G.R. No. 73002 : December 29, 1986 9.
9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant was duly
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME
PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC., Respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate
Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered
registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390
square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat
tribe.
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No.
141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial
court in said proceedings in this wise:
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation duly
organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on December 23, 1959;
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real
properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly on the provision of its
secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members
of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took place
on October 29, 1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have
possessed and occupied the land from generation to generation until the same came into the
possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse and
public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who were granted from
whom the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already
considered from time immemorial.
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act
No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by
them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public
domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five Million
(P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said improvements were seen by the Court during
its ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered on September 18, 1982;
recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated
for the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to
reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of
the land bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on
November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by the Municipal Government of Maconacon,
Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special session on November 22, 1979.
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability of the
1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration
proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had
gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV
prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain,
except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which
was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible
error to decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, as amended, reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of
the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of
ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the trial court which
were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before this
Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the lands in question on
October 29, 1962, are members of the national cultural minorities who had, by themselves and
through their progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since time immemorial, or for more
than the required 30-year period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in
Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension
that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and register ownership
of said lands under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV
already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels had
transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in
1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein against
private corporations holding lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the
registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be
answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands, the
constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously
does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et
al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic
corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two
lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed by the vendors and,
before them, by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the
Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were public land,
dismissed the application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to apply for
registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural
persons to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a
majority of this Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that:
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the
certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public land
and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b),
Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on the
one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on
the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has on imperfect title
subject to judicial confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or
qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be
secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is public'
(Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning with Carino in
1909 2 thru Susi in 1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the
doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite
period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and
becomes private property. That said dissent expressed what is the better and, indeed, the correct,
view-becomes evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of June 25,
1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands.
It was ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession
for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in
registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have recommended an
application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an
Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it.
The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to
mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected
from all but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The
effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical language,
in Susi:
.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in
paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and
physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public
domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a certificate
of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon
applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law not only a
right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should
be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is
sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had
acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain
and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the
Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands
disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void
and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of
Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of
Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it
in jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11
.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be
inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than
30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on
petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land.Thereafter, it is no longer
disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. ....
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are
complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a
government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore,
ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The
application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of
the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of
said patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land
which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant
from the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled
to a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption,
confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to
ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and
registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The
proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a
conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession
became complete. As was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that registration was
expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be
lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally
sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must
also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the
1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect
later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial
possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in
appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes right to
acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be
construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the
vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only
limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands
in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were
brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the
public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate
transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances,
that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to the sales
application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to the land
applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2,
Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands
not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the
doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.
xxx xxx xxx
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not impair vested
rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal
ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police
power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of
the corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and established and was no longer
open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the
effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a patent
for the land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without due process (Director of
Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919). 15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name must
be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than
procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be
confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is
unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973
Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to
the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid
conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling
in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as
enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor,
personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the
prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the
basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time
it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the
time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a
juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent
in Meralco:
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land
Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their
title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there
was a technical error not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing
spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against
their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition against the
application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as
such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted, because of their
indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein
provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of
refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the
Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation
as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as
natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired
by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the
herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private
lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold
or exchanged.
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter from
themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their
names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty charades,
whereas the same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by
a liberal application of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent
in Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real
sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines the
soundness of which has passed the test of searching examination and inquiry in many past cases.
Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice
Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner
therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for confirmation of an imperfect title to
public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its
Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may,
in that context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional
question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 179987 : April 29, 2009]
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is that from Indonesia to Brazil, 90
percent of the informal lands are not titled and registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in the
so-called Third World. And it has many consequences.
xxx
The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's in Indonesia to Fujimori's in
Peru, have wanted to title these people and have not been able to do so effectively? One reason is
that none of the state systems in Asia or Latin America can gather proof of informal titles. In Peru, the
informals have means of proving property ownership to each other which are not the same means
developed by the Spanish legal system. The informals have their own papers, their own forms of
agreements, and their own systems of registration, all of which are very clearly stated in the maps
which they use for their own informal business transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru, and you walk by field after field -
-in each field a different dog is going to bark at you. Even dogs know what private property is all
about. The only one who does not know it is the government. The issue is that there exists a
"common law" and an "informal law" which the Latin American formal legal system does not know
how to recognize.
- Hernando De Soto1
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of persons and entities other
than the Philippine government. The petition, while unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the
Court en banc in order to provide definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original registration
proceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. In doing so, the
Court confronts not only the relevant provisions of the Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the
reality on the ground. The countrywide phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as the problem of
informal settlement it has spawned, has unfortunately been treated with benign neglect. Yet our
current laws are hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in addressing the phenomenon. Still, the
duty on our part is primarily to decide cases before us in accord with the Constitution and the legal
principles that have developed our public land law, though our social obligations dissuade us from
casting a blind eye on the endemic problems.
I.
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of
land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre,2 situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite,
and consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco,3 and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and
continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree was based
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, on the Court's ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.9
Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of the State.4 Apart from presenting documentary evidence,
Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals;10 hence, it was his heirs who
the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-
appealed the decision of the appellate court. Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our ruling in
grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons' Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban the fourth
Republic v. Naguit,11 which was handed down just four months prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest
being Aristedes's grandfather. Upon Lino's death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it
that the discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the
among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban's wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the
Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had directed the registration of the property had no jurisdiction
properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and
in the first place since the requisite notice of hearing was published only after the hearing had already
Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A,
begun. Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the controlling doctrine, especially when the property in
which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo
question is agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to the
Velazco to Malabanan.5
declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be counted in reckoning the period of
possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act and the Property Registration Decree.
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine Aristedes Velazco. He further
manifested that he "also [knew] the property and I affirm the truth of the testimony given by Mr.
The petition was referred to the Court en banc,12 and on 11 November 2008, the case was heard on
Velazco."6 The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the
oral arguments. The Court formulated the principal issues for the oral arguments, to wit:
application.

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001,
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree,
issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and
should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that
Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was "verified to be within
such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it
the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No.
is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of
20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982."7
the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?cralawred

On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan, the dispositive portion of
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as
which reads:
alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by
prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?cralawred
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the
operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its
lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One
slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical
Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?cralawred
description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the
name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting
Ilog, Silang, Cavite. 4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both? 13
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall
forthwith issue. Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions.

SO ORDERED.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to
prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that
the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the
length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision8reversing the RTC and dismissing the
application of Malabanan. The appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and
disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that
the property was declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos' possession
prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession. This
With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court in Naguit is the
correct interpretation of the provision. The seemingly contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is
submitted, should be considered obiter dictum, since the land registration proceedings therein was
void ab initio due to lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing. Petitioners further point out that
in Republic v. Bibonia,14 promulgated in June of 2007, the Court applied Naguit and adopted the same
observation that the preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section 14(1) was patently absurd. For its
part, the OSG remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have been classified
as alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945. Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the
subsequent rulings in Buenaventura v. Republic,15Fieldman Agricultural Trading v. Republic16 and
Republic v. Imperial Credit Corporation,17 as well as the earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals.18
With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the
land into private property, thus placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2). According to them, it
would not matter whether the land sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural
land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the application, the property had already been
"converted" into private property through prescription. To bolster their argument, petitioners cite
extensively from our 2008 ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties.19
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more extensive. The OSG
notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State
refers to "patrimonial property," while Section 14(2) speaks of "private lands." It observes that the
Court has yet to decide a case that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application for
registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to the period of possession under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not the concept of prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG
further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said
period should be reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable and disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular factual circumstances
surrounding the subject property and the ownership thereof.
II.
First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full understanding of the
provision, reference has to be made to the Public Land Act.
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when the law was amended
by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term
"agricultural lands" was changed to "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain." The OSG
submits that this amendment restricted the scope of the lands that may be registered.23 This is not
actually the case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, "agricultural lands" are a mere subset of
"lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition." Evidently, alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain are a larger class than only "agricultural lands."
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for "thirty (30) years
immediately preceding the filing of the application" to possession "since June 12, 1945 or earlier." The
Court in Naguit explained:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed necessary
to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July
26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona
fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date
at June 12, 1945. xxx

It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same as Section
A.
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the various laws relative to the
registration of property, including lands of the public domain. It is Section 14(1) that operationalizes
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its enactment, governed the registration of such lands of the public domain. The provision reads:
the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. The President is authorized, from time
to time, to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral
SECTION 14. Who may apply.' The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
lands.20 Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are further classified according to their
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;
representatives:
(c) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for public
and quasi-public uses.21
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable and disposable lands of
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
the public domain? Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for
agricultural purposes may be disposed of "by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles" through
"judicial legalization."22Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1)
the details and unmistakably grants that right, subject to the requisites stated therein: therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their
predecessors-in-interest who "have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier." That circumstance may have led to the impression that
claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
one or the other is a redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
repealed or mooted. That is not the case.
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the Property Registration
Decree warrant comparison:
xxx

Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply.' The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
xxx
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed
by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which seems to presume the
pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing the right itself for the first time. It is proper to
assert that it is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has
primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who has been "in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" to perfect or complete his title by
applying with the proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of the
corresponding certificate of title.
Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of the Public Land Act,
which provides that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation
of imperfect or incomplete titles, and given the notion that both provisions declare that it is indeed
the Public Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive ownership of the possessor who has
been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945. In turn, Section 14(a) of the Property
Registration Decree recognizes the substantive right granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as well provides the corresponding original registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of
an imperfect or incomplete title.
There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section 47 of the Public Land Act
limits the period within which one may exercise the right to seek registration under Section 48. The
provision has been amended several times, most recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002. It currently
reads thus:
Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not to extend
beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this
period shall apply only where the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided,
further, That the several periods of time designated by the President in accordance with Section
Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this
Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any said persons from acting under this Chapter at any
time prior to the period fixed by the President.24
Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted under Section 48(b) may
be availed of only until 31 December 2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended and Section 14(a) of the
Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the position that for one to acquire the right to
seek registration of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough that the
applicant and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of ownership
since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable character of the property must have been declared
also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSG's approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable
after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such an implication was
discussed in Naguit.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should
have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain
meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent
phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify
only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or
remotely located.25 Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioner's position. Absent a
legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSG's view, that all lands of the public
domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant.
Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the
government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable
and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that
before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought
to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title
is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the
property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the
right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the
length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been
classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the
part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was adopted in
Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the
application of the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually
declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to
establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership
long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to
avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This
balancing fact is significant, especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach
of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from Herbieto are obiter
dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void ab initio in the first place due to lack of
the requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing. There is no need to explicitly overturn
Herbieto, as it suffices that the Court's acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used
therein concerning Section 14(1) is indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura,26 the Court, citing Herbieto, again
stated that "[a]ny period of possession prior to the date when the [s]ubject [property was] classified
as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the
period of possession' " That statement, in the context of Section 14(1), is certainly erroneous.
Nonetheless, the passage as cited in Buenaventura should again be considered as obiter. The
application therein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14(2). The evidence submitted by
petitioners therein did not establish any mode of possession on their part prior to 1948, thereby
precluding the application of Section 14(1). It is not even apparent from the decision whether
petitioners therein had claimed entitlement to original registration following Section 14(1), their
position being that they had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for
over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June 1945.
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has any precedental value with
respect to Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is embedded in Section 14(1), since it
precisely involved situation wherein the applicant had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide
claim of ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The Court's interpretation of Section 14(1) therein was
decisive to the resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which between Naguit or Herbieto provides the
final word of the Court on Section 14(1) is now settled in favor of Naguit.
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals 27 since in the
latter, the application for registration had been filed before the land was declared alienable or
disposable. The dissent though pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between the two. Yet two
years after Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling
in Republic v. Ceniza,28 which involved a claim of possession that extended back to 1927 over a public
domain land that was declared alienable and disposable only in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted
extensively from it, and following the mindset of the dissent, the attempt at registration in Ceniza
should have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and
a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November 25, 1994, issued by
Eduardo M. Inting, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that the lots involved were "found to
be within the alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per map
2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980." This is sufficient evidence to show the real character of the
land subject of private respondents' application. Further, the certification enjoys a presumption of
regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence, which is true in this case. Worth noting also was
the observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest the application of appellees
on the ground that the property still forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any showing that
the lots in question are forestal land....
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of public land for the period
required by law would entitle its occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in
favor of private respondents as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
concerned, for they were able to overcome the burden of proving the alienability of the land subject of
their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able to prove their open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land even before the year 1927. As a
rule, we are bound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Although there are exceptions,
petitioner did not show that this is one of them.29
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who authored Bracewell, sanction
the registration under Section 48(b) of public domain lands declared alienable or disposable thirty-five
(35) years and 180 days after 12 June 1945? The telling difference is that in Ceniza, the application
for registration was filed nearly six (6) years after the land had been declared alienable or disposable,
while in Bracewell, the application was filed nine (9) years before the land was declared alienable or
disposable. That crucial difference was also stressed in Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a
difference which the dissent seeks to belittle.
III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section 14(2). The provision
reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
xxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws.
The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14(2), which we did even then
recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but we nonetheless refer to it as material for further
discussion, thus:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude
the application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which
commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of "those who have acquired
ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws."
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.[30] There is a consistent
jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private
property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[31] With
such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of "private lands" under Section
14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through
prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than
June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor
may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14(2), unlike in this case where petitioners have
based their registration bid primarily on that provision, and where the evidence definitively
establishes their claim of possession only as far back as 1948. It is in this case that we can properly
appreciate the nuances of the provision.
 A. Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.
(emphasis supplied)37
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the possible basis for application
for original registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it is Article 1113 which provides legal This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which made the date 12 June
foundation for the application. It reads: 1945 the reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless, applications for registration filed prior to
1977 could have invoked the 30-year rule introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise
provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication, as it applies the rules
object of prescription. on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137. Note that
there are two kinds of prescription under the Civil Code ordinary acquisitive prescription and
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1137, is completed "through uninterrupted
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in character,
adverse possession' for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith."
they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, among the public domain lands
that are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The
Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral lands. Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942, became unavailable
after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the thirty (30)-year period is the law on prescription
under the Civil Code, as mandated under Section 14(2). However, there is a material difference
There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the acquisition of real property
between how the thirty (30)-year rule operated under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under the
through prescription. Ownership of real property may be acquired by ordinary prescription of ten (10)
Civil Code.
years,32 or through extraordinary prescription of thirty (30) years.33Ordinary acquisitive prescription
requires possession in good faith,34as well as just title.35
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to or call into
application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a requisite thirty-year
When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides that persons "who have
possession period immediately preceding the application for confirmation of title, without any
acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws," it
qualification as to whether the property should be declared alienable at the beginning of, and continue
unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands. The Civil Code is
as such, throughout the entire thirty - (30) years. There is neither statutory nor jurisprudential basis
the only existing law that specifically allows the acquisition by prescription of private lands, including
to assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had mandated such a requirement,38 similar to our earlier finding with
patrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus, the critical question that needs affirmation is
respect to the present language of Section 48(b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as the point of
whether Section 14(2) does encompass original registration proceedings over patrimonial property of
reference.
the State, which a private person has acquired through prescription.

Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period as basis for original
The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence holding that properties
registration became Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which entitled those "who
classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open,
have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws" to
continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.36Yet if we ascertain the source of
apply for original registration. Again, the thirty-year period is derived from the rule on extraordinary
the "thirty-year" period, additional complexities relating to Section 14(2) and to how exactly it
prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Section 14(2) puts into operation
operates would emerge. For there are in fact two distinct origins of the thirty (30)-year rule.
the entire regime of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold true with respect to
Section 14(1).
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act by granting the right to seek original registration of alienable public lands through
B.
possession in the concept of an owner for at least thirty years.

Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on prescription under existing
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law concept of prescription, as set forth in the
own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
Civil Code, in our interpretation of Section 14(2). There is no similar demand on our part in the case
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of
of Section 14(1).
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: "[p]roperty of the State or any of
xxx
its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription." The identification
what consists of patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in full:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article,
is patrimonial property
It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property belonging to the State,
cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the commerce of man.39 Lands of the
public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of public dominion and
thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the President or any duly
authorized government officer of alienability and disposability of lands of the public domain. Would
such lands so declared alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from property of
the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition, alienable and
disposable lands may be the object of the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things
within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further provides
that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."
It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial
property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those
property "which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as
the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains
property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the development
of the national wealth".
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is
no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property
has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified
as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and
thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall
be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
limits its scope and reach and thus affects the registrability even of lands already declared alienable
and disposable to the detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands.
Yet this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all
lands owned by the State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to be
used only by the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is to apply the Constitution
and the laws in accordance with their language and intent. The remedy is to change the law, which is
the province of the legislative branch. Congress can very well be entreated to amend Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree and pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the
requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual example. Republic Act No.
7227, entitled "An Act Accelerating The Conversion Of Military Reservations Into Other Productive
Uses, etc.," is more commonly known as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law authorizes the sale of
certain military reservations and portions of military camps in Metro Manila, including Fort Bonifacio
and Villamor Air Base. For purposes of effecting the sale of the military camps, the law mandates the
President to transfer such military lands to the Bases Conversion Development Authority
(BCDA)40which in turn is authorized to own, hold and/or administer them.41The President is authorized
to sell portions of the military camps, in whole or in part.42 Accordingly, the BCDA law itself declares
that the military lands subject thereof are "alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of
existing laws and regulations governing sales of government properties."43
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands have become alienable and
disposable. However, said lands did not become patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes
the reservation that these lands are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the former
American bases at Clark and Subic.44 Such purpose can be tied to either "public service" or "the
development of national wealth" under Article 420(2). Thus, at that time, the lands remained property
of the public dominion under Article 420(2), notwithstanding their status as alienable and disposable.
It is upon their sale as authorized under the BCDA law to a private person or entity that such lands
become private property and cease to be property of the public dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such in a duly enacted
law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth, would the period of possession prior to the conversion of such
public dominion into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the
possessors? We rule in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of possession before
the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for the purpose of completing the
prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be
the object of prescription according to the Civil Code. As the application for registration under Section
14(2) falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that
possession during the time that the land was still classified as public dominion property can be
counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration.
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)? There is no
inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2)
entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under
the aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under Section
14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year period available through
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The
period under the former speaks of a thirty-year period of possession, while the period under the latter
concerns a thirty-year period of extraordinary prescription. Registration under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years of possession alone without
regard to the Civil Code, while the registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree is founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.
It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code should not apply as well to converted into private land; and (2) the person in possession for the periods prescribed under the
Section 14(1). Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil Code, it ultimately is just one of Civil Code acquires ownership of the property by operation of the Civil Code.
numerous statutes, neither superior nor inferior to other statutes such as the Property Registration
Decree. The legislative branch is not bound to adhere to the framework set forth by the Civil Code
It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the converted patrimonial
when it enacts subsequent legislation. Section 14(2) manifests a clear intent to interrelate the
property, the ideal next step is the registration of the property under the Torrens system. It should be
registration allowed under that provision with the Civil Code, but no such intent exists with respect to
remembered that registration of property is not a mode of acquisition of ownership, but merely a
Section 14(1).
mode of confirmation of ownership.48

IV.
One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing how our land
registration procedures correlate with our law on prescription, which, under the Civil Code, is one of
the modes for acquiring ownership over property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by private
persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which states that "[a]ll things
which are within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription," and that [p]roperty of the
State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription."
There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired under the Civil
Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1117, requires possession in
good faith and with just title; and, under Article 1134, is completed through possession of ten (10)
years. There is nothing in the Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring patrimonial property of the
State through ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is there any apparent reason to impose such a
rule. At the same time, there are indispensable requisites'good faith and just title. The ascertainment
of good faith involves the application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the Civil
Code,45 provisions that more or less speak for themselves.
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the Property Registration Decree in
1977, it is apparent that the registration system then did not fully accommodate the acquisition of
ownership of patrimonial property under the Civil Code. What the system accommodated was the
confirmation of imperfect title brought about by the completion of a period of possession ordained
under the Public Land Act (either 30 years following Rep. Act No. 1942, or since 12 June 1945
following P.D. No. 1073).
The Land Registration Act49 was noticeably silent on the requisites for alienable public lands acquired
through ordinary prescription under the Civil Code, though it arguably did not preclude such
registration.50 Still, the gap was lamentable, considering that the Civil Code, by itself, establishes
ownership over the patrimonial property of persons who have completed the prescriptive periods
ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with the adoption of the Property Registration Decree in
1977, with Section 14(2) thereof expressly authorizing original registration in favor of persons who
have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws, that
is, the Civil Code as of now.
V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:

On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification. Under Article 1129, there is
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public
just title for the purposes of prescription "when the adverse claimant came into possession of the
Land Act recognizes and confirms that "those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right." Dr. Tolentino explains:
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands
Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership, and which would have based on the length and quality of their possession.
actually transferred ownership if the grantor had been the owner. This vice or defect is the one cured
by prescription. Examples: sale with delivery, exchange, donation, succession, and dacion in
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the
payment.46
lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor
is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the applicability of ordinary disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.51
acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The major premise for the argument is that "the
State, as the owner and grantor, could not transmit ownership to the possessor before the completion
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by
of the required period of possession."47 It is evident that the OSG erred when it assumed that the
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
grantor referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The grantor is the one from whom the person invoking
ordinary acquisitive prescription derived the title, whether by sale, exchange, donation, succession or
any other mode of the acquisition of ownership or other real rights. (2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil
Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However,
public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or extraordinary prescription, the
alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is
period of possession preceding the classification of public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be
already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth,
counted for the purpose of computing prescription. But after the property has been become
under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to run in favor of the possessor. Once the requisite
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
period has been completed, two legal events ensue: (1) the patrimonial property is ipso jure
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of lands of the State with their hands. They have been regarded for generation by their families and
patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof their communities as common law owners. There is much to be said about the virtues of according
under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. them legitimate states. Yet such virtues are not for the Court to translate into positive law, as the law
itself considered such lands as property of the public dominion. It could only be up to Congress to set
forth a new phase of land reform to sensibly regularize and formalize the settlement of such lands
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary
which in legal theory are lands of the public domain before the problem becomes insoluble. This could
and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a
be accomplished, to cite two examples, by liberalizing the standards for judicial confirmation of
patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title.
imperfect title, or amending the Civil Code itself to ease the requisites for the conversion of public
Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person's uninterrupted adverse possession of
dominion property into patrimonial.
patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into
ownership.
One's sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-being not only of that
individual, but also to the person's family. Once that sense of security is deprived, life and livelihood
B.
are put on stasis. It is for the political branches to bring welcome closure to the long pestering
problem.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 2007
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired and Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no
substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have
SO ORDERED.
been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date
back their possession, according to their own evidence the Tax Declarations they presented in
particular is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject
property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no
longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably
with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion
under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

VI.

A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal doctrines established in this
decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the implications of today's ruling cannot be discounted. For,
every untitled property that is occupied in the country will be affected by this ruling. The social
implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Court would be abdicating its social responsibility to
the Filipino people if we simply levied the law without comment.

The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a phenomenon tied to
long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is common among the so-called "Third World"
countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes the disconnect between a legal system and the reality on
the ground. The law so far has been unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition of
these public domain lands, such as through homestead or free patent, have

proven unattractive due to limitations imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or alienation of
said properties.52 Judicial confirmation of imperfect title has emerged as the most viable, if not the
most attractive means to regularize the informal settlement of alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain, yet even that system, as revealed in this decision, has considerable limits.

There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively held residential lands
on which they have lived and raised their families. Many more have tilled and made productive idle
 G.R. No. 199537, February 10, 2016

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. ANDREA TAN, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) from the
May 29, 2009 decision1 and October 18, 2011 resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CEB-CV No. 00702. The CA denied the Republic's appeal from LRC Case No. N-1443 wherein the
Municipal Trial Court in Consolacion, Cebu, granted respondent Andrea Tan's application for land title
registration.

Antecedents

On October 2, 2002, Tan applied for the original registration of title of Lot No. 4080, Cad. 545-D
(new) situated in Casili, Consolacion, Cebu (the subject lot). She alleged that she is the absolute
owner in fee simple of the said 7,807 square-meter parcel of residential land she purchased from a
certain Julian Gonzaga on September 17, 1992. Her application was docketed as LRC Case No. N-144.

After complying with the jurisdictional requirements, the land registration court issued an order of
general default, excepting the State which was duly represented by the Solicitor General.

During the trial, Tan proved the following facts:

1. The subject lot is within Block 1, Project No. 28, per LC Map No. 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu;

2. The subject lot was declared alienable and disposable on September 1, 1965, pursuant to
Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063;

3. Luciano Gonzaga who was issued Tax Declaration Nos. 01465 in 1965 and 02983 in 1972
initially possessed the subject lot.

4. After Luciano's death, Julian Gonzaga inherited the subject lot;

5. Andrea Tan purchased the subject lot from Julian Gonzaga on September 17, 1992;

6. She, through her predecessors, had been in peaceful, open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the subject lot in the concept of an owner for over thirty (30) years.

On 28 April 2004, the land registration court granted Tan's application. The court confirmed her title
over the subject lot and ordered its registration.

The Republic appealed the case to the CA, arguing that Tan failed to prove that she is a Filipino citizen
who has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
lot, in the concept of an owner, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of her
application. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 00702.

On May 29, 2009, the CA denied the appeal. The CA observed that under the Public Land Act, there
are two kinds of applicants for original registration: (1) those who had possessed the land since June
12, 1945; and (2) those who already acquired the property through prescription. The respondent's
application fell under the second category.
The CA noted that before land of the public domain can be acquired by prescription, it must have
been declared alienable and disposable agricultural land. The CA pointed to the certification issued by
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) as evidence that the subject was
classified as alienable and disposable on September 1, 1965, pursuant to Land Classification Project
No. 28. The CA concluded that Tan had already acquired the subject lot by prescription.
On July 2, 2009, the Republic moved for reconsideration. Citing Republic v. Herbieto,4 it argued that
an applicant for judicial confirmation of title must have been in possession and occupation of the
subject land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, and that the subject land has been likewise already
declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945, or earlier.5
On October 18, 2011, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration citing the then recent case
of Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Rep. of the Philippines6 which abandoned the ruling in Herbieto.
Malabanan declared that our law does not require that the property should have been declared
alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945, as long as the declaration was made before the
application for registration is filed.7
On January 5, 2012, the Republic filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
The Petition
The Republic argues: (1) that the CA misapplied the doctrine in Malabanan; and (2) that the CENRO
certification and tax declarations presented were insufficient to prove that the subject lot was no
longer intended for public use.
Meanwhile, the respondent insists that she has already proven her title over the subject lot. She
maintains that the classification of the subject lot as alienable and disposable public land by the DENR
on September 1, 1965, per Land Classification Project No. 28, converted it into patrimonial property
of the State.
From the submissions, the lone issue is whether a declaration that Government-owned land has
become alienable and disposable sufficiently converts it into patrimonial property of the State, making
it susceptible to acquisitive prescription.
Our Ruling
We find the petition meritorious.
All lands of the public domain belong to the State. It is the fountain from which springs any asserted
right of ownership over land. Accordingly, the State owns all lands that are not clearly within private
ownership. This is the Regalian Doctrine which has been incorporated in all of our Constitutions and
repeatedly embraced in jurisprudence.8 Under the present Constitution, lands of the public domain are
not alienable except for agricultural lands.9
The Public Land Act10 (PLA) governs the classification, grant, and disposition of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. It is the primary substantive law on this matter. Section 11
thereof recognizes judicial confirmation of imperfect titles as a mode of disposition of alienable public
lands.11Relative thereto, Section 48(b) of the PLA identifies who are entitled to judicial confirmation of
their title:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (As
amended by PD 1073.)
The Property Registration Decree12 (PRD) complements the PLA by prescribing how registrable lands,
including alienable public lands, are brought within the coverage of the Torrens system. Section 14 of
the PRD enumerates the qualified applicants for original registration of title:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,1945, or
earlier;
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision
of existing laws;
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession
or accretion under the existing laws;
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by
law.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The PRD also recognizes prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code.14Nevertheless, prescription under Section 14(2) must not be confused with judicial confirmation
of title under Section 14(1). Judicial confirmation of title requires:
1. That the applicant is a Filipino citizen;15
2. That the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in- interest, has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the property since June 12,
1945;16
3. That the property had been declared alienable and disposable as of the filing of the
application.17
Only private property can be acquired by prescription. Property of public dominion is outside the
commerce of man.18 It cannot be the object of prescription19 because prescription does not run
against the State in its sovereign capacity.20 However, when property of public dominion is no longer
intended for public use or for public service, it becomes part of the patrimonial property of the
State.21 When this happens, the property is withdrawn from public dominion and becomes property of
private ownership, albeit still owned by the State.22 The property is now brought within the commerce
of man and becomes susceptible to the concepts of legal possession and prescription.
In the present case, respondent Tan's application is not anchored on judicial confirmation of an
imperfect title because she does not claim to have possessed the subject lot since June 12, 1945. Her
application is based on acquisitive prescription on the claim that: (1) the property was declared
alienable and disposable on September 1, 1965; and (2) she had been in open continuous, public, and
notorious possession of the subject lot in the concept of an owner for over thirty (30) years.

In our 2009 decision and 2013 resolution23 in Malabanan, we already held en banc that a declaration
that property of the public dominion is alienable and disposable does not ipso facto convert it into
patrimonial property. We said:

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is
no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property
has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to
Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable
and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or
for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run.
Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation
in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.24ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

While a prior declaration that the property has become alienable and disposable is sufficient in an
application for judicial confirmation of title under Section 14(1) of the PRD, it does not suffice for the
purpose of prescription under the Civil Code.25 Before prescription can even begin to run against the
State, the following conditions must concur to convert the subject into patrimonial property:

1. The subject lot must have been classified as agricultural land in compliance with Sections 2
and 3 of Article XII of the Constitution;

2. The land must have been classified as alienable and disposable;26

3. There must be a declaration from a competent authority that the subject lot is no longer
intended for public use, thereby converting it to patrimonial property.

Only when these conditions are met can applicants begin their public and peaceful possession of the
subject lot in the concept of an owner.

In the present case, the third condition is absent. Even though it has been declared alienable and
disposable, the property has not been withdrawn from public use or public service. Without this,
prescription cannot begin to run because the property has not yet been converted into patrimonial
property of the State. It remains outside the commerce of man and the respondent's physical
possession and occupation thereof do not produce any legal effect. In the eyes of the law, the
respondent has never acquired legal possession of the property and her physical possession thereof,
no matter how long, can never ripen into ownership.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition. The May 29, 2009 decision and October 18, 2011
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 00702 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The respondent's application for Land Registration is DENIED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as
to costs.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

G.R. No. 185092, June 04, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. CORAZON C. SESE AND FE C.
SESE, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), assailing the
November 21, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA–G.R. CV No. 81439, which dismissed
its appeal and affirmed the October 3, 2003 Decision2 of the Municipal Trial Court of Pulilan,
Bulacan (MTC), in LRC Case No. 026.
Factual and Procedural Antecedents:
Records show that on September 17, 2002, Corazon C. Sese and Fe C. Sese (respondents) filed with
the MTC an application for original registration of land over a parcel of land with an area of 10,792
square meters, situated in Barangay Sto. Cristo, Municipality of Pulilan, Province of Bulacan, and more
particularly described as Lot 11247, Cad. 345, Pulilan Cadastre, under Plan No. AP–03–004226.
Respondents alleged that on July 22, 1972, they acquired, through a donation inter vivos from their
mother, Resurreccion L. Castro (Resurreccion), the subject agricultural land; that they, through their
predecessors–in–interest, had been in possession of the subject property; and that the property was
not within a reservation.
In support of their application, respondents submitted the following documents, namely: (1) Tax
Declaration No. 99–19015–01557 “in the name of Corazon Sese and Fe Sese, minor, representing
their mother Resurreccion Castro, as her Natural Guardian”; (2) Certificate of Technical Description
which was approved on December 10, 1998 by the Land Management Service, Region III, of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR); (3) Certification in lieu of lost Surveyor’s
Certificate issued by the same authority; (4) Official Receipt of payment of real property tax over the
subject property; (5) Certification from the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Pulilan, stating that
the registered owners of a property under Tax Declaration No. 99–19–015–01557 were Corazon Sese
and others; and (6) Survey plan of Lot 11247, CAD 345, Pulilan Cadastre, approved by the Regional
Technical Director of the Land Management Service, Region III, of the DENR, stating that the land
subject of the survey was alienable and disposable land, and as certified to by the Bureau of Forestry
on March 1, 1927, was outside of any civil or military reservation. On the lower portion of the plan,
there was a note stating that a deed of absolute sale over the subject property was executed by a
certain Luis Santos and Fermina Santos (the Santoses) in favor of Resurreccion on October 4, 1950.
On the lower portion of the survey plan, a note stated, among others, that: “This survey is inside the
alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 20 LC Map No. 637 certified by the Bureau of
Forestry on March 1, 1927. It is outside any civil or military reservation.” The said plan was approved
by the DENR, Land Management Services, Regional Office III, San Fernando, Pampanga, on
December 3, 1998.
Finding the application sufficient in form and substance, the MTC issued the Order, dated October 10,
2002, setting the case for hearing with the corresponding publication. After compliance with all the
requirements of the law regarding publication, mailing and posting, hearing on the merits of the
application followed.
During the trial on June 4, 2003, respondent Corazon C. Sese (Corazon) testified on their claim over
the subject lot. Thereafter, respondents submitted their formal offer of evidence, after which the
evidence offered were admitted by the MTC in the Order, dated July 10, 2003, without objection from
the public prosecutor.
The OSG did not present any evidence to oppose the application.
On October 3, 2003, the MTC rendered its Decision,3 ordering the registration of the subject property
in the name of respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding the instant application to be sufficient in form and substance and the applicants
having established their right of ownership over the subject parcel of land and are therefore entitled
to registration thereof, the Court thereby grants the petition.
Accordingly, the Court hereby orders the registration of the parcel of land subject matter of this
petition which is more particularly described in Plan Ap–03–004226 Pulilan Cadastre and in their
corresponding technical descriptions in the name of Resureccion Castro.
Upon this decision becoming final, let an Order for the decree be issued.
SO ORDERED.
The MTC reasoned out that there was evidence to show that the subject lots had been in open,
continuous, adverse, and public possession, either by the applicants themselves or their predecessor–
in–interest. Such possession since time immemorial conferred an effective title on the applicants,
whereby the land ceased to be public and became private property. It had been the accepted norm
that open, adverse and continuous possession for at least 30 years was sufficient. The MTC noted that
evidence showed that the parcel of land involved was not covered by land patent or a public land
application as certified to by the Community Environment and Natural Resources of Tabang,
Guiguinto, Bulacan. Moreover, it added that the technical descriptions of Lot 11247 were prepared
and secured from the Land Management Sector, DENR, Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga, and
were verified and found to be correct by Eriberto Almazan, In–Charge of the Regional Survey Division.
On December 19, 2003, the OSG interposed an appeal with the CA, docketed as CA–GR. CV No.
81439. In its brief,4 the OSG presented the following assignment of errors: a) only alienable lands of
the public domain occupied and possessed in concept of owner for a period of at least thirty (30)
years is entitled to confirmation of title; and b) respondents failed to prove specific acts of possession.
The OSG argued that there was no proof that the subject property was already segregated from
inalienable lands of the public domain. Verily, it was only from the date of declaration of such lands as
alienable and disposable that the period for counting the statutory requirement of possession would
start.
Also, there was absolutely no proof of respondents’ supposed possession of the subject property.
Save for the testimony of Corazon that “at present, the worker of (her) mother is occupying the
subject property,” there was no evidence that respondents were actually occupying the subject tract
of land or that they had introduced improvement thereon.
On November 21, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision5 affirming the judgment of the MTC ordering the
registration of the subject property in the name of respondents. The decretal portion of which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed decision dated October 3, 2003 of the MTC of
Pulilan, Bulacan, in LRC Case No. 026 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
The CA reasoned out, among others, that the approved survey plan of the subject property with an
annotation, stating that the subject property was alienable and disposable land, was a public
document, having been issued by the DENR, a competent authority. Its contents were prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to establish that the subject
property was indeed alienable and disposable.
With respect to the second issue, the CA was of the view that the doctrine of constructive possession
was applicable. Respondents acquired the subject property through a donation inter vivos executed on
July 22, 1972 from their mother. The latter acquired the said property from the Santoses on October
4, 1950 by virtue of a deed of absolute sale. Further, respondent Corazon testified that a small hut
was built on the said land, which was occupied by the worker of her mother. Moreover, neither the
public prosecutor nor any private individual appeared to oppose the application for registration of the
subject property.
The CA also stated that respondents’ claim of possession over the subject property was buttressed by
the Tax Declaration No. 99–19015–01557 “in the name of Corazon Sese and Fe Sese, minor,
representing their mother Resurreccion Castro, as her Natural Guardian”; the official receipt of
payment of real property tax over the subject property; and the certificate from the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer of Pulilan, stating that the registered owner of a property under Tax Declaration
No. 99–19015–01557 were respondents.
The CA added that although tax declaration or realty tax payments of property were not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they were good indicia of possession in the concept of owner.
Hence, the OSG filed this petition.
ISSUES
I built in the said land and was occupied by a worker of her mother. They countered that although tax
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN RULING THAT THE APPROVED
SURVEY PLAN IDENTIFIED BY ONE OF THE RESPONDENTS IS PROOF THAT THE SUBJECT
LAND IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION.
The OSG argues that unless a piece of land is shown to have been classified as alienable and
disposable, it remains part of the inalienable land of the public domain. In the present case, the CA
relied on the approved survey indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. It is
well–settled, however, that such notation does not suffice to prove that the land sought to be
registered is alienable and disposable. What respondents should have done was to show that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration fell within the
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, they should have
adduced a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true
copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
To bolster its argument, the OSG cites the case of Republic of the Philippine v. T.A.N. Properties,
Inc.,6where the Court stated that the trial court should not have accepted the contents of the
certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued
and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and
disposable. Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated
therein. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of
issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
With respect to the second assignment of error, the OSG argues that respondents failed to present
specific acts of ownership to prove open, continuous, exclusive, notorious, and adverse possession in
the concept of an owner. Facts constituting possession must be duly established by competent
evidence. As to the tax declaration adduced by respondents, it cannot be said that it clearly
manifested their adverse claim on the property. If respondents genuinely and consistently believed
their claim of ownership, they should have regularly complied with their real estate obligations from
the start of their supposed occupation.
Position of Respondents
On the other hand, respondents assert that the CA correctly found that the subject land was alienable
and disposable. The approved survey plan of the subject property with an annotation, stating that the
subject property is alienable and disposable land, is a public document, having been issued by the
DENR, a competent authority. Its contents are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein and are
sufficient to establish that the subject property is indeed alienable and disposable.
Respondents cite the case of Republic v. Serrano,7 where the Court stated that a DENR Regional
Technical Director’s certification, which was annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence,
constituted substantial compliance with the legal requirement. The DENR certification enjoyed the
presumption of regularity absent any evidence to the contrary.
Anent the second assignment of error, respondents contend that the CA correctly applied the doctrine
of constructive possession because they acquired the subject land from their mother, Resurreccion,
through a donation inter vivos, dated July 22, 1972. Their mother, in turn, acquired the subject land
from the Santoses on October 4, 1950 by virtue of an absolute sale. They claim that a small hut was
declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind
would be paying taxes for a property which is not in his actual or constructive custody.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The vital issue to be resolved by the Court is whether respondents are entitled to the registration of
land title under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, or pursuant to Section 14(2) of
the same statute.
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, 8 as
amended by Section 4 of P.D. No. 1073,9 provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SECTION 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors–in–interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxxx
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors–in–interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter.
Based on the above–quoted provisions, applicants for registration of land title must establish and
prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain;
(2) that the applicant and his predecessors–in–interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.10
Compliance with the foregoing requirements is indispensable for an application for registration of land
title, under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, to validly prosper. The absence of any one requisite
renders the application for registration substantially defective.
Anent the first requisite, respondents presented evidence to establish the disposable and alienable
character of the subject land through a survey plan, where on its lower portion, a note stated, among
others, as follows: “This survey is inside the alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 20 LC
Map No. 637 certified by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1, 1927. It is outside any civil or military
reservation.” The said plan was approved by the DENR, Land Management Services, Regional Office
III, San Fernando, Pampanga on December 3, 1998. The annotation in the survey plan, however, fell
short of the requirement of the law in proving its disposable and alienable character.
In Republic v. Espinosa,11 citing Republic v. Sarmiento12 and Menguito v. Republic,13 the Court
reiterated the rule that that a notation made by a surveyor–geodetic engineer that the property
surveyed was alienable and disposable was not the positive government act that would remove the
property from the inalienable domain and neither was it the evidence accepted as sufficient to
controvert the presumption that the property was inalienable. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print copy of the conversion and subdivision
plan approved by the DENR Center which bears the notation of the surveyor–geodetic engineer that
“this survey is inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27–B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified
on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry.”
Menguito v. Republic teaches, however, that reliance on such annotation to prove that the lot is
alienable is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the
presumption that it remains part of the inalienable public domain.
“To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: ‘This survey plan is inside Alienable and
Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27–B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry
on January 3, 1968,’ appearing on Exhibit “E” (Survey Plan No. Swo–13–000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: “All lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned
by the State...”
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public
land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part
of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, “occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how
long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.” To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to
be registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor geodetic engineer’s notation in Exhibit “E” indicating
that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a
positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a
mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely
on the said surveyor’s assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in
question has been declared alienable.” (Citations omitted and emphases supplied)
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable. The applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; or a legislative act or a statute. The applicant
may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for
the required number of years is alienable and disposable.14
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.15 declared that a CENRO certification was insufficient to prove the
alienable and disposable character of the land sought to be registered. The applicant must also show
sufficient proof that the DENR Secretary approved the land classification and released the land in
question as alienable and disposable.
Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied by (1) a
CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. 16
Here, the only evidence presented by respondents to prove the disposable and alienable character of
the subject land was an annotation by a geodetic engineer in a survey plan. Although this was
certified by the DENR, it clearly falls short of the requirements for original registration.
With regard to the third requisite, it must be shown that the possession and occupation of a parcel of
land by the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors–in–interest, started on June 12, 1945 or
earlier.17 A mere showing of possession and occupation for 30 years or more, by itself, is not
sufficient.18
In this regard, respondents likewise failed. As the records and pleadings of this case will reveal, the
earliest that respondents and their predecessor–in–interest can trace back possession and occupation
of the subject land was only in the year 1950, when their mother, Resurreccion, acquired the subject
land from the Santoses on October 4, 1950 by virtue of an absolute sale. Evidently, their possession
of the subject property commenced roughly five (5) years beyond June 12, 1945, the reckoning date
expressly provided under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Thus, their application for registration of
land title was legally infirm.
The respondents cannot invoke Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 which
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
applicant must be able to show that the State, in addition to the said classification, expressly declared
through either a law enacted by Congress or a proclamation issued by the President that the subject
land is no longer retained for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial. Consequently, without an express declaration by the
State, the land remains to be a property of public dominion and, hence, not susceptible to acquisition
by virtue of prescription.21 The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land
of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article
420(2) of the Civil Code. It is still insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.22

xxxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws.
The case of Malabanan v. Republic19 gives a definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original
registration proceedings under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. In the said case,
the Court laid down the following rules:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
For the above reasons, the respondents cannot avail of either Section 14 (1) or 14 (2) of P.D. No.
1529. Under Section 14 (1), respondents failed to prove (a) that the property is alienable and
disposable; and (b) that their possession of the property dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Failing to prove the alienable and disposable nature of the subject land, respondents all the more
cannot apply for registration by way of prescription pursuant to Section 14 (2) which requires
possession for 30 years to acquire or take. Not only did respondents need to prove the classification
of the subject land as alienable and disposable, but also to show that it has been converted into
patrimonial. As to whether respondents were able to prove that their possession and occupation were
of the character prescribed by law, the resolution of this issue has been rendered unnecessary by the
foregoing considerations.

In fine, the Court holds that the ruling of the CA lacks sufficient factual or legal justification. Hence,
xxxx
the Court is constrained to reverse the assailed CA decision and resolution and deny the application
for registration of land title of respondents.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil
Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However,
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The November 21, 2007 Decision and the October 8, 2008
public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA–G.R. CV No. 81439, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government
Accordingly, the Application for Registration of Title of Respondents Corazon C. Sese and Fe C. Sese in
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public
Land Registration Case No. 026 is DENIED.
service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only
when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property
SO ORDERED.
of the public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of
patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof
under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary
and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a
patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title.
Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of
patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into
ownership. (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is
no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property
has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified
as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and,
thus, incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall
be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law.20

Thus, under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, for acquisitive prescription to commence and operate
against the State, the classification of land as alienable and disposable alone is not sufficient. The
 G.R. No. 164408, March 24, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. ZURBARAN REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

An application for original registration of land of the public domain under Section 14(2) of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1529 must show not only that the land has previously been declared alienable and
disposable, but also that the land has been declared patrimonial property of the State at the onset of
the 30–year or 10–year period of possession and occupation required under the law on acquisitive
prescription. Once again, the Court applies this rule—as clarified in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Republic1—in reviewing the decision promulgated on June 10, 2004,2 whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) granted the petitioner’s application for registration of land.

Antecedents

On May 28, 1993, respondent Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation filed in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in San Pedro, Laguna an application for original registration covering a 1,520 square
meter parcel of land situated in Barrio Banlic, Municipality of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna,
denominated as Lot 8017–A of Subdivision Plan CSD–04–006985–D, Cad. 455–D, Cabuyao
Cadastre,3 alleging that it had purchased the land on March 9, 1992 from Jane de Castro Abalos,
married to Jose Abalos, for P300,000.00; that the land was declared for taxation purposes in the
name of its predecessor–in–interest under Tax Declaration No. 22711; that there was no mortgage or
encumbrance of any kind affecting the land, nor was there any other person or entity having any
interest thereon, legal or equitable, adverse to that of the applicant; and that the applicant and its
predecessors–in–interest had been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation of
the land in the concept of an owner.

Attached to the application were several documents, namely: (1) tracing cloth plan as approved by
the Land Management Division of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR); (2)
blue print copies of the tracing cloth plan; (3) copies of the technical description; (4) copies of Tax
Declaration No. 2711; and (5) copies of the Deed of Sale dated March 9, 1992.

The Republic, represented by the Director of Lands, opposed the application, arguing that the
applicant and its predecessors–in–interest had not been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land since June 12, 1945; that the muniments of title and tax
declaration presented did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition
of the land; and that the land was a portion of the public domain, and, therefore, was not subject to
private appropriation.4

The RTC directed the Land Management Bureau, Manila; the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of Los Baños, Laguna; and the Land Management Sector and Forest
Management Bureau, Manila, to submit a status report on the land, particularly, on whether the land
was covered by a land patent, whether it was subject of a previously approved isolated survey, and
whether it was within a forest zone.5

In his memorandum to the DENR, Region IV (Lands Forestry Sector), and the Provincial Prosecutor of
Laguna, a copy of which was furnished the trial court, CENRO Officer Arnulfo Hernandez stated that
the land had been “verified to be within the Alienable and Disposable land under Land Classification
Project No. 23–A of Cabuyao, Laguna, certified and declared as such pursuant to the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, under Forestry Administrative Order No. A–1627 dated
September 28, 1981 per BFD Map LC–3004.” Attached to the memorandum was the inspection report
declaring that “the area is surrounded with concrete fence, three (3) buildings for employees’
residence;” that the land was acquired through sale before the filing of the application; that the
applicant and its predecessors–in–interest had been in “continuous, open and peaceful occupation” of
the land, and that “no forestry interest is adversely affected.”6
CENRO Land Management Inspector/Investigator Rodolfo S. Gonzales reported that: (1) the land was
covered by a survey plan approved by the Regional Land Director/Land Registration Authority on May
25, 1988 pursuant to PD No. 239 dated July 9, 1975; (2) it consisted of 22,773 square meters and
was located in Barangay Banlic, Cabuyao, Laguna; (3) the area was entirely within the alienable and
disposable area; (4) it had never been forfeited in favor of the government for non–payment of taxes,
and had not been confiscated in connection with any civil or criminal cases; (5) it was not within a
previously patented property as certified to by the Register of Deeds, Calamba, Laguna; and (6) there
was no public land application filed for it by the applicant or any other persons as per verification from
the records unit of his office. The report further stated that a verification at the Office of the Municipal
Assessor showed that: (1) the land was declared for the first time in 1960 under Tax Declaration No.
6712 in the name of Enrique Hemedez with an area of 23,073 square meters; (2) it was now covered
by Tax Declaration No. 2253 issued in the name of the respondent; (3) the real property taxes had
been paid since 1968; and (4) it had not been earmarked for public or quasi–public purposes per
information from the District Engineer.
After inspection, it was also found that (1) the land was residential; (2) the respondent was in the
actual occupation and possession of the land; and (3) the land did not encroach upon an established
watershed, riverbank/bed protection, creek, right–of–way or park site or any area devoted to general
use or devoted to public service.7
A certification was issued by the Records Management Division of the Land Management Bureau
stating that it had no record of any kind of public land applications/land patents covering the parcel of
land subject of the application.8
The respondent presented Gloria P. Noel, its Vice President and Treasurer, who testified that the
respondent had purchased the land from Jane de Castro Abalos on March 9, 1992 for P300,000.00;
that the land had been declared for taxation purposes in the name of Abalos under Tax Declaration
No. 22711; that after the sale, a new Tax Declaration had been issued in the name of the respondent,
who had meanwhile taken possession of the land by building a fence around it and introducing
improvements thereon; that the respondent had paid the real property taxes thereon since its
acquisition; that the respondent’s possession had been continuous, open and public; and that the land
was free from any lien or encumbrance; and that there was no adverse claimant to the land.9
Engr. Edilberto Tamis attested that he was familiar with the land because it was a portion of Lot No.
8017 of Subdivision Plan Cad–455–D of the Cabuyao Cadastre, owned by Corazon Tapalla who had
acquired it from the Hemedez family; that Tapalla had sold a portion of Lot No. 8017 to Abalos and
the remaining portion to him; and that he had witnessed the sale of the land to the respondent.10
The respondent’s final witness was Armando Espela who declared that he was a retired land overseer
residing in Barangay Banlic from birth; that he was familiar with the land which was part of a bigger
parcel of land owned by the Hemedez family; that his father, Toribio Espela, with his assistance, and
one Francisco Capacio worked on the land since 1960; that the entire landholding had originally been
sugarland, but was later on subdivided, sold, and resold until it ceased to be agricultural land; that, in
1982, the land was sold to Corazon Tapalla who hired him as the overseer; that as the overseer, he
fenced and cleared the area; that he was allowed to use the grassy portion for grazing purposes; that
in 1987, Tapalla sold part of the land to Abalos and the remaining portion to Engr. Tamis; that he
continued to oversee the land for the new owners; that Abalos then sold her portion to the
respondent in 1992; that since then, the respondent took possession of the land, and he then ceased
to be the overseer; that the possession by the Hemedez family and its successors–in–interest was
open, continuous, public and under claim of ownership; and that he did not know any person who
claimed ownership of the land other than those he and his father served as overseers.11
Decision of the RTC
On May 12, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision, holding that the respondent and its predecessors–
in–interest had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive and adverse possession and
occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership even prior to 1960 and, accordingly,
granted the application for registration, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, taking into consideration the evidence submitted by the applicant, this Court hereby
orders the confirmation and registration of title of the land described as Lot 8017–A of subdivision
plan Csd–04–006985–D, being a portion of Lot 8017 of subdivision plan Cad–455–D, Cabuyao
Cadastre situated at Barangay Banlic, Cabuyao, Laguna with an area of 1,520 square meters to be
entered under the name of the applicant Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation, a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with office address at 33 M. Viola St., San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City by the Land Registration Authority. After the decision shall become
final, let an order for the issuance of a decree of title be issued in favor of said applicant.
SO ORDERED.12
Judgment of the CA
The Republic appealed, arguing that the issue of whether the applicant and its predecessors–in–
interest had possessed the land within the required length of time could not be determined because
there was no evidence as to when the land had been declared alienable and disposable.
On June 10, 2004, the CA promulgated its judgment affirming the RTC, and concluded that the
reports made by the concerned government agencies and the testimonies of those familiar with the
land in question had buttressed the court a quo’s conclusion that the respondent and its
predecessors–in–interest had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive, and adverse
possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership even prior to 1960.13
Issue
Hence, the Republic appeals the adverse judgment of the CA upon the following
ground:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL
COURT’S GRANT OF THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF
EVIDENCE THAT RESPONDENT AND ITS PREDECESSORS–IN–INTEREST HAVE COMPLIED WITH THE
PERIOD OF POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION REQUIRED BY LAW.14
The Republic contends that the respondent did not establish the time when the land covered by the
application for registration became alienable and disposable;15 that such detail was crucial because
the possession of the respondent and its predecessors–in–interest, for the purpose of determining
whether it acquired the property by prescription, should be reckoned from the time when the land
was declared alienable and disposable; and that prior to the declaration of the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable, it was not susceptible to private ownership, and any possession
or occupation at such time could not be counted as part of the period of possession required under
the law on prescription.16
The respondent counters that whether it established when the property was declared alienable and
disposable and whether it complied with the 30–year required period of possession should not be
entertained anymore by the Court because: (a) these issues had not been raised in the trial court and
were being raised for the first time on appeal; and (b) factual findings of the trial court, especially
when affirmed by the CA, were binding and conclusive on this Court. At any rate, the respondent
insists that it had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, and adverse possession of the property
for the prescribed period of 30 years as evidenced by the fact that the property had been declared for
taxation purposes in 1960 in the name of its predecessors–in–interest, and that such possession had
the effect of converting the land into private property and vesting ownership upon the respondent.17
In reply, the Republic asserts that it duly opposed the respondent’s application for registration; that it
was only able to ascertain the errors committed by the trial court after the latter rendered its
decision; and that the burden of proof in land registration cases rested on the applicant who must
prove its ownership of the property being registered. The Republic maintains that the Court had the
authority to review and reverse the factual findings of the lower courts when the conclusion reached
was not supported by the evidence on record, as in this case.18
Ruling
The petition for review is meritorious.
Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 enumerates those who may file an application for registration of land
based on possession and occupation of a land of the public domain, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors–in–interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of
existing laws.
xxxx
An application for registration under Section14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 must establish the following
requisites, namely: (a) the land is alienable and disposable property of the public domain; (b) the
applicant and its predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership; and (c) the applicant and
its predecessors–in–interest have possessed and occupied the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The Court has clarified in Malabanan19 that under Section14(1), it is not necessary that the land must
have been declared alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945, or earlier, because the law simply
requires the property sought to be registered to be alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration of title is filed. The Court has explained that a contrary interpretation
would absurdly limit the application of the provision “to the point of virtual inutility.”
The foregoing interpretation highlights the distinction between a registration proceeding filed under
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 and one filed under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. According
toMalabanan:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2)
entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is
extended under the aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while
registration under Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration
Decree and the Civil Code.20
In other words, registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 is based on possession and
occupation of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain since June 12, 1945 or
earlier, without regard to whether the land was susceptible to private ownership at that time. The
applicant needs only to show that the land had already been declared alienable and disposable at any
time prior to the filing of the application for registration.
On the other hand, an application under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 is based on acquisitive
prescription and must comply with the law on prescription as provided by the Civil Code. In that
regard, only the patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription pursuant to
the Civil Code.21For acquisitive prescription to set in, therefore, the land being possessed and
occupied must already be classified or declared as patrimonial property of the State. Otherwise, no
length of possession would vest any right in the possessor if the property has remained land of the
public dominion. Malabanan stresses that even if the land is later converted to patrimonial property of
the State, possession of it prior to such conversion will not be counted to meet the requisites of
acquisitive prescription.22 Thus, registration under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 requires that the
land had already been converted to patrimonial property of the State at the onset of the period of
possession required by the law on prescription.
An application for registration based on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 must, therefore, establish the
following requisites, to wit: (a) the land is an alienable and disposable, and patrimonial property of
the public domain; (b) the applicant and its predecessors–in–interest have been in possession of the
land for at least 10 years, in good faith and with just title, or for at least 30 years, regardless of good
faith or just title; and (c) the land had already been converted to or declared as patrimonial
property of the State at the beginning of the said 10–year or 30–year period of possession.
To properly appreciate the respondent’s case, we must ascertain under what provision its application
for registration was filed. If the application was filed under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, the
determination of the particular date when the property was declared alienable and disposable would
be unnecessary, inasmuch as proof showing that the land had already been classified as such at the
time the application was filed would be enough. If the application was filed under Section 14(2) of
P.D. No. 1529, the determination of the issue would not be crucial for, as earlier clarified, it was not
the declaration of the land as alienable and disposable that would make it susceptible to private
ownership by acquisitive prescription. Malabanan expounds thereon, thus
…Would such lands so declared alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from
property of the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition,
alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that
all things within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further
provides that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that “[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.”
It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial
property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those
property “which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth” are public dominion property. For as long as
the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains
property of the public dominion if when it is “intended for some public service or for the development
of the national wealth.”
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth
or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion,
pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such
alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can
begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.23

The respondent’s application does not enlighten as to whether it was filed under Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The application alleged that the respondent and its predecessors–in–
interest had been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation of the property in the
concept of an owner, but did not state when possession and occupation commenced and the duration
of such possession. At any rate, the evidence presented by the respondent and its averments in the
other pleadings reveal that the application for registration was filed based on Section 14(2), not
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. The respondent did not make any allegation in its application that it
had been in possession of the property since June 12, 1945, or earlier, nor did it present any evidence
to establish such fact.

With the application of the respondent having been filed under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, the
crucial query is whether the land subject of the application had already been converted to patrimonial
property of the State. In short, has the land been declared by law as no longer intended for public
service or the development of the national wealth?

The respondent may perhaps object to a determination of this issue by the Court for the same reason
that it objects to the determination of whether it established when the land was declared alienable
and disposable, that is, the issue was not raised in and resolved and by the trial court. But the
objection would be futile because the issue was actually raised in the trial court, as borne out by the
Republic’s allegation in its opposition to the application to the effect “that the land is a portion of the
public domain not subject to prescription.” In any case, the interest of justice dictates the
consideration and resolution of an issue that is relevant to another that was specifically raised. The
rule that only theories raised in the initial proceedings may be taken up by a party on appeal refers
only to independent, not concomitant, matters to support or oppose the cause of action.24

Here, there is no evidence showing that the land in question was within an area expressly declared by
law either to be the patrimonial property of the State, or to be no longer intended for public service or
the development of the national wealth. The Court is left with no alternative but to deny the
respondent’s application for registration.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the decision promulgated on June 10, 2004; and DISMISSES the respondent’s application for
original registration of Lot 8017–A of Subdivision Plan CSD–04–006985–D, Cad. 455–D, of the
Cabuyao Cadastre.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 176022, February 02, 2015
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. CECILIA GRACE L. ROASA, MARRIED TO GREG
AMBROSE ROASA, AS HEREIN REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEYS-IN-FACT, BERNARDO M.
NICOLAS, JR. AND ALVIN B. ACAYEN, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the annulment of the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), dated December 13, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 85515 which reversed and set
aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, in Land Registration
Case No. TG-930.
The facts of the case are as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The instant petition arose from an application for registration of title over a parcel of land filed by
herein respondent, represented by her attorneys-in-fact, Bernardo M. Nicolas, Jr. and Alvin B. Acayen.
The application was filed on December 15, 2000 with the RTC of Tagaytay City. The subject lot was
denominated as Lot 2 of the consolidation/subdivision plan, Ccs-04-000501-D, being a portion of Lots
13592 and 2681, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre.
In her application, respondent alleged, among others, that she is the owner in fee simple of the
subject lot, having acquired the same by purchase as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
December 2, 1994; that the said property is an agricultural land planted with corn, palay, bananas,
coconut and coffee by respondent's predecessors-in-interest; that respondent and her predecessors-
in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and uninterrupted possession and occupation of
the land under bona fideclaim of ownership since the 1930's and that they have declared the land for
taxation purposes. The application, likewise, stated the names and addresses of the adjoining owners.
Subsequently, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
opposed the application contending that the muniments of title, such as tax declarations and tax
payment receipts, did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of
the land applied for nor of the alleged open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by
respondent and her predecessors-in-interest as owners for the period required by law. The OSG also
argued that the subject lot is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines which is not subject to private appropriation.
Thereafter, respondent presented three witnesses to prove her allegations. She, then, filed her
formal offer of evidence. The Republic, on the other hand, did not present any evidence to support its
opposition to respondent's application for registration.
On June 21, 2004, the RTC admitted all the exhibits of respondent and considered the case submitted
for decision.
On December 8, 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision denying respondent's application. The trial court
held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
Perusal of the records show that the subject land x x x is not classified as forest land prior to March
15, 1982; x x x.
It bears stressing at this point in time that before one can register his title over a parcel of land, the
applicant must show that he, by himself or by his predecessors-in-interest, had been in notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land under a “bona fide” claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier; and further, the land subject of application is alienable and disposable portion of the
public domain. x x x
The evidence adduced by the applicant [herein respondent] particularly Exhibit “U” shows that the
subject land applied for registration was declared as not part of the forest land of the government
before March 15, 1982, or short of more or less seven (7) years of the required adverse possession of
thirty (30) years.
x x x x.2
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, herein respondent filed an appeal with the CA.
On December 13, 2006, the CA rendered its assailed Decision disposing as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the December 8, 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Tagaytay City, Branch 18, in Land Registration Case No. TG-930, is herebyREVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one issued, GRANTING the application for confirmation of imperfect title. The
Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City is herebyDIRECTED to issue Title in the name of applicant for Lot
2 of Consolidated Subdivision Plan CCs-04-000501-D, being a portion of Lot 13592 and 2681, Cad-
452-D, Silang Cadastre, consisting of 1.5 hectares.
SO ORDERED.3
The CA held that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must, therefore, prove the following: (a) that the land
forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under
a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.
There are two parts to the requirements of the law. As to the first part, there is no doubt that the
subject property, irregardless of the date, was already made alienable and disposable agricultural
land.
As to the second requirement, there is a specific cut-off date of possession: June 12, 1945. The cut-
off date of possession of June 12, 1945 only applies to the requirement of possession. It does not
have any bearing as to when the land became alienable and disposable.
When the property was classified as alienable and disposable, specifically on March 15, 1982, does
not have any bearing with the second requirement of possession so that despite the fact that the
property became alienable and disposable only in 1982, the possession requirement since June 12,
1945 stands so that, as in this case at bench, when the possession was since 1930, which is before
June 12, 1945, the requirement of possession has been met.
x x x x4
Hence, the instant petition anchored on the sole ground, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DENYING
RESPONDENT'S APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE DUE TO HER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
THE REQUIRED 30-YEAR ADVERSE POSSESSION SINCE THE SUBJECT LAND WAS DECLARED
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN ONLY ON MARCH 15, 1982 PER CENRO
CERTIFICATION, AND THE APPLICATION WAS FILED ONLY ON DECEMBER 12, 2000. ANY PERIOD OF
POSSESSION PRIOR TO THE DATE WHEN THE SUBJECT LAND WAS CLASSIFIED AS ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE IS INCONSEQUENTIAL AND SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE COMPUTATION OF THE
30-YEAR PERIOD OF POSSESSION.5
Section 14(1), Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
In the same manner, Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as The Public Land
Act,as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.cralawred
Based on the above provisions, an applicant for original registration of title based on a claim of
exclusive and continuous possession or occupation must show the existence of the
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, of land;chanrobleslaw
2. The land possessed or occupied must have been declared alienable and disposable
agricultural land of public domain;chanrobleslaw
3. The possession or occupation was under a bona fide claim of ownership;chanrobleslaw
4. Possession dates back to June 12, 1945 or earlier.6
In the instant case, petitioner's sole contention is that the possession of the subject lot by respondent
and her predecessors-in-interest before the establishment of alienability of the said land, should be
excluded in the computation of the period of possession for purposes of registration. Petitioner argues
that respondent's possession of the disputed parcel of land, prior to its re-classification as alienable
and disposable, cannot be credited as part of the required period of possession because the same
cannot be considered adverse.
The Court does not agree.
The Court's disquisition in the recent case of AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-
RSBS) v. Republic of the Philippines,7 as it retraces the various rulings of this Court on the issue as to
when an applicant's possession should be reckoned and the resulting prevailing doctrine, is
instructive, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
Republic v. Naguit [409 Phil. 405] involves the similar question. In that case, this court clarified
that Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree should be interpreted to include
possession before the declaration of the land’s alienability as long as at the time of the
application for registration, the land has already been declared part of the alienable and
disposable agricultural public lands. This court also emphasized in that case the absurdity that
would result in interpreting Section 14(1) as requiring that the alienability of public land should have
already been established by June 12, 1945. Thus, this court said
in Naguit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioner’s position. Absent a
legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSG’s view, that all lands of the public
domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant.
Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the
government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable
and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that
before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property
sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration
of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to
release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still
reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State
irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has
already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an
intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.cralawred
However, in the later case of Republic v. Herbieto [498 Phil. 227] that was cited by respondent, this
court ruled that the period of possession before the declaration that land is alienable and disposable
cannot be included in the computation of the period of possession. This court
said:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 48(b), as amended, now requires adverse possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. In the present Petition, the Subject Lots became alienable and disposable only on 25 June
1963. Any period of possession prior to the date when the Subject Lots were classified as alienable
and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had been classified
as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto. It is
very apparent then that respondents could not have complied with the period of possession required
by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, to acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the two of respondent's witnesses established that the latter and her predecessors-in-interest had been in
Subject Lots that may be judicially confirmed or legalized. adverse, open, continuous, and notorious possession in the concept of an owner even before June 12,
1945.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This Court clarified the role of the date, June 12, 1945, in computing the period of possession for
purposes of registration in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines [605 Phil. 244]. In WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated December
that case, this court declared that Naguit and not Herbietoshould be followed. Herbieto “has [no] 13, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 85515 is AFFIRMED.
precedential value with respect to Section 14(1).” This court said:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was adopted in
Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the
application of the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually
declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to
establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership
long before that date.

Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to
avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This
balancing fact is significant, especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach
of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has any precedental value with
respect to Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is embedded in Section 14(1), since it
precisely involved situation wherein the applicant had been in exclusive possession under abona
fide claim of ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The Court’s interpretation of Section 14(1) therein was
decisive to the resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which between Naguit or Herbieto provides the
final word of the Court on Section 14(1) is now settled in favor of Naguit.

Moreover, in the resolution of the motions for reconsideration of this court’s 2009 decision in Heirs of
Malabanan, this Court explained that there was no other legislative intent that could be associated
with the date, June 12, 1945, as written in our registration laws except that it qualifies the requisite
period of possession and occupation. The law imposes no requirement that land should have been
declared alienable and disposable agricultural land as early as June 12, 1945.

Therefore, what is important in computing the period of possession is that the land has
already been declared alienable and disposable at the time of the application for
registration. Upon satisfaction of this requirement, the computation of the period may
include the period of adverse possession prior to the declaration that land is alienable and
disposable.8 (Emphasis supplied)

Although adverse, open, continuous, and notorious possession in the concept of an owner is a
conclusion of law to be determined by courts, it has more to do with a person’s belief in good faith
that he or she has just title to the property that he or she is occupying.9 It is unrelated to the
declaration that land is alienable or disposable.10 A possessor or occupant of property may, therefore,
be a possessor in the concept of an owner prior to the determination that the property is alienable
and disposable agricultural land.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Respondent’s right to the original registration of title over the subject property is, therefore,
dependent on the existence of (a) a declaration that the land is alienable and disposable at the time
of the application for registration and (b) open and continuous possession in the concept of an owner
through itself or through its predecessors-in-interest since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the present case, there is no dispute that the subject lot has been declared alienable and
disposable on March 15, 1982. This is more than eighteen (18) years before respondent's application
for registration, which was filed on December 15, 2000. Moreover, the unchallenged testimonies of