Hearsay

Torralba v. People (supra)

Sps. Viloria v. Continental Airlines (G.R. No. 188288, January 16, 2012) arriana

Spouses Fernando And Lourdes Viloria vs Continental Airlines Inc.

G.R. No. 188288 January 16, 2012

FACTS:
Upon returning to the Philippines, Fernando demanded a refund from CAI alleging that
Mager, an agent from Holiday Travel had deluded them into purchasing an airline tickets on
board CAI. They claimed that the representation of Mager as to unavailability of seats for train
tickets be considered fraudulent as to vitiate the consent of Spouse Viloria in the purchase of the
subject ticket. In a letter dated March 24, 1998, Continental Micronesia denied the request and
informed him for that the subject tickets may be used as a form of payment for the purchase of
another Continental ticket, albeit with a re-issuance fee. He went to CAI for the replacement but
was informed that a round trip ticket to Los Angeles was US$1,867.40 so he would have to pay
what will not be covered by the value of his San Diego to Newark round trip ticket.

Spouses Viloria then filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against CAI.
Fernando claimed that CAI’s act of charging him with US$1,867.40 for a round trip ticket to Los
Angeles, which other airlines priced at US$856.00 breached its undertaking under its March 24,
1998 letter. CAI argued that Spouses Viloria’s sole basis to claim that the price at which CAI
was willing to issue the new tickets is unconscionable is a piece of hearsay evidence – an
advertisement appearing on a newspaper stating that airfares from Manila to Los Angeles or San
Francisco cost US$818.00.

RTC ruled in favor of the spouses however it was reversed by the CA. According to the
CA, there is no compulsion for CAI to charge the lower amount of US$856.00, which Spouses
Viloria claim to be the fee charged by other airlines. The matter of fixing the prices for its
services is CAI’s prerogative, which Spouses Viloria cannot intervene.

ISSUE: Are newspaper clippings admissible in evidence?

HELD:
There is also no showing that Spouses Viloria were discriminated against in bad faith by
being charged with a higher rate. The only evidence the petitioners presented to prove that the
price of a round trip ticket between Manila and Los Angeles at that time was only $856.00 is a
newspaper advertisement for another airline company, which is inadmissible for being “hearsay
evidence, twice removed.” Newspaper clippings are hearsay if they were offered for the purpose
of proving the truth of the matter alleged. As ruled in Feria v. Court of Appeals,:
[N]ewspaper articles amount to “hearsay evidence, twice removed” and are therefore not only
inadmissible but without any probative value at all whether objected to or not, unless offered for
a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted. In this case, the news article is
admissible only as evidence that such publication does exist with the tenor of the news therein
stated.

People v. Cusi (G.R. No. L-20986, August 14, 1965) cyrine

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.HON. VICENTE N. CUSI JR.

FACTS:
Puesca, Apa, Gustilo, Macalinao, Dairo, and Montano were charged with robbery in band with
homicide, to which they pleaded not guilty. While Sgt. Bano was testifying as prosecution
witness regarding the extrajudicial confession made to him by Puesca, he said that the latter,
aside from admitting his participation in the commission of the offense charged, revealed that
other persons conspired with him to commit the offense, mentioning the name of each and
everyone of them. The prosecuting officer asked the witness to mention in court the names of
Puesca's alleged co-conspirators. Counsel for the accused Macalinao, Gustilo and Dairo
objected to this, upon the ground that whatever the witness would say would be hearsay as far
as his clients were concerned. The respondent judge resolved the objection directing the
witness to answer the question but without mentioning or giving the names of the accused who
had interposed the objection.

ISSUE/HOLDING: Whether or no Sgt. Bano is allow to answer the question in full.

RULINGS:
Yes. Hearsay evidence, if timely objected to, may not be admitted. But while the testimony of a
witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of
facts asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of
placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made
or the tenor of such statement.

In the present case, the purpose of the prosecuting officer is nothing more than to establish the
fact that the accused Puesca had mentioned to Sgt. Bano the names of those who conspired
with him to commit the offense charged, without claiming that Puesca's statement or the
answer to be given by Sgt. Bano would be competent and admissible evidence to show that the
persons so named really conspired with Puesca. The question propounded to the witness was
proper and the latter should have been allowed to answer it in full, with the understanding,
however, that his answer shall not to be taken as competent evidence to show that the persons
named really and actually conspired with Puesca and later took part in the commission of the
offense.

Estrada v. Desierto (G.R. Nos. 146710-15 & 146738, March 2, 2001) elver

Estrada vs Desierto

Facts:

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President.

In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President.

From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems
that slowly but surely eroded his popularity

Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. However, petitioner strenuously held on
to his office and refused to resign.

On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the
petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to
the holding of a snap election for President where he would not be a candidate.

January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath,
respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency

After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems appeared in clusters.
Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.

On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting any
further proceedings or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after
the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted." Thru another counsel,
petitioner, on February 6, for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to
be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to
discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be
holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution.

Among the pieces of evidence offered to prove that Estrada had indeed resigned from the
presidency is the Angara Diary, chronicling the last moments of Estrada in Malacanang.
Issue:

Whether the use of the Angara diary to determine the state of mind of the petitioner on the
issue of his resignation violates the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that the Angara diary is not an out of court statement but is a part of
the pleadings of the case. Furthermore, the Court noted that the Angara diaries contained
direct statements of Estrada with respect to his proposal for the holding of a snap election, his
intent to leave his post by Monday and his exasperation over the bureaucracy, controversy and
red tape. An ANALYSIS of the same leads to the conclusion that the contents of the diary may
be more accurately classified as admissions of a party. Pursuant to the Rules of Evidence, “the
act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against
him.

The Angara diary contains statements of the petitioner, which reflect his state of mind and are
circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign. It also contains statements of Sec. Angara from
which we can reasonably deduce petitioner’s intent to resign. Moreover, the statements cannot
be regarded as hearsay evidence because the same can be properly categorized as
independently relevant statements. Independently relevant statements are those which are
“independent” from the truth of the statements. Independently relevant statements may be
classified into statements which consist of the very facts in issue and those which are
circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue, such as the statements of a person showing his
state of mind or statements of a person from which an inference may be made as to the state
of mind of another. Pursuant to this, it may well be said that the entries in the Angara diary
may be regarded as containing statements regarding the state of mind of Estrada, hence
constituting circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign.

Cornejo v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. L-58831, July 31, 1987) grace

Cornejo v. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. L-58831, July 31, 1987

FACTS:

Engineer Alfredo R. Cornejo, Sr. called up Beth Chua, who was renting the premises owned by
Crisanto Bautista as her residence and a sari-sari store, and introduced himself to be connected
with the City Engineer's Office. Cornejo said pursuant to the Building Code, the Metro Manila
Commission requires that the floor area of all houses be measured, a service for which a fee of
P3.00 per square meter is charged, but that, if said service is undertaken by him, the charge
would be only P0.50 per square meter. Chua believed him because he talked nicely and warned
her that unless she complied, she could be liable. She was also convinced by Cornejo that having
her store measured and a plan thereof made would prevent her eviction from the subject
premises. City Engineer Jesus I. Reyna later issued a certification, which was presented as
Exhibit B, to Chua stating that Cornejo was not authorized to conduct inspection and
investigation of privately-owned buildings. Cornejo was then arrested in an entrapment
operation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the certification issued by Pasay City Engineer Jesus Reyna is admissible.

HELD:

Yes. The law provides that where the statement or writings attributed to a person who is not on
the witness stand are being offered not to prove the truth of the facts stated therein but only to
prove that such statements were actually made or such writings were executed, such evidence is
not covered by the hearsay rule. In the case at bar, Exhibit B was not presented as an independent
evidence to prove the want of authority of petitioner to inspect and investigate privately-owned
buildings, but merely as part of the testimony of-the complainant that such certification was
issued in her presence and the declaration of Assistant Pasay City Engineer Ceasar Contreras that
the signature appearing thereon was that of Engineer Reyna. Thus, the certification issued by
Pasay City Engineer Jesus Reyna is admissible.

Philippine Realty v. Firematic (G.R. No. 156251, April 27, 2007) harey

NPC v. Diato-Bernal (G.R. No. 180979, December 15, 2010) janine

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. TERESITA DIATO-BERNAL

G.R. No. 180979, December 15, 2010

FACTS:

National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), is a government owned and controlled corporation created for
the purpose of undertaking the development of hydroelectric power throughout the Philippines. To carry out the said
purpose, NAPOCOR is authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain. Thus, in order to complete the
construction of structures and steel posts for NAPOCORs Dasmarinas- Zapote 230 KV Transmission Line Project, it
had to acquire an easement of right of way over respondent’s property.

Thus, NAPOCOR filed an expropriation suit against respondent. NAPOCOR is willing to deposit the
amount of Eight Hundred Fifty- Three Pesos and 72/100 (P853.72), representing the assessed value of the property.
But the parties failed to reach an agreement.
 So, the RTC proceeded to determine the amount of just compensation and appointed three (3)
commissioners. The commissioners submitted their report and recommended that the just compensation due from
NAPOCOR be pegged at P10,000.00 per sq. m, based on the property’s fair market value.

NAPOCOR filed an Opposition asserting that it was not substantiated by any official documents or
registered deeds of sale of the subject propertys neighboring lots. However, CA rendered its Decision affirming the
RTCs judgment.

Hence, this present petition for review on certiorari interposed by NAPOCOR.

ISSUE:

Is the valuation report of just compensation made by the court-appointed commissioners admissible?

RULING:

No. As correctly invoked by NAPOCOR, a commissioner’s report of land prices which is not based on any
documentary evidence is manifestly hearsay and should be disregarded by the court.

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation and to convey thereby the
idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample. Indeed,
the just-ness of the compensation can only be attained by using reliable and actual data as bases in fixing the value
of the condemned property.

It is evident that the above conclusions are highly speculative and devoid of any actual and reliable basis.
First, the market values of the subject property neighboring lots were mere estimates and unsupported by any
corroborative documents, such as sworn declarations of realtors in the area concerned, tax declarations or zonal
valuation from the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the contiguous residential dwellings and commercial
establishments. The report also failed to elaborate on how and by how much the community centers and
convenience facilities enhanced the value of respondents property. Finally, the market sales data and price listings
alluded to in the report were not even appended thereto.

Dantis vs. Maghinang (supra)

People v. Valero (G.R. Nos. L-45283-84, March 19, 1982) john

Dying Declaration

People v. Mara-Mara (G.R. No. 110994, October 22, 1999) lourdes

Facts:
A benefit dance sponsored by the Calpi Elementary School Parents-Teachers Association of
which accused-appellant is the president, was held in the yard of accused-appellant’s house in
Barangay Calpi, Claveria, Masbate in the evening of November 18, 1991. At about 12 midnight,
while Ricardo Donato was dancing with a certain Rowena del Rosario, one Dante Arce, a friend
of accused-appellant, approached Ricardo Donato and boxed him on the chest. Frightened,
Rowena ran away while Ricardo Donato scampered toward the fence for safety. Miguelito
Donato was about two (2) meters away from where Ricardo Donato stayed at the fence. Not for
long, accused-appellant took his handgun tucked in his waist and fired at victim Miguelito
Donato, hitting the latter on the left breast. Ricardo Donato tried to help his fallen brother
Miguelito but somebody struck Ricardo’s head with an iron bar which knocked him out for about
three (3) minutes. When Ricardo regained consciousness, he hurried home and informed his
parents of what happened to their son Miguelito.
Regarder Donato, Miguelito’s father, immediately went to the crime scene and rushed Miguelito
to the Pio Duran Hospital where the latter died early in the morning of the next day (November
19, 1991). Before Miguelito expired, Regarder Donato asked who shot him and Miguelito replied
that it was accused-appellant.
The accused-appellant was charged with murder and was ruled by the RTC to be guilty thereof.
However, the accused-appellant challenged the findings of the trial court before the SC in the
hope of securing an acquittal or, at the least, being held liable only for the death of Miguelito in a
tumultuous affray.

Issue:
Whether the dying declaration of Miguelito is admissible.

Ruling:
Yes. Regarder Donato’s testimony regarding Miguelito’s identification of the accused-appellant
as his assailant certainly qualifies as a dying declaration that is worthy of credence. For a dying
declaration to be admissible in evidence, these requisites must concur: (1) that death is imminent
and the declarant is conscious of that fact; (2) that the declaration refers to the cause and
surrounding circumstances of such death; (3) that the declaration relates to facts which the victim
is competent to testify to; (4) that the declarant thereafter dies; and (5) that the declaration is
offered in a criminal case wherein the declarant’s death is the subject of inquiry. The degree and
seriousness of the wounds suffered by the victim Miguelito Donato and the fact that his death
supervened shortly thereafter may be considered as substantial evidence that the declaration was
made by him with the full realization that he was in a dying condition. The victim Miguelito
Donato’s dying declaration having satisfied all these requisites, it must be considered as an
evidence of the highest order because, at the threshold of death, all thoughts of fabrication are
stilled. A victim’s utterance after sustaining a mortal wound may be considered pure emanations
of the incident.

People v. Molo (G.R. No. L-44680. January 11, 1979) lylanie

FACTS:
In the evening of April 9, 1976 at about 8:00 p.m. at Municipality of Romblon, Venancio Gapisa
and Simeona Rapa-Gapisa, husband and wife, retired to sleep. Venancio Gapisa immediately fell
asleep because he was tired from clearing the fields, and besides, had drunk tuba on that day. He
slept near the door lying on his right side. Not long after the couple had retired, Simeona, who
had not yet fallen asleep, heard an indistinct sound of murmur and gnashing of teeth. Although
she was seized by fear, she managed to peep through the dilapidated buri wall and saw accused
Dominador Molo attired only in short pants. He was alone. Trembling, she immediately lighted a
kerosene lamp and placed it on top of the trunk nearby. She tried to awaken her husband, but the
latter did not respond.

Meanwhile, the accused had already climbed up the house which was only a flight of two steps.
The accused forcibly pushed the sliding door and barged into the house. He inquired from
Simeona where Venancio was and she replied that he was asleep. Finding Venancio sleeping
near the door, he immediately grabbed his left wrist and started hacking at the sleeping old man.
Rudely awakened, Venancio quickly stood up and with his right hand reached for his bolo which
was atop the table nearby; but he was not able to retaliate in as much as Dominador Molo was
quick to hack at him again. Fearing for her own life, Simeona rushed out of the house through
the door of the unfinished kitchen to summon help from her son, Alejandro Gapisa, who was at
Roman Mangaring's house some 100 meters away. Trembling, she told him that his father was
boloed by Boslo, the name by which accused-appellant was known in their locality.

Upon being informed, Alejandro and Roman ran towards the house of Venancio, followed by
Simeona. Upon arrival, they saw Venancio bleeding profusely and in weakened condition. He
was sitting on the floor of the kitchen, defecating in his pants. When Alejandro took him in his
arms, Venancio told him that he was boloed by Boslo. Roman Mangaring who was present also
inquired from Venancio who his assailant was and elicited the answer, "Boslo". Venancio was
then rushed to the hospital and arrived there at about 1:50 a.m. He expired a few minutes after.

An autopsy of the victim disclosed that he died of hemorrhage from multiple incised wounds.
The following morning an investigation of the fatal incident was conducted. Pat. Manuel Marino
in the presence of Patrolmen Montojo and Antonio Madali took the statement of Simeona
Gapisa, who Identified Dominador Molo as the assailant of her deceased husband. Thereafter,
PC soldiers and policemen were dispatched to the house of Dominador Molo some one and a
half (1-1/2) kilometers away from the scene of the killing. Dominador Molo was placed under
arrest and brought by the arresting officers to the poblacion. Investigated at the PC barracks,
Molo denied having committed any wrong and having gone to the place of Venancio Gapisa.

After trial, the court a quo finds the accused Dominador Molo guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellant thru Atty. Pedro Q. Quadra, counsel de oficio now seeks acquittal on the basis
that the so-called dying declarations should not have been accorded credence, because the victim
could not have Identified his assailant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the statements made by Venacio to Alejandro and Roman are admissible.

RULING:
Yes. The statements of Venancio Identifying Dominador Molo as his assailant to Alejandro, his
son, and Roman, his neighbor are dying declarations.

Considering the nature and extent of the wounds, eight in all, Venancio must have realized the
seriousness of his condition and it can therefore be inferred that he made the incrimination under
the consciousness of impending death, which, in fact, supervened barely 4-1/2 hours after he was
boloed.

In resume then the credible and unimpeached testimonies of the victim's widow, Simeona
Gapisa, who was an eye-witness to the fatal incident, and that of Alejandro Gapisa, the victim's
son, and Roman Mangaring, a neighbor, who both testified on the ante-mortem statements of the
victim, establish the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
qualified by treachery, and aggravated by circumstances of dwelling, recidivism and reiteration,
it appearing that accused has been convicted by final judgment of murder, frustrated murder,
grave slander, less serious physical injuries, qualified trespass to dwelling and robbery, and, had
served sentences for said crimes.

People v. Bautista (G.R. No. 117685, June 21, 1999) mary rose

People v. Basay (G.R. No. 86941, March 3, 1993) nina

Teodoro Basay and Jaime Ramirez were charged with Multiple Murder with Arson in a criminal
complaint for having allegedly killed the spouses Zosimo and Beatrice Toting and their six-year
old daughter, Bombie, and for having burned the said spouses' house to conceal the crime; as a
consequence of such fire, the spouses' other daughter, Manolita, was burned to death. MCTC
issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused; no bail was recommended and were detained at the
Pamplona municipal jail.
After both accused entered a not guilty plea during their arraignment trial on the merits ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution upon which the decision is based is summarized in detail in the
trial court's decision and partly contains as follows:
Upon arriving at Tigbaw, they found a burned house and several dead bodies. The trial court
identified the four (4) fatalities and their injuries as follows:
Xxx
(3) Bombie Toting, inflicted hack wound from the anterior lumbar area transecting mid-
abdomen, inguial area left to the medial thigh left, through and through, with necrotic transected
muscle;
Xxx
Bombie Toting related to Sgt. Tabanao that on March 4, 1986 at 7:00 o'clock in the evening,
appellant and Teodoro Basay killed her parents and burned their house.
On the same day the investigating officers went to the appellant's house. They saw appellant
fixing the roof of his house and when appellant saw them, he went down and tried to ran.
Appellant was turned over to the Pamplona Police Station.
Bombie Toting was brought to the hospital but due to the gravity of her injuries she died on
March 7, 1986 at 1:40 P.M.
On the other hand, the trial court did not admit the statement of Bombie Toting as a dying
declaration but merely as part of the res gestae because the prosecution failed to prove two (2) of
the requisites for the admissibility of a dying declaration, viz., that the statement was given under
consciousness of an impending death and that Bombie Toting is a competent witness.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Bombie’s testimony is admissible.

RULING:

We harbor very serious doubts about the alleged statement given by Bombie Toting to Sgt.
Tabanao and Jaime Saguban identifying the appellant and Teodoro Basay as the perpetrators of
the heinous crime. In the first place, the trial court itself ruled that Bombie was not a competent
witness. We agree with such a conclusion, not necessarily because she was only six (6) years old,
but because her condition at the time she supposedly gave her statement made it impossible for
her to have communicated effectively. She suffered the following injuries: "Infected hack wound
from the right anterior lumbar area transecting mid abdomen, inguinal area left to the medial
thigh left through and through, with necrotic transected muscle." She was taken from the crime
scene only on 6 March 1986, or two (2) days after the commission of the crime, and died in the
hospital on 7 March 1986. The doctor who first attended to her when she arrived at the
Provincial Hospital, a certain Dr. Sy, was not presented as a witness. On the other hand, the
doctor who attended to her before she died, Dr. Edgar Cantalao, testified that when he last saw
Bombie alive, she could not talk.

Although persons of tender age are prone to tell the truth, however, the Court must be cautious in
appreciating said testimony where the person had a serious wound and had not eaten for one day
and one night. There is no evidence to show that Bombie Toting told the doctor as to who were
the perpetrators of the crime; neither did she tell her own brother, Zosimo Toting, Jr. that it was
the accused, Teodoro Basay and Jaime Ramirez who killed her parents and her brother and
sisters and burned their house. . . . The Court cannot understand why P.C. Sgt. Tabano did not
ask Bombie Toting questions concerning the commission of the crime by the accused. Neither
did the P.C. or (sic) the police take any statement from her on her way to the hospital or at the
hospital. Surprisingly, Bombie Toting did not even tell her own brother, Zosimo Toting, Jr. that
it was the accused who committed the crime. Had the statement of Bombie Toting been made to
the doctor or to the barangay captain or to any reputable member of the community where the
incident happened, the Court will have to put weight and consider her statement as a dying
declaration. Our experience has shown that persons in authority are prone to fabricate or
misrepresent the facts to serve their own purpose. Innocent people had been charged in Court
simply by the false statements of peace officers. The Court therefore has to be cautious when
these peace officers testify in Court."

While it may be true that the appellant ran away when he first saw the armed law officers, he did
so merely out of fear of them. This act should not be considered as the flight which is indicative
of guilt. The appellant had not left his house or barangay since 4 March 1986, the day the crime
was committed. If he were indeed one of the perpetrators and had the intention to flee in order to
avoid arrest, he should have vanished sooner and should not have remained in his house.
Besides, if indeed his running away could be construed as flight, it could only be considered as
circumstantial evidence. Such evidence would still be insufficient for a conviction. Under
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, in order that circumstantial evidence may sustain a
conviction, there must, inter alia, be more than one (1) circumstance. No other circumstance was
established in this case.

People vs. Cabtalan (richard)

Dying Declaration

Facts:

Benry and Adriano, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, with
deliberate intent, with treachery and abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault, and stab Jesus with the use of long bolos, with which
both accused have provided themselves for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon the victim
multiple stab wounds, which wounds resulted to his instantaneous death.

Wilfredo went to the store to buy salt. Thereat, Benny and Adriano asked him to join them in
their drinking spree to which Wilfredo obliged In the course of their drinking spree, Wilfredo
noticed that Benny and Adriano had bolos tucked on their waists. He also heard the two talking
about their plan to assault someone that same night. Sensing that something wrong would
happen, Wilfredo left them and walked home.

Upon reaching his house, Wilfredo soon noticed Benny and Adriano circling the house of Jesus’s
daughter, Elena, which is just about two arms length away from his house. Thereafter, the duo
stood on a dark portion of the road. Later on, he saw Jesus and his 9-year-old daughter, Jonalyn
walking towards the house of Jonalyn’s mother, Elena. Jesus stopped and turned towards a
grassy area to urinate when suddenly, Benny and Adriano emerged from their hiding place. They
held Jesus by his shoulders and alternately stabbed him. At that moment, Jesus shouted “I am
wounded, please help me because I was stabbed by Benny and Adriano. Jesus then fell to the
ground while Benny and Adriano immediately fled from the crime scene.

For her part, prosecution witness Jonalyn narrated that on the night of the incident, she fetched
her grandfather Jesus from her Ate Susan’s house. She and her grandfather walked side by side
in going to their house. However, upon reaching the vicinity of their house, her grandfather went
across the street to urinate. IT was then that she saw Benny and Adriano on the same street. She
knew the two because Benny and her father are cousins while Adriano and her mother are also
cousins. She saw the two men take hold of her grandfather’s arms, after which Benny stabbed
her grandfather with a long bolo. She heard her grandfather say “Donie, help me, I am
wounded.” After that, Jonalyn saw Benny go home.

Elena also tesified that when she heard her father shouting for help, she immediately went
outside the house and saw Benny releasing her father. As she got nearer to Jesus, Benny and
Adriano ran away. When Elena asked her father as to who stabbed him, the latter replied that it
was Benny and Adriano.

Answers of the respondent:

1. Wilfredo’s testimony that Benny and Adriano took turns in stabbing Jesus differs from
that of Jonalyn who stated that while the two assailants attacked Jesus in unison, it was
only Benny who inflicted the mortal wounds. Therefore, Wilfredo’s testimony is not
credible.
2. Wilfredo is not a credible witness since he surfaced three years after the incident to
testify for the prosecution.
3. Wilfredo and Jonalyn are related. Therefore, their testimony are not credible.
4. There are inconsistencies in Elena’s testimony and in her affidavit.

Issue: Are the testimony of the witnesses credible?

Ruling: Yes.

1. With respect to the Answer in no. 1, the inconsistency pertains merely to the manner the
fatal stab wounds were inflicted on Jesus. The materiality of the assailants' exact position
during their attack on the victim is a trivial and insignificant detail which cannot defeat
the witnesses' positive identification of Benny as one of the assailants. Besides "[i]t is
perfectly natural for different witnesses testifying on the occurrence of a crime to give
varying details as there may be some details which one witness may notice while the
other may not observe or remember. In fact, jurisprudence even warns against a perfect
dovetailing of narration by different witnesses as it could mean that their testimonies
were fabricated and rehearsed.
2. Deference or reluctance in reporting a crime does not destroy the truth of the charge nor
is it an indication of deceit. Delay in reporting a crime or an unusual incident in a rural
area is well-known. It is common for a witness to prefer momentary silence for fear of
reprisal from the accused. he fact remains that Wilfredo fulfilled his duty as a good
member of society by aiding the family of Jesus when they were seeking justice. In the
absence of other circumstances that would show that the charge was a mere concoction
and that Wilfredo was impelled by some evil motives, delay in testifying is insufficient to
discredit his testimony.
3. While admittedly, Wilfredo is a relative of the husband of Julita, who is the daughter of
Jesus, and Jonalyn is Jesus's granddaughter, relationship per se does not evince ulterior
motive nor does it ipso facto tarnish the credibility of witnesses. "Mere relationship to a
party cannot militate against the credibility of witnesses or be taken as destructive of the
 witnesses' credibility.” What matters is that Wilfredo and Jonalyn positively identified
Benny and Adriano as the assailants of Jesus and that they testified in a straightforward
manner. These indicate that the two are telling the truth.
4. It is settled that "affidavits or statements taken ex parte are generally considered
incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are inferior to testimony given in court,
and whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness
in court, the testimony commands greater weight.” The reason for this is that trial courts
have the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and note their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude under grilling examination."

Zarate v. Gingoog (G.R. No. 152263, July 3, 2009) rizyl

Zarate v. RTC

Facts:
At or around 10 pm of April 1, 1994, while the victim, Ernesto Guiritan was sitting outside the
Sta. Rita Church, the accused-petitioner approached the victim to ask for a cigarette but when the
former failed to give one, the latter stabbed and ran away. Due to the help sought by the victim,
he was brought to the hospital where he was treated. The morning after the incident, a police
officer went to the hospital to take ante-mortem statement of the victim in the presence of the
latter's doctor. Guiritan stated that he felt as if he would die from his wound and that Ating
Arthur Zarate was the one who stabbed him. The victim narrated the incident and how he happen
to know his perpetrator. Accused-Petitioner put up the defense of alibi, that he only knew the
victim in court and that he was in some other place 200 meters away from the place of the
incident. RTC found Zarate guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide.
It further held that the victim's positive identification of Zarate as the person who stabbed him
prevails over the denial and alibi of Zarate.

Appealed denied by CA, and confirmed RTC's decision. Hence this petition.

Issue: WON the ante-mortem statement of the victim can be taken as part of the res gestae since
the statement was taken after the operation of the victim, which operation may have affected his
mental and physical condition.

Held: Yes, Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides for the exceptions to the Hearsay
Rule, which includes statements given as part of the res gestae. The pertinent provision reads:

SEC. 42. Part of the res gestae. - - Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is
taking place, or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances
thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an
equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of
the res gestae.

A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed as part of the res gestae
when (1) the principal act, the res gestae is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made
before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements concern the occurrence
in question and its immediately attending circumstances. In this case, Guiritan lost consciousness
when he was brought to the hospital and regained consciousness the following morning after the
operation. His statements were still the reflex product of immediate sensual impressions so that it
was the shocking event speaking through him, and he did not have the opportunity to concoct or
contrive the story. Thus, his statement is admissible as part of the res gestae.

It is well settled that positive identification, where categorical and consistent and not attended by
any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over
alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and
self-serving evidence undeserving weight in law. For this reason, the defense of alibi and denial
cannot prosper in the light of the positive identification by complainant Guiritan that it was
petitioner who stabbed him.

Declaration Against Interest

Lichauco v. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co. (supra)

People v. Toledo (G.R. No. 28655, August 8, 1928)) sandro

Fuentes Jr. v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 111692, February 9, 1996) shanine

1. Petitioner points to an alleged inconsistency between the testimonies of prosecution witnesses

Alberto Toling and Honorio Osok to the effect that they saw petitioner stab Malaspina on the
right lumbar region, and the testimony of the attending physician that the victim was stabbed on
the left lumbar region. This discrepancy is inconsequential. What is material is that Malaspina
was stabbed to death and that three (3) prosecution witnesses positively identified petitioner as
the knife wielder. It must be stressed that these witnesses had known petitioner for quite some
time and never had any personal misunderstanding nor altercation with the latter as to create any
suspicion that they were impelled by ill motives to falsely implicate him.

2. One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to declarations made
against interest. (Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court) The admissibility in evidence of
such declaration is grounded on necessity and trustworthiness.

3. There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a)
the declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact cognizable
by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify
existed.

4. In the instant case, we find that the declaration particularly against penal interest attributed to
Zoilo Fuentes Jr. is not admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. One striking
feature that militates against the acceptance of such a statement is its patent untrustworthiness.
Zoilo who is related to accused-appellant had every motive to prevaricate. The same can be said
of accused-appellant and his uncle Felicisimo. But more importantly, the far weightier reason
why the admission against penal interest cannot be accepted in the instant case is that the
declarant is not unable to testify. There is no showing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally
incapacitated or physically incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates. His mere
absence from the jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable under this rule. For it is
incumbent upon the defense to produce each and every piece of evidence that can break the
prosecution and assure the acquittal of the accused. Other than the gratuitous statements of
accused-appellant and his uncle to the effect that Zoilo admitted having killed Malaspina, the
records show that the defense did not exert any serious effort to produce Zoilo as a witness.
Thus, for this case at least, exclusion is the prudent recourse.

People v. Bernal (G.R. No. 113685, June 19, 1997) stephanie

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Theodore Bernal, together with two other persons whose identities and
whereabouts are still unknown, were charged with the crime of kidnapping.
It appears that on August 5, 1991, around 11:30 in the morning, while Roberto Racasa and
Openda, Jr. were engaged in a drinking spree, they invited Bernal, who was passing by, to join
them. After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave both men, apparently because he was going
to fetch his child. Thereafter, two men arrived, approached Openda, Jr., and asked the latter if he
was Payat. When he said yes, one of them suddenly pulled out a handgun while the other
handcuffed him and told him not to run because they were policemen and because he had an
atraso or a score to settle with them. They then hastily took him away. Racasa immediately went
to the house of Openda, Jr. and informed the latters mother of the abduction. The theory of the
prosecution, as culled from the testimony of a certain Salito Enriquez, tends to establish that
Openda, Jr. had an illicit affair with Bernals wife Naty and this was the motive behind the
formers kidnapping. Until now, Openda, Jr. is still missing. On the other hand, the defense
asserts that Openda, Jr. was a drug-pusher arrested by the police on August 5, 1991, and hence,
was never kidnapped.
The court a quo rendered judgment finding Bernal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of kidnapping for the abduction and disappearance of Bienvenido Openda, Jr. Bernal assails the
lower court for giving weight and credence to the prosecution witnesses allegedly illusory
testimonies and for convicting him when his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. For
the charge of kidnapping to prosper, the deprivation of the victims liberty, which is the essential
element of the offense, must be duly proved. In the case at bar, Bernal indisputably acted in
conspiracy with the two other unknown individuals as shown by their concerted acts evidentiary
of a unity of thought and community of purpose. Proof of conspiracy is perhaps most frequently
made by evidence of a chain of circumstances only. A certain Adonis Sagarino, a childhood
friend and neighbor of the victim, testified that he saw Bernal at the billiard hall at about 11:00
a.m. with his two companions and overheard him dispatching one of them to Tarsings Store to
check if a certain person was still there. This person later turned out to be Openda, Jr. He added
that after the latters presence was confirmed, the three men left the billiard hall. Minutes later,
Openda, Jr., already handcuffed, passed by the billiard hall with Bernals companions.
Equally important is the testimony of Roberto Racasa, a resident of Bucana, Davao City who
knew both Bernal and the victim, the former being his neighbor and compadre. He narrated that
he and the victim were drinking at Tarsings Store on that fateful day when Bernal passed by and
had a drink with them. After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave, after which, two men came
to the store and asked for Payat. When Openda, Jr. confirmed that he was indeed Payat, he was
handcuffed and taken away by the unidentified men. Likewise, a certain Salito Enriquez, a tailor
and a friend of Openda, Jr., testified that sometime in January 1991, Openda, Jr. confided to him
that he and Bernals wife Naty were having an affair. One time, Naty even gave Openda, Jr.
money which they used to pay for a motel room. He advised Naty not to do it again because she
(was) a married woman. Undoubtedly, his wifes infidelity was ample reason for Bernal to
contemplate revenge.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the revelation of Openda Jr. to Enriquez is admissible in evidence.

RULING:
Yes. Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the
perpetrator. Coupled with enough circumstantial evidence or facts from which it may be
reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive may be sufficient to support a
conviction. Openda, Jr.s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernals
wife is admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, viz.:
Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. -- The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to
testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time
it was made so far contrary to declarants own interest, that a reasonable man in his position
would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in
evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons.
A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit: (1) that
the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the
declarant; (3) that at the time he made said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was
contrary to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed
such declaration to be true.
Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His
confession to Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own interest, since his affair with
Naty Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence because no sane person will be presumed to
tell a falsehood to his own detriment.

DANILO L. PAREL v. SIMEON B. PRUDENCIO, GR NO. 146556, 2006-04-19

Principles
A declaration against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts
in dispute.
The theory under which declarations against interest are received in evidence notwithstanding
they are hearsay is that the necessity of the occasion renders the reception of such evidence
advisable and, further that the reliability of such declaration asserts facts which are against his
own pecuniary or moral interest.
Facts
On February 27, 1992, Simeon Prudencio filed a complaint for recovery of possession and
damages against Danilo Parel with the RTC Baguio alleging that: he is the owner of a two-storey
residential house located at No. 61 Forbes Park National Reservation near Department... of
Public Service (DPS) compound, Baguio City; such property was constructed solely from his
own funds and declared in his name under Tax Declaration No. 47048; he commenced the
construction of said house in 1972 until its completion three years later; when the second floor of
said house became habitable in 1973, he allowed Danilo's parents, Florentino (now deceased)
and Susan Parel, to move therein and occupy the second floor while the construction of the
ground floor was on-going to supervise the construction and to safeguard the materials; when the
construction of the second floor was finished in 1975, Simeon allowed Danilo's parents and
children to transfer and temporarily reside thereat; it was done out of sheer magnanimity as
Danilo's parents have no house of their own and since Simeon's wife is the older sister of
Florentino, Danilo's father; in November 1985, Simeon wrote Florentino a notice for them to
vacate the said house as the former was due for retirement and he needed the place to which
Danilo's parents heeded when they migrated to U.S. in 1986; however, without Simeon's
knowledge, Danilo and his family unlawfully entered and took possession of the ground floor of
Simeon's house; Danilo's refusal to vacate the house despite repeated demands prompted Simeon
to file the instant action for recovery of... possession. Simeon also asked Danilo for a monthly
rental of P3,000.00 from April 1988 and every month thereafter until the latter vacates the said
premises and surrender possession thereof; and for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees
and cost of suit.
The RTC found the following matters as conclusive: that Danilo's father was an allocatee of the
land on which the subject house was erected, as one of the lowly-paid government employees at
that time when then Mayor Luis Lardizabal gave them the chance to construct their own... house
on said reservation; that Simeon failed to show proof of any contract, written or oral, express or
implied, that the late Florentino and his family stayed on the house not as co-owners but as mere
lessees, nor any other proof that would clearly establish his sole... ownership of the house; and,
that the late Florentino was the one who gathered the laborers for the construction of the house
and paid their salaries. Thus, the RTC ruled that co-ownership existed between Simeon and
Danilo's father, Florentino.
The RTC did not give credence to the tax declaration as well as the several documents showing
the City Assessor's assessment of the property all in Simeon's name since tax declarations are not
conclusive proof of ownership. It rejected the affidavit executed by Florentino declaring the
house as owned by Simeon saying that the affidavit should be read in its entirety to determine
the purpose of its execution; that it was executed because of an advisement addressed to the late
Florentino by the City Treasurer concerning the property's tax... assessment and Florentino,
thought then that it should be the Simeon who should pay the taxes; and that the affidavit cannot
be accepted for being hearsay.
Question
Was the affidavit admissible in evidence against Florentino and, by extension, Danilo?
Answer

Yes. Section 38 of Rule 130 states: The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to
testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact is asserted in the declaration was at the
time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position
would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in
evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons.
The affidavit
The affiant, Florentino, who died in 1989 was Danilo's father and had adequate knowledge with
respect to the subject covered by his statement. In said affidavit, Florentino categorically
declared that while he is the occupant of the residential building, he is not the owner of the same
as it is owned by Simeon who is residing in Quezon City. It is safe to presume that he would not
have made such declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is prejudicial to himself as well
as to his children's interests as his heirs. A declaration against interest is the best evidence
which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. Notably, during Florentino's
lifetime, from 1973, the year he executed said affidavit until 1989, the year of his death there is
no showing that he had revoked such affidavit even when a criminal complaint for trespass to
dwelling had been filed by Simeon against him (Florentino) and Danilo in 1988 regarding the
subject house which the trial court dismissed due to the absence of evidence showing that Danilo
entered the house against the latter's will and held that the remedy of Simeon was to file an
action for ejectment; and even when a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed against Danilo
and his wife also in 1988 which was subsequently dismissed on the ground that Simeon's action
should be an accion publiciana which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
The theory under which declarations against interest are received in evidence notwithstanding
they are hearsay is that the necessity of the occasion renders the reception of such evidence
advisable and, further that the reliability of such declaration asserts facts which are... against his
own pecuniary or moral interest.
Tax Declaration
Notably, Simeon has been religiously paying the real estate property taxes on the house declared
under his name since 1974. In fact, Danilo during his cross-examination admitted that there was
no occasion that they paid the real estate taxes nor declared any portion of the house in their
name.
We agree with the CA that while tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence
of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.
The house which Danilo claims to be co-owned by his... late father had been consistently
declared for taxation purposes in the name of Simeon, and this fact, taken with the other
circumstances above-mentioned, inexorably lead to the conclusion that Simeon is the sole owner
of the house subject matter of the litigation.

Philippine Free Press v. CA (G.R. No. 132864, October 24, 2005) janet
FACTS
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the publication of Philippine Free Press
Magazine. Sometime in 1963, Petitioner purchased a parcel of land situated Makati.
Upon taking possession of the subject land, the Petitioner constructed their main office
thereon.

During the 1965 presidential elections, Petitioner supported the late President Diosdado
Macapagal against then Senate President Ferdinand Marcos. Upon the election of the
late President Ferdinand Marcos in 1965 and prior to the imposition of Martial law on
September 21, 1972, the Petitioner printed numerous articles highly critical of the
Marcos administration, exposing the corruption and abuses of the regime.

On the evening of September 20, 1972 soldiers surrounded the Free Press Building and
declared that they were instructed by the President Marcos to take over the building and
to close the printing press. The cessation of the publication led to financial ruin of the
Petitioner.

On separate occasions, Mr. Locsin Sr. the owner of the Free Press was approached by
different persons with an offer from the President to acquire the Company, but he
refused. Until on 1973 when Brig. Gen. Menzi made the offer adding that “Marcos
cannot be denied” and that “He had no choice but to sell”. Hence, on October 23, 1973
the parties executed a Deed of Sale.

On February 26, 1987, Petitioner filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale on the grounds
of vitiating consent and gross inadequacy of purchase price.
Trial Court ruled in favor of the Respondents.

CA affirmed the TC’s decision with modification on Attorney’s fee.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in considering as hearsay the testimonial
evidence which clearly established the threats made upon petitioner and that
respondent Liwayway will be used as the corporate vehicle for the forced acquisition of
petitioner's properties.

RULING
Jurisprudence instructs that evidence of statement made or a testimony is hearsay if
offered against a party who has no opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Hearsay
evidence is excluded precisely because the party against whom it is presented is
deprived of or is bereft of opportunity to cross-examine the persons to whom the
statements or writings are attributed. And there can be no quibbling that because death
has supervened, the late Gen Menzi, like the other purported Marcos subalterns,
Messrs. Baizas and De Vega, cannot cross-examine the Locsins for the threatening
statements allegedly made by them for the late President.
Like the Court of Appeals, we are not unmindful of the exception to the hearsay rule
provided in Section 38, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SEC. 38. Declaration against interest. - The declaration made by a person deceased or
unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration
was at the time it was made so far contrary to the declarant's own interest, that a reasonable
man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may
be received in evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons.

However, in assessing the probative value of Gen. Menzi's supposed declaration

against interest, i.e., that he was acting for the late President Marcos when he
purportedly coerced Mr. Locsin, Sr. to sell the Free Press property, we are loathed to
give it the evidentiary weight petitioner endeavors to impress upon us. For, the Locsins
can hardly be considered as disinterested witnesses. They are likely to gain the most
from the annulment of the subject contracts. Moreover, allegations of duress or coercion
should, like fraud, be viewed with utmost caution. They should not be laid lightly at the
door of men whose lips had been sealed by death. Francisco explains why:

[I]t has been said that "of all evidence, the narration of a witness of his conversation with a
dead person is esteemed in justice the weakest. '" One reason for its unreliability is that the
alleged declarant can not recall to the witness the circumstances under which his statement
were made. The temptation and opportunity for fraud in such cases also operate against the
testimony. Testimony to statements of a deceased person, at least where proof of them will
prejudice his estate, is regarded as an unsafe foundation for judicial action except in so far as
such evidence is borne out by what is natural and probable under the circumstances taken in
connection with actual known facts. And a court should be very slow to act upon the
statement of one of the parties to a supposed agreement after the death of the other party;
such corroborative evidence should be adduced as to satisfy the court of the truth of the story
which is to benefit materially the person telling it.

Excepting, petitioner insists that the testimonies of its witnesses - the Locsins - are not
hearsay because:

In this regard, hearsay evidence has been defined as "the evidence not of what the
witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others." xxx Thus, the mere fact
that the other parties to the conversations testified to by the witness are already
deceased does [not] render such testimony inadmissible for being hearsay.
Again, we disagree.

Even if petitioner succeeds in halving its testimonial evidence, one-half purporting to

quote the words of a live witness and the other half purporting to quote what the live
witness heard from one already dead, the other pertaining to the dead shall
nevertheless remain hearsay in character.

The all too familiar rule is that "a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows
of his own knowledge". There can be no quibbling that petitioner's witnesses cannot
testify respecting what President Marcos said to Gen. Menzi about the acquisition of
petitioner's newspaper, if any there be, precisely because none of said witnesses ever
had an opportunity to hear what the two talked about.

Neither may petitioner circumvent the hearsay rule by invoking the exception under the
declaration-against-interest rule. In context, the only declaration supposedly made by
Gen. Menzi which can conceivably be labeled as adverse to his interest could be that
he was acting in behalf of Marcos in offering to acquire the physical assets of petitioner.
Far from making a statement contrary to his own interest, a declaration conveying the
notion that the declarant possessed the authority to speak and to act for the President
of the Republic can hardly be considered as a declaration against interest.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals AFFIRMED.

Dantis vs. Maghinang (supra)

Pedigree

Mendoza v. CA (201 SCRA 675) thirdy

G.R. No. 86302 September 24, 1991

CASIMIRO MENDOZA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and TEOPISTA TORING TUÑACAO, respondents.

Facts: The complaint was filed on August 21, 1981, in the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City. Teopista Toring
Tufiacao, the herein private respondent, alleged that she was born on August 20, 1930, to Brigida Toring, who was
then single, and defendant Casimiro Mendoza, married at that time to Emiliana Barrientos.

The private respondent claimed she was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza, but the latter denied her
claim. He denied it to his dying day. Teopista averred that Mendoza recognized her as an illegitimate child by
treating her as such and according her the rights and privileges of a recognized illegitimate child. The trial court
believed him and dismissed her complaint for compulsory recognition.

The appellate court did not and reversed the judgment of the court below. Now the issue is before us on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not Teopista was in continuous possession of her claimed status of an illegitimate child under
Article 283 of the Civil Code.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that Teopista Toring Tufiacao has proved that she is the illegitimate daughter of
Casimiro Mendoza and is entitled to be recognized as such. In so holding, we give effect to the policy of the Civil
Code and the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of "the paternity of illegitimate children,
without prejudice to the right of the alleged parent to resist the claimed status with his own defenses, including
evidence now obtainable through the facilities of modern medicine and technology.
Commenting on this provision, Francisco enumerates the following requisites that have to be complied with before
the act or declaration regarding pedigree may be admitted in evidence:
1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.
2. The pedigree must be in issue.
3. The declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in issue.
4. The declaration must be made before the controversy arose.
5. The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence
other than such declaration.17

All the above requisites are present in the case at bar. The persons who made the declarations about the pedigree of
Teopista, namely, the mother of Casimiro, Brigida Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito, were both dead at the time of
Isaac's testimony. The declarations referred to the filiation of Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro, which were the
very issues involved in the complaint for compulsory recognition. The declarations were made before the complaint
was filed by Teopista or before the controversy arose between her and Casimiro. Finally, the relationship between
the declarants and Casimiro has been established by evidence other than such declaration, consisting of the
extrajudicial partition of the estate of Florencio Mendoza, in which Casimiro was mentioned as one of his heirs.18
The said declarations have not been refuted. Casimiro could have done this by deposition if he was too old and weak
to testify at the trial of the case.

If we consider the other circumstances narrated under oath by the private respondent and her witnesses, such as the
financial doles made by Casimiro to Brigida Toring, the hiring of Teopista's husband to drive the passenger truck of
Casimiro, who later sold the vehicle and gave the proceeds of the sale to Teopista and her husband, the permission
he gave Lolito Tufiacao to build a house on his land after he found that the latter was living on a rented lot, and, no
less remarkably, the joint savings account Casimiro opened with Teopista, we can reasonably conclude that Teopista
was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza.

We hold that by virtue of the above-discussed declarations, and in view of the other circumstances of this case,
'reopista Toring Tufiacao has proved that she is the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza and is entitled to be
recognized as such. In so holding, we give effect to the policy of the Civil Code and the Family Code to liberalize
the rule on the investigation of "the paternity of illegitimate children, without prejudice to the right of the alleged
parent to resist the claimed status with his own defenses, including evidence now obtainable through the facilities of
modern medicine and technology

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING Teopista Toring Tuñacao to be
the illegitimate child of the late Casimiro Mendoza and entitled to all the rights appurtenant to such status. Costs
against the petitioner.

Jison v. CA (G.R. No. 124853, February 24, 1998) sheryl

Solinap v. Locsin, Jr. (G.R. No. 146737, December 10, 2001) hana
Tecson v. Comelec (G.R. No 161434, March 3, 2004) joseph dave

Tecson vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004

FACTS:

Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to
deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen
when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe,
was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo
Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen,
he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child
of an alien mother.

Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan
F.Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie
Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie
Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.

Issue:

WON the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe may
prove paternal relationship of FPJ with father Allan F. Poe

Held:

Yes.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in
respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in
evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the
names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable to
testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person
whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and (e)
the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration.

Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe
submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe,
recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his
children (including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family –

"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton,
California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby declare that:
1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly known
in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.
4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena Street,
Manila.
xxxxxxxxx
7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they were students at
the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister
that same year.
8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and
Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (now
 Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some months between
1943-1944.
10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more children after
Ronald Allan Poe.
xxxxxxxxx
18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a
natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.
Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas
Declarant

Gravador v. Mamigo (G.R. L-24989, July 21, 1967) charmaine

Facts:
The petitioner Pedro Gravador was the principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School in Sta. Catalina,
Negros Oriental when he was advised by the then, Superintendent of Schools, of his separation from the
service on the ground that he had reached the compulsory retirement age of 65.
Advice contains: based on pre-war records, you were born on November 26, 1897. As of this date,
therefore, you are now 66 years, 8 months, and 22 days old.
The petitioner wrote the Director of Public Schools, protesting his forced retirement on the ground that
the date of his birth is not November 26, 1897 but December 11, 1901
Filed suit for quo warranto, mandamus and damages asking the court to adjudge him entitled to the office
of principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School and to order payment to him of not only his back
salaries but also damages.
RTC: Birthday is Dec. 11,1901
- The court took into account the verified answer in a cadastral proceeding in the Court of First
Instance of Negros Oriental, dated March 15, 1924, filed by the petitioner's brother, Romulo
Gravador, now deceased. It is therein stated that the petitioner, said to be one of the co-owners of a
piece of land, was at the time 23 years old.
Issue: Date of birth -> which will be used to determine in computing retirement benefits
Ruling: Correct Bday: December 11, 1901
The controversy on the petitioner's date of birth arose as a result of the conflicting records of the Division
of Schools of Negros Oriental. On the one hand the pre-war records show his date of birth to be
November 26, 1897. These records consist of two Insular Teachers Cards and one Employee's Record
Card. It is on the basis of these records that the Superintendent of Schools determined the petitioner's age
to be 66 years, 8 months and 22 days on August 15, 1964.
On the other hand, the post-war records, consisting of an Elementary Teacher's Report Card, an
Employee's Record Card, and an Employee's Record of Qualifications, state that the petitioner was born
on Dec. 11, 1901. These are the records on which the petitioner bases his claim.
The problem is aggravated by two uncontroverted facts, namely, that the records of the church where the
petitioner was baptized were destroyed by fire, and that the municipal civil register contains no record. of
the petitioner's birth.
Ruling related to pedigree: Why birthday should be Dec.11,1901
In the first place, as Moran states, although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his
birth, he may testify as to his age as he had learned it from his parents and relatives and his testimony in
such case is an assertion of a family tradition. Indeed, even in his application for back pay which he filed
with the Department of Finance, the petitioner stated that the date of his birth is December 11, 1901. He
repeated the same assertion in 1956 and again in 1960 when he asked the Government Service Insurance
System and the Civil Service Commission to correct the date of his birth to December 11, 1901.
In the second place, the import of the declaration of the petitioner's brother, contained in a verified
pleading in a cadastral case way back in 1924, to the effect that the petitioner was then 23 years old,
cannot be ignored. Made ante litem motam by a deceased relative, this statement is at once a declaration
regarding pedigree within the intendment and meaning of section 33 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, December 11, 1901 is established as the date of birth of the petitioner not only by evidence of
family tradition but also by the declaration ante litem motam of a deceased relative.
Finally, the patties are agreed that the petitioner has a brother, Constantino, who was born on June 10,
1898 and who retired on June 10, 1963 with full retirement pay. The petitioner then could not have been
born earlier than Constantino, say in 1897 as pre-war records indicate, because Constantino is admittedly
older than he.

People v. Villaneueva (G.R. No. 169643, April 13, 2007) debbie

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FILOMINO L. VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 169643, April 13, 2007

FACTS:

BBB is the appellant's daughter and was born on January 23, 1983. In the evening of December 23,
1997, BBB, together with her parents and her three brothers, spent the night in her aunt's house. Her
mother left to attend a wake. While inside the room with her brothers (who were then sleeping), BBB
asked for a glass of water from appellant. After drinking, she felt dizzy. When she woke up the following
morning, her breasts and private part were aching, but she did not do anything because she thought that
she had just been bitten by ants.

At around midnight in the first week of February 1998, while BBB and her brothers were inside their room
sleeping, appellant went inside, raised BBB's blouse up to her neck and sucked her breasts. He likewise
pulled down her shorts and panty up to her thighs; kissed her lips; went on top of her; and inserted his
penis into her vagina. After satisfying his lustful desire, appellant told her that he would kill her and her
family if she reported the matter to anyone. BBB did not report the incident. She finally told her mother
when she learned that she was pregnant. Her mother cried and got mad. BBB gave birth in October 1998.
The child was later adopted by her cousin.

BBB executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay that on or about December 23, 1997, in the x x x Province
of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of force and
intimidation, succeed in having sexual intercourse with his daughter BBB, a minor 15 years old.

Appellant further claimed that he and his wife

Appellant interposed the defenses of denial and alibi.
did not have serious problems with each other except for petty quarrels over who was going to
cook in the mornings. He did not have any misunderstanding with his daughter BBB.

RTC, rendered a Decision acquitting the appellant in Criminal Case No. 1288-(98) (1ST RAPE), but
convicting him for the crime of rape in Criminal Case 1289-(98)(2ND RAPE).

The case was initially elevated to the CA on automatic review.

Appellant claimed that the trial court gravely erred in imposing the death penalty despite the prosecutions
failure to prove the qualifying circumstance of minority. While appellant did not question his
conviction, he contested the penalty imposed. He insisted that the minority of the offended party
had not been sufficiently proven because the prosecution presented a mere photocopy of the birth
certificate which was not certified as a true copy of the original.
The CA sustained the trial court’s imposition of the death penalty. It held that the qualifying
circumstance of the victims minority had been specifically alleged in the Information and duly
proven during the trial.

Appellant insists, however, that he was wrongfully sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death,
since the special qualifying circumstance of minority was not substantially proven.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the original document must be produced to prove minority.

RULING:

There are other exceptions to the best evidence rule as expressly provided under Section 3, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court:
Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of the inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in
the following cases:

xxxx

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.

In People of the Philippines v. Pruna the Court laid down the following guidelines in appreciating the age
of the victim:

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate
and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the
family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as
the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim's
mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided
that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused

Records reveal that the victim testified during the hearing that she was born on January 23, 1983, and
that appellant did not offer any objection to her testimony.

The fact of minority was further established by victim's certificate of live birth, albeit a mere photocopy of
the original. In People of the Philippines v. Mangitngit, People of the Philippines v. Barcena, and People
of the Philippines v. Cayabyab, this Court admitted and gave weight to a photocopied birth certificate to
prove the age of the offended party. Specifically, we ratiocinated in this wise:

We are not unaware of our ruling in People v. Mantis that a mere photocopy of the birth certificate, in the
absence of any showing that the original copy was lost or destroyed, or was unavailable, without the fault
of the prosecution, does not prove the victim’s minority, for said photocopy does not qualify as competent
evidence for that purpose.

However, there are other exceptions to the best evidence rule as expressly provided under Section 3,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of the
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:

xxxx

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in
a public office.

A certificate of live birth is a public record in the custody of the local civil registrar who is a public officer.
As such, the presentation of the photocopy of the birth certificate of the victim is admissible as secondary
evidence to prove its contents. Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial courts
discretion, whenever the opponent does not dispute the contents of the document and no other useful
purpose will be served by requiring production.

In the present case, appellant did not dispute the contents of the photocopied birth certificate. Having
failed to raise a valid and timely objection, the document constitutes primary evidence; it is deemed
admitted, and the other party is bound thereby.

Thus, the prosecution sufficiently established that at the time of the commission of the crime of rape in the
first week of February 1998, the victim was only 15 years of age, having been born on January 23, 1983.

People v. Flores (G.R. No. 177355, December 15, 2010) jr

TOPIC: Common Reputation
CASE:In Re Mallare (59 SCRA 45)--- Arizala

FACTS: The respondent, Florencio Mallare, was admitted to the practice of law on 5 March
1962. In his verified petition to take the bar examinations in 1961, he alleged that he is a citizen
of the Philippines and that "his father is Esteban Mallare and his mother is Te Na, both Filipino
citizens".On 16 July 1962, the then Acting Commissioner of Immigration Martiniano P. Vivo
denounced the respondent to this Court as a Chinaman masquerading as a Filipino citizen and
requested that the matter be investigated thoroughly and if the respondent fails to show that he
has legally become a Filipino, steps be taken for striking his name from the roll of persons
authorized to practice law.

The position of the respondent-lawyer is that he is a Filipino citizen based on the supposed
citizenship of his father, Esteban Mallare, alleged to be a Filipino citizen by choice, because he
was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipina mother, Ana Mallare and that the
respondent's mother, Te Na, a Chinese, followed the citizenship of her husband upon their
marriage

The respondent's second theory is that, having been declared a Filipino citizen in a final
judgment in 1960 by the Court of First Instance of Quezon province, in its Civil Case No. 329-G
(entitled, Vitaliano Itable vs. Artemio, Florencio, Paciencia, Esperanza and Raymundo Mallare)
and his birth record, wherein he was originally registered as a Chinese, has likewise been ordered
corrected to Filipino, by final judgment in Special Proceeding No. 3925 of the same court, 1 his
Filipino citizenship is conclusive, res judicata and binding to the government and to the world.
Complainant Vivo disputed, on the facts, the respondent's first theory, and, on the second theory,
claimed that the aforestated Civil Case No. 329-G (Itable vs. Mallare) was a simulated action
calculated to obtain a judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship and, after having obtained the
said declaration, the respondent, together with his brothers and sisters, utilized the declaration to
change their birth and alien registration the better to hide their true nationality, which is Chinese.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mallare is a filipino citizen and be allowed to be admitted in the bar?

HELD: YES. The witnesses, all natives of Macalelon, who had personal knowledge of the
person, birth and residency of both Ana Mallare and her son Esteban, were one in their
declaration that Ana Mallare is a Tagalog who had continuously resided in the place, and that
Esteban, her son, was reputedly born out of wedlock. Such declarations constitute admissible
evidence of the birth and illegitimacy of Esteban Mallare. Reputation has been held admissible
as evidence of age, birth, race, or race-ancestry, and on the question of whether a child was
born alive. Unlike that of matters of pedigree, general reputation of marriage may proceed
from persons who are not members of the family — the reason for the distinction is the
public interest that is taken in the question of the existence of marital relations.

The principle could not have been more true than in a Philippine rural community where
relationships not in conformity with established contentions become the subject of criticisms and
public cynosure. Thus, the public reputation in Macalelon that Esteban was Ana's natural child,
testified to by the witness, would constitute proof of the illegitimacy of the former. Besides, if
Estaban were really born out of legal union, it is highly improbable that he would be keeping the
surname "Mallare" after his mother, instead of adopting that of his father. And it would be
straining the imagination to perceive that this situation was purposedly sought by Esteban's
parents to suit some ulterior motives. In 1903, we can not concede that alien inhabitants of his
country were that sophisticated or legally-oriented.

The assertion of the witnesses, which have not been controverted, that Ana Mallare is a Tagalog
(and, therefore, a Filipino citizen), cannot be assailed as being mere conclusions devoid of
evidentiary value. The declarations were not only based on the reputation in the community
regarding her race or race-ancestry, which is admissible in evidence, but they must have
certain factual basis. For it must be realized that in this Philippine society, every region
possesses certain characteristics all its own. Thus, a Tagalog would normally detect if a person
hails from the same region even from the way the latter speaks. Considering that the witnesses
testified having known, and lived with, Ana Mallare in Macalelon, their declaration that she is a
Tagalog should receive a high degree of credibility.

Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino,
and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to
Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543; Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952; Sy Quimsuan vs.
Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could
any act taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the citizenship
privileges to which he is rightfully entitled

Res Gestae

Air France v. Carrascoso (supra)

People v. Reyes (supra)

Case: People v. Dela Cruz (G.R. No. 13910, July 20, 2001) apellido
Topic: Res Gestae

Facts:
On or about the 16th of June, 1993 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused (SPo4 Pablo
Dela Cruz) conspiring and confederating with one whose true name, identity and whereabouts
are still unknown and mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery, attack, assault and use personal violence upon
the person of one Lt. Col. GARABATO by then and there shooting the latter with a gun and
stabbing him with a bladed weapon, hitting him on different parts of his body, thereby inflicting
upon said victim serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his
death thereafter.

At his arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty.

The deceased is a military chaplain, assigned at HQS-AFP, Camp Aguinaldo Quezon City where
accused was also assigned.

Accordingly, the two workers were unloading construction materials consisting of wood and
sand from a Ford Fiera owned and driven by Fr. Garabato. At that moment, Fr. Garabato was
seated at the drivers seat.

STATEMENT OF WITNESSES
The Ford Fiera specifically was parked in front of the house of the petitioner, SPO4 Pablo De La
Cruz (a Philippine National Police personnel assigned at RHGS, HQS, CAPCOM, Camp
Karingal, Quezon City) where another vehicle was also parked behind it.

Petitioner drove his jeep out from the garage of his house with his two kids on board at the
backseat. Petitioner accosted Fr. Garabato to move his Ford Fiera since petitioners jeep could not
pass through abreast together with the Ford Fiera (the road is more or less five (5) meters wide).

Fr. Garabato drove the Ford Fiera forward and parked further at the side of the road. By that
time, petitioners jeep could already pass through the road.

At that moment, the two workers were standing behind the Ford Fiera, and they heard successive
shots of gunfire. They instinctively turned their sights towards the origin of the gunshots; such
that they saw smoke coming from the side of petitioners jeep and saw petitioner seated in the
drivers seat still holding his gun pointing towards the Ford Fiera.

Petitioner alighted from his jeep, walked towards Fr. Garabatos position, re-loaded his gun with
another magazine and shot Fr. Garabato anew. Petitioner immediately left the scene on board his
jeep.

POST MORTEM RESULT

Fr. Garabatos body was rushed to Quezon City General Hospital by the responding police
officers where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

Medico-legal Officer, Police Senior Inspector Vladimir Villasenor (a physician) conducted a post
mortem examination on Fr. Garabatos body. He concluded that Fr. Garabato died of
(h)emorrhage as a result of multiple gunshot wounds of the body. The victim sustained six (6)
gunshot wounds spread over his head and body. Four (4) of these wounds were diagnosed to be
fatal, as the bullets pierced vital organs of the victims body.

Manhunt operations were conducted against the accused. He was surrendered to Sangandaan
Police Station were he was also presented to the media and positively identified by the two
construction workers.

DEFENSE OF ACCUSED
Denial and Alibi

He claims that at the time and date Fr. Garabato was shot, he was in Gagalangin Health Center in
Tondo, Manila; that he and his two children, Carmela and Pamela, went to fetch his wife,
Cornelia, who was employed therein as a midwife. From there, they would proceed to Baclaran
Church to hear mass. This point was corroborated by defense witnesses, Cornelia de la Cruz
(Pablos wife) and Romeo Mabahagi (a janitor/utility man at Gagalangin Health Center).

RULING OF TRIAL COURT

After due trial, the court a quo rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of homicide, not
murder as was charged in the Amended Information. The trial court ruled that the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia was not sufficiently established by the prosecution. Upon the other
hand, the trial court appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

REVERSAL OF PENALTY BY CA
The CA affirmed the conviction of petitioner for homicide. The appellate court, however,
modified the penalty as it held that the trial court erred in appreciating the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. According to the CA, voluntary surrender, to be
appreciated, must be spontaneous and unconditional. These conditions were found to be absent
in petitioners case.

The penalty be increased from an indeterminate penalty of IMPRISONMENT for six years and
one day of prison mayor as minimum to (14) years, eight months and one day of reclusion
temporal as medium.

Issue:
Whether or not the basis of guilt by the petitioner-accused is a fabricated and unreliable
evidence.

Ruling:
No, the evidence is sufficient to convict him.

RES GESTAE refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants,
the victim(s) or spectators to a crime immediately before, during or immediately after the
commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made
as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by excitement of the occasion and there
was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement
(People vs. Sanchez, 213 SCRA 70).

In the case, although the people who gave this information were not presented on the witness
stand, this Court still resolved to admit and consider this spontaneous exclamation from the
spectators competent as PART OF RES GESTAE.

Records of this case reveal that the incident was reported to SPO3 Patriarca at around 2:45 in the
afternoon of June 16, 1993, while the latter was on duty, and immediately, they rushed to the
scene of the crime to investigate. It was at that instance that he gathered the aforesaid
information.

Furthermore, as borne by evidence on record, all the elements of res gestae are sufficiently
established, insofar as the aforequoted spontaneous utterance is concerned:

a) the principal act (res gestae) the killing of Fr. Garabato in broad daylight is a startling
occurrence;

b) the statements were made before the declarants had time to contrive or devise that is,
within several minutes after the victim was shot; and

c) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances the identity of the assailant is a material and vital information that
concerns the aforementioned startling occurrence.

TOPIC: RES GESTAE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AVA MA. VICTORIA CARIQUEZ y CRUZ, and LEEZEL FRANCO y
SAMSON

FACTS:

AVA and LEEZEL were initially charged with serious physical injuries under Section 10, Article VI of R.A.
No. 7610. However, on 31 May 1996 the victim, Mariel Cariquez y Cruz (hereafter ETHEL) died. On 30
August 1996 the information was amended to charge AVA and LEEZEL with the crime of parricide.

The trial court found AVA and LEEZEL guilty of parricide and homicide, respectively on the basis of
circumstantial evidence. In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General enumerates seven (7)
circumstantial evidence which the trial court took in to account and relied upon as bases for its finding
that AVA and LEEZEL, were criminally responsible for the death of ETHEL.

The Trial Court was fully convinced from the evidence on record of the culpability of AVA and LEEZEL
for ETHELs maltreatment. The testimony of Lilia Gojul, Michelle Torrente and Theresa Castillo
ineluctably show that AVA and LEEZEL tormented ETHEL.

The declarations of Lilia, Michelle and Theresa as to what they observed on ETHEL were not hearsay.
They saw her and personally noticed the injuries and telltale marks of torture. While the answer of
ETHEL as to who inflicted the injuries may have been, indeed, hearsay because ETHEL could not be
confronted on that, yet it was part of the res gestae.

The case was brought to the Supreme Court taking into consideration the penalty imposed by the Trial
Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the statement uttered by the victim was part of the res gestae.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the Regional Trial Court.

An exception to the hearsay rule pursuant to Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SEC. 42. Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequently thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in
evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the
issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.
There are three requisites to the admission of evidence as constituting part of the res gestae. (1) that the
principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; 2) the statements were made before the declarant
had time to contrive or devise; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and
its immediately attending circumstances.

In this case the startling occurrences were the tortures inflicted on ETHEL, who when asked who caused
them spontaneously pointed to AVA and LEEZEL. That some time may have lapsed between the
infliction of the injuries and the disclosure, it must however, be pointed out that there has been no
uniformity as to the interval of time that should separate the occurrence of the startling event from the
making of the declarations. What is necessary is that the injuries sustained by ETHEL prior to the
incident on 27 May 1996 were inflicted by AVA and LEEZEL. These acts are covered by and punished
under R.A. No. 7610, under which they were originally prosecuted. However, the then Information was
amended to charge them with parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code. The evidence on
the prior incidents cannot legally justify a conviction for the physical injuries inflicted before 27 May
1996.

People v. Tampus (G.R. No. L-44690, March 28, 1980) cabrido

FACTS:

Evidence show that around 10 am of January 14, 1976, Celso Saminado, a prisoner in
Muntinlupa and a patient in the emergency ward of the prison hospital went to the toilet. He was
followed by the accused, Tampus and Avila and was assaulted and stabbed therein. Saminado
died upon the arrival in the prison hospital. After emerging from the toilet, Tampus and Avila
surrendered to a prison guard with their knives. The motive of the killing was revenge.

The officer of the day investigated the incident right away. In his report he stated that Avila
stabbed Saminado when the latter was in the toilet. Two days after the killing, another prison
guard investigated the incident and have obtained the extrajudicial confessions of Avila and
Tampus. They both pleaded guilty to the charge of murder. However, the counsel de officio of
the accused points out that before the extrajudicial confession was taken the accused was not
informed of his rights to have a counsel and to remain silent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of the accused may be considered admissible in
court.

HELD:

Yes.

Article IV Sec. 20 of the constitution provides that, No person shall be compelled to be a witness
at himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to remain anent and to court and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.

There is no doubt that the confession was voluntarily made. The investigator in taking it
endeavored, according to his understanding, to comply with section 20.

The truth is that, even before Lahoz investigated the killing, Tampus and Avila had already
admitted it when, after coming out of the toilet, the scene of the crime, they surrendered to
Reynaldo S. Eustaquio, the first guard whom thuy encountered, and they revealed to him that
they had committed an act of revenge. That spontaneous statement, elicited without any
interrogation, was part of the res gestae and at the same time was a voluntary confession of guilt.

Not only that. The two accused, by means of that statement given freely on the spur of the
moment without any urging or suggestion, waived their right to remain silent and to have the
right to counsel. That admission was confirmed by their extrajudicial confession, plea of guilty
and testimony in court. They did not appeal from the judgment of conviction.

CASE:People v. Sace (G.R. No. 178063, April 5, 2010) causin

Facts:
On September 9, 1999, at around seven (7) o’clock in the evening, AAA was inside their house
with her 10-year-old brother BBB and a nephew, who was still a toddler, when appellant
suddenly showed up. As admitted by appellant, he came from a drinking spree that began at
about eleven (11) o’clock in the morning. AAA told appellant to leave and go home, but he did
not heed her. Appellant then made sexual advances on AAA. AAA was able to evade appellant
when he tried to embrace her, but appellant pulled a bladed weapon from his pocket. Sensing
danger, AAA ran upstairs to the second level of their house. Appellant followed AAA, leaving
BBB and the toddler in the first floor of the house. BBB heard appellant ordering AAA to
remove her clothes, otherwise, he will stab her.
Scared with the turn of events, the two (2) children hid at the lower portion of the house for
around twenty (20) minutes, and came out only when CCC, the mother of AAA and BBB,
arrived. CCC, together with her elder daughter DDD and a certain Abelardo Motol (Abelardo),
was on her way home when she and her companions heard AAA scream. They hurried towards
the house and searched it but found it to be empty.
As they searched further, appellant came out from somewhere in the kitchen area of the house.
They noticed that he was bloodied and he told them that he was chasing someone. Appellant then
joined in the search for AAA. Before long, Abelardo found the lifeless body of AAA lying on
the ground nearby. AAA was half-naked and she appeared to have been ravished when they
found her. Immediately, Abelardo called the barangay officials and the police.
Barangay Kagawad Carmelita Mawac (Carmelita) and other barangay officials and tanods,
including Rafael Motol and Bonifacio Vitto, arrived. Upon arrival, they noticed the bloodstains
on appellants clothing. Carmelita asked appellant what he did, but appellant denied any
knowledge of what happened. Carmelita then went to the half-naked body of AAA and again
asked appellant why he did such a thing to his cousin. At that point, appellant admitted to the
barangay officials and tanods that he was the one (1) who committed the crime. He admitted that
he raped and killed AAA. Barangay Tanod Rafael Motol also obtained the same confession from
appellant when he interviewed him in front of other people, namely, Abelardo, Carmelita, and
Bonifacio Vitto, as well as Arnaldo Mawac, Conchita and Iboy Serdea, and Salvador and Julieta
Motol. Appellant was then photographed by the police and Maribeth, who at that time had a
camera on hand.
Issue:
Whether or not the confession of appellant is admissible as evidence?
Ruling:
Yes.
The trial court took into consideration the confession of appellant that he was the one (1) who
raped and killed AAA. The trial court noted that the confession was made voluntarily and
spontaneously in public, and witnessed by prosecutions witnesses, who were not shown to have
any ill motive against appellant. Thus, appellants declaration was admissible as part of res
gestae, his statement concerning the crime having been made immediately subsequent to the
rape-slaying before he had time to contrive and devise.
Also, the facts in this case clearly show that appellant admitted the commission of the crime to
the prosecutions witnesses. According to their testimonies, appellant admitted having raped and
killed AAA. Their testimonies were not rebutted by the defense. Appellants statements infront of
the prosecution witnesses are admissible for being part of the res gestae.
Under the Revised Rules on Evidence, a declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur:
(1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before
the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence
in question and its immediately attending circumstances. All these requisites are present in this
case. Appellant had just been through a startling and gruesome occurrence, AAAs death. His
admission was made while he was still under the influence of said startling occurrence and
before he had an opportunity to concoct or contrive a story. In addition, he was still under the
influence of alcohol at that time, having engaged in a drinking spree from 1:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m.
that day. His confession concerned the rape and killing of AAA. Appellants spontaneous
statements made to private persons, not agents of the State or law enforcers, are not covered by
the constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation and, as res gestae, admissible in evidence
against him.
The rule is settled that where the culpability or innocence of the accused hinges on the credibility
of the witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, the findings of trial courts are given the
highest degree of respect. Hence, their findings on such matters are binding and conclusive on
appellate courts, unless some fact or circumstance of weight and substance has been overlooked,
misapprehended or misinterpreted.

P v. Lauga (G.R. No. 186228, March 15, 2010) joy

People v. Tulagan (G.R. No. L-68620, July 22, 1986) michael
DBP Pool v. Radio Mindanao Network Inc. (supra)
Borromeo v. CA (G.R. No. L-31342, April 7, 1976) mie

Case: BORROMEO VS CA

FACTS: Juan Borromeo (petitioner) is an administrator of the estate of the deceased Simeon
Rallos ( Rallos). The main controversy here centers on the true nature of the three documents
which are on their faces are deeds of absolute sale of real properties executed by Rallos on
various dates in favour of Emmanuel Aznar. It was alleged by petitioner that said sale were in
fact equitable mortgages to secure loans granted to Rallos by Matias Aznar, deceased father of
Emmanueal and Alma Aznar and prayed for their reformation.

On the part of the petitioner,it presented Crispina Rallos Alcantara (Crispina), who claimed to
have been present when the transactions took place, her deceased father merely borrowed money
from the late Matias Aznar in the sums of P6,000.00 and P35,000.00 and to secure the repayment
thereof mortgaged to the latter the properties and that while thus listening to their conversations
she took down notes of the various amounts mentioned by them and the respective purposes
thereof such as interest, attorney's fees, other obligations to be paid out of the money being
borrowed by her father, etc., which notes were Identified at the trial as Exhibits.
ON appeal to CA, it held that there was indeed an absolute sale by reasoning that the terms of the
contract are clear and equivocal that the parties intended therein to be a sale and not an equitable
mortgage. But somehow, upon the filing of the motion of reconsideration by the petitioner on the
decision of the CA, it overturn its previous decision by stating that the notations or memoranda
of Crispina were held to be part of res gestae thus admissible and which statements were
supported by the unusual inadequacy of the prices of the sale of the properties involved.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA is correct in declaring that the notes and memoranda of Crispina
as part of res gestae?

HELD: No. The CA is not correct and the admission of the notes and memoranda suffers from a
fatal defect.
The court did not consider the notes and memoranda as part of the res gestae for the reasons that:
Cristina was not a party to the transaction in question and that only Rallos and Matias or
Emmanuel or Alma as the documents showed.
It did not also reveal why Crispina was there at the time of the transaction,hence there can be no
basis for holding that she actually took part in the transaction.
That she made the notes only as witness and not as party and there was no showing that her
taking down notes were made because of the request or was directed to by the parties. And if the
taking down notes were made under the direction of the parties, such notes will only be
circumstantial.
No witness other than Crispina has testifies as to the veracity of her testimony relative to her
alleged notes and memoranda,not even her husband who was alleged to be present on one of the
occasions issue.
Thus the court did not give any weight to her testimony when she herself created them and they
were not considered as part of res gestae.

People v. Espinoza (supra)

People v. Gatarin (G.R. No. 198022, April 7, 2014)

Entries in the Course of Business

Canque v. CA (G.R. No. 96202, April 12, 1999)

Aznar v. Citibank (G.R. No. 164273, March 28, 2007)
Jose v. Michaelmar Phils. (G.R. No. 169606, November 27, 2009)

Entries in Official Records

Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc (supra)

Rudy Lao v. Standard Insurance Co., Inc. (G.R. No. 140023, August 14, 2003)
Wallem Maritime Services v. NLRC (G.R. No. 108433, October 15, 1996)
Manalo v. Robles (G.R. L-8171, August 16, 1956)
Herce, Jr. v. Municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna (G.R. No. 166645, November
11, 2005)
 City of Manila v. Cabangis (supra)
Fernandez v. CA (G.R. No. 108366, December 16, 1994)
In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Juan Locsin, Sr. (G.R. No. 146737,
December 10, 2001)
Africa v. Caltex (G.R. No. 12986, March 3, 1966)
Barcelon v. CIR [G.R. No. 157064, August 7, 2006)
Salmon, Dexter v. Wijangco (G.R. No. L-21649, October 9, 1924)
Tarapen v. People (G.R. No. 173824, August 8, 2008)
DOJ v. Pennisi (G.R. No. 169958, March 5, 2010)
Seguritan v. People (G.R. No. 172896, April 19, 2010)
Dimaguila v. Monteiro (supra)

Commercial Lists

PNOC Shipping v. CA (G.R. No. 107518, October 8, 1998)

Learned Treatise

Seguritan v. People (supra)

Opinion Rule

China Banking Corporation v. CA (G.R. No. 155299, July 24, 2007)

Marquez v. Sandiganbayan (G.R No. 187912-14, January 31, 2011)
Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes (G.R. No. 185286, Aug. 18, 2010)
Roxas v. Arroyo (G.R. No. 189155, September 7, 2010)
Marcos v. Heirs of Navarro (supra)