Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss and the RTC initially denied Priscillas

motion to dismiss. However, upon her motion for reconsideration, the RTC
1. Priscilla Alma Jose v. Ramon C. Javellana
reversed and granted the motion to dismiss, opining that Javellana had no cause
of action against her; that there was no evidence showing the payment of the
The denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order granting the
balance; that he had never demanded the registration of the land from
defending party’s motion to dismiss is not an interlocutory but a final order
Margarita or Juvenal, or brought a suit for specific performance against
because it puts an end to the particular matter involved, or settles definitely the
Margarita or Juvenal; and that his claim of paying the balance was not credible.
matter therein disposed of, as to leave nothing for the trial court to do other than
to execute the order.[1] Accordingly, the claiming party has a fresh period of 15
Javellana moved for reconsideration, contending that the presentation
days from notice of the denial within which to appeal the denial. [2]
of evidence of full payment was not necessary at that stage of the proceedings.
He attached to the motion for reconsideration the receipts showing the
FACTS:
payments made to Juvenal. He maintained that Priscilla could no longer succeed
to any rights respecting the parcels of land because he had meanwhile acquired
Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita) sold for consideration
absolute ownership of them; and that the only thing that she, as sole heir, had
of P160,000.00 to respondent Ramon Javellana two parcels of land located in
inherited from Margarita was the obligation to register them under the Torrens
Bulacan. They agreed that Javellana would pay P80,000.00 upon the execution
System.[12]
of the deed and the balance of P80,000.00 upon the registration of the parcels of
land under the Torrens System; and that should Margarita become
The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration. Javellana filed a notice
incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal M. Alma Jose (Juvenal), and
of appeal. CA denied the motion for reconsideration, [21] stating that it decided to
her daughter, petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would receive the payment of
give due course to the appeal even if filed out of time because Javellana had no
the balance and proceed with the application for registration.[3]
intention to delay the proceedings, that current jurisprudence afforded litigants
the amplest opportunity to present their cases free from the constraints of
After Margarita died, the vendors undertaking fell on the shoulders of
technicalities, such that even if an appeal was filed out of time, the appellate
Priscilla, being Margaritas sole surviving heir. However, Priscilla did not comply
court was given the discretion to nonetheless allow the appeal for justifiable
with the undertaking to cause the registration of the properties under the
reasons.
Torrens System, and, instead, began to improve the properties by dumping
filling materials with the intention of converting the parcels of land into a
Issues
residential or industrial subdivision. Javellana commenced an action for specific
performance, injunction, and damages against her in the Regional Trial Court in
Priscilla then brought this appeal, averring that the CA thereby erred in
Malolos, Bulacan (RTC).
not outrightly dismissing Javellanas appeal because: (a) RTC order was not
appealable; (b) the notice of appeal had been filed belatedly by three days; and
In Civil Case No. 79-M-97, Javellana averred that upon the execution of
(c) Javellana was guilty of forum shopping for filing in the CA a petition
the deed of conditional sale, he had paid the initial amount of P80,000.00 and
for certiorari to assail the orders of the RTC that were the subject matter of his
had taken possession of the parcels of land; that he had paid the balance of the
appeal pending in the CA. She posited that, even if the CAs decision to entertain
purchase price to Juvenal on different dates upon Juvenals representation that
the appeal was affirmed, the RTCs dismissal of the complaint should
Margarita had needed funds for the expenses of registration and payment of
nonetheless be upheld because the complaint stated no cause of action, and the
real estate tax; and that in 1996, Priscilla had called to inquire about the
action had already prescribed.
mortgage constituted on the parcels of land; and that he had told her then that
the parcels of land had not been mortgaged but had been sold to him.[5]
Ruling
 The petition for review has no merit.
Denial of the motion for reconsideration of the
order of dismissal was a final order and appealable
Priscilla submits that the order of June 21, 2000 was not the proper subject of
an appeal considering that Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides
that no appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion for
reconsideration.
reconsideration referred only to a denial of a motion for reconsideration of an
interlocutory order.[24]
Appeal was made on time pursuant to Neypes v. CA
Priscilla insists that Javellana filed his notice of appeal out of time. His
appeal should have been dismissed for being tardy by three days beyond the
expiration of the reglementary period.

Priscillas submission is erroneous and cannot be sustained. Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

First of all, the denial of Javellanas motion for reconsideration was clearly a final
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be
order, not an interlocutory one. The Court has distinguished between final and
taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or
interlocutory orders in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo,[22] thuswise:
final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record
The distinction between a final order and an
on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment
interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the
or final order.
subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely
to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the
motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for
latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order
reconsideration shall be allowed. (n)
deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is
yet to be held and the judgment
rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a
The Court adopted the fresh period rule in Neypes v. Court of
judgment is
Appeals,[25]by which an aggrieved party desirous of appealing an adverse
interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave
judgment or final order is allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to file
something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits
the notice of appeal in the RTC reckoned from receipt of the order denying a
of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory;
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration, to wit:
otherwise, it is final.
The fresh period rule may be applied to this case, for the Court has
And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines
already retroactively extended the fresh period rule to actions pending and
whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable, but the
undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a
remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action
person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there are no
for certiorari under Rule 65
vested rights in rules of procedure. Consequently, we rule that Javellanas notice
of appeal was timely filed pursuant to the fresh period rule.
Indeed, the Court has held that an appeal from an order denying a
motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment is effectively an appeal
III
from the final order or judgment itself; and has expressly clarified
No forum shopping was committed
that the prohibition against appealing an order denying a motion for

Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against
whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum
seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another
forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action
of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause or supposition that
one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. For
forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same
transaction, same essential facts and circumstances and must
raise identical causes of action, subject matter and issues.
Clearly, it does not exist where different orders were
questioned, two distinct causes of action and issues were
raised, and two objectives were sought.
Should Javellanas present appeal now be held barred by his filing of the
petition for certiorari in the CA when his appeal in that court was yet pending?
In the petition for certiorari, Javellana explicitly averred that his appeal
was inadequate and not speedy to prevent private respondent Alma Jose and
her transferee/assignee xxx from developing and disposing of the subject
property to other parties to the total deprivation of petitioners rights of
possession and ownership over the subject property, and that the dismissal by
the RTC had emboldened private respondents to fully develop the property and
for respondent Alma Jose to file an ejectment case against petitioners overseer
xxx.[35] Thereby, it became far-fetched that Javellana brought the petition
for certiorari in violation of the policy against forum shopping.
2. FREDESVINDO S. ALVERO, petitioner, vs. M.L. DE LA ROSA, Judge of First
Instance of Manila, JOSE . VICTORIANO, and MARGARITA VILLARICA,
respondents.
This is an original petition for certiorari filed in this court.
Respondent Jose R. Victoriano had filed a complaint against petitioner
Fredesvindo S. Alvero and one Margarita Villarica, alleging two causes of action,
to wit, (1) to declare in force the contract of sale, between said. Victoriano and a
Villarica, of two (2) parcels of land in the Manotoc subdivision, Balintawak,
which land was subsequently sold by said Villarica, in favor of petitioner
Fredesvindo S. Alvero, on December 31, 1944, for the sum of P100,000 in
Japanese military notes; and (2) to declare said subsequent sale null and void.
On July 7, 1945, Margarita Villarica filed an answer to said complaint,
expressly admitting having sold said land to Fresdesvindo S. Alvero, for
P100,000, due to the imperative necessity of raising funds with which to
provide for herself and family, and that she did not remember the previous sale;
at the same time, offering to repurchase said land from Fredesvindo S. Alvero in
the sum of P5,000, but that the latter refused to accept the offer. Alvero, in
answering said complaint, denied the allegations made therein, and claimed
exclusive ownership of the land in question.
After the trial of the case before the Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, one of
the respondents in this case, said respondent judge rendered his decision in
favor of Jose R. Victoriano, adjudging to him the title over the property in
question, including all the improvements existing thereon, and dismissed the
counterclaim.
On November 28, 1945, Fredesvindo S. Alvero was notified of said
decision; he filed a petition for reconsideration and new trial, which was denied;
and of said order he was notified on January 7, 1946. Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed
his notice of appeal and record on appeal simultaneously in the lower court,
without filing the P60-appeal bond. Jose R. Victoriano filed a petition to dismiss
the appeal, and at the same time, asked for the execution of the judgment.
Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss,
alleging that on the very same day, January 15, 1946, said appeal bond for P60
had been actually filed, and allege as an excuse, for not filing the said appeal
bond, in due time, the illness of his lawyer's wife, who died on January 10,
1946, and buried the following day.
On January 17, 1946, the respondent judge, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa,
ordered the dismissal of the appeal, declaring that, although the notice of appeal
and record on appeal had been filed in due time, the P60-appeal bond was filed
too late. Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed a petition for the reconsideration of the said
dismissing his appeal; and said petition for reconsideration was denied on
January 29, 1946. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
 According to the computation erroneously made by the court, the last
day for filing and perfecting the appeal, in this case, was January 8, 1946, or
which date, Fredesvindo S. Alvero should have filed his (1) notice of appeal, (2)
record on appeal, and (3) appeal bond. But the P60-appeal bond was filed only
on January 15, 1946.
Failure to perfect the appeal, within the time prescribed by the rules of
court, will cause the judgment to become final, and the certification of the
record on appeal thereafter, cannot restore the jurisdiction which has been lost.
Rules of courts, promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effect of law;
and rules of court prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or
certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the
prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
business. (Shioji vs. Harvey, 43 Phil., 333.)
Strict compliance with the rules of court has been held mandatory and
imperative, so that failure to pay the docket fee in the Supreme Court, within the
period fixed for that purpose, will cause the dismissal of the appeal.
(Salaveria vs. Albindo, 39Phil., 922) Counsel for the petitioner Fredesvindo
Alvero alleges as an excuse, for his failure to perfect and file his appeal, in due
time, the illness of his wife, which ended in her death on January 10, 1946, and
by which he was greatly affected.
It is not, therefore, difficult to understand the state of mind of the
attorney, and his intense devotion and ardent affection towards his dying wife.
But human laws are inflexible and no personal consideration should stand in
the way of performing a legal duty. The attorney for petitioner Fredesvindo S.
Alvero could have asked for an extension of time, within which to file and
perfect his appeal, in the court below; but he had failed to do so, and he must
bear the consequences of his act. A strict observance of the rules of court, which
have been considered indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to
the orderly and speedy dispatch of judicial business, is an imperative necessity.
3. BUSTOS vs. LUCERO G.R. No. L-2068 October 20, 1948/ March 8, 1949
FACTS:
Accused in this case during the preliminary investigation was informed of his
charges and asked whether he pleads guilty or not, the accused entered a plea of
not guilty. His counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that
she and her witnesses can be cross-examined. Fiscal and private prosecutor
objected invoking Sec 11 of Rule 108 which was sustained by the court. In view
thereof, counsel of the accused renounce his right to present evidence. Trial
ensued. Petitioner then filed a motion before CFI Pampanga to remand the
record of the case to the justice of the peace of Masantol, court of origin on the
ground that the petitioner can cross-examine the complainant and witnesses. SC
dismissed his petition citing Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L-
1336:
"The constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses
against him does not apply to preliminary hearings; nor will the absence of a
preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to confront witness. As
a matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely
without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due process
clause to a fair trial." We took this ruling to be ample enough to dispose the
constitutional question pleaded in the application for certiorari. Heeding the
wishes of the petitioner, we shall enlarge upon the subject.
Petitioner then filed his motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner’s contention:
i.Section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court infringes section 13, Article VIII, of
the Constitution.
ii. That said deals with substantive matters and impairs substantive rights.
ISSUE: WoN said rule impairs substantive rights
HELD:NO. Section 11 of Rule 108 is an adjective law and not a substantive law
or substantive right. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two
terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term
which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to
the disturbance of normal relations.
Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates
rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a
cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to
administer;as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the
method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion.
SUNSTANTIVE LAW - declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the
punishment for committing them
PROCEDURAL LAW - law which provides or regulates the steps by which one
who commits a crime is to be punished. Preliminary investigation is eminently
and essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal prosecution. As a
rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural.
Evidence— which is the "the mode and manner of proving the competent facts
and circumstances on which a party relies to establish the fact in dispute in
judicial proceedings"— is identified with and forms part of the method by
which, in private law, rights are enforced and redress obtained, and, in criminal
law, a law transgressor is punished.
Criminal procedure refers to pleading, evidence and practice the entire rules of
evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of Court. We can not tear down
section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the
whole code of evidence embodied in these Rules.
Section 11 of Rule 108. Rights of defendant after arrest.—After the arrest of the
defendant and his delivery to the court, he shall be informed of the complaint or
information filed against him. He shall also be informed of the substance of the
testimony and evidence presented against him, and, if he desires to testify or to
present witnesses or evidence in his favor, he may be allowed to do so. The
testimony of the witnesses need not be reduced to writing but that of the
defendant shall be taken in writing and subscribed by him.
4. Panay Railways v. Heva Management and Development Corporation
FACTS:
Panay Railways Inc., a government-owned and controlled corporation,
executed a Real Estate Mortgage Contract covering several parcels of lands in
favor of Traders Royal Bank (TRB) to secure ₱20 million worth of loan and
credit accommodations. Petitioner failed to pay its obligations to TRB,
prompting the bank to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgaged properties. On
20 January 1986, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of the bank as the
highest bidder and purchaser. Consequently, the sale of Lot No. 6153 was
registered with the Register of Deeds on 28 January 1986 and annotated at the
back of the transfer certificates of title (TCT) covering the mortgaged
properties.
It was only in 1994 that petitioner realized that the extrajudicial
foreclosure included some excluded properties in the mortgage contract. Thus,
on 19 August 1994, it filed a Complaint for Partial Annulment of Contract to Sell
and Deed of Absolute Sale with Addendum; Cancellation of Title No. T-89624;
and Declaration of Ownership of Real Property with Reconveyance plus
Damages.[3]
Meanwhile, respondents filed their respective Motions to Dismiss on
these grounds: (1) petitioner had no legal capacity to sue; (2) there was a
waiver, an abandonment and an extinguishment of petitioners claim or demand;
(3) petitioner failed to state a cause of action; and (4) an indispensable party,
namely TRB, was not impleaded.
On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order[6] granting the Motion to
Dismiss of respondents. On 11 August 1997, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal
without paying the necessary docket fees. Immediately thereafter, respondents
filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground of nonpayment of docket fees.
In its Opposition,[7] petitioner alleged that its counsel was not yet
familiar with the revisions of the Rules of Court that became effective only on 1
July 1997. Its representative was likewise not informed by the court personnel
that docket fees needed to be paid upon the filing of the Notice of Appeal.
Furthermore, it contended that the requirement for the payment of docket
fees was not mandatory. It therefore asked the RTC for a liberal interpretation
of the procedural rules on appeals.
On 29 September 1997, the RTC issued an Order[8] dismissing the
appeal citing Sec. 4 of Rule 41[9] of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner
thereafter moved for a reconsideration of the Order[10] alleging that the trial
court lost jurisdiction over the case after the former had filed the Notice of
Appeal. RTC denied the Motion.[11]
On 28 January 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals (CA)
a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 alleging that the
RTC had no jurisdiction to dismiss the Notice of Appeal, and that the trial
court had acted with grave abuse of discretion when it strictly applied
procedural rules.
 On 29 November 2000, the CA rendered its Decision[12] on the Petition.
It held that the jurisdiction to do so belonged to the CA and not the trial court.
Thus, appellate court ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the appeal and set aside the latters assailed Order dated 29
September 1997.
Thereafter, respondents filed their respective Motions for
Reconsideration.
RULING:
The Petition has no merit. Statutes and rules regulating the procedure
of courts are considered applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the
time of their passage. Procedural laws and rules are retroactive in that sense
and to that extent. The effect of procedural statutes and rules on the rights of a
litigant may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. This
retroactive application does not violate any right of a person adversely affected.
Neither is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule,
no vested right may attach to or arise from procedural laws and rules. It has
been held that a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a
litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or
criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.[16] More so when, as
in this case, petitioner admits that it was not able to pay the docket fees on time.
Clearly, there were no substantive rights to speak of when the RTC dismissed
the Notice of Appeal.
The argument that the CA had the exclusive jurisdiction to dismiss the
appeal has no merit. When this Court accordingly amended Sec. 13 of Rule 41
through A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, the RTCs dismissal of the action may be
considered to have had the imprimatur of the Court. Thus, the CA committed no
reversible error when it sustained the dismissal of the appeal, taking note of its
directive on the matter prior to the promulgation of its Decision.
As early as 1932, in Lazaro v. Endencia,[17] we have held that the
payment of the full amount of the docket fees is an indispensable step for the
perfection of an appeal. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
the payment of the prescribed docket fees.[18] Moreover, the right to appeal is not
a natural right and is not part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege,
which may be exercised only in accordance with the law.[19]
We have repeatedly stated that the term substantial justice is not a
magic wand that would automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural
rules. Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their
non-observance may result in prejudice to a partys substantive rights. Like all
other rules, they are required to be followed, except only for the most
persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve litigants of an
injustice not commensurate with the degree of their thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed.[20]
We cannot consider counsels failure to familiarize himself with the
Revised Rules of Court as a persuasive reason to relax the application of the
Rules. It is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This
principle is based on the rule that any act performed by lawyers within the
scope of their general or implied authority is regarded as an act of the client.
Consequently, the mistake or negligence of the counsel of petitioner may result
in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against it.[21]
5. Felix Martos v. New San Jose Builders
FACTS:
Felix Martos, et al. alleged that on various dates, New San Jose Builders, Inc.
hired them on different positions for its San Jose Plains Project (SJPP), also
known as the "Erap City." Sometime in 2000, New San Jose Builders, Inc. was
constrained to slow down and suspend most of the works on the SJPP project
due to lack of funds of the National Housing Authority. Thus, the workers were
informed that many of them would be laid off and the rest would be reassigned
to other projects. Juan Villaber, Terso Garay, Rowell Batta, Pastor Pantig, Rafael
Villa, and Melvin Garay were laid off. While on the other hand, Felix Martos,
Ariel Dominguez, Greg Bisonia, Allan Caballera, Orlando Limos, Mandy
Mamalateo, Eric Castrence, Anthony Molina, and Roy Silva were among those
who were retained and were issued new appointment papers to their respective
assignments, indicating therein that they are project employees. However, they
refused to sign the appointment papers as project employees and subsequently
refused to continue to work.
On different dates, three (3) Complaints for Illegal Dismissal and for money
claims were filed before the NLRC by the employees.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that Felix Martos (Martos) was illegally dismissed; and 5. MARIA CONSOLACION RIVERA-PASCUAL, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES MARILYN
dismissed the claims of other complainants. Both parties appealed to the NLRC. LIM and GEORGE LIM and the REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF VALENZUELA
The NLRC dismissed San Jose Builders, Inc.s appeal and partially granted the CITY, Respondents.
appeal made by the other complainants.
FACTS:
On appeal to the CA, the CA reversed the NLRC and reinstated the Labor
Arbiters decision. The CA explained that the NLRC committed grave abuse of Subject of the present controversy is a parcel of land with an approximate area
discretion in reviving the complaints of petitioners despite their failure to verify of 4.4 hectares and located at Bignay, Valenzuela City. The property is covered
the same. Out of the 102 complainants, only Martos verified the position paper by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. V-73892, registered in the names of
and his counsel never offered any explanation for his failure to secure the George and Marilyn Lim (Spouses Lim).
verification of the others. With respect to Martos, the CA ruled that he was a
regular employee and his termination was illegal. On September 8, 2004, Maria Consolacion Rivera-Pascual (Consolacion) filed
before the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) for
ISSUES: Region IV-A a petition to be recognized as a tenant of a property located at
Bignay, Valenzuela City against Danilo Deato (Deato). At that time, the property
I. Whether or not the CA is correct in dismissing the complaints filed by those was covered by TCT No. 24759 under Deato s name. During the pendency of the
petitioners who failed to verify their position papers? petition, Deato sold the property to Spouses Lim. The sale was registered on
December 21, 2004 leading to the issuance of TCT No. V-73892 in favor of
HELD: Petition is denied. Spouses Lim. Considering this development, Consolacion filed a motion on
March 3, 2005 to implead Spouses Lim as respondents.3ςrνll
REMEDIAL LAW: verification; liberal construction of the rules
FIRST ISSUE: The Court agrees with the CA. WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

The verification requirement is significant, as it is intended to secure an
assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not
the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the
pleading is filed in good faith. Verification is deemed substantially complied
with when, as in this case, one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth
of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when
matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct. The absence of a proper verification is cause to treat the pleading as
unsigned and dismissible. The liberal construction of the rules may be invoked
in situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a
pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding
and it at least connotes a reasonable attempt at compliance with the rules.
1) Declaring that petitioner is the tenant of the subject landholding by
succession from her deceased father;
2) Declaring respondents spouses George and Marilyn Lim to have subrogated
to the rights and substituted to the obligation of spouses Danilo and Divina
Deato;
3) Ordering the respondents and all persons claiming rights under them to
maintain petitioner in peaceful possession and cultivation of the agricultural
land subject hereof;
4) Declaring petitioner to have the right to exercise the right of redemption of
the subject parcel of agricultural land pursuant to Section 12 of RA 3844 as
amended;
5) Dismissing the petition against Louie Cruz, Fire Force Agency and Danny Boy
Rivera for having no proximate tenurial relationship with the petitioner hence
beyond the jurisdictional ambit of this Office.
On January 21, 2008, Consolacion filed a petition against Spouses Lim and the
Registrar of Deeds of Valenzuela City praying for the issuance of an order
directing Spouses Lim to accept the amount of P10,000,000.00 which she
undertook to tender during the initial hearing, declaring the property
redeemed, and cancelling TCT No. V-73892.8 Consolacion consigned with the
RARAD the amount of P10,000,000.00 on March 3, 2008.9ςrνll
On appeal, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
issued a Decision12 on February 18, 2009 reversing RA Miñas Decision dated
June 2, 2008. On April 13, 2009, Consolacion moved for
reconsideration,14 which the DARAB denied.
SECTION 12 Rule X of the 2003 DARAB Rules provides that a Motion for
Reconsideration shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of
the order, resolution, or decision of the Board or Adjudicator. Records show
that both the petitioner-appellee and her counsel received a copy of the
Decision dated 18 February 2009 on 27 February 2009 and that Legal Officer
Nancy Geocada, the alleged new counsel of the herein petitioner-appellee, filed
the Motion for Reconsideration only on 13 April 2009, clearly the Motion for
Reconsideration was filed beyond the fifteen (15) days (sic) reglementary
period thus the herein Decision has already become final and executory. x x
x.16ςrνll
On June 25, 2009, Consolacion filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court with the CA.17ςrνll
On July 1, 2009, the CA resolved to require Consolacion s counsel to submit
within five (5) days from notice his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) Certificate of Compliance or Exemption and an amended Verification
and Certification Against Non-Forum-Shopping.18 Apparently, Consolacion s
counsel failed to indicate in the petition his MCLE Certificate of Compliance or
Exemption Number as required under Bar Matter No. 1922. Considering the
failure of Consolacion and her counsel to comply, the CA issued a
Resolution19 on October 15, 2009 dismissing the petition.
Consolacion is, before this Court, claiming that the CA s summary dismissal of
her petition on technical grounds is unwarranted. Consolacion invoked
substantial justice against the CA s strict application of the rule requiring her
counsel to note his MCLE Compliance or Exemption Certificate Number and the
rule rendering the jurat of her verification and certification on non-forum-
shopping defective in the absence of the details of any one of her current
identification document issued by an official agency bearing her photograph
and signature. Consolacion alleged that procedural rules or technicalities
are designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and their rigid
application should be avoided if this would frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice.
RULING:
The Court finds no merit in the petition. The Court sees no reversible error
committed by the CA in dismissing Consolacion s petition before it on the
ground of petitioner s unexplained failure to comply with basic procedural
requirements attendant to the filing of a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court. Notably, Consolacion and her counsel remained obstinate
despite the opportunity afforded to them by the CA to rectify their lapses. While
there was compliance, this took place, however, after the CA had ordered the
dismissal of Consolacion s petition and without reasonable cause proffered to
justify its belatedness. Consolacion and her counsel claimed inadvertence and
negligence but they did not explain the circumstances thereof. Absent valid and
compelling reasons, the requested leniency and liberality in the observance of
procedural rules appears to be an afterthought, hence, cannot be granted. The
CA saw no compelling need meriting the relaxation of the rules. Neither does
this Court see any.
This Court will not condone a cavalier attitude towards procedural rules. It is
the duty of every member of the bar to comply with these rules. They are not at
liberty to seek exceptions should they fail to observe these rules and rationalize
their omission by harking on liberal construction.
While it IS the negligence of Consolacion's counsel that led to this unfortunate
result, she is bound by such.
SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner, vs. HON. FRANK E.
LOBRIGO, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
TOPIC: Section 23 of RA 9165, rule-making power of Supreme Court, equal
protection clause
FACTS:
Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165.
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a
Plea Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and,
instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12 (NOTE: should have
been Section 15?) of the same law, with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his
being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug
seized in his possession.
Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining in
all violations of said law violates:
1. The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof;
2. The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section
5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and
3. The principle of separation of powers among the three
equal branches of the government.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it
encroached upon the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules of procedure.
2. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for being
violative of the Constitutional right to equal protection of the law.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: YES
The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is now their exclusive domain and no longer shared
with the Executive and Legislative departments.
The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-
equal branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps
the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the
sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if
they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the
procedural rules promulgated by the Court.
Viewed from this perspective, the Court had rejected previous attempts on the
part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules
of Court (Rules), to wit:
1. Fabian v. Desierto -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman in an administrative disciplinary case should be taken
to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules
instead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in Section
27 of R.A. No. 6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc. – The Cooperative Code provisions on notices
cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from
Payment of Legal Fees; Baguio Market Vendors MultiPurpose
Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes; In
Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from
Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon.
Mangotara, et al. – Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS,
BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt from the payment of
legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) – The first
paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts
except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin an
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as
it contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court
asserted its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of
procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of
government. To reiterate, the Court’s authority to promulgate rules on pleading,
practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of Our
institutional independence.
SECOND ISSUE: UNRESOLVED
The Supreme Court did not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No.
9165 is contrary to the constitutional right to equal protection of the law in
order not to preempt any future discussion by the Court on the policy
considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165.
Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto
or a qualified version thereof, the Court deemed it proper to declare as invalid
the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made
part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for
the purpose.
ADDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT PLEA BARGAINING:
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure
Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for determining whether a rule is
substantive or procedural in nature.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice
and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any
substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is,
the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or
infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If
the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a
substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing
right then the rule deals merely with procedure.
In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates
substantive rights. By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases in all courts that
the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing criminal
charges by agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an
“important,” “essential,” “highly desirable,” and “legitimate” component of the
administration of justice.
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as “a process whereby the
accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the
case subject to court approval.” There is give-and-take negotiation common in
plea bargaining. The essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and
the defense make concessionsto avoid potential losses. Properly administered,
plea bargaining is to be encouragedbecause the chief virtues of the system –
speed, economy, and finality – can benefit the accused, the offended party, the
prosecution, and the court.
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea
bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it
operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for
justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.
No constitutional right to plea bargain
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are
infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor
need not do so if he prefers to go to trial. Under the present Rules, the
acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on
the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, which is a condition
precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included
in the offense charged. The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control
of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the
proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on
hand can sustain.
Plea bargaining, when allowed
Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to
the point when the prosecution already rested its case.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court’s exercise
of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof.
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail
hearing or after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea
only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the
guilt of the crime charged. The only basis on which the prosecutor and the court
could rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could be
nothing more and nothing less than the evidence on record. The ruling on the
motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution’s evidence.
Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, the judge’s
acceptance of the defendant’s change of plea is improper and irregular.
2. In the Matter of the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo
in Favor of Lilibeth O. Ladaga vs. Maj. Gen. Reynaldo Mapagu, G.R.
No. 189689-91, November 13, 2012
Facts:
human rights lawyer.
The Petitioners assert that the OB List is really a military hit-list as
allegedly shown by the fact that there have already been three victims of
extrajudicial killing whose violent deaths can be linked directly to the OB List.
On June 16, 2009 filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Amparo. The RTC subsequently issued separate Writs of Amparo,
directing the respondents to file a verified written return.
In the return of the respondents, they denied authorship of the OB List,
and alleged that petitioners failed to show that they were responsible for the
alleged threats.
After submission of the parties’ respective Position Papers, the RTC
issued Orders finding no substantial evidence to show that the perceived threat
to petitioners’ life, liberty and security was attributable to the unlawful act or
omission of the respondents. The privilege of the Writ was therefore denied.

Petitioners share the common circumstance of having their names

Issues:
included in what is alleged to be a JCICC “AGILA” 3rd Quarter 2007 Order
WON the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof required under
of Battle Validation Result of the Philippine Army's 10th Infantry
the Writ of Amparo.
Division (10th ID). They perceive that by the inclusion of their names in the
said Order of Battle (OB List), they become easy targets of unexplained
Held:
disappearances or extralegal killings – a real threat to their life, liberty
No, the evidence does not satisfy degree of proof for the issuance of the
and security.
Writ of Amparo. The Writ of Amparo was promulgated by the Court pursuant to
ATTY. LILIBETH O. LADAGA (Atty. Ladaga), first came to know of the
its rule-making powers in response to the alarming rise in the number of cases
existence of the OB List from an undisclosed source on May 21, 2009. In the OB
of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. It is an extraordinary
List, it was reflected that the ULTIMATE GOAL is to TRY TO OUST PGMA ON 30
remedy intended to address violations of, or threats to, the rights to life, liberty
NOV 2007.
or security and that, being a remedy of extraordinary character, is not one to
On the other hand, Atty. Angela Librado-Trinidad (Atty. Librado-
issue on amorphous or uncertain grounds but only upon reasonable certainty.
Trinidad), delivered a privileged speech before the members of the
Justifying allegations must support the issuance of the writ, on the following
Sangguniang Panlungsod to demand the removal of her name from said OB List.
matters:
The Commission on Human Rights, for its part, announced the conduct of its
1. The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
own investigation into the matter.
2. The name and personal circumstances of the respondent
According to Atty. Librado-Trinidad, in the course of the performance
responsible for the threat, act or omission;
of her dutites and functions, she has not committed any act against national
3. The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party
security that would justify the inclusion of her name in the said OB List. She said
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
that sometime in May 2008, two suspicious-looking men tailed her vehicle.
omission of the respondent and how such threat or violation is
Also, on June 23, 2008 three men tried to barge into their house
committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in
Meanwhile, Atty. Carlos Isagani T. Zarate was informed that he was
supporting affidavits;
also included on the OB List. In his petition, he alleged that the inclusion of his
4. The investigation conducted specifying the names, personal
name in the said OB List was due to his advocacies as a public interest or
circumstances and addresses of the investigating authority or
 individuals;
5. Actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the
fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of
the person responsible for the threat, act or omission;
6. The relief prayed for.
Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the parties shall establish their
claims by substantial evidence, and if the allegations in the petition are proven
by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such
reliefs as may be proper and appropriate
Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Petitioners
sought to prove that the inclusion of their names in the OB List presented a real
threat to their security by attributing the violent deaths of the other known
activists to the inclusion of their names or the names of their militant
organizations in the subject OB List. However, the existence of the OB List could
not be directly associated with the menacing behaviour of suspicious men or the
violent deaths of certain personalities.
The Petitioners cannot assert that the inclusion of their names in the
OB List is as real a threat as that which brought ultimate harm to the other
victims without corroborative evidence from which it can be presumed that the
suspicious deaths of these three people were in fact, on account of their militant
affiliations.
The Petitioners therefore were not able to prove by substantial
evidence that there was an actual threat to their rights to life, liberty and
security. The mere inclusion of their names in the OB List is not sufficient
enough evidence for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo.
3. United Claimants Association of NEA Vs National Electrification
Administration
(Topic: Principle of Judicial Hierarchy)
The Facts
Petitioners are former employees of NEA who were terminated from
their employment with the implementation of the assailed resolutions.
Respondent NEA is a government-owned and/or controlled corporation. Under
PD 269, Section 5(a)(5), the NEA Board is empowered to organize or reorganize
NEAs staffing structure.
Thereafter, in order to enhance and accelerate the electrification of
the whole country, including the privatization of the National Power
Corporation, Republic Act No. (RA) 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power
Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA Law), was enacted.. The law imposed upon
NEA additional mandates in relation to the promotion of the role of rural
electric cooperatives to achieve national electrification.
The Rules and Regulations to implement RA 9136 were issued. Under
Sec. 3(b)(ii), Rule 33 of the Rules and Regulations, all the NEA employees and
officers are considered terminated and the 965 plantilla positions of NEA
vacant.
Meanwhile, former President Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo issued
Executive Order No. 119 directing the NEA Board to submit a reorganization
plan. Thus, the NEA Board issued the assailed resolutions. The Department of
Budget and Management approved the NEA Termination Pay Plan.
Thereafter, the NEA implemented an early retirement program
denominated as the Early Leavers Program. The other employees of NEA were
terminated effective December 31, 2003.
The Issues
a. W/N petitioners violated the principle of Hierarchy of courts in filing
this petition to the SC instead of RTC (NO)
b. W/N Injunction is improper in this case given that the assailed
resolutions of the NEA Board have long been implemented (NO)
c. Whether the NEA Board had the power to pass Resolution Nos. 46 and
59 terminating all of its employees. (YES)
d. W/N the NEA Board acted in Bad faith (NO)
The Courts Ruling
This Court Has Jurisdiction over the Case
Respondents essentially argue that petitioners violated the principle of
hierarchy of courts, pursuant to which the instant petition should have been
filed with the Regional Trial Court first rather than with this Court directly.
Primarily, although this Court, the Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence does not give the
petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court
forum. In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,
citing People v. Cuaresma, this Court made the
following pronouncements:
This Courts original jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is
shared by this Court with Regional Trial
Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This
concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to
be taken as according to parties seeking any
of the writs an absolute, unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which
application therefor will be directed. There is
after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy
is determinative of the venue of appeals, and
also serves as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for
that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level
(inferior) courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court, and those against the
latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct
invocation of the Supreme Courts original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is
[an] established policy. It is a policy necessary
to prevent inordinate demands upon the
Courts time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-
crowding of the Courts docket. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Evidently, the instant petition should have been filed with the RTC. However, as
an exception to this general rule, the principle of hierarchy of courts may be set
aside for special and important reasons. Such reason exists in the instant case
involving as it does the employment of the entire plantilla of NEA, more than
700 employees all told, who were effectively dismissed from employment in one
swift stroke. This to the mind of the Court entails its attention.
Moreover, the Court has made a similar ruling in National Power Corporation
Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC-DAMA) v. National Power Corporation
(NPC).[2] In that case, the NPC-DAMA also filed a petition for injunction directly
with this Court assailing NPC Board Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002-125.
Despite such apparent disregard of the principle of hierarchy of courts, the
petition was given due course. We perceive no compelling reason to treat the
instant case differently.
The Remedy of Injunction Is still Available
Respondents allege that the remedy of injunction is no longer available to
petitioners inasmuch as the assailed NEA Board resolutions have long been
implemented.
Taking respondents above posture as an argument on the untenability
of the petition on the ground of mootness, petitioners contend that the principle
of mootness is subject to exceptions, such as when the case is of
transcendental importance.
In Funa v. Executive Secretary, the Court ruled that the case was an
exception to the principle of mootness and that the remedy of injunction was
still available, explaining thus:
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to
present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical
use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such
case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. However, as we held
in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, supervening events,
 whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from
rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the
Constitution. Even in cases where supervening events had
made the cases moot, this Court did not hesitate to resolve the
legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench, bar, and public.
As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to
enjoin acts already done. However, as an exception to the
rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise
moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading
review.(Emphasis supplied.)
Similarly, in the instant case, while the assailed resolutions of the NEA
Board may have long been implemented, such acts of the NEA Board may well
be repeated by other government agencies in the reorganization of their offices.
Petitioners have not lost their remedy of injunction.
The Power to Reorganize Includes the Power to Terminate
Under Rule 33, Section 3(b)(ii) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
the EPIRA Law, all NEA employees shall be considered legally terminated with
the implementation of a reorganization program pursuant to a law enacted by
Congress or pursuant to Sec. 5(a)(5) of PD 269 through which the
reorganization was carried out.
In Betoy v. The Board of Directors, National Power Corporation, the Court
explained:
[R]eorganization involves the reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of
economy or redundancy of functions. It could result in the
loss of ones position through removal or abolition of an
office. However, for a reorganization for the purpose of
economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient to be
valid, it must pass the test of good faith; otherwise, it is void
ab initio. (Emphasis supplied.)
Evidently, the termination of all the employees of NEA was within the
NEA Boards powers and may not successfully be impugned absent proof of bad
faith.
Petitioners Failed to Prove that the NEA Board Acted in Bad Faith
In alleging bad faith, petitioners cite RA 6656, particularly its Sec. 2,
subparagraphs (b) and (c). Petitioners have the burden to show that: (1) the
abolished offices were replaced by substantially the same units performing the
same functions; and (2) incumbents are replaced by less qualified personnel.
Petitioners failed to prove such facts. Mere allegations without hard evidence
cannot be considered as clear and convincing proof. Evidently, the fact that the
NEA Board resorted to terminating all the incumbent employees of NPC and,
later on, rehiring some of them, cannot, on that ground alone, vitiate the bona
fides of the reorganization.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
4. EMMANUEL A. DE CASTRO vs. EMERSON S. CARLOS,
TOPIC: Hierarchy of courts
The Facts
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed petitioner as Asst. General
Manager for operations of MMDA. Atty. Francis N. Tolentino, chairperson of the
MMDA, designated Corazon B. Cruz as officer-in-charge (OIC) of the Office of the
AGMO. Petitioner was then reassigned to the Legal and Legislative Affairs Office,
Office of the General Manager. The service vehicle and the office space
previously assigned to him were withdrawn and assigned to other employees.
Subsequently, Chairperson Tolentino designated respondent as OIC of the Office
of the AGMO by virtue of Memorandum Order No. 24,6 which in turn cited OP
Memorandum Circular No. 2 as basis. Thereafter, the name of petitioner was
stricken off the MMDA payroll, and he was no longer paid his salary.
Petitioner was later offered the position of Director IV of MMDA Public Health
and Safety Services and/or MMDA consultant. He turned down the offer,
claiming that it was a demotion in rank.

Petitioner demanded payment of his salary and reinstatement in the monthly
payroll. For his failure to obtain an action or a response from MMDA, he then
made a formal demand for his reinstatement as AGMO through a letter
addressed to the Office of the President. However, President Benigno S. Aquino
III (President Aquino) appointed respondent as the new AGMO of the MMDA.
Hence, the instant Petition.
ISSUES
W/N Petitioner violated the principle of hierarchy of courts (YES)
W/N Emmanuel De Castro was illegally dismissed (NO)
THE COURT’S RULING
Hierarchy of Courts
Respondent likewise raises the issue of procedural infirmity in the direct
recourse to the Supreme Court by petitioner, who thereby failed to adhere to
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
As to the procedural issue, petitioner submits that a direct recourse to this
Court is warranted by the urgent demands of public interest, particularly the
veritable need for stability in the civil service and the protection of the rights of
civil servants. Moreover, considering that no other than the President of the
Philippines is the appointing authority, petitioner doubts if a trial court judge or
an appellate court justice, with a prospect of promotion in the judiciary would
be willing to go against a presidential appointment.
A direct invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction is allowed only when there are
special and important reasons that are clearly and specifically set forth in a
petition.19 The rationale behind this policy arises from the necessity of
preventing (1) inordinate demands upon the time and attention of the Court,
which is better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction; and
(2) further overcrowding of the Court’s docket.20
In this case, petitioner justified his act of directly filing with this Court only
when he filed his Reply and after respondent had already raised the procedural
infirmity that may cause the outright dismissal of the present Petition.
Petitioner likewise cites stability in the civil service and protection of the rights
of civil servants as rationale for disregarding the hierarchy of courts.
Petitioner’s excuses are not special and important circumstances that would
allow a direct recourse to this Court. More so, mere speculation and doubt to the
exercise of judicial discretion of the lower courts are not and cannot be valid
justifications to hurdle the hierarchy of courts. Thus, the Petition must be
dismissed.
Nature of the AGMO Position
An AGMO performs functions that are managerial in character; exercises
management over people, resource, and/or policy; and assumes functions like
planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, and overseeing the
activities of MMDA. The position requires the application of managerial or
supervisory skills necessary to carry out duties and responsibilities involving
functional guidance, leadership, and supervision.
For the foregoing reasons, the position of AGMO is within the coverage of the
CES.
In relation thereto, positions in the career service, for which appointments
require examinations, are grouped into three major levels:35
Entrance to different levels requires corresponding civil service eligibilities.36
Those at the third level (CES positions) require career service executive
eligibility (CSEE) as a requirement for permanent appointment.37
Evidently, an AGMO should possess all the qualifications required by third-level
career service within the CES. In this case, petitioner does not have the required
eligibility. Therefore, we find that his appointment to the position of AGMO was
merely temporary.
Security of tenure in the career executive service, which presupposes a
permanent appointment, takes place upon passing the CES examinations
administered by the CES Board x x x.
Petitioner undisputedly lacked CES eligibility. Thus, he did not hold the position
of AGMO in a permanent capacity or acquire security of tenure in that position.
Otherwise stated, his appointment was temporary and "co-terminus with the
appointing authority."39 In Carillo v. CA,40 this Court ruled that "one who holds
a temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his employment can be
terminated at the pleasure of the appointing power, there being no need to
show that the termination is for cause." Therefore, we find no violation of
security of tenure when petitioner was replaced by respondent upon the latter’s
appointment to the position of AGMO by President Aquino.
5. United Claimants Association Of NEA Vs NEA
(Topic: transcendental importance)
Facts: Same facts with number 3
Issue:
W/N Injunction is improper in this case given that the assailed resolutions of
the NEA Board have long been implemented
The Courts Ruling : Read the ruling on number 3 entitled “The Remedy of
Injunction Is still Available”
6. Philippine Sinter Corporation And Phividec Industrial Authority,
Vs. Cagayan Electric Power And Light Co., Inc.
On January 21, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino and her Cabinet approved a
Cabinet Reform Policy for the power sector and issued a Cabinet Memorandum,
Item No. 2 of which provides:
“Continue direct connection for industries authorized under the BOI-
NPC Memorandum of Understanding of 12 January 1981, until such
time as the appropriate regulatory board determines that direct
connection of industry to NPC is no longer necessary in the franchise
area of the specific utility or cooperative. Determination shall be based
in the utility or cooperatives meeting the standards of financial and
technical capability with satisfactory guarantees of non-prejudice to
industry to be set in consultation with NPC and relevant government
agencies and reviewed periodically by the regulatory board.”
(emphasis ours).
Pursuant to such Cabinet Memorandum, respondent CEPALCO grantee of a
legislative franchise to distribute electric power to the municipalities of
Villanueva, Jasaan and Tagoloan, and the city of Cagayan de Oro, all of the
province of Misamis Oriental, filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) a
petition entitled “In Re: Petition for Implementation of Cabinet Policy Reforms
in the Power Sector”
The petition sought the “discontinuation of all existing direct supply of power
by the National Power Corporation (NPC, now NAPOCOR) within CEPALCO’s
franchise area.”
The ERB issued a notice of public hearing which was published in the
Newspapers and posted in the affected areas. After hearing, the ERB rendered a
decision granting the petition.
NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration, which the ERB denied. Thereafter,
NAPOCOR filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On October 9,
1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, holding that the motion for
reconsideration filed by NAPOCOR with the ERB was out of time and therefore,
the assailed decision became final and executory and could no longer be subject
of a petition for review.

On a petition for review on certiorari, this Court affirmed the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals. Judgment was entered on September 22, 1993, thus rendering
final the Decision of ERB.
To implement the decision in ERB Case No. 89-430,
CEPALCO wrote Philippine Sinter Corporation (PSC), petitioner, and advised the
latter of its desire “to have the power supply of PSC, directly taken from NPC
(NAPOCOR), disconnected, cut and transferred” to CEPALCO. PSC is an entity
operating its business within the PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate. The Estate is
managed and operated by the PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority (PIA).
PSC refused CEPALCO’s request, citing its contract for power supply with
NAPOCOR effective until July 26, 1996.
To restrain the execution of the ERB Decision, PSC and PIA filed a complaint for
injunction against CEPALCO with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro
City, Branch 17, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-186 They alleged, inter alia, that
there exists no legal basis to cut-off PSC’s power supply with NAPOCOR and
substitute the latter with CEPALCO since: (a) there is a subsisting contract
between PSC and NAPOCOR; (b) the ERB decision is not binding on PSC since it
was not impleaded as a party to the case; and (c) PSC is operating within the
PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate, a franchise area of PIA, not CEPALCO, pursuant to
Sec. 4 (1) of P.D. 538. Moreover, the execution of the ERB decision would cause
PSC a 2% increase in its electrical bills.
On April 11, 1994, the trial court rendered judgment favor of PSC and PIA.
CEPALCO filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the trial Court in
its order dated December 13, 1994. Aggrieved, CEPALCO appealed to the Court
of Appeals. On July 23, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision to sets
aside the decision of RTC and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction.
PSC and PIA filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a
Resolution dated December 2, 1996. Hence the instant petition.
ISSUE:
1. WON RTC Cagayan de Oro has the power to restrain the decision of
ERB.
2. WON injunction lies against the final and executory judgment of the
ERB.
HELD:
1. NO
Corollarily, Section 10 of Executive Order No. 172 (the law creating the ERB)
provides that a review of its decisions or orders is lodged in the Supreme Court.
Settled is the rule that where the law provides for an appeal from the decisions
of administrative bodies to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, it means
that such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts in terms of rank
and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter. Hence, the trial court,
being co-equal with the ERB, cannot interfere with the decision of the latter. It
bears stressing that this doctrine of non-interference of trial
2. NO
Clearly, an injunction to stay a final and executory decision is unavailing except
only after a showing that facts and circumstances exist which would render
execution unjust or inequitable, or that a change in the situation of the parties
occurred. Here, no such exception exists as shown by the facts earlier narrated.
To disturb the final and executory decision of the ERB in an injunction suit is to
brazenly disregard the rule on finality of judgments.
OMICTIN V. CA
GR No. 148004 January 22, 2007
J. Azcuna
FACTS:
Petition for certiorari with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction seeking
the nullification of the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals.
Vincent E. OMICTIN, Operations Manager Ad Interim of Saag Phils. Inc. filed a
complaint for two counts of estafa against George I. LAGOS. He alleged that
LAGOS, despite repeated demands, refused to return the two company vehicles
entrusted to him when he was still the president of Saag Phils. Inc.
However, LAGOS assailed that he retained his possession of the office
equipment of the company in a fiduciary capacity as director of the corporation
pending its dissolution and/or the resolution of the intra-corporate dispute
filed with the SEC. As such, he filed a motion to suspend proceedings on the
basis of a prejudicial question because of a pending petition with the SEC.
LAGOS had filed with the SEC a petition for the declaration of nullity of the
respective appointments of ALEX Y. TAN and petitioner OMICTIN as President
Ad Interim and Operations Manager Ad Interim of Saag Phils., Inc.. He stressed
that TAN’s appointment was invalid because it was in derogation of the
company by-laws requiring that the president must be chosen from among the
directors, and elected by the affirmative vote of a majority of all the members of
the board of directors. As Tan’s appointment did not have the acquiescence of
the board of directors, PETITIONER’S APPOINTMENT BY THE FORMER IS
LIKEWISE ALLEGEDLY INVALID. Thus, neither has the power or the authority
to represent or act for SAAG PHILS., Inc. in any transaction or action before the
SEC or any court of justice.
The RTC of Makati denied LAGOS’ motion to suspend proceedings and motion to
recuse.
LAGOS therefore filed with the CA a petition for certiorari assailing the
aforesaid orders. CA modified the RTC ruling and GRANTED LAGOS’ motion to
suspend proceedings because A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION EXISTS IN THE SEC
CASE. BUT the denial of the motion to recuse was AFFIRMED.
Petitioner OMICTIN questioned the CA decision alleging grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and elevates the case to
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
 1. WON a prejudicial question exists to warrant the suspension of the
criminal proceedings pending the resolution of the intra-corporate
controversy that was originally filed with the SEC.
2. WON SEC has the primary jurisdiction over the case.
RULINGS:
1. YES.
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case, the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal. Here, the case which was lodged originally
before the SEC and which was pending before the RTC of Mandaluyong City by
virtue of Republic Act No. 8799 involves facts that are intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution was based.
According to the SC, the resolution of the issues raised in the intra-corporate
dispute will determine the guilt or innocence of private respondent in the crime
of estafa filed against him by petitioner before the RTC of Makati. As correctly
stated by the CA, one of the elements of the crime of estafa with abuse of
confidence under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code is a demand
made by the offended party to the offender:
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence under subdivision No. 1, par.
(b) of Art. 315 are as follows:
1. That money, goods, or other personal property be received by the offender in
trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same;
2. That there be misrepresentation or conversion of such money or property by
the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt;
3. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and
4. That there is a demand made by the offended party to the offender.15
The SC further ruled that under the circumstances, since the alleged offended
party is Saag Phils., Inc., the validity of the demand for the delivery of the
subject vehicles rests upon the authority of the person making such a demand
on the company’s behalf. Private respondent is challenging petitioner’s
authority to act for Saag Phils., Inc. in the corporate case pending before the RTC
of Mandaluyong, Branch 214. Taken in this light, if the supposed authority of
petitioner is found to be defective, it is as if no demand was ever made, hence,
the prosecution for estafa cannot prosper.
Moreover, the mere failure to return the thing received for safekeeping or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to deliver or to return the same or deliver the value thereof to the owner
could only give rise to a civil action and does not constitute the crime of estafa.
This is because the crime is committed by misappropriating or converting
money or goods received by the offender under a lawful transaction
2. NO.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction states that the court cannot or will not
determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of
the administrative tribunal prior to resolving the same, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring special
knowledge, experience and services in determining technical and intricate
matters of fact.
Although the above doctrine refers specifically to an administrative tribunal, the
SC believed that the circumstances in the instant case did not proscribe the
application of the doctrine, as the role of an administrative tribunal such as the
SEC in determining technical and intricate matters of special competence has
been taken on by specially designated RTCs by virtue of Republic Act No. 8799.
Hence, the RTC of Mandaluyong where the intra-corporate case is pending has
the primary jurisdiction to determine the issues under contention relating to
the status of the domestic corporation, Saag Phils., Inc., vis-à-vis Saag Pte. Ltd.;
and the authority of petitioner to act on behalf of the domestic corporation, the
determination of which will have a direct bearing on the criminal case. The law
recognizes that, in place of the SEC, the regular courts now have the legal
competence to decide intra-corporate disputes.
REPUBLIC V. LACAP/ GR. No. 158253 March 2, 2007
J. Austia-Martinez
FACTS:
The District Engineer of Pampanga issued and duly published an "Invitation To
Bid" dated January 27, 1992. LACAP, doing business under the name and style
Carwin Construction and Construction Supply was pre-qualified together with
two other contractors. Since LACAP submitted the lowest bid, he was awarded
the contract for the concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare.
On October 29, 1992, personnel of the Office of the District Engineer of San
Fernando, Pampanga conducted a final inspection of the project and found it
100% completed in accordance with the approved plans and specifications.
Thereafter, LACAP sought to collect payment for the completed project. The
DPWH prepared the Disbursement Voucher in favor of LACAP. However, the
DPWH withheld payment from LACAP after the District Auditor of the
Commission on Audit (COA) disapproved the final release of funds on the
ground that the contractor’s license of LACAP had expired at the time of the
execution of the contract.
Nonetheless, DPWH Legal Department opined that since Republic Act No. 4566
(R.A. No. 4566), otherwise known as the Contractor’s License Law, does not
provide that a contract entered into after the license has expired is void and
there is no law which expressly prohibits or declares void such contract, the
contract is enforceable and payment may be paid, without prejudice to any
appropriate administrative liability action that may be imposed on the
contractor and the government officials or employees concerned. Thus, it
recommended that payment should be made to Carwin Construction.
However, no payment was made as such LACAP filed the complaint for Specific
Performance and Damages against the Republic as represented by the DPWH.
The DPWH through the OSG filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the nature of the action since respondent did not appeal to the
COA the decision of the District Auditor to disapprove the claim.
ISSUE:
WON it is the COA which has the primary jurisdiction to resolve respondent’s
money claim against the government.
RULING:
No.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction states that courts cannot or will not
determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of
the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact.
However, as per the SC, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
and the corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound
public policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are
many accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of
the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is
patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make
the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely
legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where
judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and
irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i)
when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
(k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto
proceedings.
Exceptions (c) and (e) are applicable to the present case.
The SC held that notwithstanding the legal opinion rendered by the DPWH Legal
Department that payment to a contractor was proper; the LACAP remained
unpaid for the completed work despite repeated demands. Clearly, there was
unreasonable delay and official inaction to the great prejudice of respondent.
Therefore the Court held that, in view of exceptions (c) and (e), the complaint
for specific performance and damages was not prematurely filed and within the
jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve, despite the failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.
ABAD et.al v. RTC of Manila et. Al
GR No. L-65505 October 12, 1987
J. Paras
FACTS:
Abad et. al filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila against
Philippine American General Insurance Company, Inc. (PHILAMGEN) for the
enforcement of contract and recovery of loss of money basically praying for,
among other things, payment of the money value of the respective accumulated
sick leave with pay of the separated employees of respondent company either
thru retirement, retrenchment or resignation. Instead of filing an answer
thereto, PHILAMGEN moved to dismiss the complaint, which the trial court
granted in its order.
After a denial of their motion to reconsider, the petitioners filed before the
Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari. The case was numbered as GR No
50563. A decision was rendered by the Supreme Court reinstating the
dismissed complaint and directed the lower court to conduct further
proceedings.
The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Unfortunately
fire destroyed the sala wherein the entire records of Civil case No. 117708 were
kept. However, the records of the case were reconstituted and the case was
renumbered as Civil Case No. 82-1324.
Thereafter, respondent Philamgen filed its Answer to the complaint.
On January, 1983, judicial reorganization took place by the passage of Executive
Order No. 864 and the case at bar was re-raffled to respondent Regional Trial
Court of Manila, which was presided over by Judge David G. Nitafan. Respondent
court motu proprio, dismissed the complaint, declaring that it lacked
jurisdiction over the subject made being money claims arising from employer-
employee relations. The RTC held that petitioners must pursue their claims
before the appropriate administrative machineries in the Ministry of Labor &
Employment.
Motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by respondent judge.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila
has the jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling: NO.
Section 1 of Executive Order No. 864 provides for the abolition of the Courts of
First Instance based on Batasan Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judicial
Reorganization Act. With the abolition of the Court of First Instance-which was
held in G.R. No. 50563 as having jurisdiction over the case, the jurisdiction of
said court was abolished with it.
The SC opined that the postulate that once jurisdiction is acquired by a court,
the same lasts until the termination of the case, notwithstanding changes in the
law on jurisdiction did not apply to this case because it was the court itself
which acquired initial jurisdiction that was abolished so that there is no more
court to continue exercising such initially acquired jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the SC held that one of the important features in the Judiciary
Reorganization effected through B.P. 129 is the addition of paragraph (6) of Sec.
19, in defining the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts (which took the place of
the abolished Courts of First Instance), which read as follows:
In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or
body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. (emphasis supplied).
This provision was not found in Sec. 44 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
It was the intention of the legislative body to unclutter the courts of cases which
may be adjudicated, in the first instance, by officials or bodies exercising quasi-
judicial adjudicatory powers like the Labor Arbiters or the National Labor
Relations Commission a specialized body or bodies on labor related provisions
and are not restricted by the technical rules of pleading and evidence.
The Regional Trial Courts of today are actually the same courts that functioned
as Courts of First Instance before the Judiciary Reorganization Act (Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129). There might have been a change in the name and in
some incidental features but essentially, they are the same.
However, whereas before jurisdiction over money claims of laborers and Summons for the Unlawful Detainer Complaint was served on Henry Bobiles,
employees appertained to Courts of First Instance, the same are now to be taken quality control supervisor of Hertz, who complied with the telephone
cognizance of by proper entities in the Department of Labor and Employment. instruction of manager Rudy Tirador to receive the Summons.

The rule of adherence of jurisdiction until a cause is finally resolved or
adjudicated does not apply when the change in jurisdiction is curative in
character. Thus in the instant case, there is nothing wrong in holding that Courts
of First Instance /Regional Trial Courts no longer have jurisdiction over
aforesaid monetary claims of labor.
OPTIMA REALTY CORP. v. HERTZ
GR No. 183035 January 9, 2013
J. Sereno
Fourteen (14) days after service of the Summons, Hertz filed a Motion for Leave
of Court to file Answer with Counterclaim and to Admit Answer with
Counterclaim (Motion for Leave to File Answer). In that Motion, Hertz stated
that, "in spite of the defective service of summons, it opted to file the instant
Answer with Counterclaim with Leave of Court." In the same Motion, it likewise
prayed that, in the interest of substantial justice, the Answer with Counterclaim
attached to the Motion for Leave to File Answer should be admitted regardless
of its belated filing, since the service of summons was defective.

The MeTC rendered a Decision, ruling that petitioner Optima had established its
FACTS:
right to evict Hertz from the subject premises due to nonpayment of rentals and
the expiration of the period of lease.
OPTIMA is engaged in the business of leasing and renting out commercial
spaces and buildings to its tenants. It entered into a Contract of Lease with
Hertz appealed the MeTC’s Decision to the RTC. But, the RTC affirmed it by
HERTZ over a 131-square-meter office unit and a parking slot in the Optima
dismissing the appeal in a Decision and further denied the MR of its assailed
Building for a period of three years, however the parties amended their lease
Decision.
agreement by shortening the lease period to two years and five months.

Hertz thereafter filed a verified Rule 42 Petition for Review on Certiorari with
Renovations in the Optima Building were made to which HERTZ alleged that it
the CA. The CA ruled thatthe MeTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person
experienced a 50% drop in monthly sales and a significant decrease in its
of respondent Hertz. The appellate court thereafter reversed the RTC and
personnel’s productivity. It then requested a 50% discount on its rent. OPTIMA
remanded the case to the MeTC to ensure that its Sheriff properly serve
granted the request but HERTZ still failed to pay its rentals and utility bills.
summons to only those persons listed in Sec. 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure in order that the MTC could acquire jurisdiction over the person of
Nonetheless, OPTIMA wrote another letter to Hertz, reminding that their
the defendant corporation HERTZ.
contract could only be renewed by a new negotiation between them. But HERTZ
did not reply to such. With this, OPTIMA informed respondent the non-renewal
ISSUE:
of the lease upon expiration.
WON the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent
Hertz.
Optima, through counsel, wrote Hertz a letter requiring the latter to surrender
and vacate the leased premises in view of the expiration of the Contract of
RULING:
Lease. Hertz, however, refused to vacate the leased premises. As a result,
YES.
Optima was constrained to file before the MeTC a Complaint for Unlawful
Detainer and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or
The SC ruled that the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction (Unlawful Detainer Complaint) against Hertz.
Hertz.
In civil cases, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be acquired
either by service of summons or by the defendant’s voluntary appearance in
court and submission to its authority.
In this case, the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz
by reason of the latter’s voluntary appearance in court.
In the case of Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy, the SC
held that:
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by
the coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary
appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative
relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason
of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to
admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default
judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is
considered voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction. This, however, is
tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who
makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction
over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on
voluntary appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative
relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution. (Emphases supplied)
In this case, the records showed that the following statement appeared in
respondent’s Motion for Leave to File Answer:
In spite of the defective service of summons, the defendant opted to file the
instant Answer with Counterclaim with Leave of Court, upon inquiring from the
office of the clerk of court of this Honorable Court and due to its notice of
hearing on March 29, 2005 application for TRO/Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction was received on March 26, 2006. (Emphasis supplied).
Furthermore, the Answer with Counterclaim filed by Hertz never raised the
defense of improper service of summons. The defenses that it pleaded were
limited to litis pendentia, pari delicto, performance of its obligations and lack of
cause of action. Finally, it even asserted its own counterclaim against Optima.
Measured against the standards in Philippine Commercial International Bank,
these actions lead to no other conclusion than that Hertz voluntarily appeared
before the court a quo.
AFDAL & AFDAL v. CARLOS
GR No. 173379 December 1, 2010
J. Carpio
FACTS:
On 18 December 2003, respondent Romeo Carlos (respondent) filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against petitioners, Zenaida
Guijabar (Guijabar), et.al before the MTC Laguna. Respondent alleged that
petitioners, Guijabar, and all other persons claiming rights under them were
occupying, by mere tolerance, a parcel of land in respondent’s name.
Respondent claimed that petitioner Abubakar Afdal (petitioner Abubakar) sold
the property to him but that he allowed petitioners to stay in the property. On
25 August 2003, respondent demanded that petitioners, Guijabar, and all
persons claiming rights under them turn over the property to him because he
needed the property for his personal use.Respondent further alleged that
petitioners refused to heed his demand and he was constrained to file a
complaint before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa(Lupon). According to
respondent, petitioners ignored the notices and the Lupon issued a "certificate
to file action." Then, respondent filed the complaint before the MTC.
Three attempts to serve the summons and complaint on petitioners but they
failed to file an answer.
Respondent filed an ex-parte motion and compliance with position paper
submitting the case for decision based on the pleadings on record
MTC ruled in favor of respondent and further issued a writ of execution.
Petitioners filed a petition for relief from judgment with the MTC. Respondent
filed a motion to dismiss or strike out the petition for relief. Subsequently,
petitioners manifested their intention to withdraw the petition for relief after
realizing that it was a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure. The MTC granted petitioners’ request to withdraw the petition for
relief.
Petitioners filed the petition for relief before the RTC. They alleged that they are
the lawful owners of the property which they purchased and denied that they
sold the property to respondent. They also pointed out that they never received
respondent’s demand letter nor were they informed of, much less participated
in, the proceedings before the Lupon. Moreover, petitioners said they were not
served a copy of the summons and the complaint.
RTC DISMISSED the petition for relief. The court averred that it had no
jurisdiction over the petition because the petition should have been filed before
the MTC in accordance with Section 1 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court which
provides that a petition for relief should be filed "in such court and in the same
case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside."
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. RTC denied the motion. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:
WON there was a valid service of summons
HELD:
NO. There was no valid service of summons.
In long line of cases, the SC held that the impossibility of personal service
justifying availment of substituted service should be explained in the proof of
service; why efforts exerted towards personal service failed. The pertinent facts
and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the
proof of service otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld.
According to the records of the MTC, there were 3 attempts to serve the
summons to the defendants. The first was unserved, the second was served to
one “Gary Akob” and the last, where the return was duly served but refused to
sign.
The indorsements in this case failed to state that prompt and personal service
on petitioners was rendered impossible. It failed to show the reason why
personal service could not be made. It was also not shown that efforts were
made to find petitioners personally and that said efforts failed. These
requirements are indispensable because substituted service is in derogation of
the usual method of service. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with
the statutory requirements of substituted service renders such service
ineffective.
Likewise, nowhere in the return of summons or in the records of the case was it
shown that Gary Acob, the person on whom substituted service of summons
was effected, was a person of suitable age and discretion residing in petitioners’
residence.
The process server failed to specify Gary Acob’s age, his relationship to
petitioners and to ascertain whether he comprehends the significance of the
receipt of the summons and his duty to deliver it to petitioners or at least notify
them of said receipt of summons.
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of
summons or the defendant’s voluntary appearance in court. If the defendant
does not voluntarily appear in court, jurisdiction can be acquired by personal or
substituted service of summons as laid out under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court, which state:
Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall
be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to
receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Sec. 7. Substituted Service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may
be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving
the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof.
Any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is null and void.
RAPSING et. al v. HON. JUDGE ABLES
GR No. 171855 October 15, 2012
J. Peralta
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 filed by
petitioners Fe Rapsing et. al seeking to set aside the Orders of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Masbate.
Private respondents SSgt. Edison Rural et al were members of the Philippine
Army based at Cabangcalan Detachment, Aroroy, Masbate. They were charged
with multiple murder for the deaths of Teogenes Rapsing, Teofilo Villanueva
and Edwin Aparejado.
However, private respondents alleged that said persons died due to a legitimate
military operation which resulted to an intense firefight between the AFP and
the NPA. Teogenes Rapsing and others were said to be members of the NPA.
Warrants of arrest was issued however the Judge Advocate General's Office
(JAGO) of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) filed an Omnibus with the
trial court seeking the cases against respondents be transferred to the
jurisdiction of the military tribunal.
Initially, the trial court denied the motion filed by the JAGO on the ground that
respondents have not been arrested. But upon MR, the Omnibus was granted
and the entire records of the case were turned over to the Commanding General
of the 9th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, for appropriate action.
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Order, but was denied by the trial
court. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC of Masbate has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
YES.
The SC opined that it is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to
depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss,
for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon
the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the
action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The
averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the
matters to be consulted.
In the case at bar, the information stated that private respondents, "conspiring
together and mutually helping with one another, taking advantage of their
superior strength, as elements of the Philippine Army, armed with their
government-issued firearms with intent to kill, by means of treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot the [victims], hitting them on different parts of their
bodies, thereby inflicting upon them multiple gunshot wounds which caused
their deaths." Murder is a crime punishable under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended, and is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Hence, irrespective of whether the killing was actually justified or not,
jurisdiction to try the crime charged against the respondents has been vested
upon the RTC by law.
Furthermore, in view of the provisions of R.A. 7055, the military tribunals
cannot exercise jurisdiction over respondents' case since the offense for which
they were charged is not included in the enumeration of "service-connected
offenses or crimes" as provided for under Section 1 thereof. The said law is very
clear that the jurisdiction to try members of the AFP who commit crimes or
offenses covered by the RPC, and which are not service-connected, lies with the
civil courts. Hence, the RTC cannot divest itself of its jurisdiction over the
alleged crime of multiple murder
b. Mendoza v. Germino & Germino, G.R. No. 165676, Nov. 22, 2010
Facts:
 On June 27, 1988, the petitioner and Aurora C. (plaintiffs) filed a
complaint with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija against
respondent Narciso Germino for forcible entry.
The plaintiffs claimed that they were the registered owners of a
five-hectare parcel of land in Soledad, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija (subject property).
Sometime in 1988, respondent Narciso unlawfully entered the subject property
by means of strategy and stealth, and without their knowledge or consent. 
On
August 9, 1988, respondent Narciso filed his answer, claiming, among others,
that his brother, respondent Benigno Germino, was the plaintiff’s agricultural
lessee and he merely helped the latter in the cultivation as a member of the
immediate farm household. The plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the case to
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), in view of the
tenancy issue raised by respondent Narciso. Thus, the MTC issued an order,
remanding the case to the DARAB, for further proceedings.
The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), impleading respondent Benigno as additional
defendant. The plaintiffs alleged that Efren Bernardo was the agricultural lessee
of the subject property. Respondent Benigno unlawfully entered the subject
property in 1982 or 1983 through strategy and stealth, and without their
knowledge or consent. In 1987, they discovered that respondent Benigno had
transferred possession of the subject property to respondent Narciso, who
refused to return the possession of the subject property to the plaintiffs and
appropriated the lands produce for himself.
The respondents filed their answer denying the allegations in the
complaint, claiming, among others, that the plaintiffs had no right over the
subject property as they agreed to sell it to respondent Benigno for P87,000.00.
The respondents also asserted that jurisdiction over the complaint lies with the
Regional Trial Court since ownership and possession are the issues.
 jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the
The PARAD found that the respondents were mere usurpers of the
subject property. Thus, PARAD ordered the respondents to vacate the subject
property. The respondents filed an appeal with the DARAB, argued that the case
should have been dismissed because the MTC’s referral to the DARAB was void
with the enactment of RA 6657, which repealed the rule on referral under PD.
316.
The DARAB held that it acquired jurisdiction because of the amended
complaint that sufficiently alleged an agrarian dispute, not the MTC’s referral of
the case. Thus, affirmed PARAD decision.
On appeal, the Court of appeals held that the MTC erred in transferring
the case to the DARAB since the material allegation of the complaint and the
relief sought show a case for forcible entry, not an agrarian dispute.
The petitioner contends that the jurisdiction lies with the DARAB, since
the nature of the action and the allegations of the complaint show an agrarian
dispute. While, the respondents contend that neither the Rules of Court nor the
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure provides that forcible entry cases can be
referred to the DARAB.
Issue:
Whether the MTC or the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling:
The Court denied the petition. Thus, MTC has jurisdiction over the case.
As a rule, jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations in the complaint. It is determined exclusively by the Constitution
and the law. It cannot be subject to agreement of the parties. Further, the
MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer. Here, based on the allegations and reliefs prayed, it is clear that the
action in the MTC was for forcible entry.
Furthermore, as a rule, allegation of tenancy does not divest the MTC
of jurisdiction, because jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas of the theories
set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise,
defendant. Here, instead of conducting a preliminary conference, the MTC
immediately referred the case to the DARAB. This was contrary to the rules.
c. Antonino v. Register of Deeds of Makati City, G.R. No. 185663, Jun.
20,2012.
Facts:
On March 21, 1978, petitioner Remedios Antonino (Antonino) had been
leasing a residential property located at Makati City and owned by private
respondent Tan Tian Su (Su).
On July 7, 2004, the parties executed a document denominated as
Undertaking Agreement, where Su agreed to sell to Antonino the subject
property for P39,500,000.00. However, in view of a disagreement as to who
between them would shoulder the payment of the capital gains tax, the sale did
not proceed as intended.
On July 9, 2004, Antonino filed a complaint against Su with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, for the reimbursement of the cost of repairs on
the subject property and payment of damages. Later that same day, Antonino
filed an amended complaint to enforce the Undertaking Agreement and compel
Su to sell to her the subject property.
The RTC dismissed Antoninos complaint on the grounds of improper
venue and non-payment of the appropriate docket fees. According to the RTC,
Antoninos complaint is one for specific performance, damages and sum of
money, which are personal actions that should have been filed in the court of
the place where any of the parties resides. Antonino and Su reside in
Muntinlupa and Manila, respectively, thus Makati City is not the proper venue.
Antonino filed a Motion for Reconsideration claiming that her
complaint is a real action and the location of the subject property is
determinative of its venue. Nonetheless, the RTC reiterated that Antoninos
complaint is a personal action such that the proper venue therefore is either the
City of Manila or Muntinlupa City.
On appeal, the CA dismissed Antoninos petition. The CA said that in a
petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner
must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack
of jurisdiction. The concept of lack of jurisdiction as a ground to annul a
judgment does not embrace abuse of discretion.
Issue:
The propriety of Antoninos use of the remedy of a petition for
annulment of judgment as against the final and executory orders of the RTC.
Held:
The Supreme Court emphasized that only void judgments, by reason
of extrinsic fraud or the courts lack of jurisdiction, are susceptible to being
annulled.
Apart from the requirement that the existence of extrinsic fraud or lack
of jurisdiction should be amply demonstrated, one who desires to avail the
remedy must convince that the ordinary and other appropriate remedies,
such as an appeal, are no longer available for causes not attributable to
him.
Here, Antoninos recourse to annulment of judgment is seriously flawed
and the reasons are patent. There is therefore no reason to disturb the
questioned issuances of the RTC that are already final and executory. In fact,
the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion or err in dismissing Antoninos
complaint. The RTC was correct in classifying Antoninos cause of action as
personal and in holding that it was instituted in the wrong venue.
The Court said, at any rate, even if the RTC erred in ordering the
dismissal of her complaint, such had already become final and executory and
will not be disturbed as it had jurisdiction and it was not alleged, much less,
proved that there was extrinsic fraud. Moreover, annulment of the assailed
orders of the RTC will not issue if ordinary remedies, such as an appeal, were
lost and were not availed of because of Antoninos fault. Litigation should end
and terminate sometime and somewhere. It is essential to an effective and efficient
administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning
party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict
2. Objections to jurisdiction over the subject matter
Lasmis V. Dong-E, G.R. No. 173021, Oct. 20,2010.
Facts:
This case involves a conflict of ownership and possession over an
untitled parcel of land, denominated as Lot No. 1. The property is located along
Km. 5 Asin Road, Baguio City and is part of a larger parcel of land with an area of
186,090 square meters. While petitioners are the actual occupants of Lot No. 1,
respondent is claiming ownership thereof and is seeking to recover its
possession from petitioners.
According to respondent Margarita Semon Dong-E (Margarita), her
familys ownership and occupation of Lot No. 1 can be traced as far back as 1922
to her late grandfather, Ap-ap. Upon Ap-aps death, the property was inherited
by his children, who obtained a survey plan in 1964 of the 186,090-square
meter property, which included Lot No. 1.
The heirs of Ap-ap then executed, a Deed of Quitclaim on February 26,
1964 in favor of their brother Gilbert Semon (Margaritas father).
Sometime between 1976 and 1978, Gilbert Semon together with his wife Mary
Lamsis, allowed his in-laws Manolo Lamsis and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma, to stay on
a portion of Lot No. 1 together with
their respective families. They were allowed to erect their houses, introduce
improvements, and plant trees thereon. This state of affairs changed when
petitioners Delfin and Agustin allegedly began expanding their occupation on
the subject property and selling portions thereof.
With such developments, Margarita filed a complaint for recovery of
ownership, possession, reconveyance and damages against all four occupants of
Lot No. 1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City.
Petitioners denied Margaritas claims of ownership and possession over
Lot No. 1. According to Delfin and Agustin, Lot No. 1 is a public land claimed by
the heirs of Joaquin Smith (not parties to the case). The Smiths gave their
permission for Delfin and Agustins parents to occupy the land sometime in
1969 or 1970.
In response, the respondent Margarita introduced as evidence an
unnumbered resolution of the Community Special Task Force on Ancestral
Lands (CSTFAL) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), acting favorably on her and her siblings ancestral land claim over a
portion of the 186,090-square meter property. The resolution was not signed by
two members of the CSTFAL on the ground that the signing of the unnumbered
resolution was overtaken by the enactment of the Republic Act (RA) No. 8371 or
the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA). The IPRA removed the
authority of the DENR to issue ancestral land claim certificates and transferred
the same to the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).
The trial court ruled in favor of respondents long-time possession of
and claim of ownership over the subject property. On appeal, the CA held that
the respondent was able to discharge her burden in proving her title and
interest to the subject property. Her documentary evidence were amply
supported by the testimonial evidence of her witnesses.
Petitioners argued that the reivindicatory action should be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction in light of the enactment of the IPRA, which gives original
and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving ancestral lands and domains
to the NCIP. They likewise argue that NCIP has primary jurisdiction over
ancestral lands, hence, the courts should not interfere when the dispute
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal
On the other hand, the respondents argued that the issue of lack of
jurisdiction is raised for the first time in the petition before the Court. It was
never raised before the trial court or the CA. Thus, respondent insists that
petitioners are now barred by laches from attacking the trial courts jurisdiction
over the case.
Issue:
Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to decide the case in light of the
effectivity of RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 at the time
that the complaint was instituted
Held:
Yes, even assuming that petitioners’ theory about the effect of IPRA is
correct, they are already barred by laches from raising their jurisdictional
objection under the circumstances.
As a rule, an objection over subject-matter jurisdiction may be
raised at any time of the proceedings. This is because jurisdiction cannot be
waived by the parties or vested by the agreement of the parties. Jurisdiction is
vested by law, which prevails at the time of the filing of the complaint.
Here, the application of the Tijam doctrine is called for because the
presence of laches cannot be ignored. If the surety in Tijam was barred by
laches for raising the issue of jurisdiction for the first time in the CA, what more
for petitioners in the instant case who raised the issue for the first time in their
petition before this Court.
At the time that the complaint was first filed in 1998, the IPRA was
already in effect but the petitioners never raised the same as a ground for
dismissal; instead they filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the value of
the property did not meet the jurisdictional value for the RTC. They obviously
neglected to take the IPRA into consideration.
When the amended complaint was filed in 1998, the petitioners no
longer raised the issue of the trial courts lack of jurisdiction. Instead, they
proceeded to trial, all the time aware of the existence of the IPRA.
The Supreme Court said, it is only before this Court, eight years after
the filing of the complaint, after the trial court had already conducted a
full-blown trial and rendered a decision on the merits, after the appellate court
had made a thorough review of the records, and after petitioners have twice
encountered adverse decisions from the trial and the appellate courts that
petitioners now want to expunge all the efforts that have gone into the litigation
and resolution of their case and start all over again. This practice cannot be
allowed.
3. Effect of estoppel on objections to jurisdiction
a. De Leon v. CA, 245 SCRA 166 [1995]
Facts:
The subject property in the case involves two parcels of irrigated
Riceland, located in Barangays Guintas and Bingke, Napnod, Leganes, Iloilo.
Jesus Jalbuena, the owner of the land, entered into a verbal lease contract in
1970 with Uldarico Inayan, for one year renewable for the same period. Inayan,
private respondent herein, bound himself to deliver 252 cavans of palay each
year as rental to be paid during the first ten days of January. Private respondent
who was a godson of Jesus Jalbuena, was allowed to continue with the lease
from year to year.
Petitioner Corazon Jalbuena de Leon is the daughter of Jesus Jalbuena
and the transferee of the subject property.
Although private respondent cultivated the subject property through
hired men, the cavans of palay were paid annually until 1983 when Inayan
ceased paying the agreed rental and instead, asserted dominion over the land.
When asked by the petitioner to vacate the land, he refused to do so, prompting
the latter to bring an action in court.
Private respondent, in his Answer, claimed that the land had been
tenanted by his father since 1938 and that he has already been issued
Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT) for the subject property. These Certificates
of Land Transfer were subsequently canceled by the then Ministry of Agrarian
Reform on November 22, 1983 upon a finding that said lands were owned by
Jesus Jalbuena and that the CLTs were erroneously issued.
The lower court issued an order adopting the procedure in agrarian
cases.
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner De Leon
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, private respondent raised the sole
issue of jurisdiction and alleged that the lower court, acting as Court of Agrarian
Relations, had no jurisdiction over the action.

The respondent appellate court, affirmed the trial court's decision. It
held that while jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law, private respondent's
attack on the jurisdiction of the lower court must fail for he is guilty of estoppel.
Despite several opportunities to question the jurisdiction of the lower court, he
failed to do so.
It is petitioner's contention that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that the case is an unlawful detainer action. Since the parties did not confine
themselves to issues pertaining solely to possession but also to the nature of the
lease contract, the case is not one of unlawful detainer but one incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
Furthermore, petitioner argues that the issue of lack of jurisdiction should not
have been resolved in favor of private respondent who had voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and raised the issue only after an
adverse decision was rendered against him.
Issue:
Whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case.
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the case filed by petitioner, not
being one of unlawful detainer, the regional trial court had jurisdiction to hear
and try the case. Moreover, private respondent is estopped from asserting the
lower court's lack of jurisdiction.
 As a rule, jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is
conferred only by the Constitution or by law. It is determinable on the basis
of allegations in the complaint.
An error in jurisdiction can be raised at any time and even for the
first time on appeal. Barring highly meritorious and exceptional
circumstances, neither estoppel nor waiver may be raised as defenses to
such an error.
The Court ruled that the complaint instituted by petitioner in the lower
court reveals that the case is, contrary to the findings of the respondent
appellate court, not one of unlawful detainer. The court finds that the situation
in the case falls within the ambit of justifiable cases where estoppel may be
applied.
Here, the trial court's recourse to agrarian procedure was undoubtedly
provoked by private respondent Inayan's insistence on the existence of a
tenancy relationship with petitioner. Private respondent cannot now use these
same misrepresentations to assert the court's lack of jurisdiction. He cannot
invoke the court's jurisdiction to secure affirmative relief against petitioner and,
after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
Private respondent cannot be allowed to seek refuge under the
protective mantle of the law after he has abused and made a mockery of it. He is,
therefore, considered estopped from asserting the court's want of jurisdiction to
try the case.
b. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 (Landmark case)
Facts:
On July 19, 1948, one month after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 296
known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas
Tagalog commenced Civil Case in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the
spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from them the
sum of P1,908.00.
A counter-bond was filed by defendants and the Manila Surety and
Fidelity Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to as the Surety.
The Court of First Instance rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
and, after the same had become final and executory, upon motion of the latter,
the Court issued a writ of execution against the defendants. The writ having
been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution against the Surety's bond
Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that
the same was issued without the required summary hearing provided for in
Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. As the Court denied the motion, the
Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals from such order of denial and from the
one denying its motion for reconsideration.It raises the question of lack of
jurisdiction, neither directly nor indirectly.
The Court of Appeals, decided the case affirming the orders appealed
from. Thereafter, the Surety filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS,
alleging substantially that appellees action was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only;
that a month before that date Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Act of 1948, had already become effective, Section 88 of which placed
within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where
the value of the subject matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed
P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the Court of First Instance
therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case.
Issue:
Whether the Surety is estopped by laches from questioning the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.
Held:
Yes, the Court ruled that the Surety is now barred by laches from
questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI. As a rule, jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it
affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the
objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, this case is an
exception to the rule.
Here, the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu
on July 19, 1948, that is, almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to
dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the
first time.
Further, the case show that from the time the Surety became a
quasi-party, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by
reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force,
was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so.
Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court as well as in the Court
of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief
and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an
adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to
raise the question of jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court said to sanction such conduct on its part, it would
in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since
it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up
their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of the case is not only
patent but revolting.
Principles:
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within
a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy
which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and,
unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a
question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced
or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure
affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain
such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction
c. Atty. Cudiamat, et al. v. Batangas Savings & Loan Bank, et al., G.R. No.
182403, March 9, 2010.
Facts:
Petitioner Atty. Restituto Cudiamat and his brother Perfecto were the
registered co-owners of a parcel of land (the property) in Balayan, Batangas.
Restituto, who resided in Ozamiz City with his wife, entrusted the custody of the
title to who was residing in Balayan.
In 1979, Perfecto, without the knowledge and consent of Restituto,
obtained a loan from respondent Batangas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (the
bank). To secure the payment of the loan, Perfecto mortgaged the property for
the purpose of which he presented a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
purportedly executed by Restituto, with the marital consent of his wife.
On June 19, 1991, Restituto was informed, via letter dated June 7, 1991
from the bank, that the property was foreclosed. He thus, by letter dated June
25, 1991, informed the bank that he had no participation in the execution of the
mortgage and that he never authorized Perfecto for the purpose.
In the meantime, Perfecto died in 1990. In 1998, as Perfectos widow
petitioner Corazon was being evicted from the property, she and her
co-petitioner-spouses Restituto and Erlinda filed on August 9, 1999 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balayan a complaint for quieting of title with
damages against the bank and the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu, assailing the
mortgage as being null and void as they did not authorize the encumbrance of
the property.
In its Answer to the complaint, the bank, maintaining the validity of the
mortgage, alleged that it had in fact secured a title in its name, after Perfecto
failed to redeem the mortgage; that the Balayan RTC had no jurisdiction over
the case as the bank had been placed under receivership and under liquidation
by the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC); that PDIC filed before
the RTC of Nasugbu a petition for assistance in the liquidation of the bank; and
that jurisdiction to adjudicate disputed claims against it is lodged with the
liquidation court-RTC Nasugbu.
Balayan RTC rendered judgment, in the complaint for quieting of title,
in favor of the plaintiffs-herein petitioners. The bank appealed to the Court of
Appeals, contending, that the Balayan RTC had no jurisdiction over petitioners
complaint for quieting of title.
The appellate court, ruling in favor of the bank, dismissed petitioners
complaint for quieting of title, without prejudice to the right of petitioners to
take up their claims with the Nasugbu RTC sitting as a liquidation court. To the
appellate court, the Balayan RTC, as a court of general jurisdiction, should have
deferred to the Nasugbu RTC which sits as a liquidation court, given that the
bank was already under receivership when petitioners filed the complaint for
quieting of title.
Assailing the appellate courts ruling that the Balayan RTC had no
jurisdiction over their complaint, petitioners argue that their complaint was
filed earlier than PDICs petition for assistance in the liquidation; and that the
bank is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the Balayan RTC
because it actively participated in the proceedings thereat.
Issue:
Whether the bank is estopped from raising the issue of lack of
jurisdiction of the Balayan RTC.
Held:
Yes. Estoppel bars the bank from raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction
of the Balayan RTC.
In the present case, the Balayan RTC, sitting as a court of general
jurisdiction, had jurisdiction over the complaint for quieting of title filed by
petitioners on August 9, 1999. The Nasugbu RTC, as a liquidation court,
assumed jurisdiction over the claims against the bank only on May 25, 2000,
when PDICs petition for assistance in the liquidation was raffled thereat and
given due course.
It is well-settled that lack of jurisdiction on the subject matter can
be raised at any time and is not lost by estoppel by laches, the present case is
an exception. To compel petitioners to re-file and relitigate their claims before
the Nasugbu RTC when the parties had already been given the opportunity to
present their respective evidence in a full-blown trial before the Balayan RTC
which had, in fact, decided petitioners complaint (about two years before the
appellate court rendered the assailed decision) would be an exercise in futility
and would unjustly burden petitioners.
G.R. No. 171989
FIRST CORPORATION V. FORMER 6TH DIVISION OF CA, ET AL.
FACTS: First Corporation is a corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws and engaged primarily in trade. Herein private respondent
Eduardo M. Sacris (Sacris) is the alleged creditor of the petitioner corporation,
while private respondent Cesar A. Abillar (Abillar) had served as the President
and Chairman of the Board of the petitioner corporation from 1993 until 26
February 1998.
In 1991, the corporate officers of the corporation convinced Sacris to invest in
their business. The petitioner corporation made a promise of turning such
equity into shareholding in the petitioner corporation. While the conversion of
such investment into shareholding was still pending, private respondent Sacris
and the petitioner corporation agreed to consider the same as a loan. The
receipts for the said loans were issued by the petitioner corporation in the name
of private respondent Abillar.
On February 27 1998, in a Special Stockholders Meeting, the stockholders of the
petitioner corporation no longer re-elected private respondent Abillar as
President and member of the Board of Directors because they had already lost
their confidence in him. On 13 March 1998, private respondent Sacris, for a
valuable consideration, executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of private
respondent Abillar, assigning and transferring to private respondent Abillar his
remaining collectibles due from the petitioner corporation.
On 10 April 1998, private respondent Abillar, by virtue of the Deed of
Assignment, filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with Prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Attachment and Damages before the RTC of Pasig City against the
petitioner corporation. While the case was still pending, both private
respondents agreed to rescind the Deed of Assignment for failure of private
respondent Abillar to comply with his undertaking to pay private respondent
Sacris.
Private respondent Sacris filed a Motion for Intervention which prompted
Petitioner Corporation to file a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the
Court of Appeals. The Third Division of the Court of Appeals granted the Petition
filed by the petitioner corporation and issued a Writ of Certiorari.
Private respondent Sacris then filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with
Damages before the RTC of Quezon City which ruled in its favor. Petitioner
Corporation filed an appeal which was denied; hence, filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
RTC of Quezon City.
ISSUE: Whether or not a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is correct
HELD: No, Petitioner Corporation evidently availed itself of the wrong mode of
appeal. . Although petitioner corporation ascribes grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of both the RTC of
Quezon City and the appellate court in rendering their respective Decisions, a
closer look on the grounds relied upon by the petitioner corporation in its
present Petition for Certiorari will clearly reveal that the petitioner corporation
seeks a review of the factual findings and evidence of the instant case.
It is a well-entrenched rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. This Court will
not pass upon the findings of fact of the trial court, especially if they have been
affirmed on appeal by the appellate court.
Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of
judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one
which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, which is
tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible
only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure
errors of the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, or its
conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law.
Settled is the rule that the proper remedy from an adverse decision of the Court
of Appeals is an appeal under Rule 45 and not a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65. It should be emphasized that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari
will not lie when there are other remedies available to the petitioner.
G.R. No. 162416
DE JOYA V. MARQUEZ ET, AL.
FACTS: The report shows that Hao induced Dy to invest more than a hundred
million pesos in State Resources Development Management Corporation, but
when the latter’s investments fell due, the checks issued by Hao in favor of Dy as
payment for his investments were dishonored for being drawn against
insufficient funds or that the account was closed
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition that seeks the Court to nullify
and set aside the warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge against
petitioner in for violation of Article 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC in relation to P.D.
No. 1689 (Syndicated estafa) Petitioner asserts that respondent judge erred in
finding the existence of probable cause that justifies the issuance of a warrant of
arrest against him and his co-accused.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is entitled to relief when he refuses to submit to the
court’s jurisdiction
HELD: NO, petitioner is not entitled to seek relief from this Court nor from the
trial court as he continuously refuses to surrender and submit to the court’s
jurisdiction. Justice Florenz D. Regalado explains the requisites for the exercise
of jurisdiction and how the court acquires such jurisdiction, thus:
x x x Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires such
jurisdiction:
a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This is acquired by the filing of the
complaint, petition or initiatory pleading before the court by the plaintiff or
petitioner.
b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent: This is acquired by the
voluntary appearance or submission by the defendant or respondent to the
court or by coercive process issued by the court to him, generally by the service
of summons.
c. Jurisdiction over the subject matter: This is conferred by law and, unlike
jurisdiction over the parties, cannot be conferred on the court by the voluntary
act or agreement of the parties.
d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case: This is determined and conferred by
the pleadings filed in the case by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial
order or stipulation, or, at times by their implied consent as by the failure of a
party to object to evidence on an issue not covered by the pleadings, as
provided in Sec. 5, Rule 10.
e. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing which is the subject of the
litigation). This is acquired by the actual or constructive seizure by the court of
the thing in question, thus placing it in custodia legis, as in attachment or
garnishment; or by provision of law which recognizes in the court the power to
deal with the property or subject matter within its territorial jurisdiction, as in
land registration proceedings or suits involving civil status or real property in
the Philippines of a non-resident defendant.
G.R. No. 189505
FERDINAND MARCOS, JR. V. REPUBLIC
FACTS: Court rendered a Decision affirming the 2 April 2009 Decision of the
Sandiganbayan and declaring all the assets of Arelma, S.A., an entity created by
the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, forfeited in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines. The anti-graft court found that the totality of assets and properties
acquired by the Marcos spouses was manifestly and grossly disproportionate to
their aggregate salaries as public officials, and that petitioners were unable to
overturn the prima facie presumption of ill-gotten wealth, pursuant to Section 2
of Republic Act No. (RA) 1379.
Petitioners seek reconsideration of the denial of their petition, on the ground
that the Sandiganbayan does not possess territorial jurisdiction over the res or
the Arelma proceeds, which are held by Merrill Lynch in the United States.
Petitioner Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. acknowledges that "the subject matter of the
case (i.e. the power/authority to determine whether an asset may be forfeited
under R.A. 1379) is within the (Sandiganbayan’s) jurisdiction. However, he
objects to the graft court’s purported lack of territorial jurisdiction on the
theory that forfeiture is an action in rem. He argues that the Sandiganbayan
must first acquire territorial jurisdiction over the Arelma proceeds before the
judgment may be enforced.
ISSUE: WON Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over the res
HELD: YES. we find that the Sandiganbayan did not err in granting the Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment, despite the fact that the Arelma account and
proceeds are held abroad. To rule otherwise contravenes the intent of the
forfeiture law, and indirectly privileges violators who are able to hide public
assets abroad.
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property
under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b)
as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the
court is recognized and made effective. In the latter condition, the property,
though at all times within the potential power of the court, may not be in the
actual custody of said court.
The concept of potential jurisdiction over the res, advanced by respondent, is
not at all new. As early as Perkins v. Dizon, deciding a suit against a non-
resident, the Court held: "In order that the court may exercise power over the
res, it is not necessary that the court should take actual custody of the property,
potential custody thereof being sufficient. There is potential custody when, from
the nature of the action brought, the power of the court over the property is
impliedly recognized by law.
G.R. No. 198356, April 20, 2015
SUPAPO V. SPS. DE JESUS
FACTS: The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint for accion publiciana against
Roberto and Susan de Jesus (Spouses de Jesus), Macario Bernardo (Macario),
and persons claiming rights under them (collectively, the respondents), with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City. ). The subject lot is covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-284416 registered and titled under
the Spouses Supapo's names and has an assessed value of thirty-nine thousand
nine hundred eighty pesos (39,980.00) as shown in the Declaration of Real
Property Value (tax declaration) issued by the Office of the City Assessor of
Caloocan.
The respondents moved to set their affirmative defenses for preliminary
hearing. The MeTC denied the motion then respondents filed a petition for
certiorari with the RTC.
The RTC granted the petition on the ground that accion publiciana falls within
its exclusive jurisdiction.
The Spouses Supapo appealed to the CA which was dismissed and held that
accion publiciana should have been lodged before the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction
HELD: Yes, the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction. Section 1 of RA No. 7691
states:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
"Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property,
or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved
exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) x x x.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Section 3 of the same law provides:
Section. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of
the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value
does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
In view of these amendments, jurisdiction over actions involving title to or
possession of real property is now determined by its assessed value. In the
present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of the subject
lot, located in Metro Manila, is P39,980.00 which falls under the jurisdiction of
the MeTC.
GR NO. 200804
A.L. ANG NETWORK INC V. EMMA MONDEJAR ET, AL.
FACTS: On March 23, 2011, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money under
the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases6 before the MTCC, seeking to
collect from respondent the amount of ₱23,111.71 which represented her
unpaid water bills for the period June 1, 2002 to September 30, 2005. Petitioner
claimed that it was duly authorized to supply water to and collect payment
therefor from the homeowners of Regent Pearl Subdivision, one of whom is
respondent.
In defense, respondent contended that since April 1998 up to February 2003,
she religiously paid petitioner the agreed monthly flat rate of ₱75.00 for her
water consumption. Notwithstanding their agreement that the same would be
adjusted only upon prior notice to the homeowners, petitioner unilaterally
charged her unreasonable and excessive adjustments (at the average of 40 cu.
m. of water per month or 1.3 cu. m. of water a day) far above the average daily
water consumption for a household of only 3 persons. She also questioned the
propriety and/or basis of the aforesaid ₱23,111.71 claim.
The MTCC ruled in favor of the respondent so petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 before the RTC.
RTC dismissed the petition for certiorari, finding that the said petition was only
filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of small claims cases.
ISSUE: WON RTC erred in dismissing petitioner’s recourse under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court assailing the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small
claims case.
HELD: Yes, Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision, the
remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus,
immediately move for its execution. Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals
in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings where appeal is not an
available remedy, does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This general rule has been
enunciated in the case of Okada v. Security Pacific Assurance Corporation,
wherein it was held that:
In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that "the extraordinary
writ of certiorari is always available where there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
Likewise, the Court finds that petitioner filed the said petition before the proper
forum (i.e., the RTC). To be sure, the Court, the Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari.
Such concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not give a party unbridled
freedom to choose the venue of his action lest he ran afoul of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Instead, a becoming regard for judicial hierarchy dictates
that petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari against first level courts
should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with
the Court of Appeals, before resort may be had before the Court.
Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, certiorari petitions
assailing its dispositions should be filed before their corresponding Regional
Trial Courts.
GR NO. 169380
FIORELLO R. JOSE V. ROBERTO ALFUERTO, ET, AL.
FACTS: In his amended complaint, the petitioner presents the following
allegations in support of his unlawful detainer complaint:
3. plaintiff leased from lessor, Mr. Rudy Chuasing, that parcel of lot owned and
registered in the lessor’s name, covering the area occupied by the defendants.
6. Plaintiff’s lessor had acquired the subject property
7. Defendants, having been fully aware of their unlawful occupancy of the
subject lot, have defiantly erected their houses thereat without benefit of any
contract or law whatsoever, much less any building permit as sanctioned by
law, but by mere tolerance of its true, lawful and registered owner, plaintiff’s
lessor.
8. By reason of defendants’ continued unlawful occupancy of the subject
premises, plaintiff referred the matter to his lawyer who immediately sent a
formal demand upon each of the defendants to vacate the premises.
9. Despite notice, however, defendants failed and refused and continues to fail
and refuse to vacate the premises without valid or legal justification.
> MeTC held that the respondents had no right to possess the land and that their
occupation was merely by the owner’s tolerance
> RTC affirmed
> CA reversed the RTC and MeTC decisions. It ruled that the respondents’
possession of the land was not by the petitioner or his lessor’s tolerance. It
emphasized that ejectment cases are summary proceedings where the
only issue to be resolved is who has a better right to the physical
possession of a property. The petitioner’s claim, on the other hand, is
based on an accion publiciana: he asserts his right as a possessor by virtue of
a contract of lease he contracted after the respondents had occupied the land
ISSUE: WON an action for unlawful detainer is the proper remedy.
HELD: NO. Unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy for the present case.
The allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action and the
jurisdiction of the court. The complaint must specifically allege the facts
constituting unlawful detainer. In the absence of these allegations of facts, an
action for unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy and the municipal trial
court or the MeTC does not have jurisdiction over the case.26
The petitioner’s allegations in the amended complaint (SEE FACTS FOR
ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT) run counter to the requirements for
unlawful detainer. In an unlawful detainer action, the possession of the
defendant was originally legal and his possession was permitted by the owner
through an express or implied contract.
In this case, paragraph makes it clear that the respondents’ occupancy was
unlawful from the start and was bereft of contractual or legal basis. In an
unlawful detainer case, the defendant’s possession becomes illegal only upon
the plaintiff’s demand for the defendant to vacate the property and the
defendant’s subsequent refusal. In the present case, paragraph 8 characterizes
the defendant’s occupancy as unlawful even before the formal demand letters
were written by the petitioner’s counsel. Under these allegations, the unlawful
withholding of possession should not be based on the date the demand letters
were sent, as the alleged unlawful act had taken place at an earlier unspecified
date.
The petitioner nevertheless insists that he properly alleged that the
respondents occupied the premises by mere tolerance of the owner. No
allegation in the complaint nor any supporting evidence on record, however,
shows when the respondents entered the property or who had granted them
permission to enter. Without these allegations and evidence, the bare claim
regarding "tolerance" cannot be upheld.
In Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al., the Court cited Prof. Arturo M. Tolentino’s
definition and characterizes "tolerance" in the following manner:
Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts merely tolerated are "those which
by reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of property allows his
neighbor or another person to do on the property; they are generally those
particular services or benefits which one’s property can give to another without
material injury or prejudice to the owner, who permits them out of friendship
or courtesy." He adds that: "they are acts of little disturbances which a person,
in the interest of neighborliness or friendly relations, permits others to do on
his property, such as passing over the land, tying a horse therein, or getting
some water from a well." And, Tolentino continues, even though "this is
continued for a long time, no right will be acquired by prescription." Further
expounding on the concept, Tolentino writes: "There is tacit consent of the
possessor to the acts which are merely tolerated. Thus, not every case of
knowledge and silence on the part of the possessor can be considered mere
tolerance. By virtue of tolerance that is considered as an authorization,
permission or license, acts of possession are realized or performed. The
question reduces itself to the existence or non-existence of the permission.
[citations omitted; italics supplied]
The Court has consistently adopted this position: tolerance or permission must
have been present at the beginning of possession; if the possession was
unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would not be the proper
remedy and should be dismissed.
It is not the first time that this Court adjudged contradictory statements in a
complaint for unlawful detainer as a basis for dismissal. In Unida v. Heirs of
Urban, the claim that the defendant’s possession was merely tolerated was
contradicted by the complainant’s allegation that the entry to the subject
property was unlawful from the very beginning. The Court then ruled that the
unlawful detainer action should fail.
The contradictory statements in the complaint are further deemed suspicious
when a complaint is silent regarding the factual circumstances surrounding the
alleged tolerance. In Ten Forty Realty Corporation v. Cruz,31 the complaint
simply stated that: "(1) defendant immediately occupied the subject property
after its sale to her, an action merely tolerated by the plaintiff; and (2) the
respondent’s allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by mere
tolerance." The Court expressed its qualms over these averments of fact as they
did not contain anything substantiating the claim that the plaintiff tolerated or
permitted the occupation of the property by the defendant:
These allegations contradict, rather than support, plaintiff’s theory that its cause
of action is for unlawful detainer. First, these arguments advance the view that
defendant’s occupation of the property was unlawful at its inception. Second,
they counter the essential requirement in unlawful detainer cases that plaintiff’s
supposed act of sufferance or tolerance must be present right from the start of a
possession that is later sought to be recovered.
As the bare allegation of plaintiff’s tolerance of defendant’s occupation of the
premises has not been proven, the possession should be deemed illegal from the
beginning. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the ejectment case should have
been for forcible entry — an action that had already prescribed, however, when
the Complaint was filed on May 12, 1999. The prescriptive period of one year
for forcible entry cases is reckoned from the date of defendant’s actual entry
into the land, which in this case was on April 24, 1998.32
Similarly, in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, the Court considered the owner’s lack of
knowledge of the defendant’s entry of the land to be inconsistent with the
allegation that there had been tolerance.
In Padre v. Malabanan,34 the Court not only required allegations regarding the
grant of permission, but proof as well. It noted that the plaintiffs alleged the
existence of tolerance, but ordered the dismissal of the unlawful detainer case
because the evidence was "totally wanting as to when and under what
circumstances xxx the alleged tolerance came about." It stated that:
Judging from the respondent’s Answer, the petitioners were never at all in
physical possession of the premises from the time he started occupying it and
continuously up to the present. For sure, the petitioners merely derived their
alleged prior physical possession only on the basis of their Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT), arguing that the issuance of said title presupposes their having
been in possession of the property at one time or another.35
Thus, the complainants in unlawful detainer cases cannot simply anchor their
claims on the validity of the owner’s title. Possession de facto must also be
proved.
As early as the 1960s, in Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al.,36 we already ruled that
a complaint which fails to positively aver any overt act on the plaintiff’s part
indicative of permission to occupy the land, or any showing of such fact during
the trial is fatal for a case for unlawful detainer. As the Court then explained, a
case for unlawful detainer alleging tolerance must definitely establish its
existence from the start of possession; otherwise, a case for forcible entry can
mask itself as an action for unlawful detainer and permit it to be filed beyond
the required one-year prescription period from the time of forcible entry:
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance" confirms
our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from
the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as
one of unlawful detainer — not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise
would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons: First. Forcible entry
into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor. Violation of that
right authorizes the speedy redress — in the inferior court — provided for in
the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is
filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have
waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second. If a forcible entry
action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then
the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No
matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely
make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court — upon plea of tolerance to
prevent prescription to set in — and summarily throw him out of the land. Such
a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that
proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and
that the one year time-bar to the suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature
of the action.37 (italics supplied)
Given these rulings, it would be equally dangerous for us to deprive the
respondents of possession over a property that they have held for at least eight
years before the case was filed in 1999, by means of a summary proceeding,
simply because the petitioner used the word "tolerance" without sufficient
allegations or evidence to support it
The Court cannot treat an ejectment case as an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria.
The petitioner argues that assuming this case should have been filed as an
accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria, this Court should still resolve the
case, as requiring him to properly refile the case serves no other ends than to
comply with technicalities.45
The Court cannot simply take the evidence presented before the MeTC in an
ejectment case and decide it as an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
These cases are not interchangeable and their differences constitute far more
than mere technicalities.
In Regis, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,46 we ruled that an action for forcible entry
cannot be treated as an accion publiciana and summarized the reasons therefor.
We find these same reasons also applicable to an unlawful detainer case which
bears the same relevant characteristics:
On the issue of whether or not an action for forcible entry can be treated as
accion publiciana, we rule in the negative. Forcible entry is distinct from accion
publiciana. First, forcible entry should be filed within one year from the
unlawful dispossession of the real property, while accion publiciana is filed a
year after the unlawful dispossession of the real property. Second, forcible entry
is concerned with the issue of the right to the physical possession of the real
property; in accion publiciana, what is subject of litigation is the better right to
possession over the real property. Third, an action for forcible entry is filed in
the municipal trial court and is a summary action, while accion publiciana is a
plenary action in the RTC.
The cause of action in ejectment is different from that in an accion publiciana or
accion reivindicatoria. An ejectment suit is brought before the proper inferior
court to recover physical possession only or possession de facto, not possession
de jure. Unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases are not processes to
determine actual title to property. Any ruling by the MeTC on the issue of
ownership is made only to resolve the issue of possession, and is therefore
inconclusive.47 Because they only resolve issues of possession de facto,
ejectment actions are summary in nature, while accion publiciana (for the
recovery of possession) and accion reivindicatoria (for the recovery of
ownership) are plenary actions.48 The purpose of allowing actions for forcible
entry and unlawful detainer to be decided in summary proceedings is to
provide for a peaceful, speedy and expeditious means of preventing an alleged
illegal possessor of property from unjustly taking and continuing his possession
during the long period it would take to properly resolve the issue of possession
de jure or ownership, thereby ensuring the maintenance of peace and order in
the community; otherwise, the party illegally deprived of possession might take
the law in his hands and seize the property by force and violence.49 An
ejectment case cannot be a substitute for a full-blown trial for the purpose of
determining rights of possession or ownership. Citing Mediran v. Villanueva, the
Court in Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals51 describes in detail how these two
remedies should be used:
In giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and detainer the purpose of
the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession; and in case of
controverted right, it requires the parties to preserve the status quo until one or
the other of them sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of competent
jurisdiction upon the question of ownership. It is obviously just that the person
who has first acquired possession should remain in possession pending the
decision; and the parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage in a petty
warfare over the possession of the property which is the subject of dispute. To
permit this would be highly dangerous to individual security and disturbing to
social order.1âwphi1 Therefore, where a person supposes himself to be the
owner of a piece of property and desires to vindicate his ownership against the
party actually in possession, it is incumbent upon him to institute an action to
this end in a court of competent jurisdiction; and he cannot be permitted, by
invading the property and excluding the actual possessor, to place upon the
latter the burden of instituting an action to try the property right. [italics
supplied]
Thus, if we allow parties to file ejectment cases and later consider them as an
accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria, we would encourage parties to
simply file ejectment cases instead of plenary actions. Courts would then decide
in summary proceedings cases which the rules intend to be resolved through
full-blown trials. Because these "summary" proceedings will have to tackle
complicated issues requiring extensive proof, they would no longer be
expeditious and would no longer serve the purpose for which they were
created. Indeed, we cannot see how the resulting congestion of cases, the hastily
and incorrectly decided cases, and the utter lack of system would assist the
courts in protecting and preserving property rights.
G.R. No. 83907. September 13, 1989.*
NAPOLEON GEGARE, petitioner
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (ELEVENTH DIVISION) AND ARMIE ELMA,
respondents.
Facts:
  This case involves a small piece of land. The decision was to cut it into
two between the parties. The petitioner wants the whole lot. Private
respondent is happy with his half.
 The center of controversy is Lot 5989 with an area of about 270 square
meters situated at Dadiangas, General Santos City, and this lot was
titled in the name of Paulino Elma.
 A reversion case was filed by the Republic of the Philippines against
Paulino Elma in the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, declaring
the title of Paulino Elma null and void and the same was ordered
cancelled.
 The lot was reverted to the mass of public domain subject to
disposition and giving preferential right to its actual occupant,
Napoleon Gegare.
 Both petitioner and private respondent filed an application for this lot
in the Board of Liquidators
 Private respondent protested against the application of petitioner
 The Board denied the protest because the case had already been
decided by the court.
 A motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent was favorably
considered by the Board
 The Board directed the chief of LASEDECO to investigate the occupancy
and area of the lot. In this investigation, it was found that only private
respondent was the actual occupant so the LASEDECO chief
recommended the division of the property between petitioner and
private respondent.
 Private respondent paid for the value of 1/2 of the lot and applied for
the issuance of a patent.
 Petitioner filed an action for Annulment and Cancellation of Partition of
Lot 5989
 Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of
conciliation efforts pursuant to Section 6 of Presidential Decree No.
1508. The motion was granted.
Issue:
WON the case is covered by PD 1508?
Held: YES
 Under Section 2 of PD 1508, a case for one of the parties therein is the
government or any subdivision or instrumentality (Board of
Liquidators) is exempted for barangay conciliation.
 However, Section 6 of the same decree provides when the government
plus another private party (ELMA) are the respondent, the case must
first be submitted for amicable settlement in the Katarungang
Pambarangay.
G.R. No. 76690 February 29, 1988
CLAUDIA RIVERA SANCHEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE MARIANO C. TUPAS
Facts:
 Petitioner and private respondent are both occupants of a public
agricultural land Identified as Lot 595 located at Budbud, Tibungco,
Davao City.
 Petitioner claims that the area of 450 square meters, more or less, has
been in her possession since 1947, long before private respondent
came in and occupied another portion of Lot 595.
 Private respondent claims that the area being claimed by petitioner is a
part of his three-fourth (3/4) of a hectare parcel, the right to which he
acquired from its former possessor and owner of the improvements.
 Private respondent filed with the City Court of Davao an ejectment case
against petitioner
 City Court of Davao rendered a "Judgment by Compromise."
 Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Davao a petition to
annul the aforesaid judgment of the City Court of Davao, she learned for
the first time that what she had signed with her thumbmark assisted by
her lawyer was a compromise agreement, wherein she recognized
private respondent's prior occupancy of the land in question, when she
received an Order of Guillermo C. Ferraris, OIC Regional Director of
Lands, dropping her petition, together with the petitions of three
others, based, allegedly, on their withdrawal, of their claims over the
disputed land; that she had never intended to recognize the private
respondent as having prior possession and occupancy of the land.
 Private respondent, in a Motion to Dismiss moved for the dismissal of
the complaint on the grounds that the records of the case do not show
that the same has been referred to the barangay court for
confrontation, conciliation or settlement of the parties concerned as
required under the provisions of Section 6 of PD 1508
 RTC dismissed the case for lack of cause of action or prematurity for
not having passed the Barangay Court.
Issue:
WON RTC erred in dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment?
Held: NO

 The records do not show that there was an opposition to the filing of
the said ejectment case on the ground that the dispute had not been
submitted to the Barangay Court for possible amicable settlement
under P.D. 1508. The only logical conclusion therefore is that either
such requirement had already been complied with or had been waived.
Under either circumstance, there appears to be no reason, much less a
requirement that this case be subjected to the provisions of P.D. 1508.
 In fact, the present controversy is an action for annulment of a
compromise judgment which as a general rule is immediately
executory and accordingly, beyond the authority of the Barangay Court
to change or modify.
PETRA VDA. DE BORROMEO, Petitioner, v. HON. JULIAN B. POGOY
Facts:
 Petitioner herein seeks to stop respondent Judge Julian B. Pogoy of the
Municipal Trial Court of Cebu City from taking cognizance of an
ejectment suit for failure of the plaintiff to refer the dispute to the
Barangay Lupon for conciliation.
 Deceased Vito Borromeo was the original owner of the building which
was leased to herein petitioner Petra Vda. De Borromeo for P500 per
month payable within the first five days of the month.
 Atty. Ricardo Reyes, administrator of the estate, served upon petitioner
a letter demanding that she pay the overdue rentals corresponding to
the period from March to September 1982, and thereafter to vacate the
premises. As petitioner failed to do so, Atty. Reyes instituted an
ejectment case against the former
 Petitioner moved to dismiss the case for failure of Atty. Reyes to refer
the dispute to the barangay court as required by PD no. 1508
 Respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss.
Issue:
WON the motion to dismiss be granted for failure to comply with PD no. 1508?
Held: NO
 Under Section 4(a) of PD No. 1508, referral of a dispute to the Barangay
Lupon is required only where the parties thereto are "individuals." An
"individual" means "a single human being as contrasted with a social
group or institution." The law applies only to cases involving natural
persons, and not where any of the parties is a juridical person such as a
corporation, partnership, corporation sole, testate or intestate, estate,
etc.
 It is indisputable that the real party in interest in the case is the
intestate estate under administration. Since the said estate is a juridical
person, plaintiff administrator may file the complaint directly in court,
without the same being coursed to the Barangay Lupon for arbitration.
ELMER PEREGRINA, ADELAIDA PEREGRINA and CECILIA PEREGRINA,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. DOMINGO D. PANIS, III, PROCOPIO SANCHEZ and CARMELITA
SANCHEZ, respondents.
Facts:
 SPOUSES Procopio and Carmelita Sanchez file a case against
PETITIONERS Elmer, Adelaida and Cecilia Peregrina for damages for
alleged disrespect for the dignity, privacy and peace of mind of the
SPOUSES under Article 26 of the Civil Code, and for alleged defamation
under Article 33 of the same Code.
 They are neighbors in Olongapo and that no conciliation proceedings
was filed.
 PETITIONERS moved for the dismissal of the complaint
 The SPOUSES applied for a Writ of Preliminary Attachment. Thereafter,
the SPOUSES presented their Opposition claiming that, under Section
6(3) of P.D. No. 1508, the parties may go directly to the Courts if the
action is coupled with a provisional remedy such as preliminary
attachment.
 Respondent Judge initially dismissed the Complaint for failure of the
SPOUSES to comply with the pre-condition for amicable settlement
under P.D. No. 1508, stating that the application for a provisional
remedy was merely an afterthought.
 On motion for reconsideration by the SPOUSES, respondent Judge
denied PETITIONERS' Motion to Dismiss on the ground that under Rule
57, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the application for attachment can
be made at the commencement of the action or any time thereafter.
Issue:
WON the judge erred in denying the motion to dismiss?
Held: YES
  Section 3 of P.D. No. 1508 provides that “disputes between or among
persons actually respectively in the same barangay shall be brought for
amicable settlement before the Lupon of said barangay.”
 SECTION 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. — No
complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within
the authority of the Lupon as provided. in Section 2 hereof shall be filed
or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication
unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon
Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been
reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary,
attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement
has been repudiated.
 P.D. No. 1508 makes the conciliation process at the Barangay level a
condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in Court. Non-
compliance with that condition precedent could affect the sufficiency of
the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to
dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity. The
condition is analogous to exhaustion of administrative remedies, or the
lack of earnest efforts to compromise suits between family members,
lacking which the case can be dismissed
 The parties herein fall squarely within the ambit of P.D. No. 1508. They
are actual residents in the same barangay and their dispute does not
fall under any of the excepted cases.
LIBRADA M. AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
ERNEST S. AURE1, respondent.
Facts:
 Aure Lending filed a Complaint for ejectment against Aquino.
 In their Complaint, Aure and Aure Lending alleged that they acquired
the subject property from a Deed of Sale.
 Aquino countered that the Complaint lacks cause of action for Aure and
Aure Lending do not have any legal right over the subject property.
 MeTC rendered in favor of Aquino and dismissed the Complaint for
ejectment of Aure and Aure Lending for non-compliance with the
barangay conciliation process, among other grounds.
 The MeTC observed that Aure and Aquino are residents of the same
barangay but there is no showing that any attempt has been made to
settle the case amicably at the barangay level.
 RTC affirmed
 CA reversed the MeTC and RTC Decisions and remanding the case to
the MeTC for further proceedings and final determination of the
substantive rights of the parties.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE BARANGAY CONCILIATION
PROCEEDINGS IS A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT THAT WARRANTS THE
DISMISSAL OFTHE COMPLAINT?
HELD: NO
 It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to comply with the
requirement of Section 412 of the Local Government Code on barangay
conciliation (previously contained in Section 5 of Presidential Decree
No. 1508) is much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies -- the complaint becomes afflicted with the
vice of pre-maturity; and the controversy there alleged is not ripe for
judicial determination. The complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion
to dismiss.
 Nevertheless, the conciliation process is not a jurisdictional
requirement, so that non-compliance therewith cannot affect the
jurisdiction which the court has otherwise acquired over the subject
matter or over the person of the defendant
 Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by
P.D. 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action
and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of
cause of action or prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court
of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication
over the case before it, where the defendants, as in this case, failed to
object to such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and even during
the entire proceedings a quo
 While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising
jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking exception thereto, they
instead invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer and
seeking affirmative relief from it. What is more, they participated in the
trial of the case by cross-examining respondent Planas. Upon this
premise, petitioners cannot now be allowed belatedly to adopt an
inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which
they had submitted themselves voluntarily.
CRISANTA ALCARAZ MIGUEL, Petitioner,
vs.
JERRY D. MONTANEZ, Respondent.

Facts:

 Jerry Montanez (Montanez) secured a loan of One Hundred Forty-Three

Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty-Four Pesos (₱143,864.00), payable in
one (1) year, or until February 1, 2002, from the petitioner.
 Due to the respondent’s failure to pay the loan, the petitioner filed a
complaint against the respondent before the Lupong Tagapamayapa
and the parties entered into a Kasunduang Pag-aayos. However,
respondent still failed to pay.
 Petitioner filed with the MeTC, a complaint for Collection of Sum of
Money.
 MeTC ordered Montanez to pay the loan
 RTC affirmed the MeTC’s decision
 CA reversed and ruled that the remedy of the petitioner was to file an
action for the execution of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos in court and not
for the collection of sum of money.
Issue:
WON a complaint for sum of money is the proper remedy for the petitioner,
notwithstanding the Kasunduang Pag-aayos?

Held: YES
 In the case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals, a party's non-compliance with
the amicable settlement paved the way for the application of Article
2041 under which the other party may either enforce the compromise,
following the procedure laid out in the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, or consider it as rescinded and insist upon his
original demand
 The Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides for a two-tiered
mode of enforcement of an amicable settlement, to wit: (a) by execution
by the Punong Barangay which is quasi-judicial and summary in nature
on mere motion of the party entitled thereto; and (b) an action in
regular form, which remedy is judicial.
 In the instant case, the respondent did not comply with the terms and
conditions of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos. Such non-compliance may be
construed as repudiation because it denotes that the respondent did
not intend to be bound by the terms thereof, thereby negating the very
purpose for which it was executed. The petitioner has the option either
to enforce the Kasunduang Pag-aayos, or to regard it as rescinded and
insist upon his original demand, in accordance with the provision of
Article 2041 of the Civil Code