1
G.R. No. 174660 May 30, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RICKY LADIANA y DAVAO,(at- large), Accused.
ANTONIO MANUEL UY, Accused-Appellant.
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is an appeal from the Decision1 dated July 18, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00110 affirming with modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 114, Pasay City, finding appellant Antonio Manuel Uy guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
In anInformation3 dated July 16, 2001, appellant, together with a co-accused merely
identified as John Doe, was charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide which reads:
That on or about the 27th day of June 2001, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Antonio Manuel Uy
y Suangan and John Doe, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, with intent to gain, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away the jewelry amounting to (Php 327,390.00) all
belonging to JEEPNEY SHOPPING CENTER, represented by RICARDO M. SALVADOR and an
ARMSCOR .38 caliber revolver with SERIAL No. 64517 amounting to ₱9,000.00, more or less,
belonging to ENERGETIC SECURITY AGENCY represented by ROMEO SOLANO, to the damage
and prejudice of Jeepney Shopping Center in the total amount of ₱327,390.00 and Energetic
Security Agency in the total amount of ₱9,000.00 more or less; and on the occasion thereof,
accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stabbed Gilbert V. Esmaquilan and hit on the
head with a 2x2 wood Felix Arañez y Gida and Delfin Biniahan y Cahtong, Security Guard,
Janitor and maintenance of Jeepney Shopping Center(,) respectively, thereby causing their
death; and accused to facilitate their escape thereafter take, steal and drive away a (sic) one
(1) Black Honda Civic with Plate No. WFD-891 registered in the name of OLIVER GATCHALIAN.
Contrary to law.4
During his arraignment on July 24, 2001, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded
"not guilty" to the crime charged.5
The Information was subsequently amended to identify appellant's co- accused as Ricky
Ladiana y Davao (Ricky), without changing the allegations of the original
information.6 However, accused Ricky remained at-large.
Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution is aptly summarized by the Solicitor General in the
appellee's brief as follows:
Appellant Antonio Manuel Uy was one of the maintenance crew of the Jeepney Shopping
Center located at No. 1913, Taft Avenue, Pasay City, owned by Mr. Jerry Limpe.
Appellant used to be a stay-in employee of the Jeepney Shopping Center. However, appellant
could not get along with his co-employees and usually engaged in quarrels with them. In
their letter dated March 29, 2001 addressed to Michael Limpe, the son of Jerry Limpe, the
co-employees of appellant requested that he be ordered to leave the employees’ quarters.
Resultantly, appellant was ordered by Michael Limpe to leave the quarters and transfer to
another place. Appellant was forced to rent a house in Sandejas St., Pasay City.
When appellant was removed from the employees’ quarters, Cecilio Aranez, also a member
of the maintenance crew of the Jeepney Shopping Center, heard appellant made a threat,
saying "Balang araw makagaganti ako."
Sometime in the first week of June 2001, the co-employees of appellant, including Neptali
Tamayo, had a drinking spree at Juz Café along Taft Avenue, Pasay City. The drinking session
lasted until 3:00 o’clock in the morning of the following day. On their way home, the group
noticed two persons outside the guardhouse of the Jeepney Shopping Center peeping inside.
One of these persons was appellant. When the group approached them, they hid themselves
inside the guardhouse. Later on, appellant came out from where he hid himself and uttered a
joke. Thereafter, appellant and his companion left.
Around 9:00 o’clock in the morning of June 26, 2001, appellant, through a text message,
informed Roger Tan, the Supervisor of the Maintenance Department of the Jeepney
Shopping Center, that he (appellant) was not feeling well and would not be able to report for
work.
Around 11:00 o’clock in the evening, Joel Adol, the security guard of Chang Juat Ltd.
Company located at No. 1906, Taft Avenue, Pasay City, saw appellant with a companion
standing at the gate of the Jeepney Shopping Center. The security guard had a clear and
unobstructed view of the Jeepney Shopping Center as Chang Juat Ltd. Company was just
adjacent to it and the Jeepney Shopping Center was brightly lighted. Joel Adol recognized
appellant because he used to see him cleaning the premises of the Jeepney Shopping Center
and directing traffic in the area. Joel Adol observed that appellant and his companion were
looking at his post and were peeping inside the Jeepney Shopping Center. When Joel Adol
went inside the building of Chang Juat Ltd. Company around 12:00 o’clock in the evening, he
noticed that appellant and his companion were still at the gate of the Jeepney Shopping
Center.
Around 5:30 in the morning of June 27, 2001, Carpio Bahatan, a stay-in employee of the
Jeepney Shopping Center, discovered the lifeless bodies of Felix Aranez and Delfin Biniahan

at the second floor and third floor, respectively, of the main building of the Jeepney Shopping
Center. Another stay-in employee, Rico Victor Arbas, discovered the dead body of the
security guard, Gilbert Esmaquilan, lying near the guardhouse which was inside the Jeepney
Shopping Center compound.
A piece of wood with blood stains was found about three to five meters from the body of
Gilbert Esmaquilan. Another blood-stained piece of wood was found in the locker room
within the compound but outside the main building of the Jeepney Shopping Center.
At the opening leading to the comfort room in the ground floor of the main building, there
were found pieces of jalousie slabs and frames scattered on the ground.
At the second floor, the lifeless body of Felix Aranez was found, lying face down and with feet
and hands tied with yellow plastic straw. A piece of cloth was stuck in his mouth and his nape
had an incise wound. A bunch of keys was found inside the display cabinet which was in
disarray. It was discovered that some pieces of jewelry inside the display cabinet were
missing.
At the third floor, the dead body of Delfin Biniahan was found lying on a folding bed between
two glass cabinets. He sustained injuries on the upper part of his body. The glass cabinets
were splattered with blood. The door of the Administrative Office had been destroyed and
bore some traces of blood.
Police Senior Inspector Emmanuel Reyes, Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory, Southern Police District Crime Laboratory Office, conducted an
autopsy on the bodies of the three victims. The examination on the body of Felix Aranez
revealed that he sustained a hack wound on the nape, measuring 0.3 cm. x 0.7 cm., which
could have been caused by a bladed weapon, and hematoma on the occipital region or on
the right side of the head, measuring 8 cm. x 8 cm., and on the frontal region just above the
right eye which may have been caused by a blunt object. Delfin Biniahan sustained five
lacerated wounds on the frontal region, particularly on the forehead, which could have been
caused by the application of a hard object, and his lower jaw was displaced toward the left
side, which could have been caused by a hard blow. The cause of death of Felix Aranez and
Delfin Biniahan was "intracranial hemorrhages secondary to traumatic injuries of the head."
Gilbert Esmaquilan sustained multiple stab wounds on the left mammary region piercing the
aorta near its attachment to the heart; the left subcostal region piercing the stomach; the
vertebral region piercing the underlying soft tissues; the left posterior rib; the right
infrascapular region piercing the 7th right posterior intercostal muscle and the lower and
upper lobes of the right lung; and the right costal region piercing the posterior right 8th
intercostal muscle and the lower and upper lobes of the right lung. The fatal wounds were
those which pierced his heart and lungs. The cause of death of Gilbert Esmaquilan was
"hemorrhage and shock secondary to multiple stab wounds of the body."
Around 8:30 in the evening of June 28, 2001, appellant met with his girlfriend, Richlie Ladiana
("Richlie"), in the latter’s workplace in Panorama Street, SSS Village, Marikina City and gave
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her ₱6,000.00. Appellant was with co-accused Ricky Ladiana ("Ricky"), Richlie’s brother.
Richlie noticed that at that time, appellant appeared to have a problem, while Ricky looked
stern. After giving the money to Richlie, appellant and Ricky immediately left.
Around 8:30 in the morning, of the following day, June 29, 2001, appellant called up Richlie
and asked her to drop by the house of Ricky in Cupang, Antipolo City where he was.
At 8:57 that same morning. appellant also sent a text message to their head supervisor,
Roger Tan, which read, "Boss, Gud morning. Bukas na ako papasok o kaya Lunes ang sama
talaga ng trangkaso nabasa K C ako ng ulan nong Martes pag diliver namin." At 9:57,
appellant sent another text message to Roger Tan, which read, "Boss, balita daw na ako ang
suspek sa nangyari dyan boss matagal na ako sa companya kahit alam kong inaapi ako nyo
wala akong ginawa na masama sa trabaho ko."
When Richlie arrived at the house of Ricky, appellant gave her ₱500.00 and asked her to buy
him some tee-shirts and shorts. Appellant also asked Richlie to return the ₱6,000.00 which
he had earlier given to her because he was leaving for the province.
Around 2:30 in the afternoon, Richlie again dropped by the house of Ricky before going to
school. Appellant requested her not to attend her classes anymore because he was leaving
for the province. Richlie stayed with appellant in the house of Ricky until 7:00 o’clock in the
evening. While appellant was putting on his clothes, Richlie noticed that appellant was
wearing a cross pendant. Thereafter, appellant handed to her something wrapped in a
newspaper. When she opened the newspaper to look what was inside, she saw 4 pairs of
earrings, a pairless earring, and 5 ladies’ rings.
Around 9:00 that same evening, appellant and Ricky went to the house of Eduardo dela Cruz
("Eduardo") in Cupang, Antipolo City. Eduardo was the second cousin of the mother of Richlie
and Ricky. Ricky looked very nervous and his eyes were reddish, while appellant was very
quiet. Ricky told Eduardo that they were in trouble and asked him to accompany appellant to
the house of Panfilo dela Cruz, Eduardo’s first cousin, in Sitio Tibol, Barangay Salasa, Palauig,
Iba, Zambales. Ricky told Eduardo that appellant will be staying in Zambales for two to three
days. Eduardo acceded to such request.
Eduardo and appellant proceeded to the bus terminal of Victory Liner in Cubao, Quezon City.
When they arrived in Cubao around 11:30 that same evening, the last trip for Zambales had
already left. Appellant told Eduardo that they will just get a taxi in going to Olongapo City.
They were able to hire a taxi for ₱1,500.00. They arrived in Olongapo City around 1:00 o’clock
in the morning of the following day, June 30, 2001. While waiting for a bus going to
Zambales, they drank coffee in a nearby store. During their conversation, Eduardo asked
appellant what happened. Appellant confessed to Eduardo that he and Ricky entered a place
in Pasay City and they killed two persons and seriously wounded another whom they left
fighting for his life. Appellant also told Eduardo about the vault which contained money and
that if "he can open the vault, and even if they die their family will live comfortably." Further,
appellant told Eduardo that nothing will be traced to him because his hands were wrapped

such that no fingerprints would be recovered from the crime scene. They arrived at the
house of Panfilo dela Cruz around 6:00 o’clock in the morning. Eduardo introduced appellant
to Panfilo dela Cruz and told the latter that appellant will be staying there for about two (2)
days. At noontime, Eduardo went back to Manila.
After a week, Eduardo went to SPO3 Rodrigo Urbina of the PNP Regional Mobile Patrol
Group. Eduardo told SPO3 Urbina what was confessed to him by appellant and that he
brought appellant to Zambales. SPO3 Urbano coordinated with the Pasay City Police Station,
Crime Investigation Division, for appellant’s arrest.
Around 5:00 o’clock in the morning of July 12, 2001, the joint team of the Regional Mobile
Patrol Group, the Pasay City Police Station and the Palauig Police Station arrested appellant
in the house of Panfilo dela Cruz. Appellant was frisked and a cross pendant was recovered
from his pocket.
The inventory conducted by Cresilda Tigolo, the accounting clerk of Jeepney Shopping
Center, revealed that 191 pieces of jewelry in the amount of ₱304,140.00 and 2 imported
bags worth ₱23,250.00 were stolen. The stolen items had a total value of ₱327,390.00.
The gold pendant recovered from appellant was worth ₱3,400.00. Also recovered were a
diamond earring worth [₱]6,700.00 and a diamond ring worth ₱5,450.00 which Richlie had
pawned through a friend Wilfredo Mazo. Said pawned items were recovered from Villarica
Pawnshop, Inc., in Marikina City. Thus, the total amount of the pieces of jewelry recovered
was ₱15,550.00.
The .38 Caliber Armscor revolver service weapon of victim Gilbert Esmaquilan, owned by the
Energetic Security Specialist, was recovered by PO3 Edison Cabotaje in the house of Ricky
Ladiana.
The Honda VTEC 1999 model car with plate no. WFD 891, owned by a certain Oliver
Gatchalian, which had been used as the "getaway" car by appellant, was recovered
somewhere in Quezon City.7
For his part, appellant denied having committed the crime charged against him. He testified
that on June 26, 2001, he called up Jeepney Shopping Center to inform them that he was
sick. He later decided to go to the house of his niece Lea Ezra Uy in Caloocan to have a
massage. He was there from 8:30 p.m. until the following morning. At noontime of June 27,
2001, Richlie, his girlfriend and Ricky's sister, called him up asking for money to pay for her
tuition fee. At around 7 p.m., he met with her in Marikina and gave her ₱6,000.00.8
On June 28, 2001, appellant went to Richlie's place and saw her and her brother Ricky
arguing about an incident that happened at Jeepney Shopping Center. Richlie showed
appellant a newspaper where his name appeared as a suspect. Ricky then put his arms
around him saying "huwag ka na lang maingay." He then told Ricky that he could not keep
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quiet because he was afraid that he might be implicated since he knew that Ricky and his
companions were the ones responsible for the incident. Ricky then gave him a package
containing two pairs of earrings and three pieces of rings but declined to accept them as he
already had many.9
After a while, Eduardo dela Cruz, Ricky's uncle, arrived and invited them to drink. Eduardo
told him that he should be acquainted with Richlie's relatives in Zambales. Although
appellant knew that he only had three days leave, he agreed to go with Eduardo to Zambales.
Before he left for Zambales, he gave the pieces of jewelry which Ricky gave him to Richlie.
Richlie gave him back the ₱6,000.00 he earlier gave her saying he might be needing the
money for his trip.10
Around 9 p.m. of June 29, 2001, he and Eduardo rode a taxi going to Olongapo City. They
were not able to talk to each other since he was asleep the whole trip. Then they boarded a
bus going to Zambales. They reached the house of Panfilo dela Cruz, Eduardo's cousin, in
Palauig, Zambales around 4 a.m. the following day, Eduardo introduced him to Panfilo as
Richlie's fiancé. After breakfast, Eduardo told him that he was going back to Manila and
would just fetch him after two or three days.11
On July 12, 2001, three policemen entered his room and arrested him. They boarded him in a
van and brought him to the Zambales Police Station. PO3 Michael Manarang took a pendant
from his pocket and told him that he already had an evidence against him. He was tortured
to admit the crime.12
On September 30, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision13 convicting appellant of robbery with
homicide and imposing upon him the penalty of death. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court, after considering the qualifying/aggravating circumstances attending
the commission of the crime, finds the accused Antonio Manuel Uy y Suangan GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the Special Complex Crime of Robbery with
Homicide in violation of paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act 7659, and hereby sentences him to suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH by
lethal injection. The accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the following:
a) the legal heirs of the late Aranez the sum of ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity;
b) the legal heirs of the late Biniahan the sum of ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity;
c) the legal heirs of the late Esmaquilan the sum of ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity;
d) the Jeepney Shopping Center the sum of ₱311,840.00 as reparation of the
damage caused; and

e) the Energetic Security Agency the sum of ₱49,784.75 for the funeral expenses of
guard Esmaquilan.
Considering the penalty imposed, let the records of this case be forwarded for automatic
review by the Honorable Supreme Court within twenty (20) days, but not earlier than fifteen
days after promulgation of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.14
The case was elevated to Us on automatic review. In a Resolution15 dated August 24, 2004,
pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo,16 we referred the case to the CA.
On July 18, 2006, the CA issued the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the court AFFIRMS the decision of the Trial Court in convicting Antonio Manuel
Uy of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and MODIFIES the penalty imposed from death
penalty to reclusion perpetua.
The accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the following:
a) the legal heirs of the late Aranez the sum of ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity;
b) the legal heirs of the late Biniahan the sum of ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity;
c) the legal heirs of the late Esmaquilan the sum of ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity;
d) the Jeepney Shopping Center the sum of ₱311,840.00 as reparation of the
damage caused; and
e) the Energetic Security Agency the sum of ₱49,784.75 for the funeral expenses of
guard Esmaquilan.
SO ORDERED.17
In a Resolution18 dated November 20, 2006, we accepted the appeal, the penalty imposed
being reclusion perpetua. We required the parties to submit their respective supplemental
briefs if they so desire.
Appellant filed a Manifestation19 dated February 8, 2007 stating that he adopts his
Appellant's Brief as Supplemental Brief.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Manifestation and Motion20 dated March 2,
2007, in lieu of the supplemental brief, stating that it will adopt its Appellee's Brief as its
Supplemental Brief in order to avoid repetitious discussions of the issues that had been
addressed in its appellee's brief and to prevent further delay.
In his Brief, appellant assigned the following errors:
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I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY.21
We find no merit in this appeal.
Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on
occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution
must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with
violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking is
animo lucrandi or with intent to gain; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery,
the crime of homicide, as used in the generic sense, was committed.22 A conviction needs
certainty that the robbery is the central purpose and objective of the malefactor and the
killing is merely incidental to the robbery.23 The intent to rob must precede the taking of
human life, but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. 24
In this case, we find that the evidence presented by the prosecution had established beyond
reasonable doubt that the crime of robbery with homicide was indeed committed. As the CA
correctly observed:
x x x The removal of the jalousies in the restroom of the Jeepney Shopping Center to gain
entrance, the destruction of the display cabinet where the items were kept, the destruction
of the lock leading to the cashier's office on the third floor of the building; and the inventory
of missing items makes the situation possess the first essential element as stated above. In
robbery by the taking of the property through intimidation or violence, it is not necessary
that the person unlawfully divested of the personal property be the owner thereof, robbery
may be committed against a bailee or a person who himself stole it. As long as the taker of
the personal property is not the owner, the second element exists. The third element is
animus lucrandi or intent to gain which is defined by the Supreme Court as "an internal act
which can be established through the overt acts of the offender, and it may be presumed
from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless special circumstance
reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator." We agree with the finding of the
trial court that: "the intent to steal was likewise proven from accused's statement to Eduardo
dela Cruz to the effect that if they were able to open the vault, their families would have
lived a good life even if they die in the process." On the other hand, the accused was proven
to be a friend of, and was with, Ricky Ladiana right after the commission of the crime as
testified to by Richlie Ladiana, his lover. Being so when the firearm of the fallen guard was

found from the abandoned house of Ricky, the conclusion is that Ricky and Antonio Uy have
been together at the shopping center and presumed the taker of a thing taken or doer in the
doing of a recent wrongful act. In the instant case, no special circumstance was present to
belie the presumption of the intent to gain of the accused-appellant. The existence of the
fourth element is incontestable. The homicide preceded the robbery but committed on the
occasion thereof, the purpose is to eliminate an obstacle to the commission of robbery. The
grudge of the appellant against his former co-workers Felix Aranez and Delfin Biniahan is not
sufficient to overcome the presumption and evidence of intent to gain, it is clear that the
victims were killed on the occasion of robbery and to commit robbery. Essential in robbery
with homicide is that there is a nexus, an intimate connection between the robbery and the
killing, whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the former or whether both crimes are
committed at the same time.25
While there was no direct evidence to establish appellant's participation in the commission
of the crime, direct evidence is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its
conclusion and finding of guilt.26 The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely on
circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that
evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be
established by inference. At times, resort to circumstantial evidence is imperative since to
insist on direct testimony would, in many cases, result in setting felons free and deny proper
protection to the community.27 Thus, Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court on
circumstantial evidence requires the concurrence of the following: (1) there must be more
than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. A judgment of conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an unbroken
chain that results to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.28
We have carefully gone over the records of the case and we find that the circumstantial
evidence presented by the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant
and his co-accused Ricky conspired to commit the crime of robbery with homicide. We find
apropos the CA's ratiocination in this wise:
x x x We concord with the trial court that the success of the prosecution in discharging its
duty to prove the guilt of the accused is anchored in the circumstantial evidence present and
proven in this case, to wit:
1. Possession of the stolen goods by the accused and his girlfriend was not
satisfactorily explained;
2. Intent to steal was evident in his confession to Eduardo dela Cruz who had no
reason to lie as he even helped him to escape;
5
3. Participation in the commission of the crime was proven by the tracing of the
possession of the deceased's firearm at Ricky Ladiana's house, accused Antonio's
friend and companion right after the killing;
4. Antonio Manuel Uy was seen in person by a guard at the scene of the crime on
the night of the robbery and killing;
5. Suspicious presence at the place of robbery immediately before the incident;
6. Antonio Manuel Uy's cellphone was established as the sender of text messages
to at least two co-employees of his; [and]
7. Confession/testimony of Richlie Ladiana, acknowledged sweetheart of accused
Uy that the latter gave her the jewelries, part of the stolen jewelries from the
shopping center.
Another circumstance is the unexplained impromptu vacation of Antonio Manuel Uy. It has
been ruled that flight per se cannot prove the guilt of an accused. But if the same is
considered in the light of other circumstances, it may be deemed a strong indication of guilt.
Considering the surrounding circumstances when he left with Eduardo dela Cruz for Palauig,
Zambales, We could draw a conclusion that he is trying to evade something in his work place.
Settled is the rule that flight of an accused, when unexplained, is a circumstance from which
an inference of guilt may be drawn. 29
In his appeal with the CA and with Us, appellant contends that contrary to the RTC findings,
he was able to satisfactorily explain the circumstance of his possession of the stolen pieces of
jewelry. He claims that Ricky, Richlie's brother, insisted on giving him those pieces of jewelry,
but since he was afraid he might be implicated in the commission of the crime which Ricky
and his companion had committed, he decided to leave the pieces of jewelry to Richlie. As to
the cross pendant which was also part of the stolen items allegedly recovered from him,
appellant claims that the same was merely planted on him by PO3 Michael Manarang. He
further contends that assuming there is truth to Richlie's allegation that the pieces of jewelry
which she pawned came from him, the stolen items did not prove his culpability for robbery
with homicide.
Appellant's explanations do not inspire belief.
Appellant testified that when Ricky gave him the valuable pieces of jewelry, he declined to
receive them saying that he already had many jewelry,30 yet he was still in possession of
these items and he even admitted giving them to Richlie.31 In fact, Richlie categorically
declared that before they parted ways at around 7 p.m. of June 29, 2001, appellant gave her
something wrapped in a newspaper.32 Upon reaching her house, she opened the wrapped
newspaper which contained 4 pairs of diamond earrings, a pairless diamond earring and 5
pieces of diamond rings.33 Richlie testified that appellant called her up and instructed her to

pawn the items as he needed money,34thus, Richlie asked her friend Wilfredo Mazo to pawn
the diamond ring and a pair of earrings to Villarica pawnshop.35 Later, Mazo, together with
Richlie and SPO3 Rodrigo Urbina, went to the pawnshop and redeemed the items36 which
were proved to be part of the stolen items.
Appellant's claim that the cross pendant found on him at the time of his arrest was merely
planted by PO3 Manarang was not proven at all. In fact, P03 Manarang rebutted such claim
by testifying that as member of the arresting team of the Pasay Police, he saw PO3 Ernie
Cabrega searched appellant's body and recovered from him the cross pendant.37 PO3
Cabrega, in his direct examination, positively declared that upon appellant's arrest, he
searched the latter's body and found the cross pendant at the back of his pocket.38 The
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties was not overcome as there
was no evidence showing that the police officers were impelled by improper motive.
In fact, Richlie corroborated the testimonies of these two police officers when she declared
that she saw appellant wearing the cross pendant for the first time on June 29, 2001,39 thus,
establishing appellant's possession of the cross pendant even before his arrest on July 12,
2001. The recovery of the stolen items which admittedly came from appellant gives rise to
the legal presumption of guilt which he failed to overcome, thus, he must necessarily be
considered the author of the robbery and the killings.40
Appellant argues that his alleged confession to Eduardo dela Cruz was not sufficient to
convict him of the crime as the latter's testimony merely established that appellant admitted
his intention to rob a vault at an unspecified place; that even if he (appellant) allegedly
admitted the killings, Eduardo did not state who between him and his co-accused Ricky
committed the killing.
Such argument deserves scant consideration.
Eduardo testified that appellant told him that the main purpose of appellant and his co-
accused Ricky in entering the Jeepney Shopping Center was to open the vault to get
everything in it, which cost millions of pesos that would make their families live
comfortably;41 that when they entered the establishment, they immediately looked for the
vault and in the process killed three people.42 It has been established that they were able to
open the glass showcase containing the valuable pieces of jewelry.43 Cresilda Tigolo, the
shopping center's employee who is responsible for preparing the monthly inventory of the
pieces of jewelry for sale, testified that pieces of jewelry and imported bags with a total
amount of ₱327,390.00 were missing.44 Moreover, it has also been proven that on the
occasion of the robbery, two stay-in staff and the guard on duty in the Jeepney Shopping
Center were killed.lawphi1
Appellant's confession to Eduardo, who is not a police officer, is admissible in evidence. 45 The
declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense
necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.46 Appellant's admissions
are not covered by Sections 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution,47 because they
6
were not extracted while he was under custodial investigation. The rule is that any person,
otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to
the substance of what he heard and understood all of it. An oral confession need not be
repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given in its substance. 48 And case law has it
that whenever homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who
took part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and
indivisible felony of robbery with homicide, although they did not actually take part in the
killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same.49 There was no
showing that appellant attempted to prevent the killing.
Appellant argues that neither the text messages he sent to his supervisor, Roger Tan (Tan),
nor to a co-worker, Bernardo Cruz (Cruz), would prove that he was responsible for the
robbery with homicide.
We are not convinced.
At 8:57 a.m. of June 29, 2001, appellant texted Tan telling the latter that he will just report
for work the following day, or Monday, because he had a fever.50 At 9:57 a.m., appellant
again texted Tan saying that he learned that he was a suspect in the incident that happened
in the shopping center and that he did nothing wrong in his work.51 On July 1, 2001, appellant
texted Cruz asking why he was considered a suspect when he and his wife were on their
honeymoon.52 Appellant's excuses for not reporting for work since June 26, 2001 were
contradictory showing their untruthfulness. Significantly, while appellant already knew that
he was considered a suspect to a very serious crime, he did not report for work anymore. If
he was really innocent of the crime as he professed to be, he should have immediately
thought of clearing himself of any suspicion. Instead, on the night of June 29, 2001, appellant
hurriedly left for Zambales and hid thereat until his arrest on July 12, 2001. Appellant's
sudden and unexplained trip to Zambales at the time that he was considered a suspect and
had a work to report to was undoubtedly flight from justice which is an indication of a guilty
mind. "Indeed, the wicked man flees though no man pursueth, but the righteous are as bold
as a lion."53
Appellant contends that the recovery of the service firearm of the slain security guard
Esmaquilan at Ricky's house did not prove his participation in the commission of the crime.
Appellant even pointed to Ricky and his companions as the ones responsible for the crime of
robbery with homicide.
Such defense is far from convincing.
Joel Adol, the security guard on duty at Chong Hwat Company located adjacent the shopping
center, testified that around 11 p.m. of June 26, 2001, he saw two persons, one of whom he
identified as appellant peeping inside the compound of the Jeepney Shopping Center. 54 He
was familiar with appellant, as he had seen him directing traffic in the area and cleaning the
premises of the shopping center.55 He clearly saw appellant as there was a light coming from
the bank beside the shopping center, as well as the light coming from the guardhouse of the

shopping center.56Notably, that was the night before the crime was discovered the following
morning.
Also, Richlie testified that on June 28, 2001, i.e., the day after the crime was committed,
appellant, together with her brother, co-accused Ricky, came to see her at her employer's
house in Marikina.57 She noticed that Ricky looked sterned while appellant looked bothered
as if they have a problem58 and then appellant gave her ₱6,000.00 and told her to study hard.
On June 29, 2001, Richlie met again with appellant and her brother at the latter's house in
Antipolo, where appellant asked her to return the money he gave her as he was leaving for
the province.59 They were together in Ricky's house until she left at 7 p.m.60
Moreover, Eduardo dela Cruz, Richlie and Ricky's uncle, testified that at 9 p.m. of June 29,
2001, Ricky, together with appellant, came to his place in Cupang, Antipolo.61 Ricky asked
him to bring appellant to the house of Panfilo dela Cruz, Eduardo's cousin and Ricky's uncle,
in Zambales because Ricky and appellant were in trouble.62 He was told that appellant would
stay in Panfilo's house for only two to three days. Eduardo observed that Ricky's eyes were
reddish and he was nervous, while appellant was quiet.63 Eduardo obliged and brought
appellant to Zambales and endorsed him to his cousin Panfilo. It was during their trip that
appellant told him what they did in Jeepney Shopping Center. In the meantime, Ricky,
together with his family, packed their things and left their house on June 30, 2001 and never
returned.64 The actuations of appellant and his co-accused Ricky are not the normal behavior
of innocent men. Their flight without plausible explanation, coupled with the recovery of the
gun of the slain security guard in Ricky's house, establish that they were together in
committing the crime.
Appellant's defense consisted merely of alibi. To prosper, alibi must meet strictly the
requirements of time and place,65 meaning that the accused was not at the scene of the
crime at the time it was committed, and that it was physically impossible for the accused to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 66
In this case, appellant claims that on June 26, 2001, he was at the house of his niece, Lea
Ezra, in Caloocan from 8:30 p.m. until the following day. Notably, appellant failed to present
corroborating witness to strengthen his alibi. Moreover, appellant failed to show that it was
physically impossible for him to be present at the locus criminis, considering that at
nighttime, Caloocan would only be more than an hour's travel to the crime scene in Pasay
City. But most importantly, security guard Joel Adol positively declared that he saw appellant
with a companion at the Jeepney Shopping Center around 11 p.m. of June 26, 2001. And it is
only axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over negative testimony.67
The CA correctly modified the penalty imposed by the RTC. We agree with the CA that the
RTC erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and treachery when
they were not specifically alleged in the information. Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the 2000
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which became effective on December 1, 2000, provides
that aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the information, otherwise, they cannot
be considered against the accused even if they are proven during the trial.
7
The special complex crime of robbery with homicide is punishable under Article 294, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, by reclusion
perpetua to death. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that when the
law prescribes a penalty consisting of two (2) indivisible penalties, and the crime is neither
attended by mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be
imposed. 68Considering that there was no modifying circumstance which attended the
commission of the crime, the CA correctly modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua.
In robbery with homicide, civil indemnity and moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00
each is granted automatically in the absence of any qualifying aggravating
circumstances.69 These awards are mandatory without need of allegation and evidence other
than the death of the victim owing to the fact of the commission of the crime.70 In this case,
the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, properly awarded the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity.
The heirs of the victims are also entitled to the award of moral damages in the amount of
₱50,000.00 each. As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably
and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim's family. It
is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes
the victim of a violent or brutal killing.71
We likewise affirm the RTC's Order for appellant to indemnify the Jeepney Shopping Center
the sum of ₱311,840.00 as reparation and the Energetic Security Agency the sum of
₱49,784.75 for the funeral expenses of security guard Esmaquilan.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00110 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION that petitioner is also ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victims the
amount of ₱50,000.00 each as moral damages.
The police and other law enforcement agencies of the government are ORDERED to
immediately implement the warrant of arrest issued against Ricky Ladiana y Davao, for him
to stand trial.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178321 October 5, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CONRADO LAOG y RAMIN, Accused-Appellant.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
For our review is the March 21, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC
No. 00234 which affirmed appellant’s conviction for murder in Criminal Case No. 2162-M-
2000 and rape in Criminal Case No. 2308-M-2000.

Appellant Conrado Laog y Ramin was charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 11, of Malolos, Bulacan. The Information,2 which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 2162-M-2000, alleged:
That on or about the 6th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of San Rafael, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a lead pipe and with intent to kill one Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, did
then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation, abuse of
superior strength and treachery, attack, assault and hit with the said lead pipe the said
Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, thereby inflicting upon said Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal serious
physical injuries which directly caused her death.
Contrary to law.
He was likewise charged before the same court with the crime of rape of AAA.3 The second
Information,4 which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2308-M-2000, alleged:
That on or about the 6th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of San Rafael, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd designs, by means of force, violence and intimidation, that is, by attacking
and hitting with a lead pipe one [AAA] which resulted [in] her incurring serious physical
injuries that almost caused her death, and while in such defenseless situation, did then and
there have carnal knowledge of said [AAA] against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. The two cases were thereafter
tried jointly because they arose from the same incident.
The prosecution presented as its principal witness AAA, the rape victim who was 19 years old
at the time of the incident. Her testimony was corroborated by her grandfather BBB, Dr. Ivan
Richard Viray, and her neighbor CCC.
AAA testified that at around six o’clock in the evening of June 6, 2000, she and her friend,
Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, were walking along the rice paddies on their way to apply for work
at a canteen near the National Highway in Sampaloc, San Rafael, Bulacan. Suddenly,
appellant, who was holding an ice pick and a lead pipe, waylaid them and forcibly brought
them to a grassy area at the back of a concrete wall. Without warning, appellant struck AAA
in the head with the lead pipe causing her to feel dizzy and to fall down. When Jennifer saw
this, she cried out for help but appellant also hit her on the head with the lead pipe, knocking
her down. Appellant stabbed Jennifer several times with the ice pick and thereafter covered
her body with thick grass.5 Appellant then turned to AAA. He hit AAA in the head several
times more with the lead pipe and stabbed her on the face. While AAA was in such
defenseless position, appellant pulled down her jogging pants, removed her panty, and
8
pulled up her blouse and bra. He then went on top of her, sucked her breasts and inserted
his penis into her vagina. After raping AAA, appellant also covered her with grass. At that
point, AAA passed out.6
When AAA regained consciousness, it was nighttime and raining hard. She crawled until she
reached her uncle’s farm at daybreak on June 8, 2000.7 When she saw him, she waved at him
for help. Her uncle, BBB, and a certain Nano then brought her to Carpa Hospital in Baliuag,
Bulacan where she stayed for more than three weeks. She later learned that Jennifer had
died.8
During cross-examination, AAA explained that she did not try to run away when appellant
accosted them because she trusted appellant who was her uncle by affinity. She said that she
never thought he would harm them.9
BBB testified that on June 8, 2000, at about six o’clock in the morning, he was at his rice field
at Sampaloc, San Rafael, Bulacan when he saw a woman waving a hand and then fell down.
The woman was about 200 meters away from him when he saw her waving to him, and he
did not mind her. However, when she was about 100 meters away from him, he recognized
the woman as AAA, his granddaughter. He immediately approached her and saw that her
face was swollen, with her hair covering her face, and her clothes all wet. He asked AAA what
happened to her, and AAA uttered, "Si Tata Coni" referring to appellant who is his son-in-
law.10 With the help of his neighbor, he brought AAA home.11 AAA was later brought to Carpa
Hospital in Baliuag, Bulacan where she recuperated for three weeks.
CCC, neighbor of AAA and Jennifer, testified that sometime after June 6, 2000, she visited
AAA at the hospital and asked AAA about the whereabouts of Jennifer. AAA told her to look
for Jennifer somewhere at Buenavista. She sought the assistance of Barangay Officials and
they went to Buenavista where they found Jennifer’s cadaver covered with grass and already
bloated.12
Meanwhile, Dr. Ivan Richard Viray, a medico-legal officer of the Province of Bulacan,
conducted the autopsy on the remains of Jennifer. His findings are as follows:
…the body is in advanced stage of decomposition[;] … eyeballs and to[n]gue were
protru[d]ed; the lips and abdomen are swollen; … desquamation and bursting of bullae and
denudation of the epidermis in the head, trunks and on the upper extremities[;] [f]rothy fluid
and maggots coming from the nose, mouth, genital region and at the site of wounds, … three
(3) lacerations at the head[;] two (2) stab wounds at the submandibular region[;] four [4]
punctured wounds at the chest of the victim[.]
… cause of death of the victim was hemorrhagic shock as result of stab wounds [in] the head
and trunk.13

The prosecution and the defense also stipulated on the testimony of Elizabeth Patawaran,
Jennifer’s mother, as to the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 2162-M-2000. It was stipulated
that she spent ₱25,000 for Jennifer’s funeral and burial.14
Appellant, on the other hand, denied the charges against him. Appellant testified that he was
at home cooking dinner around the time the crimes were committed. With him were his
children, Ronnie, Jay, Oliver and Conrado, Jr. and his nephew, Rey Laog. At around seven
o’clock, he was arrested by the police officers of San Rafael, Bulacan. He learned that his wife
had reported him to the police after he "went wild" that same night and struck with a lead
pipe a man whom he saw talking to his wife inside their house. When he was already
incarcerated, he learned that he was being charged with murder and rape.15
Appellant further testified that AAA and Jennifer frequently went to his nipa hut whenever
they would ask for rice or money. He claimed that in the evening of June 5, 2000, AAA and
Jennifer slept in his nipa hut but they left the following morning at around seven o’clock. An
hour later, he left his house to have his scythe repaired. However, he was not able to do so
because that was the time when he "went wild" after seeing his wife with another man. He
admitted that his nipa hut is more or less only 100 meters away from the scene of the
crime.16
The defense also presented appellant’s nephew, Rey Laog, who testified that he went to
appellant’s house on June 5, 2000, at around three o’clock in the afternoon, and saw AAA
and Jennifer there. He recalled seeing AAA and Jennifer before at his uncle’s house about
seven times because AAA and his uncle had an illicit affair. He further testified that appellant
arrived before midnight on June 5, 2000 and slept with AAA. The following morning, at
around six o’clock, AAA and Jennifer went home. He and appellant meanwhile left the house
together. Appellant was going to San Rafael to have his scythe repaired while he proceeded
to his house in Pinakpinakan, San Rafael, Bulacan.17
After trial, the RTC rendered a Joint Decision18 on June 30, 2003 finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2162-M-2000, this court finds the accused Conrado Laog
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay
the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran, the following sums of money:
a. P60,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
9
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2308-M-2000, this Court hereby finds the accused Conrado
Laog GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape under Art. 266-A par. (a) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
and to pay the private complainant the following sums of money.
a. P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.19
Appellant appealed his conviction to this Court. But conformably with our pronouncement
in People v. Mateo,20 the case was referred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.
In a Decision dated March 21, 2007, the CA affirmed with modification the trial court’s
judgment. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Joint Decision, dated June 30,
2003, of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 11, in Criminal Case Nos. 2162-
M-2000 & 2308-M-2000, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In Criminal Case [No.]
2162-M-2000, Accused-Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran
[an] additional P25,000.00 as actual damages. The exemplary damages awarded by the Trial
Court in 2162-M-2000 & 2308-M-2000 are hereby reduced to P25,000.00 each.
SO ORDERED.21
Appellant is now before this Court assailing the CA’s affirmance of his conviction for both
crimes of rape and murder. In a Resolution22 dated August 22, 2007, we required the parties
to submit their respective Supplemental Briefs, if they so desire. However, the parties
submitted separate Manifestations in lieu of Supplemental Briefs, adopting the arguments in
their respective briefs filed in the CA. Appellant had raised the following errors allegedly
committed by the trial court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT AND
INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS [AAA].
II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE
CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.23
Appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for
the killing of Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal and the rape of AAA. He assails AAA’s credibility, the
prosecution’s main witness, and points out alleged inconsistencies in her testimony.
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to establish that he carefully planned the
execution of the crimes charged. According to him, AAA’s narration that he waylaid them
while walking along the rice paddies on their way to apply for work negates evident
premeditation since there was no evidence that the said path was their usual route.
Appellant further contends that the trial court and CA erred in appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. He argues that for abuse of superior strength to
be appreciated in the killing of Jennifer, the physical attributes of both the accused and the
victim should have been shown in order to determine whether the accused had the capacity
to overcome the victim physically or whether the victim was substantially weak and unable
to put up a defense. Additionally, he attempts to cast doubt upon AAA’s testimony, arguing
that it lacked some details on how, after she was raped and stabbed by appellant, she was
still able to put on her clothes and crawl to her grandfather’s farm.
The appeal lacks merit.
Appellant principally attacks the credibility of prosecution witness AAA. Jurisprudence has
decreed that the issue of credibility of witnesses is "a question best addressed to the
province of the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and
incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’ deportment on the stand while testifying which
opportunity is denied to the appellate courts"24 and "absent any substantial reason which
would justify the reversal of the trial court’s assessments and conclusions, the reviewing
court is generally bound by the former’s findings, particularly when no significant facts and
circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered
would have affected the outcome of the case."25 This rule is even more stringently applied if
the appellate court concurred with the trial court.26
Here, both the trial and appellate courts gave credence and full probative weight to the
testimony of AAA, the lone eyewitness to Jennifer’s killing and was herself brutally attacked
by appellant who also raped her. Appellant had not shown any sufficiently weighty reasons
for us to disturb the trial court’s evaluation of the prosecution eyewitness’ credibility. In
particular, we defer to the trial court’s firsthand observations on AAA’s deportment while
testifying and its veritable assessment of her credibility, to wit:
From the moment [AAA] took the stand, this Court has come to discern in her the
trepidations of a woman outraged who is about to recount the ordeal she had gone through.
She took her oath with trembling hands, her voice low and soft, hardly audible. Face down,
her eyes were constantly fixed on the floor as if avoiding an eye contact with the man she
10
was about to testify against. After a few questions in direct, the emotion building up inside
her came to the fore and she burst into tears, badly shaken, unfit to continue any further
with her testimony. Thus, in deference to her agitated situation, this Court has to defer her
direct-examination. When she came back, however, to continue with her aborted
questioning, this time, composed and collected, direct and straightforward in her narration,
all vestiges of doubt on her credibility vanished.27
Indeed, records bear out that AAA became so tense and nervous when she took the witness
stand for the first time that the trial court had to cut short her initial direct examination.
However, during the next hearing she was able to narrate her harrowing ordeal in a clear and
straightforward manner, describing in detail how appellant waylaid them and mercilessly hit
and attacked her and Jennifer with a lead pipe and ice pick before raping her. We quote the
pertinent portions of her testimony:
Q: During your previous testimony, Madam Witness, you said that you’re not able
to reach your place of work on June 6, 2000, what is the reason why you did not
reach your place of work?
A: We were waylaid (hinarang) by Conrado Laog, sir.
Q: In what manner were you waylaid by Conrado Laog?
A: Conrado Laog hit me with the pipe on my head, sir.
xxxx
Q: Where were you when you were hit?
A: We were walking along the rice puddies (sic), Your Honor.
Fiscal:
Q: And what happened to you when you were hit with the lead pipe by Conrado
Laog?
A: I fell down (nabuwal) because I felt dizzy, sir.
Q: Now, what happened next, if any?
A: I heard Jennifer crying, sir.
Q: And you heard Jennifer but did you see her?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where was Conrado Laog when you heard Jennifer crying?
A: He was beside me, sir.
Court:
Q: How about Jennifer, where was she when you heard her crying?
A: She was standing on the rice puddies, (sic), Your Honor.
Fiscal:
Q: And what was Conrado Laog doing?
A: He approached Jennifer, sir.
Q: Then, what happened next?
A: He hit Jennifer with the pipe, sir.
Q: And what happened to Jennifer?
A: She fell down, sir.
Q: What did Conrado Laog do next?

A: He stabbed Jennifer, sir.
Q: After Conrado Laog stabbed Jennifer, what happened next?
A: He covered Jennifer with grasses, sir.
Q: And after that, what did Conrado Laog do?
A: He came back to me, sir.
Q: When Conrado Laog came back to you, what did you do, if any?
A: He hit me with the pipe several times, sir.
Q: And what happened to you?
A: And he stabbed me on my face, sir.
Q: Then, what happened to you?
A: After that, he pulled down my jogging pants, sir. He removed my panty and my
blouse and my bra.
Q: After that, what did he do next?
A: And then, he went on top of me, sir.
Q: Then, what happened?
A: He sucked my breast, sir.
Q: And after that?
A: He was forcing his penis into my vagina, sir.
Q: Did he suc[c]eed in putting his penis into your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: For how long did the accused Conrado Laog insert his penis into your vagina?
A: For quite sometime, sir.
Q: After that, what happened?
A: After that, he stood up, sir.
Q: And where did he go?
A: After that, he covered me with grasses, sir.
Q: And after that, what did you do?
A: I fell unconscious, sir.
Q: Now, if Conrado Laog is inside the courtroom, will you be able to point to him?
Interpreter:
Witness is pointing to a man wearing an inmate’s uniform and when asked his
name, answered: Conrado Laog.
x x x x28
On the other hand, appellant merely interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed
that at the time of the incident, he was at his house with his children and nephew cooking
dinner. His defense, however, cannot prevail over the straightforward and credible testimony
of AAA who positively identified him as the perpetrator of the murder and rape. Time and
again, we have held that positive identification of the accused, when categorical and
consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying,
should prevail over the alibi and denial of the appellant whose testimony is not substantiated
by clear and convincing evidence.29 AAA was firm and unrelenting in pointing to appellant as
the one who attacked her and Jennifer, stabbing the latter to death before raping AAA. It
should be noted that AAA knew appellant well since they were relatives by affinity. As
correctly held by the CA, with AAA’s familiarity and proximity with the appellant during the
11
commission of the crime, her identification of appellant could not be doubted or mistaken. In
fact, AAA, upon encountering appellant, did not run away as she never thought her own
uncle would harm her and her friend. Moreover, the most natural reaction of victims of
violence is to strive to see the appearance of the perpetrators of the crime and observe the
manner in which the crime is being committed.30 There is no evidence to show any improper
motive on the part of AAA to testify falsely against appellant or to falsely implicate him in the
commission of a crime. Thus, the logical conclusion is that the testimony is worthy of full
faith and credence.31
In People v. Nieto,32 we reiterated that --
It is an established jurisprudential rule that a mere denial, without any strong evidence to
support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and
involvement of appellant in the crimes attributed to him. The defense of alibi is likewise
unavailing. Firstly, alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and
difficult to disprove. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is
negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. Secondly, alibi is unacceptable
when there is a positive identification of the accused by a credible witness. Lastly, in order
that alibi might prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused has been somewhere else
during the commission of the crime; it must also be shown that it would have been
impossible for him to be anywhere within the vicinity of the crime scene.
Appellant does not dispute that he was near the vicinity of the crime on the evening of June
6, 2000. In fact, during his cross-examination, appellant admitted that his house was more or
less only 100 meters from the crime scene. Thus, his defense of alibi is not worthy of any
credit for the added reason that he has not shown that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
In view of the credible testimony of AAA, appellant’s defenses of denial and alibi deserve no
consideration. We stress that these weak defenses cannot stand against the positive
identification and categorical testimony of a rape victim.33
Appellant attempts to discredit AAA's accusation of rape by pointing out that while she
testified on being very weak that she even passed out after she was raped by appellant, she
nevertheless stated that when she crawled her way to her grandfather's farm she was
wearing her clothes. Appellant also contends that the prosecution should have presented the
physician who examined AAA to prove her allegations that she was beaten and raped by
appellant.
We are not persuaded.
Based on AAA’s account, appellant did not undress her completely -- her blouse and bra were
merely lifted up ("nililis") while her undergarments were just pulled down, which therefore
explains why she still had her clothes on when she crawled to her grandfather’s farm.

Nonetheless, this matter raised by appellant is a minor detail which had nothing to do with
the elements of the crime of rape. Discrepancies referring only to minor details and collateral
matters -- not to the central fact of the crime -- do not affect the veracity or detract from the
essential credibility of witnesses’ declarations, as long as these are coherent and intrinsically
believable on the whole.34 For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to
serve as a basis for acquittal, it must establish beyond doubt the innocence of the appellant
for the crime charged.35 It cannot be overemphasized that the credibility of a rape victim is
not diminished, let alone impaired, by minor inconsistencies in her testimony.36
As to the fact that the physician who examined AAA at the hospital did not testify during the
trial, we find this not fatal to the prosecution’s case.
It must be underscored that the foremost consideration in the prosecution of rape is the
victim’s testimony and not the findings of the medico-legal officer. In fact, a medical
examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape; the victim’s
testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict.37 Thus we have ruled that a medical
examination of the victim, as well as the medical certificate, is merely corroborative in
character and is not an indispensable element for conviction in rape. What is important is
that the testimony of private complainant about the incident is clear, unequivocal and
credible,38 as what we find in this case.
While we concur with the trial court’s conclusion that appellant indeed was the one who
raped AAA and killed Jennifer, we find that appellant should not have been convicted of the
separate crimes of murder and rape. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for
review on any question, including one not raised by the parties.39The facts alleged and
proven clearly show that the crime committed by appellant is rape with homicide, a special
complex crime provided under Article 266-B, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353.40
In People v. Larrañaga,41 this Court explained the concept of a special complex crime, as
follows:
A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is imperative. Where the law provides a
single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special
complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code
are (1) robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3) kidnapping with serious physical
injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide, and (5) rape with homicide. In a special
complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component offenses
with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate
complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code by adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of
the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed;["] and that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime. In
the cases at bar, particularly Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, the Information specifically
alleges that the victim Marijoy was raped "on the occasion and in connection" with her
12
detention and was killed "subsequent thereto and on the occasion thereof." Considering that
the prosecution was able to prove each of the component offenses, appellants should be
convicted of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape. x x x42 (Emphasis supplied.)
A special complex crime, or more properly, a composite crime, has its own definition and
special penalty in the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Justice Regalado, in his Separate
Opinion in the case of People v. Barros,43explained that composite crimes are "neither of the
same legal basis as nor subject to the rules on complex crimes in Article 48 [of the Revised
Penal Code], since they do not consist of a single act giving rise to two or more grave or less
grave felonies [compound crimes] nor do they involve an offense being a necessary means to
commit another [complex crime proper]. However, just like the regular complex crimes and
the present case of aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a single penalty is imposed
for each of such composite crimes although composed of two or more offenses."44
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides only a single penalty for the
composite acts of rape and the killing committed by reason or on the occasion of the rape.
ART. 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Considering that the prosecution in this case was able to prove both the rape of AAA and the
killing of Jennifer both perpetrated by appellant, he is liable for rape with homicide under the
above provision. There is no doubt that appellant killed Jennifer to prevent her from aiding
AAA or calling for help once she is able to run away, and also to silence her completely so she
may not witness the rape of AAA, the original intent of appellant. His carnal desire having
been satiated, appellant purposely covered AAA’s body with grass, as he did earlier with
Jennifer’s body, so that it may not be easily noticed or seen by passersby. Appellant indeed
thought that the savage blows he had inflicted on AAA were enough to cause her death as

with Jennifer. But AAA survived and appellant’s barbaric deeds were soon enough
discovered.
The facts established showed that the constitutive elements of rape with homicide were
consummated, and it is immaterial that the person killed in this case is someone other than
the woman victim of the rape. An analogy may be drawn from our rulings in cases of robbery
with homicide, where the component acts of homicide, physical injuries and other offenses
have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery. In People v. De Leon, 45we
expounded on the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, as follows:
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery,
with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to
commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before,
during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as
to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime
that has to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide
through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime,
namely, robbery with homicide, must be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of
homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that
aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is
committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the
victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide.
Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is
robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the
robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word
"homicide" is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and
infanticide.46 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term "homicide" is to be understood
in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or
on occasion of the rape.47 Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of
superior strength and evident premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly
established by the prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the
crime committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with
homicide, the aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a generic
aggravating circumstance only. Thus we ruled in People v. Macabales48
Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the aggravating
circumstance of treachery is present. They aver that treachery applies to crimes against
persons and not to crimes against property. However, we find that the trial court in this case
correctly characterized treachery as a generic aggravating, rather than qualifying,
circumstance. Miguel was rendered helpless by appellants in defending himself when his
arms were held by two of the attackers before he was stabbed with a knife by appellant
13
Macabales, as their other companions surrounded them. In People v. Salvatierra, we
ruled that when alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, such treachery is to be regarded as a generic aggravating circumstance. Robbery
with homicide is a composite crime with its own definition and special penalty in the Revised
Penal Code. There is no special complex crime of robbery with murder under the Revised
Penal Code. Here, treachery forms part of the circumstances proven concerning the actual
commission of the complex crime. Logically it could not qualify the homicide to murder but,
as generic aggravating circumstance, it helps determine the penalty to be
imposed.49(Emphasis supplied.)
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is
notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor that is plainly and
obviously advantageous to the aggressor and purposely selected or taken advantage of to
facilitate the commission of the crime.50 It is taken into account whenever the aggressor
purposely used excessive force that is out of proportion to the means of defense available to
the person attacked.51
In this case, as personally witnessed by AAA, appellant struck Jennifer in the head with a lead
pipe then stabbed her repeatedly until she was dead. Clearly, the manner by which appellant
had brutally slain Jennifer with a lethal weapon, by first hitting her in the head with a lead
pipe to render her defenseless and vulnerable before stabbing her repeatedly, unmistakably
showed that appellant intentionally used excessive force out of proportion to the means of
defense available to his unarmed victim. As aptly observed by the appellate court:
It has long been established that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an
unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority
which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was
unable to defend herself. Unlike in treachery, where the victim is not given the opportunity
to defend himself or repel the aggression, taking advantage of superior strength does not
mean that the victim was completely defenseless. Abuse of superiority is determined by the
excess of the aggressor’s natural strength over that of the victim, considering the momentary
position of both and the employment of means weakening the defense, although not
annulling it. By deliberately employing deadly weapons, an ice pick and a lead pipe,
[a]ccused-[a]ppellant clearly took advantage of the superiority which his strength, sex and
weapon gave him over his unarmed victim. The accused-appellant’s sudden attack caught the
victim off-guard rendering her defenseless.52
Abuse of superior strength in this case therefore is merely a generic aggravating
circumstance to be considered in the imposition of the penalty. The penalty provided in
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is death. However, in view of the
passage on June 24, 2006 of R.A. No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the
Death Penalty in the Philippines" the Court is mandated to impose on the appellant the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.53

The aggravating/qualifying circumstances of abuse of superior strength and use of deadly
weapon have greater relevance insofar as the civil aspect of this case is concerned. While the
trial court and CA were correct in holding that both the victim of the killing (Jennifer) and the
rape victim (AAA) are entitled to the award of exemplary damages, the basis for such award
needs further clarification.
Articles 2229 and 2230 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction
for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such
damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
In view of the presence of abuse of superior strength in the killing of Jennifer, her heirs are
entitled to exemplary damages pursuant to Article 2230. With respect to the rape committed
against AAA, Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that a man who
shall have carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat or intimidation under Article
266-A (a), whenever such rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. Since the use of a deadly
weapon raises the penalty for the rape, this circumstance would justify the award of
exemplary damages to the offended party (AAA) also in accordance with Article 2230.
Article 266-B likewise provides for the imposition of death penalty if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the aggravating/qualifying circumstances enumerated therein. Among
these circumstances is minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphasis supplied.)
AAA’s relationship to appellant, who is his uncle by affinity, was not alleged in the
information but admitted by appellant when he testified in court:
DIRECT EXAMINATION OF
CONRADO LAOG By:
Atty. Roque:
xxxx
Q Do you know a person by the name of [AAA]?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you know her?
A Because she is our neighbor. Her house is just adjacent to ours, sir.
14
Q How are you related to [AAA]?
A Her mother and my wife are sisters.
Q So she is your niece-in-law?
A Yes, sir.
x x x x54 (Emphasis supplied.)
The failure of the prosecution to allege in the information AAA’s relationship to appellant will
not bar the consideration of the said circumstance in the determination of his civil liability. In
any case, even without the attendance of aggravating circumstances, exemplary damages
may still be awarded where the circumstances of the case show the "highly reprehensible or
outrageous conduct of the offender." Citing our earlier ruling in the case of People v.
Catubig,55 this Court clarified in People v. Dalisay56:
Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, courts generally awarded
exemplary damages in criminal cases when an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary
or qualifying, had been proven to have attended the commission of the crime, even if the
same was not alleged in the information. This is in accordance with the aforesaid Article
2230. However, with the promulgation of the Revised Rules, courts no longer consider the
aggravating circumstances not alleged and proven in the determination of the penalty and in
the award of damages. Thus, even if an aggravating circumstance has been proven, but was
not alleged, courts will not award exemplary damages. Pertinent are the following sections of
Rule 110:
xxxx
Nevertheless, People v. Catubig laid down the principle that courts may still award exemplary
damages based on the aforementioned Article 2230, even if the aggravating circumstance
has not been alleged, so long as it has been proven, in criminal cases instituted before the
effectivity of the Revised Rules which remained pending thereafter. Catubig reasoned that
the retroactive application of the Revised Rules should not adversely affect the vested rights
of the private offended party.
Thus, we find, in our body of jurisprudence, criminal cases, especially those involving rape,
dichotomized: one awarding exemplary damages, even if an aggravating circumstance
attending the commission of the crime had not been sufficiently alleged but was
consequently proven in the light of Catubig; and another awarding exemplary damages only
if an aggravating circumstance has both been alleged and proven following the Revised Rules.
Among those in the first set are People v. Laciste, People v. Victor, People v. Orilla, People v.
Calongui, People v. Magbanua, People of the Philippines v. Heracleo Abello y Fortada, People
of the Philippines v. Jaime Cadag Jimenez, and People of the Philippines v. Julio Manalili. And
in the second set are People v. Llave, People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, and
People of the Philippines v. Edwin Mejia. Again, the difference between the two sets rests on
when the criminal case was instituted, either before or after the effectivity of the Revised
Rules.

Nevertheless, by focusing only on Article 2230 as the legal basis for the grant of exemplary
damages—taking into account simply the attendance of an aggravating circumstance in the
commission of a crime, courts have lost sight of the very reason why exemplary damages are
awarded. Catubig is enlightening on this point, thus—
Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are
intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue
sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of
outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In
common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award is to
account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a
person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory
being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible
conduct of the defendant—associated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness,
malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud—that
intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to
those species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his
outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter
the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only in the
presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show
the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as
Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229,
the main provision, lays down the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio, the
Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or
aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in People v.
Cristobal, the Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption,
perversity and wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman.
Recently, in People of the Philippines v. Cristino Cañada, People of the Philippines v. Pepito
Neverio and The People of the Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., the Court awarded
exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and
corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.
It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis Article 2229, rather than
Article 2230, to justify the award of exemplary damages. Indeed, to borrow Justice Carpio
Morales’ words in her separate opinion in People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par,
"[t]he application of Article 2230 of the Civil Code strictissimi juris in such cases, as in the
present one, defeats the underlying public policy behind the award of exemplary damages—
to set a public example or correction for the public good."57 (Emphasis supplied.)1avvphi1
In this case, the brutal manner by which appellant carried out his lustful design against his
niece-in-law who never had an inkling that her own uncle would do any harm to her and her
friend, justified the award of exemplary damages. Appellant’s sudden and fierce attack on
AAA -- hitting her several times on the head with a lead pipe before stabbing her face until
15
she fell down, hurriedly lifting her bra and blouse and pulling down her undergarments,
raping her while she was in such a defenseless position, covering her body with grasses and
abandoning her to die in a grassy field -- was truly despicable and outrageous. Such vicious
assault was made even more reprehensible as it also victimized Jennifer, who sustained more
stab wounds and beatings, causing her violent death. Article 2229 of the Civil Code allows the
award of exemplary damages in order to deter the commission of similar acts and to allow
the courts to forestall behavior that would pose grave and deleterious consequences to
society.58 In line with current jurisprudence, the amount of ₱30,000 each for AAA and the
heirs of Jennifer as exemplary damages was correctly awarded by the trial court.
We also affirm the trial court and CA in ordering appellant to pay the heirs of Jennifer
Patawaran-Rosal the amounts of ₱50,000 as moral damages. In cases of murder and
homicide, the award of moral damages is mandatory, without need of allegation and proof
other than the death of the victim.59 Anent the award of civil indemnity, the same is
increased to ₱75,000 to conform with recent jurisprudence. 60 As to expenses incurred for the
funeral and burial of Jennifer, the CA correctly awarded her heirs the amount of ₱25,000 as
actual damages, said amount having been stipulated by the parties during the trial.
Lastly, we affirm the award of ₱50,000 to AAA as civil indemnity for the crime of rape, as well
as the award of ₱50,000 as moral damages. Civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a
finding of the fact of rape while moral damages are awarded upon such finding without need
of further proof, because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries
entitling the victim to such award.61
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The March 21, 2007 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00234 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-
appellant Conrado Laog y Ramin is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape
With Homicide under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353,
and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuawithout eligibility for
parole.
Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal ₱75,000 as
civil indemnity ex delicto, ₱50,000 as moral damages, ₱25,000 as actual damages and
₱30,000 as exemplary damages. He is further ordered to pay to the victim AAA the sums of
₱50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, ₱50,000 as moral damages and ₱30,000 as exemplary
damages.
With costs against the accused-appellant. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 126368 September 14, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.

JOHNNY CALABROSO, SONNY BOY MATOS, RICHARD SATA and LEONARDO
DUMRIQUE, accused-appellants.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOHNNY CALABROSO, SONNY BOY MATOS, RICHARD SATA and LEONARDO DUMRIQUE were
charged with carnapping for taking away on 19 May 1994, in conspiracy with one another, a
TMX Honda motorized tricycle owned and driven by one Tranquilino Nacnac, with intent to
gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation.1 They were also charged with robbery
with homicide for taking away on the same day ₱400.00 belonging to Nacnac, again in
conspiracy with one another, also with intent to gain and by means of violence and
intimidation; and, on the occasion and by reason thereof, inflicted upon Nacnac multiple stab
wounds on different parts of his body which directly caused his death.2
On 15 March 1996 the trial court found all four (4) accused guilty of carnapping and
sentenced them to life imprisonment, to pay the costs, and required the police of Roxas,
Isabela, to return the tricycle to the widow of Nacnac. As regards the charge of robbery with
homicide, only Johnny Calabroso and Leonardo Dumrique were found guilty thereof for
which they were sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Nacnac in the
amount of ₱50,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs. The court acquitted accused Richard Sata and Sonny Boy Matos.3
The factual backdrop: Danilo Cerveza was lining up his tricycle at the waiting lane in Centro,
Barangay Nuesa, Roxas, Isabela, at about six o'clock in the evening of 19 May 1994. Four (4)
men, later identified as Johnny Calabroso, Sonny Boy Matos, Richard Sata and Leonardo
Dumrique, ages eighteen (18) to twenty-one (21), boarded Cerveza's tricycle and asked him
to take them to Gabit, Barangay Nuesa, Roxas, Isabela. They offered him ₱35.00 for their fare
but he wanted ₱40.00. Since they could not agree, the men alighted and proceeded
westward. Some thirty (30) meters away they flagged down another tricycle. It was driven by
Tranquilino Nacnac, Cerveza's compadre. Nacnac agreed to transport them to their
destination.
The following morning, Nacnac was found dead in Gabit, Barangay Nuesa. He bore twenty-
two (22) stab wounds on the head, torso and upper limbs.4
The police authorities of Kiangan, Ifugao, received a report that same morning that the
sidecar of a motorcycle was spotted at the bottom of a ten (10) to fifteen (15) - meter deep
ravine. They retrieved the sidecar. It was splattered with dried blood. A wallet containing a
driver's license, an ID picture and a certificate of registration of the tricycle belonging to
Tranquilino Nacnac were found therein. In the ensuing investigation, the police learned that
a tricycle was seen parked the previous day at a certain house in the neighborhood. When
Police Inspector Antonio Malingan visited the house he was informed that the owner had
four (4) visitors the night before, or 19 May 1994, one of whom was his former houseboy,
Sonny Boy Matos, who came in a motorized tricycle. He also told Malingan that shortly
thereafter the three (3) companions of Matos went away on board the motorcycle, at that
16
time already stripped of its sidecar, while Matos stayed behind. Malingan then took Matos to
the police station for investigation where he revealed that his three (3) companions went to
Nueva Vizcaya to dispose of the motorcycle but promised to come back for him. Malingan
sent two (2) of his men to Nueva Vizcaya. The two (2) however failed to find there the
companions of Matos, so the police decided to wait instead for their return.
Two (2) days later, Calabroso, Sata and Dumrique returned to Kiangan with the motorcycle,
so the authorities invited them to the police station for investigation. Thereafter, the four (4)
suspects, with the tricycle and the wallet of Nacnac, were turned over to the Roxas police,
Isabela.
From the suspects it was gathered that at six-thirty in the evening of 19 May 1994 they
boarded a tricycle driven by Nacnac to attend a dance party in Gabit. When they reached the
place, Dumrique tendered ₱12.00 since he knew that the regular fare was ₱3.00/head. But
Nacnac demanded ₱40.00. Dumrique refused to pay, so Nacnac boxed him five (5) times on
the neck which caused him to fall to the ground. Matos pacified them but Nacnac
simultaneously drew a veinte nueve5 from his waist. Dumrique, who was still lying prostrate
on the ground, saw Nacnac near his feet. Taking advantage of the situation to disable
Nacnac, Dumrique kicked him at his sex organ. Nacnac doubled up in pain. Calabroso then
grabbed the knife from Nacnac. When Calabroso was about to step backwards, Nacnac held
his right elbow, so Calabroso stabbed Nacnac. For his part, Matos tried to stop Calabroso but
the latter kept on swinging the knife. Sata, seated inside the tricycle, was stunned. Dumrique
was not able to do anything because he was still reeling from the punches he received from
Nacnac. Thereafter, Dumrique started the engine of the tricycle while Calabroso pulled
Matos and joined Sata inside the tricycle. All four (4) companions fled to Kiangan, Ifugao,
leaving the bloodied Nacnac behind.
The trial court appreciated the presence of conspiracy among the four (4) accused in taking
away the tricycle of Nacnac as aptly demonstrated by them when they all boarded the same
tricycle and sped away from the crime scene.
As to the charge of robbery with homicide, the trial court ruled that the claim that the victim
was robbed of his money was not duly established, but was nonetheless convinced that
Calabroso and Dumrique were responsible for his death. The court ratiocinated that since it
was already nighttime, Nacnac was justified in asking ₱40.00 from the four (4) passengers; in
fact, it was the amount previously demanded by Cerveza. It further reasoned out that
Dumrique started the fight by refusing to pay the amount demanded by Nacnac while
Calabroso had no compelling reason to stab Nacnac, repeatedly at that, considering that the
latter had already been reportedly disarmed and was in fact alone. Nevertheless, the lower
court convicted Calabroso and Dumrique of robbery with homicide, instead of homicide
alone, and exonerated Sata and Matos since it was its finding that Sata did not participate in
the fight while Matos only attempted to pacify the protagonists.
Accused-appellants Calabroso and Dumrique argue that the trial court erred in convicting
them of robbery with homicide since its discussion was clear that the prosecution failed to

establish the robbery; besides, Dumrique did not participate in stabbing Nacnac while
Calabroso acted in incomplete self-defense and in defense of his friends when he stabbed
Nacnac even as he admitted that reasonable means to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression by Nacnac was wanting. Accused-appellants also submit that the trial court erred
in awarding an indemnity of ₱50,000.00 because it was exorbitant and devoid of legal basis.
At the outset we must stress that the trial court was categorical in its finding that "[n]obody
declared that the victim was robbed of anything."6 Yet it convicted Calabroso and Dumrique
of robbery with homicide. This is glaring error. Where a complex crime is charged and the
evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the component offenses, the defendant can
be convicted only of the offense proved.7 To be specific, absent any evidence that the
accused indeed robbed the victim the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
cannot stand.8 Having ruled out robbery for want of evidence and satisfied of the equal
liability of Calabroso and Dumrique for the death of Nacnac, the trial court should have
convicted them only of homicide.
Where the accused invokes self-defense, as Calabroso does, it is incumbent upon him to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself.9 There are
three (3) requisites to prove the claim of self-defense under Art. 11, par. 1, of the Revised
Penal Code, namely, (a) unlawful aggression; (b) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and, (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself. In the same manner, an accused who invokes defense of a
stranger pursuant to Art. 11, par. 3, of the same Code, has the burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence the exculpatory cause that would save him from conviction.10 The first
two (2) requisites of self-defense should also be present in defense of a stranger. A third
requisite is that the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment or other evil
motive.11
The defense narrated that Nacnac and Dumrique continuously argued over the tricycle fare
from Centro to Gabit. Nacnac insisted on ₱40.00 but Dumrique believed it should only be
₱12.00 at ₱3.00/person. Their verbal clash escalated into a full blown fight. Nacnac initiated
the blows which landed on the neck of Dumrique. As a consequence, Dumrique fell down.
Matos pacified them but Nacnac simultaneously drew a veinte nueve from his waist and
nicked the left wrist of Matos. Still lying on the ground, Dumrique saw Nacnac standing near
his feet. Dumrique aimed at the sex organ of Nacnac and kicked it. Nacnac grimaced in pain
and bent his body. While Nacnac was in this position and about to stab Dumrique, Calabroso
grabbed the knife. Calabroso was about to step backward when his right elbow was caught
by Nacnac so Calabroso stabbed Nacnac in self-defense.
As the trial court opined, Nacnac was right in charging ₱40.00 since it was already nighttime
and this was the same amount earlier demanded by Cerveza when accused-appellants
offered to hire his tricycle. Dumrique drew the ire of Nacnac when he refused to pay the
higher fare. The trial court thus concluded that Nacnac was not an unlawful aggressor.
17
We share the view of the trial court although our reasoning springs from a different
perspective. Dumrique claimed there was no understanding with Nacnac as to the fare. He
merely assumed that Nacnac would be charging the regular fare of ₱3.00 per
passenger,12 implying that they readily rode in the tricycle without bothering to inquire about
the fare. This claim is hard to believe. According to Cerveza, accused-appellants offered him
₱35.00 for their tricycle fare but he turned it down because he wanted ₱40.00; thereafter
they flagged down the tricycle of Nacnac. The trial court assessed the testimony of Cerveza
to be credible, and we find no cogent reason to believe otherwise because no material fact
appears to have been overlooked nor was any palpable error committed in the
process.13 What was more in accord with the natural course of events was that accused-
appellants must have also offered to pay Nacnac ₱35.00 but Nacnac likewise demanded
₱40.00. Considering that they boarded the tricycle of Nacnac they must have accepted his
counter-offer. However, upon reaching their destination, Dumrique presumably reneged on
their agreement and insisted instead on paying only ₱12.00.
The ₱28.00 - difference to some may be just a drop in the bucket. But to a tricycle driver
every centavo counts.1âwphi1 The circumstance that Nacnac boxed Dumrique on the neck,
when taken by itself, may appear to be a sufficient provocation. But it should not be taken in
isolation from the other antecedents. All significant details must be pieced together to
complete the scenario which was immediately preceeded by the denial of accused-appellants
to pay the agreed fare. If indeed Nacnac struck the first blows, it could have only been
provoked by their reneging on their undertaking. Thus, the initial blows delivered by Nacnac
could hardly be treated as the unlawful aggression contemplated in the law as an element of
self-defense.14
Calabroso also made it appear that Nacnac was the unlawful aggressor when the latter
allegedly held his right elbow when he was about to step back. But this version of Calabroso
is at best self-serving. For, not even one (1) of his co-accused corroborated his version. On
the contrary, Dumrique,15 Sata16 and Matos17 were one in their narration that when Nacnac
was in a bent position Calabroso grabbed Nacnac's knife and stabbed him several times. It
also surfaced from the evidence that Matos tried to stop Calabroso but the latter was beyond
control. Self-defense to be successfully invoked must be established with certainty and
proved with sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of
criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it. It may not be justifiably entertained
when it is uncorroborated by separate competent evidence.18
Assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression by Nacnac against Dumrique, it
ceased to exist after Nacnac was disarmed by Calabroso. By then, there was nothing else to
prevent or repel.19 Again assuming that unlawful aggression originated from Nacnac, but this
time against Calabroso, the means Calabroso employed, as he himself admitted, was
unreasonable. The examining physician found that twenty-two (22) stab wounds were
inflicted on Nacnac, nine (9) on the chest, ten (10) above the right nipple and three (3) lateral
to the nipple.20 The location, number and severity of the wounds obviously belie the claim of
self-defense.21 Moreover, Calabroso did not raise self-defense, nor even hint at it, when
apprehended by the police. A protestation of innocence or justification could have been the

logical and spontaneous reaction of a man who finds himself in such an inculpatory
predicament.22Hence, thre can be no other conclusion than that Calabroso is liable for
homicide for the death of Tranquilino Nacnac.
The charge against Dumrique should be treated differently. While Dumrique was lying on the
ground, Nacnac was beside his feet attacking Matos with a knife. Dumrique saw this as an
opportunity to neutralize Nacnac; so he kicked the latter's groin. The evidence clearly
disclosed that the intention of Dumrique was merely to disable Nacnac, not to kill him, and
his attack was confined only to that. Dumrique did not actively participate in killing Nacnac
nor did he join in any other manner to further the objective of Calabroso.23 Conspiracy, which
exists when two (2) or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
the felony and decide to commit it,24 was not established between Dumrique and Calabroso.
The trial court, while ruling out conspiracy between the two (2) in the killing of Nacnac,
erroneously held that Dumrique was equally responsible with Calabroso for the victim's
death; hence, Dumrique must be acquitted.
Accused-appellants assail the trial court for concluding that they conspired in carnapping the
tricycle of Tranquilino Nacnac. They assert that their individual participations were distinct
from each other's, i.e., Sata was seated quietly inside the tricycle; Matos was merely pulled
into the tricycle by Calabroso; Dumrique drove the vehicle, while Calabroso was only a
passenger. Moreover, they allege that they used the tricycle only as a getaway vehicle,
without intent to gain, for when they reached Kiangan the following morning they intended
to surrender it, as they did, to the police. Lastly, they argue that the trial court erred in
imposing life imprisonment because such penalty is no longer provided in Sec. 14 of RA 6539
as amended.
Carnapping is defined in Sec. 2, par. 2, RA 6539, as the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor
vehicle belonging to another without the latter’s consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons or by using force upon things. The elements of carnapping therefore
are: (a) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another; (b) the taking is without the
consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using
force upon things; and, (c) the taking is done with intent to gain.
As mentioned earlier, the trial court was of the view that when accused-appellants fled the
crime scene on board the tricycle conspiracy was established. We agree. All the elements of
carnapping were present in the instant case. After Nacnac was fatally stabbed Dumrique
started the engine of the tricycle, while Calabroso dragged Matos into the tricycle to join Sata
who was already seated inside. They fled to Kiangan, Ifugao. Intent to gain is presumed when
one takes a property belonging to another against his will.25 The following morning of the
incident, the police retrieved from a ravine the sidecar of the motorcycle belonging to
Nacnac. Police Inspector Malingan gathered from his investigation that upon reaching
Kiangan, the group proceeded to the house of the former employer of Matos. After a while,
Matos was left behind while his three (3) companions went to Nueva Vizcaya to dispose of
the motorcycle. They promised to fetch Matos afterwards. When the three (3) returned two
(2) days later, the motorcycle was still in their possession. They were invited for questioning
18
by the policemen. The intent to gain became an established fact when accused-appellants
remained in possession of the motorcycle even after the lapse of two (2) days from the
commission of the crime. Given the choice between their gratuitous claim that they utilized
the vehicle only as a means of escape and surrendered it to the police upon reaching Kiangan
the following morning, and that of the police, we sustain the latter. When police officers
have no motive for testifying falsely against the accused, as Inspector Malingan and members
of his team were not so falsely motivated, courts will uphold the presumption of regularity in
the performance of their duties.26
To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to
have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy. That overt act
may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or moral
assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the time of the commission of the crime
or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators moving them to execute or
implement the conspiracy.27 When Calabroso, Matos and Dumrique joined Sata inside the
tricycle and fled towards Kiangan after Nacnac was stabbed they performed well-coordinated
acts indicating a common purpose to steal the vehicle.28 Conspiracy is also inferred not only
from their conduct before and during the commission of the crime but also thereafter,
showing that they acted in unison with each other.29 Calabroso, Dumrique and Sata
proceeded to Nueva Vizcaya to dispose of the motorcycle. Matos stayed behind as his
companions promised to pick him up later. As promised, they returned to Kiangan still with
the vehicle. Conspiracy having been proven, accused-appellants are equally liable for
carnapping the tricycle of Nacnac.30
The penalty for carnapping is provided in Sec. 14 of RA 6539 as amended by Sec. 20 of RA
7659 - 31
Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. - Any person who is found guilty of carnapping x x x x shall,
irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not
less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four
months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or
force upon things, and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months
and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence
against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof.
Prior to the amendment of Sec. 14 abovequoted, the last clause of its original version read:
"x x x and the penalty of life imprisonment to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver
or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed in the commission of the carnapping." In still
imposing the penalty of life imprisonment on accused-appellants, the trial court clearly
overlooked the 1993 amendment of Sec. 14.

The theory of the Solicitor General is that the killing of Nacnac is deemed absorbed in the
"graver offense of qualified carnapping or carnapping in an aggravated from." The
carnapping and killing can be considered as a "single or indivisible crime" or "a special
complex crime" which is not covered by Art. 48 of the Penal Code.32 Hence, accused-
appellants Dumrique and Calabroso should be held liable for qualified carnapping and
penalized with reclusion perpetua.
We disagree. The taking away of the tricycle of Nacnac followed the killing apparently as an
afterthought of accused-appellants.1âwphi1 In fact, their original design was not to commit
any crime but to attend a dance party. There is no direct relation, a causal connection,
between the carnapping and the killing, i.e., whether the killing be prior or subsequent to the
carnapping, or whether both crimes be committed at the same time.33 Therefore, the penalty
applicable is imprisonment of not less than fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and not
more than seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, since the carnapping was committed
without violence or intimidation of persons or force upon things. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the Court may impose upon accused-appellants a prison term of fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and ten (10) days as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, four (4) months
and twenty (20) days as maximum.
As regards the homicide of which we find accused-appellant Johnny Calabroso guilty, the
imposable penalty under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal the range
of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) one day to twenty (20) years. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court may impose upon accused-appellant a prison term of
eight (8) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium as
maximum.34
The award by the trial court of ₱50,000.00 in favor of the heirs of the victim without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency was properly granted. When death occurs as a
result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to such amount as indemnity for the
death without need of any evidence or proof of damages.35
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from finding accused-appellants Johnny Calabroso,
Sonny Boy Matos, Richard Sata and Leonardo Dumrique guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
carnapping is AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATION that the indeterminate prison term
imposed is fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and ten (10) days as minimum, to fifteen
(15) years, four (4) months and twenty (20) days as maximum.
The conviction for robbery with homicide of Johnny Calabroso and Leonardo Dumrique is SET
ASIDE. We find Calabroso alone guilty of homicide and impose upon him an indeterminate
prison term of eight (8) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion
temporal medium as maximum. In addition, he is ordered to pay death indemnity to the
heirs of Tranquilino Nacnac in the amount of ₱50,000.00. Dumrique is ACQUITTED for failure
19
of the prosecution to present the quantum of proof mandated by law to establish conspiracy
in the killing of Tranquilino Nacnac. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 138874-75 January 31, 2006
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias "PACO;" JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias
"WESLEY;" ALBERT CAÑO alias "ALLAN PAHAK;" ARIEL BALANSAG; DAVIDSON VALIENTE
RUSIA alias 'TISOY TAGALOG;" JAMES ANTHONY UY alias "WANGWANG;" and JAMES
ANDREW UY alias "MM," Appellants.
PER CURIAM:
Most jurisdictions recognize age as a barrier to having full responsibility over one’s
action.1 Our legal system, for instance, does not punish a youth as it would an adult, and it
sees youthful misconduct as evidence of unreasoned or impaired judgment. Thus, in a myriad
of cases, we have applied the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority embodied in
Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code -- the rationale of which is to show mercy and some
extent of leniency in favor of an accused who, by reason of his age, is presumed to have
acted with less discernment. The case at bar is another instance when the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority must apply.
For our resolution is the motion for reconsideration2 filed by brothers James Anthony and
James Andrew, both surnamed Uy, praying for the reduction of the penalties we imposed
upon the latter on the ground that he was a minor at the time the crimes were committed.
A brief review of the pertinent facts is imperative.
On February 3, 2004, we rendered a Decision3 convicting the Uy brothers, together with
Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño and Ariel Balansag of
the crimes of (a) special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape; and (b) simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City in Criminal Cases
Nos. CBU 45303 and 45304 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias
‘PACO;’ JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias ‘WESLEY;’ ALBERTO CAÑO alias
‘ALLAN PAHAK;’ ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias ‘MM,’ are found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention with homicide and rape and are sentenced to suffer the
penalty of DEATH by lethal injection;

(2) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias
‘PACO’; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias ‘WESLEY;’ ALBERTO CAÑO alias
‘ALLAN PAHAK;’ ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias ‘MM,’ are found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention
and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA;
(3) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellant JAMES ANTHONY UY who was a
minor at the time the crime was committed, is likewise found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with homicide and rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA; in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, he is declared guilty of
simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of TWELVE (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period,
as MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period,
asMAXIMUM;
(4) Appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Marijoy and
Jacqueline, in each case, the amounts of (a) ₱100,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (b) ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages; (c) ₱150,000.00 as moral
damages; and (d) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Three (3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is unconstitutional insofar
as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that
the law is constitutional and the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
In accordance with Article 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of RA No.
7659, upon the finality of this Decision let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to
the Office of the President for the possible exercise of Her Excellency’s pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
On March 23, 2004, the Uy brothers filed a motion for reconsideration anchored on the
following grounds:
I Consequently, the Solicitor General recommended that the penalty imposed on James
ACCUSED JAMES ANDREW S. UY WAS, LIKE HIS YOUNGER BROTHER JAMES ANTHONY S.
UY, A MINOR AT THE TIME THE OFFENSES AT BAR ALLEGEDLY HAPPENED LAST JULY 16,
1997;
II
20
THE IDENTITY OF THE DEAD BODY OF THE WOMAN FOUND IN TAN-AWAN, CARCAR, CEBU
LAST JULY 18, 1997 WAS NEVER CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED THUS THE NEED FOR ITS
EXHUMATION FOR DNA TESTING.4
The issues raised in the above motion being intertwined with those raised by Larrañaga,
Aznar, Adlawan, Caño and Balansag in their separate motions for reconsideration, we
deemed it appropriate to consolidate the motions. After a painstaking evaluation of every
piece and specie of evidence presented before the trial court in response to the movants’
plea for the reversal of their conviction, still we are convinced that the movants’ guilt has
been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, in our Resolution dated July 21, 2005, we
denied all the motions. However, left unresolved is the issue of James Andrew’s minority.
Hence, this disquisition.
In their motion, the Uy brothers claim that James Andrew was only seventeen (17) years and
two hundred sixty two (262) days old at the time the crimes were committed. To
substantiate such claim, he begs leave and pleads that we admit at this stage of the
proceedings his (1) Certificate of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office, and (2)
Baptismal Certificate. In the ultimate, he prays that his penalty be reduced, as in the case of
his brother James Anthony.
Considering that the entry of James Andrew’s birth in the proffered Certificate of Live Birth is
not legible, we required the Solicitor General (a) to secure from the City Civil Registrar of
Cotobato, as well as the National Statistics Office, a clear and legible copy of James’
Certificate of Live Birth, and thereafter, (b) to file an extensive comment on the Uy brothers’
motion, solely on the issue of James Andrew’s minority.
On November 17, 2005, the Solicitor General submitted his comment.1âwphi1 Attached
therewith are clear and legible copies of James’ Certificate of Live Birth duly certified by the
Office of the City Civil Registrar of Cotobato and the National Statistics Office. Both
documents bear the entry October 27, 1979 as the date of his birth, thus, showing that he
was indeed only 17 years and 262 days old when the crimes were committed on July 16,
1997.
Andrew be modified as follows:
In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303 for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with homicide and rape, the death penalty should be reduced to reclusion
perpetua.
In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, for the crime of simple kidnapping and serious illegal
detention, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be reduced to twelve (12) years of
prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion

temporal in its medium period, as maximum, similar to the penalty imposed on his brother
James Anthony in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303.
The motion is meritorious.
Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 68. – Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. – When the
offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of
the paragraph next to the last of article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:
xxx
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than
that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.
Thus, the imposable penalty on James Andrew, by reason of his minority, is one degree lower
than the statutory penalty. The penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention with homicide and rape, being death, one degree lower therefrom
is reclusion perpetua.5 On the other hand, the penalty for simple kidnapping and serious
illegal detention is reclusion perpetua to death. One degree lower therefrom is reclusion
temporal.6 There being no aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be
imposed on James Andrew is reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12)
years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years
of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.7
Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be
imposed upon James Andrew; while in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, the imposable penalty
upon him is twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. Our Decision dated
February 3, 2004 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303,
James Andrew Uy is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; while in Criminal
Case No. CBU-45304, the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum
period, as MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 116239 November 29, 2000
21
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELPIDIO MERCADO y HERNANDO and AURELIO ACEBRON y ADORA, accused-appellants.
PER CURIAM:
For automatic review by the court is the decision,1 dated July 22, 1994, of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 156, Pasig, convicting accused-appellants SPO2 Elpidio Mercado y Hernando
and SPO1 Aurelio Acebron y Adora, of the Philippine National Police of Tanay, Rizal, of
kidnapping with murder and sentencing them as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing discussions and finding the guilt of both accused
to be proven beyond reasonable doubt, while the undersigned Presiding Judge does not
believe in the imposition of the death penalty as a form of punishment, nevertheless, in
obedience to the law which is his duty to uphold, the Court hereby sentences both accused,
ELPIDIO MERCADO y HERNANDO and AURELIO ACEBRON y ADORA, to death, to
proportionately indemnify the heirs of the deceased Richard Buama in the sum of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00); to pay the sum of fifty two thousand six hundred eighty pesos
(P52,680.00) (Exhibit ‘J’, ‘J-1’ to ‘J-7’) as expenses incident to the burial; and the further sum
of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) by way of moral and exemplary damages, all
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
"Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of both accused from the Pasig
Municipal Jail to the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
"Let the records of this case be forwarded immediately to the Supreme Court for mandatory
review.
"SO ORDERED."2
The information against accused-appellants charged-
"That on or about the 9th day of February, 1994, in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being them members of the PNP, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping and aiding one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
kidnap one Richard Buama, a 17 year old minor and boarded him in a Red car bearing License
plate No. CGZ 835 against his will thus depriving him of his freedom of liberty (sic), brought
him to Tanay, Rizal in a safe house and there subjected him to extreme/brutal physical
violence, and thereafter with abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation hacked
and bludgeoned/clubbed said Richard Buama who thereby sustained mortal wounds which
directly caused his death.
"Contrary to law."3

Because of the gravity of the charge, no bail was recommended for the provisional release of
accused-appellants.
When arraigned on March 8, 1994, both accused-appellants, assisted by counsel,4 pleaded
not guilty to the crime charged. During the trial, the prosecution presented the following
witnesses: Florencio Villareal, Eric Ona, SPO2 Virgilio Buama, Maria Buama, Lourdes Vergara,
SPO2 Delfin Gruta, SPO2 James Mabalot, Jesus Nieves Vergara, and Lupito Buama. Their
testimonies are as follows:
Twelve-year-old Florencio Villareal testified that at around 9 o’clock in the evening of
February 9, 1994, he and Richard Buama were picked up by accused-appellant Elpidio
Mercado near Mercado’s house in Sto. Tomas, Bukid, Pasig, Metro Manila. Mercado arrived
in a car, together with Eric Ona. Mercado suspected Florencio Villareal and Richard Buama of
being the ones who had broken into his store and stolen money. Florencio’s friend, Rex
Bugayong, was able to run from Mercado. Florencio and Richard were pushed into Mercado’s
car. Florencio said Mercado poked a gun at Richard which made the latter say, "Sasama na
lang po ako. Wag ninyo lang po akong sasaktan." ("I will go with you. Just don’t hurt me.")
Mercado drove the car to Tanay, Rizal. Florencio and Richard were seated at the back, behind
Mercado and Eric, respectively. Upon reaching Tanay at around 11 o’clock in the evening
Mercado took the three of them (Florencio, Richard, and Eric) to an apartment. Florencio was
led inside the apartment while Richard was held outside by Mercado. When Florencio looked
through the window, he saw Mercado slap and box Richard. Then he was brought inside.
Mercado later went upstairs. According to Florencio, Richard asked if they could leave the
place as he held his stomach in pain, but Florencio replied that the door was padlocked.
Eventually, Mercado came down with Acebron.
Richard was made to sit on the floor in the kitchen of the apartment. Mercado then told
Aceborn that the had brought him a present ("pasalubong") and that they were going to kill
two boys – a small one and a big one who was dark. In reply, Aceborn said, "Pare, huwag
yung maliit dahil kasing hawig ng anak ko, saka magbe-birthday pa kinabukasan." ("Buddy,
not the small one because he resembles my son who will celebrate his birthday tomorrow.")
As the conversation was made within his hearing distance, Richard became so scared that he
could not answer when asked by Acebron about a girl’s picture found in his wallet. This
angered Acebron who boxed Richard’s in the stomach.
Mercado thereafter ordered Richard to take off all his clothes and lie face down on the
kitchen floor. Mercado asked his aide Jeff to get a rope. Jeff brought a piece of rattan rope
and tied Richard’s hands, while Mercado tied Richard’s feet. This happened at about 11:30 in
the evening. Mercado also ordered Jeff to get rags with which to blindfold and gag Richard
and then asked Acebron to get a bolo or a big knife. After getting a bolo, Acebron and Jeff
put Richard into the luggage compartment of Mercado's car. They then drove away, leaving
behind Florencio and Eric in the apartment. After two hours, Mercado and Acebron came
back. Florencio saw Acebron washing the bloodstains off the bolo. He asked Mercado where
22
Richard was, to which Mercado replied, "Wala na. Pinatahimik ko na." ("Gone. I have already
silenced him.")
Mercado and Acebron then took Eric and Florencio to a beerhouse in Tanay, Rizal and
warned them not to tell anyone about the incident or they and their families would be killed.
For fear of his life and that of his family, Florencio promised he would not. From the
beerhouse, Mercado drove to Acebron's apartment, where the latter was dropped off, and
then proceeded home to Pasig with Eric and Florencio.
Florencio waited three days for news about Richard. On February 12, 1994, with still no news
about Richard, Florencio decided to talk to Richard's sister, a flower vendor whose store was
located near the Pasig Church. Florencio told her to look for Richard in Tanay; he even
promised to help them once they found him. Actually, it was Richard's brother, Virgilio
Buama, a policeman, who found Richard's body in a morgue in Morong, Rizal. He was told by
a funeral parlor employee that they had retrieved Richard's body near the boundary of
Laguna. Florencio attended the wake of his friend in Sto. Tomas, Pasig.5
Virgilio Buama, a policeman and brother of Richard, last saw the latter on December 25,
1993 as Richard lived with their mother. On February 11, 1994, Virgilio learned from his
sister, Maria Buama, that Richard had been picked up by a policeman on February 9, 1994.
Hence, he went to see Florencio Villareal, who related to him how Richard had been
kidnapped and killed by Mercado. Virgilio took Florencio to his house, and the following day,
February 12, 1994, they went to the PNP headquarters at Hilltop, Taytay, Rizal, where
Florencio was shown pictures by Maj. Patricio Abenido. Florencio picked out pictures of
Mercado and Acebron and identified them as the culprits in the killing of Richard. Florencio
gave a sworn statement concerning the incident to SPO2 James Mabalot at the PNP
headquarters. Mercado was thereafter ordered to report to the Provincial Director, Col.
Maralit, and it was there that Florencio pointed to Mercado as the person who had
kidnapped and killed Richard. Acebron was likewise called, and he and Mercado were
detained at the Rizal PNP Command Stockade.
Virgilio found Richard's body at the San Francisco Funeral Homes in Morong, Rizal. The
owner/manager of the funeral parlor told him that Richard's body had been recovered in
Mabitac, Laguna. Virgilio brought the remains of his brother home.6
Eric Matanggihan Ona, 21 years old, was in the house of his neighbor Coco San Juan, in Sto.
Tomas, Pasig, Metro Manila, at around 9 o'clock in the evening of February 9, 1994 when
Mercado arrived and asked him to go with him, after Mercado had asked Eric's father for
permission to do so. Along the way, Eric asked Mercado where they were going, and the
latter said that they would look for "Bunso" (Florencio Villareal's nickname) who had stolen
money from his video machines. Eric went with Mercado in the latter's car.
Florencio voluntarily went with them when Eric and Mercado saw him. Later, they saw
Richard and Rex Bugayong seated on the street gutter. When the two saw the car stop, Rex
stood up and ran away. Mercado told Eric to go after Rex, but Eric refused to do so because

Rex was his friend. Mercado was able to get Richard. Mercado placed his arm around
Richard's shoulders while his other hand poked a gun at Richard's side. Eric heard Richard
pleading with Mercado not to hurt him and saying that he would go with him. Eric knew that
Mercado poked a gun at Richard because the latter was Mercado's suspect in the robbery of
his store. He heard Mercado ask, "Eric, bakit naman pinasok nina Richard Buama at Florencio
Villareal ang tindahan ko?" ("Eric, why did Richard Buama and Florencio Villareal break into
my store?") He answered that he did not know anything about it. Then, Mercado told Richard
and Florencio, "Nagkamali kayo ng tinalo. Isang napakalaking bangungot ang ginawa
ninyo." ("You picked on the wrong guy. What you have done is a big nightmare.") According
to Eric, they then boarded Mercado's car. Along the way, Eric asked Mercado where they
were going, to which Mercado replied, "Sa Tanay. Have you been there?" Mercado asked
Richard how many they were in the family, to which Richard replied that they were ten and
that one of his brothers was "one of them." ("Kabaro ninyo.") Mercado also asked them
when their birthdays were and whether they would like to have another birthday.
Upon reaching Tanay, they were brought to an apartment. There Mercado hit Richard on the
face and told him to take off his clothes. Mercado then went upstairs to wake up Acebron.
Acebron tried to talk to Richard, but the latter would not speak. This so angered Acebron that
he boxed Richard hard on the stomach. Mercado then asked his aide named Jeff to tie
Richard's hands and feet and to blindfold and gag him. This done, Acebron and Jeff loaded
Richard into the luggage compartment of the car. Eric described Richard as
pale ("maputla"). He had hematoma on his stomach and a swollen right cheek that was
blackish in color. Eric saw Acebron get a bolo from the kitchen, a long one, "mapurol" ("dull
and not sharp"), and with a black handle. Fearing for his safety, Eric kept quiet. Mercado
warned them not to tell anybody about the incident; otherwise, they would be killed.
After two hours, Mercado and Acebron returned to the apartment without Richard. Eric saw
the bolo with bloodstains. He asked Mercado, "Tata Pedi, where is Richard?" Mercado
answered, "Wala na, pinagpahinga ko na." ("He is gone. I have laid him to rest.")
At around 4 o'clock in the morning, they went to the nearby "Space" beerhouse in Tanay,
Rizal where they were made to drink. It was there that Eric heard Mercado and Acebron's
conversation. Mercado asked, "Pare, ilan na ba ang napatay mo?" ("How many have you
killed?") Acebron said, "Ako, labimpito." ("Me, 17.") Mercado countered, "Pare, ako
dalawampu't lima." ("Buddy, me, 25.") Acebron said Richard was the 17th person he had
killed while Mercado said that Richard was his 25th victim.
Thereafter, with Eric and Florencio in tow, Mercado brought Acebron back to the apartment
and they then went home to Pasig in Mercado's car. They reached Sto. Tomas, Pasig at
around 5:30 in the morning. Mercado again warned them: "Eric, Bunso, yung sinabi ko, ha."
("Eric, Bunso, don't forget what I told you.") Eric took that to mean that they should not tell
anyone about the incident; otherwise, something bad would happen to them. Hence,
hounded by fear, Eric did not report the matter to the police. He also did not know that
Richard had been killed. He said if he had known that Richard was already dead when
Mercado brought him home, he would have reported the matter to police authorities.
23
Richard's brothers and sisters searched for him the following day, but Eric, fearing for his life,
did not talk to them. It was only when he saw the wake being held for Richard at the Sto.
Tomas Chapel that Eric realized that Richard was dead. After Richard's wake, Mercado told
Eric to look for Florencio lest the latter talk about the incident. Eric did not obey Mercado.
When Mercado asked him if he had seen Florencio, Eric said he had not. Thereafter,
someone from the PNP headquarters in Hilltop picked him up. At the investigation
conducted, Eric executed a sworn statement.7
The sisters Maria Buama and Lourdes Buama Vergara testified that Richard was informally
adopted by the Buama family. When Richard was six months old, his mother gave him to
Maria at the Pasig Immaculate Conception Church on June 18, 1977. They considered Richard
as their own brother and a member of their family. It was Florencio who informed them that
Mercado had picked him up and Richard on February 9, 1994. In the evening of February 11,
1994, upon learning about the incident, Maria and Lourdes went to Mercado's
house cum store in Sto. Tomas, Pasig where Richard used to play video machines. Mercado's
wife told them that Richard no longer came to the video store as he had done something
wrong. Asked what it was that Richard had done, Mercado's wife failed to answer because
someone inside the store said, "Hinahanap si Richard ng mga kapatid niya." When asked why
his parents were not informed about Richard's alleged mischief, Mercado's wife allegedly
replied it was because their store had not yet been emptied. ("Hindi pa raw nauubos ang
tindahan nila.") Lourdes and Maria eventually found Richard's body in the early morning of
February 12, 1994. For the wake the Buama family held for Richard at the Chapel of Sto.
Tomas in Pasig and his funeral, they spent P52,680.00.8
SPO2 James Mabalot took the statements of Eric and Florencio. When the latter implicated
Mercado and Acebron, SPO2 Mabalot took the two boys to the Administrative Building. From
the pictures of almost all of the more than 100 members of the PNP Rizal, Eric and Florencio
picked those of Mercado and Acebron. The statements that Eric and Florencio executed were
signed in the presence of both SPO2 Mabalot and his superior. SPO2 Mabalot and his team
thereafter went to a funeral parlor in Morong, Rizal where they were told that Richard's body
had been taken to the PNP Crime Laboratory Services for autopsy. They learned that
Richard's body had been found at the boundary of Rizal and Laguna.
On the way to that site, SPO2 Mabalot and his team dropped by the Tanay Police Station to
coordinate with the Tanay police in the investigation of the case. When Florencio, who was
with them, saw Mercado's car parked outside the police station, he recognized it as the one
used in taking them from Pasig to Tanay. When SPO2 Mabalot and his team opened the car,
they found blood spots on the backseat. The car was then taken to the PNP Headquarters in
Hilltop, Taytay, Rizal for proper identification and examination of the bloodstains.
On orders of Col. Maralit, Mercado and Acebron were placed in detention. SPO2 Mabalot
wanted Florencio and Eric to confront Mercado and Acebron, but Florencio and Eric were so
scared to do so for fear that the accused might hurt them.9

Dr. Jesusa Nieves Vergara, Acting Chief of the Medico-legal Division of the PNP Crime
laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City, executed and signed the postmortem examination
report on Richard's body. Her report shows that the cadaver had previously been embalmed;
that there were two marks at the back of the left hand; that both hands were tied with
plastic cord while both feet were tied with rattan; and that it sustained nine injuries on the
head, neck, left upper extremity, and the left arm. There were abrasions, lacerations, and
stab wounds. The multiple abrasions on the forehead and the back of the left arm were
possibly secondary to a fall against a hard surface. The lacerations were on the lower jaw, on
the front right ear, at the right ear lobe, and two on the right side of the neck. These could
have been caused by a blunt object such as a piece of wood, an iron bar, a hollow block, or
anything hard. There were also injuries and other lacerations on the back of the head
towards the right side which could have been caused by the application of blunt force.
Opening of the head revealed hematoma or accumulation of blood. The medical report
stated that Richard died of "(i)ntracranial hemorrhage as a result of skull fracture."10
Accused-appellants' defense was alibi. SPO1 Miguel Catapusan, Administrative Officer of the
Tanay PNP Municipal Station, testified that accused-appellants both reported for work on
February 9, 1994 at the police station. The morning and evening Formation Sheets and the
Police Duty Roster Book or the logbook showed that accused-appellant Elpidio Mercado and
accused- appellant Aurelio Acebron were both present from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. However,
after signing the logbook in the morning, accused-appellants were told to report to the Rizal
PNP Headquarters Command between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. regarding some important
matters. After the head count that night, the Chief of Police briefed the policemen on their
assignments for thirty minutes, until 8:30 p.m.11
Testifying in his own defense, accused-appellant Elpidio Mercado said that before he joined
the PNP Tanay, Rizal, he was with the Philippine Navy since 1976. He was transferred to the
Philippine Coast Guard in 1981 where he served until 1986. When the EDSA Revolution broke
out, he was assigned to Malacañang as a member of the Presidential Security Group (PSG)
until 1991. His next assignment from 1991 to 1992 was at the Maritime Command, Anti-
smuggling Division. Thereafter, he was assigned to Task Force Habagat under Col. Panfilo
Lacson of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC). In 1993, he was assigned to the
PNP of Rizal. For his military and police services, Mercado claimed he received several
awards, commendations, and medals.12
On February 9, 1994, Mercado reported to the Tanay police station because Col. Maralit had
summoned him the night before. After signing the logbook, Mercado, together with Acebron
and one SPO4 Bias, asked permission from their superior officer to go to the PNP Hilltop
Headquarters for an investigation. They left the Tanay Police Station at 8:10 a.m. and
proceeded to the Hilltop Headquarters where they stayed until 5:00 p.m. They went back to
the Tanay Police Station to attend the evening formation that lasted up to 8:30 p.m.
Thereafter, Mercado went home with Acebron. They invited SPO4 Bias to have dinner with
them in their house at Plaza Aldea, Tanay. The house was provided to them by the local
government of Tanay, and they shared it with SPO2 Sagat and Chief Inspector Genabe. After
SPO4 Bias went home at 10 o'clock in the evening, Mercado went to bed. At around 7 o'clock
24
in the morning the following day, February 10, 1994, Acebron woke Mercado up as he
prepared to go to the office. Mercado told Acebron to inform his officer that he would not
attend the morning formation.
Mercado said he was married and that his wife stayed in their house in Sto. Tomas, Baltazar
St., Pasig, Metro Manila, to attend to their store and two video machines. He usually went
home every 15th and 30th of the month except when there were special occasions. He
owned a red Chevrolet car, but it was seized by the 221st Mobile Force on the ground that it
was used in a crime. Mercado claimed that the travel time from Pasig to Tanay was one-and-
a-half hours and if traffic was heavy, two hours.
Mercado denied the allegations against him. He claimed that Eric and Florencio implicated
them in the crime because of an incident on January 23, 1994 in which Eric created trouble in
his video machine shop. Mercado saw Eric strangling a kid. He was going to pacify Eric, but
the latter uttered bad words against him. So, he slapped Eric. The youngsters scampered, but
Acebron, who was visiting Mercado, was able to grab Florencio. Mercado hit Florencio on the
back of the head and told him not to show their faces anymore in his store because they
were driving away his customers. Since then, Eric and Florencio harbored ill feelings against
him. They had been calling his house and threatening his family that they would kill his son
and rape his daughters. Hence, as a precautionary measure, he sent his children to Cavite;
only his wife, sister-in-law, and their maid remained in their house in Pasig.13
Aurelio Acebron, the other accused-appellant, also testified. He said that before he joined
the Tanay Police Force in November 1993, he had been a member of the Philippine
Constabulary since 1975. He was assigned to the 61st PC Battalion in Basilan and Cebu until
1978. From 1978 to 1979, he was an investigator of the Constabulary Metrocom. From 1979
to 1982, he was also an investigator at the regional headquarters of the RT Division in
Zamboanga City. From 1982 to 1985, he served in the Military Police Brigade in Camp
Aguinaldo. At the Rizal PNP Command, he was also an investigator. During his active duty, he
received 22 commendations, two medals, and six military merit medals. He was also awarded
a bronze medal in the aftermath of the 1989 failed coup d' etat in Makati.
Acebron claimed that on February 9, 1994, he reported for work before 8 o'clock in the
morning as shown by the logbook he signed. With Mercado and SPO4 Bias, he was ordered
to report to Supt. Crescencio Maralit at Hilltop, Taytay, Rizal. They left Tanay at 8: 10 a.m.
and arrived at Hilltop at 9 o'clock that same morning. They conferred with Supt. Maralit from
2 until 5 o'clock in the afternoon. They then went back to the Tanay PNP station and
reported to Major Genabe. Acebron attended the evening formation that lasted up to 8:30 in
the evening, after which he went home to Plaza Aldea, Tanay together with Mercado and
SPO4 Bias. They had dinner with Bias and Major Genabe. Bias left at 10 o'clock in the evening
and they settled for the night. The following morning, he woke up at 6 o'clock. Before leaving
for the office, he woke up Mercado who, however, said that he would not attend the
morning formation as he would go directly to his assignment at Post No. 2.
 25

Acebron also denied all accusations against him. He claimed that he had been implicated in
revenge for what happened on January 23, 1994 when he collared Florencio and Mercado hit
the boy's back for causing trouble in Mercado's video shop. Acebron claimed that he had
been asked by police officers Mabalot and Ople to testify against Mercado, but he refused.
He claimed he had been detained on February 12, 1994 after he was implicated in this case.14
Corroborating other defense witnesses, SPO4 Teofilo Paz Bias swore that at 7:30 in the
morning on February 9, 1994, he attended the morning formation at the Tanay police
station. Mercado and Acebron were there present. At past 8:00 a.m., as he accompanied
Mercado and Acebron to the headquarters at Hilltop, Taytay, Rizal, they saw Col. Maralit with
whom they conferred from 2:00 p.m. until 5:00 p.m. They then went back to Tanay to attend
the evening formation which lasted until about 8:45 in the evening. Major Genabe ordered
him to go with Mercado and Acebron to discuss in the house the result of the investigation at
Hilltop, Taytay. They arrived in that house at 9:00 p.m. While they were having dinner, they
discussed what had happened at the investigation of Mercado and Acebron by the Provincial
Director. At 10 o'clock that evening, after supper, Bias went home to Pililla, Rizal. The
following morning, he saw Acebron report to work.15
On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the trial court found both accused guilty and
sentenced them to death. Hence, this appeal. The joint brief of accused-appellants Mercado
and Acebron contains the following assignment of errors:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN GIVING CREDENCE TO CLASHING MATERIAL
INCONSISTENCIES ON THE TESTIMONIES OF THE TWO (2) PROSECUTIONS (sic) PRINCIPAL
WITNESSES. THEIR CONTRADICTING TESTIMONIES AND EVIDENCES CREATED NOT ONLY
REASONABLE DOUBT BUT RATHER ESTABLISHED FACTUAL ERROR THAT WOULD BRING
ABOUT ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE ACCUSED MERCADO TO PICK UP THE VICTIM AT 9:00 P.M.
AT PASIG, METRO MANILA.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THERE EXIST (sic) A CONSPIRACY,
WITHOUT ANY EVIDENCE AND BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW THAT WILL SUPPORT ITS
DECISION.
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME KIDNAPPING WITH HOMICIDE, THERE BEING
NO EVIDENCE ADDUCED THAT HOMICIDE HAS BEEN COMMITTED IN FURTHERANCE OR AS A
CONSEQUENCE OF KIDNAPPING.
FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN WRITING THE DECISION WITH UNDUE HASTE AND
INCREDIBLE SPEED ONE (1) DAY AFTER THE SUBMISSION OF ACCUSED (sic) 32-PAGE JOINT
MEMORANDUM ON JULY 21, 1994, WITHIN THE 15-DAY PERIOD GRANTED BY THE COURT
AND PROMULGATING ITS DECISION ON THE NEXT DAY, JULY 22, 1994, CONSISTING OF 39
PAGES, THUS, RESULTING IN FATAL ERROR OF CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED SENTENCING
THEM TO DEATH BASED ON WRONG APPRECIATION OF FACTS, SPECULATIONS AND
PROBABILITIES AND DESPITE PATENT FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE WHAT HAVE
BEEN ALLEGED UNDER THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION.

These assigned errors boil down to the following main issues: (1) credibility of witnesses, (2)
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
alibi as a defense, and (3) the presence of conspiracy.

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
These issues will be discussed in the course of this decision, although not necessarily in the
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DISREGARDING THE DIRECT MATERIAL EVIDENCE
order discussed by accused-appellants in their brief. But before doing so, we first consider
CONSISTING OF POLICE LOGBOOK OR DUTY ROSTER BOOK (EXHIBITS "6" -MERCADO AND "4"
the threshold question raised in the Supplemental Brief filed for accused-appellants by
-ACEBRON) AND TESTIMONIES OF SPO2 POLICE CATAPUSAN THAT BOTH ACCUSED-
collaborating counsel Rene V. Sarmiento with regard to the constitutionality of Republic Act
APPELLANTS ATTENDED THE MORNING FORMATION AT 8:00 IN THE MORNING OF FEBRUARY
No. 7659 providing for the death penalty for 13 heinous crimes.
9, 1994 AT TANAY, RIZAL, THEN ATTENDED A CONFERENCE CALL OF SUPT. CHIEF COLONEL
MARALIT THE WHOLE DAY AT TAYTAY, RIZAL, THEN BACK TO TANAY, RIZAL AT 6:00 P.M. AND
BOTH ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ATTENDED THE EVENING FORMATION AT 8:00 P.M. WHICH I. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF R.A. 7659 AND R.A. 8177
LASTED UP TO 8:45 P.M., AFTER WHICH, THEY (SPO1 BIAS, MERCADO & ACEBRON)
PROCEEDED TO MAJOR GENABE AT THE TANAY APARTMENT AND MADE REPORT Accused-appellants argue that Republic Act 7659 violates the 1987 Constitution because -
REGARDING THE CONFERENCE CONDUCTED BY COL. MARALIT UP TO 10:00 P.M. HENCE,

1. There are no compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for the crimes of treason,
qualified piracy, qualified bribery, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping and serious
illegal detention, robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons, destructive arson,
rape, plunder, importation of prohibited drugs, etc.
2. R.A. No.7659 violates the constitutional ban against infliction of cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment.
3. R.A. No. 7659 impugns the constitutional right to equality before the law.
4. R.A. No. 7659 repudiates the obligation of the Philippines under international law.
5. Death penalty is not deterrence to the commission of crimes.16
The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 has already been settled in the Court's 12-
3 per curiam Resolution in People vs. Echegaray,17 wherein the following rulings were made:
1. The death penalty is not a "cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment." It is an
exercise of the state's power to "secure society against the threatened and actual evil."
2. The offenses for which Republic Act No. 7659 provides the death penalty satisfy "the
element of heinousness" by specifying the circumstances which generally qualify a crime to
be punishable by death;
3. Republic Act No. 7659 provides both procedural and substantial safeguards to insure its
correct application.
4. The Constitution does not require that "a positive manifestation in the form of a higher
incidence of crime should first be perceived and statistically proven" before the death
penalty may be prescribed. Congress is authorized under the Constitution to determine when
the elements of heinousness and compelling reasons are present, and the Court would
exceed its own authority if it questioned the exercise of such discretion.
In the subsequent case of Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice,18 the Court sustained the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8177, providing for death by lethal injection against
claims that death by lethal injection was cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment, and that
the law violated treaty obligations. Petitioner in that case argued that death by lethal
injection constituted cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment because: (1) Republic Act
No. 8177 failed to provide for the drugs to be used in administering lethal injection, the
dosage for the drug to be administered, and the procedure in administering drug(s) to the
convict; (2) Republic Act No. 8177 and its implementing rules did not fix either the date of
execution of the convict or the time for notifying him, with the result that such uncertainties
26
cause pain and suffering to the convict, and (3) the possibility of botched executions or
mistakes in administering drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel.
Rejecting petitioner's contention that death by lethal injection violates the prohibition
against cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment in Section 19(1), Article III of the
Constitution, the Court said:
"Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment. In the oft-cited case of Harden v. Director of Prisons, this Court held
that '[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the
constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the
mere extinguishment of life.' Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in
the execution by lethal injection render said law 'cruel, degrading or inhuman'? The Court
believes not. For reasons hereafter discussed, the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are
matters which are properly left to the competence and expertise of administrative
officials."19
As to the contention that the re-imposition of the death penalty violates international treaty
obligations, particularly the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Court
explained:
"Indisputably, Article 6 of the Covenant enshrines the individual's right to life. Nevertheless,
Article 6(2) of the Covenant explicitly recognizes that capital punishment is an allowable
limitation on the right to life, subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the most serious
crimes.' Pursuant to Article 28 of the Covenant, a Human Rights Committee was established
and under Article 40 of the Covenant, States Parties to the Covenant are required to submit
an initial report to the Committee on the measures they have adopted which give effect to
the rights recognized within the Covenant and on the progress made on the enjoyment of
those rights within one year of its entry into force for the State Party concerned and
thereafter, after five years. On July 27, 1982, the Human Rights Committee issued General
Comment No. 6 interpreting Article 6 of the Covenant stating that '(while) it follows from
Article 6(2) to (6) that State parties are not obliged to abolish the death penalty totally, they
are obliged to limit its use and, in particular, to abolish it for other than the 'most serious
crimes.' Accordingly, they ought to consider reviewing their criminal laws in this light and, in
any event, are obliged to restrict the application of the death penalty to the 'most serious
crimes.' The article strongly suggests (pars. 2[2] and [6]) that abolition is desirable. x x x. The
Committee is of the opinion that the expression 'most serious crimes' must be read
restrictively to mean that the death penalty should be a quite exceptional measure.
Further, The Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of Those Facing the Death Penalty adopted
by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations declare that the ambit of the term
'most serious crimes' should not go beyond intentional crimes, with lethal or other extremely
grave consequences.

"The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted
by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 16, 1966, and signed and
ratified by the Philippines on December 19, 1966 and August 22, 1989, respectively.
The Optional Protocol provides that the Human Rights Committee shall receive and consider
communications from individuals claiming to be victims of violations of any of the rights set
forth in the Covenant.
"On the other hand, the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the General
Assembly on December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither signed nor ratified said
document. Evidently, petitioner's assertion of our obligation under the Second Optional
Protocol is misplaced."20
Accused-appellants further argue that Republic Act No. 7659 denies equality before the law.
They cite studies here and abroad allegedly showing that "the death penalty has most often
been used against the poor." This statement is too sweeping to merit further serious
consideration. Anyone, regardless of his economic status in life, may commit a crime. While
there may be perceived imbalances in the imposition of penalties, there are adequate
safeguards in the Constitution, the law, and procedural rules to ensure due process and
equal protection of the law. As pointed out by Representative Pablo Garcia when
interpellated by Representative Joker Arroyo during the congressional deliberation on the
death penalty bill:
"x x x. (T)here is something more in the bill that protects the rights of every accused person,
be he rich or poor. I refer to the provisions under the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. The
Constitution itself protects, envelops the accused with the mantle of protection guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights. Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution provides that no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. In other words, the
accused cannot be deprived of his life without due process of law nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws. In other words, the laws protect the rich and the
poor, the lettered and the unlettered. That is guaranteed by the Constitution. x x x."21
Similarly, in People vs. Mijano,22 this Court recently said:
"Finally, accused-appellant in his reply brief contends that the death penalty law is violative
of the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution because it punishes only people like
him, the poor, the uneducated, and the jobless.
"The equality the Constitution guarantees is legal equality or, as it is usually put, the equality
of all persons before the law. Under this guarantee, each individual is dealt with as an equal
person in the law, which does not treat the person differently because of who he is or what
he is or what he possesses (Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A
Commentary, 1987 ed., p. 6).
27
xxx xxx xxx
"Apparently, as it should be, the death penalty law makes no distinction. It applies to all
persons and to all classes of persons - rich or poor, educated, or uneducated, religious or
non-religious. No particular person or classes of persons are identified by the law against
whom the death penalty shall be exclusively imposed."
Accused-appellants' claim that the death penalty does not deter the commission of crimes is
without any basis. To be sure, deterrence is not the only aim of the law. As Representative
Pablo Garcia, the principal author of the death penalty bill, explained "more than deterrence,
x x x is retributive justice."23 In People vs. Echegaray, it was further stated:
"The abolitionists in Congress insisted that all criminal reforms first be pursued and
implemented before the death penalty be reimposed in case such reforms prove
unsuccessful. They claimed that the only compelling reason contemplated by the
Constitution is that nothing else but the death penalty is left for the government to resort to
that could check the chaos and the destruction that is being caused by unbridled criminality.
Three of our colleagues are of the opinion that the compelling reason required by the
constitution is that there occurred a dramatic and significant change in the socio-cultural
milieu after the suspension of the death penalty on February 2, 1987 such as an
unprecedented rise in the incidence of criminality. Such are, however, interpretations only of
the phrase 'compelling reasons' but not of the conjunctive phrase 'compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes.' The imposition of the requirement that there be a rise in the
incidence of criminality because of the suspension of the death penalty, moreover, is an
unfair and misplaced demand, for what it amounts to, in fact, is a requirement that the death
penalty first prove itself to be a truly deterrent factor in criminal behavior. If there was a
dramatically higher incidence of criminality during the time that the death penalty was
suspended, that would have proven that the death penalty was indeed a deterrent during
the years before its suspension. Suffice it to say that the constitution in the first place did not
require that the death penalty be first proven to be a deterrent; what it requires is that there
be compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
"Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that Congress, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said
provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive
manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and
statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said
provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other
criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society. It is immaterial and irrelevant that
R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an 'alarming upsurge of such crimes,' for the same
was never intended by said law to be the yardstick to determine the existence of compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that 'the
Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to rationalize
and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose
the death penalty for said crimes.'"24

Indeed, today, even members of the Court who originally dissented from the majority ruling
sustaining the validity of Republic Act No. 7659 agree on the imposition of the death penalty
without in the least changing their view about the constitutionality of the penalty.
As we did in People vs. Godoy,25 we restate mankind's age-old observation and experience on
the penological and societal effect of capital punishment: "If it is justified, it serves as a
deterrent; if injudiciously imposed, it generates resentment."26
We now consider the merits of this case.
II. THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES
The question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine. 27 For this
reason, its observations and conclusions are accorded great respect on appeal.28 This rule is
variously stated thus: The trial court's assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to
great weight. It is conclusive and binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or
unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not been
considered.29 Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case,
or that the judge acted arbitrarily, his assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves
high respect by appellate courts.30
In the case at bar, inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimonies of the two principal
prosecution witnesses, Florencio Villareal and Eric Ona, are alleged as undermining their
credibility, to wit:
(1) Florencio testified that on February 9, 1994 at about 9 o'clock in the evening, he and the
victim, Richard Buama, were picked up by Mercado and Eric while he and Richard, in the
company of Rex Bugayong, were passing time near Mercado's house. Eric belied this
testimony when, on cross-examination, he said that he and Mercado saw Florencio first at
about 8 o'clock, not 9 o'clock in the evening of February 9, 1994 at the corner of Sto. Tomas
Street, Pasig, one block away from the place where they later found Richard.
(2) Florencio testified that when they were apprehended at the corner of Baltazar Street,
Mercado pushed him straight into the car, and held and poked a gun at Richard. On the other
hand, Eric testified that Florencio voluntarily went with them into the car as Mercado, with a
.38 black gun tucked at his side, placed his arm around Richard's shoulder.
(3) In his sworn statement, Florencio stated in answer to Question No.3, "At kami
po ay dinala ng pulis na humuli sa amin doon sa inuupahan niyang bahay at isinakay
kami sa kanyang kotse at kami ay dinala sa Tanay, Rizal." However, in answer to Question
No. 6, Eric said "Una kaming dinala sa bahay na inuupahan ni Elpidio Mercado
dito sa Pasig." Eric denied Florencio's statement that they did not stay in Mercado's house;
instead, they just circled the place and then proceeded to Tanay, Rizal right away. Florencio
28
in fact contradicted his own statement at the trial by declaring that they just passed by
Mercado's house and did not stay there.
(4) In his testimony, Florencio said that on their way to Tanay, Rizal, he did not hear
conversation between Mercado and Eric. Yet Eric testified that, upon reaching Rosario, he
talked to Mercado and asked him where they were going. Mercado answered, "Sa
Tanay, have you been there?" Mercado even asked them their birthdays and if they still
wanted to have birthdays.
(5) Florencio testified that upon reaching Tanay, Rizal and alighting from the car he was
brought inside the apartment and that when he peeped through the window he saw
Mercado slapping Richard on the face. On the contrary, Eric testified that upon their arrival in
Tanay, Rizal, they alighted from the car and were told to go inside the apartment and it was
there where Mercado slapped Richard on the face and asked him to undress.
(6) Florencio further testified that after Richard had taken off his clothes as ordered by
Mercado, the latter asked Richard to lie down, face downward, and thereafter, Richard's feet
and hands were tied by Mercado and his aide, Jeff, with a rattan rope. Eric stated on cross-
examination that when Richard was lying down, Mercado stepped on Richard's left cheek,
implying that Richard lay not with his face down but with his right cheek on the ground.
(7) Florencio stated in his sworn statement that upon reaching Tanay, Rizal, they were taken
into an apartment opposite a beerhouse. On the other hand, Eric claimed that the apartment
was some 130 to 150 meters away from the beerhouse.
(8) Florencio stated in his sworn statement that after Richard was beaten up, his hands and
feet were tied and then Mercado and his police companion loaded (sinakay) Richard into the
car. Eric, however, testified that Richard was loaded in the baggage compartment of the car
by Acebron and Jeff. On cross-examination, Florencio contradicted himself by admitting that
it was Acebron and Jeff who loaded Richard into the car.
(9) Florencio testified that, although Mercado asked Acebron to get a bolo, the latter got a
long knife (not a bolo) with a "sharp pointed edge" (sic). Eric declared that the bolo taken by
Acebron was "mapurol."
(10) Eric testified that on February 12, 1994, he was investigated ahead of Florencio by SPO2
James Mabalot and insisted that his statement was the truth. He even stated that as he was
being investigated, Florencio was around, talking. However, this testimony was contradicted
by SPO2 James Mabalot who declared that it was Florencio who was first investigated as
shown by the fact that Florencio was investigated at 6:20 p.m., while Eric was investigated at
10:45 p.m. of February 12, 1994.
(11) On cross-examination, Eric testified that while SPO2 Mabalot was investigating him and
Florencio, SPO1 Buama was just outside the office and even saw him. SPO1 Buama confirmed

this statement. However, SPO2 Mabalot said that when he investigated Florencio and Eric,
SPO1 Buama was not present having then already left.
(12) SPO1 Buama testified that Richard was his full blood brother, but his sister, Maria
Buama, said that Richard was an adopted child, although they considered him their full blood
brother.31
Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses which refer only to minor details and
collateral matters do not affect the veracity and weight of their testimonies where there is
consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailants.
Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses and
prove that their testimonies are not rehearsed. They are thus safeguards against memorized
perjury.32
Nor are such inconsistencies and even improbabilities unusual, for there is no person with
perfect faculties or senses.33 An adroit cross-examiner may trap a witness into making
statements contradicting his testimony on direct examination. Intensive cross-examination
on points not anticipated by a witness and his lawyer may make a witness blurt out
statements which do not dovetail even with his own testimony. Yet, if it appears that the
same witness has not willfully perverted the truth, as may be gleaned from the tenor of his
testimony and the conclusion of the trial judge regarding his demeanor and behavior on the
witness stand, his testimony on material points may be accepted.
A witness' testimony may likewise contradict that of another witness. As long as the
contradiction involves minor details and collateral matters, the credibility of both witnesses
will not be deemed impaired. After all, no two witnesses could testify on a matter from the
same point of view or perception. The recollection of different witnesses with respect to the
time, place, and other circumstances of a criminal event would naturally differ in various
details. Absolute uniformity in every detail of testimonies cannot be expected of witnesses
who by nature react differently to what they see and hear depending upon their situation
and state of mind.34 On the contrary , if witnesses should agree on every detail of a
transaction that occupied a considerable space of time and should undertake to tell all that
occurred in precisely the same order, each giving the same incidents as the others in
precisely the same words, that fact should make their testimonies suspect.35
Applying these rules to this case, the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of Florencio
Villareal and Eric Ona pointed out by appellants concern only minor details which do not
detract from the essential points of their testimonies that accused-appellants, after beating
up the victim, took him away in accused-appellant Mercado's car, and, when they returned
to the apartment, both admitted that they had "silenced" the victim or had "laid him to rest."
The alleged inconsistencies between the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and their
affidavits, on the other hand, refer to minor matters that do not affect the substance of the
prosecution's evidence. Affidavits are not entirely reliable evidence in court due to their
incompleteness and the inaccuracies that may have attended their formulation.36 In general,
29
such affidavits are not prepared by the affiants themselves but by another
person (i.e., investigator) who may have used his own language in writing the statement or
misunderstood the affiant or omitted material facts in the hurry and impatience that usually
attend the preparation of such affidavits. As this Court has often said:
"An affidavit, 'being taken ex-parte, is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate,
sometimes from partial suggestion, and sometimes from want of suggestion and inquiries,
without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral
circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his memory and for his
accurate recollection of all that belongs to the subject.'"37
"'We have too much experience of the great infirmity of affidavit evidence. When the witness
is illiterate and ignorant, the language presented to the court is not his; it is; and must be, the
language of the person who prepares the affidavit; and it may be, and too often is, the
expression of that person's erroneous inference as to the meaning of the language used by
the witness himself; and however carefully the affidavit may be read over to the witness, he
may not understand what is said in a language so different from that which he is accustomed
to use. Having expressed his meaning in his own language, and finding it translated by a
person on whom he relies, into language not his own, and which he does not perfectly
understand, he is too apt to acquiesce; and testimony not intended by him is brought before
the court as his.' (2 Moore on Facts, sec. 952, p. 1105; People v. Timbang, 74 Phil. 295,
299)."38
For this reason, affidavits have generally been considered inferior to testimony given in open
court.39
Neither is the credibility of prosecution witnesses Florencio Villareal and Eric Ona in any way
lessened, much less impaired, by the motives imputed to them by accused-appellants who
claim that the former testified against them on account of an incident on January 23, 1994
when Mercado slapped Eric and hit Florencio on the back. Accused-appellants' contention is
nothing more than a desperate attempt to discredit said witnesses. It is inconceivable that
these principal prosecution witnesses, two young boys, would impute a crime as heinous as
kidnapping with murder to anyone if the same was not true. Indeed, it would be contrary to
the natural order of events and of human nature, and against the presumption of good faith
for Florencio and Eric to falsely testify against accused- appellants.40These young boys, in
testifying against accused-appellants, would have nothing to gain and everything to lose,
including their lives. Florencio and Eric knew that, even if accused-appellants were
bemedalled military and police officers, they had no compunction at all in claiming to have
killed a number of people. Even granting that such braggadocio was simply meant to frighten
these young boys into silence, it would nonetheless have the same effect on them and would
have deterred them from testifying against accused-appellants had what they testified to
been a mere fabrication.
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION

It is true that no eyewitnesses were presented by the prosecution o testify on the actual
killing of Richard Buaman. But it is settled that a conviction may rest on purely circumstantial
evidence, provided the following requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.41 Thus,
in People vs. Fulinara,42 wherein the victim was kidnapped in the evening and the following
day his body found in a ravine, this Court said:
"While the positive identification made by the key witness does not refer to the actual killing
of the deceased, the circumstantial evidence on record constitutes an unbroken chain which
leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that accused-appellants are indeed guilty of the
offense charged. It is not only by direct evidence upon which guilt may be predicated. The
accused may also be convicted on circumstantial evidence."
In this case, the following circumstances, viewed in their entirety, show beyond shadow of a
doubt that accused-appellants are indeed guilty of kidnapping with murder:
(1) Mercado picked up Richard on the night of February 9, 1994 near his (Mercado's) house
in Pasig and, poking a gun at him, forced him to ride with him in his car;
(2) Mercado took Richard to his apartment in Tanay;
(3) Mercado slapped and boxed Richard before bringing him inside the apartment;
(4) Mercado went up the second floor of the apartment and came down with Acebron;
(5) Mercado and Acebron took turns in subjecting Richard to physical abuse;
(6) Mercado ordered his aide named Jeff to get a piece of rope with which to bind Richard
and Jeff obliged by getting a rattan rope;
(7) Richard was gagged and his limbs were bound;
(8) Acebron and Jeff put Richard into the luggage compartment of Mercado's car;
(9) Mercado asked Acebron to get a bolo before they drove away;
(10) Accused-appellants rode together in the car with Richard in its compartment;
(11) After two hours, accused-appellants returned to the apartment without Richard;
30
(12) When Florencio asked Mercado about Richard's whereabouts, Richard replied, "Wala
na, pinatahimik ko na." ("Gone, I already silenced him").
(13) When Eric asked Mercado the same question, the latter replied, "Wala na, pinagpahinga
ko na." ("He is gone. I have laid him to rest").
(14) Eric saw Acebron wiping off bloodstains on the bolo;
(15) At the disco bar, accused-appellants bragged about the fact that Richard was the 25th
person and the 17th person Mercado and Acebron had killed, respectively;
(16) Richard's body was found in a morgue on February 12, 1994;
(17) The victim's body showed signs that his hands and feet had been tied and his mouth
stuffed with a towel; and
(18) Mercado warned Eric and Florencio not to talk to anyone regarding the incident.
These circumstances constitute an unbroken chain clearly pointing to accused-appellants'
culpability to the crime of kidnapping with murder.
IV. THE EVIDENCE OF CONSPIRACY
Accused-appellants argue that the trial court erred in finding conspiracy in the commission of
the crime because the prosecution allegedly failed to establish a common resolution
between them to commit the crime charged. This argument is likewise without merit.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To establish the existence of conspiracy,
direct proof is not essential, as it may be shown by the conduct of the accused before,
during, and after the commission of the crime.43 It may be proven by facts and circumstances
from which may logically be inferred the existence of a common design among the accused
to commit the offense charged, or it may be deduced from the mode and manner by which
the offense was perpetrated.44 In this case, the concatenation of facts and circumstances
establish beyond a shadow of a doubt that accused-appellants conspired to kill Richard, to
wit: (1) upon reaching the Tanay apartment, which he shared with Acebron, Mercado went
upstairs and called Acebron; (2) as they came downstairs, Mercado told appellant Acebron
that he had a present for him and that they were going to kill someone, saying "Pare, may
regalo ako sa iyo, may papatayin tayo"; (3) Mercado and Acebron slapped and boxed
Richard; (4) when told by Mercado to get a bolo, Acebron did so; (5) Acebron helped in
loading Richard into the car's luggage compartment; (6) Mercado and Acebron left the
apartment together in Mercado's car with Richard in the car's luggage compartment; (7)
after two hours, the two came back to the apartment without Richard; (8) when Eric and

Florencio asked them where Richard was, they answered that Richard had been "silenced" or
had been "laid to rest"; and (9) Acebron washed a bloodstained bolo.
V. ACCUSED-APPELLANTS' ALIBI
Invoking alibi as a defense, accused-appellants argue that it was impossible for them to be in
Pasig at the time of the commission of the crime because they were then in Tanay, Rizal on
official duty, as members of the PNP force in that town. For this purpose, they cite the PNP
logbook, duly signed by them. However, as the trial court pointed out:
"This defense, however, collapsed with the testimony of SPO4 Bias when he affirmed before
the Court that travel time between Tanay and Pasig could take less than an hour, especially
at nighttime. Moreover, the Court finds wanting the evidence presented by the defense to
support its claim that both accused were indeed present at the Tanay PNP Headquarters until
about 8:30 p.m. of February 9, 1994.
"Firstly, it was admitted by the defense that the duty log-book and the morning/evening
formation sheet do not always reflect the whereabouts of the Tanay PNP members for the
day such that even when they have deviated from their regular assignments, no note
whatsoever appears on said log-book. Accused were at the Hilltop Headquarters in Taytay
from around 9:15 a.m. to 5 p.m. of February 9, 1994 and yet, the duty log-book they
submitted in Court show otherwise. In said log-book, the Post/Assignment of accused
Acebron was "Intel Optvs/follow-up" while accused Mercado was supposed to be at "Post OP
#2." The Court does not believe this log-book is reliable. Secondly, again by the defense' own
admission, Tanay PNP members sign their names once on the log-book and this will be
enough to confirm their presence or attendance for the entire day. Surely, the possibility that
all the PNP members do not in fact arrive at and leave their office at the same time of 8 a.m.
and 8 p.m. can not be disregarded. Still, a reading of the entries in the log-book submitted by
the defense would somehow suggest this. The physical impossibility of accused Mercado, at
least, being in Pasig at around 9 p.m. on February 9, 1994 is not established. The defense of
alibi is, therefore, rejected by the Court."45
Indeed, alibi is generally regarded with suspicion and is always received with caution, not
only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because it can be easily fabricated
and concocted. For alibi to prosper as a defense, it must be convincing enough to preclude
any doubt on the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the locus criminis or
its immediate vicinity at the time of the incident.46 An accused who invokes the defense of
alibi must prove (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime
and (b) the physical impossibility for him to be at the scene of the crime.47
In this case, even granting that accused-appellants were in Tanay at the time they were
supposed to have taken the two prosecution witnesses and the victim to Pasig, it was still not
physically impossible for them to be in that place. Pasig is only an hour's drive from Tanay
and when traffic is light, as it would generally be late in the evening, the distance could be
negotiated in less time. Significantly, when the three young men were taken from Pasig at
31
around 9 o'clock in the evening, accused-appellants had already been discharged from their
duties because, by their own admission, the evening formation at the Tanay Police Station
ended at around 8:30 that evening.
Above all, given Florencio and Eric's clear and positive identification of accused-appellants as
the perpetrators of the crime, the failure of the defense to give any plausible reason for
Florencio and Eric to testify falsely against accused-appellants renders the latter's alibi bereft
of any probative value.48
Their positive identification by the witnesses prevails over their alibi and denial.49
VI. ACCUSED-APPELLANTS' CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY
Accused-appellants are guilty of kidnapping because, by placing the victim in an enclosed
place consisting of the luggage compartment of the car, they detained or otherwise deprived
him of his liberty. There was also actual restraint of the victim's liberty when he was taken at
gunpoint from Pasig to accused-appellants' apartment in Tanay.50 The evidence proves that
Mercado initiated the kidnapping of the victim. Acebron's subsequent loading of the victim
into the car's compartment after tying the latter shows community of criminal purpose with
Mercado. However, although both were police officers, they acted in this case in their private
capacities.51
The crime was committed by accused-appellants on February 9, 1994, after the amendment
of the Revised Penal Code on December 31, 1993 by Republic Act No. 7659. Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as thus amended, provides:
"Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain
another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is
any of the parents, female or a public officer;
"The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the
circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

"When the victim is killed or dies as a conseguence of the detention or is raped, or is
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed."
(Underscoring supplied)
In People vs. Ramos,52 the accused was found guilty of two separate heinous crimes of
kidnapping for ransom and murder committed on July 13, 1994 and sentenced to death. On
appeal, this Court modified the ruling and found the accused guilty of the "special complex
crime" of kidnapping for ransom with murder under the last paragraph of Article 267, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This Court said:
"x x x This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of 'special complex
crime' of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn
by the courts between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely
sought by the accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not deliberately
resorted to but was merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the
person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing
was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or
homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but
shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as
amended by RA No. 7659." (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, in the case at bar, the trial court correctly found accused-appellants guilty of
kidnapping with murder and sentenced each of them to death.
Four (4) members of the Court, although maintaining their adherence to the separate
opinions expressed in People vs. Echegaray53 that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the
penalty of death, is unconstitutional, nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority that
the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.
It does not matter whether there are circumstances qualifying the killing as
murder.1âwphi1 Under the last paragraph of Article 267, it is sufficient that the victim is
"killed or dies as a consequence of the detention." In any event, the killing of Richard Buama
as a consequence of his kidnapping was committed under circumstances which make it
murder. His limbs were tied and his mouth gagged before he was taken away. When his body
was discovered, his limbs were still tied and his mouth gagged, indicating that treachery
attended the killing of Richard Buama.
The trial court awarded P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P100,000.00 by way of moral and
exemplary damages to the Buama family as heirs of the deceased Richard Buama pursuant to
Articles 2206 and 2230 of the Civil Code. It is not disputed, however, that Richard had not
been legally adopted by the Buamas, and so the latter cannot be considered his heirs, the
term "heirs" being limited to the deceased's "spouse, legitimate, and illegitimate ascendants
and descendants" per the definition of "heirs" under Articles 782 and 2206 of the Civil Code.
For this reason, in one case,54 the award of moral damages for the death of a brother caused
by quasi-delict was disallowed. In this case, since the heirs of the deceased Richard Buama
32
are not known, the awards of civil indemnity and moral and exemplary damages to the
Buamas should be disallowed.
As to the award of P52,680.00 for actual damages incurred for wake and funeral expenses,
only the amount of P22,690.00 is supported by receipts (Exhs. J-2 to J-7). Accused-appellants
contend that these receipts constitute hearsay evidence because the witness who identified
them, Lourdes Vergara, admitted that she merely collated the same but had otherwise no
personal knowledge of the facts pertaining to their issuance.55 In People vs. Paraiso,56this
Court disregarded the list of burial expenses for being hearsay since it was prepared by the
victim's sister-in-law and not by the victim's eldest son who testified thereon. The Court held
that actual damages should be based upon competent proof and on the best evidence
available.
One receipt (Exh. J-5) for P1,300.00 shows that it was issued by the Immaculate Conception
Parish Church in Pasig to Lourdes Vergara, and it was for Richard Buama's burial mass.
Another receipt (Exh. J-7), for the amount of P2,210.00 for flowers for Richard Buama's wake,
was issued by Lourdes Vergara herself as the owner of the flower shop. These two receipts
should be considered competent evidence of the amount of expenses indicated therein, and
therefore the total amount of P3,510.00 should be awarded to Lourdes Vergara as actual
damages.
VII. ALLEGED HASTE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN DECIDING THE CASE
One last point. Accused-appellants bewail the fact that the trial court rendered its decision
just a day after it had received their Joint Memorandum.57 Accused-appellants charge that
their case was decided with "fantastic, incredible and unbelievable speed" with the result
that "grave and serious errors" were committed in convicting them.58
This contention has no merit. A review of the trial court's decision shows that its findings
were based on the records of this case and the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during
the trial. The speed with which the trial court disposed of the case cannot thus be attributed
to the injudicious performance of its function. Indeed, a judge is not supposed to study a
case only after all the pertinent pleadings have been filed. It is a mark of diligence and
devotion to duty that a judge studies a case long before the deadline set for the
promulgation of his decision has arrived. The one-day period between the filing of accused-
appellants' memorandum and the promulgation of the decision was sufficient time to
consider their arguments and to incorporate these in the decision. As long as the trial judge
does not sacrifice the orderly administration of justice in favor of a speedy but reckless
disposition of a case, he cannot be taken to task for rendering his decision with due dispatch.
The trial court in this case committed no reversible errors and, consequently, except for
some modification, its decision should be affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City, finding
accused-appellants Elpidio Mercado y Hernando and Aurelio Acebron y Adora guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping with murder and imposing upon each of them

the DEATH PENALTY, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that the awards of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages are DELETED and accused-
appellants are ORDERED to pay jointly and severally to Lourdes Vergara the amount of
P3,510.00 as reimbursement for the expenses she incurred for the victim's wake and funeral.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, upon the finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith
forwarded to the Office of the President for his use in case he decides to exercise his
prerogative of mercy. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 171655 July 22, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
PABLO L. ESTACIO, JR. and MARITESS ANG, Appellants.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Appellant Maritess Ang (Maritess) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City with kidnapping for ransom, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 10th of October 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused conspiring together, confederating with two (2) other persons whose true names,
identities and whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping one
another did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap one CHARLIE CHUA, a
businessman, from the Casa Leonisa Bar located at Examiner Street, Quezon City and brought
him to an unknown place and detained him up to the present for the purpose of extorting
ransom money in the amount of P15,000,000.00, Philippine Currency, thereby depriving him
of his liberty from October 10, 1995 up to the present, to the damage and prejudice of said
offended party.1
The Information was subsequently amended to implead the other appellant, Pablo Estacio,
Jr. (Estacio), and to change the charge from kidnapping for ransom to kidnapping with
murder. The accusatory portion of the Amended Information reads:
That on or about the 11th day of October, 1995, in Quezon City, Philippipnes, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating with another person whose true name and
identity has not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap one CHARLIE MANCILLAN CHUA, a
businessman, with the use of motor vehicle from Casa Leonisa Bar located at Examiner
Street, Quezon City and brought him to BRGY. STO. CRISTO, San Jose, del Monte, Bulacan and
thereafter with intent to kill, qualified by evident premeditation, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously repeatedly stab said CHARLIE MANCILLAN CHUA on the
different parts of his body with the use of [a] fan knife, thereby inflicting upon him serious
33
and mortal wounds, which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of said Charlie Mancillan Chua.2 (Underscoring in the original.)
Still later, the Information was further amended to additionally implead one Hildo Sumipo
(Sumipo)3 who was, however, subsequently discharged as state witness.4
The evidence for the prosecution presents the following version of events: 5
At around 10:00 in the evening of October 10, 1995, Maritess, together with Estacio and
Sumipo, arrived at Casa Leonisa, a bar-restaurant at Examiner Street, Quezon City where the
three of them would meet with Charlie Mancilla Chua (the victim). Maritess had earlier told
Sumipo that she would settle her debt to the victim and then "deretsong dukot na rin x x x
kay Charlie [the victim]."6 Sumipo assumed, however, that Maritess was just joking.
After the victim arrived past midnight and talked to Maritess for a short while, the group
boarded his car, Maritess taking the seat beside the victim who was driving, as Estacio and
Sumipo took the backseat.
Not long after, Estacio pulled out a gun and ordered the victim to pull the car over. As the
victim complied, Estacio, with a gun pointed at him, pulled him to the backseat as Maritess
transferred to the backseat, sat beside the victim, tied the victim’s hands behind his back,
and placed tape on his mouth.1avvphi1 Estacio then directed Sumipo to take over the wheels
as he did.7
While Sumipo tried to dissuade appellants from pursuing their plan, they replied that they
would kill the victim so that he would not take revenge.8 Thereupon, the victim told Maritess,
"bakit mo nagawa sa akin ito sa kabila ng lahat?," to which she replied, "Bayad na ako sa
utang ko sa iyo ngayon."
On Estacio’s instruction, Sumipo drove towards San Jose del Monte, Bulacan and on reaching
a secluded place, Estacio ordered Sumipo to stop the car as he did. Maritess and Estacio then
brought the victim to a grassy place. Estacio with bloodied hands later resurfaced.
The three then headed towards Malinta, Valenzuela, Bulacan. On the way, Estacio and
Maritess talked about how they killed the victim, Estacio telling Maritess, "Honey, wala na
tayong problema dahil siguradong patay na si Charlie sa dami ng saksak na nakuha niya."
On Estacio’s and Maritess’ directive, Sumipo stopped by a drug store where Maritess bought
alcohol to clean their hands. Along the way, Maritess and Estacio threw out the victim’s
attaché case. Maritess later told Estacio "Honey, sana hindi muna natin pinatay si Charlie
para makahingi pa tayo ng pera sa mga magulang [niya]."
The three later abandoned the car in Malinta.

The following morning, Estacio went to the residence of Sumipo where he called up by
telephone the victim’s mother and demanded a ₱15,000,000 ransom. The mother replied,
however, that she could not afford that amount.
In the afternoon of the same day, Maritess and Estacio went to Sumipo’s residence again
where Estacio again called up the victim’s mother, this time lowering the ransom demand to
₱10,000,000 which she still found to be too steep. Sumipo expressed his misgivings about
future calls, as they might get caught, but Estacio and Maritess assured him that that call
would be the last.
The group then went to Greenhills where Estacio still again called up the victim’s mother, still
lowering the ransom demand to ₱5,000,000, ₱1,000,000 of which should be advanced. The
victim’s mother having agreed to the demand, Maritess and Estacio directed her to place the
money in a garbage can near Pizza Hut in Greenhills at 11:30 in the evening. Estacio and
Sumipo later proceeded to Pizza Hut, and as they were seated there, a patrol car passed by,
drawing them to leave and part ways.
Sumipo soon learned that Maritess and Estacio sold Chua’s gun, watch, and necklace from
the proceeds of which he was given ₱7,000.
On May 16, 1996, Sumipo surrendered to the National Bureau of Investigation. On May 23,
1996, Estacio surrendered to the police. The police then informed the victim’s mother that
Estacio had admitted having killed her son, and that he offered to accompany them to the
crime scene.ten.1ihpwa1
The police, accompanied by the victim’s mother and Estacio, went to the crime scene and
recovered the remains of the victim who was identified by his mother by the clothes
attached to his bones. The victim’s dentist found his teeth to match his dental record.
Sumipo explained in an affidavit,9 which he identified in open court,10 that Maritess got angry
with the victim after he lent money to her husband, one Robert Ong,11 enabling him to leave
the country without her knowledge, while Estacio was jealous of the victim with whom
Maritess had a relationship.12
In his affidavit13 which he identified in open court, Estacio claimed that a quarrel broke out in
the car between the victim and Maritess about a debt to the victim; that he tried to pacify
the two, but the victim got angry at him, prompting him to point a fan knife at his neck; and
that he then asked Sumipo to drive the car up to Barangay Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan where he dragged the victim away from the car and accidentally stabbed him.
When asked on cross-examination why the stabbing was accidental, Estacio replied that he
and Maritess originally planned to leave the victim in Bulacan, but since there was talk of the
victim getting back at them, he "got confused and so it happened."14
34
Maritess for her part denied15 having conspired with Estacio. She claimed that while on
board the car, the victim took issue with her "friendship" with Estacio, whom he insulted.
Incensed, Estacio grabbed the victim by the collar, prompting the victim to pull out a gun
from under the driver’s seat which he aimed at Estacio.
Continuing, Maritess claimed that she tried to pacify the quarreling men; that the car
stopped at San Jose del Monte and the three men alighted; that Sumipo returned to the car
and was later followed by Estacio who said "Masama raw ang nangyari,"16 he adding that he
did not intend to stab the victim.
Branch 219 of the Quezon City RTC found both Estacio and Maritess guilty of "kidnapping on
the occasion of which the victim was killed," disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Pablo Estacio, Jr. and Maritess Ang guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of kidnapping on the occasion of which the victim was killed, the court
hereby sentences each of them to suffer the maximum penalty of Death; to jointly and
severally pay the heirs of Charlie Chua the amount of ₱200,000.00, as actual damages,
and ₱1,000,000.00, as moral damages; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.17 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The case was forwarded to this Court for automatic review.18 However, the Court referred it
to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review following People v. Mateo.19
Estacio faulted the trial court for:
I
x x x FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED
WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
x x x CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE
OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE INDISPENSABLE ELEMENTS OF DETENTION AND "LOCK
UP".20 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As for Maritess, she faulted the trial court for:
A. x x x Discharging Sumipo as State Witness and in Relying on His Testimony for
the Conviction of Appellant Ang.21
xxx

B. x x x Finding That There was Kidnapping with Murder and That Appellant Ang is
Guilty Thereof.
C. x x x Not Concluding that the Crime Committed was Plain Homicide, and That
Accused Estacio is Solely Responsible Therefor.22 (Emphasis and underscoring in the
original)
By Decision23 of May 12, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed, with modification, the trial
court’s decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City in Criminal Case No. Q-95-63818 finding accused-appellants Maritess Ang and Pablo
Estacio, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping with murder and
sentencing them to each suffer the penalty of DEATH, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Accused-appellants are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased the
amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱25,000.00 as exemplary
damages and ₱500,000.00 as moral damages.
In view of the death penalty imposed, let the entire records of this case be forwarded to the
Honorable Supreme Court for further review.
SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Appellants manifested before this Court that supplemental pleadings would not be
necessary, all relevant matters having already been taken up.25
Findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of witnesses, and its
assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said
findings are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect, by this Court because of the trial
court’s unique advantage in observing and monitoring at close range the demeanor,
deportment, and conduct of the witnesses as they testify.26 This Court need not thus pass
upon the findings of fact of the trial court, especially if they have been affirmed on appeal by
the appellate court, as in the present case.27 Nevertheless, the Court combed through the
records of the case and found no ground to merit a reversal of appellants’ conviction.
The Court finds, however, that the offense of which appellants were convicted
was erroneously designated.
Appellants were eventually charged with and convicted of the special complex crime
of kidnapping with murder, defined in the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must prove each of the component
offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of
separate complaints.28
35
In the case at bar, kidnapping was not sufficiently proven. Although appellants bound and
gagged Chua and transported him to Bulacan against his will, they did these acts to facilitate
his killing, not because they intended to detain or confine him. As soon as they arrived at the
locus criminis, appellants wasted no time in killing him. That appellants’ intention from the
beginning was to kill the victim is confirmed by the conversation which Sumipo heard in the
car in which Maritess said that a knife would be used to kill him so that it would not create
noise.29 The subsequent demand for ransom was an afterthought which did not qualify
appellants’ prior acts as kidnapping.
People v. Padica30 instructs:
We have consistently held that where the taking of the victim was incidental to the basic
purpose to kill, the crime is only murder, and this is true even if, before the killing but for
purposes thereof, the victim was taken from one place to another. Thus, where the evident
purpose of taking the victims was to kill them, and from the acts of the accused it cannot be
inferred that the latter’s purpose was actually to detain or deprive the victims of their liberty,
the subsequent killing of the victims constitute the crime of murder, hence the crime of
kidnapping does not exist and cannot be considered as a component felony to produce the
complex crime of kidnapping with murder. In fact, as we held in the aforecited case of
Masilang, et. al., although the accused had planned to kidnap the victim for ransom but they
first killed him and it was only later that they demanded and obtained the money, such
demand for ransom did not convert the crime into kidnapping since no detention or
deprivation of liberty was involved, hence the crime committed was only murder.
That from the beginning of their criminal venture appellant and his brothers intended to kill
the victim can be readily deduced from the manner by which they swiftly and cold-bloodedly
snuffed out his life once they reached the isolated sugarcane plantation in Calamba, Laguna.
Furthermore, there was no evidence whatsoever to show or from which it can be inferred
that from the outset the killers of the victim intended to exchange his freedom for ransom
money. On the contrary, the demand for ransom appears to have arisen and was
consequently made as an afterthought, as it was relayed to the victim’s family very much
later that afternoon after a sufficient interval for consultation and deliberation among the
felons who had killed the victim around five hours earlier.
x x x The fact alone that ransom money is demanded would not per se qualify the act of
preventing the liberty of movement of the victim into the crime of kidnapping, unless the
victim is actually restrained or deprived of his liberty for some appreciable period of time or
that such restraint was the basic intent of the accused. Absent such determinant intent and
duration of restraint, the mere curtailment of freedom of movement would at most
constitute coercion.31 (Underscoring supplied)
The crime committed was thus plain Murder. The killing was qualified by treachery. The
victim was gagged, bound, and taken from Quezon City to an isolated place in Bulacan
against his will to prevent him from defending himself and to facilitate the killing.
 36

This Court’s finding that the offense committed is Murder notwithstanding, the resulting
penalty is the same. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua to death. The use of a motor vehicle, having been alleged in the
Information and proven, can be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. There
being one generic aggravating circumstance, the resulting penalty is death. In view, however,
of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 on June 24, 2006 prohibiting the imposition of
death penalty, the penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
Respecting the assigned error in discharging Sumipo as a state witness, the same does not lie.
The conditions for the discharge of an accused as a state witness are as follows:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;
And there is no proof that Sumipo had, at any time, been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude.
Even assuming arguendo that the discharge of Sumipo as a state witness was erroneous,
such error would not affect the competency and quality of his testimony.36
Finally, the Court brushes aside Maritess’ disclaimer of participation in killing the victim. It
was she who bound the hands and gagged the victim. When Estacio, in Maritess’ company,
brought the victim to the scene of the crime and thereafter returned to the car, her and
Estacio’s hands were bloodied.
Parenthetically, prosecution witness Arlene Francisco, Maritess’ friend who visited her in
prison, testified that Maritess admitted having killed Chua.37 And the prosecution presented
letters from Maritess to Estacio, written from prison, where she admitted the deed.38

(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material
points;
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals of May 12, 2005 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. The Court finds appellants Maritess Ang and Pablo Estacio, Jr. guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder, with the generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor
vehicle. And in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 on June 24, 2006, the penalty
is reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. SO ORDERED.

(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and

(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.32

These conditions were established by the prosecution. Sumipo was the only person other
than appellants who had personal knowledge of the acts for which they were being
prosecuted. Only he could positively identify appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. He
does not appear to be the most guilty. He did not participate in planning the commission of
the crime. He in fact at first thought that Maritess was joking when she said, "Diretsong
dukot na rin kay Charlie." He tried to dissuade appellants from pursuing their plan. He did not
participate in the actual stabbing. And he tried to extricate himself from the attempts to
extract ransom from the victim’s family.

Sumipo’s testimony was corroborated on material points. The victim’s mother testified
regarding the demands for ransom.33 Cesar Moscoso, an employee of Casa Leonisa, testified
to seeing the victim, Estacio, and Maritess at the bar-restaurant on the day and at the time in
question.34 Henry Hong, the victim’s cousin who arrived at Pizza Hut, Greenhills ahead of the
victim’s brother during the scheduled delivery of the ransom, testified to seeing Estacio there
with companions.35 And the victim’s skeletal remains were found at the scene of the crime
upon Estacio’s information and direction.