Director of Lands could waive that condition. Only after the land is duly registered,
and a writ of possession issued after due hearing (or alternatively, a final court
order of ejectment) can oppositors below, now petitioners in this court, be
dispossessed. In ordering the demolition of petitioners' houses at this stage of the
proceedings, the respondent court acted in grave abuse of discretion, equivalent
to excess of jurisdiction, and certiorari lies to correct it.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the order of 3 December 1969 is declared
null and void in so far as it directed the demolition of the 11 huts of petitioners-
oppositors on the disputed premises; and the preliminary writ of injunction
heretofore issued is made permanent. Let the records be remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings. Costs against private respondent Juan Borromeo.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., is on leave.
||| (Fernandez v. Tañada, G.R. No. L-31673, [June 30, 1971], 148-A PHIL 596-602)
SYLLABUS
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J : p
Direct appeal taken, by Palawan Agricultural and Industrial Co., Inc., from a
decision of the Court of First Instance of Palawan dismissing the former's
application for registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of land of
414.5144 hectares, more or less, situated in the barrio of Panacan, municipality of
Aborlan, Province of Palawan, and more particularly described in amended plan
SC-4782-AMD.
Said application, filed on February 14, 1961, relies upon section 48
of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 1942 and 2061,
upon the ground that, through its predecessor in interest, appellant had been in
open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and lawful possession of the land since
1912, under a bonafide claim of acquisition and ownership.
The Director of Lands opposed the application, alleging that it involves a public
land covered by appellant's sales application No. 4782 dated April 9, 1920; that
the land was not awarded to appellant, it having refused to pay the value thereof
as determined by an appraisal committee in July, 1950; and that appellant has no
valid title to be confirmed, its possession being, not that of an owner, but, merely,
that of a (sales) applicant of a portion of the public domain.
In due course, the Court of First Instance of Palawan rendered Judgment
sustaining the opposition of the Director of Lands and, accordingly, dismissing the
application. Hence, this appeal, upon the ground that the lower court had erred in
holding that:
1. ". . . the possession and occupation by the applicant-
appellant of the land subject of the application is not the possession
and occupation contemplated by the law (subsection [b]), Section 48
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No.
1942)."
2. ". . . the applicant-appellant's possession and occupation
of the land subject of the application did not exclude the Bureau of
Lands."
3. ". . . if the possession and occupation by the applicant-
appellant of the land subject of the application were to be considered
as falling under sub-section (b) of section 48 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942 there will be many
instances where the government will be defrauded."
4. ". . . the only remedy of applicant-appellant is to continue
with its sales application and that it cannot choose the remedy of
confirmation of title because it would be defrauding the government."
Appellant invokes section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended
by Republic Act No. 1942, which reads:
"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of public domain or claiming to own any such lands
or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
"(a) . . .
"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors
in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter." 1
More particularly, appellant maintains that it is entitled to the registration applied
for pursuant to the abovequoted provision, which authorizes the confirmation of
claims of "those who . . . have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty years immediately preceding
the filing of the application . . ."
In this connection, the lower court had made the following findings of fact:
"Sometime on April 19, 1920 the Palawan Agricultural and
Industrial Company, Inc. filed Sales Application No. 4782 over a
parcel of public land consisting of 1,024 hectares located at
Panacan, Aborlan, Palawan (see Exhs. '1' and '13-A'-status Report).
The application was given due course by the Bureau of Lands.
Sometime in December, 1930, the Palawan Agricultural and
Industrial Company, Inc. requested the Director of Lands that it be
permitted to reduce the area applied for to 680 hectares because the
portion it originally applied for were squatted and claimed by other,
(Exhs, '2' and '2-A'). On November 13, 1933, the Director of Lands
wrote a letter to the Palawan Agricultural and Industrial Company,
Inc. advising the latter that it had recommended to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce an appraisal of P18.00 per hectare for
the land it had applied for sale (Exh. '3'), On November 27, 1934, the
Director of Lands issued Notice of Auction Sale over the land applied
for consisting of 764.0633 hectares — setting the date of bidding for
February 27, 1935 at Puerto Princesa, Palawan (Exh. '4'). According
to the records, this auction sale set for February 27, 1935 did not
take place because of the request of the applicant for
postponement. On June 5, 1936, the applicant wrote to the Director
of Lands praying that its Sales Application No. 4782 be not
cancelled, in view of the demand of the Director of Lands that the
sales application be cancelled for lack of interest and that the
company may be given time to comply with the condition required by
the Bureau of Lands, (Exh. '5').
"According to Exhs. 'G', 'G-1', 'G-2' and 'G-4', Tax
Declarations Nos. 342, 1414, 1425 and 1750, respectively, the
applicant had declared the land applied for, for taxation purposes.
On the face of these exhibits, the following appears: On Tax
Declaration No. 342 — 'Purchase Application'; on Tax Declarations
Nos. 1414, 1425 and 1720, appear the words 'S.A. No. 4782'. In
February 1936, the company protested to the Provincial Treasurer
that the land applied for by it be not subject to real estate taxes, (Exh.
'6').
"It also appears from the records that applicant had paid for
the necessary expenses for the survey and had cooperated with the
Bureau of Lands surveyor for the survey of the land, (Exhs. '7', '11'
and '20'). On June 13, 1939, a resurvey was ordered by the Director
of Lands, preparatory to the requirements of public bidding, (Exh.
'19').
"The land applied for was again set to be sold at a public
bidding on May 19, 1941, but the bidding was again postponed
because the applicant company requested its suspension because
it asked for the reconsideration of the appraised value set by the
Director of Lands, (Exh. '3'). On March 24, 1950, the applicant, thru
its Attorney Almario, wrote a petition to the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources asking that the appraised value be reduced.
"On July 24, 1950, pursuant to the order of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, a committee of appraisal
reappraised the property and fixed the price of P100.00 per hectare,
(Exhs. '10', '16', '17' and '18').
"On October 9, 1950, the applicant, thru its counsel, Atty.
Clemente C. Fontanilla, asked for the reconsideration of the
appraisal, (Exh. '18'). The Bureau of Lands stood pat.
"Since the time the applicant had applied for the land, it took
possession thereof partially and improved portion thereof planting
coconuts and other crops. The value of improvements are reflected
in the various lax declarations. The total area, as finally surveyed is
415.5144 hectares under Amd Plan No. Sc-4782, SWO-34910. This
plan as well as the survey was undertaken and prepared by a public
land surveyor instructed to make the survey. The land covered by
this plan is the same land applied for by the applicant under SA-
4782, and it is the same plan that was submitted by the applicant in
these registration proceedings.
"On November 24, 1961, in reply to a subpoena issued by the
District Land Office of Palawan, the applicant thru its president,
advised the latter for the first time that he will not submit to the
investigation set because they want to wait for the result of their
application involving the present case which was filed sometime in
March, 1961." 2
It is obvious from the foregoing facts — which are not and can not be disputed in
this direct appeal, which, as such, is limited to questions of law — that appellant's
possession of the land in question was merely that of a sales applicant thereof, to
whom it had not been awarded because of its refusal to pay the price fixed therefor
by the Bureau of Lands. As such sales applicant, appellant manifestly
acknowledged that he does not own the land and that the same is a public land
under the administration of the Bureau of Lands, to which the application was
submitted. The trial court was, therefore, fully justified in concluding that applicant's
possession was not that of an owner, as required by law.
This conclusion is assailed upon the ground that said section 48 (b)
of Commonwealth Act No. 141 originally provided that:
"xxx xxx xxx
"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors
in interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, except as against the Government, since July twenty-
sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter."
and that Republic Act No. 1942, which became effective on June 22, 1957,
amended said paragraph (b), not only by dispensing with the requirement that
the possession begin not later than July 26, 1894, but, also, by eliminating the
phrase "except as against the Government," qualifying the possession "under
a bona fideclaim of acquisition of ownership" therein called for.
We find no merit in this pretense, for, under both the original and the amended
provision, it is essential that the applicant hold the land "under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership," and appellant herein had never made such claim,
except in its present application for registration, filed on February 14, 1961. All of
its acts prior thereto, including its real estate tax declarations, characterized its
possession of the land as that of a "sales applicant," and, consequently, as one
who expects to buy it, but has not as yet done so, and is not, therefore, its owner.
Moreover, the elimination of the qualifying expression "except as against the
Government," found in said section 48(b) as originally enacted, bolsters up the
view taken by the lower court. Indeed, it suggests that the "bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership," under the amendment by Republic Act No. 1942, must
be adverse to the whole world, including the Government.
Again, as the trial court had aptly observed:
"In the mind of the Court, the possession and occupation by
the applicant company of the land sought to be registered, is not the
possession and occupation contemplated by the present law on this
matter (Subsection [b], Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as
amended by Republic Act No. 1942). If this were the case, there will
be many instances where the government will be defrauded. If
confirmation or registration of title can be done, as it is being done
now by the applicant company, a possessor and occupant of a public
agricultural land under the administration of the Bureau of Lands who
has applied for the purchase of the same will just sit on his right,
making the application pending for more than 30 years while he
possesses and occupies the land, declare the same for taxation
purposes, pay the corresponding taxes religiously and consistently,
and then after a lapse of 30 years, will abandon his sales application
and convert it to an application for judicial confirmation or registration
of title. Such situation is not the one contemplated by our legislators
when they passed Republic Act No. 1942, for had it been their
intention, our legislators would have been a party to an act of
defrauding our government . . ."
Appellant brands this process of reasoning as "illogical" and "contrary to law,"
because, pursuant to section 47 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended
by Republic Act No 2061, the benefits of section 48(b) of the former are available
not later than December 31, 1968, so that those whose possession had not as yet
lasted 30 years could not seek a confirmation of their title. We do not see the
violation of the rules of logic or of law alluded to by appellant. The fact is that, were
we to accept its own process of reasoning — which we cannot, it being contrary to
the clear and natural import of said section 48 (b), as amended — appellant could
have sought confirmation of its alleged title as early as 1942 or 1950, 3 or long
before December 31, 1968.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, with
costs against the appellant.
It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Villamor and Makasiar,
JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., took no part.
Barredo, J., did not take part.
(Palawan Agricultural and Industrial Co., Inc. v. Director of Lands, G.R. No. L-
|||
SYLLABUS
DECISION
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J : p
This is a petition filed by the Director of Land Management to review the decision
dated March 29, 1990 of the Court of Appeals, affirming the trial court's decision
which ordered the registration of the title of a 16-hectare parcel of land in the
names of the private respondents.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found the facts of this case to be as follows:
The Land Investigator/Inspector of the Bureau of Lands verified that Feliciano
Juco, his grandparents or predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, exclusive,
adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of the land in question in the concept
of owners, for a period of twenty (20) years. Juco built a house on Lot 3 where his
family lived. He had carabaos grazing in his pasture. His brother-in-law, Gelacio
de la Cruz, owned and lived on the adjacent Lot 4.
On March 10-11, 1957, Nieves Naval de Roldan caused the whole tract of land in
Cuyambay, Tanay, Rizal, to be resurveyed as PSU-164381, by Private Land
Surveyor Francisco Agustin. Her children filed an application to purchase the
property through the Bureau of Lands. Lot 4 was placed in the name of Desiderio
Roldan. A sales application was filed by Mariano Roldan for Lot 3.
Feliciano Juco was informed of the posting in the Municipality of Tanay, Rizal, of
Mariano Roldan's sales application for Lot 3. But having no money, he failed to
participate in the bidding. Lot 3 was purchased by Bernardina Manalaysay. llcd
In 1963, with Quirino D. Villena's help, Feliciano Juco was able to obtain financial
assistance from the spouses Leon and Loreta R. Lina to protest against Mariano
Roldan's acquisition of Lot 3. He promised to sell the lot to Lina later. On July 23,
1963, a "Conditional Sale and Transfer of Right to Land" was executed by Juco in
favor of the Lina spouses.
The Lina spouses fenced Lots 3 and 4 and planted fruit trees thereon. Two (2)
years later, a Bilihang Tuluyan was executed by Juco, with his wife's consent, in
favor of Lina. The document was notarized by Teodulo Q. Bernardos (Exh. C) and
registered under Act No. 3344 on September 5, 1972.
Juco lost his protest in the Bureau of Lands, but upon appeal to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, he was, on December 18, 1969, adjudged to
have the preferential right to buy the property (Exh. O). He was given sixty (60)
days from the finality of the decision to file his own application to purchase it, which
he did on August 29, 1971 (Exh. I-Director of Lands). Shortly thereafter, Feliciano
Juco died.
Juco's wife, Pacita Resurreccion, and their children, Jimmy, Nicanor, Beatriz and
Adalia, offered to sell the property to Pompeyo Maliwat who was told about the
proceedings in the Bureau of Lands but not about the earlier sale of the land to the
Lina spouses. He verified from the records that Feliciano Juco did have a
preferential right to the property, so he bought it (Exh. D). He had the deed of sale
registered (Exh. E) and he declared the land for tax purposes in his name. He
placed men on the land to take care of it (pp. 610-613, Rollo.)
Claiming to be the owners in fee simple of Lot 3, PSU-164381, with an area of
169.301 square meters, situated at Barrio Cayambay, Tanay, Rizal, the Maliwats
filed on March 20, 1977 in the Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro Manila, an
application for registration of the land in their names under the Torrens system. It
was docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-7753.
The Director of Lands (now Director of the Land Management Bureau) opposed
the application on the ground that the land is public land.
The Minister of Agrarian Reform also opposed it on the ground that the land is
reserved for agrarian reform.
On November 8, 1972, the Lina spouses filed a motion to dismiss Maliwat's
application for registration of title on the ground that the land is covered by a
homestead application of Loreto R. Lina duly filed and recorded on January 9,
1970 in the District Land Office No. 3 of the Bureau of Lands, and that it is public
land under the administration and disposition of the Director of Lands, not the
court. On April 5, 1973, they amended their opposition. They claimed that they had
purchased the land from Feliciano Juco, and that hence, the title should be
registered in their names.
Another opposition was filed by one Cesar N. Roldan, claiming to be the actual
occupant of the land, that the possession was given to him by the heirs of Feliciano
Juco who died while awaiting the action of the Director of Lands on his application
for a free patent; and that he (Roldan) filed an application (for free patent) in
substitution of the deceased, Feliciano Juco.
On December 26, 1985, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:
"In view of the foregoing, this Court hereby orders and decrees the
registration of the parcel of land subject matter of the present proceeding
and the registration of title thereto in favor of the applicants, Pompeyo
Maliwat and Amelia G. Maliwat, spouses, of age, Filipinos with residence
and postal address at Sta. Mesa, Metro Manila, who are hereby declared
the true and lawful owners in fee simple thereof.
"Upon the finality of this decision, let the corresponding decree of
registration and certificate of title be issued in the name of the applicants."
(pp. 123-124, Rollo.)
The Director of Lands appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV
No. 12601). On March 29, 1990, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court. A motion for reconsideration, filed by the petitioner, was denied, hence,
this petition for review.
The Director of Lands avers that the Court of Appeals erred:
1. in holding that Lot 3, Plan Psu-164381 is private land, despite
overwhelming evidence including the admissions of private respondents'
predecessors-in-interest, that it is a public land.
2. In applying the Bengzon (152 SCRA 369) and Acme (146 SCRA 509)
rulings on the conversion of alienable public land to private property,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that the possession of Lot 3, Psu-
164381 by Feliciano Juco and respondents spouses, Pompeyo Maliwat
and Amelia Maliwat, was not in the concept of owner; and
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied for lack of merit. The decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 12601 is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz and Medialdea, JJ ., concur.
(Director of Land Management v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94525, [January 27,
|||
1992])
28. EN BANC
SYLLABUS
DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J : p
Direct appeal from orders of dismissal of five applications for registration of land
on the ground of res judicata, by order of June 17, 1960, issued by the Court of
First Instance of Baguio City, in its cases Nos. N-40, N-41, N-42, N-43 and N-44.
The fact is uncontroverted that on August 31, 1954, Maglia Cayapa, Nabos
Valenciano, Waldo Kidpalos, Fernandez Kidpalos, and Ipang Lebos Vda. de
Lampacan sued the Baguio Gold Mining Company and the Director of Mines in the
Court of First Instance of Baguio City (Civil Cases Nos. 457, 458, 460, 463 and
549), seeking judgment declaring said plaintiffs to be the owners of certain parcels
of land situated in sitio Binanga, Barrio of Tuding, Municipality of Itogon, Benguet,
Mountain Province; to annul the declaration of location of certain mineral claims of
the Baguio Gold Mining Company, overlapping the parcels claimed by plaintiffs;
and to recover damages from the Company. The complaint also sought to enjoin
the Director of Mines from proceeding with the lode patent applications of the
Mining Company, and to have the mine buildings erected on the land in question
demolished at the latter's expense. The defendant Baguio Gold Mining Company,
claiming title by virtue of valid locations of the claims since 1925 to 1930, asked
for dismissal of the action and damages.
After due trial, the Court of First Instance found that the plaintiffs Cayapa, et al.,
had failed to substantiate their claims of ownership and dismissed the suits. Upon
appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 19628-R to 19632-R), the latter
rendered judgment, on July 31, 1958, finding that the land lay within the Cordillera
Forest Reservation proclaimed by Governor General Stimson, and that it formed
part of the public domain; that from 1927 to 1933, one George Icard and his son,
Joseph, had entered and located therein certain mining claim, subsequently sold
and transferred to the Baguio Gold Mining Company; that the latter had occupied
the land, worked the claims, and performed the acts required by the mining laws
to entitle it to mineral patents therefore until the recent World II; that after the war
the claims were validated by Act No. 4268 of the Philippine Legislature; that the
Mining Company had acquired beneficial title to the claims by its locations,
although the corresponding patents were still in process at the Bureau of Mines;
that "the appellee mining company has acquired a superior title to that of the
plaintiffs-appellants over the mineral claims under litigation" (Rec. App., pp. 186 to
220). Consequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the actions by
the Court of First Instance.
In view of the affirmance of the decision of the trial court by the Court of Appeals,
the plaintiffs-appellants therein resorted to the Supreme Court (G. R. Nos. L-16649
to 16653). The latter, however, declined review in a resolution reading as follows:
"In G. R. Nos. L-16649-53 (Maglia Cayapa vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.), acting on the petition for review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals rendered on July 31,
1958, THE COURT RESOLVED to dismiss the same on
the ground that the issues raised are factual and have no
merit, but without prejudice to the registration proceedings
filed by petitioner before the same court regarding the
properties herein involved, it appearing that the Court of
Appeals, in touching incidentally on the question of
ownership, did so without interfering with the merits of said
registration proceedings". (Italics supplied.)
While the cases were still pending appeal to the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs had
filed in Court the present registration cases. Baguio Gold opposed the registration,
and moved to dismiss the applications. Proceedings were originally held in
abeyance until the appeals in the preceding cases were decided.
The 1960 Supreme Court resolution in L-16649-53 having become final, the
oppositor Baguio Gold Mining Company reiterated its motions to dismiss the
registration cases in the Court of First Instance. The latter dismissed the
applications, and the applicants then directly appealed to this Supreme Court.
They assail the order of dismissal of the Court below claiming that there could not
be res judicata because (1) the 1960 resolution of the Supreme Court dismissing
their petition for review of the Court of Appeals decision in favor of Baguio Gold
Mining Company, contained the reservation "without prejudice to the registration
proceedings filed by petitioner" (which are the cases now at bar); and (2) that the
former judgment's dispositive portion provided only for dismissal of the appellant's
previous complaint against Baguio Gold Mining Company, and it is only this
dispositive portion that is binding on the parties to the former litigation.
It thus appears that appellants do not dispute that the subject matter in the present
registration proceedings is the same land involved in the previous litigation, or that
the parties are the same (the applicants-appellants Lampacan in Registration Case
No. N-44, L.R.C. Record No. N-11914, now G. R. L-19944, being the heirs and
successors of the former plaintiff Ipang Lebos Vda. de Lampacan in the preceding
law suit). It is not denied either that the former judgment of the Court of Appeals
was rendered on the merits of the case.
Neither is it disputable that the causes of action in both cases are identical, since
in both the appellants asserted that they are the sole and exclusive owners of the
land in dispute, allegedly invaded by appellee Baguio Gold Mining Company. While
the former cases were reivindicatory in character and the ones presently before us
are land registration proceedings, such difference in forms of action are irrelevant
for the purposes of res judicata. It is a firmly established rule that a different remedy
sought or a diverse form of action does not prevent the estoppel of the former
adjudication (Peñalosa vs. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303, 322; Juan vs. Go Cotoy, 26 Phil.
328; Chua Tanvs. Del Rosario, 57 Phil. 411; Francisco vs. Blas, 93 Phil. 1;
Sarabia vs. Sec. of Agriculture, 111 Phil. 1081, and cases cited therein). Since
there can be no registration of land without applicant being its owner, the final
judgment of the Court of Appeals in the previous litigation declaring that the mining
company's title is superior to that of appellants should be conclusive on the
question in the present case.
Much reliance is placed by appellants on the statement made in this Court's 1960
resolution declining review of the former judgment of the Court of Appeals,
"without prejudice to the registration proceedings filed by
petitioner before the same court regarding the properties
herein, involved, it appearing that the Court of Appeals in
touching incidentally on the question of ownership, did so
without interfering with the merits of the registration
proceedings."
The words quoted merely establish that the decision in the reivindicatory action
decided by the Court should not be considered as having decided the pending
registration proceedings, since the nature of both proceedings were different, one
being a personal action and the registration being one in rem. The Court of First
Instance could not, in other words, automatically apply the decision of the Court of
Appeals to the registration proceedings. And the reason is plain: the
pronouncements of the judgment in the former case would not necessarily
preclude relitigation of the issues if res judicata is not invoked, since res judicata is
a matter of defense and does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to act on a
second suit between the parties on the same subject matter (cf. Rule 16, sec. 1[f],
Revised Rules of Court). But the defense having been set up in the present
proceedings, the trial court acted properly in considering and resolving the same.
Appellants likewise argue that only the dispositive portion of a judgment concludes
the parties, and the previous adjudication was merely that appellants'
reivindicatory suit should be dismissed. We find this view unduly restrictive of the
salutary rule that issues once previously threshed out and finally adjudicated
should no longer be relitigated between the same parties on the same subject
matter and cause of action. This is the substance of res judicata, without which
multiplicity of actions will be unavoidable. Hence the doctrine is that —
"Under this rule, if the record of the former trial shows that
the judgment could not have been rendered without
deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as
having settled that matter as to all future actions between
the parties, and if a judgment necessarily presupposes
certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment
itself." (30 Am. Jur., p. 930).
Or, as stated in Redden vs. Metzger, 26 Am. St. Rep. 97, 99-100:
". . . The rule of res adjudicata applies as well to facts
settled and adjudicated as to causes of action: Whitaker
vs. Hawley, 30 Kan. 326. The judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive on the parties as to all
points directly involved in it and necessarily
determined: Shirland vs. Union Nat. Bank, 65 Iowa, 96;
Freeman on Judgments, sec. 249.
"When a fact has been once determined in the course of
a judicial proceeding, and a final judgment has been
rendered in accordance therewith, it cannot be again
litigated between the same parties without virtually
impeaching the correctness of the former decision, which,
from motives of public policy, the law does not permit to
be done. The estoppel is not confined to the judgment, but
extends to all facts involved in it as necessary steps, or
the groundwork upon which it must have been founded. It
is allowable to reason back from a judgment to the basis
on which it stands, upon the obvious principle that where
a conclusion is indisputable, and could have been drawn
only from certain premises, the premises are equally
indisputable with the conclusion':Burlen vs. Shannon, 99
Mass. 200; 96 Am. Dec. 733; Board etc. vs. Mineral Point
R. R. Co., 24 Vis. 124; Freeman on Judgments, sec. 257;
Wells on Res Adjudicata, sec. 226; 1 Herman on Estoppel,
sec. 111."
In consonance with the foregoing principles, we hold that the findings in the former
judgment (that the mining claims were validly located and that the title of the mining
company is superior to that of appellants), being the basis of the sentence of
dismissal, conclude the applicants in the present case, the previous adjudication
being final and rendered on the merits, and there being identity of parties, subject
matter and causes of action in all the cases. Hence, the dismissal of these land
registration proceedings by the Court of First Instance of Baguio was in order and
conformable to law.
That at present the law permits registration applicants to proceed on the basis of
30 years' open, adverse, and uninterrupted possession as owner, instead of
requiring, as of yore, continuous adverse possession as owner since 1894, does
not help appellants at all. The vesting of title to the lands in question in the appellee
Baguio Gold Mining Company has effectively interrupted and rendered
discontinuous the possession claimed by applicants.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of dismissal of these
proceedings on the ground of res judicata is affirmed. Appellants shall pay the
costs.
Bengzon, C . J ., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Paredes, Dizon, Regala,
Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ ., concur.
(Kidpalos v. Baguio Gold Mining Co., G.R. No. L-19940, [August 14, 1965], 122
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PHIL 249-256)