BENJAMIN P. GOMEZ vs.

ENRICO PALOMAR
G.R. No. L-23645
October 29, 1968

FACTS:
Republic Act 1635, as amended by Republic Act 2631 was
passed, which provides as follows:

To help raise funds for the Philippine Tuberculosis

Society, the Director of Posts shall order for the period
from August nineteen to September thirty every year the
printing and issue of semi-postal stamps of different
denominations with face value showing the regular postage
charge plus the additional amount of five centavos for the
said purpose, and during the said period, no mail matter shall
be accepted in the mails unless it bears such semi-postal
stamps: Provided, That no such additional charge of five
centavos shall be imposed on newspapers. The additional
proceeds realized from the sale of the semi-postal stamps
shall constitute a special fund and be deposited with the
National Treasury to be expended by the Philippine
Tuberculosis Society in carrying out its noble work to prevent
and eradicate tuberculosis.

The respondent Postmaster General, in implementation of the

law, thereafter issued four (4) administrative orders numbered 3
(June 20, 1958), 7 (August 9, 1958), 9 (August 28, 1958), and 10
(July 15, 1960). All these administrative orders were issued with
the approval of the respondent Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.

On September l5, 1963 the petitioner Benjamin P. Gomez mailed

a letter at the post office in San Fernando, Pampanga. Because
this letter, addressed to a certain Agustin Aquino of 1014 Dagohoy
Street, Singalong, Manila did not bear the special anti-TB stamp
required by the statute, it was returned to the petitioner.

In view of this development, the petitioner brought suit for

declaratory relief in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, to
test the constitutionality of the statute, as well as the
implementing administrative orders issued, contending that it
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution as well
as the rule of uniformity and equality of taxation. The lower court
declared the statute and the orders unconstitutional; hence this
appeal by the respondent postal authorities.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Anti-TB Stamp Law unconstitutional, for being

allegedly violative of the equal protection clause?

Ruling:

No, Supreme Court reiterated that the legislature has the

inherent power to select the subjects of taxation and to grant
exemptions. The reason for this is that traditionally,
classification has been a device for fitting tax programs to local
needs and usages in order to achieve an equitable distribution of
the tax burden. The legislative classifications must be reasonable
is of course undenied in this case.

The classification of mail users is not without any reason.

It is based on ability to pay, let alone the enjoyment of a
privilege, and on administrative convenience. The classification
is likewise based on considerations of administrative convenience.
For it is now a settled principle of law that "consideration of
practical administrative convenience and cost in the
administration of tax laws afford adequate ground for imposing a
tax on a well recognized and defined class. Lastly, mail users
were already a class by themselves even before the enactment of
the statue and all that the legislature did was merely to select
their class. Legislation is essentially empiric and Republic Act
1635, as amended, no more than reflects a distinction that exists
in fact. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter said, "to recognize differences
that exist in fact is living law; to disregard [them] and
concentrate on some abstract identities is lifeless logic."

Petitioner's assertions that statutory classification of

mail users must bear some reasonable relationship to the end sought
to be attained, and that absent such relationship the selection of
mail users is constitutionally impermissible does not hold water.
This is altogether a different proposition, since explained by the
court "that while the principle that there must be a reasonable
relationship between classification made by the legislation and
its purpose is undoubtedly true in some contexts, it has no
application to a measure whose sole purpose is to raise revenue,
so long as the classification imposed is based upon some standard
capable of reasonable comprehension, be that standard based upon
ability to produce revenue or some other legitimate distinction,
equal protection of the law has been afforded."