CURRENT AFFAIRS www.iasscore.

in
Internal Security www.iasscore.in

Notes

Contents

• Critical Overview of Defence In India

• OROP
• Make In India in Defence
• AFSPA - Armed Forces Special Powers Act
• Bodoland -BTAD (Bodoland Territorial Area Districts)
• Chakmas and Hajongs
• Connectivity to the Region
• Passage of Three Bills by Manipur Assembly in August 2015
• Nagaland Peace Accord
• Racism / Discrimination
• Inner Line Permit for Manipur
• Doctrine of Hot Pursuit
• Anti Terror Legislations
• Gujarat Control of Terrorism and Organised Crime (GCTOC) Bill, 2015
• Development and its Linkages with Extremism
• Vikas Sangarsh Samiti - Renewal of Salwa Judum
• Being a Maoist is not Illegal

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Notes

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Critical Overview of Defence In India Notes

Standing Committee on Defence on status of Defence in India
The Standing Committee on Defence, which presented its report to Parliament
on the last day of the Monsoon Session, has highlighted several shortcomings
that need immediate attention.
Key Recommendations:
1. Wheeled Guns
a. The Defence Ministry, in its reply to the Standing Committee, had
said that “arms and ammunitions” were “by and large available”
with the Army. The Committee, headed by Major General (retd)
B.C. Khanduri, has said “it fails to understand what does ‘by and
large’ mean”.
b. The Ministry’s response, the Committee has said, gives “false hope”
that ammunition levels in the Army are as per the authorized strategic
Artillery Profile 2027. The Committee has asked the Ministry to
provide details of the programme, and to step up efforts to adhere to
timelines.
2. Missiles
a. The Army has been facing a major shortage of vehicles to carry
missiles. This has affected the deployment of missiles at strategic
locations. Replying to the Committee’s recommendations that the
private sector be engaged to make missile-carrying vans, the Defence
Ministry had said that the Defence PSU, Bharat Earth Movers
Limited, was in a position to supply the vehicles. “The planning
process of Army should not be hampered due to non-availability of
missile carrying vehicles,” the Committee has said.
3. Rifles
a. The Committee expressed “dismay” that DRDO “started working
on INSAS Rifle way back in 1982 but surprisingly it took 14 years
in its development… But just after 3 years, the quality of rifle tested
in Operation Vijay revealed that product was not up to the mark…
b. The Committee found it shocking that even after years of expertise;
DRDO has not evolved enough to develop a basic product like rifle
up to global standards”. Lacunae in the weapon were revealed by the
1999 Kargil conflict, but DRDO has not been able to provide a good
rifle to the Army. The Committee has asked why rifles were not
being procured from elsewhere.
4. Manpower
a. As revealed by replies in Parliament and disclosures made to the
Standing Committee, the Armed Forces face a major shortage of
officers, especially in junior ranks.
b. According to the Committee’s report, the Army is short of 9,642
officers — 40,095 against the stipulated strength of 49,737. The
Navy is 1,561 officers short, and the IAF 659.

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c. Attempts are being made to address the situation by making short

service commission more attractive. It is hoped that attractive perks Notes
and recommendations of the Sixth Pay Commission would be able
to attract youngsters to the profession of arms. The Committee has
asked the Ministry to explore the reasons behind younger people no
longer looking at the armed forces as a career.
5. Lack of Funds
a. The Defence Ministry has noted the lack of funds as one of the
reasons behind porous pockets along the India-Myanmar border.
b. The Ministry, in its reply to the Standing Committee, has said that
“non-allotment of funds” to the Border Roads Organisation (BRO)
resulted in only 4.5 km of the proposed 15.73 km fence along the
border being completed.
c. The Defence Ministry’s disclosure is significant in the backdrop of
the recent killing of 18 Army personnel by insurgents in Manipur
along the India-Myanmar border. The Army had carried out a cross
border raid subsequent to the attack. “
d. Assam Rifles is mandated to guard the 1,631 km India-Myanmar
border. All Assam Rifles units and formations operate under the
command of the Army. 15 battalions of Assam Rifles with 77
Company Operating Bases are deployed along the strategic border.
Seven of these battalions are in Manipur.
6. IAF Trainer
a. The Intermediate Jet Trainer project by state-owned Hindustan
Aeronautics Limited has run into troubled waters. The project that
started in 1999 has made no headway, the Committee has noted.
The non-induction of IJT Sitara has compelled the IAF to extend
the life of the Kiran trainers. “By not taking effective steps to procure
trainer, the government is jeopardising the lives of our pilots,” the
Committee has noted. Experts have blamed the absence of trainers
for the spate of MiG-21 crashes.
Steps by NDA Government
1. Within a year, the Narendra Modi government has brought significant
changes to India’s defence policy.
2. It has ended the paralysis on arms acquisition and put greater emphasis
on creating a defence industrial base.
3. It has encouraged the participation of private and foreign capital in Indian
defence production. These initiatives have created a much better policy
environment for the DTTI.
4. Equally important, Defence Minister Parrikar has demonstrated the political
will to shake things up in the MoD, which had become acutely sclerotic
under Antony’s extended reign. Parrikar decisively cut through the
bureaucratic logjam on the purchase of Rafale fighters.
5. He has also taken the surgeon’s knife to the DRDO. After sacking the
DRDO chief earlier, Parrikar has separated the posts of DRDO chief and
scientific advisor to the defence minister.

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6. For the first time since Indira Gandhi brought a young scientist, V.S.
Arunachalam, to head the DRDO in the early 1980s, Parrikar has injected Notes
younger blood into leadership positions.

OROP
1. Meaning of One Rank One Pension:
a. OROP implies that uniform pension be paid to the Armed Forces
personnel retiring in the same rank with the same length of service
irrespective of their date of retirement and any future enhancement
in the rates of pension to be automatically passed on to the past
pensioners
b. It also implies “bridging the gap between the rate of pension of the
current pensioners and the past pensioners, and also future
enhancements in the rate of pension to be automatically passed on
to the past pensioners”.
2. Evolution of the Movement:
a. OROP was the basis for determining the pension and benefits of Indian
Armed Forces till 1973, when it was terminated by the Indian Ministry
of Defence (MOD).
b. The termination of OROP, and drastic decrease in Armed Forces
soldiers’ pension from 70 percent to 37 percent of last pay drawn,
two years after 1971 Bangladesh war, caused disquiet in the Indian
Armed Forces and, since 2008, has been cause of public appeals and
protests, and hunger strikes by armed forces veterans, the
overwhelming majority of whom retire before they are forty years
old.
c. Koshiyari Committee: Growing unease in the Armed Forces, and
escalating protest by veterans, with implementation of OROP as
focus, led to setting up of a ten-member all-party Parliamentary
Panel, known as the Koshyari Committee after its chairman, to
examine the OROP issue. The Koshyari Committee after considering
the evidence, and hearing oral depositions for eight months, in
December 2011, unanimously found merit in OROP and strongly
recommended that, ‘Government should implement OROP in the
defence forces across the board at the earliest and further that for
future, the pay, allowances, pension, family pension, etc., in respect
of the defence personnel should be determined by a separate
commission’.
Despite the Koshyari Committee report, public commitments,
including in the parliament, and visible disaffection amongst the
armed force veterans, the UPA Government was slow to reach out
to the veterans and implement OROP.
d. The recently formed NDA government after it assumed office
continued to make pledges, and promises, but was slow to implement
OROP, raising doubts about its commitment to implement OROP
according to the accepted definition.
e. On 5 September 2015, the NDA Government following 83 days of
protest announced, unilaterally, the implementation the ‘OROP
Scheme’ for the Armed Forces.

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3. Arguments Against the OROP:

Notes
a. Financial burden of its implementation will be 12,000 crore (said in
2011).
b. Administrative challenges : it a gigantic task, records of early 80s are
manually maintained.
c. If OROP is accepted for the Armed Forces, then there will be similar
demands from the civilian pensioners, 
d. All central pay commissions have opposed it since 1970s.
4. Arguments in Favor of it
a. Importance of rank is inherent in armed forces. These ranks are even
allowed to be retained by the individual concerned after his/her
retirement. Hence, two armed personnel in the same rank and equal
length of service should get same pension.
b. To the argument that there will be similar demands from the civilian
pensioners, Koshyari Committee argued that civilian terms and
conditions of service are not comparable with military conditions
which are ‘tougher and harsher’ (risk to life, adverse family life).
After retirement they have a limited job opportunity.
c. Demand of OROP for armed forces has been considered time and
again by various committees of the Government and Central Pay
Commissions. This shows the merit in demand.
d. It’s a cause of disquiet in the Armed Forces, who are already critical
of govt. for their low salaries.
e. Koshyari committee cited its non-implementation as a case of
bureaucratic apathy. The higher posts in Ministry of defence is
manned by IAS who are not familiar with the working of armed
forces.
f. OROP is affordable as it is small fraction of the defense budget. At
present, our defence budget is Rs 250,000 crore.
g. Delays in its implementation will damage the pride of the veterans
and lowering the morale of the armed forces.
5. Features of OROP Announced by Government in September 2015:
a. Will keep certain premature retirement (PMR) categories out of
OROP like those who have taken VRS or penalized with
administrative strictures. 
b. “Pension equalization or adjustment” to be done at five-year intervals
c. Base year for pension fixation is calendar year 2013.
d. Set-up of a one-man judicial commission to submit its report on
OROP implementation in six months.
e. Pension of old retirees to be fixed at the average of the maximum
and minimum retirees.

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6. Criticism of OROP features Announced by Government

Notes
a. “Pension equalization or adjustment” to be done at least once every
two years
b. Base year for pension fixation to be financial year 2013-4
c. Five-member committee would have been better, with three of
representatives from armed forces, to submit its report within a
month. 
d. Pension of old retirees to be fixed at the maximum of current retirees.

Make In India in Defence

India is probably the only large country in the world which is overwhelmingly
dependent on external sources for its defence requirements. According
to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India is the world’s
largest arms importer, accounting for 14 per cent of global arms import during
2009-13. Replying to a question in the Rajya Sabha, the Union Defence Minister
stated that India spent a whopping Rs. 83,458.31 crore on arms imports in a
matter of three years ending 2013-14. This dependency on arms import is a
stark reminder of how far India is from the objective of substantive self-
reliance in defence production that it has aspired to since the early days of
independence.
However all is not lost. The ‘Make in India’ (MII) initiative launched by the
government offers a ray of hope. Under the initiative, 25 sectors including
defence manufacturing have been identified to revive India’s industrial growth
and more importantly propel the nation as a global manufacturing hub. If the
objectives of the MII are to be realized in the defence manufacturing sector,
the government needs to address some pressing issues that have hindered
India’s drive for self-reliance.
Present Institutional Mechanism for Defence Manufacturing and Challenges
in it
a. The greatest weakness in India’s defence manufacturing is the lack of a
high-powered institution that can lay out a long term roadmap for the
defence industry, set a target for the industry, monitor the progress, and
more importantly bring all the stakeholders on one platform and commit
to the common cause of MII or self-reliance.
b. In the absence of such an institution, crucial decisions with far reaching
implications are being pursued by various stakeholders in a piecemeal
fashion, and often at cross-purposes. For instance, while the armed forces
are interested in acquiring equipment in the shortest possible timeframe
without being too concerned about where it is acquired from, the Defence
Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the premier R&D
agency of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), seems content with endless
design and development efforts, with scant respect to timelines and the
sanctioned budget.
c. For their part, the defence production agencies, major parts of which are
owned by the government, appear to be happy manufacturing, while the
technology for it is not in their control. Consequently, the focus of
producing defence equipment in-house and achieving true self-reliance
loses focus and India ultimately ends up importing.

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d. Government has created a Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) that would,

“lay down the broad objectives of the long term equipment policies and Notes
planning on production, simplification of procedures.” However, as the
name suggests, the DAC is geared towards addressing the short-term
procurement-related hurdles rather than addressing the concerns of the
domestic industry for achieving self-reliance in the long term. As a matter
of fact, indigenisation is a mere by-product of the DAC’s decisions rather
than being the cornerstone. For the MII to become a reality in the defence
manufacturing sector and more importantly for the initiative to become a
self-sustaining drive, the long existing culture of apathy towards indigenous
defence manufacturing needs to change.
Defence Manufacturing and R&D Plan
a. The apathy towards in-house production of defence equipment is perhaps
best exemplified in the way various defence plans are prepared and pursued.
True, India has a well-articulated, if not the best, system of drawing defence
plans that covers three distinct time periods: 15-year Long Term Integrated
Perspective Plan (LTIPP), five-year Services Capital Acquisition Plan
(SCAP) and two-year roll-on Annual Acquisition Plan (AAP). All these
plans are prepared with a focus on ‘acquiring’ the best possible equipment
available in the world. The DRDO and domestic industry are completely
ignored in the planning process. To make matters worse, there is no channel
for the armed forces to provide advance information to the domestic
industry so as to enable the latter to come up with detailed financial,
technological and industrial plans to meet the requirements in a timeframe
that is acceptable to the armed forces. The Technological Perspective and
Capability Roadmap (TPCR), announced in April 2013 as a means to
bridge this gap, has been disappointing and regarded as completely useless
by both industry and analysts for its lack of specificities and absence of
any commitment from the government.
b. Consequently, when the acquisition process begins, it is often too late for
the R&D and production agencies to offer a solution. To overcome this
difficulty, the Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister, in a
report of September 2013, had recommended that  it would be useful to
“convert the LTIPP into a defence manufacturing and R&D plan”. More
significantly, the advisory council had suggested that the conversion should
be undertaken by a joint working group involving all important stakeholders
including the Indian industry and R&D establishments. This vital
recommendation does not seem to have received the required attention of
the policy makers. Since much of the success of MII lies in translating the
long term requirement of the armed forces into technological and industrial
outputs, it is high time that the government comes out with a detailed
plan for the industry and R&D agencies at the earliest. The plan, in order
to be successful, must identify specific projects that would be executed by
local agencies.
Research and Development: Looking Beyond the DRDO
a. One of the unique features of India’s defence industrialisation process has
been the near monopoly enjoyed by the DRDO over defence research and
development. This began with the establishment of the DRDO in 1958
and has been perpetuated ever since. The dependence on DRDO for
technology has however not yielded the desired results. Despite having a
large pool of scientists/engineers and over 50 labs and establishments, the

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DRDO has been beset with many a problem leading to failures and cost
and time overruns in the projects undertaken. This, combined with lack Notes
of R&D in industry and academia, has compelled the country to source
technology from outside, leading to a vicious cycle where initial imports
lead to further imports.
b. Compared to India, other advanced defence manufacturing countries
encourage R&D at diverse sources that include dedicated research institutes,
universities and industry. The model followed by many counties is one of
R&D management, rather than limiting it to one agency. For instance, the
Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) of the US, which has
been at the heart of the several radical innovations including in the areas
of stealth, internet, Global Positioning System(GPS) and Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle (UAV), does not do R&D on its own. In fact, DARPA does not
own a single lab of its own! Rather, it identifies talent and ideas from
industry, academia, government laboratories and individuals, and awards
R&D contracts to be executed in typical time scales of three-to-five
years. DARPA’s role is limited to short listing of projects and managing
the programmes, which it does through 140-odd programme managers.
c. In order to expand its R&D base, India also needs to have an institution
similar to DARPA. For this to happen there is need to look beyond the
DRDO. The Scientific Advisor to Raksha Mantri (SA to RM) who is also
Secretary, Defence Research & Development and Director General DRDO, 
should be relieved of his daily duties at the DRDO and given a role like
that of the head of DARPA or OCS with a dedicated R&D fund at his
disposal. This will not only create a healthy competition between DRDO
labs and other agencies, but also lead to more innovation.
Human Resource Development
a. Unlike in most other sectors, defence industry requires a highly skilled
labour force. Currently, there is hardly any thinking on how to create a
robust human resource base both in terms of number and quality. Clear
evidence to this effect is visible in the DRDO, which is the premier
institution for India’s defence innovation. The number of scientists at
DRDO has not increased since 2001, although the number of projects has
increased exponentially, with the organisation currently pursing 44 major
projects (each costing over Rs 100 crore) worth Rs. 39,560 crore.
Private Sector as Equal Partner
a. Although the Indian defence industry was opened to the private sector in
2001, the latter is yet to contribute in any meaningful manner. The biggest
hindrance in the private sector’s participation so far has been mistrust.
When it comes to big contracts, procedural hurdles come in the way,
making it virtually impossible for the private sector to get into complex
defence manufacturing. Moreover, single source procurement from the
private sector is still considered a taboo, whereas import without
competition is greatly admired.
b. For the MII to succeed there is a need to change the mind-set and treat
the private sector as an equal partner. This can only be demonstrated by
awarding big contracts, preferably through the ‘Make’ and ‘Buy and Make
(Indian)’ procurement categories, which hold the key to the success of the
private sector’s participation in defence production. For the government,
it is imperative to announce a list of contracts which can be awarded
under these two categories.

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A Conducive Financial Framework

Notes
a. The Indian defence industry, however, operates in a hostile financial
framework that tends to render it less competitive vis-à-vis foreign
manufactures. It operates in a double-digit interest regime compared to
the nearly zero interest rate system prevalent in Europe, US and many
other countries. This increases the cost of working capital for the Indian
industr y which is reflected in the final products, making them
uncompetitive vis-à-vis the products offered by foreign manufactures. The
Indian industry also suffers on account of the variation in exchange rates.
As per the MoD’s Defence Procurement Procedures (DPP), local private
companies winning contracts under the ‘Buy (Indian)’ category are required
to bear all the risks associated with exchange rate variation (ERV). Non-
protection against ERV has, however, led several companies to virtual
bankruptcy due to a wide variation in exchange rates as has been witnessed
in the recent past.
b. Apart from the above, Indian industry also suffers from prevailing taxes
and duties, which offer virtually no incentive for any local company to
undertake defence production.
Reform DRDO, DPSUs and Ofs
a. It is a fact that much of India’s defence industrial woes are attributable
to the inefficiency of the three major players ­ – DRDO, the Defence
Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) and the Ordnance Factories (OFs) ­–
which, despite having a long presence in the sector, are yet to become
globally competitive. Several efforts have been made in the past to reform
these organisations but all have failed due to vested interests and lack of
political will. Given that these are major players and their functioning will
have a direct impact on the MII initiative, it is imperative to examine
afresh the recommendations given by several past committees. Among
others, the OFs should be corporatized and made more accountable for
their functioning. All the unlisted DPSUs need to be listed in the stock
exchanges to bring in transparency and enhance their corporate governance.
The recommendations of the Rama Rao Committee on DRDO, especially
the one for creation of a defence technology commission, should also be
implemented at the earliest.
Summary and Recommendations
The ‘Make in India’ (MII) drive  of Prime Minister Narendra Modi offers a
way of improving the country’s self-reliance in defence production. However,
for the MII to succeed in the defence manufacturing sector, the government
needs to address some legacy issues. These are:
a. Establish a Defence Minister’s Council on Production (DCMP) to prepare
a long term roadmap and set a target for the defence industry, monitor
progress, and, more importantly, bring all the stakeholders on one platform
and subscribe to the vision of MII.
b. Convert the Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) of the Indian
armed forces into a defence manufacturing and R&D plan, to be executed
by local entities.
c. Promote a certain degree of defence research and development outside
the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).

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d. Set up a dedicated defence technology university on the lines of the

Indian Institute of Space Science and Technology to meet the vast human Notes
resource requirement of defence.
e. Treat the private sector as an equal partner and expedite big-ticket contracts
to be awarded to them under the ‘Make’ and ‘Buy and Make (Indian)’
procurement categories.
f. Create a conducive financial framework that incentivises defence
manufacturing by domestic industry.
g. Reform DRDO, Defence Public Sector Undertaking (DPSUs) and Ordnance
Factories (OFs) along the lines suggested by past committees appointed
by the Government.
Conclusion
As per the official estimate of the MoD, India is likely to spend around $130
billion on defence modernisation in the coming seven-to-eight years.  While
this makes India one of the largest defence markets in the world, the opportunity
it offers should be fully exploited for the benefit of local industry. This will not
only improve India’s self-reliance in defence production but will have a multiplier
effect on the wider economy. The government must ensure that the local
industry is geared and incentivised enough to rise up to the expectations and
make the government’s ‘Make in India’ initiative a success story.

AFSPA – Armed Forces Special Powers Act

1. AFSPA is imposed in areas declared as disturbed under section two of the
act.
2. The ‘special powers’ of armed forces under Section 4 are -
a. ‘Power to use force, including open fire’ at an individual if he
violates laws which prohibit (a) the assembly of five or more persons;
or (b) carrying of weapons.
b. ‘Power to arrest’ without a warrant; (Under section 5 the Armed
Forces have to hand over the arrested person to the nearest Police
Station “with the least possible delay”.
c. ‘Power to seize and search’ without any warrant any premise.
These armed forces are immune from prosecution unless Union Government
provides sanction to the prosecuting agencies.
3. At present the act has been in place in 2 regions (i) some areas of J&K
and (ii) North east (except Sikkim and Tripura ).
4. In May 2015, Tripura government announced the withdrawal of AFSPA
from the state.
5. Arguments for retaining AFSPA –
a. Need to control insurgency
b. Can even lead to secession
6. Arguments against AFSPA –
a. Across states, insurgencies seem to be winding down

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i. In J&K, toll has come down from 4,500 in 2001 to 40 till May
2015.
Notes
ii. In NE, death toll has reduced from 717 in 2005 to 122 in 2015.
b. License to kill and immunity has led to alleged extra-judicial killings,
human rights abuse
i. Santosh Hegde commission in 2013 found that 6 encounters
done in manipur were “not genuine”.
ii. Union govt. hasn’t prosecuted the armed forces for human right
abuses done in J&K (amnesty international report in July 2015)
c. In fact it has increased alienation among people and thus instead of
preventing secession, can lead to secession.
d. Like Tripura follow a multi-dimensional approach to counter-
insurgency.
i. Counter-insurgency operations were led by a trained and
reorganized state police rather than the army. This led to
1. Establishing state presence,
2. Increased accountability by Govt., thus fewer complaints of
human rights violation.
ii. Provide jobs and basic services for people in affected areas,
iii. Opportunities for surrendered militants to return to the
mainstream.
e. Against FRs of people.
7. Recommendations of BP Jeevan Reddy Commission
a. AFSPA should be repealed and its appropriate provisions should be
inserted in the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
b. Clearly defined powers of armed forces.
c. Establish a Grievance redressal mechanism in each district where the
armed forces are deployed.

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DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH-EAST OF INDIA

Notes
Bodoland –BTAD (Bodoland Territorial Area
Districts)
1. Background
a. Bodoland or BTAD created in 2003 consists of four districts of
Assam, namely, Kokrajhar, Chirang, Baksa and Udalguri.
b. A Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) created under 6TH Schedule of
the Constitution has been given legislative powers over 40 subjects.
c. Demography of bodoland: 30 % of the population is Bodos (who are
STs) and rest comprises of tribals, Bengali Muslims and Hindus and
Assamese.
2. Violence in bodoland is a common feature. In past 5 years some 3,500
riots have been reported, most recent being the December 2014 Violence
by NDFB (songbijit) against adivasis and retaliatory violence.
3. Reason for Violence
a. Demand for a separate state of bodoland,
b. Occupation of their land by illegal Bangladeshi migrants.
c. Illegal migration from Bangladesh who have settled on their land
(loss of land rights),
d. Adivasis demand to be included in ST list.
i. They argue that 34 of the 40 seats of BTC are reserved for
STs. Now bodos having ST status dominates it, although they
are only 34% of population.
ii. This is opposed by Bodos who don’t want to lose power.
4. Solution
a. Security measures
i. Have permanent security forces here.
ii. Intensify operations against the militants.
iii. Curb the proliferation of illegal weapons.
iv. Seek cooperation from Bhutan and Bangladesh.
b. Solve underlying reasons
i. Stop illegal migration and update land records.
ii. Ensure equal rights and opportunities to all socio-religious and
ethnic communities in the area and if need arises then review
the BTAD model, where the minority Bodos rule over the
majority non-Bodos.

Chakmas and Hajongs

1. Overview
a. Chakmas are Buddhist, while Hajongs are Hindus.
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b. They were inhabitants of the Chittagong Hill Tracts of erstwhile

East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) who migrated to India and settled in
Notes
Arunachal Pradesh due to following reasons
i. Their land was submerged by the Kaptai dam in the 1960s.
ii. Faced religious persecution in East Pakistan.
2. Supreme Court in September 2015 ordered that Chakmas and Hajongs
needed to be protected, and their claims of citizenship need to consider
“as per applicable procedure”. Reasons –
a. Almost all present-day Chakmas and Hajongs were born in India
thus should be citizens by birth.
b. Settlement of (these) people in AP will help in developing the
unoccupied regions. Besides, the presence of stretches of vacant land
along the border is strategically not desirable.
3. AP governemnt argued that they were not against Indian citizenship for
Chakmas and Hajongs, but objected to their permanent settlement in
Arunachal.
a. Their settlement goes against the Inner Line Permit provisions,
b. Dilute the constitutional safeguards for the indigenous communities
of the state,
c. Affects the demography of state thus threatens their identity and
puts pressure on its limited resources. (Acc. To a 1998 white paper,
numbers of chakma had increased by 300% from the original numbers
in 1965)
4. AP governemnt subsequently filed a review petition in SC.

Connectivity to the Region

1. Present Status
a. 99% of NE border are international; only 1% is connected to mainland
via a narrow Siliguri corridor (aka chicken neck corridor); NH-31
passes through it.
b. Rail connectivity is poor. E.g. Meghalaya got its first rail connectivity
in 2014; capitals of Manipur, Nagaland, Mizoram and Sikkim are
still off the map.
c. Air connectivity is also confined to few regions only. It is Pawan
Hans Helicopters Ltd, which provides helicopter services in some
states with subsidy from Government for carriage of passengers,
emergency/medical evacuation.
d. Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project is in limbo –The
project envisages
i. Connectivity between Indian Ports on the eastern seaboard and
Sittwe Port in Myanmar.
ii. And then through riverine transport and by road to Mizoram.

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2. Reasons
Notes
a. Ignored by central government as NE doest constitutes an attractive
constituency (under 4% of population); 25 seats in LS (for NE &
Sikkim).
b. Faraway from Delhi, thus attention not given.
c. Ignored by media.
d. Continuing insurgency which prevents execution by government.
3. Consequences
a. Prevents Socio-economic development.
b. Difficult to monitor situation over.
c. Strategic – can be blocked by NE insurgents and even by china in
future conflict.
d. Poor border roads will ensure delays supply to our armed personnel
guarding the NE borders.
4. Solution
a. Execute the projects ASAP by outing a special person/agency in
charge for it.
b. Focus on air-connectivity as the terrain is inhospitable for development
of roads and railways. For this do the following
i. Development of small low cost ‘no-frill‘ airports.
ii. Development of regional airlines.
iii. For this provide subsidies.
5. Steps by NDA Government to Connect NE
a. Kolkata – Dhaka – Agartala bus service started in June 2015. Kolkata
to Agartala via chicken neck corridor takes 36 hours, but via this
route only 16 hours.
b. Guwahati-Dhaka bus service started in June 6, 2015.
c. Signing of BBIN-MVC agreement.
d. Moving towards implementing of IMT – India Myanmar Thailand
highway.
e. In April 2015 Govt. announced a direct daily air flight from Delhi
to Dimapur in Nagaland via Kolkata.

Passage of Three Bills by Manipur Assembly in

August 2015
1. In august 2015, on 31 August 2015, State Government headed by Ibobi
Singh hurriedly enacted three Bills in the State Assembly. The Bills are:
a. Protection of Manipur People (PMP) Bill-2015 – it fixes 1951 as the
base year to detect outsiders.

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b. Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reform (MLRLR) Bill-2015 –

aims at preventing alienation of land in the Imphal Valley from the
Notes
Meitis.
c. Manipur Shops and Establishments (MSE) Bill-2015 – to monitor
the engagement of non-Manipuris by the State’s commercial and
private establishments.
2. Justification for Passing of Bills
a. These bills along with ILP will control the flow of non-Manipuri to
the State.
b. Critics argue that the incumbent CM Ibobi Singh is himself a meitei,
thus it was case of vote-bank politics.
3. The situation in Manipur has turned volatile as the enactment of bills was
criticized on following ground
a. Hill tribes (Kukis, Mizos and Chins) who feel that they will identified
as outsiders/refugees as they came to Manipur after 1951 or their
lineage may not meet the list of criteria set out in the Bills.
b. The processing of these Bills was done in a non-consultative manner,
thus violating the constitution (Article 371C – hold prior consultations
with tribal representatives elected from the hill areas of the State,
before any enactment involving the interests of tribal people).
c. Hill tribes argue that documentation of residential status in 1951 was
extremely poor, thus taking a clear-cut view on the ‘native people of
the State‘ is highly contentious issue.
d. Since starting, the Hill tribes have remained backward relative to the
Imphal Valley districts. Govt. has done little to improve their
conditions, thus it’s natural for them to migrate down.
i. Manipur does not have a good track record of devolution of powers
and resources to its district and autonomous councils – in the hill
districts as well as in the plains.
4. Way Forward
a. In all probability, formal assent to these Bills by the future Governor
of Manipur will not be a smooth affair.
b. All this has increased the enmity between hills and valley tribes and
thus will renew the militancy.

Nagaland Peace Accord

1. Background
a. Nagas are a congeries of tribes living in eastern Himalayas (Naga
Hills) along the Burma border.
b. The two major demands of the Naga movement are independence
and creation of greater Nagaland by merging of Naga-inhabited areas
of AP, Assam, and Manipur
2. On August 3, 2015, Naga Peace Accord (a framework agreement) was
signed between the National Socialist Council of Nagalim-Isak-Muivah
(NSCN-IM) and the Government of India.

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3. Details of Accord – Although exact details of the accord are not out, but
following has been reported through media and experts Notes
a. There is a ceasefire agreement till April 27, 2016.
b. They will drop their demand of sovereignty.
c. Non-Territorial Framework – under this Instead of Greater Nagalim,
there will be greater autonomy for Naga in other states by
establishment of autonomous district councils. Thus there won’t be
any territorial division of other states.
4. Critical Analysis:
Benefits
a. Advantages of a Non-Territorial Framework for all –
i. To AP, Assam and Manipur – maintain the territorial status
quo while only giving up developmental privileges in their Naga
inhabited areas to a new Naga non-territorial body.
ii. To Nagas – meet their core demands – such as recognition of
their “unique history” and culture, Naga leverage over deciding
the development path for the Naga inhabited areas, etc.
b. Accord has been signed with the strongest insurgent group, the NSCN
(IM) which moreover has demonstrated representation across tribes.
Rival group NSCN (K) is on decline.
c. The accord is supported by various Naga civil society groups (shows
that it enjoys support among people).
d. It shows the flexibility and realism of the NSCN (IM) to alter goals.
e. Resolution of Naga conflict can offer a way forward to resolving
many other ethnic conflicts in the region such as those involving
Kukis, Meiteis, Bodos, Dimasas, Hmars, and Karbis.
Challenges
a. The exact details are still not out.
b. It’s a framework agreement only, the groundwork needs to be done.
c. Not an all group/party accord –
i. Rival faction NSCN (khaplang) has been excluded from accord – it
broke ceasefire with GOI in March 2015 and following it up with the
June 4 ambush in Manipur that killed 20 military personnel.
ii. Shillong accord of 1975 wasn’t accepted by some leaders of Naga
movement and led to formation of NSCN. Thus it needs to be all-
party accord.
d. It will be opposed by other three states.
e. Can be a time-buying step by NSCN (IM) to regroup itself. According to
intelligence, post accord, it has increased its cadre strength.
5. Way forward
a. Naga movement leader should remember the following
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i. In 2014 general elections, Nagaland recorded a voter turnout

of 87% which shows faith of Naga people in Indian democracy. Notes
ii. Mizo peace accord, 1985 ended the insurgency and led to
development of Mizoram (has peace and highest literacy).
b. So what’s the way forward
i. Bring NSCN (K) also on board via negotiations. If it doesn’t
then Reach out to Myanmar and formulate a coordinated
mechanism to deal with separatist and terror groups using hard
power.
ii. Prevent illegal migration from Bangladesh which threatens their
identity.
iii. Protect their indigenous rights of land.
iv. Aim for socio-economic development of the region. Following
recent steps in this direction are a good move.
1. Budget 2015 announced the creation of Indian Institute of
Science Education and Research (IISER) to be setup in
Nagaland.
2. In April 2015 Govt announced a direct daily air flight
from Delhi to Dimapur in Nagaland via Kolkata.

Racism / Discrimination
1. According to Bezbaruah committee report, 86 percent of NE in Delhi
face some type of racial discrimination.
2. Ways of discrimination
a. Landlords refusing accommodation.
b. Being called as chinki, noodles, Momos, etc
c. Considered as foreigners
3. Reasons for discrimination
a. Unique identity of north eastern states.
b. Poor awareness of their cultural heritage due to neglect by media,
school textbooks.
c. Attitude of neglect by government.
4. Recommendations by Bezbaruah committee – submitted report in July,
2014
a. Legal Aspect
i. Have a Law against racial discrimination by making offence
cognizable and non-Bailable.
ii. Make NE people aware of their legal rights by undertaking
awareness campaigns, introducing lectures in universities.
iii. Time-bound prosecution (Investigation of the FIR should be
completed in 60 days by a special squad, trial should be
completed in 90 days by a special prosecutor).
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b. Education
Notes
i. Have chapters on NE culture in schools curriculum.
ii. Higher education institutions should be setup in NE areas, so
that large scale migration doesn’t happen.
c. Use of social media in improving communication with the
community.
d. Sports
i. Hold national and international events in the North East.
ii. Promote Indigenous games of the North East.
5. Some steps by Government
a. Under the ‘Ishan Uday’ scheme scholarships to granted for
undergraduates.
b. Under the ‘Ishan Vikas’ scheme, select students will be taken to the
IITs, the NITs for internship.

Inner Line Permit for Manipur

1. Since July 2015, in Manipur there is a renewed demand of imposition of
ILP (inner line permit)
a. ILP is a system making it mandatory for Indian citizens to seek
permission from entering the state.
b. ILP is currently in operation in Mizoram, AP and Nagaland. Manipur
had the system of ILP but it was abolished in 1950.
2. Arguments for it
a. Manipuri (esp. Meitei’s living in valley) fear that like in Tripura, they
too will too become a minority in their land due to influx of outsiders
who are buying their Ancestral land.
i. According to 2001 census size of the migrant community (7
lakh) was nearly as much as that of the dominant ethnic Meiteis
(7.5 lakh).
b. Criminals flee to Manipur to escape arrest in their States and indulge
in criminal activities here.
c. Although people have the FR to move freely throughout the territory
of India (19(1)(d)) and to settle in any part of the territory of India
(19(1)(e)). However, constitution also says that this right can be
restricted in tribal areas to protect the distinctive culture, language,
and customs of Tribals and prevent their exploitation.
d. “One-sixth of the total area” of Manipur has been leased out for oil
exploration and drilling to international oil majors without sharing of
benefits with them.
3. These concerns are understandable, but does the solution lie in the ILP?
a. Firstly ILP is a colonial-era permit system introduced by the British
to protect their commercial interests, particularly in oil and tea.

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b. Manipur should realize that it can emerge as a major trading hub to

Southeast Asia esp. with the implementation of BCIM corridor (it Notes
will pass through Barak valley of Manipur) and IMT trilateral
highway. But having ILP will keep people as well as capital outside
their state thus stunting their eco growth.
c. What Government should do?
i. Don’t compromise on the rights and entitlements of the local
population.
ii. Don’t follow a piece-meal approach instead follow a long-term,
composite agenda for the region. E.g. Opposing ILP for Manipur
while allowing it for Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland and Mizoram
is wrong.
iii. Do socio-eco development.

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TERRORISM
Doctrine of Hot Pursuit Notes
1. Hot pursuit means crossing the international boundary in pursuit of terror
groups.
2. The international law principle of hot pursuit is analogous to the common
law principle, but was probably conceived independently. It began to
coalesce into a general custom of international relations during the early
years of the 20th century, although the general principle had been advanced
before in national legislation such as the British Hovering Acts.
The participating states at the League of Nations Codification
Conference of 1930 broadly agreed on the validity of the right of hot
pursuit, but the proposed convention on territorial waters in which it was
included was never ratified. It was finally codified as Article 23 of
the Geneva Convention on the High Seas in 1958.
3. The Geneva Convention on the High Seas was eventually folded into
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Article 111 of the
latter treaty grants a coastal state the right to pursue and arrest ships
escaping to international waters, as long as:
a. The pursuers are competent authorities of the state;
b. They have good reason to believe that the pursued ship has violated
the state’s laws or regulations;
c. The pursuit begins while the pursuing ship is in the State’s internal
waters or territorial waters; and
d. The pursuit is continuous.
4. If the foreign ship is within a contiguous zone, the Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ), the Continental Shelf, and the Safety Zones in the EEZ or
the Continental Shelf then the pursuit may only be undertaken if there
has been a violation of the rules and regulations (customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal state) as
applicable in the respective regimes (areas, zones).
5. The right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued enters the
territorial sea of a foreign state.
6. Where a coastal state, stopping or arresting a foreign ship outside the
territorial sea on the basis of its right of hot pursuit, fails to justify the
exercise, it shall be liable to compensate the ship for any loss or damage
cause to it due to the exercise of this right.
7. This right is particularly relevant to fisheries management, maritime
pollution laws, and the seaborne illegal drug trade.
8. In addition, some have proposed translating the maritime right of hot
pursuit into a comparable right to pursue criminals over land borders.
Although it does not form a settled tenet of international law, the principle
has been invoked by the United States regarding Taliban militants crossing
into Pakistan, by Turkey regarding its attacks on Kurdistan Workers
Party bases in northern Iraq, and by Colombia regarding its raid on
a Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia camp in Ecuador, which led
to the 2008 Andean diplomatic crisis.

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Critical Analysis
Notes
1. It was in news when in June 2015 after Indian army crossed into Myanmar
territory to raid NSCN (Khaplang) camps without Myanmar’s consent.
Now this led to a debate on the issue.
2. Arguments in favor
a. It was done in response to attack by militants on the Indian Army
in Manipur on June 4, 2015.
b. Every country has the right to protect its boundary.
c. Myanmar’s relation with NSCN(K) are warming up, it wouldn’t have
helped us the way Bhutan and Bangladesh did.
d. These terror outfits are taking benefits of the border i.e. after
conducting strikes they went back to Myanmar knowing that Indian
forces won’t cross the border. In this asymmetric warfare, they don’t
have an option.
e. India has a reputation of respecting the sovereignty of other country,
hasn’t invaded any till now, and so won’t do this unnecessarily.
3. Arguments Against
a. The doctrine of hot pursuit lacks legal validity on land. It has validity
only in high seas. This doctrine has been codified only for navy to
cross international waters under United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea). But no such doctrine has been codified for state
to pursue criminals crossing land border.
b. As the term is open-ended/vague thus armed forces can use it
attack not only militants, but even armed forces thus leading to war
among the nations.
c. It will set a bad precedent as other countries can also start using
it to cross border.
d. If Myanmar had done the same vis-à-vis India then how would we
have reacted?
e. It is more to assert regional dominance and coerce neighbours.
f. Even a possibility of military action justified by hot pursuit can fuel
wide-scale humanitarian crises e.g. displacing the innocent people.
4. Way forward
a. First option is that the 2 countries should coordinate so no need
arises (like Bhutan and Bangladesh did).
b. If not then cross the border as everything is valid to protect our
sovereignty. but only for self-defense, not to assert dominance.
c. And quote the expanded doctrine of self defense under UN charter
instead of hot pursuit (which lacks legality) – which is used by many
states after 9/11 to deal with non-state actors. It is more acceptable.
d. And above all stop chest-thumping as witnessed in its aftermath.
Remain silent while doing it.

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Anti Terror Legislations Notes

Context – Gujarat Control of Terrorism and Organised Crime (GCTOC) Bill,
2015
Laws – Governement has passed the following laws with respect to Terrorism

Name of law Status

1. TADA, 1985Ter rorist Status: Repealed
and Disruptive Activities
(Prevention) Act Details:
• It was the first anti-terrorism law legislated by the government to define
and counter terrorist activities.
• It was in force between 1985 and 1995 under the background of Punjab
insurgency and was applied to whole of India.
• It was allowed to lapse in 1995 due to increasing unpopularity due to
widespread allegations of abuse. 

2. POTA, 2002Prevention Status: Repealed

of Terrorism Act, 2002 Details:
• It was an anti-terrorism legislation enacted by in 2002. It was supported
by the governing National Democratic Alliance.
• The act was enacted due to several terrorist attacks that took place in
India especially the attack on the Parliament.
• The act was repealed in 2004 by the United Progressive Alliance coalition.
Status: in existence; but is w.r.t preventive detention. It is not specifically w.r.t
3. NSA, 1980 terrorism
Status: in existence; Thus, at present this is the only Union Legislation dealing
specifically with terrorism
4. UAPA, 1967
Details
• This law was enacted to provide for more effective prevention of certain
unlawful activities of individuals and associations and for matters
connected with it.
• It empowered appropriate authorities to declare any association as
‘unlawful’ if it is carrying out ‘unlawful activities’.
• This law was comprehensively amended by the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Amendment Act, 2004 to deal with terrorist activities. (it
was further amended in 2008 and 2012)
• It incorporates provisions regarding
o Defining a ‘terrorist act’ and defining a “terrorist organisation”
o Listing of terrorist organizations
o Seizure and forfeiture of property,
o Enhanced punishments and

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• But it has certain limitations like

Notes
o It does not provide for special courts or
o Enhanced powers of investigation and
o Provisions regarding confessions made before police officers.

Should we bring back TADA and POTA – Need of a Stronger,

Comprehensive Law
1. Recently Gujarat enacted Gujarat Control of Terrorism and Organised
Crime Act, 2015 to curb terrorism. This led to the debate that whether
we should have a similar central legislation (as TADA and POTA have
been repealed.
2. Opposition by human rights activists
a. Against the spirit of constitution
b. It confers excess power on law enforcement agencies which can be
misused as seen in past
c. Leads to undeclared emergency aimed to curb dissent
3. Arguments in favor
Law commission in its 173rd report and 2nd ARC have recommended the
enactment on the following grounds
a. Human rights are important but the 1st priority is to ensure sovereignty
and territorial integrity of nation which is under threat due to LWE/
terrorism (esp. rise of IS; Indian youth is joining IS).
b. They will be some human rights violation, but it will be negligible as
compared to the areas getting under control of these extremists (brutality
of IS in front of us).
c. Almost all western democracies (USA (USA PATRIOT act, 2001),
Australia, Canada) with strong traditions of democracy and civil liberty
have enacted such legislations to deal with the threat of terrorism.
d. SC in the past has observed that Potential to misuse is not an excuse for
denying the power to agencies.
e. SC has upheld the constitutional validity of anti – terrorism laws. Our
constitution allows for preventive detention.
f. At present we have only UAPA specifically for dealing with terrorism but
it also has some limitations like doesn’t provide for Special courts. Enhanced
powers of investigation and Provisions regarding confessions made before
police officers.
g. Also the present laws are not sufficient to deal with the linkages of
organized crime and terrorism.
h. When it becomes an Act, will undergo course corrections egged on by the
judiciary and the many social watchdogs.
i. Under MCOCA and GCTOC, there are several safeguards for the citizen
- Permission of a Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG)/Additional

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Commissioner of Police (ACP) is required for registering a case;

Investigating officer will have to be of the rank of Deputy Superintendent Notes
(DSP) and the permission of an Additional Director General of Police
(ADGP) is required for charge sheeting an accused before a court.
j. Some findings of the Dharmadhikari Committee on misuses of MCOCA
– only a small number from the minority communities is charge-sheeted;
an average of about 40 cases registered annually and about 6-7 persons
arrested in each case; thus the act has been extremely selective and not
indiscriminate as was the case with TADA or POTA. The main crux is
that police in other states have to pattern themselves after their
Maharashtra counterparts.
4. Way forward
a. To make a claim or take the position that an anti-terror law such as
the one Gujarat is now steering will eliminate terror would be
dishonest and hypocritical. At the same time, to portray GCTOC as
being diabolical and a tool to serve the ruling dispensation’s political
ends would also be unfair and preposterous
b. Enact a law by reconciling the 2 (i) Security and (ii) Human rights.
c. Law should contain provisions pertaining to:
i. Definition of terrorist acts,
ii. Enhanced punishment for such acts,
iii. Special powers of investigating officers regarding seizure and
attachment of property representing proceeds of terrorism,
iv. Constitution of special fast track courts,
v. Protection of witnesses,
vi. Confessions made to police officers to be taken into
consideration,
vii. Enhanced police custody, making release on bail extremely
difficult for the accused,
viii. Protection of action taken in good faith etc.
ix. Cutting the source of funding for terror activities etc.

Gujarat Control of Terrorism and Organised

Crime (GCTOC) Bill, 2015
1. In March 2015, Gujarat assembly passed the Gujarat Control of Terrorism
and Organised Crime (GCTOC) Bill, 2015. At present the bill is awaiting
Presidential assent (as any Bill passed by an Assembly on issues
contravening Central laws needs Presidential assent.
2. It is the 4th attempt by Gujarat to pass the bill. In the past it has been
rejected thrice by president due to its controversial provisions. Even the
present bill has been criticized on following grounds –
a. Clause 16, which makes confessions before police officers admissible
in court (it violates the Indian Evidence Act which makes confessions
before the police inadmissible in evidence)
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b. Empowers police to tap telephonic conversations and submit them in

court as evidence (Intercepting phone is against privacy, will allow
Notes
agencies in snooping all the time)
c. Extends period of probe from 90 days to 180 days before filing of
charge sheet.
d. Offences under this act are non-bailable
e. Section 25 of the Bill provides immunity to the State government
from legal action for acts done in good faith in pursuance of this
Act.(will dilute its accountability)
3. Arguments in favor of the Bill
a. Use all points mentioned above for a central bill.
b. Citing past terror attacks in Gujarat by Pakistan, Gujarat’s vulnerable
coastline and the proliferation of criminal gangs and linkages between
organized crime groups and terrorists.
c. GCTOC replicates only the MCOCA in Maharashtra. It has been
there for 15 years and has been successful).

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NAXALISM (LWE)
Development and its Linkages with Extremism Notes
Present Status of Development Activities by NDA Government to Counter
LWE – (as of September 30, 2015)
1. Rising number of Attacks by Maoists
a. The string of audacious attacks on security forces, civilians and
politicians carried out by Maoist rebels in recent times, the calling
of a two-day ‘Bastar Mahabandh’, and the abduction of villagers who
were on their way to attend Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s public
meeting in Dantewada, point to the current strategy and intent, as
well as determination, of the CPI (Maoist) organisation.
b. Despite suffering severe reverses in several States and failing in its
efforts to spread the “revolutionary” movement to new territories,
the rebels want to send the message across that they are still a force
to reckon with. What is happening in the Bastar forests in Chhattisgarh
remains the best example of the failure of counterinsurgency
strategies adopted by successive governments.
c. If the UPA government’s strategy was to rely heavily on the security
forces, under its now infamous “clear, hold, and build” model, the
BJP government appears to be pursuing a pronounced strategy of
development. The first-ever visit by a Prime Minister to a Maoist
stronghold, to inaugurate the mega steel plant at Dilmili village in
Dantewada and the extended rail line between Rowghat and Jagdalpur,
represents this shift from the deployment of ‘battalions’ to
‘development’.
2. In this background, over the last few months, the Central government has
initiated a series of steps like:
a. Upgrading communications and transport infrastructure in areas
affected by naxalite activity. The larger project is to not only usher
in development in the tribal areas and improve the living conditions
of populations in hilly and forest terrains, but also facilitate security
operations against Maoists, who specialise in ambushes and hit-and-
retreat tactics.
b. Hundreds of mobile phone towers have been erected along the Red
Corridor, and roads and bridges are being built to connect naxalite-
affected districts. Ending the isolation of some of the villages in
remote areas of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand is, no doubt, part of a
strategy to win over local populations and wean them away from the
influence of armed groups of Maoists.
c. PM in his visit to Bastar rightly said that if Punjab can be free from
terror, then why not bastar. On his visit to bastar region in May
2015, PM inaugurated 2 projects with an estimated investment of
Rs. 24,000 crore in bastar region. These were – Mega steel plant at
village dilmili in dantewada and Extension of 140 km rowghat
jagdalpur railway line (2nd phase).
3. Critical aspect of these steps
a. Developmental activities invariably take time to have a visible and
positive impact on socio-economic conditions. Counterinsurgency
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strategists and the political leadership must be equally sensitive to

the political component of the Maoist movement, which has at its
Notes
core many issues relating to the people. The Raman Singh-led
government in Chhattisgarh is a stable one no doubt, but its ability
to ensure ‘effective’ governance needs to be ensured: this is the critical
component of any counterinsurgency strategy.
b. The Centre should first formulate a counterinsurgency doctrine
encompassing also the development and security-related components.
Such a doctrine would provide a certain unity of approach among
States and security agencies, irrespective of which political party is
in power. Out of such a doctrine, area-specific strategies and tactics
could be developed and implemented across States. Security agencies
must stop using assassination as a tool in counterrevolutionary warfare.
The fact that top Maoist leaders Roopesh (with his wife) in
Coimbatore, and Ajith in Pune, were arrested, and not killed in the
process, is notable. Prime Minister Modi’s advice to a child in
Dantewada to learn from failures is even more apt for the political
establishment and the security forces. If only they did so, the problem
of Maoist extremism could have been tackled to a large extent by
now.
c. But, coming as it does with heavy deployment of Central police
forces, such infrastructure development is suspect in the eyes of
many villagers in the tribal regions. The ‘development’ is often seen
more as an effort to allow access to tribal areas for security personnel
in pursuit of Maoists rather than as an attempt to open up the
outside world to the villages. Invariably, the state is seen as an external
agency waiting to wield its authority and extend its reach without
allowing substantial consequential benefits to the villages. Any state-
sponsored activity, even if it is in the name of development, is thus
met with hostility, and viewed as no more than an extension of the
security apparatus.
d. Better facilities can at best mark the beginning of a process of
addressing the livelihood concerns and social insecurities of tribal
populations. Without investing in health and education infrastructure,
increasing employment opportunities, and raising the quality of life
in tribal areas, it would be difficult to address the socio-
economic grievances that feed into the Maoist agenda.
e. While the government ought to do everything in its power to end
arbitrary and irrational violence by the Maoists, ‘development’ should
not be reduced to building mobile towers, roads and bridges.
f. Democratic institutions are yet to take root in many of the villages
where Maoists have their sympathizers. In many areas Maoists have
assumed a representative character and elections are boycotted at the
instance of leaders of the Communist Party of India (Maoist).
g. Thus, merely concentrating on upgrading infrastructure without
addressing long-standing grievances will not meet the government’s
objectives. Representative institutions in the villages must be made
party to decision-making in the development process, which should
go beyond the infrastructure needs of the security personnel.

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Vikas Sangarsh Samiti – Renewal of Salwa Notes

Judum
1. In may 2015, formers leaders of Salwa Judum formed VSS in Dantewada
district of Chattisgarh to carry forward the work of salwa judum in bastar.
i.e. to finish Maoism in Bastar and bring development.
2. They argue that this will be a peaceful movement. They will do the
following i.e. Undertake padyatra to spread awareness against Maoism and
Undertake development work.
3. When asked by its leaders that can it be called as Salwa Judum part-2,
they replied in affirmative.
4. About Salwa judum – It was an anti-Maoist militia which was blamed for
large – scale forcible displacement of Bastar Tribals and extra-judicial
killings. In 2011, SC declared it illegal and unconstitutional and ordered
its disbandment.
5. Opposition to formation of vikas sanhgarsh samiti –
a. State cannot support a civilian vigilante force against Maoists, under
any name.
b. But such a revival would be in flagrant violation of the Supreme
Court’s 2011 directions in Nandini Sundar v/s State of Chhattisgarh.
The SC had declared that the recruitment and arming of tribal people
as special police officers (SPOs), as a counter-insurgency measure,
was illegal and unconstitutional.
c. The SC forbade the state government from supporting any civilian
vigilante force and declared that it was the responsibility of the state
to prevent the operation of any such group. “The state of Chhattisgarh
shall take appropriate measures to prevent the operation of any group,
including but not limited to Salwa Judum and Koya Commandos,
that in any manner or form seek to take law into private hands, act
unconstitutionally or otherwise violate human rights of any person.”
The Vikas Sangharsh Samiti clearly falls foul of these directions. The
failure of the state government to prevent the creation of such a
force could justifiably attract the court’s ire.
d. Mahendra Karma launched the Salwa Judum in 2005 as a counter-
insurgency measure to tackle the Maoist threat. Large-scale human
rights violations and the displacement of tribals followed at the
hands of the state-supported Salwa Judum. In 2007, a group of
petitioners approached the SC to challenge the legality of the
appointment of tribals as SPOs and highlight the violations committed
by it. The court held that the state’s policy of appointing
undertrained and ill-equipped tribals to combat the Maoists was an
extreme transgression of the Constitution — particularly the right
to equal treatment and the right to life.
e. The SC struck down these appointments as unconstitutional on the
grounds that they violated Articles 14 and 21: Article 14 because
the undertrained and ill-equipped tribals were treated on par with
members of the regular force, who were better trained and equipped.
This amounted to treating unequal persons as equals. Further, the

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policy of employing SPOs was deemed irrational and arbitrary. The

appointment of tribals for counter-insurgency measures violated their
Notes
right to live and also put at risk the lives of others.
f. Today, the Vikas Sangharsh Samiti is offering the same justification
that was given by the state of Chhattisgarh earlier: that tribal
volunteered to fight against the Maoists. The SC rightly debunked
this “spontaneous movement” justification. It examined in detail the
required qualification, manner of training, mode of control and
provisions for protection of the SPOs, as well as for their discharge.
It was held that placing tribals “motivated by the urge of self-
protection and to defend family members from violent attacks” to
combat the Maoists was an egregious violation of their right to life.
g. The court also struck down the functions and responsibilities of
SPOs enumerated in Section 23 of the Chhattisgarh Police Act,
2007, except the duty to “help people in situations arising out of
natural or man-made disasters, and to assist other agencies in relief
measures” and “to facilitate orderly movement of people and vehicles,
and to control and regulate traffic”. Thus, the court envisaged a
limited function for SPOs.
6. Concluding Remark
a. A Salwa Judum 2.0 could survive constitutional challenge only if
its role is restricted to helping out the state machinery during natural
and man-made disasters, and to the regulation of traffic.
b. The employing and arming of untrained tribals in the fight against
Maoists is unconstitutional and illegal — it doesn’t matter whether
it goes by the name “Salwa Judum”, “Vikas Sangharsh Samiti” or
any other.

Being a Maoist is not Illegal

1. In May 2015, Kerala HC freed Shyama Balakrishnan, who had been picked
up in 2014 on suspicion of being a Maoist, saying that “being a Maoist
is not a crime” i.e., it is legal to be a Maoist as long as no laws are broken.
2. Arguments in favor of it – (by Kerala HC while delivering the verdict and
judiciary in earlier cases while dealing with similar issues)
a. Kerala HC said that although the political ideology of the Maoists
ran counter to India’s constitutional polity, a person could be
prosecuted only if it could be proved that he had acted unlawfully
as a result of his adherence to this ideology. i.e. a clear distinction
was made between having a particular ideology and acting in
furtherance to it. I.E. membership of a banned outfit has to be active
– not passive – to attract penal provisions.
In 2011, SC while borrowing from a US verdict rejected the theory
of “guilt by association” by arguing prosecuting a member of
organization, who doesn’t engage to further the illegal aims of
organization, infringes on the protected freedom of individual.
b. It also said that it was a “basic human right for people to have
aspirations”. It has said that the concept of membership ought to be
read in the light of freedom and rights.

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c. While granting bail to Binayak Sen in April 2011, the SC said that
he may be a Maoist sympathizer and possessed some material on Notes
that ideology, but that could not automatically make him guilty of
sedition. If the state could not prove that Sen had propagated the
ideology or acted in collusion with Naxalites, even meeting a hardcore
Naxalite such as Narayan Sanyal in jail was not enough to prosecute
him, the court said. Could a person be called a Gandhian merely for
possessing a biography of Gandhi, the SC asked.
Latest Data : Civilians Biggest Casualty of Naxal Violence April 2015
• While left wing extremism (LWE) — the governments’ preferred phrase
for Naxal-related violence — has caused over 20,000 deaths in the country
since 1980, it is not the extremists or the security forces who have suffered
the most. Data shows that a majority of those killed were civilians.
• In fact, the ongoing conflict has claimed at least one life every single day
over a 35-year period beginning 1980. The total body count, as on June
30, 2013, stood at 19,327, according to information obtained under the
Right to Information Act.
• Latest data compiled by the Ministry of Home Affairs adds another 685
fatalities to the record taking the total tally to 20,012 as on March 30,
2015. As many as 12,146 civilians lost their lives to LWE-related violence
across the country during this period for which official data is available.
• During this period, 4,761 extremists and 3,105 security personnel were
killed. That adds up to about two security personnel dying for every three
extremists killed.
• The year 2010 was the bloodiest of this insurgency, leading to the death
of 1,177 persons — over 60 per cent of them civilians. The year saw the
horrific Dantewada ambush that led to the death of 75 CRPF men and
one Chhattisgarh police constable, the Gyaneshwari Express derailment,
the Dantewada bus bombing and the Silda camp attack in Midnapore
among other incidents.
• In fact, the six years from 2005 to 2010 were the bloodiest in the entire
two-decade timeline, with the reported death of 5,916 persons.
• LWE-affected States have their differing policies on providing financial
compensation to families of civilians and state police personnel killed in
such violence. However, under the Security Related Expenditure (SRE)
scheme, the central government reimburses expenditure incurred by the
state governments for payment of ex-gratia to the victims — Rs. 1 lakh
for every civilian and Rs. 3 lakh for each security personnel killed in
LWE violence.

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